TO: >internet: cypherpunks@toad.com Re. responses to my digicash proposal: * The bank system (& feds) will know the original and ultimate recipients. True, but they can (& do sometimes) track this with the green pieces of paper we use now. With the system I propose, "they" cannot know anything about all the (potentially many) transactions in between the original and ultimate recipients. * Example about Alice getting digicash, paying Bob who pays Carol. Alice then "respends" the digicash password elsewhere before Carol can deposit it. That's why each non-trusting recipient calls the bank to verify that the password is still valid. The non-trusting recipient then anonymously receives a new password representing a claim on the money, preventing respending by a prior link in the chain. Note that, if the payee *trusts* the payor, he can silently accept and pass on ("spend") the claim password to another person - but he does so at his own risk. * Concerns that Escobar, Jr. could create a digi-bill, spend it, and the feds might come claim the money from the ultimate recipient. Escobar would want to use digi-bills already in circulation. That way no one could show they came from him. Of course the government still could say that the original recipient of the bill was a bad fellow and the ultimate recipient (or intermediate posessor) should surrender the money. Having the original and ultimate accounts in banks somewhere other than the U.S. would help. Having a non-fascist government would help, too. * bank employee honesty problems I don't see that this is more or less of a problem here than elsewhere. bdolan personal responses to bdolan@well.sf.ca.us, please