The "message drop" is essentially what a "pool" is,
The message drop described was held at a single place, not transmitted widely or even available widely, as a message pool is. I've come to believe that message drops or, more generally, rendevouz points are a big pragmatic win. Here's why. I have a friend out here whose BBS was seized in a civil action by Sega. Sega's lawyers made a pleading to the court based on logs they had taken from the BBS. The court granted Sega the ability to search and seize the computer. But all Sega had was the phone number. So Sega first had a _subpoena duces tecum_ served on Pacific Bell. This form of subpoena is not an order to appear but rather an order to produce documents or items relevant to a judicial proceeding. Sega gave Pac Bell the phone number, Pac Bell gave them a name and address. This was the same name and address that the US Marshall's service used when seizing the BBS equipment. Suppose that phone number was an email address or an IP address. If the provider of message or packet delivery actually knows the final destination, a subpoena to produce records will disclose that destination. On the other hand, if the 'public face' of the address is only mapped to some authentication means (such as a password or a public key), then such a subpoena will only reveal that authentication info, not an identity or a location. Willful ignorance can be a beautiful thing. Furthermore, if the system is constructed such that the only way to get at the information in RAM about current connections is to take down the system, well, then there's no way to get at that information, is there? Eric