+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ dcosenza@netcom.com wrote:
I spoke with Phil Zimmermann today at some length, and he has informed me that users who decide to use the jumo keys generated by the hack of 2.6ui will be running a risk of incompatibility on down the line with future releases he has planned. You have been warned!
Ever forward,
Doesn't part of "ever forward" sometimes involve something "non-standard" and "running the risk of incompatibility"? Unless there's something flawed with the implementation of longer keys, why shouldn't the first to implement them become the de-facto standard? If a leter release turns out to be incompatible with an older one, but it's cryptographically superior, then it's time to switch, even if it means generating and distributing new keys. Anyone concerned enough about security to want the "latest and greatest" crypto package, with longer/stronger keys or whatever, should already be practicing good key management and generating new keys periodically, anyway. My only concern would be whether the implementation of longer keys might possibly "push the envelope" of the math routines used, and thus introduce subtle, hidden weaknesses. Two examples might be an RNG that became non-random with larger numbers, or a primality tester that failed to detect larger non-primes. If you have evidence for any of those scenarios, I'd love to hear it. Personally, I'm staying with PGP 2.3a until the dust settles a bit. I've FTPed the RSAREF 2.6 release, and it remains in its zipped archive for now. Just as an aside, can some of the PGP-aware-anon-remailer operators comment on what they plan to do with respect to the various PGP versions? ++++++++++++++++++++++