Mr. Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com> posted a clarification on a misunderstanding that the Orange book has anything to do with cryptographic algorithms, pointing out that it deals only with higher level security issues. However, his strong claim that the NSA is not involved with these criteria whatsoever appears to be complete fantasy, as T. Newsham pointed out, also indicating that the NCSC (Nat'l Center for Security & Communications?) which ``came out with the original Trusted Criterion rainbow books including the orange book'' is apparently just another ugly NSA protrusion. In fact, I can remember people posting suggestions when I first joined the list (a seeming eternity ago) that the NCSC is *entirely* a front agency for the NSA, with no independent operation whatsoever--supposedly essentially nothing but a reception office and a secretary. I'm willing to accept that the Orange book doesn't specifically address cryptography, and I appreciate the clarifications on something that is one of the deepest, complex, and most obscure military handbooks, which frankly I take some pride and relief in having very little knowledge of, but I'm writing to correct another serious error in the original post:
NSA is uninterested in making systems secure; their job is to break them anyway.
This is simply entirely incorrect. A *very* major aspect of the NSA function, ever since its inception, involves the *creation* of secure cryptographic algorithms and equipment. Skipjack is simply the first `commercial' version ever introduced of a cryptographic algorithm. They have supported virtually all branches of the U.S. military in the code-making function. They are directly responsible for most encryption schemes and devices used in military radio communication (tanks, airplanes, ships, etc.). I understand the NSA even sells cryptographic equipment to some countries (U.S. allies) making sure it can be intercepted and decrypted -- this from claims of one of the `defectors' of the agency, I believe. Bamford describes it all in _Puzzle_Palace_. In fact, I've often stated the following position on the NSA, which highlights its past dual role and future legitimate one: Since ``the cold war is over'', if they are to exist at all, they should focus their energy on something *constructive* like algorithm development and not something *destructive* like its sinister vacuum-cleaner intelligence slurping. Increasingly, the world is making the choice for them.