On Wed, 27 Apr 1994, Phil G. Fraering wrote:
(Who thinks that the whole point of cypherpunks *was* supposed to be that modern electronics and networking would make standard spook blind drops and the like obsolete).
<smile> ah, but one day when we are truly computerized, the ability to hand-write messages and pass them on obsolete paper will be such an esoteric enterprise that it will be reserved for eccentrics, SCA reenactors, and spies. (wasn't there an Asimov story about man rediscovering the ability to do math by hand after centuries of calculator dependency?) -=*=- I do have another observation...I read the "RSA-129 Cracked" piece but as a true cryptologic novice who hasn't even finished reading _Applied Cryptography_, I was uncertain of the implications of this. As I understood it, the team cracked a specific message encoded with RSA-129 after about 10 months of work by dozens of people working in concert. Since my goal is to achieve a level of encryption that the government (read: NSA) cannot penetrate, this brought some questions to mind. Assuming that the NSA, with its massive budget and ability to design/manufacture/buy special-purpose hardware, could duplicate the efforts of all those on the "crack" team, does this mean that the NSA can break any RSA-129-encoded message in ~10 months? Or would it be reasonable to assume that they can work faster?
From Schneier's book, I draw the conclusion that while this is significant, it does not affect current RSA usage, which uses longer keys...1024-bit/308-digit for "the most paranoid use" (Schneier). Am I correct in assuming that this news has little bearing on current PGP use?
Andrew Fabbro If laws are outlawed, weltschmerz@umich.edu only outlaws will University of Michigan have laws. Fnord. _____________________________________________________________ Finger afabbro@churchst.ccs.itd.umich.edu for PGP public key. PGPprint: 87 41 65 E0 C2 51 9F E5 A9 44 ED A6 6B 16 76 9E NSA bait: assassinate uranium dreamland CIA p.o.e. zimmerman