Earlier, Robert Cain wrote:
We shall see. I contend that with this I can establish a spoof-proof point to point with a total stranger to any desired probability that a spoof could not be there without disclosing him/her. It is not hard for me to envision, especially in business situations, how such a thing would be more than useful.
If I understand you correctly, your asserting that without _any_ prior knowledge of the person you are communicating to, and without any form of online checks before or during your authentication mechanism, that you can be _sure_ you're talking to said stranger ? Unless there are other presumptions, I fail to see how you can be sure you are communicating to someone, when you don't know who they are. Even if you can get something akin to a pgp key with an identifier and be sure you are taking to the owner of _that_ identifier, but you can't be sure that identifier is real and/or not a forgery. Given those circumstances, wouldn't a man in the middle relay attack be a piece of cake ? Matthew. -- Matthew Gream. ph: (02)-821-2043. M.Gream@uts.edu.au. PGPMail and brown paperbags accepted.