The original article in the Indpendent contained too many factual inaccuracies to take the NSA statement at face value. Further, some of the details resemble an interchange between Carl Ellison and the OSTP. For the details, check out: http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/html/nist-ske.html Here's the relevant excerpt: Sell to Chinese dissidents In the opening session, Mike Nelson of the OSTP (Office of Science and Technology Policy on the vice president's staff) presented his discussion of the Key Escrow criteria. He was asked who in his right mind would buy a product with a master key escrowed in the U.S., with access by US Law Enforcement. His answer was that a Chinese dissident would be quite happy to have the key escrowed by a US agent, in the US, for US government access -- rather than by a Chinese agent, in China, for Chinese government access. That's a good plan, Mike. That's a huge market. I'm looking forward to seeing the agreement with the People's Republic under which they allow the importation of such products. [end excerpt] My best guess is that we're seeing a distortion of this interchange. If I were a Chinese dissident, I wouldn't want to use GAK, for three reasons: using US-lackey encryption is certainly not going to get you into any _less_ trouble than using independent encryption, if you used GAK you'd be working as a US spy whether you wanted to be or not, and finally, who says the Chinese can't decrypt it, especially with the rapid growth of television. Raph P.S. To those who are suriprised that I'm still here - my flight got delayed, and I'm waiting it out on the Net, in true geek style.