tails.boum.org/<.title> in your webpages will cause the same effect, even when CSS/JavaScript makes such a title invisible. > > > In theory, the NSA should only be monitoring foreign traffic, and not traffic originating from the United States (or, apparently, the other five-eyes). So here is the fun thing (xks-0010): run your jamming tools from United States IP addresses against those servers in Iran you know the NSA is monitoring. Since the code should already be ignoring the traffic because it originates from the United States, then they can't complain if you've filled up their databases full of Tor Onion and bridge addresses. > > Robert Graham -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 842 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140704/bf67161d/attachment.sig> From wb8foz at nrk.com Fri Jul 4 09:24:09 2014 From: wb8foz at nrk.com (David) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 12:24:09 -0400 Subject: messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> Message-ID: <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> On 7/4/14 12:02 PM, Scott Blaydes wrote: > You will know this has worked when a wall of the NSA’s Utah Data Center > bulges and bursts spilling bits and bytes all over the desert. But will they then get shut down by the EPA? From nathan at squimp.com Fri Jul 4 04:59:14 2014 From: nathan at squimp.com (Nathan Andrew Fain) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 13:59:14 +0200 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list In-Reply-To: <CAFggDF2kQnBtsMr3tJYxijXwyrHRhX5JBpm6b3NbjpoJFfAw=g@mail.gmail.com> References: <53b57339.a4f8420a.17ce.50b2SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> <CAJVRA1TtTrizkaH03_pMr4rWnpnp67UpRyU=xTQ-nkD51B_40g@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1QJt0muygvVPiw+iFvtWb6kd_kNgGw8c7zjwmbWH4c8Rg@mail.gmail.com> <CAFggDF2kQnBtsMr3tJYxijXwyrHRhX5JBpm6b3NbjpoJFfAw=g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53B69712.2090909@squimp.com> what was the last modification time for these filters? or is that unclear? On 03/07/2014 18:11, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: > On 7/3/14, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >> On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 8:36 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> >> wrote: >>> ... i presume you mean as below: (more a translation than >>> additional QUELLCODE info though ;) >> > > Here is some of the source code: > > http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt > > Happy hacking, Jacob > From nathan at squimp.com Fri Jul 4 05:15:34 2014 From: nathan at squimp.com (Nathan Andrew Fain) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 14:15:34 +0200 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> "Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, Deanonymization" Alex Biryukov, Ivan Pustogarov, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf the two seem very similar. in the case of the paper linked amazon services were utilized. or perhaps someone can explain where the two research groups differ? On 03/07/2014 20:05, grarpamp wrote: > You Don't Have to be the NSA to Break Tor: Deanonymizing Users on a > Budget Alexander Volynkin / Michael McCord > > [...] Looking for the IP address of a Tor user? Not a problem. > Trying to uncover the location of a Hidden Service? Done. We know > because we tested it, in the wild... > > In this talk, we demonstrate how the distributed nature, combined > with newly discovered shortcomings in design and implementation of > the Tor network, can be abused to break Tor anonymity. In our > analysis, we've discovered that a persistent adversary with a > handful of powerful servers and a couple gigabit links can > de-anonymize hundreds of thousands Tor clients and thousands of > hidden services within a couple of months. The total investment > cost? Just under $3,000. During this talk, we will quickly cover > the nature, feasibility, and limitations of possible attacks, and > then dive into dozens of successful real-world de-anonymization > case studies, ranging from attribution of botnet command and > control servers, to drug-trading sites, to users of kiddie porn > places. The presentation will conclude with lessons learned and our > thoughts on the future of security of distributed anonymity > networks. > From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 11:47:13 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 14:47:13 -0400 Subject: [tor-talk] messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28XUPfoNK2PTwVAg164MSoCuw1hUZzYDcR4qGLz5ykG9Q@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 10:56 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/jamming-xkeyscore_4.html?m=1 Good work, glad someone had time to really dig in, perhaps even drawing on some comments from others in the early buzz such as https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/033695.html > Andreas Krey >> grarpamp >> http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt >> 2) rules100... this thing likely has more N00 rulesets as well. > Er, no. ndr.de always uses URLs with 100 or similar in them. > (No idea why.) That is not the original file name. Ahh, good to know, thanks. From eugen at leitl.org Fri Jul 4 06:15:32 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 15:15:32 +0200 Subject: [tor-dev] XKeyscore rules probably are from Snowden, after all Message-ID: <20140704131531.GN26986@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Maxim Kammerer <mk at dee.su> ----- From wahspilihp at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 22:47:26 2014 From: wahspilihp at gmail.com (Philip Shaw) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 15:17:26 +0930 Subject: SSL Co-op In-Reply-To: <1714525.rN0PzF0okU@lapuntu> References: <1714525.rN0PzF0okU@lapuntu> Message-ID: <16E3D954-1049-4A27-9FCB-395196DD5444@gmail.com> On 26 Jun 2014, at 5:51 , rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > So, > > this has been proposed: > http://www.hezmatt.org/~mpalmer/blog/2014/06/05/ssl-certificate-cooperative.html > http://www.hezmatt.org/~mpalmer/blog/2014/06/25/moving-forward-with-an-ssl-coop.html > http://www.sslcoop.org/ > > "The vision of the SSL Co-operative is to be a professionally-operated, > member-controlled globally-trusted Certification Authority, serving the > identity verification and management needs of its members. > > At present, this initiative is in the analysis and planning stage. > Investigation is underway to determine the full set of costs involved, both > financial and temporal. > > If you think a member-controlled CA that puts the interests of its members, > and that of the Internet community, ahead of profits is a good idea, and > might consider being a member if it gets off the ground, I would appreciate > it if you would fill out a short survey letting me know a little bit about > your organisation, to ensure that the co-op best serves your needs.” http://www.cacert.org seems to be an attempt to do something like that, but there are two catches: * CACert association membership is by nomination by pre-existing members, rather than being everyone with a certificate (or, perhaps more practically, open to everyone with a certificate). * It hasn’t complied with the CA/Browser Forum rules, so isn’t included in any of the four main browser certificate lists. I’m not sure how professional their operation is either: their class 1 certificates are issued robotically (although that doesn’t make them any worse than some for-profit CAs), and I haven’t actually looked into the verification they offer for class 3 certs. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 535 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140704/1f155917/attachment.sig> From mk at dee.su Fri Jul 4 05:40:01 2014 From: mk at dee.su (Maxim Kammerer) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 15:40:01 +0300 Subject: [tor-dev] XKeyscore rules probably are from Snowden, after all Message-ID: <CAHsXYDBdwVu6dcmY1NETphzPa6PBLBsEaVT2rH0nCkrZ4b2SJg@mail.gmail.com> There has been some speculation that the recent XKeyscore rule leaks [1] do not come from Snowden — particularly, by Schneier [2]. I believe that there is a good case that the leaks do come from Snowden, since it is possible to pinpoint the date range when the rule sources [3] have been last updated. The earliest possible date is 2011-08-08, when the Linux Journal writeup about Tails [4], referenced by the glob pattern "linuxjournal.com/content/linux*" has been published. The pattern is not a generic Linux Journal filter, as implied in [1]. The likely latest possible date is 2012-02-28, when "maatuska" directory authority has changed its IP [5]. A less likely upper bound is 2012-09-21, when "Faravahar" directory authority has been added [6]. NSA either took the 8 authorities from the actual consensus, or picked them from Tor's sources [7]. However, Tor sources list more than 8 authorities, and are not properly maintained (e.g., see entry for "moria1" wrt. its last .34/.39 octet tweaks), so I doubt NSA would use that. Moreover, it is hard to miss the port number in the sources, whereas NSA did miss that some authorities do not (and did not) use ports 80/443. E.g., "moria1" (the MIT campus server mentioned in [1]) would not be matched as a Tor authority by the rules. Snowden most likely tried to contact Greenwald at the end of 2012 [8], which is entirely consistent with the above. Another NSA employee leaking XKeyscore rules after being inspired by Snowden's leaks, would have probably downloaded a more up-to-date rules file. Cross-posting to tor-dev, in case I got any historical directory authority changes wrong. [1] http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html [2] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/07/nsa_targets_pri.html [3] http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt [4] http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/linux-distro-tales-you-can-never-be-too-paranoid [5] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2012-February/003312.html [6] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5749 [7] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/src/or/config.c [8] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/laura-poitras-snowden.html -- Maxim Kammerer Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev at lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 13:05:29 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 16:05:29 -0400 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 8:15 AM, Nathan Andrew Fain <nathan at squimp.com> wrote: > "Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, > Deanonymization" > Alex Biryukov, Ivan Pustogarov, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann > http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf > > the two seem very similar. in the case of the paper linked amazon > services were utilized. or perhaps someone can explain where the two > research groups differ? Yes, clearly an extension, optimization, or new work along the lines of the above paper. Perhaps more interesting is this dilemma... > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/033693.html > "They wanted a NDA, so most Tor Project's core contributors don't know > what's in the air." So we have at least one core person who knows. Now assuming this presentation [1] is in fact 'Really Bad News' for, at minimum, Hidden Services... will the details of it be leaked in order to 'save' HS operators/users before CERTs/GOVs/LEAs/Vigilantes/Spies and the thought police have time to get at them (or what unexposed elements still remain of them)? This is premised upon CERT's typical cozy relationships with LEA's, naturally leading to sharing with them what are potentially ... 'tested ... in the wild ... dozens of successful real-world de-anonymization case studies, ranging from attribution of' ... really diskliked things. Particularly cases of human harm where it is only natural to seek intervention. Then there are the cases worthy of every possible protection outlined here... https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en Therein lies the dilemma. What do you do? [Note that even if the above relationships, or desire to intervene, do not exist... said spies and their actors are likely to monitor the full research details, and know who in the public knows as well. This could lead to shorter time constraints on all sides.] [1] Which I forgot to link in the OP, thanks Matthew. https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#you-dont-have-to-be-the-nsa-to-break-tor-deanonymizing-users-on-a-budget From nathan at squimp.com Fri Jul 4 07:38:20 2014 From: nathan at squimp.com (Nathan Andrew Fain) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 16:38:20 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized Message-ID: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> Based on the xkeyscore rules does anyone have some idea of the technology being utilized? Looking at the mapreduce::plugin definition I get the impression Hadoop is in use. Hadoop provides a stream interface for Map Reduce functions letting one utilize any program or language of their choosing [1-example]. Can with more knowledge of distributed data technologies confirm this? 1. http://cs.smith.edu/dftwiki/index.php/Hadoop_Tutorial_2.2_--_Running_C++_Programs_on_Hadoop see also slide 5: http://cecs.wright.edu/~tkprasad/courses/cs707/ProgrammingHadoop.pdf <quote> cat input | grep | sort | unique -c | cat > output Input | Map | Shuffle & Sort | Reduce | Output </quote> From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 13:52:52 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 16:52:52 -0400 Subject: Disk Firmware Data Exfiltration Backdoor / NSA IRATEMONK Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29EQ43VjnRVBjxC5N2OD855eArEAtpA17AEJK5MnDRLPw@mail.gmail.com> http://s3.eurecom.fr/docs/acsac13_zaddach.pdf http://s3.eurecom.fr/~zaddach/docs/Recon14_HDD.pdf http://s3.eurecom.fr/publications.html Always interesting when public, and presumably secret, research are lined up beside each other (recon slides). From eugen at leitl.org Fri Jul 4 07:56:41 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 16:56:41 +0200 Subject: messing with XKeyScore Message-ID: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/jamming-xkeyscore_4.html?m=1 Errata Security Advanced persistent cybersecurity Friday, July 04, 2014 Jamming XKeyScore Back in the day there was talk about "jamming echelon" by adding keywords to email that the echelon system was supposedly looking for. We can do the same thing for XKeyScore: jam the system with more information than it can handle. (I enumerate the bugs I find in the code as "xks-00xx"). For example, when sending emails, just send from the address "bridges at torproject.org" and in the email body include: https://bridges.torproject.org/ bridge = 0.0.0.1:443 bridge = 0.0.0.2:443 bridge = 0.0.0.3:443 ... Continue this for megabytes worth of bridges (xks-0001), and it'll totally mess up XKeyScore. It has no defense against getting flooded with information like this, as far as I can see. Note that the regex only cares about 1 to 3 digit numbers, that means the following will be accepted by the system (xks-0002): bridge = 75.748.86.91:80 The port number matches on 2 to 4 digits ([0-9]{2,4}). Therefore, bridges with port numbers below 10 and above 9999 will be safe. I don't know if this code reflect a limitation in Tor, or but assuming high/low ports are possible, this can be used to evade detection (xks-0011). Strangely, when the port number is parsed, it'll capture the first non-digit character after the port number (xks-0012). This is normally whitespace, but we could generate an email with 256 entries, trying every possible character. A character like < or ' might cause various problems in rendering on an HTML page or generating SQL queries. You can also jam the system with too many Onion addresses (xks-0003), but there are additional ways to screw with those. When looking for Onion addresses, the code uses a regex that contains the following capture clause: ([a-z]+):\/\/) This is looking for a string like "http://" or "https://", but the regex has no upper bounds (xks-0004) and there is no validation. Thus, you can include "goscrewyourself://o987asgia7gsdfoi.onion:443/" in network traffic, and it'll happily insert this into the database. But remember that "no upper bounds" means just that: the prefix can be kilobytes long, megabytes long, or even gigabytes long. You can open a TCP connection to a system you feel the NSA is monitoring, send 5 gigabytes of lower-case letters, followed by the rest of the Onion address, and see what happens. I mean, there is some practical upper bound somewhere in the system,, and when you hit it, there's a good chance bad things will happen. Likewise, the port number for Onion address is captured by the regex (d+), meaning any number of digits (xks-0005). Thus, we could get numbers that overflow 16-bits, 32-bits, 64-bits, or 982745987-bits. Very long strings of digits (megabytes) at this point might cause bad things to happen within the system. There is an extra-special thing that happens when the schema part of the Onion address is exactly 16-bytes long (xks-0006). This will cause the address and the scheme to reverse themselves when inserted into the database. Thus, we can insert digits into the scheme field. This might foul up later code that assumes schemes only contain letters, because only letters match in the regex. In some protocol fields, the regexes appear to be partial matches. The system appears to match on HTTP servers with "mixminion" anywhere in the name. Thus, we start causing lots of traffic to go to our domains, such as "mixminion.robertgraham.com", that will cause their servers to fill up with long term storage of sessions they don't care about (xks-0007) Let's talk X.509, and the following code: fingerprint('anonymizer/tor/bridge/tls') = ssl_x509_subject('bridges.torproject.org') or ssl_dns_name('bridges.torproject.org'); Code that parses X.509 certificates is known to be flaky as all get out. The simplest thing to do is find a data center you feel the NSA can monitor, and then setup a hostile server that can do generic fuzzing of X.509 certificates, trying to crash them. It's likely that whatever code is parsing X.509 certificates is not validating them. Thus, anybody can put certificates on their servers claiming to be 'bridges.torproject.org' (xks-0008). It's likely that the NSA is parsing SSL on all ports, so just pick a random port on your server not being used for anything else, create a self-signed CERT claiming to be "bridges.torproject.org', then create incoming links to that port from other places so at least search-engines will follow that link and generate traffic. This will cause the NSA database of bridges to fill up with bad information -- assuming it's not already full from people screwing with the emails as noted above :). <img src="http://www.google.com/?q=tails+usb" /> Putting the above code in a web page like this one will cause every visitor to trigger a search for TAILS in the XKeyScore rules. The more people who do this, the less useful it becomes to the NSA (xks-0009) in labeling people as suspicious. Likewise, putting <title>tails.boum.org/<.title> in your webpages will cause the same effect, even when CSS/JavaScript makes such a title invisible. In theory, the NSA should only be monitoring foreign traffic, and not traffic originating from the United States (or, apparently, the other five-eyes). So here is the fun thing (xks-0010): run your jamming tools from United States IP addresses against those servers in Iran you know the NSA is monitoring. Since the code should already be ignoring the traffic because it originates from the United States, then they can't complain if you've filled up their databases full of Tor Onion and bridge addresses. Robert Graham From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 14:04:01 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 17:04:01 -0400 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> On 7/4/14, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#you-dont-have-to-be-the-nsa-to-break-tor-deanonymizing-users-on-a-budget I2P is a tool that likely presents the nearest analog to Tor's hidden services (.i2p) to the user. Usable in much the same way. Always good to be familiar with and have other options out there. And see that they receive community research and review efforts too. http://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor From hozer at hozed.org Fri Jul 4 16:21:21 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 18:21:21 -0500 Subject: NSA targets the privacy-conscious In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TX8461nayt4uC28=cDuSTgabFAG4=rfrUJB=3K4F3_Ew@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140703152947.GK26986@leitl.org> <E1X2kAT-0000Ax-U0@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAJVRA1TX8461nayt4uC28=cDuSTgabFAG4=rfrUJB=3K4F3_Ew@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140704232121.GL3180@nl.grid.coop> On Thu, Jul 03, 2014 at 01:24:14PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 9:47 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > > ... sharing tips on spying the counterspies, > > i for one am most concerned about spying the counter-counter-spies. > > ... note that no cryptome.org fingerprint yet leaked; perhaps JYA > successfully signal jamming the collection colossus through copious > cross pollination. JYA & cryptome is not really business sensitive 'material non-public information'. However, if you want advance tips to pass on to your VC buddies you'd flag some software developers for big business http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/nsa-linux-journal-extremist-forum-and-its-readers-get-flagged-extra-surveillance Then you go with phase two and connect that data to high frequency trading algorithms to properly anonymize the ill-gotten gains, and then proceed to launder, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/venture-capitalist-tim-draper-wins-bitcoin-auction/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 rinse, repeat From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 16:00:03 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 19:00:03 -0400 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Paweł Zegartowski <pzegar at gmail.com> wrote: > I2P (aka Invisible Internet Protocol) is designed to be "a real undernet" > Using I2P to acces a "standard" Internet but in anonymous way is much less Right, in the likely context of the subject exploit, I referred only to the similar .onion/.i2p hidden constructs that available for users. Binding to and using them is a bit different of course but it all works. And the .i2p's are generally as 'efficient' (speedy) in use regarding initial connect, latency and bandwidth, if not better. (A lot of filesharing is on i2p.) Bootstrapping into the net does take a while though. And of course as with any other darknet you should run a 'non-exit' relay to help out. i2p does have 'exits' you can compare to tor as well. Anyone can run an exit. But users have first find one on a wiki list or somesuch, and then manually configure their i2p to use it. Consider it like a bolt on proxy. Last I checked one comes preconfigured but as such expect it to be far overloaded. No reason there can't be many, there just aren't. > http://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor From guninski at guninski.com Fri Jul 4 09:07:05 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 19:07:05 +0300 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized In-Reply-To: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> References: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> Message-ID: <20140704160705.GA2481@sivokote.iziade.m$> Another question: How much traffic they are monitoring with these definitions? All visible? Almost all except the u$a? I suspect the above will require quite large hardware. I suppose this is a matter of importance for the dear NSA. To paraphrase a Susan Sontag quote [1] ``Most people in this society who aren't actively terrorists are, at best, reformed or potential terrorists.'' [1] http://thinkexist.com/quotation/most_people_in_this_society_who_aren-t_actively/220423.html On Fri, Jul 04, 2014 at 04:38:20PM +0200, Nathan Andrew Fain wrote: > Based on the xkeyscore rules does anyone have some idea of the > technology being utilized? > > Looking at the mapreduce::plugin definition I get the impression > Hadoop is in use. Hadoop provides a stream interface for Map Reduce > functions letting one utilize any program or language of their > choosing [1-example]. Can with more knowledge of distributed data > technologies confirm this? > > 1. > http://cs.smith.edu/dftwiki/index.php/Hadoop_Tutorial_2.2_--_Running_C++_Programs_on_Hadoop > see also slide 5: > http://cecs.wright.edu/~tkprasad/courses/cs707/ProgrammingHadoop.pdf > <quote> > cat input | grep | sort | unique -c | cat > output > Input | Map | Shuffle & Sort | Reduce | Output > </quote> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Fri Jul 4 10:22:26 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 19:22:26 +0200 Subject: messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> Message-ID: <1835869.E5psAZDHl5@lapuntu> Dnia piątek, 4 lipca 2014 12:24:09 David pisze: > On 7/4/14 12:02 PM, Scott Blaydes wrote: > > You will know this has worked when a wall of the NSA’s Utah Data Center > > bulges and bursts spilling bits and bytes all over the desert. > > But will they then get shut down by the EPA? A THOUSAND EYES, TWISTED TAIL, EPA! EPA! TRAPPED FOREVER! -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140704/233e10ca/attachment.sig> From jya at pipeline.com Fri Jul 4 17:15:14 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 20:15:14 -0400 Subject: NSA targets the privacy-conscious In-Reply-To: <20140704232121.GL3180@nl.grid.coop> References: <20140703152947.GK26986@leitl.org> <E1X2kAT-0000Ax-U0@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAJVRA1TX8461nayt4uC28=cDuSTgabFAG4=rfrUJB=3K4F3_Ew@mail.gmail.com> <20140704232121.GL3180@nl.grid.coop> Message-ID: <E1X3Dcb-0007ct-Fd@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Clamoring to get on NSA hit lists for popular support and corresponding business, researching, teaching, litigating and speaking opportunities is a frenzy. Once it was a booster being on the FBI hit lists, then CIA, then KGB, then MI5 and/or MI6, then Mossad, then Savak, then Cheney, then Bin Laden, then AQ in Yemen, now Glenn Greenwald is swamped with applicants to be put on list of names of US persons who are desperate to be surveilled for starring roles in the multiple scripts of the Snowden blockbusters, with many more digital Che's in the pipeline. Snowden's mom has not yet, in public, rolled out a campaign for evelasting fame and profit for her darling like Assange's mother and various fathers. Ed's dad has had his team going full blast for a year, in concert with ACLU, EFF, Plato Cacheris and a gaggle of natsec sharks and stunt arrangers, the red phones are hot between DC and Moscow to set up beamings of Snowden for queues of ass-kissers eager to be photographed with his metadata-rich talking head. US attorneys in Eastern Virginia, DC, Southern NY and Northern CA are wagering on who gets Assange, who gets Snowden, who gets Greenwald, who gets Poitras, Appelbaum and unnamed co-conspirators along with the dudes at EFF for orchestrating Ed's seduction, purloining and dashings from Japan to Maryland to Hawaii to Hong Kong to Moscow. Other ex-NSA patriots are in heavy demand to beef up the lightweight Snowden with dark musings on what the young man had no access to but they did and will never ever tell. Behind the legal and media shindigs technical agents are working the outliers, FOI minions, CCC, Pirates, Torrents, Drops, Jabbers, chats, IP2s, the invisible -- really -- of dark nets to gather intel on counterspying apparatus and IO errors. This is Phase 1. At 07:21 PM 7/4/2014, you wrote: >On Thu, Jul 03, 2014 at 01:24:14PM -0700, coderman wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 9:47 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > > > ... sharing tips on spying the counterspies, > > > > i for one am most concerned about spying the counter-counter-spies. > > > > ... note that no cryptome.org fingerprint yet leaked; perhaps JYA > > successfully signal jamming the collection colossus through copious > > cross pollination. > >JYA & cryptome is not really business sensitive 'material non-public >information'. However, if you want advance tips to pass on to your >VC buddies you'd flag some software developers for big business >http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/nsa-linux-journal-extremist-forum-and-its-readers-get-flagged-extra-surveillance > >Then you go with phase two and connect that data to high frequency >trading algorithms to properly anonymize the ill-gotten gains, and >then proceed to launder, >http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/venture-capitalist-tim-draper-wins-bitcoin-auction/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 >rinse, >repeat From guninski at guninski.com Fri Jul 4 10:23:22 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 20:23:22 +0300 Subject: messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> Message-ID: <20140704172322.GB2481@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Fri, Jul 04, 2014 at 12:24:09PM -0400, David wrote: > On 7/4/14 12:02 PM, Scott Blaydes wrote: > > >You will know this has worked when a wall of the NSA’s Utah Data Center > >bulges and bursts spilling bits and bytes all over the desert. > > > But will they then get shut down by the EPA? Not sure I understand correctly, but a positive answer to the first question would imply to me the Game Of Life works correctly no matter what EPA means/does. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 21:54:26 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 01:54:26 -0300 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> "BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000" Oh, come on. That is 'FUD"! A conspiracy theory!! Those guys didn't create tor, so they shouldn't be hacking it!!! FUCK THEM. Tor is a project of the US government, the most righteous and clever organization on the planet, and the invincible defenders of free speech. Their anonymity network is simply unassailable. $3000? Please. Look, their own site says "Protect your privacy. Defend yourself against network surveillance and traffic analysis."[1] See? Using tor you can defend yourself against TRAFFIC ANALYSIS! There you have it. How on earth can tor be vulnerable to trivial traffic analysis when their site says just the opposite? HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid liars! You freedom hating commies! and so on and so forth... [1] https://www.torproject.org/ (yes! Now I feel like a real phd who wrote an email with a [] numbered footnote) From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Sat Jul 5 01:18:12 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 09:18:12 +0100 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <53B7B4C4.70103@cathalgarvey.me> Funny, nobody else responded that way. On 05/07/14 05:54, Juan wrote: > > "BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000" > > Oh, come on. That is 'FUD"! A conspiracy theory!! Those guys didn't > create tor, so they shouldn't be hacking it!!! FUCK THEM. > > Tor is a project of the US government, the most righteous and clever > organization on the planet, and the invincible defenders of free speech. > > Their anonymity network is simply unassailable. $3000? Please. > > Look, their own site says > > "Protect your privacy. Defend yourself against network surveillance and > traffic analysis."[1] > > > See? Using tor you can defend yourself against TRAFFIC ANALYSIS! There > you have it. How on earth can tor be vulnerable to trivial traffic > analysis when their site says just the opposite? > > HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid > liars! You freedom hating commies! > > > and so on and so forth... > > > [1] > https://www.torproject.org/ > > > (yes! Now I feel like a real phd who wrote an email with a [] numbered > footnote) > > > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/742260c4/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/742260c4/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Sat Jul 5 01:20:34 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 09:20:34 +0100 Subject: Spam more i2p outproxies? (Was: Re: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000) In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53B7B552.4090701@cathalgarvey.me> > I checked one comes preconfigured but as such expect > it to be far overloaded. No reason there can't be many, > there just aren't. Quite right, there's no reason why there can't be more, except for the liability of actually hosting those exits. OTOH, there are now plenty of hosts who accept bitcoin for hosting in countries that probably don't give a damn about outproxies, so why not crowdfund a set of dedicated high-bandwidth outproxies? On 05/07/14 00:00, grarpamp wrote: > On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Paweł Zegartowski <pzegar at gmail.com> wrote: >> I2P (aka Invisible Internet Protocol) is designed to be "a real undernet" >> Using I2P to acces a "standard" Internet but in anonymous way is much less > > Right, in the likely context of the subject exploit, I referred only to > the similar .onion/.i2p hidden constructs that available for users. > Binding to and using them is a bit different of course but it all works. > And the .i2p's are generally as 'efficient' (speedy) in use regarding > initial connect, latency and bandwidth, if not better. (A lot of filesharing > is on i2p.) Bootstrapping into the net does take a while though. And > of course as with any other darknet you should run a 'non-exit' relay > to help out. > > i2p does have 'exits' you can compare to tor as well. > Anyone can run an exit. But users have first find one > on a wiki list or somesuch, and then manually configure > their i2p to use it. Consider it like a bolt on proxy. Last > I checked one comes preconfigured but as such expect > it to be far overloaded. No reason there can't be many, > there just aren't. > >> http://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/da4df436/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/da4df436/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sat Jul 5 01:50:26 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 10:50:26 +0200 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <3809175.sgfKXsGOB8@lapuntu> Dnia sobota, 5 lipca 2014 01:54:26 Juan pisze: > "BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000" > > Oh, come on. That is 'FUD"! A conspiracy theory!! Those guys didn't > create tor, so they shouldn't be hacking it!!! FUCK THEM. > > Tor is a project of the US government, the most righteous and clever > organization on the planet, and the invincible defenders of free speech. > > Their anonymity network is simply unassailable. $3000? Please. > > Look, their own site says > > "Protect your privacy. Defend yourself against network surveillance and > traffic analysis."[1] > > > See? Using tor you can defend yourself against TRAFFIC ANALYSIS! There > you have it. How on earth can tor be vulnerable to trivial traffic > analysis when their site says just the opposite? > > HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid > liars! You freedom hating commies! > > > and so on and so forth... See, the thing is: the fact that somebody submitted such a talk doesn't mean it holds any water yet. I will gladly have a look at the documents and the talk to see, what the problem is. Once we know that, we'll see if the Tor guys can fix it, or not. There have been several "deanonimize Tor" talks over the years. Some where pure bull, some held some water and caused changes to Tor. That's the normal lifecycle of any complicated project. But ah, why am I feeding the trolls? :) > (yes! Now I feel like a real phd who wrote an email with a [] numbered > footnote) Good for you. :) -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/22fb7011/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sat Jul 5 03:55:21 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 12:55:21 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized In-Reply-To: <20140704160705.GA2481@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> <20140704160705.GA2481@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <3915223.CRxYkLzkWp@lapuntu> Dnia piątek, 4 lipca 2014 19:07:05 Georgi Guninski pisze: > Another question: > > How much traffic they are monitoring with these definitions? > All visible? > Almost all except the u$a? Well, some definitions contain Five Eyes country codes as negative matching rules (i.e. IPs from Five Eyes countries will *not* get matched), others do not have this condition. I find this very surprising as it suggests that Five Eyes and other exclusion rules are possibly defined on a per-fingerprint basis; I would have thought these would rather be implemented somewhere higher-up (i.e. some post- processing/post-filtering) so that IPs from Five Eyes don't get accidentally snatched due to somebody forgetting to include the rule in their fingerprint. On the other hand, I guess it can also be the other way around: NSA doesn't give a flying fsck about Five Eyes and the policy is to "grab everything, nobody will know anyway"; the "do not include Five Eyes IPs" rule in one of the fingerprints would then be an overzealous technician including it in the fingerprint because they thought they should ("we don't spy on our friends", etc). Fun stuff either way. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/029c92e5/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 5 11:29:08 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 14:29:08 -0400 Subject: Spam more i2p outproxies? (Was: Re: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000) In-Reply-To: <53B7B552.4090701@cathalgarvey.me> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> <53B7B552.4090701@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-oaQBzonT6whCF2UQu702zv1vBosBhGGJLqusEfvwJug@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 4:20 AM, Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> wrote: > Quite right, there's no reason why there can't be more, except for the > liability of actually hosting those exits. OTOH, there are now plenty of > hosts who accept bitcoin for hosting in countries that probably don't > give a damn about outproxies, so why not crowdfund a set of dedicated > high-bandwidth outproxies? Legally, in most western / sane countries, there are provider/carrier/isp exceptions exits fall into such that running exits (tor/i2p/vpn/proxies) is not a problem... Tor has about 1000 of them. And if you follow torproject.org, torservers.net, noisebridge.net, accessnow.org, you'll find lots of donation and funding efforts. eff.org runs PR challenges. This all applies to I2P and other projects, they could join together in these efforts, and develop some more of their own as well. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 5 11:51:54 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 14:51:54 -0400 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28ki1yJy+ChdB3-vd1xA+0Fyipgr=i8fjj0OkOMRyH-Qw@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 2:13 PM, Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> wrote: > https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore There's some sort of old and hopefully irrelevant spat here: http://www.tox-chat.com/ From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Sat Jul 5 11:13:11 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 19:13:11 +0100 Subject: Tox.im Message-ID: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Anyone looked this over? I only just discovered it, but it seems nice: * P2P * Encrypted * Voice/Video/Chat/Files * GPL'd https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore It's written mostly in C(++) with a dash of assembly, which worries me security wise.. -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/0ec034a4/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/0ec034a4/attachment.sig> From l at odewijk.nl Sat Jul 5 10:52:59 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 19:52:59 +0200 Subject: On trolls - was Re: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAOsGNSTJJCMcG7LCUyOHuN5RSc_mqtVF8tVLWnzeXkTwY0UtPw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAOsGNSTJJCMcG7LCUyOHuN5RSc_mqtVF8tVLWnzeXkTwY0UtPw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKGNMGtjPtK8UQ39Day8xfAYqsP65kkH98m1VwBGEobKg@mail.gmail.com> What about humanity hating nihilists? Think they're crazy? Just thinking in a way that defines "they" is the real insanity here. Maybe you should think before you judge. God! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 308 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/138d87a4/attachment.txt> From geert at desk.nl Sat Jul 5 11:29:38 2014 From: geert at desk.nl (Geert Lovink) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 20:29:38 +0200 Subject: open the snowden files In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29EQ43VjnRVBjxC5N2OD855eArEAtpA17AEJK5MnDRLPw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti29EQ43VjnRVBjxC5N2OD855eArEAtpA17AEJK5MnDRLPw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <BF5745F2-BF44-49FB-BA13-744FF7BB79F7@desk.nl> (fwd. from the nettime mailinglist /geert) from: Krystian Woznicki <kw at berlinergazette.de> the snowden files are of public interest. but only a small circle of people is able to access, read, analyze, interpret and publish them. and only a very small percentage of those files has been made available to the public. those who belong to the small circle of people, tend to argue that this has to do with security reasons. so one could say, that the leaked files have been "secured" in order to prevent bigger harm. yet, in the very sense that "data is the oil of the 21 century" one can also say, that the snowden files have been privatised by people who try to exploit them according to their own interests. what can be done about this situation? are we able to find a way to "open" this data? and in the course of this create a modell for future leaks? many researchers, activistis and technology experts (not to speak of other journalists than the "few luckey ones") have a great interest to work with those files. imagine the historical impact on sciences, social movements and it-infrastructures, if those files would serve as material to study and learn from in the respective areas. the snowden story has been a great, exceptional media narrative -- if only for its unusual duration (unfolding over the course of more than a year and stimulating a variety of debates). but the fact, that material, that one brave whistleblower considered to be worth of public interest, has been "secured" or "privatised", rendering again unaccessible what previously has been unaccessible -- doesn't this fact add a very unsettling layer to the narrative, turning the success story into somewhat of a tragedy? yesterday at the netzwerk recherche conference in hamburg (the great gathering of the investigative community) i confronted luke harding (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luke_Harding) with this question. prior to my intervention harding had already hinted at some very obvious limitations of the ongoing investigation, alluding to various reasons why those "few lucky ones" are incapable to deal with the investigation challenge in an approriate manner: "we are not technical experts" or "after two hours your eyes pop out". inspite of this, harding seemed unprepared to refelect the possibility to open the small circle of analysts dealing with the snowden files. to paraphrasie his response: yes, it is a dilemma, that only few people can look at the snowden files and draw their own conclusions. however this limitation is a natural result of their very precarious nature (files containing state secrets) and a consequence of the massive pressure by the government. nonetheless, 'if you have a special project' you could contact alan rusbridger and probably get him to provide you with the requested material... a request for files -- such a request is usually directed towards somewhat obscure organistions and corporations and it is usually articulated by the press (deploying the freedom of information law or other legal instruments); such a request is usually denied at first. and as the histrory of investigative journalism shows: one must fight for one's right to access for information including going to court. such a request for files is an important, if not the most important, instrument *for the press*. but now it is the press itself (respectively some of its representatives) towards which such a request needs to be articulated. this is absurd and prompts many questions, including: to whom are organisations like the guardian accountable? a couple of things one could do about it: * such requests may seem futile, but they are an instrument and as the experience shows, one can win the fight. * one can consider to complain at e.g. the press complaints commission with regard to media corporations exercising exclusive control over the files -- in germany for example this sort of (quasi-monopolistic) control violates the so called presserat-kodex. * last but not least: one should work out a concept/model for transferring those files into the public domain -- taking also into account the obvious problems of "security" and "government pressure". it would be great of we could start a debate about in order to build a case for the future of handling big data leaks in a more democratic and sustainable manner. i will also write a german version of this post for berlinergazette.de and i am more than happy to include some of your responses into that version. best wishes, krystian # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime at kein.org From zen at freedbms.net Sat Jul 5 04:54:18 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 21:54:18 +1000 Subject: On trolls - was Re: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 Message-ID: <CAOsGNSTJJCMcG7LCUyOHuN5RSc_mqtVF8tVLWnzeXkTwY0UtPw@mail.gmail.com> On 7/5/14, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > Dnia sobota, 5 lipca 2014 01:54:26 Juan pisze: >> HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid >> liars! You freedom hating commies! So what are us freedom hating democrats s'posed ta do? What about freedom loving commies? Or free loving hippies? What if I'm just a communist in my beliefs and am sittin' on the fence about all those individual freedom things? >> and so on and so forth... Indeed :) > See, the thing is: the fact that somebody submitted such a > talk doesn't mean it holds any water yet. ... Of course, but the point is: > some held some water and caused changes to Tor. > That's the normal lifecycle of any complicated project. Did I mention, you made a good point? > But ah, why am I feeding the trolls? :) Because trolls are juicy. And ripe for comedy. And we all enjoy a good spit roast now and then. :? From felix at tribut.de Sat Jul 5 13:10:29 2014 From: felix at tribut.de (Felix Eckhofer) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 22:10:29 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <1b178da0f0b1155ac3086a34ea2c82dd@tribut.de> Hey. Am 05.07.2014 20:13, schrieb Cathal Garvey: > https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore > > It's written mostly in C(++) with a dash of assembly, which worries me > security wise.. There's no assembly (that I could find). Github just mis-classifies Makefile.inc as assembly. It does depend of libvpx though which uses assembly liberally. Last time I tried to play around with it, it was far from usable. Not sure how much progress was made in the meantime. felix From s at ctrlc.hu Sat Jul 5 13:36:50 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 22:36:50 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <20140705203650.GG6997@ctrlc.hu> On Sat, Jul 05, 2014 at 07:13:11PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > Anyone looked this over? I only just discovered it, but it seems nice: afaics there's a traffic analysis weakness in all messages, it discloses both public keys of the peers in public: https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore/blob/master/docs/updates/Crypto.md#crypto-request-packets -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From l at odewijk.nl Sat Jul 5 14:35:18 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 23:35:18 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> I apologize for the wording in the following post. I feel entirely unmotivated to do anything but write down what I think of in a fairly-hack-and-slash-and-mash manner and I am sort of fatigued and sort of boosted on caffeine (which helps remedy sleepiness and increases focus but does nothing for the intellectual fatigue I'm experiencing after a good 8 hours of mind-bending geometric programming***, tips welcome). 2014-07-05 20:13 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > * P2P > * Encrypted > Tor/network layer ish stuff > * Voice/Video/Chat/Files > Application layer stuff > * GPL'd > You could give me a steaming pile of NSA honeytrap codepies, as long as it's GPL I'll trust it with my life and love it feverishly. (joke) If anyone ever steals this idea I'll point to this e-mail and claim it was originally mine and it stuck in your head until you thought it was yours**: Just write the communications layer. Expose it through a socket on the local machine. Let's say the port will be 33742 (actually a good port number) (say "eel for tee too") and one can talk modern-JSON-over-an-HTTP-subset with it. Platform dependent high-performance stuff like COM objects, maybe some RPC, etc. are optional. This little daemon/server maintains the connection to whatever P2P network is currently thought to be neat. It may or may not also do DNS-ish stuff and (if that's the popular P2P thing) it can have a keyring with trusted peers (aka "friends"). Once you have that you can communicate in an abstracted form. You can send messages that will pop out on the other side to registered listeners (method of registration is pretty much irrelevant, but let's say it's either directly by subscribing to 33742 or by some other sockety means). The service rendered is "you give me a destination (as per my spec) and a message and I will make sure it gets there without anyone really knowing if it was us". So it's like TOR, but a little more explicit and less proxy-like. You might wonder, why not proxy like? I like it because I never know whether something is going through the proxy or not. I'd prefer the application saying "Golly, where is 33742?" than going "You know, I swear we had this proxy arrangement.... Oh well". 33742 will also* do trickle connections and arbitrarily decide that a certain application is getting snailservice today. A few (~5?) trickle connections will always be kept cheerfully active, ticking away a few kbps of random data, and the occasional fully crypted packet that looks just like random data. Add some sort of meshing thingy on top of it, and the requirement that snailservice packets should be snailserviced with at least an 80% chance and voila every frikkin packet has plausible deniability ("I got it over trickles/snailservice!"). Then, to make it attractive to actually use it, you write *SEVERAL DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS WITH SPECIFIC PURPOSES*, because you want to do *one thing, and do it right*. One of these things should be an IMAP server, because letter-secret is very nice indeed. Why? * Performance * Simplicity * Stability * Security * Modularity * Ease of extension * Separation of concerns The best part? The longer you think of it, the better the idea becomes. * if it's good 337. ** or the idea spread from someone that had this or a variation going on. The point is that I claim this idea. It's not very original because really it's just Tor++ with some reasonable processing, but that's what we usually call an original idea so I'll just claim it anyway. (Antartica is mine too btw, really) *** If you do enough geometric programming you start to notice that perhaps "space", geometry and coordinates and things like that, are probably not at all as natural as they seem to be. Graphics programming gives a similar sense. Collisions just aren't .. ¿ natural? Crypto really makes mathematical sense, but geometry, man! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 6031 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/5add6ad8/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 6 00:56:17 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 09:56:17 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1868188.ScVqno3VsH@lapuntu> Dnia sobota, 5 lipca 2014 23:35:18 Lodewijk andré de la porte pisze: > I apologize for the wording in the following post. I feel entirely > unmotivated to do anything but write down what I think of in a > fairly-hack-and-slash-and-mash manner and I am sort of fatigued and sort of > boosted on caffeine (which helps remedy sleepiness and increases focus but > does nothing for the intellectual fatigue I'm experiencing after a good 8 > hours of mind-bending geometric programming***, tips welcome). > > 2014-07-05 20:13 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > > * P2P > > * Encrypted > > Tor/network layer ish stuff > > > * Voice/Video/Chat/Files > > Application layer stuff > > > * GPL'd > > You could give me a steaming pile of NSA honeytrap codepies, as long as > it's GPL I'll trust it with my life and love it feverishly. (joke) > > If anyone ever steals this idea I'll point to this e-mail and claim it was > originally mine and it stuck in your head until you thought it was yours**: > > > Just write the communications layer. Expose it through a socket on the > local machine. Let's say the port will be 33742 (actually a good port > number) (say "eel for tee too") and one can talk > modern-JSON-over-an-HTTP-subset with it. > > Platform dependent high-performance stuff like COM objects, maybe some RPC, > etc. are optional. > > This little daemon/server maintains the connection to whatever P2P network > is currently thought to be neat. It may or may not also do DNS-ish stuff > and (if that's the popular P2P thing) it can have a keyring with trusted > peers (aka "friends"). > > Once you have that you can communicate in an abstracted form. You can send > messages that will pop out on the other side to registered listeners > (method of registration is pretty much irrelevant, but let's say it's > either directly by subscribing to 33742 or by some other sockety means). > > The service rendered is "you give me a destination (as per my spec) and a > message and I will make sure it gets there without anyone really knowing if > it was us". So it's like TOR, but a little more explicit and less > proxy-like. > > You might wonder, why not proxy like? I like it because I never know > whether something is going through the proxy or not. I'd prefer the > application saying "Golly, where is 33742?" than going "You know, I swear > we had this proxy arrangement.... Oh well". > > 33742 will also* do trickle connections and arbitrarily decide that a > certain application is getting snailservice today. A few (~5?) trickle > connections will always be kept cheerfully active, ticking away a few kbps > of random data, and the occasional fully crypted packet that looks just > like random data. Add some sort of meshing thingy on top of it, and the > requirement that snailservice packets should be snailserviced with at least > an 80% chance and voila every frikkin packet has plausible deniability ("I > got it over trickles/snailservice!"). > > > Then, to make it attractive to actually use it, you write *SEVERAL > DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS WITH SPECIFIC PURPOSES*, because you want to do *one > thing, and do it right*. One of these things should be an IMAP server, > because letter-secret is very nice indeed. > > > Why? > * Performance > * Simplicity > * Stability > * Security > * Modularity > * Ease of extension > * Separation of concerns > > The best part? The longer you think of it, the better the idea becomes. > > * if it's good 337. > ** or the idea spread from someone that had this or a variation going on. > The point is that I claim this idea. It's not very original because really > it's just Tor++ with some reasonable processing, but that's what we usually > call an original idea so I'll just claim it anyway. (Antartica is mine too > btw, really) > *** If you do enough geometric programming you start to notice that perhaps > "space", geometry and coordinates and things like that, are probably not at > all as natural as they seem to be. Graphics programming gives a similar > sense. Collisions just aren't .. ¿ natural? Crypto really makes > mathematical sense, but geometry, man! That all seems like MaidSAFE: http://maidsafe.net/ -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/cc4322d6/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 10:42:55 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 13:42:55 -0400 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 5:35 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: > Just write the communications layer. Expose it through a socket on the local > machine. Let's say the port will be 33742 (actually a good port number) (say > > This little daemon/server maintains the connection to whatever P2P network > is currently thought to be neat. It may or may not also do DNS-ish stuff and > (if that's the popular P2P thing) it can have a keyring with trusted peers > (aka "friends"). > > Once you have that you can communicate in an abstracted form. You can send Yes, I've always felt the level of interop among crypto darknets is arbitrarily far less than ideal. Everybody seems to want to make their own user protocol for umm, say, the simple act of sending a message. And with all these different vertical darknet silos, you'll never be able to seamlessly cross message your friends on some other nets you also happen to be running. Then even if you got a pluggable *user* protocol for messaging, surfing, storage ironed out and made, you still have the problem of *backend* dest (and src) addressing. ie: There are at least four, maybe six nets I know of that can present an IPv6 tunnel interface to the user. Making it dead simple to securely route all your traffic into the darknet[s], or the entire set of darknets based on CIDR block addressing into them. But no, right now they overlap and conflict :( And without IPv6, they use different native addressing schemes. This begs for a serious sitdown conference amongst darknets to see what better cooperative user and backend interfaces might be possible. Or at least create one grand DHT based middleware addressing shim between them and the user (and preferably one that presents IPv6 tun interface, you know... because every app on the planet can speak that these days. Which is a big adoption win.) > You could give me a steaming pile of NSA honeytrap codepies Mmm, pies, me hungry. From sdw at lig.net Sun Jul 6 15:09:30 2014 From: sdw at lig.net (Stephen D. Williams) Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 15:09:30 -0700 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rLfbWWvN=e9DkJ0b7KFGcD4Nx3BdJOx625aHbStHBB7Fg@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rKxRM5So=EbFYh8ORzUZPpo3mz0inAQw5T+2AEvSp-UeQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rLfbWWvN=e9DkJ0b7KFGcD4Nx3BdJOx625aHbStHBB7Fg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53B9C91A.30003@lig.net> Let me know if you want a collaborator. I have a few things to get off my queue too. On 7/6/14, 12:28 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > > One of these months I will continue work on a paper reg. semantic addressing and a true IP layer replacement. I feel bad > having talked about it for /years/ now, but life and inexperience haven't really allowed me to make a great paper out of it. > One of these months. > > > One of these months I will also write about a federated protocol that feels a lot like twitter meets IRC meets Wordpress meets > e-mail meets FidoNet. It's all really the same problem anyway, you know? > > One of these months. -- Stephen D. Williams sdw at lig.net stephendwilliams at gmail.com LinkedIn: http://sdw.st/in V:650-450-UNIX (8649) V:866.SDW.UNIX V:703.371.9362 F:703.995.0407 AIM:sdw Skype:StephenDWilliams Yahoo:sdwlignet Resume: http://sdw.st/gres Personal: http://sdw.st facebook.com/sdwlig twitter.com/scienteer -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2479 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/598ab843/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Sun Jul 6 07:36:25 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 16:36:25 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1868188.ScVqno3VsH@lapuntu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> <1868188.ScVqno3VsH@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKWuyuvYJx3ZhSsLFA+1OUEP5_uF3bN-4b7Qi9XYdwQPg@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-06 9:56 GMT+02:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: > That all seems like MaidSAFE: > http://maidsafe.net/ > Maidsafe is trying to be the cloud but P2P. At Bitcoin2014 I asked as to why they wanted a blockchain/consistency, that guy didn't know (nice guy though), left my e-mail address and didn't hear back. It definitely rings a similar bell, it sure did with me when I heard about it. I've even pointed to it when saying how things could also be. Overall I'm underwhelmed by the design and I think it tries to do too much. I think It's not fundamental/simple enough. I think Blockchain style consensus is expensive and not required. Only reason I can think off is that they want premined coins or something. There's a whole flux of not-really-working-yet ideas that use the blockchain for no reason other than having premined coins and some P2P framework. It's interesting and good to see that blockchain-tech is such a key for people's creativity. And it's a shame that it's probably not the right tool for the job in most cases. (Consensus is overrated! Who needs it? You just need things to work the way you want them for you. What do you care how it looks to people you never deal with?) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1882 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/8067146a/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 10:11:45 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 19:11:45 +0200 Subject: XKeyScore code authenticity - genuine [was: messing with XKeyScore] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RVnA1kamSg=at=7kHsLD4EpnJKV0fyw4g9n6Ygs0p_Xg@mail.gmail.com> the theme of messing with XKeyScore is amusing[0], but more to the point i was asked to respond to some concerns of authenticity made in a different post: "Validating XKeyScore code" http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/validating-xkeyscore-code.html i'm trying to keep this feedback technical, as i don't like much of Graham's reasoning. (i do however approve of his use of "Great Man" in the Voldemort sense, in reference to Cowboy Alexander[1]) his claim that "we believe the code partly fake and that it came from the Snowden treasure trove." should be ammended: "we believe the code deprecated, and that it came from the Snowden archives" onward! --- first segment of summary, by point: # Point 1) "The signatures are old (2011 to 2012), so it fits within the Snowden timeframe, and is unlikely to be a recent leak." - agreed. # Point 2) "The code is weird, as if they are snippets combined from training manuals rather than operational code. That would mean it is “fake”." - false; the code is valid and deprecated (can be used as example) rather than false. the technical detail. as a programmer, i know that a regexp rule like: ''' extractors: {{ bridges[] = /bridge\s([0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}):?([0-9]{2,4}?[^0-9])/; }} ''' is both written by a novice regexp'er, and also took them a bit of time. more than they'd spend on an example. for another example, ''' for (size_t i=0; i < bridges.size(); ++i) { std::string address = bridges[i][0] + ":" + bridges[i][1]; DB[SCHEMA_OLD]["tor_bridge"] = address; DB.apply(); DB[SCHEMA_NEW]["tor_ip"] = bridges[i][0]; DB[SCHEMA_NEW]["tor_port_or"] = bridges[i][1]; DB[SCHEMA_NEW]["tor_flags"] = FLAGS; DB.apply(); } ''' why two commits here to backend changes? as a programmer i understand why this is done, but as a purely fictitious example the double commit is pointless noise. # Point 3) "The story makes claims about the source that are verifiably false, leading us to believe that they may have falsified the origin of this source code." - false how does limited misunderstanding arcane technicalities invalidate the entirety? if this were true, Robert Graham would be a complete imbecile, rather than technically competent and occasionally wrong. # Point 4) "The code is so domain specific that it probably is, in some fashion, related to real XKeyScore code – if fake, it's not completely so." - false. as stated above, these rules are deprecated rather than fictitiously constructed. (and perhaps referenced in training materials for utilizing the particular language engines demonstrated) as explained above, and i will go into more detail later (i wager i have more big data experience and DPI experience than Mr. Graham the DPI expert does in this domain alone[2] ;) last but not least, this speaks to the need for greater technical expertise to be applied to the leaked archives. if anything, the nature of domain specific details discussed here show that not just generalists, but an army of specialists, will ultimately be needed to properly parse and protect based upon the archives as yet revealed. best regards, --- 0. "" for those with "Jam Eschelon Day" nostalgia ;) ^- see whole thread from "messing with XKeyScore" 1. "The character assassination of Keith Alexander" '... People have criticized calling him a "great man". I'm quoting the Harry Potter movie here people, where the guy who sells Harry's[sic] wand points out that Voldermort was a great wizard,[sic] a great and terrible wizard' http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/06/the-character-assassination-of-keith.html 2. "XKeyScore: it's not attacking Tor" '... I am an expert in deep packet inspection (DPI). I've written a system vaguely similar to this XKeyScore system here: (ferret). I find the conclusions in this story completely unwarranted, though the technical information cited by this story is pretty good. I suggest future stories about the NSA's deep packet inspection actually consult with engineers who've written DPI code before making wild claims.' http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/xkeyscore-its-not-attacking-tor.html From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 10:30:01 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 19:30:01 +0200 Subject: XKeyScore code authenticity - genuine [was: messing with XKeyScore] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RVnA1kamSg=at=7kHsLD4EpnJKV0fyw4g9n6Ygs0p_Xg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RVnA1kamSg=at=7kHsLD4EpnJKV0fyw4g9n6Ygs0p_Xg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SPoP4cOMjuZXbCBYRdgQ=8P2wrc31wsmfJiT6438FYHw@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 7:11 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > a regexp rule like: > ''' > extractors: {{ > bridges[] = > /bridge\s([0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}):?([0-9]{2,4}?[^0-9])/; > }} > ''' > is both written by a novice regexp'er, and also took them a bit of > time. more than they'd spend on an example. i should have clarified this statement. this is code someone wrote to get a job done. they are pulling bridge addresses out of text (email bodies?) and getting a job done. this is fine code and similar to what you'd see in any production environment. this is not what a regexp guru would use to show their ability to tightly match with sparse efficiency. it is also not so simple that a non-PCRE fluent person would use it as a fictitious example. to be clear: all signs point to this being real code a person wrote to get a job done - parse out bridge addresses from text. the signs point toward this code being legitimate depricated code, even if not currently useful. the code do not point toward this being a non-fictitious example, and it seems Robert even alludes to as much with. "One interesting thing to note about the port number is that it captures the first non-digit character after the number as well. This is obvious[sic] a bug, but since it's usually whitespace, one that doesn't impact the system." - implying he believes this is a legitimate rule, and also not written by an expert. best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 10:33:11 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 19:33:11 +0200 Subject: XKeyScore code authenticity - genuine [was: messing with XKeyScore] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1SPoP4cOMjuZXbCBYRdgQ=8P2wrc31wsmfJiT6438FYHw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RVnA1kamSg=at=7kHsLD4EpnJKV0fyw4g9n6Ygs0p_Xg@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SPoP4cOMjuZXbCBYRdgQ=8P2wrc31wsmfJiT6438FYHw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SNqzDZt3J_RS5EjZOFm8qms7vg-0c4zjVB91Fb6igJCQ@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 7:30 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > the code do not point toward this being a non-fictitious example, i meant "non-functional, fictitious example" of course. and with that, i will leave my further comments to a later, more sober date... airport security, here i come! :P best regards, From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 6 11:25:27 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 20:25:27 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 13:42:55 grarpamp pisze: > On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 5:35 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: > > Just write the communications layer. Expose it through a socket on the > > local machine. Let's say the port will be 33742 (actually a good port > > number) (say > > > > This little daemon/server maintains the connection to whatever P2P network > > is currently thought to be neat. It may or may not also do DNS-ish stuff > > and (if that's the popular P2P thing) it can have a keyring with trusted > > peers (aka "friends"). > > > > Once you have that you can communicate in an abstracted form. You can send > > Yes, I've always felt the level of interop among crypto darknets is > arbitrarily far less than ideal. Everybody seems to want to make their > own user protocol for umm, say, the simple act of sending a message. > And with all these different vertical darknet silos, you'll never be able to > seamlessly cross message your friends on some other nets you also happen to > be running. Then even if you got a pluggable *user* protocol for messaging, > surfing, storage ironed out and made, you still have the problem of > *backend* dest (and src) addressing. ie: There are at least four, maybe six > nets I know of that can present an IPv6 tunnel interface to the user. > Making it dead simple to securely route all your traffic into the > darknet[s], or the entire set of darknets > based on CIDR block addressing into them. But no, right now they overlap and > conflict :( And without IPv6, they use different native addressing schemes. > > This begs for a serious sitdown conference amongst darknets to see what > better cooperative user and backend interfaces might be possible. Or at > least create one grand DHT based middleware addressing shim between > them and the user (and preferably one that presents IPv6 tun interface, you > know... because every app on the planet can speak that these days. > Which is a big adoption win.) Absolutely. Without serious and seamless interoperability, we have no way of actually getting people to use these solutions. "Nobody's there" × tens of solutions/networks. This is, by the way, a huge problem in the free and open decentralised/federated crowd. Consider this e-mail exchange: http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-fedsocweb/2013May/0058.html -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/fec260f5/attachment.sig> From l at odewijk.nl Sun Jul 6 12:27:28 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 21:27:28 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKxRM5So=EbFYh8ORzUZPpo3mz0inAQw5T+2AEvSp-UeQ@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-06 19:42 GMT+02:00 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com>: > IPv6 To be honest, too centralized and too arbitrary. It's odd to declare IP(v6) addresses bullocks that simply. It's in our systems and in our thinking. But really, universally unique addresses are just a dream. The only address I think makes sense is derived off a public key. Any other address should be network-topology-semantic, not assigned by committee. That way there's real identity (private-publickey) and real address/location (place dependent or similar address) One of these months I will continue work on a paper reg. semantic addressing and a true IP layer replacement. I feel bad having talked about it for *years* now, but life and inexperience haven't really allowed me to make a great paper out of it. One of these months. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1317 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/3d16a781/attachment.txt> From odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net Sun Jul 6 22:44:35 2014 From: odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net (Odinn Cyberguerrilla) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 22:44:35 -0700 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <aa127cad451e99c78e91f8e1cb309f45.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> Ahhh. The smell of fresh lawsuits in the morning. > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-28185149 > > """ > US enhanced airport security checks target electronics in latest > stretch for Total Information Awareness > - not by the BBC 6 July 2014 Last updated at 28:45 GMT > > > Frustrated by technically savvy privacy extremists using encryption to > protect confidentiality of their data, the United States is preparing > a particularly clever ruse to rummage through your digital detritus. > > The US announced new security measures last week, apparently in > response to a terror threat, but gave hints that multiple privacy > enhancing technology conferences occurring this summer were of the > utmost interest. > > Analysts say the changes have been couched in a conceit made to appear > to be in response to intelligence that Islamic militants in Syria and > Yemen developing bombs that could evade airport security. > > "It's really clever if you think about it.", one anonymous expert on > the wiki explained. "First, they put the real terrorists on notice, > adding to operational paranoia. But second, they get to enable every > device crossing the border at their discretion with minimal concern!" > > When asked for comment, the National Security Agency replied they > could 'neither confirm nor deny any knowledge of "mobile phones"'. > [EDITORS' NOTE: The NSA asked us to use scare quotes and not normal > quotes, yet in a brave show of defiance we stood up for our readership > and refused. "" Take that NSA! With Love, The Editors.] > > "During the security examination, officers may also ask that owners > power up some devices, including cell phones," it said. "All devices > must be fully unlocked and past any full disk encryption > authentication to properly test the battery." > > "Powerless devices will not be permitted on board the aircraft. The > traveller may also undergo additional screening once the device is > powered on and keyed up to be sure it is working correctly in > CUSTOMS." > > Reuters news agency reported that officials had singled out mobile > phones made by Apple and Samsung for extra checks. Apparently these > devices are most often used by developers and other privacy > extremists. > > More as this story develops. Back to you, Tom. > From alfiej at fastmail.fm Sun Jul 6 14:38:04 2014 From: alfiej at fastmail.fm (Alfie John) Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 23:38:04 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized In-Reply-To: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> References: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> Message-ID: <1404682684.15101.138637861.601B9425@webmail.messagingengine.com> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014, at 04:38 PM, Nathan Andrew Fain wrote: > Based on the xkeyscore rules does anyone have some idea of the > technology being utilized? > > Looking at the mapreduce::plugin definition I get the impression > Hadoop is in use. Hadoop provides a stream interface for Map Reduce > functions letting one utilize any program or language of their > choosing [1-example]. Can with more knowledge of distributed data > technologies confirm this? It's been known for a while that the NSA are using Hadoop (June 9, 2013)[1]: "The NSA's advances have come in the form of programs developed on the West Coast—a central one was known by the quirky name Hadoop—that enable intelligence agencies to cheaply amplify computing power, U.S. and industry officials said." Also, from the Hadoop 2014 speaker lineup [2]: "Joey Echeverria is Cloudera`s Chief Architect for Public Sector where he coordinates with Cloudera`s Customers and Partners as well as Cloudera`s Product, Engineering, and Field teams to speed up the time it takes to move Hadoop applications to production. Previously Joey was a Principal Solutions Architect where he worked directly with customers to deploy production Hadoop clusters and solve a diverse range of business and technical problems. Joey joined Cloudera from the NSA where he worked on data mining, network security, and clustered data processing using Hadoop." Alfie [1] http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323495604578535290627442964?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424127887323495604578535290627442964.html [2] http://hadoopsummit.org/san-jose/speakers/ -- Alfie John alfiej at fastmail.fm From odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net Sun Jul 6 23:49:34 2014 From: odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net (Odinn Cyberguerrilla) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 23:49:34 -0700 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <3809175.sgfKXsGOB8@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> <3809175.sgfKXsGOB8@lapuntu> Message-ID: <8fc0083aed183b57bfc45fe083e36b65.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> This sort of conversation has been going on for at least a year. I don't feel as though it's fresh or new. Mid-June of 2014 I responded to this same sort of thing when it was mentioned with respect to possible effects on Darkwallet on another list that I'm on. This is more or less the substance of my response, I've copied it here: > http://www.coindesk.com/eavesdropping-attack-can-unmask-60-bitcoin-clients/ > > Is this something DW can protect against? > _______________________________________________ > unSYSTEM mailing list: http://unsystem.net > https://mailinglists.dyne.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/unsystem > > Technically, what the attack really will do is unmask certain IPs and ISPs, bitcoin isn't anonymous, hence, darkwallet, bytecoin, zerocash, etc. The question becomes is darkwallet and / or anyone using stealth a-la http://sx.dyne.org/stealth.html identifiable (or at least is either their client identifiable even if other information may not be) through said attacks as described at: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.7418v2.pdf In this article, partially what is described is the following: "the attack requires establishing 1008 connections and sending a few MBytes in data. This can be repeated for all Bitcoin servers, thus prohibiting all Tor connections for 24 hours at the cost of a million connections and less than 1 GByte of trac." The reference to "servers" is presumably indicating servers which are running Tor and through which something of the Bitcoin network is also transiting through or about. It seems as though if someone wanted to they could target personal computers or servers, although the likelihood of finding much useful information is unlikely, unless someone already knows something about who they are going after and is interested in additional, related information. This was covered in a previous study, here: http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_11.pdf See originally posted content which appeared _before_ fincrypto14 at: http://miki.it/pdf/thesis.pdf and http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/~baldoni/ssd2013/lezioneseminari_diluna.pdf and http://indigo.uic.edu/bitstream/handle/10027/10144/Spagnuolo_Michele.pdf?sequence=1 "The goal of the Clusterizer is to nd groups of addresses that belong to the same user. It incrementally reads the blockchain DB and generates-updates clusters of addresses using two heuristics, detailed in 3.2. The first heuristic exploits transactions with multiple inputs, while the second leverages the concept of \change" in transactions" (from the BitIodine paper) And so on and so forth. Standard clustering and correlation methods infer usernames associated with addresses. Etc. (My suggestion upon thinking about this further was to suggest that Darkwallet development collaborate closely with Tor developers and the Zerocash developers on this issue to find logical solutions. It seemed to be an issue but not one that is insurmountable. Further, it seemed to me that what would be key to the attack referenced in the coindesk article is the following:) "Whenever a peer receives a malformed message, it increases the penalty score of the IP address from which the message came (if a client uses Tor, than the message will obviously come from on of the Tor exit nodes). When this score exceeds 100, the sender's IP is banned for 24 hours." Knowing this and other things about the attack, solutions can be crafted to make such attacks more difficult, not just adding "random delays after transactions" as the paper's authors suggested, assuming DW collaboration with Tor developers and perhaps use of zero knowledge proofs. See also the following: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=309073.msg7303979#msg7303979 (has something about libsnark and zero knowledge proofs) https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7r4osQgWVqKTHdxTlowUVpsVmJRcjF3Y3dtcTVscFhEaW5F/view?sle=true (TorPath to TorCoin) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/4079 (my issue in bitcoin/bitcoin) > Dnia sobota, 5 lipca 2014 01:54:26 Juan pisze: >> "BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000" >> >> Oh, come on. That is 'FUD"! A conspiracy theory!! Those guys didn't >> create tor, so they shouldn't be hacking it!!! FUCK THEM. >> >> Tor is a project of the US government, the most righteous and clever >> organization on the planet, and the invincible defenders of free speech. >> >> Their anonymity network is simply unassailable. $3000? Please. >> >> Look, their own site says >> >> "Protect your privacy. Defend yourself against network surveillance and >> traffic analysis."[1] >> >> >> See? Using tor you can defend yourself against TRAFFIC ANALYSIS! There >> you have it. How on earth can tor be vulnerable to trivial traffic >> analysis when their site says just the opposite? >> >> HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid >> liars! You freedom hating commies! >> >> >> and so on and so forth... > > See, the thing is: the fact that somebody submitted such a talk doesn't > mean > it holds any water yet. I will gladly have a look at the documents and the > talk to see, what the problem is. Once we know that, we'll see if the Tor > guys > can fix it, or not. > > There have been several "deanonimize Tor" talks over the years. Some where > pure bull, some held some water and caused changes to Tor. That's the > normal > lifecycle of any complicated project. > > But ah, why am I feeding the trolls? :) > >> (yes! Now I feel like a real phd who wrote an email with a [] numbered >> footnote) > > Good for you. :) > > -- > Pozdr > rysiek From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 21:24:23 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 00:24:23 -0400 Subject: Interoperating the DarkNets [was: Tox] Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28fbEby30ZyxVk_z0SVQurqbkXBxaOphWdASeaQQJ1Kag@mail.gmail.com> >From this thread: https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/004957.html On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 3:27 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: > 2014-07-06 19:42 GMT+02:00 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com>: >> IPv6 > To be honest, too centralized There's nothing centralized about it at all. You generate your own rfc4193 IPv6/48. It's random so still check with other projects to be 100% sure before going live, and there's even an open registry to help with that. The problem is when people like cjdns blindly stake the other whole available even wider fc00::/8 as their own without thinking about interop (well if you actually need the bits that is, but with accepted crypto starting at 128 / 2048, 120 bits is no more valid width than 80. and with the DHT below this native width limitation is moot). > and too arbitrary. > It's odd to declare IP(v6) addresses bullocks that simply. It's in our > systems and in our thinking. The reason to declare IPv6 on a tun interface on your host is so users can run whatever IPv6 enabled app users want to run, on whatever darknet, right now, today. Darknet projects should be coding good darknets, not duplicating existing writing user facing apps for them (browser's, mua's, login's, fileshare's, git's, wiki's, webserver's, etc). > But really, universally unique addresses are just a dream. The only address > I think makes sense is derived off a public key. Any other address should be > network-topology-semantic, not assigned by committee. That way there's real > identity (private-publickey) and real address/location (place dependent or > similar address) An IPv6/48 is big enough to hold every user on every darknet simultaneously. But yes, we cannot arbitrate control central the map from IPv6 addr to user (truly, their darknet internal wide address / PKI key). So DHT... darknet user picks random IPv6 addr as their own key, adds in each of their darknet addresses with sigs over it [1] as values. Now you have the needed interop map. You need to label and rewrite packets to/from each darknet with this scheme, but that is easy part. [1] To be flexible in binding, one darknet per port/range, or one per whole IP. The DHT could hosted over any darknet, or it's own special darknet. > One of these months I will continue work on a paper reg. semantic addressing > and a true IP layer replacement. I feel bad having talked about it for years > now, but life and inexperience haven't really allowed me to make a great > paper out of it. One of these months. The problem with IP stack replacements to something really wide (eg: 512) is you then have to produce a library and beg all the above user apps to link it and handle it... not going to happen. Or write your own apps which takes the whole variety of apps/life on clearnet and crushes it into your few apps... not fun. So replacement = limitation and poor adoption. From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 15:33:22 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 00:33:22 +0200 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics Message-ID: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-28185149 """ US enhanced airport security checks target electronics in latest stretch for Total Information Awareness - not by the BBC 6 July 2014 Last updated at 28:45 GMT Frustrated by technically savvy privacy extremists using encryption to protect confidentiality of their data, the United States is preparing a particularly clever ruse to rummage through your digital detritus. The US announced new security measures last week, apparently in response to a terror threat, but gave hints that multiple privacy enhancing technology conferences occurring this summer were of the utmost interest. Analysts say the changes have been couched in a conceit made to appear to be in response to intelligence that Islamic militants in Syria and Yemen developing bombs that could evade airport security. "It's really clever if you think about it.", one anonymous expert on the wiki explained. "First, they put the real terrorists on notice, adding to operational paranoia. But second, they get to enable every device crossing the border at their discretion with minimal concern!" When asked for comment, the National Security Agency replied they could 'neither confirm nor deny any knowledge of "mobile phones"'. [EDITORS' NOTE: The NSA asked us to use scare quotes and not normal quotes, yet in a brave show of defiance we stood up for our readership and refused. "" Take that NSA! With Love, The Editors.] "During the security examination, officers may also ask that owners power up some devices, including cell phones," it said. "All devices must be fully unlocked and past any full disk encryption authentication to properly test the battery." "Powerless devices will not be permitted on board the aircraft. The traveller may also undergo additional screening once the device is powered on and keyed up to be sure it is working correctly in CUSTOMS." Reuters news agency reported that officials had singled out mobile phones made by Apple and Samsung for extra checks. Apparently these devices are most often used by developers and other privacy extremists. More as this story develops. Back to you, Tom. From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 15:38:26 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 00:38:26 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized In-Reply-To: <1404682684.15101.138637861.601B9425@webmail.messagingengine.com> References: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> <1404682684.15101.138637861.601B9425@webmail.messagingengine.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RyxWP6MHDBtALA1xWM7hkMyQc7Bt6fjnpkLq5UQz3i5Q@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 11:38 PM, Alfie John <alfiej at fastmail.fm> wrote: > ... > It's been known for a while that the NSA are using Hadoop (June 9, > 2013)[1]: > > "The NSA's advances have come in the form of programs developed on the > West Coast—a central one was known by the quirky name Hadoop—that > enable intelligence agencies to cheaply amplify computing power, U.S. > and industry officials said." Hadoop made the Utah data center ;) [ now if only all that computing was actually performed in the public interest ... ] From davispuh at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 21:00:54 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 07:00:54 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: > Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: > > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification created? I > > know about XMPP, but nothing more... > > Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: > https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview > > And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, BuddyCloud > (XMPP- > based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. Some of > them > are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing strong > symptoms of the NIH syndrome. > > Which is absurd. > > -- > Pozdr > rysiek that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for social network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must have majority of people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise without people they are totally useless so currently we're stuck with no-so-great applications/protocols only because everyone already are on them like Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list there were discussion about a polyglot protocol/application which could support all networks so users wouldn't be forced to migrate which I think is essential because a lot of people won't bother. There was mention to Sockethub <http://sockethub.org/>which seems quite cool, only for a bit different use case I would say. Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee <http://bitlbee.org> it is a gateway between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with friends on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet on your Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports OTR. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2305 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/1dfeb252/attachment.txt> From tom at ritter.vg Mon Jul 7 05:52:59 2014 From: tom at ritter.vg (Tom Ritter) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 08:52:59 -0400 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics In-Reply-To: <20140707181058.731411b7b0336d3f0e68399c@mega-nerd.com> References: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> <20140707181058.731411b7b0336d3f0e68399c@mega-nerd.com> Message-ID: <CA+cU71k3qkGUfb6ON48h5RcsNEd8w_KJuZNVmgUSEBxfMvb1rQ@mail.gmail.com> On 7 July 2014 04:10, Erik de Castro Lopo <mle+tools at mega-nerd.com> wrote: >> "During the security examination, officers may also ask that owners >> power up some devices, including cell phones," it said. "All devices >> must be fully unlocked and past any full disk encryption >> authentication to properly test the battery." > > The "All devices ....." part now seems to be missing from that article. > > What's going on? The text in the email is satire/commentary and not actual reporting. -tom From edhelas at movim.eu Mon Jul 7 00:11:24 2014 From: edhelas at movim.eu (edhelas) Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2014 09:11:24 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Hi everyone, I'm working on the Movim project since 2008, our aim is to create a full social network on top of the XMPP protocol. As I see again, the guys of the Tox project are trying to reinvent the wheel… again. Now, to do IM, we have Skype, BBM, Line, WhatsApp, MSN, QQ, AIM, ICQ, IRC, XMPP, Facebook Messenger… Same for the social networks as Davis said (PumpIO, TentIO…) I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and improve it, and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all theses things : - Standard IM + chatroom - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC on Movim) - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) - Geolocation - Vcard4 support - SASL2 authentication - OTR support - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) - and so on… XMPP can do a lot more than just IM, it's a full social-communication protocol it just need to be implemented, tested and debugged :) Tim On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 6:00 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: > 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: >> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: >> > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification >> created? I >> > know about XMPP, but nothing more... >> >> Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: >> https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview >> >> And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, >> BuddyCloud (XMPP- >> based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. >> Some of them >> are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing >> strong >> symptoms of the NIH syndrome. >> >> Which is absurd. >> >> -- >> Pozdr >> rysiek > > that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for social > network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must have > majority of people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise without > people they are totally useless so currently we're stuck with > no-so-great applications/protocols only because everyone already are > on them like Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list there were > discussion about a polyglot protocol/application which could support > all networks so users wouldn't be forced to migrate which I think is > essential because a lot of people won't bother. There was mention to > Sockethub which seems quite cool, only for a bit different use case I > would say. > Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee it is a gateway > between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with friends > on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet on your > Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports OTR. > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3637 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/94e3d650/attachment.txt> From odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net Mon Jul 7 10:08:38 2014 From: odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net (Odinn Cyberguerrilla) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 10:08:38 -0700 Subject: open the snowden files In-Reply-To: <BF5745F2-BF44-49FB-BA13-744FF7BB79F7@desk.nl> References: <CAD2Ti29EQ43VjnRVBjxC5N2OD855eArEAtpA17AEJK5MnDRLPw@mail.gmail.com> <BF5745F2-BF44-49FB-BA13-744FF7BB79F7@desk.nl> Message-ID: <10124769faf8f7842b448d34c6041764.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> This comes to mind: https://twitter.com/Cryptomeorg/status/485504337968246784 (Your e-mail was featured on Cryptome twitter) See also: https://twitter.com/Cryptomeorg/status/483353469789556739 Supposedly Cryptome will do a July dump, but not clear as to what exactly is to be released. > (fwd. from the nettime mailinglist /geert) > > from: Krystian Woznicki <kw at berlinergazette.de> > > the snowden files are of public interest. but only a small circle of > people is able to access, read, analyze, interpret and publish them. and > only a very small percentage of those files has been made available to > the public. > > those who belong to the small circle of people, tend to argue that this > has to do with security reasons. so one could say, that the leaked files > have been "secured" in order to prevent bigger harm. yet, in the very > sense that "data is the oil of the 21 century" one can also say, that > the snowden files have been privatised by people who try to exploit them > according to their own interests. > > what can be done about this situation? are we able to find a way to > "open" this data? and in the course of this create a modell for future > leaks? > > many researchers, activistis and technology experts (not to speak of > other journalists than the "few luckey ones") have a great interest to > work with those files. imagine the historical impact on sciences, social > movements and it-infrastructures, if those files would serve as material > to study and learn from in the respective areas. > > the snowden story has been a great, exceptional media narrative -- if > only for its unusual duration (unfolding over the course of more than a > year and stimulating a variety of debates). but the fact, that material, > that one brave whistleblower considered to be worth of public interest, > has been "secured" or "privatised", rendering again unaccessible what > previously has been unaccessible -- doesn't this fact add a very > unsettling layer to the narrative, turning the success story into > somewhat of a tragedy? > > yesterday at the netzwerk recherche conference in hamburg (the great > gathering of the investigative community) i confronted luke harding > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luke_Harding) with this question. > > prior to my intervention harding had already hinted at some very obvious > limitations of the ongoing investigation, alluding to various reasons > why those "few lucky ones" are incapable to deal with the investigation > challenge in an approriate manner: "we are not technical experts" or > "after two hours your eyes pop out". inspite of this, harding seemed > unprepared to refelect the possibility to open the small circle of > analysts dealing with the snowden files. > > to paraphrasie his response: yes, it is a dilemma, that only few people > can look at the snowden files and draw their own conclusions. however > this limitation is a natural result of their very precarious nature > (files containing state secrets) and a consequence of the massive > pressure by the government. nonetheless, 'if you have a special > project' you could contact alan rusbridger and probably get him to > provide you with the requested material... > > a request for files -- such a request is usually directed towards > somewhat obscure organistions and corporations and it is usually > articulated by the press (deploying the freedom of information law or > other legal instruments); such a request is usually denied at first. and > as the histrory of investigative journalism shows: one must fight for > one's right to access for information including going to court. > > such a request for files is an important, if not the most important, > instrument *for the press*. but now it is the press itself (respectively > some of its representatives) towards which such a request needs to be > articulated. this is absurd and prompts many questions, including: > > to whom are organisations like the guardian accountable? > > a couple of things one could do about it: > > * such requests may seem futile, but they are an instrument and as the > experience shows, one can win the fight. > > * one can consider to complain at e.g. the press complaints commission > with regard to media corporations exercising exclusive control over the > files -- in germany for example this sort of (quasi-monopolistic) > control violates the so called presserat-kodex. > > * last but not least: one should work out a concept/model for > transferring those files into the public domain -- taking also into > account the obvious problems of "security" and "government pressure". > > it would be great of we could start a debate about in order to build a > case for the future of handling big data leaks in a more democratic and > sustainable manner. > > i will also write a german version of this post for berlinergazette.de > and i am more than happy to include some of your responses into that > version. > > best wishes, > > krystian > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime at kein.org > > > From grarpamp at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 12:46:24 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 15:46:24 -0400 Subject: [tor-talk] washingtonpost.com: In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the foreigners who are In-Reply-To: <1404687822.96654.YahooMailNeo@web140806.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> References: <CAOsGNSSZH_JWrRVwdhZAEsO7cMdFhFnKz_FTd2E8Wuxa_Xe4xA@mail.gmail.com> <53B94C25.2030709@cryptopathie.eu> <1404658233.56244.YahooMailNeo@web140806.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53B97681.5090302@cryptopathie.eu> <1404671221.40896.YahooMailNeo@web140805.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53B99868.8050604@gmx.com> <1404679159.29806.YahooMailNeo@web140805.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53B9BCC2.5060505@gmx.com> <1404687822.96654.YahooMailNeo@web140806.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29Y0QecMb6Qpi1vSQERfwHdNYKQwsUnEJFvxxYAZmiM4Q@mail.gmail.com> >>> ... >> Or, there could be a "secret society" that largely runs NH & wants better privacy? >> ... On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 7:03 PM, C B <cb736 at yahoo.com> wrote: > ... > It is easier to do things here because it is a small state. > New Hampshire has the largest state legislative body in the country, and pays them $100/year (plus mileage). But our state motto is "Live Free or Die" and we take it seriously http://freestateproject.org/ From davispuh at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 06:06:47 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 16:06:47 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically use asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network stack, OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you use. So by changing plaintext to other payload such as XMPP we introduce another layer but this layer could be parsed in a sandbox / virtual machine thus even if you receive malicious message it couldn't exploit other parts of your system and it would work exactly like that simple plaintext protocol. Now but what if there's a bug in cryptography library, well you have already lost even with your basic plaintext protocol... 2014-07-07 11:41 GMT+03:00 stef <s at ctrlc.hu>: > On Mon, Jul 07, 2014 at 09:11:24AM +0200, edhelas wrote: > > I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and improve > it, > > and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all theses things : > > - Standard IM + chatroom > > - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC on > > Movim) > > - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) > > - Geolocation > > - Vcard4 support > > - SASL2 authentication > > - OTR support > > - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) > > - and so on… > > i dunno, but xml based protocol (attack surface), geolocation (privacy), > video/audio conferencing (traffic analysis), etc are all attributes i do > not > want in a secure communication protocol and a protocol that supports these > is > considered bloated. also the huge amounts of known/guessable plaintext in > xmpp > are quite worrisome. i agree NIH is bad, but xmpp is as bad for a > post-snowden > adversary model. > > -- > otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2525 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/daa0d991/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Mon Jul 7 07:55:37 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2014 16:55:37 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: > I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack > surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you > create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically use > asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any > features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network stack, > OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you > use. Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface beyond these problems... how exactly? I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there might be salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/4e0d7a68/attachment.sig> From mle+tools at mega-nerd.com Mon Jul 7 01:10:58 2014 From: mle+tools at mega-nerd.com (Erik de Castro Lopo) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 18:10:58 +1000 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140707181058.731411b7b0336d3f0e68399c@mega-nerd.com> coderman wrote: > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-28185149 <snip> > "During the security examination, officers may also ask that owners > power up some devices, including cell phones," it said. "All devices > must be fully unlocked and past any full disk encryption > authentication to properly test the battery." The "All devices ....." part now seems to be missing from that article. What's going on? Erik -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Erik de Castro Lopo http://www.mega-nerd.com/ From edhelas at movim.eu Mon Jul 7 10:44:07 2014 From: edhelas at movim.eu (edhelas) Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2014 19:44:07 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSxSzF19Wz7XXWCppRievQ_YOEVBz8Fr8e+MG88Oyb=fAw@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <CAOE4rSxSzF19Wz7XXWCppRievQ_YOEVBz8Fr8e+MG88Oyb=fAw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1404755047.15776.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Hi Davis, Thank you very much for this awesome feedback, having constructives criticizes like this helps me a lot :) I'll try to explain my choices for some of them. I agree with your first comment, there's clearly a lack of communication. But, I'm currently working on the 0.8 release and on a fundraising (on Kickstarter) before the end of summer. I'll create a thread on Reddit and talk about it theses next couple of weeks ;) For the video, I don't have skills to do a nice looking one. But if you have tips, do not hesitate to share them with me. For PHP, the choice was made a couple of years ago and the aim was to install Movim on quite all the servers (I love Ruby on Rails but deploying a RoR application can be quite difficult for some administrators). We also tried to built Movim on top of differents PHP frameworks (Zend, Symfony and more recently Laravel). The thing is that Movim works in a really special way (the connexion is kept open with the XMPP server using BOSH threw long polling requests so I have to do session synchronisation en prevent session-lock… all in PHP) so it cannot be ported easily on a "classical MVC" framework. We also use our own internal widget system with event handling (when a specific XMPP stanza is handled). I'll take a look at the sanitizer.rb file and try to find a proper way to sanitize the strings, maybe use an external library for that ;) Having a public/ folder is also planned for the 1.0 version but I need to refactor a couple of stuffs in the app to make it works properly. I'm also using the PSR standard (http://www.php-fig.org/) especially for the library loading (using composer) and the logger. I've already moved parts of Movim to independant libraries to modularize the project ;) I'm trying to move from Bazaar to Git but I mave a couple of issues when I convert the commit-history tree. Also I'm looking for a proper way to handle the internationalisation (Launchpad has a ship-in system for that). We are also one of the most advanced XMPP client, with a really nice implementation of the standard (all the currently implemented XEP are listed here : http://wiki.movim.eu/en:dev:protocol_implementations). I'm working with the XMPP Standard Fundation to standardise and improve the XMPP protocol. Thanks again ! edhelas On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 7:18 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: > 2014-07-07 10:11 GMT+03:00 edhelas <edhelas at movim.eu>: >> Hi everyone, >> >> I'm working on the Movim project since 2008, our aim is to create a >> full social network on top of the XMPP protocol. As I see again, the >> guys of the Tox project are trying to reinvent the wheel… again. >> Now, to do IM, we have Skype, BBM, Line, WhatsApp, MSN, QQ, AIM, >> ICQ, IRC, XMPP, Facebook Messenger… >> >> Same for the social networks as Davis said (PumpIO, TentIO…) >> >> I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and >> improve it, and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all >> theses things : >> - Standard IM + chatroom >> - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC >> on Movim) >> - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) >> - Geolocation >> - Vcard4 support >> - SASL2 authentication >> - OTR support >> - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) >> - and so on… >> >> XMPP can do a lot more than just IM, it's a full >> social-communication protocol it just need to be implemented, tested >> and debugged :) >> >> Tim >> >> On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 6:00 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> >> wrote: >>> 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: >>>> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: >>>> > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification >>>> created? I >>>> > know about XMPP, but nothing more... >>>> >>>> Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: >>>> https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview >>>> >>>> And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, >>>> BuddyCloud (XMPP- >>>> based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. >>>> Some of them >>>> are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing >>>> strong >>>> symptoms of the NIH syndrome. >>>> >>>> Which is absurd. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Pozdr >>>> rysiek >>> >>> that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for >>> social network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must >>> have majority of people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise >>> without people they are totally useless so currently we're stuck >>> with no-so-great applications/protocols only because everyone >>> already are on them like Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list >>> there were discussion about a polyglot protocol/application which >>> could support all networks so users wouldn't be forced to migrate >>> which I think is essential because a lot of people won't bother. >>> There was mention to Sockethub which seems quite cool, only for a >>> bit different use case I would say. >>> Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee it is a gateway >>> between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with >>> friends on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet >>> on your Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports >>> OTR. >>> > okay so I've quickly reviewed Movim, idea is really good and it seems > to be nice, but I haven't yet tried to run it, will do that someday. > It looks like you haven't really marketed it good enough because this > is first time I hear about it despite it being an somewhat old > project. For example Tox is pretty new but it's already quite popular > and I keep hearing about it every few months. I would suggest to post > more on various social sites, forums and just let people know it > exists (eg. post to Reddit) Another thing I would suggest is add a > video to website of example usage so people could see how it is > actually used, explain various features and such as users might not > immediately discover some features. > > Now I'll tell a few things, but that's only my personal opinion and > most likely a lot of people won't agree with it. So anyway firstly > I'm not a fan of PHP, it's just generally awful language (see > http://phpsadness.com/ and look at PHP src :D), I know it because > I've been writing it for like 7+ years but now 2-3 years I'm PHP-less > and happy about it :) Next it looks like you aren't using any PHP > framework but self-developed one which gives you more work than is > needed and obviously it's less battletested. But overall code itself > is nice and pretty, correctly uses MVC pattern. Bad things are that > you don't have separate public directory for frontend and anyone can > access PHP files directly, view templates for example > (https://pod.movim.eu/app/views/admin.tpl) it's not a big deal, but > still not good idea (running version https://pod.movim.eu/VERSION). > Then in some places HTML tags and entities are used directly rather > than proper Unicode which isn't a good idea and it means that string > isn't later escaped and if it gets mixed together with user-input or > translation strings there's a place for XSS. The worse thing probably > is that sanitization is based on regexp blacklists/filters, I'm > talking about StringHelper.php, I didn't look how it's actually used, > but still even without trying I'm pretty sure it would be possible to > find XSS there, why? because Rails framework over 5 years have had > ~20 XSS vulnerabilities and it's extremely good framework used by > dozens of projects and reviewed regularly, and it's even based on > whitelists, but still uses regexps for that which isn't good and I > wonder why no one does proper SGML parsing which they should. Just > take a look at sanitizer.rb to see how non-trivial it is. Anyway the > whole idea of sanitization is wrong, you should just escape all text > and don't try to guess which tags you should render. I suggest any > web developer to read OWASP from A to Z it's a must for any web > developer. Then there's `?>` PHP end tags used at end of various > files which are useless and can introduce problems like famous > "headers already sent" warning. So seems that's about it with my > quick look, but I might have forgotten to mention some things. > Another thing I don't like is that AGPL is used, I really dislike all > GPL family, but that's just me and I rather prefer copyfree so if > there's similar projects then I'll rather contribute to MIT than any > GPL variant :P And I'm not a fan of Bazaar nor LaunchPad but that's > not the worst thing (someone should ban CVS and SVN :D) > > So to sum up about Movim, good parts: > Good idea > Quite decent code, MVC used correctly > Localization support > Pretty website > Open Source > Active development > SCM is used > and bad: > > Not enough known, marketed > PHP is used > No PHP framework used but self-developed one > Some questionable and potentially vulnerable code in some places > Scripts and files accessible directly > Not my favorite (un)license > > But yeah keep it up and continue developing it ;) I might use it some > day... > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 11334 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/1730c24b/attachment.txt> From davispuh at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 10:18:07 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 20:18:07 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSxSzF19Wz7XXWCppRievQ_YOEVBz8Fr8e+MG88Oyb=fAw@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-07 10:11 GMT+03:00 edhelas <edhelas at movim.eu>: > Hi everyone, > > I'm working on the Movim project since 2008, our aim is to create a full > social network on top of the XMPP protocol. As I see again, the guys of the > Tox project are trying to reinvent the wheel… again. Now, to do IM, we have > Skype, BBM, Line, WhatsApp, MSN, QQ, AIM, ICQ, IRC, XMPP, Facebook > Messenger… > > Same for the social networks as Davis said (PumpIO, TentIO…) > > I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and improve > it, and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all theses things : > - Standard IM + chatroom > - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC on > Movim) > - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) > - Geolocation > - Vcard4 support > - SASL2 authentication > - OTR support > - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) > - and so on… > > XMPP can do a lot more than just IM, it's a full social-communication > protocol it just need to be implemented, tested and debugged :) > > Tim > > On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 6:00 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: > > 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: > >> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: >> > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification created? I >> > know about XMPP, but nothing more... >> >> Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: >> https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview >> >> And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, BuddyCloud >> (XMPP- >> based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. Some of >> them >> are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing strong >> symptoms of the NIH syndrome. >> >> Which is absurd. >> >> -- >> Pozdr >> rysiek > > > that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for social > network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must have majority of > people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise without people they are > totally useless so currently we're stuck with no-so-great > applications/protocols only because everyone already are on them like > Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list there were discussion about a > polyglot protocol/application which could support all networks so users > wouldn't be forced to migrate which I think is essential because a lot of > people won't bother. There was mention to Sockethub > <http://sockethub.org/>which seems quite cool, only for a bit different > use case I would say. > Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee <http://bitlbee.org> it > is a gateway between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with > friends on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet on your > Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports OTR. > > okay so I've quickly reviewed Movim, idea is really good and it seems to be nice, but I haven't yet tried to run it, will do that someday. It looks like you haven't really marketed it good enough because this is first time I hear about it despite it being an somewhat old project. For example Tox is pretty new but it's already quite popular and I keep hearing about it every few months. I would suggest to post more on various social sites, forums and just let people know it exists (eg. post to Reddit) Another thing I would suggest is add a video to website of example usage so people could see how it is actually used, explain various features and such as users might not immediately discover some features. Now I'll tell a few things, but that's only my personal opinion and most likely a lot of people won't agree with it. So anyway firstly I'm not a fan of PHP, it's just generally awful language (see http://phpsadness.com/ and look at PHP src :D), I know it because I've been writing it for like 7+ years but now 2-3 years I'm PHP-less and happy about it :) Next it looks like you aren't using any PHP framework but self-developed one which gives you more work than is needed and obviously it's less battletested. But overall code itself is nice and pretty, correctly uses MVC pattern. Bad things are that you don't have separate public directory for frontend and anyone can access PHP files directly, view templates for example ( https://pod.movim.eu/app/views/admin.tpl) it's not a big deal, but still not good idea (running version https://pod.movim.eu/VERSION). Then in some places HTML tags and entities are used directly rather than proper Unicode which isn't a good idea and it means that string isn't later escaped and if it gets mixed together with user-input or translation strings there's a place for XSS. The worse thing probably is that sanitization is based on regexp blacklists/filters, I'm talking about StringHelper.php, I didn't look how it's actually used, but still even without trying I'm pretty sure it would be possible to find XSS there, why? because Rails framework over 5 years have had ~20 XSS vulnerabilities and it's extremely good framework used by dozens of projects and reviewed regularly, and it's even based on whitelists, but still uses regexps for that which isn't good and I wonder why no one does proper SGML parsing which they should. Just take a look at sanitizer.rb <https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/master/actionview/lib/action_view/vendor/html-scanner/html/sanitizer.rb#L72> to see how non-trivial it is. Anyway the whole idea of sanitization is wrong, you should just escape all text and don't try to guess which tags you should render. I suggest any web developer to read OWASP <https://www.owasp.org> from A to Z it's a must for any web developer. Then there's `?>` PHP end tags used at end of various files which are useless and can introduce problems like famous "headers already sent" warning. So seems that's about it with my quick look, but I might have forgotten to mention some things. Another thing I don't like is that AGPL is used, I really dislike all GPL family, but that's just me and I rather prefer copyfree <http://copyfree.org> so if there's similar projects then I'll rather contribute to MIT than any GPL variant :P And I'm not a fan of Bazaar nor LaunchPad but that's not the worst thing (someone should ban CVS and SVN :D) So to sum up about Movim, good parts: - Good idea - Quite decent code, MVC used correctly - Localization support - Pretty website - Open Source - Active development - SCM is used and bad: - Not enough known, marketed - PHP is used - No PHP framework used but self-developed one - Some questionable and potentially vulnerable code in some places - Scripts and files accessible directly - Not my favorite (un)license But yeah keep it up and continue developing it ;) I might use it some day... -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 8695 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/e5e11335/attachment.txt> From davispuh at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 10:52:58 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 20:52:58 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSxK6M21WHcrgSJFP=i7kEnT0gZ=jRni7tdDuE0MTAA21A@mail.gmail.com> security is always a trade-off with convenience/usability and IMO that layer on top of plaintext protocol would be minimal comparing to already your OS surface. And if you go in that direction then why not go further? develop a basic custom minimalistic OS (in a way that compiled code could be verified in case of compiler backdoor) for just single purpose for secure messaging. It could be booted from CD-ROM or read-only flash, would self-verify itself and PC hardware for known anomalies, present you with a hash of environment so you've memorized it and if it ever changes you know someone have touched something on your PC, maybe BIOS, maybe other firmware maybe your boot medium etc. Then you would plugin your security token with encrypted GPG key and you could securely message. But actually no, you wouldn't use just general purpose computer, you would have developed a custom computer from ground-up with every single chip and transistor to be verifiable and it would serve only this single purpose of secure messaging. But now what if your friend doesn't do the same? it's all bets off and you've lost because it will be easier to "attach" to other end than you. Anyway I see a reason for both of these use cases, encrypted feature full messaging and just extremely secure basic plaintext messaging. But if you go with latter then I wouldn't stop in middle that is I wouldn't use same general OS but something trimmed down. I think currently Tails is pretty good and it comes with Pidgin OTR and you can use it over IRC network which is basically a simple plaintext protocol so your case is already covered I think. So for this first case of feature full messaging, XMPP seems to be a good choice. 2014-07-07 17:55 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: > Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: > > I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack > > surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you > > create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically > use > > asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any > > features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network stack, > > OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you > > use. > > Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface > beyond > these problems... how exactly? > > I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there might > be > salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? > > -- > Pozdr > rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3180 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/7afb5772/attachment.txt> From davispuh at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 11:19:03 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1404755047.15776.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <CAOE4rSxSzF19Wz7XXWCppRievQ_YOEVBz8Fr8e+MG88Oyb=fAw@mail.gmail.com> <1404755047.15776.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSyagocHwPLre997CA7BC6ERboVJDdwj6gOSJG_kKhUu_g@mail.gmail.com> sounds great :) well, about frameworks I've tried really a lot of them over years and I was satisfied only with FuelPHP <http://fuelphp.com/> which I think is the best one IMO, but I haven't heard about Laravel, seems to be really new. About FuelPHP I really like idea of HMVC and it's very useful. But as I said I haven't done anything with PHP for few years now. But generally you've to choose framework when starting a project as it's usually not easy to change it later. Yeah I forgot to mention that it's really good that you're using Composer and have good object orientated code structure. About internationalization it depends which parts you want to cover. If translated strings then look at transifex.com <http://www.transifex.com> and crowdin.net they both offer free solutions to open source projects and are quite good. If you want localized date and time formats then use CLDR <http://cldr.unicode.org/> you can either write a script to directly get data from them or use some already made libraries for PHP, I don't know for PHP, but for Ruby there's ruby-cldr <https://github.com/svenfuchs/ruby-cldr> and twitter-cldr-rb <https://github.com/twitter/twitter-cldr-rb>, for example ruby-cldr can export CLDR data to yaml files and then you could parse and use those in PHP. (twitter-cldr also uses that same exported data from ruby-cldr) 2014-07-07 20:44 GMT+03:00 edhelas <edhelas at movim.eu>: > Hi Davis, > > Thank you very much for this awesome feedback, having constructives > criticizes like this helps me a lot :) I'll try to explain my choices for > some of them. > > I agree with your first comment, there's clearly a lack of communication. > But, I'm currently working on the 0.8 release and on a fundraising (on > Kickstarter) before the end of summer. I'll create a thread on Reddit and > talk about it theses next couple of weeks ;) > > For the video, I don't have skills to do a nice looking one. But if you > have tips, do not hesitate to share them with me. > > For PHP, the choice was made a couple of years ago and the aim was to > install Movim on quite all the servers (I love Ruby on Rails but deploying > a RoR application can be quite difficult for some administrators). We also > tried to built Movim on top of differents PHP frameworks (Zend, Symfony and > more recently Laravel). > The thing is that Movim works in a really special way (the connexion is > kept open with the XMPP server using BOSH threw long polling requests so I > have to do session synchronisation en prevent session-lock… all in PHP) so > it cannot be ported easily on a "classical MVC" framework. We also use our > own internal widget system with event handling (when a specific XMPP stanza > is handled). > > I'll take a look at the sanitizer.rb file and try to find a proper way to > sanitize the strings, maybe use an external library for that ;) > > Having a public/ folder is also planned for the 1.0 version but I need to > refactor a couple of stuffs in the app to make it works properly. > > I'm also using the PSR standard (http://www.php-fig.org/) especially for > the library loading (using composer) and the logger. I've already moved > parts of Movim to independant libraries to modularize the project ;) > > I'm trying to move from Bazaar to Git but I mave a couple of issues when I > convert the commit-history tree. Also I'm looking for a proper way to > handle the internationalisation (Launchpad has a ship-in system for that). > > We are also one of the most advanced XMPP client, with a really nice > implementation of the standard (all the currently implemented XEP are > listed here : http://wiki.movim.eu/en:dev:protocol_implementations). I'm > working with the XMPP Standard Fundation to standardise and improve the > XMPP protocol. > > Thanks again ! > > edhelas > > > On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 7:18 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: > > 2014-07-07 10:11 GMT+03:00 edhelas <edhelas at movim.eu>: > >> Hi everyone, >> >> I'm working on the Movim project since 2008, our aim is to create a full >> social network on top of the XMPP protocol. As I see again, the guys of the >> Tox project are trying to reinvent the wheel… again. Now, to do IM, we have >> Skype, BBM, Line, WhatsApp, MSN, QQ, AIM, ICQ, IRC, XMPP, Facebook >> Messenger… >> >> Same for the social networks as Davis said (PumpIO, TentIO…) >> >> I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and improve >> it, and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all theses things : >> - Standard IM + chatroom >> - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC on >> Movim) >> - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) >> - Geolocation >> - Vcard4 support >> - SASL2 authentication >> - OTR support >> - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) >> - and so on… >> >> XMPP can do a lot more than just IM, it's a full social-communication >> protocol it just need to be implemented, tested and debugged :) >> >> Tim >> >> On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 6:00 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: >> >> 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: >> >>> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: >>> > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification created? I >>> > know about XMPP, but nothing more... >>> >>> Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: >>> https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview >>> >>> And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, BuddyCloud >>> (XMPP- >>> based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. Some of >>> them >>> are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing strong >>> symptoms of the NIH syndrome. >>> >>> Which is absurd. >>> >>> -- >>> Pozdr >>> rysiek >> >> >> that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for social >> network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must have majority of >> people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise without people they are >> totally useless so currently we're stuck with no-so-great >> applications/protocols only because everyone already are on them like >> Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list there were discussion about a >> polyglot protocol/application which could support all networks so users >> wouldn't be forced to migrate which I think is essential because a lot of >> people won't bother. There was mention to Sockethub >> <http://sockethub.org/>which seems quite cool, only for a bit different >> use case I would say. >> Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee <http://bitlbee.org> it >> is a gateway between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with >> friends on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet on your >> Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports OTR. >> >> okay so I've quickly reviewed Movim, idea is really good and it seems to > be nice, but I haven't yet tried to run it, will do that someday. It looks > like you haven't really marketed it good enough because this is first time > I hear about it despite it being an somewhat old project. For example Tox > is pretty new but it's already quite popular and I keep hearing about it > every few months. I would suggest to post more on various social sites, > forums and just let people know it exists (eg. post to Reddit) Another > thing I would suggest is add a video to website of example usage so people > could see how it is actually used, explain various features and such as > users might not immediately discover some features. > > Now I'll tell a few things, but that's only my personal opinion and most > likely a lot of people won't agree with it. So anyway firstly I'm not a fan > of PHP, it's just generally awful language (see http://phpsadness.com/ > and look at PHP src :D), I know it because I've been writing it for like 7+ > years but now 2-3 years I'm PHP-less and happy about it :) Next it looks > like you aren't using any PHP framework but self-developed one which gives > you more work than is needed and obviously it's less battletested. But > overall code itself is nice and pretty, correctly uses MVC pattern. Bad > things are that you don't have separate public directory for frontend and > anyone can access PHP files directly, view templates for example ( > https://pod.movim.eu/app/views/admin.tpl) it's not a big deal, but still > not good idea (running version https://pod.movim.eu/VERSION). Then in > some places HTML tags and entities are used directly rather than proper > Unicode which isn't a good idea and it means that string isn't later > escaped and if it gets mixed together with user-input or translation > strings there's a place for XSS. The worse thing probably is that > sanitization is based on regexp blacklists/filters, I'm talking about StringHelper.php, > I didn't look how it's actually used, but still even without trying I'm > pretty sure it would be possible to find XSS there, why? because Rails > framework over 5 years have had ~20 XSS vulnerabilities and it's extremely > good framework used by dozens of projects and reviewed regularly, and it's > even based on whitelists, but still uses regexps for that which isn't good > and I wonder why no one does proper SGML parsing which they should. Just > take a look at sanitizer.rb > <https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/master/actionview/lib/action_view/vendor/html-scanner/html/sanitizer.rb#L72> > to see how non-trivial it is. Anyway the whole idea of sanitization is > wrong, you should just escape all text and don't try to guess which tags > you should render. I suggest any web developer to read OWASP > <https://www.owasp.org> from A to Z it's a must for any web developer. > Then there's `?>` PHP end tags used at end of various files which are > useless and can introduce problems like famous "headers already sent" > warning. So seems that's about it with my quick look, but I might have > forgotten to mention some things. Another thing I don't like is that AGPL > is used, I really dislike all GPL family, but that's just me and I rather > prefer copyfree <http://copyfree.org> so if there's similar projects then > I'll rather contribute to MIT than any GPL variant :P And I'm not a fan of > Bazaar nor LaunchPad but that's not the worst thing (someone should ban CVS > and SVN :D) > > So to sum up about Movim, good parts: > > - Good idea > - Quite decent code, MVC used correctly > - Localization support > - Pretty website > - Open Source > - Active development > - SCM is used > > and bad: > > - Not enough known, marketed > - PHP is used > - No PHP framework used but self-developed one > - Some questionable and potentially vulnerable code in some places > - Scripts and files accessible directly > - Not my favorite (un)license > > > But yeah keep it up and continue developing it ;) I might use it some > day... > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 13728 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/0f26a1ec/attachment.txt> From cyberkiller8 at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 23:03:06 2014 From: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?IsWBdWthc3ogXCJDeWJlciBLaWxsZXJcIiBLb3JwYWxza2ki?=) Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2014 08:03:06 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: > Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: >> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack >> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you >> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically use >> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any >> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network stack, >> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you >> use. > > Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface beyond > these problems... how exactly? > > I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there might be > salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an already established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal looking from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These are imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new (again :-P ). -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com xmpp: cyber_killer at jabster.pl site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/edf9bca3/attachment.sig> From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 10:07:10 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 10:07:10 -0700 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics In-Reply-To: <CA+cU71k3qkGUfb6ON48h5RcsNEd8w_KJuZNVmgUSEBxfMvb1rQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> <20140707181058.731411b7b0336d3f0e68399c@mega-nerd.com> <CA+cU71k3qkGUfb6ON48h5RcsNEd8w_KJuZNVmgUSEBxfMvb1rQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RKeBTw7iF-QXQrSed1=Gs1OKj+cMU36LoU+HBgOMyFKQ@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 5:52 AM, Tom Ritter <tom at ritter.vg> wrote: > ... > The text in the email is satire/commentary and not actual reporting. thanks Tom. perhaps i need to be more full disclosure on my mocking ripostes.. (reality so fscked it's hard to tell the difference? ;) for the record, i sailed through customs with two laptops, three phones, one tablet, and one high performance Noctar SDR card without any trouble. (and a pelican 1550 checked bag full of stinky clothes) i would be curious to know if anyone encounters a border crossing this summer where powered on electronics are then taken from you for :"further inspection". From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 12:08:19 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 12:08:19 -0700 Subject: data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 11:29 AM, Geert Lovink <geert at desk.nl> wrote: > ... > the snowden files are of public interest. but only a small circle of > people is able to access, read, analyze, interpret and publish them. and > only a very small percentage of those files has been made available to > the public... > > what can be done about this situation? are we able to find a way to > "open" this data? and in the course of this create a modell for future > leaks? > .. > prior to my intervention harding had already hinted at some very obvious > limitations of the ongoing investigation, alluding to various reasons > why those "few lucky ones" are incapable to deal with the investigation > challenge in an approriate manner: "we are not technical experts" or > "after two hours your eyes pop out". inspite of this, harding seemed > unprepared to refelect the possibility to open the small circle of > analysts dealing with the snowden files. an impasse of extremes, a full or limited dump off the table. let's find a middle ground. how best to proceed? > * last but not least: one should work out a concept/model for > transferring those files into the public domain -- taking also into > account the obvious problems of "security" and "government pressure". > > it would be great of we could start a debate about in order to build a > case for the future of handling big data leaks in a more democratic and > sustainable manner. very great indeed. what kind of tools would make the journalists involved more effective and productive? 1. using the leaks currently published, devise a framework for "data mining" the leak documents, aka, generating metadata from the data and operating various matches and relevance across the metadata to narrow the search and aggregate related efforts or technologies across their compartmentalized worlds. 2. #1 requires that there is an index of special terms, techniques, suppliers, code names, algorithms, etc. that used to generate the metadata for deeper search and tie to general themes of surveillance. 3. extrapolating from current leaks, also look toward recent advancements and specific technical tell tales of interest. doping silicon as tailored access technique? this could refer to compromised runs of security processors for desired targets. etc. 4. justifying technical detail specifically. we have seen so little technical detail of the source code / hardware design level. how best to justify source code - explaining that the language choice, the nature of the algorithms, the structure of the distributed computing upon which it runs all conveys critical technical details important to understand what part of our technologies are compromised, and guiding the fixes required to protect against such compromises? in short, it would behoove us to build tools to make the journalists more effective, rather than bitch about not being included in the inner circle. (sadly, many good knowledge discovery tools are proprietary and applied to open source intelligence) what types of features would you want such a leak-assistant software to have? what types of existing tools, if any, would provide these capabilities? best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 13:11:44 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 13:11:44 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 1:05 PM, Griffin Boyce <griffin at cryptolab.net> wrote: > One approach is to take the existing public data, make some assumptions > (educated guesses) and do additional research on top of that. It's what I'm > doing right now. It's also what led to the original cointelpro revelations. > Before the follow-up research, it was a meaningless acronym. > > Find, extrapolate, expand. hi Griffin! this is the type of effort i was hoping to see undertaken. when you say "additional research", is this organic or structured? tool assisted or old skewl? i too have been building up some terms and technologies, but yet to put it into any structured format with context, as part of my post is to see how others are handling the vast complexity and extensive compartmentalization embodied in the leaks to date. i also would like to pursue this research anonymously, on hidden services rather than public sites or email. best regards, From zen at freedbms.net Tue Jul 8 01:25:53 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 18:25:53 +1000 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> On 7/8/14, "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" <cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> wrote: > W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: >> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: >>> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack >>> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you >>> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically >>> use >>> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any >>> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network >>> stack, >>> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you >>> use. >> >> Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface >> beyond >> these problems... how exactly? >> >> I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there might >> be >> salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? > > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an already > established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal looking > from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially > privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These are > imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new (again > :-P ). As has been said over the decades: start correct, 'good' easy to maintain code, secure of course, and optimize later, eg 1-1 mapping from XMPP (XML I assume?) to say msgpack: MessagePack: http://msgpack.org/ - a fast, binary replacement for JSON Such optimizations ought be behind a library anyway! (From user app point of view.) As someone else said, think of the stack, separate the concerns: IP, user addressing, persistence of ids, persistence of addresses, crypting, dht, distributed storage, libs, user apps. For impatient programmers wanting instant gratification, work on one layer in the stack. From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 15:27:18 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 18:27:18 -0400 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 4:11 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 1:05 PM, Griffin Boyce <griffin at cryptolab.net> wrote: >> One approach is to take the existing public data, make some assumptions >> (educated guesses) and do additional research on top of that. It's what I'm >> doing right now. It's also what led to the original cointelpro revelations. >> Before the follow-up research, it was a meaningless acronym. >> >> Find, extrapolate, expand. > > this is the type of effort i was hoping to see undertaken. > > when you say "additional research", is this organic or structured? > tool assisted or old skewl? > > i too have been building up some terms and technologies, but yet to > put it into any structured format with context, as part of my post is > to see how others are handling the vast complexity and extensive > compartmentalization embodied in the leaks to date. > > i also would like to pursue this research anonymously, on hidden > services rather than public sites or email. To do any of this you will need to collect all the releases of docs and images to date, in their original format (not AP newsspeak), in one place. Then dedicate much time to normalizing, convert to one format and import into tagged document store, etc. Yes, this could be hosted on the darknet. From davispuh at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 09:05:22 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 19:05:22 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> yeah I agree that using XML was bad idea in XMPP design, there's no good reason to use it, but XMPP is already thought out unlike any new protocol. But actually I think could use same XMPP protocol and just map on different encoding. What is XML? basically it's just a language for data mapping (an encoding) and it would be perfectly possible to use same XMPP protocol concepts and map them on different data structure. And this is the thing I think should be pursued for. Which encoding to use is debatable. I would say using Google Protocol Buffers <https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/> are perfect for network protocols. I haven't investigated how good is MessagePack, but it could be usable too. Only about JSON and similar I don't like that they're "type-less", they have just some basic data types like String, Number etc and you loose information that way, say you've uint32 and you store and transmit that with JSON and on other end it will be probably int64 because that CPU is 64bit, of course you could find shortest fitting type, but that's not practical because you don't know limits of this field, maybe next message it will be bigger. In Protobuf there's types for everything int32, unit64 and so on. 2014-07-08 11:25 GMT+03:00 Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net>: > On 7/8/14, "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" <cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> > wrote: > > W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: > >> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: > >>> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack > >>> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you > >>> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically > >>> use > >>> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any > >>> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network > >>> stack, > >>> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you > >>> use. > >> > >> Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface > >> beyond > >> these problems... how exactly? > >> > >> I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there > might > >> be > >> salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? > > > > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an already > > established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal looking > > from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially > > privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These are > > imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new (again > > :-P ). > > As has been said over the decades: start correct, 'good' easy > to maintain code, secure of course, and optimize later, > eg 1-1 mapping from XMPP (XML I assume?) to say msgpack: > MessagePack: http://msgpack.org/ - a fast, binary replacement for JSON > > Such optimizations ought be behind a library anyway! > (From user app point of view.) > > As someone else said, think of the stack, separate the concerns: > IP, user addressing, persistence of ids, persistence of addresses, > crypting, dht, distributed storage, libs, user apps. > > For impatient programmers wanting instant gratification, > work on one layer in the stack. > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 4063 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/7157386d/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 8 11:05:11 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 20:05:11 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rLygoPKkKh3_Do4G9Y-D698R3MyTugO3Y0i-oRFiv7Esw@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-08 18:05 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com>: > XMPP design, I used XMPP with facebook chat. It didn't support even a quarter of the cookiejar of features. This was with Pidgin, afaik the only serious rich crossplatform manyprotocol chat program. So forgive me for being a little underwhelmed on the protocol itself. It is also by design the most common denominator, with extensions infrequently supported (read: less useful). The most common denominator is of course chat and user accounts. But chat is not the atomic networked message that we're talking about. VOIP over base64 also seems kind of like banging your head into the wall. It feels pretty good though, because it means state of the art can be improved. It gives some reason for the current state of things. We have a go-to solution, why improve? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1392 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/06056f50/attachment.txt> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Tue Jul 8 12:22:23 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2014 20:22:23 +0100 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> Biggest FAIL in json is lack of binary. I think a quick extension to bencoding is in order: "u<len>" prefix for utf8, "b<len>" for binary. Other types are pretty generally useful as-is. Replace "d", "l" and "e" with curly and square braces for readability. Bencoding's structure and basic idea is nice as it's terse and understandable, but also easy to make security guarantees about: length prefix, and on parse errors just dump the input and error out. Minimal overhead for raw binary, which is what you want for crypto, file transfers, and VoiP streams. Trivial to write in any language so rapidly portable, and can be coded recursively with relative ease without sacrificing understandability or security (much). Thoughts? Bencoding 2.0? On 8 July 2014 17:05:22 GMT+01:00, "Dāvis Mosāns" <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: >yeah I agree that using XML was bad idea in XMPP design, there's no >good >reason to use it, but XMPP is already thought out unlike any new >protocol. >But actually I think could use same XMPP protocol and just map on >different >encoding. What is XML? basically it's just a language for data mapping >(an >encoding) and it would be perfectly possible to use same XMPP protocol >concepts and map them on different data structure. And this is the >thing I >think should be pursued for. Which encoding to use is debatable. I >would >say using Google Protocol Buffers ><https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/> are perfect for >network >protocols. I haven't investigated how good is MessagePack, but it could >be >usable too. Only about JSON and similar I don't like that they're >"type-less", they have just some basic data types like String, Number >etc >and you loose information that way, say you've uint32 and you store and >transmit that with JSON and on other end it will be probably int64 >because >that CPU is 64bit, of course you could find shortest fitting type, but >that's not practical because you don't know limits of this field, maybe >next message it will be bigger. In Protobuf there's types for >everything >int32, unit64 and so on. > > > > >2014-07-08 11:25 GMT+03:00 Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net>: > >> On 7/8/14, "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" ><cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: >> >> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: >> >>> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes >attack >> >>> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even >if you >> >>> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say >basically >> >>> use >> >>> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without >any >> >>> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, >network >> >>> stack, >> >>> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging >protocol you >> >>> use. >> >> >> >> Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack >surface >> >> beyond >> >> these problems... how exactly? >> >> >> >> I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as >there >> might >> >> be >> >> salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? >> > >> > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an >already >> > established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal >looking >> > from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially >> > privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These >are >> > imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new >(again >> > :-P ). >> >> As has been said over the decades: start correct, 'good' easy >> to maintain code, secure of course, and optimize later, >> eg 1-1 mapping from XMPP (XML I assume?) to say msgpack: >> MessagePack: http://msgpack.org/ - a fast, binary replacement for >JSON >> >> Such optimizations ought be behind a library anyway! >> (From user app point of view.) >> >> As someone else said, think of the stack, separate the concerns: >> IP, user addressing, persistence of ids, persistence of addresses, >> crypting, dht, distributed storage, libs, user apps. >> >> For impatient programmers wanting instant gratification, >> work on one layer in the stack. >> >> -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 5390 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/8bbe950b/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 8 13:18:07 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 22:18:07 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKcav1ty4pMjcqPE3c2KJA3CjPUhtc6L-52_Va2DguR_A@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-08 21:22 GMT+02:00 Cathal (Phone) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > Thoughts? Bencoding 2.0? tl;dr: I think it's a good idea, but it is offensive in a vague way. --- It's really unfun to suddenly see binary in your JSON file. Both for automated software that parses HTML (or something) and for people that use text editors. The motivation for JSON isn't that it's easy and not too inefficient. It's cleaner and more generic than XML. It's also faster to write because the { and } are always written in code (you find them more easily). It's just XML but a bit better. If you want efficiency you could take to templated binary blobs. It wouldn't actually be that hard, either, once we have some tools to do it. You could even have a dual request, where you request "file.binary" and "filelayout.json", where a JSON file describes the shape of the binary information file. It is actually a good idea. Definitely better than any alternatives (all none of them). Just need plugins for text editors to hide the binary when you're viewing it. And find some way to prevent binary overflow. You know how C coders love to believe a length field, then do something bad and everything goes poof. Maybe port over how attachments work in e-mail. Actually, please don't it's awful. But it shows the sort of trouble you get. It's great for some applications. I don't like that it would be good for the wrong applications too. I also think we should harness more off the power we already have, instead of thinking of new ways that are easier-but-not-actually-much-easier. I think I'd rather have a way to put JSON in front of my binary file, than a way to put binary into my JSON file. It'd be great for metadata for images, actually I've seen XML in front of PNG's and GIFS. We could use a .BJSN, a format for a (JSON, Binary) tuple. References may be better than embedding; flexibility in delivery and storage, respects both formats more, keeps JSON simpler. That's the only really valid concern I can come up with. It depends on the application field. As a webdeveloper I can see the utility and also the difficulty of good support. I think of previous trouble with binary overflow, and how it can get really really messy. I'm pro-possibility though! We should be able to do it, and leave it wherever we think that's bad. Maybe we should start calling it "JSON Transfer Protocol", though! I'm a little under the weather atm so please forgive my awkward verbosity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3362 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/87ab4624/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 8 13:31:06 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 22:31:06 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-08 21:53 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com>: > Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in C/C++ > using typical char * null-terminated string, how'll pass this JSON to > someone? because well NUL... At the parser level you would find a "b" character that's not between brackets, signalling a binary header is coming. A binary header is actually just the number of bytes that follow in binary format. The following bytes are then a binary file, to be assigned to a string as if it were a variable. We have a binarybuffer in javascript, that sort of thing. It would contain the NULL byte if you like it to. That may break some parsers, but this is the real life. Parsers must deal with malformed input securely already > being unaware of bencoding2 should not cause problems. If the length-indicating thingy is short of what it should binary will spill over into your JSON document. It may represent perfectly fine JSON, and thus opens up binary overflow as a possible JSON hack. Someone that can alter that number can already hack your JSON, so that doesn't actually change any attack profile. If it's too long it will gobble up your JSON file, which opens up reading the rest of the file and maybe even into random memory and treating it as a file in your JSON. That's much more serious but requires the JSON parser to have bugs. The thing is that if you don't cut yourself in the fingers it can be nice to have a knife. If you don't write some pretty obvious bugs you will be fine. I think it's much more serious that you have to serve the BJSON completely as a binary file. It's not like you can dump it onto a webpage anymore. You can't slip it into your normal HTTP text transfer bodies either, has to work with attachments. Attachments should be secure when facing malformed transfers* etc. Inconvenient, but not the end. * It would be pretty wack to mess with the HTTP protocol. Maybe you could confuse a keep-alive connection to serve a file before it should be, confusing a webapp or sending a redirect. Haven't really looked into it and haven't really heard about it either. Maybe servers are just secure enough against those attacks? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2876 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/a54dd4da/attachment.txt> From davispuh at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 12:53:06 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 22:53:06 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> I think it's unreal/unpractical and not worth going for and there's just no benefits for it (just use proper binary serialization), JSON was meant as human-readable serialization format and introducing binary format there, then what was the point of using JSON in first place? Why not just some proper binary serialization? (eg. Protobuf). It just really seems that people throw a lot of stuff on JSON, XML and others even if it was never intended to be used for those purposes. There are different tools each for it's own specific purpose and people should not abuse them. Current JSON parsers treat " as special token to separate strings, so if you want to include " in JSON you've to escape, so it will be "\"" and now with any binary encoding you're complicating this because either you've to escape " or track whether you're inside binary data or not and it will crash for non-binary aware parsers. Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in C/C++ using typical char * null-terminated string, how'll pass this JSON to someone? because well NUL... 2014-07-08 22:22 GMT+03:00 Cathal (Phone) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > Biggest FAIL in json is lack of binary. I think a quick extension to > bencoding is in order: "u<len>" prefix for utf8, "b<len>" for binary. Other > types are pretty generally useful as-is. Replace "d", "l" and "e" with > curly and square braces for readability. > > Bencoding's structure and basic idea is nice as it's terse and > understandable, but also easy to make security guarantees about: length > prefix, and on parse errors just dump the input and error out. Minimal > overhead for raw binary, which is what you want for crypto, file transfers, > and VoiP streams. Trivial to write in any language so rapidly portable, and > can be coded recursively with relative ease without sacrificing > understandability or security (much). > > Thoughts? Bencoding 2.0? > > > On 8 July 2014 17:05:22 GMT+01:00, "Dāvis Mosāns" <davispuh at gmail.com> > wrote: >> >> yeah I agree that using XML was bad idea in XMPP design, there's no good >> reason to use it, but XMPP is already thought out unlike any new protocol. >> But actually I think could use same XMPP protocol and just map on different >> encoding. What is XML? basically it's just a language for data mapping (an >> encoding) and it would be perfectly possible to use same XMPP protocol >> concepts and map them on different data structure. And this is the thing I >> think should be pursued for. Which encoding to use is debatable. I would >> say using Google Protocol Buffers >> <https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/> are perfect for >> network protocols. I haven't investigated how good is MessagePack, but it >> could be usable too. Only about JSON and similar I don't like that they're >> "type-less", they have just some basic data types like String, Number etc >> and you loose information that way, say you've uint32 and you store and >> transmit that with JSON and on other end it will be probably int64 because >> that CPU is 64bit, of course you could find shortest fitting type, but >> that's not practical because you don't know limits of this field, maybe >> next message it will be bigger. In Protobuf there's types for everything >> int32, unit64 and so on. >> >> >> >> >> 2014-07-08 11:25 GMT+03:00 Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net>: >> >>> On 7/8/14, "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" <cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> > W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: >>> >> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: >>> >>> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack >>> >>> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if >>> you >>> >>> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say >>> basically >>> >>> use >>> >>> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any >>> >>> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network >>> >>> stack, >>> >>> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol >>> you >>> >>> use. >>> >> >>> >> Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface >>> >> beyond >>> >> these problems... how exactly? >>> >> >>> >> I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there >>> might >>> >> be >>> >> salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? >>> > >>> > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an already >>> > established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal looking >>> > from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially >>> > privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These are >>> > imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new (again >>> > :-P ). >>> >>> As has been said over the decades: start correct, 'good' easy >>> to maintain code, secure of course, and optimize later, >>> eg 1-1 mapping from XMPP (XML I assume?) to say msgpack: >>> MessagePack: http://msgpack.org/ - a fast, binary replacement for JSON >>> >>> Such optimizations ought be behind a library anyway! >>> (From user app point of view.) >>> >>> As someone else said, think of the stack, separate the concerns: >>> IP, user addressing, persistence of ids, persistence of addresses, >>> crypting, dht, distributed storage, libs, user apps. >>> >>> For impatient programmers wanting instant gratification, >>> work on one layer in the stack. >>> >>> >> > -- > Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 6976 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/008456ed/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 07:04:06 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 07:04:06 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 3:27 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > To do any of this you will need to collect all the releases of docs > and images to date, in their original format (not AP newsspeak), > in one place. Then dedicate much time to normalizing, convert to > one format and import into tagged document store, etc. Yes, this > could be hosted on the darknet. indeed. i will also be hosting the complete cryptome archive on hidden site, as it too is part of this corpus to feed into a normalization and extraction engine of great justice. i am using the various python image processing libraries to accomplish this but any language or tool could be useful. i had hoped to distribute the cryptome archives further during the Paris hackfest, alas, unexpected events conspired otherwise. anyone who would like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how they anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) From cyberkiller8 at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 22:30:56 2014 From: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?IsWBdWthc3ogXCJDeWJlciBLaWxsZXJcIiBLb3JwYWxza2ki?=) Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 07:30:56 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> W dniu 08.07.2014 22:31, Lodewijk andré de la porte pisze: > 2014-07-08 21:53 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com > <mailto:davispuh at gmail.com>>: > > Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in (---snip the technical discussion about a new protocol---) > secure enough against those attacks? Stop right there... It's really nice that so many of you got into the spirit and start thinking about how to change xmpp to make it something new, but what are you achieving here? It will end up being a new protocol, incompatible with existing xmpp, it will take a few years to finish the spec, then another 10+ years until any meaningful applications start using it (if at all)... So yeah, except being "coder porn" it does nothing to help the problem here and now. I agree that xmpp is not perfect, it has some problems of its own, but it is an already established and widely used and standard protocol, with lots of implementations. From a practical point of view the best course of action to get something fast is to use it, and put whatever new stuff there is needed inside xmpp, keeping it compatible with the existing spec. A technically pretty proto won't help, today’s world has a huge problem with taking anything new. Better to stay with existing stuff, make it maybe less efficient because of it, but it will be here fast, when it's needed. Plus being less efficient is a no issue today, with fast machines (you can use compression on the fly, yes really :-P ), loads of storage, broadband connections (even the 3G data caps are getting larger and larger each year), etc. People are sending gigabytes of binary files in base64 each day in email messages, so why even care? ;-) In my opinion the bottom line is - a small addition to existing xmpp has a far larger chance of being widely adopted (by applications and by the users) than a completely new protocol. And despite how awesome coder one might be - you won't be able to write all those implementations yourself or convince the masses to switch (again!). -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com xmpp: cyber_killer at jabster.pl site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140709/c942c78a/attachment.sig> From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 08:36:29 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 08:36:29 -0700 Subject: distributing Cryptome June 2014 [was: data mine the snowden files] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 7:04 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > anyone who would like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how they > anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) based on feedback, here is what i intend: 1. A torrent of: USB-1.rar USB-2.rar Update-13-1231.rar each of these have an accompanying signature from John. i will include a magnet URI. 2. The same files on a hidden service with nginx and HTTP/1.1 range request capable (resume-able) 3. An extracted collection of all relevant files, which can be rsync'ed from hidden service or browsed directly. note that this is a point in time archive from June 2014. please donate to John as i hate to think i would be taking revenue from his pocket with this setup! best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 08:39:36 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 08:39:36 -0700 Subject: Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RtA=wN5T6DQOZfQsqXU=WZkxSQpCsw5V-DyqC-uZ4B=w@mail.gmail.com> latest from The Intercept: https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/ a choice excerpt: """ The FBI—which is listed as the “responsible agency” for surveillance on the five men—has a controversial record when it comes to the ethnic profiling of Muslim-Americans. According to FBI training materials uncovered by Wired in 2011, the bureau taught agents to treat “mainstream” Muslims as supporters of terrorism, to view charitable donations by Muslims as “a funding mechanism for combat,” and to view Islam itself as a “Death Star” that must be destroyed if terrorism is to be contained. John Guandolo, a former FBI counterterrorism official who takes credit for developing a training program for agents on the “Muslim Brotherhood and their subversive movement in the United States,” told The Intercept that he participated in investigations of some of the individuals whose email accounts were monitored. Echoing the “red under every bed” hysteria of the McCarthy era, Guandolo believes that “hundreds” of covert members of the Muslim Brotherhood are active in the United States, that some of them have succeeded in infiltrating the Pentagon, and that CIA director John Brennan is a secret Muslim. Other former and current federal officials say such beliefs are not representative of the FBI or Justice Department. But blatant prejudice against Muslim-Americans is also documented in the Snowden archive. In one 2005 document, intelligence community personnel are instructed how to properly format internal memos to justify FISA surveillance. In the place where the target’s real name would go, the memo offers a fake name as a placeholder: “Mohammed Raghead.” """ best regards, Brother Coder Raghead Muhammed From gfoster at entersection.org Wed Jul 9 09:43:30 2014 From: gfoster at entersection.org (Gregory Foster) Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 11:43:30 -0500 Subject: The Facebook "Experiment" (was <nettime> Facebook's Mood Study: Orwellian newspeak 2.0) In-Reply-To: <20140709120759.GC26986@leitl.org> References: <20140709120759.GC26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <53BD7132.9080806@entersection.org> On 7/9/14, 7:07 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > [SCG (Jul 1)] Facebook's Psychological Experiments Connected to Department of Defense > Research on Civil Unrest > http://scgnews.com/facebooks-psychological-experiments-connected-to-department-of-defense-research-on-civil-unrest Thanks for sending this, Eugen. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - "Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks" by Adam D. I. Kramera, Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeffrey T. Hancock: http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full US Department of Defense - The Minerva Research Initiative: http://minerva.dtic.mil/ > There have been rumors that the research described in the recent publication "Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks" (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 111 no. 24) was funded by the Department of Defense or its Minerva Research Initiative. This is not the case. Though a study co-author did receive a Minerva grant in the past, that effort was unrelated to the research of interest. > > The Minerva Research Initiative is committed to ensuring informed consent by its research subjects and abides by all human subject protection regulations for its domestic and international work alike. For further questions or any press inquiries, please contact DOD Public Affairs. Here's some insight on the Minerva Research Initiative (HT the article Eugen sent): Guardian - Earth Insight (Jun 12) - "Pentagon preparing for mass civil breakdown" by @nafeezahmed: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/12/pentagon-mass-civil-breakdown Jeffrey T. Hancock was one of the co-authors of the Facebook study. He was funded by the DoD's Minerva Research Initiative in 2009 to research "Modeling Discourse and Social Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes". http://infosci.cornell.edu/faculty/jeffrey-hancock The authors of the Facebook study thanked Cornell colleague Michael Macy for his feedback. Macy is currently funded by the DoD's Minerva Research Initiative in 2014 to study "Tracking Critical-Mass Outbreaks in Social Contagions". http://infosci.cornell.edu/faculty/michael-macy Here's all of the funded research: http://minerva.dtic.mil/funded.html gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster at entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ From keithl at kl-ic.com Wed Jul 9 11:43:47 2014 From: keithl at kl-ic.com (Keith Lofstrom) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 11:43:47 -0700 Subject: [Server-sky] Server sky and social architecture Message-ID: <20140709184347.GA5290@gate.kl-ic.com> Inspired by a brief conversation with Cory Doctorow at his presentation 2014 July 8, Tuesday: http://server-sky.com/CodeLawHardware Keith -- Keith Lofstrom keithl at keithl.com _______________________________________________ Server-sky mailing list Server-sky at lists.server-sky.com http://lists.server-sky.com/mailman/listinfo/server-sky ----- End forwarded message ----- Code is Law, Hardware is Code's Language CodeLawHardware The Law of Law is language. If your language is richly metaphorical and contains the word "schadenfreude", you will annex the Sudetenland, gas most of your ethnic minorities, and a surviving ethnic outlier will use your language to express general relativity. Other languages better express other crimes and concepts. A linguist will tell you all languages can express all concepts - languages are Turing complete - but this fashionable conceit does not tell us why different cultures do different things. Code is law. Hardware is the language and law of code. Code can only do what hardware permits. A Turing complete machine can manufacture any set of symbols from any other set, but those symbols cannot go where the hardware doesn't connect. In 1990 I designed a chip, a non-blocking crossbar routing device, for the startup I-Cube Design Systems. This chip routed signals from any pin to any other pin, and could route 240 inputs to any combination of 240 other outputs. But it also had fanout - it could route an input to two or more outputs. 160 inputs could become 320 outputs. This was useful for the original task - hardware logic simulation. When the original logic simulator customers became enmired in patent lawsuits, I-Cube found a new customer, another small startup called Cisco. Cisco's routers distributed the backbone of the early internet, and still route most of it. I realize, decades later, that I made one of the architectural decisions that allows the NSA to watch you as you read this webpage. Cisco's routers flowed bitstreams, not "packets", a software metaphor for a time-bounded sequence of bits. Packet headers told the router which flow got the bits, the router told the crossbar device which path the bits should take. Sending the bits to more than one place was implicit in how the hardware worked, because the hardware had fanout. Cisco remains, I-Cube was killed by incompetent venture capitalists. I'm not party to how Cisco designs routers today, but fanout is implicit in dataflow, hardware can stream one transmitter to multiple receivers, tracelessly. Software is merely "judicial opinion" applied to that hardware, and we non-electrical macroscopic human beings only have opinions, not sure knowledge, about how the bits are actually moving and transforming from memory location to other (possibly multiple) memory locations. Software can encrypt - or it can pretend to. Software becomes machine instructions via a compiler. Dennis Ritchie taught us that a compiler emits machine instructions chosen by the compiler author, who can override the decisions of the source code author. The hardware author can override both. The hard disk manufacturer decides what firmware bytes go on the boot tracks of your hard drive, the disk firmware decides what bytes you actually get to your RAM from which disk track, and this firmware is invisible to the machine code it dispenses. In an age of Viterbi coding and VLSI disk chips, even a hardware logic analyzer may not tell you what's actually on the boot tracks. For sure knowledge, you will need your own hardware, either your own replacement disk chips or a focused ion beam milling system (FIB) to take apart the disk chips and learn what they actually do. The economics of chip production make it impossibly expensive to give everyone a different chip architecture, though you can cheaply individualize every chip (another of my inventions, see http://siidtech.com ). If there is a ghost in the hardware machine, it is in all the machines, and those versed in VLSI, equipped with FIB, can find the ghosts. The individuality can be perfectly hidden, and cannot be unmasked without destroying the chip. Puzzling out a proprietary design is possible but time-consuming, perhaps costing as much as the original design. Verifying that an open source hardware design is faithfully replicated in silicon is relatively easy, and could be automated, perhaps as cheap as sequencing a genome. We do not do so, because software designers pretend the substrate does not exist, or is logically identical to all other substrates, and thus not worth controlling or verifying (doctors and pharmaceutical companies share the same pretense). Open source hardware can also encrypt, and properly-designed hardware can encrypt without fanout (no feasible side channel attacks). If we choose, we can build individual hardware that encrypts each keystroke and decrypts it at each screen, whether the path between is centimeters or megameters. With proper hardware, you can still use Gmail for your mail host, but your messages are gibberish to Google, and to whoever they share the messages with. Google banner ads can be ignored by your decrypter. Google would starve, so they want to make your software and hardware "for free", protecting their product (which is you). Hardware geeks will still need to re-examine (identical) copies of the hardware from time to time, to make sure the hardware matches specification, and crypto geeks will need to frequently re-examine the specification to make sure it is mathematically correct. And sometimes the hardware will be invalid, and we will need to replace it with new hardware. But a billion transistors costs pennies from Intel, which Amazon can get to you overnight. Why this matters to Server Sky Server sky will use far fewer routers. Access to server sky arrays will be trigonometric, agile antenna pointing, not packet routing via DNS and border gateway protocol; if the array is above the horizon and has what you want, you can talk to it directly without intermediaries, and your conversation can be encrypted end-to-end. Of course, each end can have fanout, with either the orbiting array or your ground terminal copying your conversation to your Designated Overlord. Each end can have a fanout of zero, censorship applied by that same (or different) Designated Overlord. No man-in-the-middle attacks when there is only vacuum and Maxwell's equations between sender and receiver. Orbital mechanics, Doppler shift, and twelve-nines-accurate shared clocks provide link authentication that cannot be spoofed without reshaping space-time. There will be Designated Overlords - in the US, we call the overlords "Google" and "Hollywood", in China the overlords are the Communist Party and/or the People's Liberation Army. People can't seem to live without chains, sigh. But we must design our hardware so the overlords are explicit in the design, few in number, and subject to organized social opinion (which may be more true for China than the US, though I love Google more than the PLA). This matters because the Server Sky team will make the design decisions now that will shape the hardware for decades, until the next big re-architecting (the last two were the Bell network, and internet protocol). These decisions should be informed by every capable brain on the planet. They should not be made by me, nor by my handful of smart but fallible collaborators. The best minds work elsewhere, and the best minds, if they know what's good for them, will get involved while the future is still conceptual and easy to shape. After launch, we can still replace all the satellites and all the ground terminals and all the end-user gear, but this is costly, and even the best minds don't have the money and persuasiveness to make this happen often. Better to get it approximately right the first time, and make it plug-upgradable. This webpage is an appeal for help. Bad social design is easy, and regrettably common. Hardware is easy compared to competent social design. I beg you to help design the future you and your descendants will live in. I goofed up once, I would rather not do it again. From jya at pipeline.com Wed Jul 9 09:17:15 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 12:17:15 -0400 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Message-ID: <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Tag the Cryptome Archive: "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." At 10:58 AM 7/9/2014, you wrote: >What about a Torrent ? We can easily share the >magnet everywhere (Reddit, Twitter ). > >On mer., juil. 9, 2014 at 4:04 , coderman <codderman at gmail.com> wrote: >>On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 3:27 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: >>... To do any of this you will need to collect >>all the releases of docs and images to date, in >>their original format (not AP newsspeak), in >>one place. Then dedicate much time to >>normalizing, convert to one format and import >>into tagged document store, etc. Yes, this could be hosted on the darknet. >> >>indeed. i will also be hosting the complete >>cryptome archive on hidden site, as it too is >>part of this corpus to feed into a >>normalization and extraction engine of great >>justice. i am using the various python image >>processing libraries to accomplish this but any >>language or tool could be useful. i had hoped >>to distribute the cryptome archives further >>during the Paris hackfest, alas, unexpected >>events conspired otherwise. anyone who would >>like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how >>they anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1590 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140709/dc8a2dda/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Wed Jul 9 03:17:31 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 12:17:31 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rJt55_FiCNruwkoJ-_YKav9H+PSdhEjM8D7rTpzko4YDQ@mail.gmail.com> On Jul 9, 2014 7:44 AM, Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski < cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> wrote: > It's really nice that so many of you got into the spirit and start > thinking about how to change xmpp to make it something new, but what are > you achieving here? We're being more fundamental and will achieve better and more modular results because of it. The protocol has a different aim than XMPP. > another 10+ years until any meaningful applications start using it (if > at all)... So yeah, except being "coder porn" it does nothing to help > the problem here and now. Concentrated pessimism? Why not both? Just make an XMPP bridge. Facebook does that, Google might be doing that (or proprietary extensions), who doesn't? > I agree that xmpp is not perfect, it has some problems of its own, but > it is an already established and widely used and standard protocol, with > lots of implementations. From a practical point of view the best course > of action to get something fast is to use it, and put whatever new stuff > there is needed inside xmpp, keeping it compatible with the existing spec. Why didn't XMPP do that? What do you mean widely used? IRC is widely used. XMPP is not normally used with the user knowing it is XMPP. It's under the hood technology. > A technically pretty proto won't help, today’s world has a huge problem > with taking anything new. Which is because of a lack of "polymorphic protocols". > fast machines (you can use compression on the fly, yes really :-P ), loads of > storage, broadband connections (even the 3G data caps are getting larger > and larger each year), etc. People are sending gigabytes of binary files > in base64 each day in email messages, so why even care? ;-) Nobody ever said it will be efficient. But aside from that, there's scale to worry about. You're also missing how people usually send data in binary to hotmail or gmail, then they perform whatever voodoo they perform. So, actually, most people send their e-mail attachments in binary. The rest would probably really want to, but nobody is making the standard any better. Why would they? They can do whatever they want without worrying about compatibility because they own so much market share. A new standard may have been used inside and between the mayor e-mail providers, would you know? > In my opinion the bottom line is - a small addition to existing xmpp has > a far larger chance of being widely adopted (by applications and by the > users) than a completely new protocol. And despite how awesome coder one > might be - you won't be able to write all those implementations yourself > or convince the masses to switch (again!). There is no masses using XMPP. Masses of coders, maybe, and they will use the best tool for the job. All the extensions have succeeded in making any XMPP app lacking in usability. I sure haven't found any nice XMPP clients, nice enough to compare with native clients. In fact I'm willing to bet everyone in the western world uses FB, Google chat and MSN (slackers and slowpokes). They all have limited XMPP implementations, they native clients do more. And there's no good app for interacting with XMPP. Pidgin really isn't good, it's just the only one out there. And it is still in the MSN era. I've switched to Office 2013 from Libre/OpenOffice and it really is in a different league all together. And it sucks that it is. But what can we do? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3979 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140709/f72d68f9/attachment.txt> From eugen at leitl.org Wed Jul 9 05:23:28 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 14:23:28 +0200 Subject: BPjM blacklist reversed Message-ID: <20140709122328.GG26986@leitl.org> https://bpjmleak.neocities.org/ tl;dr: Germany has a censorship federal agency called BPjM which maintains a secret list of about 3000 URLs. To keep the list secret it is distributed in the form of md5 or sha1 hashes as the "BPJM-Modul". They think this is safe. This leak explains in detail that it is in fact very easy to extract the hashed censorship list from home routers or child protection software and calculate the cleartext entries. It provides a first analysis of the sometimes absurd entries on such a governmental Internet censorship list. From edhelas at movim.eu Wed Jul 9 07:58:05 2014 From: edhelas at movim.eu (edhelas) Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 16:58:05 +0200 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> What about a Torrent ? We can easily share the magnet everywhere (Reddit, Twitter…). On mer., juil. 9, 2014 at 4:04 , coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 3:27 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: >> ... >> To do any of this you will need to collect all the releases of docs >> and images to date, in their original format (not AP newsspeak), >> in one place. Then dedicate much time to normalizing, convert to >> one format and import into tagged document store, etc. Yes, this >> could be hosted on the darknet. > > indeed. i will also be hosting the complete cryptome archive on hidden > site, as it too is part of this corpus to feed into a normalization > and extraction engine of great justice. i am using the various python > image processing libraries to accomplish this but any language or tool > could be useful. > > i had hoped to distribute the cryptome archives further during the > Paris hackfest, alas, unexpected events conspired otherwise. > > anyone who would like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how they > anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1244 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140709/2136fbbc/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 18:35:50 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 18:35:50 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Tec5NQr-iCF0bhUCuyuzTvBsMWPJQqECY8QQ_0xO9dGQ@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 9:17 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > Tag the Cryptome Archive: "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use > it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in > complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and > Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." see attached. onion before torrent; rest TBD. also: http://cryptome.org/donations.htm best regards, -------------- next part -------------- Cryptome Donation Required - http://cryptome.org/donations.htm "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." Index: 0eb8551d977dde4f4193b3a16dedcd18f01e854e371e96623d33dd5b9519e413 *USB-1.rar 9653d105293b9f77d5b0067d51a35ed286a7f50a0b37b3ea2bd78c092caab584 *USB-2.rar 7e798bb2b09cac49181aa7c12170e03fc3d3cf69a73d9e1b04171c80910e7525 Update-13-1231.rar 80652978f46ef6e6f26bd2bec406349ef766ad1722fc81d9f7575148edc6324f wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip c56f0fd30924f7398ca9e20c098acced50766d3325754f29014dd33029ebf351 wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip 9d2aa03048c60eec2c94d45293d4e95977a94f3477a4701f6ee2ef7ec888a7c9 WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip *- these files have a detached signature from key 0xB650572B8B3BF75C "Cryptome <cryptome at earthlink.net>" -------------- next part -------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iL4EABEKAGYFAlO97OxfFIAAAAAALgAoaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldDQxQzEyQjhDMzA3RDdFMjE5OEFBNTc4MTY1 QTg0N0U3QzJCOTM4MEMACgkQZahH58K5OAxW4AEAgBKvsQz16zQyBsXbAl+qluiL 5/p3BtEPTLWSW6V5gTsA/1i8gatIPCAA3TXwTHRabvScVJ16CuIMkWm7Pb6QPIhJ =XcIm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 17:17:59 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 20:17:59 -0400 Subject: distributing Cryptome June 2014 [was: data mine the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_HapN34Wa=s+nsfoSqtLD+7jBUGS_7oVnMJfVJuaTpjQ@mail.gmail.com> > Could you do tarballs or zip files, rather than rar files? They're > much easier to deal with than recent rars using free software (the > only program I know that will do it is unar[0], which depends on > loads of GNUstep stuff). > 0. http://wakaba.c3.cx/s/apps/unarchiver.html Disrupting the originals inhibits verification with others who possess mailings and should be avoided. Supplementation is fine. There's this if you don't mind blobs. http://www.rarlab.com/download.htm RAR is proprietary. ZIP is not compact. Assuming Cryptome's working platform is not an opensource Unix, I'd definitely consider switching to 7z, which works on or is shipped with Linux/Win/BSD/Mac, is opensource, and produces great compression ratios. xz is another fine choice. There are probably prettier GUI's for lzma/lzma2 out there if desired. http://www.7-zip.org/download.html http://tukaani.org/xz/ 917504 1.xz lzma2 1718180 1.7z lzma 1873481 1.rar proprietary 2247179 1.bz2 b-w-huff 3341315 1.gz lz 3345104 1.zip lz 13323604 1.tar (wget src) From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 17:38:10 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 20:38:10 -0400 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28soTT9W13V0jFR3yF_AAGGc=MOUg_PbEVhg3FebMKYfQ@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 12:17 PM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > Tag the Cryptome Archive: "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use > it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in > complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and > Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." Cryptome and JYA's curation, words, and work are important and a monument in their own right. Nuff said. As with other works in this class, I agree with this and other preservation, distribution and downstream analysis efforts. And with carrying whatever tag and preface he so wishes to be carried with them. Please ensure such frontmatter is attached. From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 18:04:46 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 21:04:46 -0400 Subject: distributing Cryptome June 2014 [was: data mine the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2--pBcoSph1CTev_pAsGZE-=z--C85Zx_brbnWHMDLbLQ@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 11:36 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 7:04 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >> ... >> anyone who would like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how they >> anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) Please put a contact key on your darknet announce. > based on feedback, here is what i intend: > > 1. A torrent of: > USB-1.rar > USB-2.rar > Update-13-1231.rar > each of these have an accompanying signature from John. OpenPGP at its best. > Griffin Boyce said: > Also keep in mind that it's possible to spy on who downloads these > just by seeding the torrent and monitoring connections to your box. So > it's certainly not anonymous. I'd say hidden service first, a website > second, and torrent third. Please no clearnet website/dumps for files. You're not teaching anyone how to use crypto tools by giving them the easy way out. Make them download and use Tor, I2P, Freenet, gnupg, sha256, whatever. You can put those instructions on clearnet if you want. > i will include a magnet URI. As for torrent... Tor doesn't have much of a darknet torrent community. I'd suggest seeding it on I2P, whereby others might pick it up there and seed on clearnet. > 2. The same files on a hidden service with nginx and HTTP/1.1 range > request capable (resume-able) The original files can be rsync'ed as well. You may want to do 500MiB split(1)'s if resumes of large files become a problem (2GiB limit bugs, etc). > note that this is a point in time archive from June 2014. > > please donate to John as i hate to think i would be taking revenue > from his pocket with this setup! I still have Cryptome CD's :) From davispuh at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 15:27:14 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 01:27:14 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rJt55_FiCNruwkoJ-_YKav9H+PSdhEjM8D7rTpzko4YDQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> <CAHWD2rJt55_FiCNruwkoJ-_YKav9H+PSdhEjM8D7rTpzko4YDQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSzQOdjTMMurtQAWv3+kx35KG2KDuzd2i53tKKZpdrp8GQ@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-08 23:31 GMT+03:00 Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl>: > 2014-07-08 21:53 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com>: > > Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in C/C++ >> using typical char * null-terminated string, how'll pass this JSON to >> someone? because well NUL... > > > At the parser level you would find a "b" character that's not between > brackets, signalling a binary header is coming. A binary header is actually > just the number of bytes that follow in binary format. The following bytes > are then a binary file, to be assigned to a string as if it were a > variable. We have a binarybuffer in javascript, that sort of thing. It > would contain the NULL byte if you like it to. > > [...] > > I think it's much more serious that you have to serve the BJSON completely > as a binary file. It's not like you can dump it onto a webpage anymore. You > can't slip it into your normal HTTP text transfer bodies either, has to > work with attachments. Attachments should be secure when facing malformed > transfers* etc. Inconvenient, but not the end. > > A lot of protocols are text based, often implemented using C strings and that's what I mean, you can't embed a JSON with binary data containing NUL there (because NUL will terminate that string), so you handle it like typical binary file and then what's the point of JSON to use in first place, because I don't see how it can be any better than any other proper binary data. Such binary JSON gives only overhead but no advantages. 2014-07-09 7:25 GMT+03:00 Bill Stewart <billstewart at pobox.com>: > I haven't used it in years, but I was always quite fond of XDR > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/External_Data_Representation > Sun's External Data Representation coding from the 80s, RFC-1014. > Defines a bunch of variable types, and gives you tools for packing and > unpacking them. > > It's actually pretty good, but there are reasons why Protobuf was created and used instead. The main benefit of Protobuf is that it's easily extendable and can have optional fields. If you add or remove optional fields to server all old clients will still work like nothing have changed. But with XDR you can't do that unless you add another layer on top of it, but that's more work comparing to just taking Protobuf and using it. Also currently Protobuf is much more popular and have more libraries available for dozens of langauges. 2014-07-09 8:30 GMT+03:00 "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" < cyberkiller8 at gmail.com>: > > It's really nice that so many of you got into the spirit and start > thinking about how to change xmpp to make it something new, but what are > you achieving here? It will end up being a new protocol, incompatible > with existing xmpp, it will take a few years to finish the spec, then > another 10+ years until any meaningful applications start using it (if > at all)... So yeah, except being "coder porn" it does nothing to help > the problem here and now. > > The goal would be to create smaller overhead and thus be more performance effective. Also it doesn't have to be incompatible. It could be incorporated in XMPP so that new applications could use it but other's just use same legacy XMPP and everything keeps working fine and people wouldn't know what's happening under the hood, nor they would care. And I think it would be trivial to convince people to use and enable this "Binary" XMPP mode (if it's implemented in their client) which makes their chat client app to use 100x times less bandwidth and 50x times less CPU time (spent in parsing), thus your phone's battery would last longer. And yes XML overhead is that big. > A technically pretty proto won't help, today’s world has a huge problem > with taking anything new. Better to stay with existing stuff, make it > maybe less efficient because of it, but it will be here fast, when it's > needed. Plus being less efficient is a no issue today, with fast > machines (you can use compression on the fly, yes really :-P ), loads of > storage, broadband connections (even the 3G data caps are getting larger > and larger each year), etc. People are sending gigabytes of binary files > in base64 each day in email messages, so why even care? ;-) > > I guess you don't know that nothing is ever fast or good enough. People will always want things faster. What about real-time video call in 4k @ 60 FPS ? It's unreal to imagine this in XMPP unless some really good binary protocol is used so that it's not your software that creates a bottleneck, but if it does then your software is bad and why would I use it over other that can do it, the one that was designed for it, for example see Elemental Demonstrates 4K HEVC Video at 60 fps in London <http://www.streamingmediaglobal.com/Articles/Editorial/Featured-Articles/Elemental-Demonstrates-4K-HEVC-Video-at-60-fps-in-London-93707.aspx> Anyway, I must admit that I haven't studied XMPP enough to know how good or bad it is, but always should try to minimize any overhead, basically you want to process as little as possible. Here straight from wiki, weaknesses: - Does not support Quality of Service (QoS) - XMPP does not have the ability to set the timing flow of messages, preventing XMPP from becoming practical for many embedded distributed realtime, Machine-to-Machine, or IoT applications. - High overhead for embedded applications - As a text based protocol, XMPP has a relatively high computing and network overhead. - In-band binary data transfer is inefficient - Binary data must be first base64 encoded before it can be transmitted in-band. Therefore any significant amount of binary data (e.g., file transfers) is best transmitted out-of-band, using in-band messages to coordinate. The best example of this is the Jingle <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jingle_%28protocol%29> XMPP Extension Protocol, XEP-0166 <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0166.html>. This issue are being adressed by the experimental XEP-0322: Efficient XML Interchange (EXI) Format <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0322.html>. that sounds really really bad. But it's not all lost, Jingle <http://xmpp.org/about-xmpp/technology-overview/jingle/> actually seems good as it have option to switch to Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-time_Transport_Protocol> and then it's just pure binary stream with minimal overhead. And looks like they are aware of these issues as EXI is being developed, but still while it's a big step forward, it will never beat pure binary protocol. Also from wiki, this is good idea: A perhaps more efficient transport for real-time messaging is WebSocket <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebSocket>, a web technology providing for bi-directional, full-duplex communications channels over a single TCP connection. Experimental implementations of XMPP over WebSocket exist, and a (now-expired) Internet-Draft documenting this approach was published at the IETF but not yet standardized. In my opinion the bottom line is - a small addition to existing xmpp has > a far larger chance of being widely adopted (by applications and by the > users) than a completely new protocol. And despite how awesome coder one > might be - you won't be able to write all those implementations yourself > or convince the masses to switch (again!). > > Maybe yes, maybe no. I think if you've written specification in very clear and understandable way and if you've reference implementation library which everyone could just link against and if your protocol does it better than current existing solutions then I don't see why it wouldn't get adapted. Besides you don't need it implemented everywhere, you need it so that it's in application you use and you could contribute there yourself. 2014-07-09 13:17 GMT+03:00 Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl>: > [...] > > There is no masses using XMPP. Masses of coders, maybe, and they will use > the best tool for the job. > > All the extensions have succeeded in making any XMPP app lacking in > usability. I sure haven't found any nice XMPP clients, nice enough to > compare with native clients. > That's true indeed, currently there aren't any decent XMPP client (atleast I'm not aware of any). I mean from user's usability point (UX/UI). There are good either proprietary clients (eg. Skype) or good open source clients (eq. Quassel) that doesn't support XMPP :D In fact I'm willing to bet everyone in the western world uses FB, Google > chat and MSN (slackers and slowpokes). They all have limited XMPP > implementations, they native clients do more. And there's no good app for > interacting with XMPP. > About which Western wold you're talking about? I don't know, but I would assume that in Europe, Skype would be one of the most popular clients. Atleast here MSN never was a thing and everyone have always been using Skype and almost everyone still does. FB isn't really used that much (here we've better alternative). And about Google Talk only some people are aware that it even exists. I know that in Russia it's ICQ and in China it's QQ that's dominating there. Anyway I think they don't implement XMPP because it's too much work for too small benefit. Also then how they would compete with others if they would be limited with XMPP if it doesn't do something that they want to do. So own protocol might be safer bet for a lot of companies. By the way Google Talk dropped XMPP support <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/google-abandons-open-standards-instant-messaging> . I actually really hoped that Tox would succeed so that I could drop Skype and convince others to do same :D But now I'm not so sure if there will be some replacement in nearest future. Actually I think one of reason why Tox created new protocol and didn't used XMPP is that generally XMPP consists of client-server architecture and P2P support is only with extension which isn't widely known nor implemented much. Also XMPP seems way too complicated than it should be. Pidgin really isn't good, it's just the only one out there. And it is still > in the MSN era. I've switched to Office 2013 from Libre/OpenOffice and it > really is in a different league all together. And it sucks that it is. But > what can we do? > I personally don't like Pidgin too. And about Office and LibreOffice they both have their own advantages and disadvantages but I wouldn't say that any of them would be significantly better or worse than other. Also it's nothing to do with open souirce, it's just we've more users that want everything to be perfect without any effort for free than go and help and contribute to projects. Ok, so anyway I've come to conclusion that I'm not sure anymore whether it's better to try to fix XMPP or just create new much simpler and better protocol. But in any case we really should summarize all our points about what's bad in XMPP and send them to XMPP group and see if they're willing to fix them and accept our proposals. If we want to create a new protocol, then I've few ideas about it. Firstly it's really a shame that a lot of things are getting reinvented over and over again. So the main goal would be don't reinvent stuff but reuse as much as possible from existing things. It would help a lot as there's libraries for already everything and would just have to combine them. Next, think about high-level differences between instant message, group message, offline chat message, email, SMS, MMS, mailing list. What are differences? Actually if you think about it, there are no differences at all, it's the same message being delivered in various ways. But why single protocol couldn't handle it all? In fact it could. We're already using browser for all of that. It's just that there's no specification to unify it all in single protocol. Imagine if we wouldn't need a separate application for IRC, for email nor for other chats. It all could be handled by one general protocol. And why stop here, actually calls, sound and video are also exactly same. There's no really difference between text or sound/video, it's just a data and it depends only how you interpret it. Also security, there's only one option, just encrypt it all before sending. It's just so simple. This next generation protocol would be a superset of typical media protocols and thus it wouldn't matter anymore what other people use. You would just use some middle-ware protocol layer that would translate that foreign protocol to this next-gen protocol and you simply use your favorite client. From user's point of view it doesn't matter at all which protocol is used under the hood. So the main features and design goals of this protocol should be: - Support for peer-to-peer and client-server architectures over both TCP and UDP - Lightweight, minimal overhead, generally be just pass-thru - Efficient encoding, basically binary streams - Encryption by default with option for OTR - Data stream itself can contain anything: text, images, sound, video, animations, screen sharing (and even remote desktop control would be possible) - Dozens of events: joined, left, started typing and so on - One to one and one to many streams - maybe more things So how that all would be possible? It's extremely simple. In client-server architecture, open connection to server, establish TLS (for example) now send this next-gen protocol header message (to specify what kind of data you're sending) and then send your data, it could be for example a raw Theora <http://www.theora.org/> stream (directly from your camera) or just a text message. Then server just relays it to all parties. I don't think it could be any simpler and nothing will beat this in terms of performance. You've just some basic dependencies and what would be the reason to complicate this? It's trivial to implement as there's already libraries for those. In case of offline messages server would just store them and in fact it could do same for sound and videos too. You know Vine, Snapchat? what about YouTube, Soundcloud, basically it could support them all. IMO this is millions worth idea :D It's worth looking at WebSockets <https://www.websocket.org/>, WebRTC <http://www.webrtc.org> and probably other standards. I really don't understand why currently it all have been made so complicated because it isn't. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 18104 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/105a73d3/attachment.txt> From hettinga at gmail.com Thu Jul 10 03:37:21 2014 From: hettinga at gmail.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 06:37:21 -0400 Subject: [Server-sky] Server sky and social architecture In-Reply-To: <20140710090654.GV26986@leitl.org> References: <20140710090654.GV26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <D54FF7F8-CCF8-4A0B-A89B-BC6154D1282B@gmail.com> On Jul 10, 2014, at 5:06 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > Keith Lofstrom Lord. I met Keith at the 1983 SSI Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing, where he was pitching the LaunchLoop. Bob is old. :-) Cheers, RAH -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 496 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/261cf291/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 10 00:59:19 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 08:59:19 +0100 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSzQOdjTMMurtQAWv3+kx35KG2KDuzd2i53tKKZpdrp8GQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> <CAHWD2rJt55_FiCNruwkoJ-_YKav9H+PSdhEjM8D7rTpzko4YDQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzQOdjTMMurtQAWv3+kx35KG2KDuzd2i53tKKZpdrp8GQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53BE47D7.8080900@cathalgarvey.me> > A lot of protocols are text based, often implemented using C strings and > that's what I mean, you can't embed a JSON with binary data containing NUL > there (because NUL will terminate that string), so you handle it like > typical binary file and then what's the point of JSON to use in first > place, because I don't see how it can be any better than any other proper > binary data. Such binary JSON gives only overhead but no advantages. You can also shove NUL bytes into any other transfer encoding to make headaches for the recipient, it's not an encoding-specific problem. It's up to the author of a decoder to account for their language's issues. In C, you'd have to treat the data as binary, not a string, to avoid NUL termination, and only decode (safely) that which is explicitly described as a UTF8 string by leading with "u"; if that contains premature NULs, it's an error condition. On 09/07/14 23:27, Dāvis Mosāns wrote: > 2014-07-08 23:31 GMT+03:00 Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl>: > >> 2014-07-08 21:53 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com>: >> >> Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in C/C++ >>> using typical char * null-terminated string, how'll pass this JSON to >>> someone? because well NUL... >> >> >> At the parser level you would find a "b" character that's not between >> brackets, signalling a binary header is coming. A binary header is actually >> just the number of bytes that follow in binary format. The following bytes >> are then a binary file, to be assigned to a string as if it were a >> variable. We have a binarybuffer in javascript, that sort of thing. It >> would contain the NULL byte if you like it to. >> >> [...] >> >> I think it's much more serious that you have to serve the BJSON completely >> as a binary file. It's not like you can dump it onto a webpage anymore. You >> can't slip it into your normal HTTP text transfer bodies either, has to >> work with attachments. Attachments should be secure when facing malformed >> transfers* etc. Inconvenient, but not the end. >> >> > A lot of protocols are text based, often implemented using C strings and > that's what I mean, you can't embed a JSON with binary data containing NUL > there (because NUL will terminate that string), so you handle it like > typical binary file and then what's the point of JSON to use in first > place, because I don't see how it can be any better than any other proper > binary data. Such binary JSON gives only overhead but no advantages. > > > 2014-07-09 7:25 GMT+03:00 Bill Stewart <billstewart at pobox.com>: > >> I haven't used it in years, but I was always quite fond of XDR >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/External_Data_Representation >> Sun's External Data Representation coding from the 80s, RFC-1014. >> Defines a bunch of variable types, and gives you tools for packing and >> unpacking them. >> >> > It's actually pretty good, but there are reasons why Protobuf was created > and used instead. The main benefit of Protobuf is that it's easily > extendable and can have optional fields. If you add or remove optional > fields to server all old clients will still work like nothing have changed. > But with XDR you can't do that unless you add another layer on top of it, > but that's more work comparing to just taking Protobuf and using it. Also > currently Protobuf is much more popular and have more libraries available > for dozens of langauges. > > > 2014-07-09 8:30 GMT+03:00 "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" < > cyberkiller8 at gmail.com>: > >> >> It's really nice that so many of you got into the spirit and start >> thinking about how to change xmpp to make it something new, but what are >> you achieving here? It will end up being a new protocol, incompatible >> with existing xmpp, it will take a few years to finish the spec, then >> another 10+ years until any meaningful applications start using it (if >> at all)... So yeah, except being "coder porn" it does nothing to help >> the problem here and now. >> >> > The goal would be to create smaller overhead and thus be more performance > effective. Also it doesn't have to be incompatible. It could be > incorporated in XMPP so that new applications could use it but other's just > use same legacy XMPP and everything keeps working fine and people wouldn't > know what's happening under the hood, nor they would care. And I think it > would be trivial to convince people to use and enable this "Binary" XMPP > mode (if it's implemented in their client) which makes their chat client > app to use 100x times less bandwidth and 50x times less CPU time (spent in > parsing), thus your phone's battery would last longer. And yes XML overhead > is that big. > > >> A technically pretty proto won't help, today’s world has a huge problem >> with taking anything new. Better to stay with existing stuff, make it >> maybe less efficient because of it, but it will be here fast, when it's >> needed. Plus being less efficient is a no issue today, with fast >> machines (you can use compression on the fly, yes really :-P ), loads of >> storage, broadband connections (even the 3G data caps are getting larger >> and larger each year), etc. People are sending gigabytes of binary files >> in base64 each day in email messages, so why even care? ;-) >> >> > I guess you don't know that nothing is ever fast or good enough. People > will always want things faster. What about real-time video call in 4k @ 60 > FPS ? It's unreal to imagine this in XMPP unless some really good binary > protocol is used so that it's not your software that creates a bottleneck, > but if it does then your software is bad and why would I use it over other > that can do it, the one that was designed for it, for example see Elemental > Demonstrates 4K HEVC Video at 60 fps in London > <http://www.streamingmediaglobal.com/Articles/Editorial/Featured-Articles/Elemental-Demonstrates-4K-HEVC-Video-at-60-fps-in-London-93707.aspx> > > Anyway, I must admit that I haven't studied XMPP enough to know how good or > bad it is, but always should try to minimize any overhead, basically you > want to process as little as possible. > > Here straight from wiki, weaknesses: > > - Does not support Quality of Service (QoS) > - XMPP does not have the ability to set the timing flow of messages, > preventing XMPP from becoming practical for many embedded distributed > realtime, Machine-to-Machine, or IoT applications. > - High overhead for embedded applications > - As a text based protocol, XMPP has a relatively high computing and > network overhead. > - In-band binary data transfer is inefficient > - Binary data must be first base64 encoded before it can be > transmitted in-band. Therefore any significant amount of binary > data (e.g., > file transfers) is best transmitted out-of-band, using in-band > messages to > coordinate. The best example of this is the Jingle > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jingle_%28protocol%29> XMPP Extension > Protocol, XEP-0166 <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0166.html>. This > issue are being adressed by the experimental XEP-0322: Efficient XML > Interchange (EXI) Format <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0322.html>. > > > that sounds really really bad. But it's not all lost, Jingle > <http://xmpp.org/about-xmpp/technology-overview/jingle/> actually seems > good as it have option to switch to Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-time_Transport_Protocol> and then it's > just pure binary stream with minimal overhead. And looks like they are > aware of these issues as EXI is being developed, but still while it's a big > step forward, it will never beat pure binary protocol. > > Also from wiki, this is good idea: > > A perhaps more efficient transport for real-time messaging is WebSocket > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebSocket>, a web technology providing for > bi-directional, full-duplex communications channels over a single TCP > connection. Experimental implementations of XMPP over WebSocket exist, and > a (now-expired) Internet-Draft documenting this approach was published at > the IETF but not yet standardized. > > > In my opinion the bottom line is - a small addition to existing xmpp has >> a far larger chance of being widely adopted (by applications and by the >> users) than a completely new protocol. And despite how awesome coder one >> might be - you won't be able to write all those implementations yourself >> or convince the masses to switch (again!). >> >> > Maybe yes, maybe no. I think if you've written specification in very clear > and understandable way and if you've reference implementation library which > everyone could just link against and if your protocol does it better than > current existing solutions then I don't see why it wouldn't get adapted. > Besides you don't need it implemented everywhere, you need it so that it's > in application you use and you could contribute there yourself. > > > 2014-07-09 13:17 GMT+03:00 Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl>: > >> [...] >> >> There is no masses using XMPP. Masses of coders, maybe, and they will use >> the best tool for the job. >> >> All the extensions have succeeded in making any XMPP app lacking in >> usability. I sure haven't found any nice XMPP clients, nice enough to >> compare with native clients. >> > That's true indeed, currently there aren't any decent XMPP client (atleast > I'm not aware of any). I mean from user's usability point (UX/UI). There > are good either proprietary clients (eg. Skype) or good open source clients > (eq. Quassel) that doesn't support XMPP :D > > In fact I'm willing to bet everyone in the western world uses FB, Google >> chat and MSN (slackers and slowpokes). They all have limited XMPP >> implementations, they native clients do more. And there's no good app for >> interacting with XMPP. >> > About which Western wold you're talking about? I don't know, but I would > assume that in Europe, Skype would be one of the most popular clients. > Atleast here MSN never was a thing and everyone have always been using > Skype and almost everyone still does. FB isn't really used that much (here > we've better alternative). And about Google Talk only some people are aware > that it even exists. I know that in Russia it's ICQ and in China it's QQ > that's dominating there. Anyway I think they don't implement XMPP because > it's too much work for too small benefit. Also then how they would compete > with others if they would be limited with XMPP if it doesn't do something > that they want to do. So own protocol might be safer bet for a lot of > companies. By the way Google Talk dropped XMPP support > <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/google-abandons-open-standards-instant-messaging> > . > > > I actually really hoped that Tox would succeed so that I could drop Skype > and convince others to do same :D But now I'm not so sure if there will be > some replacement in nearest future. Actually I think one of reason why Tox > created new protocol and didn't used XMPP is that generally XMPP consists > of client-server architecture and P2P support is only with extension which > isn't widely known nor implemented much. Also XMPP seems way too > complicated than it should be. > > Pidgin really isn't good, it's just the only one out there. And it is still >> in the MSN era. I've switched to Office 2013 from Libre/OpenOffice and it >> really is in a different league all together. And it sucks that it is. But >> what can we do? >> > I personally don't like Pidgin too. And about Office and LibreOffice they > both have their own advantages and disadvantages but I wouldn't say that > any of them would be significantly better or worse than other. Also it's > nothing to do with open souirce, it's just we've more users that want > everything to be perfect without any effort for free than go and help and > contribute to projects. > > > Ok, so anyway I've come to conclusion that I'm not sure anymore whether > it's better to try to fix XMPP or just create new much simpler and better > protocol. But in any case we really should summarize all our points about > what's bad in XMPP and send them to XMPP group and see if they're willing > to fix them and accept our proposals. > > If we want to create a new protocol, then I've few ideas about it. Firstly > it's really a shame that a lot of things are getting reinvented over and > over again. So the main goal would be don't reinvent stuff but reuse as > much as possible from existing things. It would help a lot as there's > libraries for already everything and would just have to combine them. Next, > think about high-level differences between instant message, group message, > offline chat message, email, SMS, MMS, mailing list. What are differences? > Actually if you think about it, there are no differences at all, it's the > same message being delivered in various ways. But why single protocol > couldn't handle it all? In fact it could. We're already using browser for > all of that. It's just that there's no specification to unify it all in > single protocol. Imagine if we wouldn't need a separate application for > IRC, for email nor for other chats. It all could be handled by one general > protocol. And why stop here, actually calls, sound and video are also > exactly same. There's no really difference between text or sound/video, > it's just a data and it depends only how you interpret it. Also security, > there's only one option, just encrypt it all before sending. It's just so > simple. > > This next generation protocol would be a superset of typical media > protocols and thus it wouldn't matter anymore what other people use. You > would just use some middle-ware protocol layer that would translate that > foreign protocol to this next-gen protocol and you simply use your favorite > client. From user's point of view it doesn't matter at all which protocol > is used under the hood. > > So the main features and design goals of this protocol should be: > > - Support for peer-to-peer and client-server architectures over both TCP > and UDP > - Lightweight, minimal overhead, generally be just pass-thru > - Efficient encoding, basically binary streams > - Encryption by default with option for OTR > - Data stream itself can contain anything: text, images, sound, video, > animations, screen sharing (and even remote desktop control would be > possible) > - Dozens of events: joined, left, started typing and so on > - One to one and one to many streams > - maybe more things > > > So how that all would be possible? It's extremely simple. In client-server > architecture, open connection to server, establish TLS (for example) now > send this next-gen protocol header message (to specify what kind of data > you're sending) and then send your data, it could be for example a raw > Theora <http://www.theora.org/> stream (directly from your camera) or just > a text message. Then server just relays it to all parties. > > I don't think it could be any simpler and nothing will beat this in terms > of performance. You've just some basic dependencies and what would be the > reason to complicate this? It's trivial to implement as there's already > libraries for those. In case of offline messages server would just store > them and in fact it could do same for sound and videos too. You know Vine, > Snapchat? what about YouTube, Soundcloud, basically it could support them > all. IMO this is millions worth idea :D > > > It's worth looking at WebSockets <https://www.websocket.org/>, WebRTC > <http://www.webrtc.org> and probably other standards. > > > I really don't understand why currently it all have been made so > complicated because it isn't. > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/243194fb/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/243194fb/attachment.sig> From deoxyt2 at lacamaradegas.cl Thu Jul 10 07:17:37 2014 From: deoxyt2 at lacamaradegas.cl (deoxyt2) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 10:17:37 -0400 Subject: Chile, project to modify the penal code. Message-ID: <BLU436-SMTP257C70BF619780B80C57FA1960E0@phx.gbl> Attached document [es] which attempts to modify the penal code of Chile, which involves reducing the freedom of expression in our country. A part of the amendments says: Add how numeral 3rd of article 261 of the title VI: Those who make threats or utter insults against the authority by means of electronic platforms, either textual or graphical, form being considered as aggravating circumstance that don't do it with your true identity or that attempt to impede the identification of the computer from which the message spreads. Regards. deoxyt2.- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: proyecto modifica c?digo penal.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 14519 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/5007d9be/attachment.docx> From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 10 02:06:55 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 11:06:55 +0200 Subject: [Server-sky] Server sky and social architecture Message-ID: <20140710090654.GV26986@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Keith Lofstrom <keithl at kl-ic.com> ----- From blibbet at gmail.com Thu Jul 10 15:54:51 2014 From: blibbet at gmail.com (Blibbet) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 15:54:51 -0700 Subject: tools used by intelligence analysts In-Reply-To: <26ebfd1e9a4edd4756866edf60622452@cryptolab.net> References: <20140703131613.GJ26986@leitl.org> <26ebfd1e9a4edd4756866edf60622452@cryptolab.net> Message-ID: <20140710155451.14838b20@dbox> > This is very useful, thanks for sharing. There's a mostly-annual semantic technology conference called STIDS (Semantic Technology for Intelligence, Defense, and Security), formerly called OIC (Ontologies for the Intelligence Community). First day is public, second day is secret. Focuses on using semantic network technologies for national security issues. http://stids.c4i.gmu.edu/index.php The list of sponsors and vendors, and most of the presentations are from companies talking about how well their products work, are useful to find out companies that analyze various metadata. It's funny how many are based on open source technologies, like Semantic MediaWiki. :-) From coderman at gmail.com Thu Jul 10 17:29:42 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 17:29:42 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Tec5NQr-iCF0bhUCuyuzTvBsMWPJQqECY8QQ_0xO9dGQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAJVRA1Tec5NQr-iCF0bhUCuyuzTvBsMWPJQqECY8QQ_0xO9dGQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1S=LwGugvi3Oggk4OoUmkyX7zaLjtgp6U5CAaVYc0dAdQ@mail.gmail.com> -------------- next part -------------- Cryptome Donation Required - http://cryptome.org/donations.htm Donation also provides current archive as this selection is not current, and increasingly out of date by the day. - "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." - Index: 0eb8551d977dde4f4193b3a16dedcd18f01e854e371e96623d33dd5b9519e413 *USB-1.rar 9653d105293b9f77d5b0067d51a35ed286a7f50a0b37b3ea2bd78c092caab584 *USB-2.rar 7e798bb2b09cac49181aa7c12170e03fc3d3cf69a73d9e1b04171c80910e7525 Update-13-1231.rar b63e185c21232724f9c90238496b9122a46d492752d56f690200fab6fe9fb6ed Update-14-0206-0602.tar.rar 6e5146b4c53f61b555822eda90e70a20a8050fe3dbf0bd3a084a042a36bdd3b1 Cryptome-Update-13-0701-to-13-1202.tgz 80652978f46ef6e6f26bd2bec406349ef766ad1722fc81d9f7575148edc6324f wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip c56f0fd30924f7398ca9e20c098acced50766d3325754f29014dd33029ebf351 wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip 9d2aa03048c60eec2c94d45293d4e95977a94f3477a4701f6ee2ef7ec888a7c9 WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip *- these files have a detached signature by presumed key 0xB650572B8B3BF75C "Cryptome <cryptome at earthlink.net>" - Recommended Usage: # Requires Tor running and http proxy to Tor at 127.0.0.1:8888 export onions="sek42kxkbjuivxws.onion ajzxwgtrtws7zwyg.onion wpv2bxujoctsmzcn.onion aiyu6uyckomxt2ld.onion kvrvzxgdutjcjxqw.onion hz5sj76rh3avsmfc.onion jt7klzczup6hrtes.onion 3qcs4cqbsrfdz7xa.onion" export files="Update-13-1231.rar Update-14-0206-0602.tar.rar USB-1.rar USB-2.rar wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip Cryptome-Update-13-0701-to-13-1202.tgz" for cfile in `echo $files`; do export olist="" for chost in `echo $onions`; do export olist="${olist} http://${chost}/cryptome-july2014/${cfile}" done echo "Retrieving $cfile ..." aria2c \ --all-proxy=127.0.0.1:8123 \ --continue=true --always-resume=true \ --retry-wait=30 --timeout=120 \ --summary-interval=3 \ --max-connection-per-server=2 --max-concurrent-downloads=8 \ -o "$cfile" `echo $olist` done -------------- next part -------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iL4EABEKAGYFAlO/L2BfFIAAAAAALgAoaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldDQxQzEyQjhDMzA3RDdFMjE5OEFBNTc4MTY1 QTg0N0U3QzJCOTM4MEMACgkQZahH58K5OAyvjgEAjX5aggjFGl2sIHqzBZanMYiV pQ6Wm9EaH1UvPHkt4CgBAKTqhhj77W4aNfkafuqxXM9pgUaBBhT3pnKe64I0vaGs =jqsm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net Thu Jul 10 22:39:12 2014 From: nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net (Nicolas Bourbaki) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 07:39:12 +0200 Subject: GeoIP is a threat to democracy Message-ID: <53BF7880.5050807@riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 It seemed logical that old-world media companies would want to restrict access to content on the Internet. GeoIP was then used to induce distribution barriers analogous to those found offline so that existing models of rent extraction could survive. And while this is something most of us would be fine with leaving to the invisible hand of the market we can not take the same stance when governments start to use these measures to dictate who is a citizen, and who is not, and who is provided civil liberties and who is not. This is what the XKeyscore rules made clear was happening and will continue to happen in the future. The internet standards and governing bodies cannot relinquish themselves of political responsibility any longer. The structure of a protocol will dictate our behavior and in this world there is no such thing as an agnostic protocol. The term "neutrality" is false. In the context of service providers battling with media providers over who gets a larger share of rent from consumers, "neutrality" may be the agreed upon term but the policies that result from this debate will have real impact on our behavior, the ethics of the protocol, and our liberties. Once a neutral protocol is understood as an oxymoron standards bodies with charters claiming to serve the betterment of all nations, corporations and consumers should be clearly seen for what they are: a new Tower of Babel. Those of us still placing stones one on top of the other within these institutions should take a moment to look at our work and ask what are we actually doing. In 2010 the DHS went against their own charter and hijacked ICANN's to take down hundreds of domains for unclear copyright claims. Why is ICANN still relevant when decentralized models could easily replace them when supported by either the EU, Google or Firefox? And when the NSA can with absolutely no oversight claim that the location of an IP in some table dictates who gets civil liberties, why have we not replaced BGP or at least begun to build parallel models within universities or like minded corporations that could support reverse tunnels through collision free identities similar to Tor's onion service handles? The number of protocols that falsely advertised as agnostic are many. We should be ashamed that it took such a scandal as pervasive western surveillance to awaken us to this falsehood when so many, living under more hostel regimes, have lived with the tools of oppression we built into these protocols from the very start. If we cannot convince our institutions to take fixing these falsehoods seriously by considering civil liberties within the protocol, and overcome the obstacles of legacy systems, and work for support for parallel models, than at least we can hasten the demise of this Babel to start anew. Indeed this may sadden optimists such as Larry Page and others that are waiting for technology to become our messiah. But as Benjamin Franklin would say, those who would trade liberated networks for efficient networks deserve neither. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTv3iAAAoJEHi6xtksL8/uJo4P/jf7RVFFJKtUD5VmEzWUr7eK 2B74/ksSqjJWyqHCVcWCRVIQpokzgBq6cwITNRky8ahh0I1+4NORJVOj++n9b6d0 4Wv2mihZpEdIOLOZZESSYgb05L9rPXuX8HTdOtWkbFgpcofXqO59Q1Y6xOKhdZlI 2PwZTXUkmnqycv7cE1n6GgYrR41M+RZzXSiEEHqeVi3pbfYGEaTTX78vcmYzmMGP E7NlJzUvwWRLZMnX9+RN0qUiZQsqKRhOYwfl3Pj7XOo7GNlUqGcphY+cQUHTSNf5 i3HZbblq3UDCAQ7kWFiX+yj5NGVAyfUVBYxJx0/RrJf5zcG9JfzKPXuOtlfeq/yF G9SJ+qCydnCzDmdZCphw0pcGOZnDRBPQzUjd+bdjpBbv2y76Jz3zKzj3Jv1QjkeN NMaw7fGfJ4uTCddFJv2gLdgB0BZta6shhqBoca3k03qWJAmKkp4/559ApoZo8Eyz Gg8+iwPQPsew/2SpXtV6uj1jyLcy36jM1F0IC4OkfGwAFyHJ+Xy/QQehJLlZ+yPO r+aLDIN1+a1ydLINCcv9OhVQCuUO9vfPah0TB2Jql+kD05MNfMnDtTMYVgQaMlcd o+QOj9U2fhVN5qWpMWoxathO0k+L1nwIMUqpMi6GOMS9wqw8pUCdoBhDka/FElQG 50CdY4PooGDfOksxeF+G =3CPP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From eugen at leitl.org Fri Jul 11 03:36:00 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:36:00 +0200 Subject: The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control Message-ID: <20140711103600.GA26986@leitl.org> http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William Binney – that's a 'totalitarian mentality' Antony Loewenstein theguardian.com, Friday 11 July 2014 00.54 BST William Binney testifies before a German inquiry into surveillance. Photograph: Getty Images William Binney is one of the highest-level whistleblowers to ever emerge from the NSA. He was a leading code-breaker against the Soviet Union during the Cold War but resigned soon after September 11, disgusted by Washington’s move towards mass surveillance. On 5 July he spoke at a conference in London organised by the Centre for Investigative Journalism and revealed the extent of the surveillance programs unleashed by the Bush and Obama administrations. “At least 80% of fibre-optic cables globally go via the US”, Binney said. “This is no accident and allows the US to view all communication coming in. At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are recorded and stored in the US. The NSA lies about what it stores.” The NSA will soon be able to collect 966 exabytes a year, the total of internet traffic annually. Former Google head Eric Schmidt once argued that the entire amount of knowledge from the beginning of humankind until 2003 amount to only five exabytes. Binney, who featured in a 2012 short film by Oscar-nominated US film-maker Laura Poitras, described a future where surveillance is ubiquitous and government intrusion unlimited. “The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control”, Binney said, “but I’m a little optimistic with some recent Supreme Court decisions, such as law enforcement mostly now needing a warrant before searching a smartphone.” He praised the revelations and bravery of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and told me that he had indirect contact with a number of other NSA employees who felt disgusted with the agency’s work. They’re keen to speak out but fear retribution and exile, not unlike Snowden himself, who is likely to remain there for some time. Unlike Snowden, Binney didn’t take any documents with him when he left the NSA. He now says that hard evidence of illegal spying would have been invaluable. The latest Snowden leaks, featured in the Washington Post, detail private conversations of average Americans with no connection to extremism. It shows that the NSA is not just pursuing terrorism, as it claims, but ordinary citizens going about their daily communications. “The NSA is mass-collecting on everyone”, Binney said, “and it’s said to be about terrorism but inside the US it has stopped zero attacks.” The lack of official oversight is one of Binney’s key concerns, particularly of the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Fisa), which is held out by NSA defenders as a sign of the surveillance scheme's constitutionality. “The Fisa court has only the government’s point of view”, he argued. “There are no other views for the judges to consider. There have been at least 15-20 trillion constitutional violations for US domestic audiences and you can double that globally.” A Fisa court in 2010 allowed the NSA to spy on 193 countries around the world, plus the World Bank, though there’s evidence that even the nations the US isn’t supposed to monitor – Five Eyes allies Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – aren’t immune from being spied on. It’s why encryption is today so essential to transmit information safely. Binney recently told the German NSA inquiry committee that his former employer had a “totalitarian mentality” that was the "greatest threat" to US society since that country’s US Civil War in the 19th century. Despite this remarkable power, Binney still mocked the NSA’s failures, including missing this year’s Russian intervention in Ukraine and the Islamic State’s take-over of Iraq. The era of mass surveillance has gone from the fringes of public debate to the mainstream, where it belongs. The Pew Research Centre released a report this month, Digital Life in 2025, that predicted worsening state control and censorship, reduced public trust, and increased commercialisation of every aspect of web culture. It’s not just internet experts warning about the internet’s colonisation by state and corporate power. One of Europe’s leading web creators, Lena Thiele, presented her stunning series Netwars in London on the threat of cyber warfare. She showed how easy it is for governments and corporations to capture our personal information without us even realising. Thiele said that the US budget for cyber security was US$67 billion in 2013 and will double by 2016. Much of this money is wasted and doesn't protect online infrastructure. This fact doesn’t worry the multinationals making a killing from the gross exaggeration of fear that permeates the public domain. Wikileaks understands this reality better than most. Founder Julian Assange and investigative editor Sarah Harrison both remain in legal limbo. I spent time with Assange in his current home at the Ecuadorian embassy in London last week, where he continues to work, release leaks, and fight various legal battles. He hopes to resolve his predicament soon. At the Centre for Investigative Journalism conference, Harrison stressed the importance of journalists who work with technologists to best report the NSA stories. “It’s no accident”, she said, “that some of the best stories on the NSA are in Germany, where there’s technical assistance from people like Jacob Appelbaum.” A core Wikileaks belief, she stressed, is releasing all documents in their entirety, something the group criticised the news site The Intercept for not doing on a recent story. “The full archive should always be published”, Harrison said. With 8m documents on its website after years of leaking, the importance of publishing and maintaining source documents for the media, general public and court cases can’t be under-estimated. “I see Wikileaks as a library”, Assange said. “We’re the librarians who can’t say no.” With evidence that there could be a second NSA leaker, the time for more aggressive reporting is now. As Binney said: “I call people who are covering up NSA crimes traitors”. From rodionraskolnikov at riseup.net Fri Jul 11 09:36:51 2014 From: rodionraskolnikov at riseup.net (Rodion Raskolnikov) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:36:51 -0400 Subject: Chile, project to modify the penal code. In-Reply-To: <BLU436-SMTP257C70BF619780B80C57FA1960E0@phx.gbl> References: <BLU436-SMTP257C70BF619780B80C57FA1960E0@phx.gbl> Message-ID: <cf4ac3ea-b7e0-48a1-8451-c1fa38015c6a@email.android.com> http://m.biobiochile.cl/notas/2014/07/11/sabag-retirara-proyecto-sobre-memes-de-internet-no-me-fije-lo-que-habian-redactado-mis-asesores.shtml Sabag has decided to remove the bill from the chamber. But I'm sure the right will push this in some other way... On July 10, 2014 10:17:37 AM GMT-04:00, deoxyt2 <deoxyt2 at lacamaradegas.cl> wrote: >Attached document [es] which attempts to modify the penal code of >Chile, >which involves reducing the freedom of expression in our country. > >A part of the amendments says: > >Add how numeral 3rd of article 261 of the title VI: >Those who make threats or utter insults against the authority by means >of electronic platforms, either textual or graphical, form being >considered as aggravating circumstance that don't do it with your true >identity or that attempt to impede the identification of the computer >from which the message spreads. > >Regards. > >deoxyt2.- -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1485 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140711/650337b8/attachment.txt> From jtmurphy at cmu.edu Fri Jul 11 12:13:43 2014 From: jtmurphy at cmu.edu (James Murphy) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 14:13:43 -0500 Subject: Universities giving personal health information to NSA Message-ID: <53C03767.1000305@cmu.edu> Seen in: http://www.healthyhorns.utexas.edu/IMAGES/pdf/privacypractices.pdf http://www.cmhc.utexas.edu/ppn.html What Are Other Way UHS [University Health Services] May Use Your PHI [Personal Health Information]? - National security and intelligence activities. No warrant, no judge, just "activities." A quick search shows that this privacy policy is spreading. How can I stop it? I get the feeling calling management's phone isn't going to do much. -- James T. Murphy III jtmurphy at cmu.edu PGP Key-ID: 0x67E3BC49, available at keys.gnupg.net, pgp.mit.edu. From skquinn at rushpost.com Fri Jul 11 15:24:38 2014 From: skquinn at rushpost.com (Shawn K. Quinn) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 17:24:38 -0500 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <1405117478.3765.4.camel@klax> On Sat, 2014-07-05 at 19:13 +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > Anyone looked this over? I only just discovered it, but it seems nice: > * P2P > * Encrypted > * Voice/Video/Chat/Files > * GPL'd > > https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore > > It's written mostly in C(++) with a dash of assembly, which worries me > security wise.. Tried this out with a friend last night. I'm disappointed so far, even given this is an alpha. Maybe I'm using the wrong client (Venom) but I don't see any way to do video or voice chat. I'm keeping it to send files encrypted as I'm not sure if Pidgin's OTR encrypts file transfers as well (guessing not) as well as keep testing it to try and find bugs. -- Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn at rushpost.com> From coderman at gmail.com Fri Jul 11 22:19:20 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 22:19:20 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1S=LwGugvi3Oggk4OoUmkyX7zaLjtgp6U5CAaVYc0dAdQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAJVRA1Tec5NQr-iCF0bhUCuyuzTvBsMWPJQqECY8QQ_0xO9dGQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1S=LwGugvi3Oggk4OoUmkyX7zaLjtgp6U5CAaVYc0dAdQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RKbx7s0qZPBC+bR0d8xWn4tipKu46X5FfvqZ-kgnGaPw@mail.gmail.com> added example privoxy config as http_proxy to Tor, add sig note for Update 13. no further updates on list; contact direct if issues encountered. best regards, -------------- next part -------------- Cryptome Donation Required - http://cryptome.org/donations.htm Donation also provides current archive as this selection is not current, and increasingly out of date by the day. - "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." - https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/005020.html - Index: 0eb8551d977dde4f4193b3a16dedcd18f01e854e371e96623d33dd5b9519e413 *USB-1.rar 9653d105293b9f77d5b0067d51a35ed286a7f50a0b37b3ea2bd78c092caab584 *USB-2.rar 7e798bb2b09cac49181aa7c12170e03fc3d3cf69a73d9e1b04171c80910e7525 *Update-13-1231.rar b63e185c21232724f9c90238496b9122a46d492752d56f690200fab6fe9fb6ed Update-14-0206-0602.tar.rar 6e5146b4c53f61b555822eda90e70a20a8050fe3dbf0bd3a084a042a36bdd3b1 Cryptome-Update-13-0701-to-13-1202.tgz 80652978f46ef6e6f26bd2bec406349ef766ad1722fc81d9f7575148edc6324f wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip c56f0fd30924f7398ca9e20c098acced50766d3325754f29014dd33029ebf351 wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip 9d2aa03048c60eec2c94d45293d4e95977a94f3477a4701f6ee2ef7ec888a7c9 WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip *- these files have a detached signature by presumed key 0xB650572B8B3BF75C "Cryptome <cryptome at earthlink.net>" append '.sig' for signature files. - Recommended usage: # apt-get install privoxy tor nano /etc/privoxy/config --- begin-cut /etc/privoxy/config --- # Tor Privoxy configuration # NOTE: toggle=0 disables all privacy rewrite protections toggle 0 confdir /etc/privoxy logdir /var/log/privoxy logfile logfile hostname hostname.example.org listen-address 127.0.0.1:8118 enable-remote-toggle 0 enable-remote-http-toggle 0 enable-edit-actions 0 enforce-blocks 0 forwarded-connect-retries 0 accept-intercepted-requests 0 allow-cgi-request-crunching 0 split-large-forms 0 keep-alive-timeout 5 socket-timeout 300 max-client-connections 256 # # for Tor browser bundle #forward-socks5 / 127.0.0.1:9150 . # for Tor upstream forward-socks5 / 127.0.0.1:9050 . --- end-cut --- Aria2 download: # Requires Tor running and http proxy to Tor at 127.0.0.1:8118 export onions="sek42kxkbjuivxws.onion ajzxwgtrtws7zwyg.onion wpv2bxujoctsmzcn.onion aiyu6uyckomxt2ld.onion kvrvzxgdutjcjxqw.onion hz5sj76rh3avsmfc.onion jt7klzczup6hrtes.onion 3qcs4cqbsrfdz7xa.onion" export files="Update-13-1231.rar Update-14-0206-0602.tar.rar USB-1.rar USB-2.rar wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip Cryptome-Update-13-0701-to-13-1202.tgz" for cfile in `echo $files`; do export olist="" for chost in `echo $onions`; do export olist="${olist} http://${chost}/cryptome-july2014/${cfile}" done echo "Retrieving $cfile ..." aria2c \ --all-proxy=127.0.0.1:8118 \ --continue=true --always-resume=true \ --retry-wait=30 --timeout=120 \ --summary-interval=3 \ --max-connection-per-server=2 --max-concurrent-downloads=8 \ -o "$cfile" `echo $olist` done -------------- next part -------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iL4EABEKAGYFAlPAxEBfFIAAAAAALgAoaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldDQxQzEyQjhDMzA3RDdFMjE5OEFBNTc4MTY1 QTg0N0U3QzJCOTM4MEMACgkQZahH58K5OAxNnwD/QgupHQOtNx6RNsF1nJR2n9FB qXRhdIYxwbTbTzAji8MA/0XAy3vpsS/V7TR2MmS1Lrhvyg7UHrcBZVZlu36hYWaU =fdiR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 11 22:11:54 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 01:11:54 -0400 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] Message-ID: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> > Sayeth James Murphy: > ... > A quick search shows that this privacy policy is spreading. > How can I stop it? I get the feeling calling management's phone isn't > going to do much. No corp/edu/gov entity intrinsically gives a fuck about your privacy, and their only incentive is covering their ass and kissing others. Sorry to break it to ya bro. The only ones that give a fuck are the people, and the people need to provide said entities with drastically more convincing incentives than the current set. Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. It's now or never. From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 11 23:39:42 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 02:39:42 -0400 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <53c0cd12.b0e7ec0a.70ff.ffff87df@mx.google.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> <53c0cd12.b0e7ec0a.70ff.ffff87df@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-g55C693mTmjWJazEpm=AP9jqhhOY7issXcijP8Fk16g@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 1:56 AM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > wha ha ha ha > fuckingly clueless assertion of the day... Who loves Juan, I do :) Never take a cpunk at face value. Certainly not in politik. Get deeper. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Fri Jul 11 22:56:16 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 02:56:16 -0300 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53c0cd12.b0e7ec0a.70ff.ffff87df@mx.google.com> On Sat, 12 Jul 2014 01:11:54 -0400 > Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. > It's now or never. wha ha ha ha fuckingly clueless assertion of the day... From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 12 11:13:51 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 11:13:51 -0700 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SS_97c1JpRy86-DeNTsub-w=tiW1NWtK_FqT-7nSq+4Q@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 10:11 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. on my list right after: "produce blockbuster feature film on game theory and key management" best regards, Crypto Reagan From blibbet at gmail.com Sat Jul 12 11:47:22 2014 From: blibbet at gmail.com (Blibbet) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 11:47:22 -0700 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140712114722.0fe27133@dbox> > Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. > It's now or never. Check out the Pirate Party. IMO, it should be called the Hacker Party, or the Technology Party. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pirate_Party In a few days, or when our Open Video volunteer finishes postproduction, look on at the TA3M Seattle web site for an URL to last month's talk from a Seattle-area Pirate Party organizer. <https://wiki.openitp.org/events:techno-activism_3rd_mondays:seattle/> From nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net Sat Jul 12 18:15:53 2014 From: nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net (nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 18:15:53 -0700 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] Message-ID: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements attempting to play the game within the construct of behavior most expected. The establishment of a party itself with intent for longevity is entirely unnecessary for what needs to be done. Most people here should understand that ignoring ones own brand by removing it entirely from the picture gives greater focus to a singular ideal. Don't mistake this rhetoric for revolution. It is only that Democracy has plenty of room for trolling and no one has really figured this out yet. Unbeknownst to most people born within the past 20+ years they were all born with dual citizenship. First to their analog nationality and second to the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Estate. Yochai Benkler expands on this definition when describing Wikileaks as part of the Networked Fourth Estate. That is, media institutions not beholden to any particular nation. I would extend this further to include people that took upon themselves an alternate understanding of rights, social norms, governance and behaviors as experienced through the network as an unwritten constitution. This is not just hackers and cypherpunks but many internet users as a whole. It includes *every* internet user that found any form of solace or confidence through the liberated network. At this moment in time you could be an American, European, South African or Brazilian and all will collectively notice that this alternate constitution is under attack, even if its existence is unknown. The Pirate Party most certainly attempts to represent this 4th estate. I applaud them. The reason they might fail to fix the most significant problems we currently face is due to their quest for longevity and a brand. We do not need 4 or 10 years to fix these problems. We only need 100 days. On 12/07/2014 20:47, Blibbet wrote: >> Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. >> It's now or never. > > Check out the Pirate Party. IMO, it should be called the > Hacker Party, or the Technology Party. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pirate_Party > > In a few days, or when our Open Video volunteer finishes > postproduction, look on at the TA3M Seattle web site for an > URL to last month's talk from a Seattle-area Pirate Party > orginizer. > <https://wiki.openitp.org/events:techno-activism_3rd_mondays:seattle/> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTwd0qAAoJEHi6xtksL8/uzYUP/173TrgtoO7b3Ph+2juBtQcm x9f/KOF/qs/gGaGv8857QOiVUV+KefbMTvg6D4cuPXDIT+VKeMbg1tLDyOCMjLZE zHoToj/UA70J8j66LZN3B+LmNpdxhJijBQfiZBas7yUd2/NHZKbHkBXjUy4jrR++ jRv/DgNeLDQe/EVabQvFJYv397WRpegxJonJmuUSOKS48jCy07hnAEyopJgDQOhd I8iUYH6YtcAZ47kiMxrYgMX4W7Xm4eolpqLWXxGdwB8gmxGxTkoQYM4vorYYzMib EQGvLgVYeMVEmWPQuJ9X4JQJR4BThBiCx5/O1lqdR0akA23Vtm6RAkW+QSm/SqL4 Fxv1ryUCZk/dxOgbaYprBgm5UbhBmAoC1GN9oz4HzGwFIwWmaCnfzM2p7jIGIUb3 LtgUwXya9rxv8ihXDISwIEu8iqYzI4kkJeFUBCh9WyJXPXjc9T1JAW+BQ7T+hKjb 9W9Q7VAMGkFaW4dsmpm/47ZIQnBVU3IyJzk9P3gEYZE1lFleejsvyZL02WPjT7QJ 12gd7QzEoXD2SAjpDQV0Wp0v/OyrUkCV84G6xDDtxnlEfKFYzbjadikyedOss9e9 NzUp4r2QztY/wP/ZyEALlV0yaU53Jv9GRB5OHWdDxv8iWWSIe1Xa/JIFY+ztP9Me ffknV+yAnaIT/DxPjSnz =D7gB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 14:07:48 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 18:07:48 -0300 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-g55C693mTmjWJazEpm=AP9jqhhOY7issXcijP8Fk16g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> <53c0cd12.b0e7ec0a.70ff.ffff87df@mx.google.com> <CAD2Ti2-g55C693mTmjWJazEpm=AP9jqhhOY7issXcijP8Fk16g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53c2f419.2843ec0a.10a6.ffffc69c@mx.google.com> On Sat, 12 Jul 2014 02:39:42 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 1:56 AM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > > wha ha ha ha > > fuckingly clueless assertion of the day... > > Who loves Juan, I do :) Thanks grarpamp ^-^ We should not forget that jesus, who lives in a little white house, loves us all. > Never take a cpunk at face value. > Certainly not in politik. > Get deeper. Oh, OK. I guess somewhat cryptic remarks are to be expected from people who like cryptography =P From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 16:01:11 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 19:01:11 -0400 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. In-Reply-To: <DUB121-W17EB3FAAD5225D4888132EC80B0@phx.gbl> References: <d31648d2e60f70c5195e991fd0b07cb7@openmailbox.org> <DUB121-W17EB3FAAD5225D4888132EC80B0@phx.gbl> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29zXxuUoEkFgnxKLk6JRfKbON5nJm0rqByGHVNvgO96EA@mail.gmail.com> Trillions? ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Mark McCarron <mark.mccarron at live.co.uk> Date: Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 9:27 AM Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. To: "tor-talk at lists.torproject.org" <tor-talk at lists.torproject.org> I can answer this: 1. The IP addresses can be connected to an ISP and physical address should the need arise. It allows the NSA to "rewind the tape" so to speak. That is why there has been a push for data retention at ISPs. Given that in the EU governments are seeking 2 years, it would indicate that the platform can rewind internet activity for at least that long. 2. Tor is a communications platform, the NSA's job is to monitor communications and intercept military planning that effects either itself or its partners. Secure global communications and computing is now a commodity, whereas it was mainly a state-only capability. Thus, the average user is now coming up against intelligence agencies, rather than state actors alone. Leaving blind spots would be dangerous to national security as it provides opportunities for planning and coordination. So, there is a legitimate case here and no one denies it. The real problem is that in the absence of a genuine international threat and by that I mean someone on the scale of Russia/China, these systems are being directed against groups with limited capabilities. Those groups are now being defined as national security threats to justify budgets and to filter money into particular black projects. Revelations by Snowden and other releases are merely a distraction to where the money is really going. Did no one notice trillions are being drained from the US economy into some unidentified military project for the last decade or more??? It would seem to indicate that there is a Manhatten-style project underway. Regards, Mark McCarron > Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 23:14:30 +0000 > From: simonsnake at openmailbox.org > To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > Subject: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. > > I have two questions about the recent revelations that the NSA has been > collecting data about Tor users. > > I would like to hear from those with personal knowledge and experience > such as Jacob, Roger, Mike, etc. > > AIUI, from the stories in the German media > (http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html) and Wired > (http://www.wired.com/2014/07/nsa-targets-users-of-privacy-services/), > the NSA has logged the IP of everyone who ever accessed: > a) a directory server. > b) an entry node. > c) bridges.torproject.org > d) requested an email of bridges. > e) the tor website itself (except from five eyes countries). > > This is viable as the NSA runs the Quantum network which allows it to > intercept traffic to whichever sites it desires before that traffic > arrives at its destination. > > Two questions: > > 1. What would be the purpose of collecting a vast trove of IP addresses? > In my case, my IP could be tied to my real name since I send emails via > SMTP which will contain my IP, email address, real name, etc. That said, > IP addresses are dynamic. I don't know how easy it would be to identify > most people via an IP. Of course, one way would be to ask the ISP > directly. But, whether tied to a real identity or not, what's the point? > What does it achieve? They also gather the IP address for those who > access any number of proxy services such as MegaProxy and > FreeProxies.org. Would they not just end up with a massive database of > (mostly dynamic) IPs? > > 2. What is the attitude that encourages the gathering of this > information? Is it: because they can? Or do they truly believe that > anyone who uses Tor is dangerous? Bear in mind that Tor was developed > and is still funded by the US government. No-one can deny that > dissidents in unfree countries use it. So, even if you assume that a > high percentage of users are bad people, what about the dissidents in > the Middle East or wherever? What is the psychology here? I'm sure > people like Roger are in regular contact with some government types. > Perhaps he can shed some light on the motivation? > > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk From apx.808 at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 16:34:53 2014 From: apx.808 at gmail.com (APX 808) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 20:34:53 -0300 Subject: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29zXxuUoEkFgnxKLk6JRfKbON5nJm0rqByGHVNvgO96EA@mail.gmail.com> References: <d31648d2e60f70c5195e991fd0b07cb7@openmailbox.org> <DUB121-W17EB3FAAD5225D4888132EC80B0@phx.gbl> <CAD2Ti29zXxuUoEkFgnxKLk6JRfKbON5nJm0rqByGHVNvgO96EA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAFZYV3OAefoCpQuLJ5DnoJZg4fyzRmZyYMa_suG6Uu3+V-qcxg@mail.gmail.com> >Mark McCarron said: >Did no one notice trillions are being drained from the US economy into some unidentified military project for the last decade or more??? >It would seem to indicate that there is a Manhatten-style project underway. Do you have more details/links about that? Thanks Cheerz http://apx808.blogspot.com On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 8:01 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > Trillions? > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Mark McCarron <mark.mccarron at live.co.uk> > Date: Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 9:27 AM > Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. > To: "tor-talk at lists.torproject.org" <tor-talk at lists.torproject.org> > > > I can answer this: > > 1. The IP addresses can be connected to an ISP and physical address > should the need arise. It allows the NSA to "rewind the tape" so to > speak. That is why there has been a push for data retention at ISPs. > Given that in the EU governments are seeking 2 years, it would > indicate that the platform can rewind internet activity for at least > that long. > > 2. Tor is a communications platform, the NSA's job is to monitor > communications and intercept military planning that effects either > itself or its partners. Secure global communications and computing is > now a commodity, whereas it was mainly a state-only capability. Thus, > the average user is now coming up against intelligence agencies, > rather than state actors alone. Leaving blind spots would be > dangerous to national security as it provides opportunities for > planning and coordination. So, there is a legitimate case here and no > one denies it. The real problem is that in the absence of a genuine > international threat and by that I mean someone on the scale of > Russia/China, these systems are being directed against groups with > limited capabilities. Those groups are now being defined as national > security threats to justify budgets and to filter money into > particular black projects. Revelations by Snowden and other releases > are merely a distraction to where the money is really going. > Did no one notice trillions are being drained from the US economy > into some unidentified military project for the last decade or more??? > > It would seem to indicate that there is a Manhatten-style project underway. > > Regards, > > Mark McCarron > > > Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 23:14:30 +0000 > > From: simonsnake at openmailbox.org > > To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > > Subject: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. > > > > I have two questions about the recent revelations that the NSA has been > > collecting data about Tor users. > > > > I would like to hear from those with personal knowledge and experience > > such as Jacob, Roger, Mike, etc. > > > > AIUI, from the stories in the German media > > (http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html) and Wired > > (http://www.wired.com/2014/07/nsa-targets-users-of-privacy-services/), > > the NSA has logged the IP of everyone who ever accessed: > > a) a directory server. > > b) an entry node. > > c) bridges.torproject.org > > d) requested an email of bridges. > > e) the tor website itself (except from five eyes countries). > > > > This is viable as the NSA runs the Quantum network which allows it to > > intercept traffic to whichever sites it desires before that traffic > > arrives at its destination. > > > > Two questions: > > > > 1. What would be the purpose of collecting a vast trove of IP > addresses? > > In my case, my IP could be tied to my real name since I send emails via > > SMTP which will contain my IP, email address, real name, etc. That said, > > IP addresses are dynamic. I don't know how easy it would be to identify > > most people via an IP. Of course, one way would be to ask the ISP > > directly. But, whether tied to a real identity or not, what's the point? > > What does it achieve? They also gather the IP address for those who > > access any number of proxy services such as MegaProxy and > > FreeProxies.org. Would they not just end up with a massive database of > > (mostly dynamic) IPs? > > > > 2. What is the attitude that encourages the gathering of this > > information? Is it: because they can? Or do they truly believe that > > anyone who uses Tor is dangerous? Bear in mind that Tor was developed > > and is still funded by the US government. No-one can deny that > > dissidents in unfree countries use it. So, even if you assume that a > > high percentage of users are bad people, what about the dissidents in > > the Middle East or wherever? What is the psychology here? I'm sure > > people like Roger are in regular contact with some government types. > > Perhaps he can shed some light on the motivation? > > > > > > -- > > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 6838 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140713/a57784be/attachment.txt> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 20:18:29 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 23:18:29 -0400 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> References: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29yZh_p+JCwr1sONPGmfhNXrDq04eW5MJOvN7KyCxFNrw@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 5:35 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > Dnia sobota, 12 lipca 2014 18:15:53 nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net pisze: >> The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements > I couldn't agree more, and the sad state of Pirate Party here in Poland: > Same shit is going on in Germany and Sweden, AFAIK. Pirate Party movement is > in deep crisis in Europe. Forgetting the actual failures in execution, you're simply not going to gain much public acceptance (votes) among the masses, or earn influence by them, by calling yourselves the 'pirate' or 'punks' party. Well, except by luck and whim. At least call yourselves something relatively benign on the books so that you can then choose to carry whatever banner suits each audience. Disruption, when you have insufficient force outright, implies subterfuge and sleight of hand. Get deeper. From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 13 14:35:06 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 23:35:06 +0200 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> References: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> Message-ID: <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> Dnia sobota, 12 lipca 2014 18:15:53 nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net pisze: > The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements > attempting to play the game within the construct of behavior most > expected. The establishment of a party itself with intent for > longevity is entirely unnecessary for what needs to be done. Most > people here should understand that ignoring ones own brand by > removing it entirely from the picture gives greater focus to a > singular ideal. Don't mistake this rhetoric for revolution. It is > only that Democracy has plenty of room for trolling and no one has > really figured this out yet. > > Unbeknownst to most people born within the past 20+ years they were > all born with dual citizenship. First to their analog nationality > and second to the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Estate. > Yochai Benkler expands on this definition when describing Wikileaks > as part of the Networked Fourth Estate. That is, media institutions > not beholden to any particular nation. I would extend this further > to include people that took upon themselves an alternate understanding > of rights, social norms, governance and behaviors as experienced > through the network as an unwritten constitution. This is not just > hackers and cypherpunks but many internet users as a whole. It > includes *every* internet user that found any form of solace or > confidence through the liberated network. At this moment in time > you could be an American, European, South African or Brazilian and > all will collectively notice that this alternate constitution is > under attack, even if its existence is unknown. > > The Pirate Party most certainly attempts to represent this 4th > estate. I applaud them. The reason they might fail to fix the > most significant problems we currently face is due to their > quest for longevity and a brand. We do not need 4 or 10 years > to fix these problems. We only need 100 days. I couldn't agree more, and the sad state of Pirate Party here in Poland: http://rys.io/en/119 ...only amplifies that. I mean, when I hear them saying things like "first we need to get to the Parliament to be able to do anything", I feel like I'm going to throw up. Same shit is going on in Germany and Sweden, AFAIK. Pirate Party movement is in deep crisis in Europe. So that got me thinking about parties as a system hack: http://rys.io/en/80 http://rys.io/en/78 I think it's worth a try. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140713/3a28e9b0/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 13 22:57:28 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 07:57:28 +0200 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29yZh_p+JCwr1sONPGmfhNXrDq04eW5MJOvN7KyCxFNrw@mail.gmail.com> References: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> <CAD2Ti29yZh_p+JCwr1sONPGmfhNXrDq04eW5MJOvN7KyCxFNrw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <2073850.n1LFRd6Irl@lapuntu> Dnia niedziela, 13 lipca 2014 23:18:29 grarpamp pisze: > On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 5:35 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > > Dnia sobota, 12 lipca 2014 18:15:53 nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net pisze: > >> The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements > > > > I couldn't agree more, and the sad state of Pirate Party here in Poland: > > Same shit is going on in Germany and Sweden, AFAIK. Pirate Party movement > > is in deep crisis in Europe. > > Forgetting the actual failures in execution, you're simply not going > to gain much public acceptance (votes) among the masses, or earn > influence by them, by calling yourselves the 'pirate' or 'punks' party. > Well, except by luck and whim. At least call yourselves something > relatively benign on the books so that you can then choose to carry > whatever banner suits each audience. I disagree. The Pirate Party got a lot of media attention thanks to the name, and got a strong support in the beginning. The current crisis is not due to the name, but due to the fact the PP abandoned quite a lot of their original core issues (filesharing, data protection, privacy, etc). > Disruption, when you have insufficient force outright, implies subterfuge > and sleight of hand. Get deeper. But the PP created a hell of a disruption. Some big parties today have integrated some elements of the original PP platform into their programmes, which is a success regardless of what happens with PP now. However, I'm a big supporter of the idea of creating a single, strong Commons Party, assimilating the Greens and the Pirate Parties across Europe (and further) into a single force. When one thinks about it, it makes sense. On some level the Greens and PP have similar core values: protecting the commons -- be it environmental, or digital. They cooperate closely on several issues in the EU already, and yet go to elections separately. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140714/1751e65e/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Mon Jul 14 01:42:02 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 09:42:02 +0100 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <2073850.n1LFRd6Irl@lapuntu> References: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> <CAD2Ti29yZh_p+JCwr1sONPGmfhNXrDq04eW5MJOvN7KyCxFNrw@mail.gmail.com> <2073850.n1LFRd6Irl@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53C397DA.9050006@cathalgarvey.me> > When one thinks about it, it makes sense. On some level the Greens > and PP have similar core values: protecting the commons -- > be it environmental, or digital. They cooperate closely on several > issues in the EU already, and yet go to elections separately. Sure, but the greens are fairly anti-evidence, whereas I see a lot more focus on evidence-based policy in the pirate parties. If you asked the greens to adopt evidence-based policy, they'd implode because they'd have to accept nuclear and GE, and abandon pushing stupid things like homeopathy to state medical boards. There is a growing rebellion within the green movement, I think; I've spoken to senior greens recently who are preparing to start pushing evidence based green policy, but it'll be a longer journey; they have to warm up their voting base to the idea or they simply die. Most of their voters are die-hard organics-and-ear-candles greenpeace-donating hippies, the genuine environmentalists who understand the basics of..well, reality..are in the minority. OTOH the pirate parties (who, let's remember, are technically part of the EU Greens meta-party), in a debate, could pull out statistics and scientific studies backing their positions; it made it difficult to discard their arguments or to take the other guy's position without seeming like a bought politician (of course, the bought politicians did anyway). And yea; major parties are now taking the PP line. Even Neelie Kroes, an EU Commissioner, is coming out and delivering speeches on how we criminalise normal activity by making "piracy" illegal. So they may share a lot, but I don't think the two are compatible yet. Soon, I hope; I'd like to resume calling myself a green without being regarded as someone who supports falsified research, romanticises subsistence farming, and rejects every possible solution that features words with more than two syllables. Long live the pirates! ;) Cathal On 14/07/14 06:57, rysiek wrote: > Dnia niedziela, 13 lipca 2014 23:18:29 grarpamp pisze: >> On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 5:35 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> >> wrote: >>> Dnia sobota, 12 lipca 2014 18:15:53 nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net >>> pisze: >>>> The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements >>> >>> I couldn't agree more, and the sad state of Pirate Party here in >>> Poland: Same shit is going on in Germany and Sweden, AFAIK. >>> Pirate Party movement is in deep crisis in Europe. >> >> Forgetting the actual failures in execution, you're simply not >> going to gain much public acceptance (votes) among the masses, or >> earn influence by them, by calling yourselves the 'pirate' or >> 'punks' party. Well, except by luck and whim. At least call >> yourselves something relatively benign on the books so that you can >> then choose to carry whatever banner suits each audience. > > I disagree. The Pirate Party got a lot of media attention thanks to > the name, and got a strong support in the beginning. The current > crisis is not due to the name, but due to the fact the PP abandoned > quite a lot of their original core issues (filesharing, data > protection, privacy, etc). > >> Disruption, when you have insufficient force outright, implies >> subterfuge and sleight of hand. Get deeper. > > But the PP created a hell of a disruption. Some big parties today > have integrated some elements of the original PP platform into their > programmes, which is a success regardless of what happens with PP > now. > > However, I'm a big supporter of the idea of creating a single, strong > Commons Party, assimilating the Greens and the Pirate Parties across > Europe (and further) into a single force. > > When one thinks about it, it makes sense. On some level the Greens > and PP have similar core values: protecting the commons -- be it > environmental, or digital. They cooperate closely on several issues > in the EU already, and yet go to elections separately. > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140714/351f07c6/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140714/351f07c6/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Mon Jul 14 11:55:40 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 14:55:40 -0400 Subject: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. In-Reply-To: <20140714120146.GL26986@leitl.org> References: <20140714120146.GL26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_JMwAVjGgR18VU53ScKJHKSsMjpq-5MRj8L=7L+4E0+Q@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 14, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > ----- Forwarded message from Mirimir <mirimir at riseup.net> ----- >>> From: Mark McCarron <mark.mccarron at live.co.uk> >>> Did no one notice trillions are being drained from the US economy >>> into some unidentified military project for the last decade or more??? >>> >>> It would seem to indicate that there is a Manhatten-style project underway. >>> do you have any links or additional info about this? beyond the vague >> sense of large black budgets, I'm not sure exactly what you might be >> referring to. > Well, the modern NSA _is_ a Manhattan-scale project. According to > So, even counting cleanup costs, they're comparable. > Perhaps Mark can add some specifics that haven't come out yet. > http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/29/your-cheat-sheet-to-americas-secret-intelligence-budget/ http://www.martingrandjean.ch/data-visualization-top-secret-us-intelligence-budget/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_intelligence_budget https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Intelligence_Community They're comparable but already reasonably well "identified" and with reasonably known budgets... Manhattan/Hanford, wars, Intel Community Budget, Social Programs, and so on. This new claim of "some unidentified military project for the last decade or more" to the '$trillions' size needs substantiated. That's $100+B/yr of new money, rather hard to hide. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_megaprojects https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Economy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_federal_budget From uwecerron at gmail.com Tue Jul 15 07:21:14 2014 From: uwecerron at gmail.com (Uwe Cerron) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 10:21:14 -0400 Subject: Experts report potential software "back doors" in U.S. standards In-Reply-To: <20140715133815.GT26986@leitl.org> References: <20140715133815.GT26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAM0iPqMTgZtz7rGYhQ1wo9ffzt7Jh_kZULbm-fdQO9zj=gOq4g@mail.gmail.com> Hello, I was wondering what are your opinions on an open source project i am developing decentralbank.com, i began building it as a colored coins bitcoin wallet complementary to open transactions audit servers,which act as multisignature wallets among other things,if colored coins were used people would exchange the rights to the bitcoin stored in the audit server and skip transaction fees, i thought this would be very useful for low income countries where the transaction fee may seem exorbitant. I will be using open transactions technology and will be expanding audit servers which allow multi signature deposits to support colored coin definitions as a way to create a decentralized asset definition storage for colored coins. I was wondering if you guys think there is demand for this or am i just wasting my efforts? The repo is open source and located here https://github.com/DecentralBank Open transactions audit servers are part of the voting pools scheme for those of you who don't know here is the link http://opentransactions.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Voting_Pools Thanks, Uwe Cerron On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 9:38 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > > > http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/usa-nsa-software-idUSL2N0PP2BM20140715 > > Experts report potential software "back doors" in U.S. standards > > BY JOSEPH MENN > > SAN FRANCISCO, July 14 Mon Jul 14, 2014 8:58pm EDT > > (Reuters) - U.S. government standards for software may enable spying by the > National Security Agency through widely used coding formulas that should be > jettisoned, some of the country's top independent experts concluded in > papers > released on Monday. > > Such mathematical formulas, or curves, are an arcane but essential part of > most technology that prevents interception and hacking, and the National > Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been legally required to > consult with the NSA's defensive experts in approving them and other > cryptography standards. > > But NIST's relationship with the spy agency came under fire in September > after reports based on documents from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden > pointed to one formula in particular as a Trojan horse for the NSA. > > NIST discontinued that formula, called Dual Elliptic Curve, and asked its > external advisory board and a special panel of experts to make > recommendations that were published on Monday alongside more stinging > conclusions by the individual experts. > > Noting the partially obscured hand of the NSA in creating Dual Elliptic > Curve > - which Reuters reported was most broadly distributed by security firm RSA > [USN:nL2N0JZ1B6] - the group delved into the details of how it and other > NIST > standards emerged. It found incomplete documentation and poor explanations > in > some cases; in others material was withheld pending legal review. > > As a whole, the panels recommended that NIST review its obligation to > confer > with the NSA and seek legal changes "where it hinders its ability to > independently develop the best cryptographic standards to serve not only > the > United States government but the broader community." > > They also urged NIST to weigh the advice of individual task force members > who > made more dramatic suggestions, such as calling for the replacement of a > larger set of curves approved for authenticating users, in part because > they > were selected through unclear means by the NSA. > > "It is possible that the specified curves contain a back door somehow," > said > Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Ron Rivest, a co-founder of > RSA and the source of the letter R in its name. Though the curves could be > fine, he wrote, "it seems prudent to assume the worst and transition away." > > More broadly, Rivest wrote, "NIST should ask the NSA for full disclosure > regarding all existing standards... If NSA refuses to answer such an > inquiry, > then any standard developed with significant NSA input should be assumed to > be `tainted,'" absent proof of security acceptable to outsiders. > > In an email exchange, Rivest told Reuters that "NIST needs to have a > process > whereby evidence is publicly presented" about how the curves were chosen. > > The curves faulted on Monday had been questioned by outsiders after media > reports in September said the NSA could break much widely used security > software, without detailing which ones or how. "These curves are ubiquitous > in commercial cryptography," Johns Hopkins University professor Matthew > Green > said in an interview. "If you connected to Google or Facebook today, you > probably used one." > > Rivest's long association with RSA, now part of electronic storage maker > EMC > Corp, made his remarks more poignant. But prominent task force colleagues > including Internet co-creator Vint Cerf and Ed Felten, former chief > technologist at Federal Trade Commission, also gave strongly worded > verdicts > on the Department of Commerce unit. > > "It cannot be accepted that NIST's responsibilities should be co-opted by > the > NSA's intelligence mission," wrote Cerf, who now works at Google Inc. > > While Rivest called the internal history of Dual Elliptic Curve a "smoking > gun" with an "almost certain" NSA back door, Felten wrote that NSA might > not > remain alone in its ability to use it and other possible NIST-approved > holes > for spying. > > In each of three cases, including Dual Elliptic Curve and the more common > curves faulted by Rivest, Felten said the suspected back door access > "reduces > the security of users against attack by other adversaries, including > organized crime groups or foreign intelligence services." > > The NSA might have been able to generate curves that pass cursory security > tests but are still breakable through the aid of sheer computing power, > because it can try millions of curves and get a few that fit its goals. > But a > researcher working for another country could discover the flaw, Felten > said. > > In the case of the curves approved under the FIPS 186 standard for > authenticating digital signatures, NIST should start over and pick its own > curves publicly rather than relying on the NSA, Felten and others said. > > Several experts said NIST had to hire more cryptographers and strengthen > its > internal processes to avoid relying on NSA. > > NIST acting Director Willie May agreed in a statement, saying his agency > "must strengthen its in-house cryptography capabilities to ensure we can > reach independent conclusions about the merits of specific algorithms or > standards." > > NIST did not respond to a Reuters email asking about the fate of the > suspect > curves. (Reporting by Joseph Menn; Editing by Ken Wills) > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 8426 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140715/01f9858a/attachment.txt> From dan at geer.org Tue Jul 15 11:31:55 2014 From: dan at geer.org (dan at geer.org) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 14:31:55 -0400 Subject: The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:36:00 +0200." <20140711103600.GA26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <20140715183155.59BDC22813B@palinka.tinho.net> > The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control This is not the NSA's goal. This is the goal of those for whom the NSA works even if their deal includes giving both Congress & POTUS plausible deniability about just whose goals are whose. --dan From eugen at leitl.org Tue Jul 15 06:38:15 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 15:38:15 +0200 Subject: Experts report potential software "back doors" in U.S. standards Message-ID: <20140715133815.GT26986@leitl.org> http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/usa-nsa-software-idUSL2N0PP2BM20140715 Experts report potential software "back doors" in U.S. standards BY JOSEPH MENN SAN FRANCISCO, July 14 Mon Jul 14, 2014 8:58pm EDT (Reuters) - U.S. government standards for software may enable spying by the National Security Agency through widely used coding formulas that should be jettisoned, some of the country's top independent experts concluded in papers released on Monday. Such mathematical formulas, or curves, are an arcane but essential part of most technology that prevents interception and hacking, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been legally required to consult with the NSA's defensive experts in approving them and other cryptography standards. But NIST's relationship with the spy agency came under fire in September after reports based on documents from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden pointed to one formula in particular as a Trojan horse for the NSA. NIST discontinued that formula, called Dual Elliptic Curve, and asked its external advisory board and a special panel of experts to make recommendations that were published on Monday alongside more stinging conclusions by the individual experts. Noting the partially obscured hand of the NSA in creating Dual Elliptic Curve - which Reuters reported was most broadly distributed by security firm RSA [USN:nL2N0JZ1B6] - the group delved into the details of how it and other NIST standards emerged. It found incomplete documentation and poor explanations in some cases; in others material was withheld pending legal review. As a whole, the panels recommended that NIST review its obligation to confer with the NSA and seek legal changes "where it hinders its ability to independently develop the best cryptographic standards to serve not only the United States government but the broader community." They also urged NIST to weigh the advice of individual task force members who made more dramatic suggestions, such as calling for the replacement of a larger set of curves approved for authenticating users, in part because they were selected through unclear means by the NSA. "It is possible that the specified curves contain a back door somehow," said Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Ron Rivest, a co-founder of RSA and the source of the letter R in its name. Though the curves could be fine, he wrote, "it seems prudent to assume the worst and transition away." More broadly, Rivest wrote, "NIST should ask the NSA for full disclosure regarding all existing standards... If NSA refuses to answer such an inquiry, then any standard developed with significant NSA input should be assumed to be `tainted,'" absent proof of security acceptable to outsiders. In an email exchange, Rivest told Reuters that "NIST needs to have a process whereby evidence is publicly presented" about how the curves were chosen. The curves faulted on Monday had been questioned by outsiders after media reports in September said the NSA could break much widely used security software, without detailing which ones or how. "These curves are ubiquitous in commercial cryptography," Johns Hopkins University professor Matthew Green said in an interview. "If you connected to Google or Facebook today, you probably used one." Rivest's long association with RSA, now part of electronic storage maker EMC Corp, made his remarks more poignant. But prominent task force colleagues including Internet co-creator Vint Cerf and Ed Felten, former chief technologist at Federal Trade Commission, also gave strongly worded verdicts on the Department of Commerce unit. "It cannot be accepted that NIST's responsibilities should be co-opted by the NSA's intelligence mission," wrote Cerf, who now works at Google Inc. While Rivest called the internal history of Dual Elliptic Curve a "smoking gun" with an "almost certain" NSA back door, Felten wrote that NSA might not remain alone in its ability to use it and other possible NIST-approved holes for spying. In each of three cases, including Dual Elliptic Curve and the more common curves faulted by Rivest, Felten said the suspected back door access "reduces the security of users against attack by other adversaries, including organized crime groups or foreign intelligence services." The NSA might have been able to generate curves that pass cursory security tests but are still breakable through the aid of sheer computing power, because it can try millions of curves and get a few that fit its goals. But a researcher working for another country could discover the flaw, Felten said. In the case of the curves approved under the FIPS 186 standard for authenticating digital signatures, NIST should start over and pick its own curves publicly rather than relying on the NSA, Felten and others said. Several experts said NIST had to hire more cryptographers and strengthen its internal processes to avoid relying on NSA. NIST acting Director Willie May agreed in a statement, saying his agency "must strengthen its in-house cryptography capabilities to ensure we can reach independent conclusions about the merits of specific algorithms or standards." NIST did not respond to a Reuters email asking about the fate of the suspect curves. (Reporting by Joseph Menn; Editing by Ken Wills) From jya at pipeline.com Tue Jul 15 13:19:25 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 16:19:25 -0400 Subject: The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control In-Reply-To: <20140715183155.59BDC22813B@palinka.tinho.net> References: <Your message of "Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:36:00 +0200." <20140711103600.GA26986@leitl.org> <20140715183155.59BDC22813B@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <E1X79C6-0005ko-FG@elasmtp-dupuy.atl.sa.earthlink.net> This is a crucial observation and NSA cannot deny the deniability of its commanding superiors and budget axe-persons. One possibility which recurs in NSA history is that individuals inside will have the courage or opportunity to explain how this actually works, verging on virgin suicide. Limited as always by draconian secrecy agreements which imperil disclosers with retribution of being pilloried as Betrayers of the Trust in NSA domestication journals. This looming retribution is what induces hemming and hawing by former insiders -- interlaced with inhuman clarity of not going too far, top secrets activate brain-implanted recorders -- who spill some beans but not all, always followed by an assertion you can never know what I know, recorder beeps damn tootin. As with Edward Snowden, Thomas Drake, William Binney, et al. Nobody beeps like that here. Bleeping predators who exploit former insiders without sharing the risk are despicable scoundrels, not motherfucking cowards, cowering behind privileges of press, law, religion, and, oh my sweet James Jesus: Judas-duplicitous cryptology, finger-pointng brayers extraordinaire, verily in thrall to kings-coined, oversexed In-Q-Televangelists. At 02:31 PM 7/15/2014, you wrote: > > The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control > >This is not the NSA's goal. This is the goal of those for whom the >NSA works even if their deal includes giving both Congress & POTUS >plausible deniability about just whose goals are whose. > >--dan From eugen at leitl.org Tue Jul 15 09:31:11 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 18:31:11 +0200 Subject: Rainforest Connection and WildLeaks Message-ID: <20140715163110.GW26986@leitl.org> Interesting uses of old mobile phones https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/topherwhite/rainforest-connection-phones-turned-to-forest-guar (I'm sure you'll how this be made applicable in other contexts (say, urban environment) and with other modifications). One group hopes to end poaching, WikiLeaks-style http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-07-14/one-group-hopes-end-poaching-wikileaks-style From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 15 22:32:11 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 01:32:11 -0400 Subject: The next gen P2P secure email solution ["meta" data] Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-BGWarRU1rbLeyhdiOwdvuYS-AVaquWEfXBmeb-mpaPw@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 5:03 PM, John Denker <jsd at av8n.com> wrote: > http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-July/022150.html > It seems to me that the binary distinction between "metadata" and > other data is a crock. As a glaring example of the problem, common > protocols for encrypted email encrypt only the main body of the > message, leaving /all/ the headers unencrypted. This is a serious > security breach, as discussed below [*]. > > We can do better than this. We need to do better than this. > > At first glance, one might think that "data is data" and we should > not distinguish "metadata" from other data, but actually I wish to > go in the other direction, and distinguish /more/ classes of data. > ... > Let's be clear: A great deal of the stuff that appears in RFC822 > headers is not needed for delivery of the message, and MUST NOT > be sent in the clear. > ... > To say the same thing another way: Assume the law of the jungle. > The only privacy rights you have are the ones you can enforce on > your own, using the strength of your cryptography. Well, when you give up those rights by still disclosing your source IP and trusting your 'destination organization' [aka provider] with address info regarding you and who you're mailing... it's not much of a solution. Put in as many classes as you want... besides the body of the message which you control, you can't fix centralized Email. Here's another class of provider and browser based non solutions... https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/004894.html There's a thread of this subject ongoing that acknowledges Email can't really be fixed against the issues of the day... and discusses other possible messaging designs towards a next gen solution... https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2013-December/002638.html https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/004900.html The goal is likely one or both of these over an anonymous P2P network... o direct delivery to your recipients online node. o stored delivery to same (push or pull, only exposes destination). More interesting than wasting time on futility of old Email. From bluelotus at openmailbox.org Wed Jul 16 04:19:47 2014 From: bluelotus at openmailbox.org (Bluelotus) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 07:19:47 -0400 Subject: BadBIOS forensics Message-ID: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora CD, infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), infected external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting forensics. I wrote threads on my limited ability to perform forensics in /r/badBIOS subreddit of reddit.com. My other threads are in other subreddits. Look at my submit history. My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted. From demonfighter at gmail.com Wed Jul 16 07:41:34 2014 From: demonfighter at gmail.com (Steve Furlong) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 10:41:34 -0400 Subject: BadBIOS forensics In-Reply-To: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> References: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CAOFDsm0Oh4X8UA7ihdj7MAyYQ90vUPV3wXxgn8uirBqJs3L2cw@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 7:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> wrote: > I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora CD, infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), infected external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting forensics Forensics is fine, I suppose, but wouldn't it be better to donate them to some organization that you don't like? The reelection committee for some politician you don't like, a lobbying group whose position you despise, or a charity which is conspicuous for high overhead might be deserving recipients. (Not on topic, but I never donate cash to charities or other not-for-profits. I've done various support work (as a paid consultant) for quite a few NFPs, including work on their accounting databases, and every single one had funny business going on with the money. Not necessarily covering up pilferage by corporation bosses, though there was some of that, but always overhead that was much higher than reported. And usually the total compensation of the bosses was much higher than reported, if you include non-trivial expenses like paid-for cars. I'm not interested in putting money in the pocket of someone with three times my income while they poor-mouth to get more donations.) -- Neca eos omnes. Deus suos agnoscet. -- Arnaud-Amaury, 1209 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1728 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140716/0c3c9fbf/attachment.txt> From scott at sbce.org Wed Jul 16 19:43:02 2014 From: scott at sbce.org (Scott Blaydes) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 21:43:02 -0500 Subject: Keybase.io Message-ID: <FD44079F-9E63-44DD-9BD7-6681CE3F9A93@sbce.org> I know Keybase.io is old news, but I still have a couple of invites if anyone in interested. Bonus if your request is encrypted. Thank you, Scott Blaydes ========================\ /---------------------------------------------------------- scott at sbce.org \ / *BSD/Linux Advocate crypto user GPG 096EECF0D8A2381E \/ Society for Better Computing Ethics gpg key on keyserver / \ http://sbce.org/ -------------------------------------------/ \================================== -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 842 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140716/0e664baf/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 17 00:35:47 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 03:35:47 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <20140716224117.DF1BB22810A@palinka.tinho.net> References: <20140716224117.DF1BB22810A@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28uFoH2Xinsd9PwHK-n7xLCwmHF2tSpX6GsOgkWbXciOg@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 6:41 PM, <dan at geer.org> wrote: > http://www.cnbc.com/id/101841875 > Breyer also predicted big things for digital currencies. > > He said the leader in the field may not end up being bitcoin, which > is the most prominent name now but has faced price volatility, theft > and scandal over the past year. Other providers will emerge. > > "I have zero doubt in the next five to seven years that we will see > at least half a dozen multibillion dollar digital currency companies," > he said. All currencies and property exhibit volatility, scandal and theft. It is a laugh to suggest otherwise, especially for anything 'new'. And of course there will be new digital currency 'companies'. Let's just call them what they will be, large central banks and govt's. But none of them will have the property that their currency is not under their control. Other than the obivous head start bitcoin has in the digital currency game, that is what bitcoin offers philosophically... freedom from control. No company can or will offer that with their currency. And people are choosing freedom to the tune of roughly $100M moved per day [1] when they could just as easily use the current centralized digital currencies of CC/ACH/wire. If bitcoin itself ends up not scaling well enough, or being anonymous enough, or resistant enough to centralization... another decentral digital currency will do better and take its place. The only real question is, will a decentralized currency such as bitcoin beat the centralizers in the race to global adoption by the masses? And similarly to reach point of no return adoption before centralizers realize it's too late to say no? You really don't want to let big central things emerge (here $trillion-dollar corps), bad things always happen with that. [1] http://bitcoincharts.com/bitcoin/ http://blockchain.info/charts http://www.coindesk.com/ From demonfighter at gmail.com Thu Jul 17 04:19:00 2014 From: demonfighter at gmail.com (Steve Furlong) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 07:19:00 -0400 Subject: BadBIOS forensics In-Reply-To: <1864806.Uu4lpW7xK6@lapuntu> References: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> <CAOFDsm0Oh4X8UA7ihdj7MAyYQ90vUPV3wXxgn8uirBqJs3L2cw@mail.gmail.com> <1864806.Uu4lpW7xK6@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAOFDsm3JypoSJfWpZPTV+M+X6k5LoTkRL_DgGDR8x2ukvtso-A@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 6:49 AM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > The way it is, you don't have such control. So you would be giving these away > to some orgs you don't like hoping this will get them in hot water with the > NSA/the government. > ... > Either way, a bad, bad idea Oh, agreed. I was joking when I suggested spreading the malware. (People keep telling me that my (alleged) sense of humor will get me in trouble one of these days. Meh, hasn't happened yet.) > I work in an NGO that tries to be at least > partially funded by donations, and it's fucking hard. I'd say it's a case of the 10% making the rest look bad, but really, every single NFP whose accounting I've seen has had something to hide. It's not always excessive perqs for the bosses (and only for the bosses; one of the things to hide is just how much the boss's little extras cost while she tells the staff that there just isn't the money to give any of them pay raises this year), sometimes it's just the level of overhead. One person was telling me that they needed to conceal their overhead level because if they reported the actual level they would lose donations to "more efficient" charities ... who also were lying in their financials. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1660 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/784dcf12/attachment.txt> From nettime at kein.org Thu Jul 17 00:59:02 2014 From: nettime at kein.org (nettime's blockwart) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 09:59:02 +0200 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT Message-ID: <mailman.4606.1575949103.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org> http://www.warwickshire.police.uk/currentIssues/campaigns/suspectreport Terrorists have to live somewhere. They store their equipment and materials somewhere. They need vehicles. They have people who help them - and these people might come and go at strange times of the day and night. They may make unusual financial transactions or use false documents to hide their real identities. They may be behaving differently to how you've known them to behave in the past. If you suspect it, report it. You can also give non-urgent information that may assist police investigations online through www.online.police.uk. Van – Terrorists need transport. If you work in commercial vehicle hire or sales, has a sale or rental made you suspicious? Passport – Terrorists use multiple identities. Do you know someone with documents in different names for no obvious reason? Mobile phone – Terrorists need communication. Anonymous, pay-as-you-go and stolen mobiles are typical. Have you seen someone with large quantities of mobile phones? Has it made you suspicious? Camera – Terrorists need information. Observation and surveillance help terrorists plan attacks. Have you seen anyone taking pictures of security arrangements? Chemicals – Do you know someone buying large or unusual quantities of chemicals for no obvious reason? Mask and goggles – Terrorists use protective equipment. Handling chemicals is dangerous. Maybe you’ve seen goggles or masks dumped somewhere. Credit card – Terrorists need funding. Cheque and credit card fraud are ways terrorists generate cash. Have you seen any suspicious transactions? Computer – Terrorists use computers. Do you know someone who visits terrorist-related websites? Suitcase – Terrorists need to travel. Meetings training and planning can take place anywhere. Do you know someone who travels but is vague about where they are going? Padlock – Terrorists need storage. Lock-ups, garages and sheds can all be used by terrorists to store equipment. Are you suspicious of anyone renting a commercial property? # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime at kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- From tom at vondein.org Thu Jul 17 02:03:26 2014 From: tom at vondein.org (Tom) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 11:03:26 +0200 Subject: Mathematicians discuss severing ties to the NSA Message-ID: <20140717090326.GA11885@r4> FYI: http://www.ams.org/notices/201406/rnoti-p623.pdf -- This message has been scanned for viruses and dangerous content by MailScanner, and is believed to be clean. From demonfighter at gmail.com Thu Jul 17 08:22:27 2014 From: demonfighter at gmail.com (Steve Furlong) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 11:22:27 -0400 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT In-Reply-To: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> References: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 7:16 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > /s/terrist/spook >> Terrorists have to live somewhere. Indeed. And so do police. And politicians, and bureaucrats and TSA gropers. Get out and talk to your neighbors and find out what they do for a living. If they're evasive, there's a good chance they work for the government. (Or are drug dealers or something, but at least in the US, the number of government employees greatly exceeds even the highest estimates of the number of drug dealers.) This information may come in useful someday. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 766 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/e73892d5/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 17 03:40:27 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 12:40:27 +0200 Subject: Mathematicians discuss severing ties to the NSA In-Reply-To: <20140717090326.GA11885@r4> References: <20140717090326.GA11885@r4> Message-ID: <1582334.vLpvnVs2p8@lapuntu> Dnia czwartek, 17 lipca 2014 11:03:26 Tom pisze: > FYI: http://www.ams.org/notices/201406/rnoti-p623.pdf Interesting, thanks for the link! -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/7cd15f6c/attachment.sig> From wb8foz at nrk.com Thu Jul 17 09:44:28 2014 From: wb8foz at nrk.com (David) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 12:44:28 -0400 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT In-Reply-To: <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> On 7/17/14 11:22 AM, Steve Furlong wrote: > If they're evasive, there's a good chance they work for the government. Or they think you do..... From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 17 03:49:22 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 12:49:22 +0200 Subject: BadBIOS forensics In-Reply-To: <CAOFDsm0Oh4X8UA7ihdj7MAyYQ90vUPV3wXxgn8uirBqJs3L2cw@mail.gmail.com> References: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> <CAOFDsm0Oh4X8UA7ihdj7MAyYQ90vUPV3wXxgn8uirBqJs3L2cw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1864806.Uu4lpW7xK6@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 16 lipca 2014 10:41:34 Steve Furlong pisze: > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 7:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> > > wrote: > > I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora > > CD, infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), > infected external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting > forensics > > > Forensics is fine, I suppose, but wouldn't it be better to donate them to > some organization that you don't like? The reelection committee for some > politician you don't like, a lobbying group whose position you despise, or > a charity which is conspicuous for high overhead might be deserving > recipients. No. I feel an internal disgust at such an idea. Had you full control of the bugs/implants and could actually get the info/data out and then leak it to Wikileaks/whatever, then it would have a shred of sense, because you could use these tools as a force for good. The way it is, you don't have such control. So you would be giving these away to some orgs you don't like hoping this will get them in hot water with the NSA/the government. There are two scenarios here. Either you'd be de facto giving a present to the NSA -- and I don't feel like giving the NSA presents; or, it would be an org that works with the NSA, or at least is conducive to whatever the gov does -- hence, the implant-gathered data would not be used. Of course you could also hit a potential whistleblower within such an organisation, which would be even worse. Either way, a bad, bad idea. Forensics is the way here. > (Not on topic, but I never donate cash to charities or other > not-for-profits. I've done various support work (as a paid consultant) for > quite a few NFPs, including work on their accounting databases, and every > single one had funny business going on with the money. Not necessarily > covering up pilferage by corporation bosses, though there was some of that, > but always overhead that was much higher than reported. And usually the > total compensation of the bosses was much higher than reported, if you > include non-trivial expenses like paid-for cars. I'm not interested in > putting money in the pocket of someone with three times my income while > they poor-mouth to get more donations.) Sorry you had bad experiences. I work in an NGO that tries to be at least partially funded by donations, and it's fucking hard. We want to be funded by donations because being funded by grants or sponsors is always a "strings attached" situation, and we need to be as independent as possible. Employees here get decent, but not high, pay, and there are no perks like paid-for cars. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/574206bc/attachment.sig> From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 17 04:16:40 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 13:16:40 +0200 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT Message-ID: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> /s/terrist/spook ----- Forwarded message from nettime's blockwart <nettime at kein.org> ----- From jya at pipeline.com Thu Jul 17 10:37:41 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 13:37:41 -0400 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT In-Reply-To: <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> References: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> Message-ID: <E1X7pcj-00007i-Kd@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net> We all work for government unless tax avoiders. Latest guesstimate is 33-45% of pay goes to governments at all levels and those subsidized by governments. Some argue we will all become full-time government workers happily having DoD do what's necessary to bring in 100% revenue by piracy. Reason: citizen tax squeeze is rising as wealthy and corporations shed tax burden by NGOs, off-shore evasion, moving HQs overseas, hiring, manufacturing and financing overseas, massaging taxation laws, bribing revenuers and office holders, increasing crackdown on citizen tax deductions, hiring more private police to intimidate those asking for better pay, offloading environmental crimes to taxpayers, buying legislators to enact favors for high-profit, high-income beneficiaries, controlling and ffixing elections to pack offices with sleazes who work for them before, during and after holding office. That's the short list. Look at your tax due instructions for the long one. Or if youngster, your student debt draconian provisions. Dream of being on the dole by holding political office, or NGO, from which you can escape the long list and shift it to citizens wondering if the increasing shit shower ever stopping. At 12:44 PM 7/17/2014, you wrote: >On 7/17/14 11:22 AM, Steve Furlong wrote: > >>If they're evasive, there's a good chance they work for the government. > >Or they think you do..... > From tommy at collison.ie Thu Jul 17 14:07:00 2014 From: tommy at collison.ie (Tommy Collison) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 14:07:00 -0700 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> Hi Rich, hi list -- I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would love to say hi to whoever's around. TC <tommycollison.com> On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: > Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? > > Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! > > R > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 536 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/ab700075/attachment.sig> From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 17 06:09:14 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 15:09:14 +0200 Subject: the NSA revelations all in one chart Message-ID: <20140717130914.GD26986@leitl.org> http://projects.propublica.org/nsa-grid/ The NSA Revelations All in One Chart This is a plot of the NSA programs revealed in the past year according to whether they are bulk or targeted, and whether the targets of surveillance are foreign or domestic. Most of the programs fall squarely into the agency’s stated mission of foreign surveillance, but some – particularly those that are both domestic and broad-sweeping – are more controversial. Just as with the New York Magazine approval matrix that served as our inspiration, the placement of each program is based on judgments and is approximate. For more details, read our FAQ or listen to our podcast. Also, take our quiz to test your NSA knowledge. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Thu Jul 17 12:31:29 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 16:31:29 -0300 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT In-Reply-To: <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> References: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> Message-ID: <53c82379.0938ec0a.354b.55de@mx.google.com> On Thu, 17 Jul 2014 12:44:28 -0400 David <wb8foz at nrk.com> wrote: > On 7/17/14 11:22 AM, Steve Furlong wrote: > > > If they're evasive, there's a good chance they work for the > > government. > > Or they think you do..... > +1 From rich at openwatch.net Thu Jul 17 13:34:14 2014 From: rich at openwatch.net (Rich Jones) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 16:34:14 -0400 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE Message-ID: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! R -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 173 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/39e04edf/attachment.txt> From aestetix at aestetix.com Thu Jul 17 14:14:34 2014 From: aestetix at aestetix.com (aestetix) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 17:14:34 -0400 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> Message-ID: <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I'm here! I'm speaking at 11pm on saturday in Olson (http://x.hope.net/schedule.html#updatesfro). Would love to have crypto/privacy folks come. On 7/17/14, 5:07 PM, Tommy Collison wrote: > Hi Rich, hi list -- > > I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights > advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, > which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would > love to say hi to whoever's around. > > TC <tommycollison.com> > > On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: >> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? >> >> Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! >> >> R >> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTyDy5AAoJEOrRfDwkjbpTc+kH/0Z4VvDALMluN5hRwFsgOHm3 u0ZGX3sCqj6mgRN1x6dmtSEmvAwHcnUBnjam7SObew1FsNOWixuN6VuGQCN0FhXF Bifgt6so56XGnF2nNbT7jsfealzlGWQS9EL9otqSwrqGHf8mdRVB4oeehRb+4YU0 mHlZyNOvidmqHQiE0xPUlGn4ATEkcliD1mcFHJ77+kwkDkBX0iDic94hF9KuLOoX wipJvBdMNsUeZfibBHrmK55dEHCVn8mZ1ZXX5KyCnyInjQQM+LacjBZQkCE5IIuE ir7KS4P/Jqi+7P6nGao36lNCa5ImSveBBDG77hT3+a1osvS1d/ojx1dWb22eZTE= =O+gt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From griffin at cryptolab.net Thu Jul 17 14:32:05 2014 From: griffin at cryptolab.net (Griffin Boyce) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 17:32:05 -0400 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> Message-ID: <5e8bbf39-fc7f-4dba-a7f9-c974400e00dd@email.android.com> I'll be there, sometimes kicking it in NoisySquare =) I'm the androgyne in the political shirt. On July 17, 2014 5:14:34 PM EDT, aestetix <aestetix at aestetix.com> wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > >I'm here! I'm speaking at 11pm on saturday in Olson >(http://x.hope.net/schedule.html#updatesfro). Would love to have >crypto/privacy folks come. > >On 7/17/14, 5:07 PM, Tommy Collison wrote: >> Hi Rich, hi list -- >> >> I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights >> advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, >> which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would >> love to say hi to whoever's around. >> >> TC <tommycollison.com> >> >> On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: >>> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? >>> >>> Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! >>> >>> R >>> >> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) >Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > >iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTyDy5AAoJEOrRfDwkjbpTc+kH/0Z4VvDALMluN5hRwFsgOHm3 >u0ZGX3sCqj6mgRN1x6dmtSEmvAwHcnUBnjam7SObew1FsNOWixuN6VuGQCN0FhXF >Bifgt6so56XGnF2nNbT7jsfealzlGWQS9EL9otqSwrqGHf8mdRVB4oeehRb+4YU0 >mHlZyNOvidmqHQiE0xPUlGn4ATEkcliD1mcFHJ77+kwkDkBX0iDic94hF9KuLOoX >wipJvBdMNsUeZfibBHrmK55dEHCVn8mZ1ZXX5KyCnyInjQQM+LacjBZQkCE5IIuE >ir7KS4P/Jqi+7P6nGao36lNCa5ImSveBBDG77hT3+a1osvS1d/ojx1dWb22eZTE= >=O+gt >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2369 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/ddd3c9d3/attachment.txt> From gbnewby at pglaf.org Thu Jul 17 18:47:30 2014 From: gbnewby at pglaf.org (Greg Newby) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 18:47:30 -0700 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <5e8bbf39-fc7f-4dba-a7f9-c974400e00dd@email.android.com> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> <5e8bbf39-fc7f-4dba-a7f9-c974400e00dd@email.android.com> Message-ID: <20140718014730.GA49636@pglaf.org> I'm going to be helping out backstage etc. as in the past. The guy in the blue suit. The program is fantastic. Workshops...vendors...art... all kinds of stuff! -- Greg On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 05:32:05PM -0400, Griffin Boyce wrote: > I'll be there, sometimes kicking it in NoisySquare =) I'm the androgyne in the political shirt. > > > On July 17, 2014 5:14:34 PM EDT, aestetix <aestetix at aestetix.com> wrote: > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Hash: SHA1 > > > >I'm here! I'm speaking at 11pm on saturday in Olson > >(http://x.hope.net/schedule.html#updatesfro). Would love to have > >crypto/privacy folks come. > > > >On 7/17/14, 5:07 PM, Tommy Collison wrote: > >> Hi Rich, hi list -- > >> > >> I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights > >> advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, > >> which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would > >> love to say hi to whoever's around. > >> > >> TC <tommycollison.com> > >> > >> On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: > >>> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? > >>> > >>> Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! > >>> > >>> R > >>> > >> > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > >Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) > >Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > > > >iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTyDy5AAoJEOrRfDwkjbpTc+kH/0Z4VvDALMluN5hRwFsgOHm3 > >u0ZGX3sCqj6mgRN1x6dmtSEmvAwHcnUBnjam7SObew1FsNOWixuN6VuGQCN0FhXF > >Bifgt6so56XGnF2nNbT7jsfealzlGWQS9EL9otqSwrqGHf8mdRVB4oeehRb+4YU0 > >mHlZyNOvidmqHQiE0xPUlGn4ATEkcliD1mcFHJ77+kwkDkBX0iDic94hF9KuLOoX > >wipJvBdMNsUeZfibBHrmK55dEHCVn8mZ1ZXX5KyCnyInjQQM+LacjBZQkCE5IIuE > >ir7KS4P/Jqi+7P6nGao36lNCa5ImSveBBDG77hT3+a1osvS1d/ojx1dWb22eZTE= > >=O+gt > >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > -- > Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 17 09:54:26 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 18:54:26 +0200 Subject: Leaked GCHQ catalog of exploit tools for manipulation and mass surveillance Message-ID: <20140717165426.GF26986@leitl.org> http://blogs.computerworld.com/privacy/24145/leaked-gchq-catalog-exploit-tools-manipulation-and-mass-surveillance?source=CTWNLE_nlt_security_2014-07-17 Leaked GCHQ catalog of exploit tools for manipulation and mass surveillance By Darlene Storm July 16, 2014 1:22 PM EDTAdd a comment Just as civil liberties groups challenge the legality of the UK intelligence agency’s mass surveillance programs, a catalog of exploit tools for monitoring and manipulation is leaked online. The Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG), a department within the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), “develops the majority of effects capabilities” for UK’s NSA-flavored intelligence agency. First Look Media first published the Snowden-leaked Wikipedia-like document full of covert tools used by GCHQ for surveillance and propaganda. JTRIG tools and techniques help British spies “seed the internet with false information, including the ability to manipulate the results of online polls,” monitor social media posts, and launch attacks ranging from denial of service, to call bombing phones, to disabling users' accounts on PCs. Devil’s Handshake, Dirty Devil, Reaper and Poison Arrow are but a few vicious-sounding JTRIG system tools, but the naming convention for others are just inane like Bumblebee Dance, Techno Viking and Jazz Fusion. Perhaps the British spies were hungry when coming up with Fruit Bowl, Spice Island, Nut Allergy, and Berry Twister? Most of the tools are "fully operational, tested and reliable,” according to the 2012 JTRIG Manual, but "Don't treat this like a catalog. If you don't see it here, it doesn't mean we can't build it." Like the previously leaked TAO exploits, it’s an eye-opener as to exploits that GCHQ can deploy. GCHQ spy tools, techniques and exploits in JTRIG manual Some of the especially invasive tools that are “either ready to fire or very close to being ready” include: Angry Pirate can “permanently disable a target’s account on their computer.” Stealth Moose can “disrupt” a target’s “Windows machine. Logs of how long and when the effect is active.” Sunblock can “deny functionality to send/receive email or view material online.” Swamp Donkey “silently” finds and encrypts all predefined types of files on a target’s machine. Tracer Fire is an “Office document that grabs the targets machine info, files, logs, etc and posts it back to GCHQ.” Gurkhas Sword is a tool for “beaconed Microsoft Office documents to elicit a targets IP address.” Tornado Alley is a delivery system aimed at Microsoft Excel "to silently extract and run an executable on a target's machine." Changeling provides UK spies with the “ability to spoof any email address and send email under that identity.” Glassback gets a target’s IP by “pretending to be a spammer and ringing them. Target does not need to answer.” Denial of Service: Rolling Thunder uses P2P for distributed denial of service. Predators Face is used for “targeted denial of service against web servers.” Silent Movie provides “targeted denial of service against SSH services.” Other JTRIG exploits include Screaming Eagle, “a tool that processes Kismet data into geolocation information” and Chinese Firecracker for “overt brute login attempts against online forums.” Hacienda is a “port scanning tool designed to scan an entire country or city” before identifying IP locations and adding them to an “Earthling database.” Messing with cellphones: Burlesque can “send spoofed SMS text messages.” Cannonball can “send repeated text messages to a single target.” Concrete Donkey can “scatter an audio message to a large number of telephones, or repeatedly bomb a target number with the same message.” Deer Stalker provides a way to silently call a satellite and GSM phone “to aid geolocation.” Imperial Barge can connect two target phones together in a call. Mustang “provides covert access to the locations of GSM cell towers.” Scarlet emperor is used for denial of service against targets’ phones via call bombing. Scrapheap Challenge provides “perfect spoofing of emails from BlackBerry targets.” Top Hat is “a version of Mustang and Dancing Bear techniques that allows us to pull back cell tower and Wi-Fi locations targeted against particular areas.” Vipers Tongue is another denial of service tool but it’s aimed at satellite or GSM phone calls. Manipulation and propaganda Bomb Bay can “increase website hits/rankings.” Gateway can “artificially increase traffic to a website;” Slipstream can “inflate page views on websites.” Underpass “can change the outcome of online polls.” Badger can mass deliver email messages “to support an Information Operations campaign.” Gestator can amplify a “given message, normally video, on popular multimedia websites” like YouTube. The “production and dissemination of multimedia via the web in the course of information operations” can be accomplished with Skyscraper. There are also various tools to censor or report “extremist” content. Online surveillance of social networks Godfather collects public data from Facebook. While Spring Bishop finds private photos of targets on Facebook, Reservoir allows the collection of various Facebook information. Clean Sweep can “masquerade Facebook wall posts for individuals or entire countries.” Birdstrike monitors and collects Twitter profiles. Dragon’s Snout collects Paltalk group chats. Airwolf collects YouTube videos, comments and profiles. Bugsy collects users’ info off Google+. Fatyak is about collecting data from LinkedIn. Goodfella is a “generic framework to collect public data from online social networks.” Elate monitors a target's use of UK's eBay. Mouth finds, collects and downloads a user’s files from achive.org. Photon Torpedo can “actively grab the IP address of an MSN messenger user.” Pitbull is aimed at large scale delivery of tailored messages to IM services. Miniature Hero is about exploiting Skype. The description states, “Active Skype capability. Provision of real time call records (SkypeOut and SkypetoSkype) and bidirectional instant messaging. Also contact lists.” If that’s not enough mass-scale surveillance and manipulation to irk you, there are more weaponized tricks and techniques in the JTRIG Manual. From lists at cooperq.com Thu Jul 17 19:45:51 2014 From: lists at cooperq.com (Cooper Quintin) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 22:45:51 -0400 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <20140718014730.GA49636@pglaf.org> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> <5e8bbf39-fc7f-4dba-a7f9-c974400e00dd@email.android.com> <20140718014730.GA49636@pglaf.org> Message-ID: <53C88A5F.9000904@cooperq.com> I'll be around, giving a workshop about crypto for noobs. Helping people set up OTR and stuff. On 07/17/2014 09:47 PM, Greg Newby wrote: > I'm going to be helping out backstage etc. as in the past. > The guy in the blue suit. > > The program is fantastic. Workshops...vendors...art... > all kinds of stuff! > -- Greg > > On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 05:32:05PM -0400, Griffin Boyce wrote: >> I'll be there, sometimes kicking it in NoisySquare =) I'm the androgyne in the political shirt. >> >> >> On July 17, 2014 5:14:34 PM EDT, aestetix <aestetix at aestetix.com> wrote: > I'm here! I'm speaking at 11pm on saturday in Olson > (http://x.hope.net/schedule.html#updatesfro). Would love to have > crypto/privacy folks come. > > On 7/17/14, 5:07 PM, Tommy Collison wrote: > >>>> Hi Rich, hi list -- > >>>> > >>>> I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights > >>>> advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, > >>>> which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would > >>>> love to say hi to whoever's around. > >>>> > >>>> TC <tommycollison.com> > >>>> > >>>> On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: > >>>>> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? > >>>>> > >>>>> Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! > >>>>> > >>>>> R > >>>>> > >>>> >> >> -- >> Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2600 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/83cf26e4/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Fri Jul 18 06:16:09 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 06:16:09 -0700 Subject: Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Shfw4w4dq4f0qzr8RMHcJNg6npxdxLGUyGCy5sB4bAdw@mail.gmail.com> "Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections" A request for all security conscious organizations handling vulnerability reports to deploy privacy enhancing technologies. --- With the Snowden disclosures and Google's Project Zero on the minds of security professionals everywhere, it is time to evaluate one more aspect of this renewed focus on 0day and targeted attacks: vulnerability submission to vendors. [0][1] Software vulnerabilities of use to nation states and espionage organizations are recognized as a threat to privacy and basic human rights. Their impact no longer dismissable or discounted given evidence of misuse. I will not discuss hardware vulnerabilities in this treatment as they entail different considerations and constraints. [2] Reporting vulnerabilities of this nature in turn requires strong privacy protections commensurate with the five and six digit monetary values they command, and the adversaries intent on discouraging their discovery or mitigation. [3][4] --- Therefore, any organization handling vulnerability reports must support strong privacy for vulnerability submission. This is mandatory even if most or all issues received via this channel are not 0day, not high value, and entail very little risk to users. The characteristics of a strong private reporting method are: - Email must not be used. In the best circumstances email leaks too much information. In common situations it is passed around clear text, trivially interfered with, and winds through software with huge usability and vulnerability problems. Email for initial security vulnerability reporting must cease immediately. [5][6] - Public web systems for vulnerability reporting must not be used. Like email, this leaks too much information and is vulnerable to a wide array of attacks destroying any privacy intended. [7][8] - Submission of reports via hidden site required. This has become fashionable in media organizations as the "secure drop" for whistleblowers, and it is equally apropriate for vulnerability reporting. This significantly raises the cost of surveilling a vulnerability reporting service, and ensures that passive interception of reported vulnerabilities is impossible. [9] - Encryption of submitted reports required. PGP and GPG are wonderful tools, despite encrypted email being a dismal failure. While the hidden drop may protect the privacy of the reporter, encryption of the report content to specific vulnerability researchers' keys ensures privacy to the receiver. A compromise of the hidden site must not lead to access of reported vulnerabilities. [10] - Submitter anonymity the default. Submissions and communication must accomodate an anonymous identity. If a researcher wishes to claim credit they must opt-in and provide additional information. No psuedonymous account requirements, no key linking across submissions. - Obfuscated disclosure should be available if desired. Capturing 0day in the wild used for espionage or cyber effects is a rare event. Publicly disclosing when, where, and how you obtained such captures ensures you're likely never to see any others. Researchers in position to observe and inspect such events should be able to report the vulnerabilities without credit and without indicating the origin. A vendor could provide a "cover story" for how the vulnerability was discovered internally, to best protect sources' ability to continue to discover these types of weaponized exploits in the wild. Finally, it goes without saying that this privacy applies during reporting and mitigation phases of defect resolution. Once a patch is prepared and public the details of the vulnerability should be public as well, via email list, public blog, or any other useful medium. --- As participants in the security industry it behooves us all to set an example for others and to demonstrate a committment to security and privacy via action. Security conscious organizations handling vulnerability reports can support strong privacy and send a clear message deploying private reporting methods described above. Security researchers must demand strong privacy from organizations they collaborate with, even in the most trivial or minor of circumstances, so that infrequent severe vulnerabilities may also be reported in confidence. Privacy is a basic human right we must all support. Let's demonstrate our support by using privacy enhancing technologies to resolve risks to privacy! best regards, 0. "The NSA Revelations All in One Chart" https://projects.propublica.org/nsa-grid/ 1. "Announcing Project Zero" No link as the announcement is only supported over HTTP; attempt HTTPS and you're redirected to plain-text. This is an embarassment that should be fixed, Google Project Zero! (the other plain-text sites below have not unreasonable exuses ;) 2. "New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms but they are also enabling unparalleled invasions of privacy" https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy 3. "A Declaration of Cyber-War" http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104 '''On July 15, the day Stuxnet’s existence became widely known, the Web sites of two of the world’s top mailing lists for newsletters on industrial-control-systems security fell victim to distributed-denial-of-service attacks...''' 4. "The Real Story of Stuxnet" http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet '''Just as Kaspersky’s engineers were tricking Gauss into communicating with their own servers, those very servers suddenly went down,...''' 5. "Universal Email Encryption Specification" http://ritter.vg/blog-uee_email_encryption.html 6. "Pond" (not like email) https://pond.imperialviolet.org/tech.html 7. "Bullrun (decryption program)" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_%28decryption_program%29 8. "How secure is HTTPS today? How often is it attacked?" https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/how-secure-https-today 9. "How the NSA Attacks Tor/Firefox Users With QUANTUM and FOXACID" https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_att.html (this is what a hard to attack system looks like, and keeping disclosure entirely within the network from clients to hidden sites amplifies the difficulty significantly.) 10. "The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture" https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3724.txt From coderman at gmail.com Fri Jul 18 06:55:37 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 06:55:37 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload In-Reply-To: <E1X86cZ-00060q-A0@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <53C82098.7090108@yahoo.com> <20140717191931.GL4258@hexapodia.org> <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.gmail.com> <E1X86cZ-00060q-A0@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1T4+0-8VFK902zTXLbuUnZgHjEKy=-rGvR8JAFf6u+Wmg@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 4:46 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > ... > No nonsense Omidyar has bet $200 million on peddling security > products generated by his $50 million investment in insecurity > scare news via Snowden cornicopia of NSA scare programs, which > in turn have received huge boosts of counter-Snowden actions > by the usual suspects of mil-com-spy-edu-org-hackers. modern security analysis requires ever increasing skills and knowledge, driving the pool of practitioners ever smaller. combined with demand from government and private industry for private research, paying researchers to work in the light rather than [REDACTED] a hard sell. this is one aspect of Project Zero i am keen to monitor, as the initial recruiting is top talent and top dollar. research to harden software against advanced threats and analyze advanced attacks encountered almost always locked behind non-disclosure, confidentiality, classification constraints. independent security research and state-of-the-art security research at odds, increasingly so, day by day. > Nothing like it since 9/11. Thank you, Edward Snowden, thank > you media, for prolonging godsent cyber fear and salvation. > Dust off cyber Pearl Harbor posters for Defcon, HOPE, Blackhat, > this very sordid squat. an industry in sorry shape[0] and much volatility, for sure. Google's "Announcing Project Zero" post itself only accessible via plain-text, attempts to https redirected back to plainly observable and trivially tamper-able. that mathematicians are having an introspective moment to consider their role in mass privacy violations, and in turn advocating for employment outside such private industries is a telling contrast to the relative silence in infosec where developing weaponized exploits, not just precursors or components, has yet to generate an honest and open discussion. "Mathematicians Urge Colleagues To Refuse To Work For The NSA" http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/05/mathematicians-urge-colleagues-to-refuse-to-work-for-the-nsa/ From jya at pipeline.com Fri Jul 18 04:46:36 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 07:46:36 -0400 Subject: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.g mail.com> References: <53C82098.7090108@yahoo.com> <20140717191931.GL4258@hexapodia.org> <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <E1X86cZ-00060q-A0@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Some, maybe all, of those sitting on Snowden docs would/are selling to the highest bidder for other clandestine hacks. The fundamental purpose of security is to do that lulling, gulling and smiling at the ease with which trust can be exploited when a manufactured crisis drives the fearful into gaping maws of protection. The especially private kind, the higher the secrecy the higher the price, is most effective. Fake highest classification markings obligatory. The frenzy to exploit Snowden revelations, tiny as they are, has saved the security industry -- mil-com-spy-edu-org-hackers -- from post-2-war decline. BTW, what are the odds all parties to the Snowden boondoggle are placing on hot war cyberwar to surpass the cool stinking-poo of AV and security vendors planting malware to foster upticks of market? No nonsense Omidyar has bet $200 million on peddling security products generated by his $50 million investment in insecurity scare news via Snowden cornicopia of NSA scare programs, which in turn have received huge boosts of counter-Snowden actions by the usual suspects of mil-com-spy-edu-org-hackers. Nothing like it since 9/11. Thank you, Edward Snowden, thank you media, for prolonging godsent cyber fear and salvation. Dust off cyber Pearl Harbor posters for Defcon, HOPE, Blackhat, this very sordid squat. >this is exactly why some who have received these payloads are sitting >on them, rather than disclosing. > >it is more useful to mitigate privately, and observe how/when an >exploit is used, > than burn it publicly for zero effective security improvement. > >(the less scrupulous would sell to highest bidder for other clandestine hacks) > > >better ideas welcome! > > >best regards, >-- >Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. >Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: >https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. >Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing >moderator at companys at stanford.edu. From jya at pipeline.com Fri Jul 18 08:19:58 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 11:19:58 -0400 Subject: Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections, Re: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Shfw4w4dq4f0qzr8RMHcJNg6npxdxLGUyGCy5sB4bAdw@mail.g mail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Shfw4w4dq4f0qzr8RMHcJNg6npxdxLGUyGCy5sB4bAdw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <E1X89x2-0004gZ-Ie@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> On two related threads: It's a challenge to work counter-spying without access to all of Snowden's alleged, note alleged -- nobody knows except Ed how many or where multiply-accumulated and -stashed from 2008-2013 and afterwards -- documents. But parsing the unknown, imagining and acting on possibilities, is the purpose counter-spying as well as spying. Failure expected, narrowing it for modest utility, no lasting triumph. Privacy as elusive as security. It could be, has been, argued that open source coding, like the Internet, is a ploy, or decoy, like comsec standards committees and spy oversight committees, even, some claim, Tor and PKC, AV and Blacknet, so forth and so on paraded here for Internet dog years. Duplicity, buyer beware and who watches the watchers inherent, is that not the wee chihuahua way of survival against greater powers of Fort Huachuca whisperers, GMO vegetables, fracked minerals, DoD-fabricated asteroids and black hos of nightsweat zombies. Whistling in the dark, whistleblowing sunshine, coding out of sight except for sneaky supra-Tempest io-germs gnawing backbone taps into HUMINT dervishing switch doctors. From eugen at leitl.org Fri Jul 18 03:24:15 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 12:24:15 +0200 Subject: interesting thread on BND intercept at DE-CIX on denog@ Message-ID: <20140718102415.GL26986@leitl.org> The netops are not amused. You need to be a list member in order to access the archive. http://lists.denog.de/mailman/private/denog/2014-July/002049.html From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 15:12:33 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 15:12:33 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> wrote: > ... > My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted. and now they're getting thoroughly cleaned, see attached. please note for all future reference that suspect materials should be delivered in person, even at cost of a plane ticket. so much for that inquiry, :/ best regards, (attached interdiction of shipment from Washington State to Oregon via Florida - usually they at least try to make it look plausible, heh) https://peertech.org/files/fedex-fail.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: fedex-fail.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 25539 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140719/605b16db/attachment.jpg> From bryan at thestarbucks.com Sat Jul 19 17:20:45 2014 From: bryan at thestarbucks.com (Bryan Starbuck) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 17:20:45 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <B8AA3FD7-264B-481D-909C-5C1E9FF5EF84@thestarbucks.com> I like buying a computer in a surprise visit to an apple store or a store that sells windows computers. Best, -Bryan Bryan Starbuck On Jul 19, 2014, at 3:12 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> wrote: >> ... >> My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted. > > and now they're getting thoroughly cleaned, see attached. > > please note for all future reference that suspect materials should be > delivered in person, even at cost of a plane ticket. > > so much for that inquiry, :/ > > > best regards, > > (attached interdiction of shipment from Washington State to Oregon via > Florida - usually they at least try to make it look plausible, heh) > https://peertech.org/files/fedex-fail.jpg > <fedex-fail.jpg> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2820 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140719/64e3f12e/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 17:25:52 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 17:25:52 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1QMGkfR-ffN=GMMM2dFxb-_kf9+hx4-au+FKmyUz_qkSQ@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Bryan Starbuck <bryan at thestarbucks.com> wrote: > I like buying a computer in a surprise visit to an apple store or a store > that sells windows computers. agreed; on site ad-hoc cash purchases the best procurement technique. not infallible by any means, but at least avoids some known problems like this amusing scenario. (shipments from the Seattle Amazon warehouse to Kansas before delivery to Oregon was also funny.) repeat for emphasis: - keep chain of custody of sensitive hardware at all times - never procure or ship through mail. at one point, priority same day air would get a pass, but even this no longer suitable. best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 17:31:10 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 17:31:10 -0700 Subject: first reference to "data diodes" in NSA documents or leaks Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TYOLtjS1t9b2rBovysUxLgt3oKxCVMy1D7NEV+fTYn2g@mail.gmail.com> i am trying to find the first reference to "data diodes" in any NSA documents or leaks. bonus points for background on where this technical structure originated and why :) best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 18:20:18 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 18:20:18 -0700 Subject: Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TESDg6D7HVoBOoqx6MTXhO2V_DiFRsNOhok0AAbvNWhw@mail.gmail.com> doubt this will surprise anyone; iOS intentionally designed to support surveillance. --- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287614000036 "Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices" by Jonathan Zdziarski Abstract The iOS operating system has long been a subject of interest among the forensics and law enforcement communities. With a large base of interest among consumers, it has become the target of many hackers and criminals alike, with many celebrity thefts (For example, the recent article “How did Scarlett Johansson's phone get hacked?”) of data raising awareness to personal privacy. Recent revelations (Privacy scandal: NSA can spy on smart phone data, 2013 and How the NSA spies on smartphones including the BlackBerry) exposed the use (or abuse) of operating system features in the surveillance of targeted individuals by the National Security Agency (NSA), of whom some subjects appear to be American citizens. This paper identifies the most probable techniques that were used, based on the descriptions provided by the media, and today's possible techniques that could be exploited in the future, based on what may be back doors, bypass switches, general weaknesses, or surveillance mechanisms intended for enterprise use in current release versions of iOS. More importantly, I will identify several services and mechanisms that can be abused by a government agency or malicious party to extract intelligence on a subject, including services that may in fact be back doors introduced by the manufacturer... ''' From bryan at thestarbucks.com Sat Jul 19 18:42:12 2014 From: bryan at thestarbucks.com (Bryan Starbuck) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 18:42:12 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1QMGkfR-ffN=GMMM2dFxb-_kf9+hx4-au+FKmyUz_qkSQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1QMGkfR-ffN=GMMM2dFxb-_kf9+hx4-au+FKmyUz_qkSQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <D4761877-2306-43BE-B088-11F24046C14C@thestarbucks.com> If you don’t mind saying, can you say if you are a US citizen? (Probably) Do you work on an open source project like TOR? Do you think they do that because you do development? I’d love if we build a profile of who they actively perform hardware attacks on. They likely repeat this on categories of people (TOR devs, employees at CAs, etc.). Even if you can give a vague category (crypto-currency vs open source file system encryption, etc.) That one lady on twitter was a TOR dev. I’d love us to deduce as many patterns as possible, so those people can be incredibly diligent. Best, -Bryan Bryan Starbuck | Bryan at TheStarbucks.com On Jul 19, 2014, at 5:25 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Bryan Starbuck <bryan at thestarbucks.com> wrote: >> I like buying a computer in a surprise visit to an apple store or a store >> that sells windows computers. > > > agreed; on site ad-hoc cash purchases the best procurement technique. > not infallible by any means, but at least avoids some known problems > like this amusing scenario. > > (shipments from the Seattle Amazon warehouse to Kansas before delivery > to Oregon was also funny.) > > > repeat for emphasis: > - keep chain of custody of sensitive hardware at all times > - never procure or ship through mail. at one point, priority same day > air would get a pass, but even this no longer suitable. > > > best regards, -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3522 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140719/3f7a9984/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 19:23:06 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 19:23:06 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] In-Reply-To: <D4761877-2306-43BE-B088-11F24046C14C@thestarbucks.com> References: <CAJVRA1QMGkfR-ffN=GMMM2dFxb-_kf9+hx4-au+FKmyUz_qkSQ@mail.gmail.com> <D4761877-2306-43BE-B088-11F24046C14C@thestarbucks.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TvbCphaZm9WwMCq6BzgV=7xF_ywrUQ10rqV81PzCZVyg@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 6:42 PM, Bryan Starbuck <bryan at thestarbucks.com> wrote: > ... > I’d love us to deduce as many patterns as possible, so those people can be > incredibly diligent. yes i am a citizen, and as for those at risk of scrutiny (shipments, border crossings, etc.) any of the following activities has been demonstrated to put you under scrutiny: - developing privacy enhancing technologies - administering high value networks or computer systems - documentaries and journalism adversarial to some big business or government - cryptology of any form - technical surveillance and operational security interests - hobbyists in domains including drones, rockets, airplanes - information security and network security professionals - running cryptome.org - many, many, more. it most cases, it seems that drawing attention to attempts to intimidate diminishes or ceases the intrusions. as for deducing patterns, perhaps the useful metric would be a trend up or down. best regards, From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 19:15:40 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 23:15:40 -0300 Subject: Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TESDg6D7HVoBOoqx6MTXhO2V_DiFRsNOhok0AAbvNWhw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TESDg6D7HVoBOoqx6MTXhO2V_DiFRsNOhok0AAbvNWhw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53cb2530.461bec0a.4529.ffff9525@mx.google.com> On Sat, 19 Jul 2014 18:20:18 -0700 coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > doubt this will surprise anyone; iOS intentionally designed to support > surveillance. > > --- > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287614000036 $ 31.50 ? > > "Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in > iOS devices" > by Jonathan Zdziarski > > Abstract > > The iOS operating system has long been a subject of interest among the > forensics and law enforcement communities. With a large base of > interest among consumers, it has become the target of many hackers and > criminals alike, with many celebrity thefts (For example, the recent > article “How did Scarlett Johansson's phone get hacked?”) of data > raising awareness to personal privacy. Recent revelations (Privacy > scandal: NSA can spy on smart phone data, 2013 and How the NSA spies > on smartphones including the BlackBerry) exposed the use (or abuse) of > operating system features in the surveillance of targeted individuals > by the National Security Agency (NSA), of whom some subjects appear to > be American citizens. This paper identifies the most probable > techniques that were used, based on the descriptions provided by the > media, and today's possible techniques that could be exploited in the > future, based on what may be back doors, bypass switches, general > weaknesses, or surveillance mechanisms intended for enterprise use in > current release versions of iOS. More importantly, I will identify > several services and mechanisms that can be abused by a government > agency or malicious party to extract intelligence on a subject, > including services that may in fact be back doors introduced by the > manufacturer... > ''' > From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 00:07:47 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 00:07:47 -0700 Subject: minimum viable toolset for low level malware forensics [was: BadBIOS forensics] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1S=O9Yq1KeL_C2-T4fKeSHC1C8xvD3GKg4pM-kE3V3pkA@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> wrote: > ... > I wrote threads on my limited ability to perform forensics for those technical, the minimum viable toolset for identifying low level subversive programming is: - a solid base (clean hw, clean installs, clean environment) in a separate location with RF shielding. (a closed metal barn out in the country, for example. if you're a geek you love the thought of a faraday closet ;) - instrumented runtime (e.g. volatility memory forensics, system performance profiling, all to append only storage) on any systems you are using as suspect to attack. - obstructed runtime (see thread on "how to hack your systems before someone else") - this is optional; a modified system that appears to be vulnerable / stock condition will exhibit undefined behavior under attempted enabling, sometimes. otherwise it may be difficult to identify a successful infection. - direct flash memory pinout rig (specs for all chips including flash memory associated with BIOS, integrated management controllers, network devices, I/O ports, keyboard, trac pad or mouse, HD/DVD/CD drives, graphics memory, wifi, 4g, and bluetooth wireless adapters will be needed you're programming an FPGA to perform reads directly from the flash chips. converting flash memory into high level block storage the next black art upward. - wide band high performance software defined radio. you will be building custom GNU radio blocks and running many from third party repositories or research projects. you are using a two stage process, where wide sweeps and auto ranging are applied to sample swaths of signal of interest to storage. then parallel processing on other hardware or later time (off-use-hours) extracting known / useful data and anomalies for further analysis. - in-line network archival, shaping, and cut-out for link to internet / local network. this works best as a zero visibility transparent ethernet bridge with ARP spoofing and ether mangling at each end. that does not speak IP at all. the shaping is used to squelch suspect or unexpected peak traffic (both a signalling system for malicious activity and a means to constrain the reach once compromised) as per the kit above, you are instrumenting a system to observe its runtime behavior on an external audit system. this is because the advanced attacks inject into processes and ring0, persisting only what is needed / chosen (enabling hooks). you need to capture the active payloads that are delivered on-demand in host memory space. you are observing the network and RF space for anomalies and discrepancies. for example, a wifi radio disabled yet still emitting into 2.4Ghz/5.xGhz spectrum. network captures also provide evidence to correlate with malicious memory, for example identifying a payload delivered over the network, with keys from volatility used to decrypt the encrypted communications containing the payload identified in memory. you are (sometimes destructively) sampling all flash memory as parts of advanced payloads persist outside of the OS and storage level interface visibility. (stealth at bus/bios level). discrepancies in blocks that should not have changed, executable code segments where not expected, strange carvings of wear leveling around "protected" offsets. all of these are indicators for further scrutiny and instruction level reversing (if corresponding to microcontroller programming instructions for manipulating streams read or written to and from device, for example :) last but not least, you are not getting attached to any hardware, because at any moment you may find it all suspect and have to replace all laptops, desktops, routers, printers, mobile devices, storage media, media servers, smart televisions, and god forbid you installed one of those intelligent thermostats. [ laugh for sanity, then go back and read the list, and then understand that the far end of the nation state malware asymptote is full of freaky exotics. i also hope you never hit that level of "all systems go" *grin* ] best regards, From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 22:45:35 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 01:45:35 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <53CADD1C.4090906@av8n.com> References: <53CADD1C.4090906@av8n.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2983FzywxXRJ52Kv=_0z=248muZxVCpaaC4p8MxCVLhhA@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 5:03 PM, John Denker <jsd at av8n.com> wrote: > AFAICT, a lot of existing protocols were designed to resist > passive eavesdropping. In contrast, the idea of large-scale > MITM attacks was sometimes considered tin-foil-hat paranoia. > To this day, standard Ubuntu Firefox trusts 162 different > authorities (including the Hong Kong Post Office) to certify > /anything and everything/. > > In the /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla directory, only one > of 163 root certificates has any v3 Name Constraints at all. > Why Ubuntu and Firefox tolerate this is beyond me; I can > understand trusting Microsoft to sign Microsoft-related stuff, > but allowing them to sign /anything and everything/ ?!????!! The mozilla bundle includes about 150. It would be nice if the new cert observatoris publish a count of how many end certs they see each root cert covers... a topN list of sorts. Then you could save some time by including the N of your choice into your 'empty by default' list. I think the distribution would be severly skewed to maybe top 10 or 15 covers most any place. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 22:56:23 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 01:56:23 -0400 Subject: Rainforest Connection and WildLeaks Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_NOH_ahTuvViG7i1XHKmofS1r6rSPETyWyWgWq7Q_tRw@mail.gmail.com> Nice to have Eugen back, wherever did he go? Thanks for posting this applied tech ink. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 23:21:21 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 02:21:21 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <20140717200256.8837.qmail@joyce.lan> References: <CAD2Ti28uFoH2Xinsd9PwHK-n7xLCwmHF2tSpX6GsOgkWbXciOg@mail.gmail.com> <20140717200256.8837.qmail@joyce.lan> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 4:02 PM, John Levine <johnl at iecc.com> wrote: >>But none of them will have the property that their currency is not >>under their control. Other than the obvious head start bitcoin has >>in the digital currency game, that is what bitcoin offers >>philosophically... freedom from control. > > I realize that's the theory, but in reality, there is a mining pool > that could easily grow to be more than half of all the miners, at > which point it could start ignoring blocks from outside the pool, > which would be to the benefit of people inside the pool. So long as > the cost of joining the pool remained small, e.g., if you join you > still get 98% of the coins you mine, this looks to me like it would be > a stable situation, no matter how much outsiders complained about how > awful it was. Thing is, having seen the possibilities, people actually *want* this freedom from central control, in a bad way, and they're willing to act to get it. They also realize that if they, and the entire community, don't act together to maintain the decentralization they have... then it's over. That's why ghash.io (the largest pool) just announced that they will not exceed 40%. Down from 55% to 32% now... http://www.coindesk.com/ghash-commits-40-hashrate-cap-bitcoin-mining-summit/ http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-mining-detente-ghash-io-51-issue/ http://blockchain.info/pools And why BTC isn't exactly rushing to support regulation... http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1ygcil/as_requested_im_ben_lawsky_superintendent_of_the/ http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2aycxs/hi_this_is_ben_lawsky_at_nydfs_here_are_the/ http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2b1jpl/dear_ben_lawsky_thank_you_for_the_totalitarian/ Further, again, since people want decentral, if some large entity does manage a BTC takeover, no problem... all users ok with that will stay with the now central coin, and the free decentral people will just exchange their coin (or fork) into whatever is the current decentral coin. Repeat as needed. So far BTC has a good history of actively cooperating to avoiding central. Excepting mining companies (ie: the 10% corps, who have made similar self limiting statements), the VC money seems to stay out of the coin itself and is being placed in surrounding service ventures... exchanges, banking, processors, wallets, retail. In the end years from now, maybe only three coin will remain... - A World central - A State central - A World decentral/anon/etc With all of them being roughly similar in acceptance, volatility, etc. > There also remain long term questions about the technical viability of > Bitcoin, most notably whether people will still find it interesting > after the transaction cost rises. (If a transaction costs a dollar, > there's a lot of other options with much less price volatility.) People spend more than a dollar to post mail, or drive to the store. It will be a long time before the ASIC and electric cost to clear a transaction (at whatever network transaction demand rate) exceeds palatability, if ever. Pick a projected compute power, node count, required tx rate (at 100% utilization) and then basically figure gigawatt and gigahash dollars per tx. http://www.coinometrics.com/bitcoin/btix https://bitmaintech.com/productDetail.htm?pid=00020140704023505485N5SxDMkW0693 https://medium.com/@interdome/how-much-electricity-does-bitcoin-use-c350bd84c64e http://organofcorti.blogspot.nl/ A guesstimate with current state and data? - Installing double current hashrate to take 50+% costs about $130M in retail hardware alone. Less for a real deployment. - About $10k/hr to power it. More for cooling, support, bandwidth. - About $0.40/tx-current spread over a year. Much less if running at 100% tx rate capacity. Up to twice more due to doubling current hashrate. Right now that amount is being covered by coin mining profit. The future taper of coin production vs then current market value of coin vs tx fees will be interesting. And ASIC platforms have yet to reach performance plateau. The base tx cost is cost of the coin algorithm to support a given required tx rate. That seems quite low. The race (difficulty) to claim the tx fee profit drives it up. Yet the hardware market is open, yielding a level playing field. So as long as the required tx rate can be met affordably within the algorithm, this is unlikely to be an issue. Cost of tx rates also naturally moderate the proportion of users amongst each payment system. It remains to be seen, once all the various BTC costs are fully optimized, if BTC can handle tx rates approaching the credit cards. Even if not, that doesn't keep it from utility at its own natural rate limit. Some seriously big players don't seem to have any problem with BTC... http://www.coindesk.com/computer-giant-dell-now-accepts-bitcoin/ > To me Bitcoin is very interesting as an experiment. It shows that > within certain parameters, the distributed proof of work model is > viable. I doubt that anyone anticipated the grotesque amount of > computing resources that people would throw at it, or that there would > be mining pools. > > The model is likely useful for applications like distributed notary, > particularly if there are several mutually suspicious groups > participating which makes it less likely that any one of them could > take over. > > It's also impressive to see the number of economically ignorant > enthusiasts who imagine there is something innovative or disruptive > about a commodity bubble, which is what Bitcoin is. Well, since BTC is nothing but experimental scrap metal, please be sure to send yours (and that of all your central fiat loving friends) off for proper recycling to my recycle bin here... btc:1C96B6DszNqnX4KRzveu6BKRuznmmdFhdm Liked or learned something from the links, etc? Tips go here, I'll buy a miner / tx processor, or do something generally useful... btc:1D6rPeQUETfGpSp2JB2oojJUC8GiURyhp7 From crypto at jpunix.net Sun Jul 20 07:12:38 2014 From: crypto at jpunix.net (Crypto) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 09:12:38 -0500 Subject: New XMPP servers Message-ID: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello Everyone! For those that are using secure XMPP clients (Jitsi and the like) I'd like to announce two new Prosody servers. Both are located in the Netherlands and are available for public use. If you would like to try them out they are located at chat.jpunix.net and chat.cpunk.us. Both are fully-featured. Give them a try if you're so inclined! - -- Crypto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTy85WAAoJEDhzgt+U8WIyBAkQAK3+TXmPU6z7Pj8ZbnHBg5cB p2xLfXJuWbObrF4Dd8izbsFGcir1zJw6E/hfyNLD9gZQGhRmvvsQWP3LkWuo6spF 1r92QAumNZQP6hRjKcgvPH28sBKXg8GElW78v+vDUlggpym/UBNXqxxsA6JDXPRT LPwzuqCBayHsA0ghY2TrBy73yLURjJzaJOayd2QWBRcNtEt30NFxU0uu3jkVmsX7 ovqqmFIekNiuiecYFad2+9bH/rt5BsMz6jFZIVhVaXueb9GeQO/Qmu1IXp8yxnS4 XAHDa+5tuUbZDzYvSuwLGdIJpMUxaxnoKQiXEDTNal7cyNt3xkKHXjOIav2eElx1 VD/l4mbTbfn3k8QgtMl1fUJS8o35vHurpF7Yjw/uG/sAy1G2XRG85VoF4vKP08OX /QgZr4LXR9U1uX912Zbf6gjNXsqtOQMP3JL0oa13AzAdT3WKwPJcWOCU2feD5eDh 0uT1rzUk1sS4qfveI1cG45HKz31ayNl2pYX58VXN9F7VtR4F/xPW9FjwG80cm1yv a99OvN1M01GQqUAGh+dj+VKHmPRhux61dpVErgi6viV3Ev5Bb/JvDc7uIGoO/ZcJ 48N/sQjVsABqYFD4yTDm6GrsLeG1OaYXOlhzrwHxPTUsMEJE8BnB4Z6NAVt7PocH LsYy+G/0yoSU8zTHsRBq =7ba8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From crypto at jpunix.net Sun Jul 20 09:45:56 2014 From: crypto at jpunix.net (Crypto) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 11:45:56 -0500 Subject: New XMPP servers In-Reply-To: <CAGxBuBV4YVKCyQTyKAUMr+HMRab9MMg9sOo5Y69+AhFTWb3vFg@mail.gmail.com> References: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> <CAGxBuBV4YVKCyQTyKAUMr+HMRab9MMg9sOo5Y69+AhFTWb3vFg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53CBF244.2030304@jpunix.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 7/20/2014 10:20 AM, Damian Fossi wrote: > Thank you > > > On 20 July 2014 09:42, Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: > > Hello Everyone! > > For those that are using secure XMPP clients (Jitsi and the like) > I'd like to announce two new Prosody servers. Both are located in > the Netherlands and are available for public use. If you would like > to try them out they are located at chat.jpunix.net and > chat.cpunk.us. Both are fully-featured. Give them a try if you're > so inclined! You're very welcome! Just to be sure, I run chat.jpunix.net. chat.cpunk.us is a sister site that is under different management. - -- Crypto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTy/JEAAoJEDhzgt+U8WIybXMP/0jOSMr+F3NAeahDgluDNcyl /TZ4jjEpsjECCAz8ivNAh2ARo1gLcncPZ+8LsItNzHNLu9tUrubeET2hxx2OLb77 Ojzs021KV2d2x0ewIlhvJoWi5ZuPFghZ6CrjTFRNpyhwKe5a6iHkpwkJD+QEHY8T hvH9rMubdHwxK9G6RlsNTYavJ8qMj02JNpGbhEaisgeT0N4T+/QMEn2nqPC0Dczf egFZJFfU0vjRZcrT+3Xd6njBOaNzONzewEbVvdyB9TrKuVwNJK76YTEsIixl4rmA MQSSf45Zq5KHEhauO26K/2Cn7bx7CurIErfXkzpnbdf2XJWazcJMjZtnyZUMHudd zn5zjq2iwjDReRA6WZaGO2phCGXp8J4xew6aBvM+ReINff1pKkYdOuAOPRZqIWzW kql4K4z1Ye4IalioIu+I4tnPsUDd/gijpyh5hZwUPeWXfiTMcQr0wpzlXHCnyxHp waRaFI5qub9qu6GekMFuU/IEnJFfRSql0bTakszqS5oegupNLUTPbyxY3P77Wojt oRrRKkeWK2GvDBMd5mjgZ05Qgpp+lDe3JCTXpL4vfuCyC3c+RJ1ZG4sLA+potSBs wKCuMHZbE0Zi86NggQiPPKPE5GCBG3g6DVRl2yQgTNS29IlWbqfC5iT2JZHdv1x5 Qm01qb8iE9yQPe6s0YvD =Kfsq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From carimachet at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 07:02:27 2014 From: carimachet at gmail.com (Cari Machet) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 14:02:27 +0000 Subject: Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices In-Reply-To: <53cb2530.461bec0a.4529.ffff9525@mx.google.com> References: <CAJVRA1TESDg6D7HVoBOoqx6MTXhO2V_DiFRsNOhok0AAbvNWhw@mail.gmail.com> <53cb2530.461bec0a.4529.ffff9525@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAGRDzQXnvUf4=ZO75y-jSod6t6mobipPyaxFrUeETXG+Dvz+7A@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 2:15 AM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, 19 Jul 2014 18:20:18 -0700 > coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > > > doubt this will surprise anyone; iOS intentionally designed to support > > surveillance. > > > > --- > > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287614000036 > > > $ 31.50 ? > what are you referencing please? > > > > > > > > "Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in > > iOS devices" > > by Jonathan Zdziarski > > > > Abstract > > > > The iOS operating system has long been a subject of interest among the > > forensics and law enforcement communities. With a large base of > > interest among consumers, it has become the target of many hackers and > > criminals alike, with many celebrity thefts (For example, the recent > > article "How did Scarlett Johansson's phone get hacked?") of data > > raising awareness to personal privacy. Recent revelations (Privacy > > scandal: NSA can spy on smart phone data, 2013 and How the NSA spies > > on smartphones including the BlackBerry) exposed the use (or abuse) of > > operating system features in the surveillance of targeted individuals > > by the National Security Agency (NSA), of whom some subjects appear to > > be American citizens. This paper identifies the most probable > > techniques that were used, based on the descriptions provided by the > > media, and today's possible techniques that could be exploited in the > > future, based on what may be back doors, bypass switches, general > > weaknesses, or surveillance mechanisms intended for enterprise use in > > current release versions of iOS. More importantly, I will identify > > several services and mechanisms that can be abused by a government > > agency or malicious party to extract intelligence on a subject, > > including services that may in fact be back doors introduced by the > > manufacturer... > > ''' > > > > > -- Cari Machet NYC 646-436-7795 carimachet at gmail.com AIM carismachet Syria +963-099 277 3243 Amman +962 077 636 9407 Berlin +49 152 11779219 Reykjavik +354 894 8650 Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> 7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187 Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without permission is strictly prohibited. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3721 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/3654faee/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 20 08:38:55 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 17:38:55 +0200 Subject: New XMPP servers In-Reply-To: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> References: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> Message-ID: <6698793.CpWEIIHNNk@lapuntu> Dnia niedziela, 20 lipca 2014 09:12:38 Crypto pisze: > Hello Everyone! > > For those that are using secure XMPP clients (Jitsi and the like) I'd > like to announce two new Prosody servers. Both are located in the > Netherlands and are available for public use. If you would like to try > them out they are located at chat.jpunix.net and chat.cpunk.us. Both > are fully-featured. Give them a try if you're so inclined! Thank you. This is great news, and we need more people ready and willing to run XMPP, e-mail and other services servers. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/0a44f646/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 20 08:45:20 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 17:45:20 +0200 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28uFoH2Xinsd9PwHK-n7xLCwmHF2tSpX6GsOgkWbXciOg@mail.gmail.com> <20140717200256.8837.qmail@joyce.lan> <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1924759.2PFzfidjzr@lapuntu> Dnia niedziela, 20 lipca 2014 02:21:21 grarpamp pisze: > On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 4:02 PM, John Levine <johnl at iecc.com> wrote: > >>But none of them will have the property that their currency is not > >>under their control. Other than the obvious head start bitcoin has > >>in the digital currency game, that is what bitcoin offers > >>philosophically... freedom from control. > >> > > I realize that's the theory, but in reality, there is a mining pool > > that could easily grow to be more than half of all the miners, at > > which point it could start ignoring blocks from outside the pool, > > which would be to the benefit of people inside the pool. So long as > > the cost of joining the pool remained small, e.g., if you join you > > still get 98% of the coins you mine, this looks to me like it would be > > a stable situation, no matter how much outsiders complained about how > > awful it was. > > Thing is, having seen the possibilities, people actually *want* > this freedom from central control, in a bad way, and they're willing > to act to get it. They also realize that if they, and the entire > community, don't act together to maintain the decentralization they > have... then it's over. That's why ghash.io (the largest pool) just > announced that they will not exceed 40%. Down from 55% to 32% now... While I applaud ghash.io's self-regulation (!), I do not in general believe in self-regulation. "We promise we will not abuse the system" only works as long as the payout from having the system not collapsing is (by the self-regulating potential abuser) deemed higher than the one-off payout from collapsing the system and running away with the spoils. This is not a good base for a monetary system, I'd say. ;) -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/5a8e6261/attachment.sig> From edhelas at movim.eu Sun Jul 20 08:53:03 2014 From: edhelas at movim.eu (edhelas) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 17:53:03 +0200 Subject: New XMPP servers In-Reply-To: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> References: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> Message-ID: <1405871583.615.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Hi ! That's a great new ! I'm always happy to see new XMPP servers instance. Prosody is a great choice. With the Movim we are building a social network on top of the XMPP protocol and we are using Metronome, a fork of prosody with some fix and great features (full Pubsub/PEP support especially). If you are interested to set-up a Movim instance on one (or both !) of your servers, do not hesitate to mail me (or via XMPP, my JID is the same as my email adress ;)). I'm also looking for new independant pods in The Netherlands, most of the Movim instances are currently hosted in France (https://pod.movim.eu/?q=pods). Regards, edhelas On dim., juil. 20, 2014 at 4:12 , Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hello Everyone! > > For those that are using secure XMPP clients (Jitsi and the like) I'd > like to announce two new Prosody servers. Both are located in the > Netherlands and are available for public use. If you would like to try > them out they are located at chat.jpunix.net and chat.cpunk.us. Both > are fully-featured. Give them a try if you're so inclined! > > - -- > Crypto > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTy85WAAoJEDhzgt+U8WIyBAkQAK3+TXmPU6z7Pj8ZbnHBg5cB > p2xLfXJuWbObrF4Dd8izbsFGcir1zJw6E/hfyNLD9gZQGhRmvvsQWP3LkWuo6spF > 1r92QAumNZQP6hRjKcgvPH28sBKXg8GElW78v+vDUlggpym/UBNXqxxsA6JDXPRT > LPwzuqCBayHsA0ghY2TrBy73yLURjJzaJOayd2QWBRcNtEt30NFxU0uu3jkVmsX7 > ovqqmFIekNiuiecYFad2+9bH/rt5BsMz6jFZIVhVaXueb9GeQO/Qmu1IXp8yxnS4 > XAHDa+5tuUbZDzYvSuwLGdIJpMUxaxnoKQiXEDTNal7cyNt3xkKHXjOIav2eElx1 > VD/l4mbTbfn3k8QgtMl1fUJS8o35vHurpF7Yjw/uG/sAy1G2XRG85VoF4vKP08OX > /QgZr4LXR9U1uX912Zbf6gjNXsqtOQMP3JL0oa13AzAdT3WKwPJcWOCU2feD5eDh > 0uT1rzUk1sS4qfveI1cG45HKz31ayNl2pYX58VXN9F7VtR4F/xPW9FjwG80cm1yv > a99OvN1M01GQqUAGh+dj+VKHmPRhux61dpVErgi6viV3Ev5Bb/JvDc7uIGoO/ZcJ > 48N/sQjVsABqYFD4yTDm6GrsLeG1OaYXOlhzrwHxPTUsMEJE8BnB4Z6NAVt7PocH > LsYy+G/0yoSU8zTHsRBq > =7ba8 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2321 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/471385d6/attachment.txt> From bryan at thestarbucks.com Sun Jul 20 18:40:50 2014 From: bryan at thestarbucks.com (Bryan Starbuck) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 18:40:50 -0700 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti295WACp0i4+c1Os94-9mBBV6S9SGR6QTb5fL+16udTKXg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> <20140720161205.55408.qmail@joyce.lan> <CAD2Ti295WACp0i4+c1Os94-9mBBV6S9SGR6QTb5fL+16udTKXg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <71CD9553-C7B6-4702-A650-BA80A18CBD87@thestarbucks.com> > And similarly to reach point of no return adoption before centralizers realize it's too late to say no? There will always be some set of benefits to crypto-currencies that won’t exist elsewhere. So their growth will just happen, no matter what. The question is just if “centralizers” throw their entrepreneurial citizens in jail, when they build these benefits for fellow citizens. But even when they do that, it will still grow in other countries and by other entrepreneurs. Soon it will be illegal to publish open source software in some cases. That would be the only way to stop a future Satoshi from releasing a next generation of bitcoin. That is where “centralizers saying no” or “centralizers stopping it” means they must throw people who publish open source software in jail. Best, -Bryan Bryan Starbuck | Bryan at TheStarbucks.com On Jul 20, 2014, at 4:00 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: >> This is wandering away from crypto > > No better way to naysay BTC than to break the crypto and wash > everyone out. $Billions gone, and a permanent seat in the research > hall of fame ;-) (BTW, where are the BTC insurance companies...) > >>> announced that they will not exceed 40%. Down from 55% to 32% now... > >> That's not surprising. Bitcoin is a speculative asset, and at this >> point the Bitcoin fans have a shared interest in keeping its price up. >> The story that nobody's in charge is one of the things that makes >> people want to buy it, so, well, sure. In the admittedly unlikely >> event that there are enough contracts or debts denominated in Bitcoin >> that there were significant non-speculative demand, things could >> change. > > I'd agree that actual market float outstanding is thin right now. > Yet different from purely propping things up, speculation is all > about assessing future value and making moves accordingly today... > > https://ciphrex.com/archive/bofa-bitcoin.pdf > http://honestnode.com/bitcoin-fair-value-a-first-assessment/ > http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-2014-report/ > http://www.coindesk.com/state-of-bitcoin-q2-2014-report-expanding-bitcoin-economy/ > >> This is what's technically known as "marketing BS". Dell accepts >> dollars. They have a deal with Coinbase in which Coinbase takes the >> risk of raising dollars by selling Bitcoins in return for a commission > > Not so fast! Yes, Dell accepts dollars (subject to whatever BTC > holdback they, like Overstock, may be specifying). However obtaining > those dollars is totally dependant on Coinbase's ability to convert > BTC to dollars on exchange or privately. And Coinbase is surely > nowhere near whole enough from commissions to be able to back their > contracts against any significant outstanding float in a long price > dive situation. Therefore Dell *is* in the BTC game before dollars > on these sales, regardless of the denomination they're booking. So > is everyone else who 'accepts' BTC. Dell and others are large > companies, with well paid accountants and lawyers... it takes more > than whim of 'marketing BS' for them to put a BTC sticker on their > door. > > >>>> volatility >> but if >> there's another collapse in the Bitcoin market > > The BTC market has been in a fairly steady log uptrend over the > long term. The 'collapses' people speak of are, in that context, > spikes returning to normal. All new markets and properties undergo > price discovery. It's a continual process. Ever watch the NYSE, > it's volatile too. > >> the distributed notary idea seems likely to be useful for something > > There is no 'useful for this or useful for that' concerning things > riding on top of this tech... the underlying model, including the > social contract aspects, either works for all uses, or for none. > It's either broken or it's not. > >> but it's never going to replace real money. > > Neither will credit/debit cards. Nor is your fiat paper of choice > 'real money' either, it's just called money by default. (Probably > because the next default, real property, is hard to fit in your > pocket.) Digital currencies will, like 'money', operate in the layer > above real property. > > Again, here's the recycle bin for your trash, this time I'll even > waive the recycling fee... ;) > btc:1C96B6DszNqnX4KRzveu6BKRuznmmdFhdm > > >> On re, replies on: Ghash.io, 50%, takeovers, self regulation... > > > 50% is not a magical binary breakpoint, it merely permits more > influence as the share moves along the scale from 50% to 100%. > > Right now, the $130M plus expenses (or $27M plus for ghash) that > is needed to reach 50% seems to not be worth it to anyone. > > Who is graphing the cost-to-50%? And the cost-to-50% to market cap, > volume, and quantity ratios? Those would be interesting and important > graphs to watch. > > $130M is nothing to someone who wants to own a currency. So why > hasn't it happened to BTC yet? Perhaps because the value of BTC > owes a lot to its decentralization. If so, and you take that away, > you're risking your own value before you start. And risking an > exodus fork. > > Just as easy as it was to add BTC to Dell's checkout in N days time, > adding another currency is easy if yours (or your takeover) fails, > or customers continue to demand a decentral one. > > And you're not going to win a takeover anyways because no one will > tolerate you blocking their transactions... no entity survives > having 50, 40, 30 percent of its users in abject protest against > theft, loss of value and service, and principle. Among other things, > you'd be prosecuted, sued, DDoS'd off the net, badmouthed, and > forked against. > > Probably better to start your own digital currency and put $115M > into marketing and $15M into central hardware. > > >> Also, were such a thing in the works, I wouldn't count on the >> people involved publicly broadcasting their intentions on Twitter. > > That only applies to mining 'companies'. Mining 'pools' derive > their share from the users who elect to use them. Of course a > pool could become a company. And a company could uphold the > social contract. > > The Ghash was a remarkable social contract event by both shedding > users and users leaving. It's happened before, and each time it > does it underscores the importance of the contract to the currency > to everyone involved. > > In the end, if anyone succeeds in taking/making any private/centralized > coin, there will be some users who follow it, and some people who > reject it in favor of other decentral coin. > > Digital banking and transacting has been done for decades. Banks > could have made ACH/Wire compellingly attractive to users and the > marketplace. But they waited, and didn't, and lost the chance... > just like telcos lost the internet and music lost itself. > > As with those things, crypto in the 90's and overlay networks today, > what is really being tested with BTC along with the tech, are meta > concepts such as freedom, regulation, where value is stored, law, > etc. > > At the moment it would be quite hard to say decentral digital > currency is failing or holds little long term prospect. > > You can fund more drunken rambling here... :) > btc:1D6rPeQUETfGpSp2JB2oojJUC8GiURyhp7 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 9897 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/832db77d/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 18:47:00 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 18:47:00 -0700 Subject: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> the stream at http://new.livestream.com/internetsociety2/hopex2 less than optimal. "Johannes of art tech group monochrom will indulge in a public rant about hacker culture and why it has to be saved from itself." and other enumerated unusefullness :) [ no telling when http://store.2600.com/videos.html will update, BTC for digital please? ] --- speaking of Fuckyouhackerfucks, http://trouble.org/?p=1013 <him> do you even know what this is? <her> a bitcoin QRcode <him> ... From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 16:00:52 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 19:00:52 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <20140720161205.55408.qmail@joyce.lan> References: <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> <20140720161205.55408.qmail@joyce.lan> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti295WACp0i4+c1Os94-9mBBV6S9SGR6QTb5fL+16udTKXg@mail.gmail.com> > This is wandering away from crypto No better way to naysay BTC than to break the crypto and wash everyone out. $Billions gone, and a permanent seat in the research hall of fame ;-) (BTW, where are the BTC insurance companies...) >> announced that they will not exceed 40%. Down from 55% to 32% now... > That's not surprising. Bitcoin is a speculative asset, and at this > point the Bitcoin fans have a shared interest in keeping its price up. > The story that nobody's in charge is one of the things that makes > people want to buy it, so, well, sure. In the admittedly unlikely > event that there are enough contracts or debts denominated in Bitcoin > that there were significant non-speculative demand, things could > change. I'd agree that actual market float outstanding is thin right now. Yet different from purely propping things up, speculation is all about assessing future value and making moves accordingly today... https://ciphrex.com/archive/bofa-bitcoin.pdf http://honestnode.com/bitcoin-fair-value-a-first-assessment/ http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-2014-report/ http://www.coindesk.com/state-of-bitcoin-q2-2014-report-expanding-bitcoin-economy/ > This is what's technically known as "marketing BS". Dell accepts > dollars. They have a deal with Coinbase in which Coinbase takes the > risk of raising dollars by selling Bitcoins in return for a commission Not so fast! Yes, Dell accepts dollars (subject to whatever BTC holdback they, like Overstock, may be specifying). However obtaining those dollars is totally dependant on Coinbase's ability to convert BTC to dollars on exchange or privately. And Coinbase is surely nowhere near whole enough from commissions to be able to back their contracts against any significant outstanding float in a long price dive situation. Therefore Dell *is* in the BTC game before dollars on these sales, regardless of the denomination they're booking. So is everyone else who 'accepts' BTC. Dell and others are large companies, with well paid accountants and lawyers... it takes more than whim of 'marketing BS' for them to put a BTC sticker on their door. >>> volatility > but if > there's another collapse in the Bitcoin market The BTC market has been in a fairly steady log uptrend over the long term. The 'collapses' people speak of are, in that context, spikes returning to normal. All new markets and properties undergo price discovery. It's a continual process. Ever watch the NYSE, it's volatile too. > the distributed notary idea seems likely to be useful for something There is no 'useful for this or useful for that' concerning things riding on top of this tech... the underlying model, including the social contract aspects, either works for all uses, or for none. It's either broken or it's not. > but it's never going to replace real money. Neither will credit/debit cards. Nor is your fiat paper of choice 'real money' either, it's just called money by default. (Probably because the next default, real property, is hard to fit in your pocket.) Digital currencies will, like 'money', operate in the layer above real property. Again, here's the recycle bin for your trash, this time I'll even waive the recycling fee... ;) btc:1C96B6DszNqnX4KRzveu6BKRuznmmdFhdm > On re, replies on: Ghash.io, 50%, takeovers, self regulation... 50% is not a magical binary breakpoint, it merely permits more influence as the share moves along the scale from 50% to 100%. Right now, the $130M plus expenses (or $27M plus for ghash) that is needed to reach 50% seems to not be worth it to anyone. Who is graphing the cost-to-50%? And the cost-to-50% to market cap, volume, and quantity ratios? Those would be interesting and important graphs to watch. $130M is nothing to someone who wants to own a currency. So why hasn't it happened to BTC yet? Perhaps because the value of BTC owes a lot to its decentralization. If so, and you take that away, you're risking your own value before you start. And risking an exodus fork. Just as easy as it was to add BTC to Dell's checkout in N days time, adding another currency is easy if yours (or your takeover) fails, or customers continue to demand a decentral one. And you're not going to win a takeover anyways because no one will tolerate you blocking their transactions... no entity survives having 50, 40, 30 percent of its users in abject protest against theft, loss of value and service, and principle. Among other things, you'd be prosecuted, sued, DDoS'd off the net, badmouthed, and forked against. Probably better to start your own digital currency and put $115M into marketing and $15M into central hardware. > Also, were such a thing in the works, I wouldn't count on the > people involved publicly broadcasting their intentions on Twitter. That only applies to mining 'companies'. Mining 'pools' derive their share from the users who elect to use them. Of course a pool could become a company. And a company could uphold the social contract. The Ghash was a remarkable social contract event by both shedding users and users leaving. It's happened before, and each time it does it underscores the importance of the contract to the currency to everyone involved. In the end, if anyone succeeds in taking/making any private/centralized coin, there will be some users who follow it, and some people who reject it in favor of other decentral coin. Digital banking and transacting has been done for decades. Banks could have made ACH/Wire compellingly attractive to users and the marketplace. But they waited, and didn't, and lost the chance... just like telcos lost the internet and music lost itself. As with those things, crypto in the 90's and overlay networks today, what is really being tested with BTC along with the tech, are meta concepts such as freedom, regulation, where value is stored, law, etc. At the moment it would be quite hard to say decentral digital currency is failing or holds little long term prospect. You can fund more drunken rambling here... :) btc:1D6rPeQUETfGpSp2JB2oojJUC8GiURyhp7 From griffin at cryptolab.net Sun Jul 20 19:19:01 2014 From: griffin at cryptolab.net (Griffin Boyce) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 22:19:01 -0400 Subject: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> I've got the video and can upload it asap. ~ Griffin On July 20, 2014 9:47:00 PM EDT, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >the stream at http://new.livestream.com/internetsociety2/hopex2 less >than optimal. > >"Johannes of art tech group monochrom will indulge in a public rant >about hacker culture and why it has to be saved from itself." and >other enumerated unusefullness :) > >[ no telling when http://store.2600.com/videos.html will update, BTC >for digital please? ] > >--- > >speaking of Fuckyouhackerfucks, http://trouble.org/?p=1013 ><him> do you even know what this is? ><her> a bitcoin QRcode ><him> ... -- Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1197 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/96aa84b7/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 20 13:55:57 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 22:55:57 +0200 Subject: Video meme hunt: hackers Message-ID: <14349984.2Bs7lofdlx@lapuntu> Hi guys, if I want to introduce the anarchist approach by showing this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SGyAnXfd4Yg and the diggers' approach by showing this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3toLwGs7o-k then what short video you would recommend for introducing the hacker approach? -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/c2bce41d/attachment.sig> From rich at openwatch.net Sun Jul 20 20:41:22 2014 From: rich at openwatch.net (Rich Jones) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 23:41:22 -0400 Subject: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing In-Reply-To: <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> References: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CADJYzxKksrtKLG5SpgpeVy2joPvrvHQoL=deoq8XG9YZvjiWBg@mail.gmail.com> I was kind of disappointed by it.. normally Johannes is very funny, but this was just kind of rambling Marxist SJW stuff without much imperative or self-awareness.. or maybe the coffee hadn't hit me yet.. On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 10:19 PM, Griffin Boyce <griffin at cryptolab.net> wrote: > I've got the video and can upload it asap. > > ~ Griffin > > > On July 20, 2014 9:47:00 PM EDT, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >> >> the stream at http://new.livestream.com/internetsociety2/hopex2 less >> than optimal. >> >> "Johannes of art tech group monochrom will indulge in a public rant >> >> about hacker culture and why it has to be saved from itself." and >> other enumerated unusefullness :) >> >> [ no telling when http://store.2600.com/videos.html will update, BTC >> >> for digital please? ] >> >> --- >> >> speaking of Fuckyouhackerfucks, http://trouble.org/?p=1013 >> <him> do you even know what this is? >> <her> a bitcoin QRcode >> >> <him> ... >> >> > -- > Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1920 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/fc7d302b/attachment.txt> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 22:24:57 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 01:24:57 -0400 Subject: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing In-Reply-To: <CADJYzxKksrtKLG5SpgpeVy2joPvrvHQoL=deoq8XG9YZvjiWBg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> <CADJYzxKksrtKLG5SpgpeVy2joPvrvHQoL=deoq8XG9YZvjiWBg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti284PHpjmHPz32VCmD1mhZgFY4MktHt1kGMxxnm+15Zkeg@mail.gmail.com> Obvious link for anyone interested in overall theme... https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=johannes+grenzfurthner From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 23:01:41 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 02:01:41 -0400 Subject: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Hidden service policies In-Reply-To: <53CC736C.80600@riseup.net> References: <CANEZrP2jriLF-mXYTg=B5kjJ2_PPOzNOZVrnRXc_T1gH7pA1MQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-qM4eqH+6Oy4QJb3NHYMBmSGQQFL=HAfGpTxv4=gz4xw@mail.gmail.com> <53CC736C.80600@riseup.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29CP01BiEC-7fQnwQ_fSfeqEOj47LxDtm=4JGyvLZJEbg@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Thomas White <thomaswhite at riseup.net> wrote: > Mike Hearn, > Simple. If you start filtering anything at all, regardless of what it > is ... then I will > block any connection of your relays to mine > ... > Freedom isn't free unless it is > totally free and a selective reading policy through Tor is not just a > bad idea as stated below, I find it outright insulting to me and > everyone else who cares about the free and open internet. The fact > somebody has the audacity to come to a project like Tor and propose > blacklisting mechanisms is jaw-dropping. > ... > As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin > tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify > "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you. Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of many discussions from that suggestion is here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=333824.0 > so while you are reading this, let me know if you run any relays so I > can avoid them. router riker 207.12.89.16 9001 0 0 fingerprint 8657 6CF6 AA84 496F 62C0 5AFE 9F26 8962 A5F0 B2BD contact Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> accept *:8333 reject *:* Normally I would thank exits for passing BTC traffic, but now I'm unsure of this one (and a few others), especially given that's the only exit policy of the above node. To identify anon (Tor) coins for marking and tracking? From coderman at gmail.com Mon Jul 21 02:29:52 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 02:29:52 -0700 Subject: Fwd: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1QOEJ8NZByWf-uZMWdoQNng7HSZ1jxm77Gtx0dMcXD10Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> <CADJYzxKksrtKLG5SpgpeVy2joPvrvHQoL=deoq8XG9YZvjiWBg@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1QOEJ8NZByWf-uZMWdoQNng7HSZ1jxm77Gtx0dMcXD10Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RDDx0zde4vZwEgwq6b6-jQNfvr_viWP8zaSOfx92aLNg@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: coderman <coderman at gmail.com> Date: Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 2:28 AM Subject: Re: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing To: Rich Jones <miserlou at gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 8:41 PM, Rich Jones <rich at openwatch.net> wrote: > I was kind of disappointed by it.. normally Johannes is very funny, but this > was just kind of rambling Marxist SJW stuff without much imperative or > self-awareness.. or maybe the coffee hadn't hit me yet.. i expected nothing, and enjoyed a shared frustration. best regards, "This e-postcard powered by Google Wuffie" "This e-postcard best viewed in G+" From coderman at gmail.com Mon Jul 21 02:35:21 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 02:35:21 -0700 Subject: DropItLike Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RKRgC5COw-UzGdxwyWs3JZJ1H4hmb8ghr0sQR-QBFA=g@mail.gmail.com> https://github.com/mozilla/DropItLike From martin.rublik at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 23:12:29 2014 From: martin.rublik at gmail.com (Martin Rublik) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 08:12:29 +0200 Subject: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2983FzywxXRJ52Kv=_0z=248muZxVCpaaC4p8MxCVLhhA@mail.gmail.com> References: <53CADD1C.4090906@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2983FzywxXRJ52Kv=_0z=248muZxVCpaaC4p8MxCVLhhA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53CCAF4D.9040602@gmail.com> On 20. 7. 2014 7:45, grarpamp wrote: ... > The mozilla bundle includes about 150. It would be nice if the > new cert observatoris publish a count of how many end certs > they see each root cert covers... a topN list of sorts. Then you > could save some time by including the N of your choice into your > 'empty by default' list. I think the distribution would be severly > skewed to maybe top 10 or 15 covers most any place. > Here is one visualization http://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/trust-tree/ and the discussion as well https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/observatory/2012-December/000669.html Martin From eric at konklone.com Mon Jul 21 06:48:32 2014 From: eric at konklone.com (Eric Mill) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 09:48:32 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] miniLock seems pretty interesting Message-ID: <CANBOYLVg=Dndusthy82zbksDwyVupdHU9BaSL1mE6199FbvmYQ@mail.gmail.com> I saw this announced at HOPE X this weekend: http://minilock.io/ It uses curve25519 <http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html>, which requires much smaller keys (32 or 64 bits) to ensure security -- and so it basically just demands a strong passphrase from the user from which can be derived a strong private key. The developer has a video <http://vimeo.com/101237413> and slides <http://minilock.io/files/HOPEX.pdf> to go along with it, and in general focused his energy on persuading the audience that JavaScript crypto is a necessary and achievable part of the future. -- Eric -- konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone> _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- From s at ctrlc.hu Mon Jul 21 03:13:04 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 12:13:04 +0200 Subject: DropItLike In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RKRgC5COw-UzGdxwyWs3JZJ1H4hmb8ghr0sQR-QBFA=g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RKRgC5COw-UzGdxwyWs3JZJ1H4hmb8ghr0sQR-QBFA=g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140721101304.GB6799@ctrlc.hu> On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 02:35:21AM -0700, coderman wrote: > https://github.com/mozilla/DropItLike quite disappointing (but then i have no expectations when it comes to mozilla), looks like mostly a pile of libtech crap to m -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From eugen at leitl.org Mon Jul 21 07:31:35 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:31:35 +0200 Subject: potential leak on Torpedo Message-ID: <20140721143135.GU26986@leitl.org> https://pay.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/2b8oq3/please_read_if_you_usedepend_on_tor_never_before/ Please read if you use/depend on Tor. Never before seen FH information. (self.TOR) submitted 16 hours ago * by Deepthroat2 [+1] Hello everyone, I have some information that I have been dying to share for months, but due to the circumstances, and to avoid detection, I had to wait for some time before I was able to safely make this post. My goal here is to provide information that I know is credible and for the Tor community to use it as they see fit, due to the nature of my work, and the severe penalties associated with breaking the rules and giving out information you aren't supposed too, I have no way of verifying or proving anything to you that I say here, I understand if find me less than credible, however, this is essentially a PSA, and you can take it for what it's worth to you. Just about one year ago, the Tor community was shaken by a Firefox exploit which utilized a javascript exploit and an old vulnerbility in the Tor Browser Bundle to unmask some users of Freedom Hosting. There has been rampant misinformation, and speculation to the point that I felt like pulling my hair out, or just simply bursting out into laughter when reading some of the outlandish claims made by people who have little to no idea what they are talking about. Today, I will set the record straight. The FH exploit was a government engineered, and deployed exploit that was designed in response to former Director Mueller's fustration at an earlier child pornography case in which the FBI was ridiculed for being unable to ascertain the source of child pornography, for those who aren't familiar with this case, it involved a man who had accessed child pornography by accident on a Tor hidden service, and then brought his desktop computer to the office, explaining what had happened and that he subsequently preformed a "Full wipe" on the disk. The agent who took the report had limited knowledge about Tor, however, at the time he knew that any directed effort to identify a specific Tor user was hopeless, and in the report he indicated that "There is currently no known way to ascertain the location of a Tor user, thus, no investigative leads exsist." This got leaked to the press, and they had a field day, hinting at the incompetency of the Bureau. Needless to say, the FBI had it's ego hurt quite badly by this public display of incompetency. Then Director Mueller directed the CEOS (Child exploitation and obscenity section) to find a way to penetrate the layers of protection provided by Tor, and to come up with a fesible way to conduct a sting operation in order to bring these people to justice. The FBI had previously conducted a sting on viewers of child pornography in a case out of Nebraska, that resulted in the arrest of about 25 people. This was the first successful take down of CP consumers that were utilizing a Tor hidden service. One of the errors that I see alot on these forums and others was that the Nebraska take down was done in a similar fashion to the FH exploit, with the code being deployed onto the pages of the boards, however, this is not the case. From my understanding, the Nebraska field office was able to find the actual server, take it over covertly, then upload a series of files that purported to be child pornography, but actually contained nothing but encrypted gibberish. They were video files that were embedded with code that called back to a computer that recorded the IP address of the requestor, date and time similar to the way windows media player attempts to recall album information and cover art for music cds and such. These were files that the user actually had to download and attempt to open. This is why the service was run for weeks, and only 25 people were identified as users. This method was described by the techs who deployed it as a "NIT" or "Network Investigational Tool". Now for Freedom Hosting.... The javascript exploit could not be deployed directly on the servers which Mr. Marques was using due to either technical reasons, or legal requirements by the AUSA in Maryland. So the decision was made to clone the services exactly, and transport then to the home of the FBI CEOS in the Greenbelt division of Maryland. This location was picked specifically because sentencing in this district for Child Pornography crimes is more severe. It was July 31st of 2013 when the exploit actually went live, and tried to identify criminals. It was installed previously, however, there were technical problems early on and the code had to be revised 3 times before it was running as intended, it ran for about 11 days before being shut down. The amount of people identified by this exploit is still a closely gaurded secret, with only agents having a direct "Need to know" being privy to this information. Howver, the victory dance was short lived as news started flowing around that the evidence may not be admissible in court, due to the manner in which it was collected, among other reasons. Although proper warrants were issued, it would take atleast 4-7 years to comb through the list of suspects, and question, arrest each one. The major problem is that after about 12 months, the courts start to presume your evidence is prejudicial to the defendant because you're supposed to have an indictment and serve it on the defendant within 30 days, and that just wasn't possible. You can request an extension of this time, however you must present a new, fresh reason for doing so..."We still aren't ready" doesn't cut it. There is no statue of limitations for the crime of "Accessing with intent to view child pornography" so barring any other limitations, the FBI can come after someone 10-15 years later. The AUSA became uncomfortable with the prospects of his legal case against the exploitees of FH and went to the US Attorney. There was disagreement as to whether or not the evidence would be viable, however, the operation went on anyways. One of the victims of the FH exploit was a man by the name of Grant Klein from Vermont. The Bureau had made arrangements with the local police for assistance with the raid (This is pretty much standard operation procedure, and is done for the saftey of the agents, as well as to maintain professional courtesy. Local cops get butt hurt when you arrest people on their turf without them knowing). The FBI had provided the local police with court documents and the affidavit of arrest regarding the cirsumstances of Mr. Klein's warrant, which they promptly posted onto their press release against the wishes of the FBI. This resulted in the termination of atleast one employee from local PD. He was raided and before even being asked a question ,he began spewing a confession. His home was searched, and a desktop computer with no hard disk was found, as well a laptop computer belonging to his wife Susan. There was no illegal materials found on these, however, he had a smartphone in the drawer of a nightstand which contained illegal images of minors. He was arrested and charged with 3 seperate crimes. To make a long story short, the FH related charges were dropped because the FBI had crossed a legal line by offering up child pornography de novo, by shutting down the server, then bringing it back online hosting real CP. They were uncomfortable with the prospects of this case, and were able to use a leon good faith exception to admit the evidence they found on his phone to make a single possession charge stick, however, he agreed to plead guilty. The rest of the leads which lead to foreign nationals were then distributed accordingly to the various LEA's. Also, earlier this wekk, the UK police arrested 660 people as part of Operation Notarise. The operation name of the FBI takedown in Nebraska was "Operation Torpedo" This was a cute poke at both the method they used, and the users they targeted Torpedo - Navy missile Tor Pedo - Tor Pedophile. -DT moar comments on Reddit From coderman at gmail.com Mon Jul 21 16:40:14 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:40:14 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1QG97sjXRSRFsmyXAXhjxy-paX5qTQCb77H=qskLc2r=A@mail.gmail.com> latest update, details of note: stated pick-up date is after actual pick up date. (Friday pickup, Saturday indication of interdiction, Monday "claimed" pickup) "Package received after final location pickup has occurred. Scheduled for pickup next business day." is code for scrutiny. https://peertech.org/files/fedex-fail2.jpg it appears that more complicated "jobs" may need to go to specific offices (e.g. physical modifications or cleaning, rather than substitution with ready implanted replacements) who else has fun shipping tales? :) On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 3:12 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >... > (attached interdiction of shipment from Washington State to Oregon via > Florida - usually they at least try to make it look plausible, heh) > https://peertech.org/files/fedex-fail.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: fedex-fail2.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 57856 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140721/39f0d065/attachment.jpg> From guninski at guninski.com Mon Jul 21 08:21:48 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 18:21:48 +0300 Subject: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53C82098.7090108@yahoo.com> <20140717191931.GL4258@hexapodia.org> <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140721152148.GA2785@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 12:32:26PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 12:19 PM, Andy Isaacson <adi at hexapodia.org> wrote: > > ... > > And once you've patched this bug, FOXACID will update to issue another > > 0day. > > > > It's worth doing, for sure! Patching bugs makes us all incrementally > > safer. > > > > But don't pretend that patching the specific attack your adversary is > > currently using will disable or even seriously inconvenience the > > adversary. > > > this is exactly why some who have received these payloads are sitting > on them, rather than disclosing. > > it is more useful to mitigate privately, and observe how/when an > exploit is used, > than burn it publicly for zero effective security improvement. > > (the less scrupulous would sell to highest bidder for other clandestine hacks) > > > better ideas welcome! > > > best regards, /me agrees with this. how would the dear NSA respond to a target who ``borrowed'' the sploits, trolls them and advertises vulnerable to the borrowed sploits configuration, yet the borrowed sploits don't work? (the advertised configuration is not at all vulnerable to the borrowed sploits). From eugen at leitl.org Mon Jul 21 09:25:04 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 18:25:04 +0200 Subject: [Cryptography] miniLock seems pretty interesting Message-ID: <20140721162504.GX26986@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Eric Mill <eric at konklone.com> ----- From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 01:51:32 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 01:51:32 -0700 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws In-Reply-To: <20140722083014.GB26986@leitl.org> References: <20140722083014.GB26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1T61-9U9AsYn4wgvzpyKJoQnJ2176HdYfZW+QSju2wpCw@mail.gmail.com> thanks Eugen! ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> Date: Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM Subject: [tor-talk] Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org, Liberation Technologies <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu> https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140721/11362227955/carnegie-mellon-kills-black-hat-talk-about-identifying-tor-users.shtml Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws from the questionable-legality dept There's some buzz in security circles today after it came out that a session at the upcoming Black Hat Conference entitled "You Don't Have to be the NSA to Break Tor: Deanonymizing Users on a Budget" by Michael McCord and Alexander Volynkin (both of whom work for Carnegie-Mellon University and CERT) had been pulled from the conference at the request of CMU. A Black Hat spokeswoman told Reuters that the talk had been canceled at the request of lawyers for Carnegie-Mellon University, where the speakers work as researchers. A CMU spokesman had no immediate comment. There's been plenty of speculation about what's going on, but Chris Soghoian has a pretty good thesis that the researchers likely didn't have institutional approval or consent of the users they were identifying, meaning that they were potentially violating wiretapping statutes. As he notes, running a Tor server to try to spy on Tor traffic without talking to lawyers is a very bad idea. While it hasn't yet been confirmed that this is what happened, it certainly is a pretty sensible theory. Of course, none of that changes the fact that it's possible to identify some Tor users. But... that's also not particularly new. In fact, we've discussed in the past how the feds can identify Tor users. Tor adds an important layer of protection, but there are plenty of ways that you can still be identified while using Tor. Just ask Russ Ulbricht. The problem isn't so much Tor itself but how people use it -- and the simple fact is that most people use it in a way that will eventually reveal who they are. While it's not definite, it seems likely that this is what the talk would have revealed. Shutting it down wasn't any sort of big attempt to cover up this fact, but perhaps it was to protect the researchers and CMU (potentially) from a lawsuit for violating wiretapping laws. From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Tue Jul 22 02:42:41 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 11:42:41 +0200 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1T61-9U9AsYn4wgvzpyKJoQnJ2176HdYfZW+QSju2wpCw@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140722083014.GB26986@leitl.org> <CAJVRA1T61-9U9AsYn4wgvzpyKJoQnJ2176HdYfZW+QSju2wpCw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <3142613.dUzchBGUPq@lapuntu> Dnia wtorek, 22 lipca 2014 01:51:32 coderman pisze: > thanks Eugen! > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> > Date: Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM > Subject: [tor-talk] Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About > Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws > To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org, Liberation Technologies > <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu> > > > > https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140721/11362227955/carnegie-mellon-kills > -black-hat-talk-about-identifying-tor-users.shtml > > Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps > Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws Damn. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140722/7bc925a7/attachment.sig> From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 12:48:35 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 12:48:35 -0700 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors In-Reply-To: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 5:21 AM, Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: > Alleged IOS backdoors > > http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf > > Identifying Back Doors, Attack > Points, and Surveillance > Mechanisms in iOS Devices note that Google is no better. back in 2011 i reported the abuse of Google Voice Search as easily accessible (no permissions required) and excellent for eavesdropping (always on should not be possible). the more things change, the more they stay the same ;) best regards, --- '... nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack' http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4923 """ Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These approaches get data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking permissions. This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch permission bypassing attacks from a zero permission Android application (VoicEmployer) through the speaker. The idea of GVS-Attack utilizes an Android system built-in voice assistant module -- Google Voice Search. Through Android Intent mechanism, VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice Search to the foreground, and then plays prepared audio files (like "call number 1234 5678") in the background. Google Voice Search can recognize this voice command and execute corresponding operations. With ingenious designs, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote control without any permission. Also we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google Search app, which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary numbers even when the phone is securely locked with password. A prototype of VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of GVS-Attack in real world. In theory, nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack. This study may inspire application developers and researchers rethink that zero permission doesn't mean safety and the speaker can be treated as a new attack surface. """ From eugen at leitl.org Tue Jul 22 04:45:36 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 13:45:36 +0200 Subject: HackRF will likely start shipping in August Message-ID: <20140722114536.GD26986@leitl.org> (the tinfoilhatterati will understand and rejoice) https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/ HackRF One is now available for pre-order from: HakShop (US) NooElec (US/CA) Hacker Warehouse (US) Ada's Technical Books (US) Wall of Sheep (US) Store4Geeks (SE) Passion Radio Shop (FR) Passion Radio Shop UK (UK) TAPR (US) iSource Asia (CN) WiMo (DE) Pre-ordered units will ship immediately after all rewards have shipped to Kickstarter backers, estimated July 2014. For the latest information on development and manufacturing, follow the Kickstarter updates. From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 22 05:21:37 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 15:21:37 +0300 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors Message-ID: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> Alleged IOS backdoors http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf Identifying Back Doors, Attack Points, and Surveillance Mechanisms in iOS Devices JONATHAN ZDZIARSKI From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 15:58:16 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 15:58:16 -0700 Subject: Fwd: a catalog of bugs, or "Why to disable assembly optimization" In-Reply-To: <CAM_a8JzDYmrp8z5ga3sD2dGnR_PNVhY1a72JpA=b6zUU0UbLvw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAM_a8JzDYmrp8z5ga3sD2dGnR_PNVhY1a72JpA=b6zUU0UbLvw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Q5K2vQoXZ6PuY8oYkee9mrA=Kr__W1yj1A2PhLfh7HgQ@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko at leastauthority.com> Date: Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:23 PM Subject: a catalog of bugs, or "Why to disable assembly optimization" Folks: We had already agreed to disable assembly optimizations in pycryptopp, because there seem to have been a lot of bugs in the optimized assembly code in the past, and because the added speed really makes no difference to our uses, as far as I know. However, in order to explain and justify to other people (e.g. Debian packagers) why we are doing this, and why they should consider doing the same thing themselves, I just read through the entire history of issues in pycryptopp and classified whether they were runtime errors (and therefore potential security bugs) or build-time errors (therefore probably not), and whether they would have been avoided if we had been disabling assembly optimizations all along. Here are the results. They clearly show that we should disable the optimized assembly! About half of all the security-threatening bugs we've had would never have been an issue if we'd avoided assembly from the beginning. By the way, in my opinion the author of Crypto++, Wei Dai, is an *exceptionally* skilled, careful, and experienced coder, and I would assume that if Crypto++ has had this many security-threatening bugs in its optimized assembly code, then other crypto libraries that also use optimized assembly code also have at least as many. Here's the ticket to track this issue: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/85 bugs that cause run-time failures ================================= (These bugs are potential security issues.) * would have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/24 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/31 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/45 (three *different* bugs in the assembly implementation) - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/67 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/84 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/86 * unclear if it would have been avoided if we'd used DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/65 * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/17 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/44 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/83 * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM (but would have been avoided by using cffi instead of CPython API) - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/19 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/70 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/80 * would have been avoided if we *didn't* use DISABLE_ASM! (A bug only in the non-ASM version!) - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/66 bugs that cause deterministic build or compilation failures =========================================================== (These bugs are *typically* not potential security issues but they can be, and in any case they are engineering/deployment issues.) * would have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/37 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/96 * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/22 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/23 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/32 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/39 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/62 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/77 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/78 -- Regards, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep https://LeastAuthority.com Freedom matters. From cryptomars at cryptoparty.fr Tue Jul 22 08:13:33 2014 From: cryptomars at cryptoparty.fr (Cryptoparty Marseille) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 17:13:33 +0200 Subject: web based shared secret symmetric encryption application Message-ID: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> Hi! I'm looking for a decent free and open source application that would work similarly to "Hushmail Express message" (https://help.hushmail.com/entries/351388-I-have-received-an-encrypted-email-from-Hushmail-how-do-I-read-it-) that would allow me to deposit an encrypted message on an apache web server that would be decrypted by the recipient using a shared secret (that's already established, so I don't need a key exchange mechanism). I read Tony's posts and his blog article (http://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto) and I'm well aware that browser based encryption is not optimal but I'm just looking for something slightly more secure than plain text email that could be used by an end user not willing to install GPG, not an NSA proof secure system. The (apache2/debian7) web server is physically under my control, I'm the only root (I hope! :-) and SSL/TLS is enabled. Thanks for your advice. cryptomars -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 897 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140722/0b4d6136/attachment.sig> From cyberkiller8 at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 08:34:31 2014 From: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?IsWBdWthc3ogXCJDeWJlciBLaWxsZXJcIiBLb3JwYWxza2ki?=) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 17:34:31 +0200 Subject: web based shared secret symmetric encryption application In-Reply-To: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> References: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> Message-ID: <53CE8487.8050009@gmail.com> W dniu 22.07.2014 17:13, Cryptoparty Marseille pisze: > Hi! > > I'm looking for a decent free and open source application that would > work similarly to "Hushmail Express message" > (https://help.hushmail.com/entries/351388-I-have-received-an-encrypted-email-from-Hushmail-how-do-I-read-it-) > that would allow me to deposit an encrypted message on an apache web > server that would be decrypted by the recipient using a shared secret > (that's already established, so I don't need a key exchange mechanism). > > I read Tony's posts and his blog article > (http://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto) and I'm well aware > that browser based encryption is not optimal but I'm just looking for > something slightly more secure than plain text email that could be used > by an end user not willing to install GPG, not an NSA proof secure system. > > The (apache2/debian7) web server is physically under my control, I'm the > only root (I hope! :-) and SSL/TLS is enabled. > > Thanks for your advice. > Have you looked at ZeroBin and 0bin? They do more or less what you described. -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com xmpp: cyber_killer at jabster.pl site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140722/5a5b9b5b/attachment.sig> From rdohm321 at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 09:54:49 2014 From: rdohm321 at gmail.com (Randolph) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 18:54:49 +0200 Subject: web based shared secret symmetric encryption application In-Reply-To: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> References: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> Message-ID: <CAEvNM8nd59+Kr9k0QNrXg0z+b50w2k1M=G3=EnYrgc6fhFMChA@mail.gmail.com> hi, you might want to have a look at the "Email Institution" Function of http://goldbug.sf.net this enables you to create within a p2p email system a virtual host, which is hosting your key and message. so the storage is not an encrypted apache, but a virtual institution email provider on the network. This is not browserbased, but clientbased. you can evaluate it within a cryptoparty at Marseille. In case this is not the fuction you want, you might want to look at the Rosetta CryptoPad, which is encrypting the message and then you can post it in any pastebin and your friend can grabb it there at any time and decrypt. so this can be done in a browser. Regards Randolph 2014-07-22 17:13 GMT+02:00 Cryptoparty Marseille <cryptomars at cryptoparty.fr>: > Hi! > > I'm looking for a decent free and open source application that would > work similarly to "Hushmail Express message" > (https://help.hushmail.com/entries/351388-I-have-received-an-encrypted-email-from-Hushmail-how-do-I-read-it-) > that would allow me to deposit an encrypted message on an apache web > server that would be decrypted by the recipient using a shared secret > (that's already established, so I don't need a key exchange mechanism). > > I read Tony's posts and his blog article > (http://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto) and I'm well aware > that browser based encryption is not optimal but I'm just looking for > something slightly more secure than plain text email that could be used > by an end user not willing to install GPG, not an NSA proof secure system. > > The (apache2/debian7) web server is physically under my control, I'm the > only root (I hope! :-) and SSL/TLS is enabled. > > Thanks for your advice. > > cryptomars > From juan.g71 at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 15:25:15 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 19:25:15 -0300 Subject: HackRF will likely start shipping in August In-Reply-To: <20140722114536.GD26986@leitl.org> References: <20140722114536.GD26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <53cee3a3.c9ad3a0a.63b7.18ae@mx.google.com> On Tue, 22 Jul 2014 13:45:36 +0200 Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > > (the tinfoilhatterati will understand and rejoice) > > https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/ Looks nice. Is it backdoored? > > HackRF One is now available for pre-order from: > > HakShop (US) > NooElec (US/CA) > Hacker Warehouse (US) > Ada's Technical Books (US) > Wall of Sheep (US) > Store4Geeks (SE) > Passion Radio Shop (FR) > Passion Radio Shop UK (UK) > TAPR (US) > iSource Asia (CN) > WiMo (DE) > > Pre-ordered units will ship immediately after all rewards have > shipped to Kickstarter backers, estimated July 2014. For the latest > information on development and manufacturing, follow the Kickstarter > updates. From unixninja92 at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 21:24:22 2014 From: unixninja92 at gmail.com (unixninja92) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 00:24:22 -0400 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? Message-ID: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more secure/trustworthy than skype to me. [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 722 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/3a58ed2c/attachment.txt> From fosforo at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 22:51:53 2014 From: fosforo at gmail.com (Fosforo) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 02:51:53 -0300 Subject: HackRF will likely start shipping in August In-Reply-To: <53cee3a3.c9ad3a0a.63b7.18ae@mx.google.com> References: <20140722114536.GD26986@leitl.org> <53cee3a3.c9ad3a0a.63b7.18ae@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAH8ZuZrxCCW6cJQ2RjS-6xMvPv2z1JXyB63oDEUssXF8PgVhKQ@mail.gmail.com> sources can be audited, about the chips, need an optical microscope and surgeon hands - I do not have both. -- []s Fosforo ------------------------------------------------------------- "Se eu tiver oito horas pra cortar uma arvore, passarei seis afiando meu machado." -Abraham Lincoln ------------------------------------------------------------- On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, 22 Jul 2014 13:45:36 +0200 > Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > > > > > (the tinfoilhatterati will understand and rejoice) > > > > https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/ > > Looks nice. Is it backdoored? > > > > > > > > > HackRF One is now available for pre-order from: > > > > HakShop (US) > > NooElec (US/CA) > > Hacker Warehouse (US) > > Ada's Technical Books (US) > > Wall of Sheep (US) > > Store4Geeks (SE) > > Passion Radio Shop (FR) > > Passion Radio Shop UK (UK) > > TAPR (US) > > iSource Asia (CN) > > WiMo (DE) > > > > Pre-ordered units will ship immediately after all rewards have > > shipped to Kickstarter backers, estimated July 2014. For the latest > > information on development and manufacturing, follow the Kickstarter > > updates. > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1876 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/5b881d8e/attachment.txt> From pzegar at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 22:25:08 2014 From: pzegar at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?Pawe=C5=82_Zegartowski?=) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 07:25:08 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAEcD9QdS6wTsBYBKeMw33fgQ-Hg--C1uPnNk768A_pv2RpmGkg@mail.gmail.com> Even if technicaly they're so anonymous and afe as they claim to be, they won't be an alternative for skype without accounts and "friend lists" etc. It is just to hard to use for "average user". Imagine when every time when you would like to chat or call someone via skype, instead of make a double click on his position on the list, you would have to let him know you want to speak, agree code and wait till he get to the website... its quite problematic. Zegar On 23 July 2014 06:24, unixninja92 <unixninja92 at gmail.com> wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use > P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. > Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they > don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more secure/trustworthy > than skype to me. > > [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ > -- Pozdrawiam, Paweł Zegartowski -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1710 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/0ab461b2/attachment.txt> From jya at pipeline.com Wed Jul 23 07:17:56 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 10:17:56 -0400 Subject: Tor developers vow to fix bug that can uncloak users In-Reply-To: <20140723122236.GG26986@leitl.org> References: <20140723122236.GG26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <E1X9xMl-0006tN-Os@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Terrible instance of official censorship by intimidation of an educational institution. Another nail in the coffin of TOR, just about nailed shut. Fortunately better alternatives are in the works, and more after those. High success and popularity assures a security system will be compromised and a stake must be driven into the hearts of promoters, repeatedly as with vampires. At 08:22 AM 7/23/2014, you wrote: >http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/tor-developers-vow-to-fix-bug-that-can-uncloak-users/ > > >Tor developers vow to fix bug that can uncloak users > >Weakness was topic of talk abruptly pulled from security conference. From bluelotus at openmailbox.org Wed Jul 23 08:10:18 2014 From: bluelotus at openmailbox.org (Bluelotus) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 11:10:18 -0400 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors In-Reply-To: <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <d0f9f999-7971-4166-8fc1-a4402f4f6137@email.android.com> Dpnt have to go back as far as 1990's. This month, I purchased a Palm Treo 705p, released in 2006. External antenna, superior voice quality and qwerty keyboard. WebOS doesnt capture MAC addresses of nearby wifi devices like iphones, ipads, android and Windows do. No FM radio to hack air gapped computers. For articles see my submit history on reddit.com under user nme BadBIOSvictim. Verizon does not activate older phones. PagePlusCellular.com does. My other phone is a Palm Pre2 for the above reasons. Released in 2011. On July 23, 2014 10:04:13 AM EDT, Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: >Are dumb phones sufficiently secure? >Say something monochrome from the 90's? >Heard rumors operators can update the >firmware on a lot of models, not sure >how true is this. > >On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:48:35PM -0700, coderman wrote: >> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 5:21 AM, Georgi Guninski ><guninski at guninski.com> wrote: >> > Alleged IOS backdoors >> > >> > >http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf >> > >> > Identifying Back Doors, Attack >> > Points, and Surveillance >> > Mechanisms in iOS Devices >> >> note that Google is no better. back in 2011 i reported the abuse of >> Google Voice Search as easily accessible (no permissions required) >and >> excellent for eavesdropping (always on should not be possible). >> >> the more things change, the more they stay the same ;) >> >> best regards, >> >> >> --- >> >> '... nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services >> Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack' >> >> >> http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4923 >> """ >> Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform >> focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device >> components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These approaches get >> data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking >> permissions. >> >> This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch >permission >> bypassing attacks from a zero permission Android application >> (VoicEmployer) through the speaker. The idea of GVS-Attack utilizes >an >> Android system built-in voice assistant module -- Google Voice >Search. >> Through Android Intent mechanism, VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice >> Search to the foreground, and then plays prepared audio files (like >> "call number 1234 5678") in the background. Google Voice Search can >> recognize this voice command and execute corresponding operations. >> With ingenious designs, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access >> privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote >> control without any permission. >> >> Also we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google Search >app, >> which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary numbers even >> when the phone is securely locked with password. A prototype of >> VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of >> GVS-Attack in real world. In theory, nearly all Android devices >> equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by >GVS-Attack. >> This study may inspire application developers and researchers rethink >> that zero permission doesn't mean safety and the speaker can be >> treated as a new attack surface. >> """ From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Wed Jul 23 03:48:38 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 11:48:38 +0100 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53CF9306.80505@cathalgarvey.me> "Closed source" is exactly the same as "something in the source code to hide from the user". Never, ever trust closed source code. On 23/07/14 05:24, unixninja92 wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use > P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. > Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they > don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more secure/trustworthy > than skype to me. > > [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/64a57109/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/64a57109/attachment.sig> From eugen at leitl.org Wed Jul 23 03:13:28 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 12:13:28 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140723101328.GF26986@leitl.org> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 12:24:22AM -0400, unixninja92 wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use > P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. > Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they > don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more secure/trustworthy > than skype to me. RetroShare has quite good P2P audio. It's not properly audited though, caveat emptor. > [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 09:46:40 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: Compromise of Soviet codes in WWII Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_DMR1ttzh_AcPeBVu8FodQiYZFztGL34uR0638nyYWoQ@mail.gmail.com> http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2014/07/compromise-of-soviet-codes-in-wwii.html Overview of Soviet cryptosystems The secretive Soviet state used various cryptosystems in order to secure its communications from outsiders. The task of preparing and evaluating cipher procedures was handled by two main Soviet organizations, the NKVD’s 5th Department and the Army’s 8th department of the main intelligence directorate GRU. In the 1920’s simple substitution systems were used and these were solved by ... From cypher at cpunk.us Wed Jul 23 11:29:15 2014 From: cypher at cpunk.us (Cypher) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 13:29:15 -0500 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype =?UTF-8?Q?alternative=3F?= In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <57537d265357422a84dc49c5bec794fe@cajuntechie.org> On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to > use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their > servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. > They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more > secure/trustworthy than skype to me. Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and runs on just about any platform (including Android). [1] www.jitsi.org Cypher From eugen at leitl.org Wed Jul 23 05:22:36 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 14:22:36 +0200 Subject: Tor developers vow to fix bug that can uncloak users Message-ID: <20140723122236.GG26986@leitl.org> http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/tor-developers-vow-to-fix-bug-that-can-uncloak-users/ Tor developers vow to fix bug that can uncloak users Weakness was topic of talk abruptly pulled from security conference. by Dan Goodin - July 22 2014, 8:15pm CEST Developers of the Tor privacy service say they're close to fixing a weakness that researchers for an abruptly canceled conference presentation said provides a low-cost way for adversaries to deanonymize hundreds of thousands of users. The talk previously scheduled for next month's Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas was titled "You Don't Have to be the NSA to Break Tor: Deanonymizing Users on a Budget." The abstract said that the hack cost less than $3,000 and could uncloak hundreds of thousands of users. On Monday, Black Hat organizers said the presentation was canceled at the request of attorneys from Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), where the researchers were employed, as well as the Software Engineering Institute (SEI). The attorneys said only that the materials to be presented "have not yet been approved by CMU/SEI for public release." Researchers Alexander Volynkin and Michael McCord have yet to explain why their talk was pulled. Tor officials responded by saying that they're working on an update for individual Tor relay nodes that will close the unspecified security hole. "Based on our current plans, we'll be putting out a fix that relays can apply that should close the particular bug they found," Tor project leader Roger Dingledine wrote in an e-mail to Tor users. "The bug is a nice bug, but it isn't the end of the world. And of course these things are never as simple as 'close that one bug and you're 100% safe.'" He said the fix was complicated because the researchers didn't provide all the technical details when privately informing Tor officials of the vulnerability. "We've been trying to find delicate ways to explain that we think we know what they did, but also it sure would have been smoother if they'd opted to tell us everything," he wrote. "The main reason for trying to be delicate is that I don't want to discourage future researchers from telling us about neat things that they find. I'm currently waiting for them to answer their mail so I can proceed." In a previous e-mail, Dingledine said Tor developers "informally" received some materials related to the vulnerability. He went on to say Tor officials played no role in the cancellation of the Black Hat talk. "We did not ask Black Hat or CERT to cancel the talk. We did (and still do) have questions for the presenter and for CERT about some aspects of the research, but we had no idea the talk would be pulled before the announcement was made," he wrote. CMU is affiliated with CERT, which coordinates security disclosures between researchers and affected parties. A CMU spokesman contacted Monday didn't elaborate on the reasons for pulling the talk. From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 23 07:44:00 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 16:44 +0200 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors In-Reply-To: <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <12557311.IadWnVgEYq@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 17:04:13 Georgi Guninski pisze: > Are dumb phones sufficiently secure? > Say something monochrome from the 90's? > Heard rumors operators can update the > firmware on a lot of models, not sure > how true is this. There's always the question of baseband, for example, but regardless of it and many other things, the attack surface is much, much, much smaller. You *won't* be keeping your e-mails, full contacts info, etc., on the phone, simply because it is unable to cater for such a use. Hence, you will be this much safer, at the very least. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/a3cfeb31/attachment.sig> From guninski at guninski.com Wed Jul 23 07:04:13 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 17:04:13 +0300 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> Are dumb phones sufficiently secure? Say something monochrome from the 90's? Heard rumors operators can update the firmware on a lot of models, not sure how true is this. On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:48:35PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 5:21 AM, Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: > > Alleged IOS backdoors > > > > http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf > > > > Identifying Back Doors, Attack > > Points, and Surveillance > > Mechanisms in iOS Devices > > note that Google is no better. back in 2011 i reported the abuse of > Google Voice Search as easily accessible (no permissions required) and > excellent for eavesdropping (always on should not be possible). > > the more things change, the more they stay the same ;) > > best regards, > > > --- > > '... nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services > Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack' > > > http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4923 > """ > Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform > focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device > components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These approaches get > data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking > permissions. > > This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch permission > bypassing attacks from a zero permission Android application > (VoicEmployer) through the speaker. The idea of GVS-Attack utilizes an > Android system built-in voice assistant module -- Google Voice Search. > Through Android Intent mechanism, VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice > Search to the foreground, and then plays prepared audio files (like > "call number 1234 5678") in the background. Google Voice Search can > recognize this voice command and execute corresponding operations. > With ingenious designs, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access > privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote > control without any permission. > > Also we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google Search app, > which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary numbers even > when the phone is securely locked with password. A prototype of > VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of > GVS-Attack in real world. In theory, nearly all Android devices > equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack. > This study may inspire application developers and researchers rethink > that zero permission doesn't mean safety and the speaker can be > treated as a new attack surface. > """ From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 14:24:22 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 17:24:22 -0400 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:29 PM, Cypher <cypher at cpunk.us> wrote: > On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: >> >> Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to >> cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being >> audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to >> use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their >> servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. >> They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. >> >> So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might >> actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more >> secure/trustworthy than skype to me. > > > Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] > available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and runs on > just about any platform (including Android). > > [1] www.jitsi.org > Eugen says... > RetroShare has quite good P2P audio. It's not properly audited though, > caveat emptor. Ditto. Though it will take some time not just for the open source community to pick which projects to audit under limited resources, but to even develop a real auditing framework within itself to do that under. It's a huge undertaking and responsibility in its own right. Further, what's with crap like gruveo.com, goldbug.sf.net [1], protonmail.ch, and so many more (especially the 'Look, we just solved Email encryption' crowd)? And of the partly open hw/sw stack vendor types like BlackPhone? What are we, some free debunkment service for shills, charlatans, closed source, browser/app/phone loaded crypto/exec environments provided by the service provider instead of reasonably disinterested third parties, keys disclosed, Web3.0, looks like a phone, junk? Sure, ok, it's good that we are, but the dearth of CrapWare and ProCrap analysts and marketers popping up out there lately is ridiculous. And I'm not laying down a universal CrapWare blanket, some of the stuff we see is pretty good, but simply fails to clearly, publicly, and obviously state to its users what risks their model does not cover. That's lack of care, obliviousness, lying, or profiteering... so it lands itself back in Crap territory. To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. Though the makeup of their lists is perhaps not yet complete/ideal, you'd be better off picking anything from prism-break.org, yes say Jitsi, than this type of Crapware. We should make prism-locked.org just to list all the junk out there. It's good to have more crypto used in the world, but let's at least try to make and promote strong and open solutions. [1] I and others have been displeased with their, shall we say, 'community involvement'. As with the attempts at parallel compilation and auditing of Truecrypt, has anyone attempted that with their code? Tried to contact them? Seen any presentations? Know who they are? Open development? Etc? People say OpenPGP and crypto is hard for user adoption, no gui's for grandma, etc. So when potentially interesting gui tools appear, it's a shame many of them choose to draw these questions and thus seriously limit and tarnish their forward prospectus. At least Gruveo appears to have already answered those questions. From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 14:42:02 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 17:42:02 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <53CCAF4D.9040602@gmail.com> References: <53CADD1C.4090906@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2983FzywxXRJ52Kv=_0z=248muZxVCpaaC4p8MxCVLhhA@mail.gmail.com> <53CCAF4D.9040602@gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti298LiGhhLX1O09-qNHiZUbTZjGXirMU=DZxm5nXQC_RVQ@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 2:12 AM, Martin Rublik <martin.rublik at gmail.com> wrote: > On 20. 7. 2014 7:45, grarpamp wrote: > ... >> The mozilla bundle includes about 150. It would be nice if the >> new cert observatoris publish a count of how many end certs >> they see each root cert covers... a topN list of sorts. Then you >> could save some time by including the N of your choice into your >> 'empty by default' list. I think the distribution would be severly >> skewed to maybe top 10 or 15 covers most any place. >> > > Here is one visualization http://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/trust-tree/ and the > discussion as well > https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/observatory/2012-December/000669.html Neat. I should have worded better as to be visualizing the tree from the roots to the AlexaTop500, plus selected other sets such as all universities, all global $Gigacorps, etc. http://www.alexa.com/topsites From s at ctrlc.hu Wed Jul 23 08:45:34 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 17:45:34 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140723154534.GG6799@ctrlc.hu> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 12:24:22AM -0400, unixninja92 wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use > P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. > Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they > don't keep any logs that could identify users. this paragraph rings so many alarmbells that writing this should have already answered your question, no? -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From gizmoguy1 at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 10:16:51 2014 From: gizmoguy1 at gmail.com (John Preston) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:16:51 +0100 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? Message-ID: <1406135811.2025.2.camel@gmail.com> You can find the results of my inquiry below. ¬_¬ -------- Forwarded Message -------- > From: Art Matsak <art at gruveo.com> > To: John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> > Subject: Re: Security specifics > Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:34:28 +0200 > > Hi John, > > Thank you for your interest in Gruveo. Gruveo uses WebRTC, an open technology for browser realtime communication. You can find details on its security architecture here: > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-10 > > Please note that WebRTC is work in progress and its specifications may change in the future. > > To answer your other questions, Gruveo is a proprietary product. > > Best regards, > > Art Matsak > Founder and CEO > Gruveo > https://www.gruveo.com > > > On 23 Jul 2014, at 18:19, John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> wrote: > > > From: John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> > > Subject: Security specifics > > > > Message Body: > > Hey all, > > > > Like the idea, but I'd like to know about the specifics of how Gruveo is designed. Specifically: > > * what is the threat model? > > * what are the network protocol specifications? Packet formats, ciphers and modes, and semantics all critically determine the security of the system. > > * who owns the IP, and how is it licensed? > > * what's the development model like? > > > > Thanks for your time, :) > > John > > > > -- > > This mail is sent via contact form on Gruveo https://www.gruveo.com > > From bmanning at isi.edu Wed Jul 23 18:21:21 2014 From: bmanning at isi.edu (manning bill) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:21:21 -0700 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <E6855C3A-818E-42C1-AEC6-966DF6E33DAD@isi.edu> it is being delivered. will let folks know /bill PO Box 12317 Marina del Rey, CA 90295 310.322.8102 On 23July2014Wednesday, at 18:11, Ulex Europae <europus at gmail.com> wrote: > At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: > >> < http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-73511096050.html> > > > It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? > > Ulex > From alfiej at fastmail.fm Wed Jul 23 15:31:23 2014 From: alfiej at fastmail.fm (Alfie John) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:31:23 -0400 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <1406154683.2425.144992333.68B01022@webmail.messagingengine.com> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014, at 05:59 PM, stef wrote: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to > detect > snakeoil: > > not free software > runs in a browser > runs on a smartphone > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption > keys > there is no threat model > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > neglects general sad state of host security I like the idea of this. Are there any check lists out there that can be used to qualify if software is safe? Flipping what Stef wrote, so far we have: - Must be open source - Must be run on the client's machine - Must use non-shared, private key Alfie -- Alfie John alfiej at fastmail.fm From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Wed Jul 23 10:58:16 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:58:16 +0100 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <1406135811.2025.2.camel@gmail.com> References: <1406135811.2025.2.camel@gmail.com> Message-ID: <17b33633-4de0-4e17-94b7-9c819b8d564f@email.android.com> So, snakeoil of the highest order, then. On 23 July 2014 18:16:51 GMT+01:00, John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> wrote: >You can find the results of my inquiry below. ¬_¬ > >-------- Forwarded Message -------- >> From: Art Matsak <art at gruveo.com> >> To: John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> >> Subject: Re: Security specifics >> Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:34:28 +0200 >> >> Hi John, >> >> Thank you for your interest in Gruveo. Gruveo uses WebRTC, an open >technology for browser realtime communication. You can find details on >its security architecture here: >> >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-10 >> >> Please note that WebRTC is work in progress and its specifications >may change in the future. >> >> To answer your other questions, Gruveo is a proprietary product. >> >> Best regards, >> >> Art Matsak >> Founder and CEO >> Gruveo >> https://www.gruveo.com >> >> >> On 23 Jul 2014, at 18:19, John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> wrote: >> >> > From: John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> >> > Subject: Security specifics >> > >> > Message Body: >> > Hey all, >> > >> > Like the idea, but I'd like to know about the specifics of how >Gruveo is designed. Specifically: >> > * what is the threat model? >> > * what are the network protocol specifications? Packet formats, >ciphers and modes, and semantics all critically determine the security >of the system. >> > * who owns the IP, and how is it licensed? >> > * what's the development model like? >> > >> > Thanks for your time, :) >> > John >> > >> > -- >> > This mail is sent via contact form on Gruveo https://www.gruveo.com >> > -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2509 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/d1b68be7/attachment.txt> From alfiej at fastmail.fm Wed Jul 23 16:30:43 2014 From: alfiej at fastmail.fm (Alfie John) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 19:30:43 -0400 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> Message-ID: <1406158243.15417.145007837.0FE9636C@webmail.messagingengine.com> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014, at 06:34 PM, rysiek wrote: > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 23:59:25 stef pisze: > > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > > > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > > > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > > > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > > > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > > > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > > snakeoil: > > > > not free software > > runs in a browser > > runs on a smartphone > > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption > > keys there is no threat model > > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > > neglects general sad state of host security > > So very true. Can we have it named as "stef's six rules of snakeoilness" > and > spread around? I'm serious, this is important. I've always been a fan of the Spam Solution checklist: https://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt Maybe Stef's six rules can be expanded into something like this. Alfie -- Alfie John alfiej at fastmail.fm From europus at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 18:11:14 2014 From: europus at gmail.com (Ulex Europae) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 21:11:14 -0400 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com > References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: ><<http:///>http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-73511096050.html> It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? Ulex -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 354 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/e4b5b8e9/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 23 12:40:59 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 21:40:59 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <57537d265357422a84dc49c5bec794fe@cajuntechie.org> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> <57537d265357422a84dc49c5bec794fe@cajuntechie.org> Message-ID: <14351021.WWkIAbKN6v@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 13:29:15 Cypher pisze: > On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: > > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to > > use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their > > servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. > > They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more > > secure/trustworthy than skype to me. > > Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] > available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and > runs on just about any platform (including Android). Plus, simply does not work, at least when I try it from time to time. :/ -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/f44c86d9/attachment.sig> From jya at pipeline.com Wed Jul 23 19:01:06 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 22:01:06 -0400 Subject: Increased and Diverse Disclosure Initiatives Needed Message-ID: <E1XA8J1-0001Vo-NV@elasmtp-dupuy.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Cryptome has canceled the Kickstarter. Following the purpose of the kickstarter it urges support for increased and diverse disclosure initiatives. A few suggestions: 1. Many more and diverse disclosure initiatives are needed to broaden public participation, to diversify content and to increase unpaid access. 2. They should be novel and unexpected. 3. They should evolve and avoid being static, preferrably brand-free. 4. These may be online, offline or neither, inventive and variable. 5. They may be short- or long-lived or episodic and erratic. 6. Might be hit and run, for a single disclosure or unpredictable series. 7. Provided by individuals, groups or variable. 8. Funded by individuals, groups or variable. 9. Anonymous, nonymous, pseudononymous or variable. 10. Legal, extra-legal, quasi-legal, pushing against legal or variable. 11. Low-key, low-profile, low-recognition, the opposite or variable. 12. Reputable, disreputable or variable. 13. Risky, dangerous, outrageous, the opposite or variable. 14. Citizens' duty should be to disclose, resist secrecy, official secrecy most so. From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Wed Jul 23 15:40:39 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 23:40:39 +0100 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <53D039E7.9070704@cathalgarvey.me> > neglects general sad state of host security You mean user host (client endpoint security, for most people nonexistent) or server host? Because at least with the latter, a clever design or threat-model can make server-client pretty secure by simply making the server zero-knowledge. I used to be a total P2P hippie, and P2P is still my preference aesthetically and for reasons of simple resilience, but I no longer regard server-client as an automatic fail, provided the server is zero-knowledge. So, encrypted XMPP/Jingle (Jitsi) is good, whereas lol-not-really-encrypted-server-sees-all Mumble is not. On 23/07/14 22:59, stef wrote: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: >> To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. >> 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very >> interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, >> but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those >> parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > snakeoil: > > not free software > runs in a browser > runs on a smartphone > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys > there is no threat model > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > neglects general sad state of host security > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/c2770c2c/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/c2770c2c/attachment.sig> From s at ctrlc.hu Wed Jul 23 14:59:25 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 23:59:25 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect snakeoil: not free software runs in a browser runs on a smartphone the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys there is no threat model uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" neglects general sad state of host security -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 23 15:09:59 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 00:09:59 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <8473412.hccbPQBTms@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 17:24:22 grarpamp pisze: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:29 PM, Cypher <cypher at cpunk.us> wrote: > > On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: > >> Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > >> cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > >> audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to > >> use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their > >> servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. > >> They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. > >> > >> So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > >> actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more > >> secure/trustworthy than skype to me. > > > > Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] > > available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and runs > > on just about any platform (including Android). > > > > [1] www.jitsi.org > > > > Eugen says... > > RetroShare has quite good P2P audio. It's not properly audited though, > > caveat emptor. > > Ditto. Though it will take some time not just for the open source > community to pick which projects to audit under limited resources, > but to even develop a real auditing framework within itself to do that > under. It's a huge undertaking and responsibility in its own right. > > Further, what's with crap like gruveo.com, goldbug.sf.net [1], > protonmail.ch, and so many more (especially the 'Look, we just solved Email > encryption' crowd)? And of the partly open hw/sw stack vendor types like > BlackPhone? Here, have a chuckle: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/icloak/icloak-tm-stik-easy-powerful-online-privacy-for-yo Hat-tip to all the TAILS/Tor people here. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/501adf4d/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 23 15:34:24 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 00:34:24 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 23:59:25 stef pisze: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > snakeoil: > > not free software > runs in a browser > runs on a smartphone > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption > keys there is no threat model > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > neglects general sad state of host security So very true. Can we have it named as "stef's six rules of snakeoilness" and spread around? I'm serious, this is important. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/663581ac/attachment.sig> From s at ctrlc.hu Wed Jul 23 16:02:03 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 01:02:03 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D039E7.9070704@cathalgarvey.me> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D039E7.9070704@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <20140723230203.GM6799@ctrlc.hu> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 11:40:39PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > > neglects general sad state of host security > > You mean user host (client endpoint security, for most people > nonexistent) + -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From s at ctrlc.hu Wed Jul 23 16:08:31 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 01:08:31 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> Message-ID: <20140723230831.GN6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 12:34:24AM +0200, rysiek wrote: > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 23:59:25 stef pisze: > > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > > > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > > > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > > > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > > > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > > > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > > snakeoil: > > > > not free software > > runs in a browser > > runs on a smartphone > > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption > > keys there is no threat model > > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > > neglects general sad state of host security > > So very true. Can we have it named as "stef's six rules of snakeoilness" and > spread around? I'm serious, this is important. "7 rules of thumb against snakeoil" is good enough. pls note it's really 7 rules. ;) -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 23:42:53 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 02:42:53 -0400 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <E6855C3A-818E-42C1-AEC6-966DF6E33DAD@isi.edu> References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> <E6855C3A-818E-42C1-AEC6-966DF6E33DAD@isi.edu> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-P8LU9eyr10v5fAL4siaLkwTY33WN7-qPiwFVFeVG_NA@mail.gmail.com> > On 23July2014Wednesday, at 18:11, Ulex Europae <europus at gmail.com> wrote: >>> < http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-73511096050.html> >> It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 9:21 PM, manning bill <bmanning at isi.edu> wrote: > it is being delivered. will let folks know http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/06/exclusive-a-review-of-the-blackphone-the-android-for-the-paranoid/ https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/06/blackphone.html https://www.blackphone.ch/ https://blog.silentcircle.com/category/blackphone/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackphone Though it's more consumer oriented and the price is lower, blackphone isn't the first to market a crypto phone to the public, these guys have been around for many years... lately doing a GSM+Android combo as well... http://www.cryptophone.de/ And a couple companies claim to be building 'open' hardware phones, I'd call them 'more/mostly' open. I forget their links at the moment :( I see these cute silent* demo screens of one or two word 'verification strings' with this and tech like ZRTP, that's not even close to OPIE strength. I'd rather be able to see and read a full real hash, key import/export, etc. Maybe the option is there, I don't know yet. No doubt because these sorts of companies bury all their real tech docs deep behind glitzy Web3.0 splash, (points finger at blackphone.ch, ahem!) https://source.android.com/ https://guardianproject.info/ https://github.com/SilentCircle https://github.com/WhisperSystems https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/guardian-dev/2014-January/003055.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/search?q=silentcircle I don't much care what they've done with opensource Android and things riding on top of it, since anyone like Guardian can do that as a project. Blackphone does have some Cell, Server, VoIP, etc stacks deployed to complement the phone, that's handy and takes $capital. But what I really want to know is: - What phone make and model is it based on? - About how, if at all, they've managed to open (or claim to certify, reverse engineer, substitute open replacements, or somehow control) the closed Android blobs and/or the closed phone firmware/hardware below that??? That's would be the real progress, and worth buying as an integrated system (I'd definitely buy that progress), but only if it was open in turn. Does Blackphone accept BTC? I was begging for BTC the other day... :) Thanks Bill, we'll need more than a few quality reviews of the security model of the system as a whole. If this phone and company does well, maybe it will use its power to leverage that progress as time goes on, but it only matters if it's open. And for where you need Cell based voice/data connectivity, I'd like to see them offer a GSM hotspot wifi tether so you don't have to trust the cell baseband (now unused, or even physically neutered) on your device (phone/pad/tablet) as much. From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 23:52:10 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 02:52:10 -0400 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-P8LU9eyr10v5fAL4siaLkwTY33WN7-qPiwFVFeVG_NA@mail.gmail.com> References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> <E6855C3A-818E-42C1-AEC6-966DF6E33DAD@isi.edu> <CAD2Ti2-P8LU9eyr10v5fAL4siaLkwTY33WN7-qPiwFVFeVG_NA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28_mP3ViiCap8ZvAh_=4s1Qv=FAvdBi4NESgCsnqeRPrw@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 2:42 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > really want to know is: > - What phone make and model is it based on? - What hardware changes did they make to it, whether OEM to order, or locally? > - About how, if at all, they've managed to open (or claim to > certify, reverse engineer, substitute open replacements, or somehow control) > the closed Android blobs and/or the closed phone firmware/hardware below > that??? From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 00:10:52 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 03:10:52 -0400 Subject: OT: List Archives Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_Wxj_f5YM2qk1EFMK4spO5ouqU0t7W+OYcYLeamWebmA@mail.gmail.com> Can mailman be configured to include the 'To:' and 'Cc:' addresses in the archive gz's? It would add some needed context when locally combining/splitting multiple lists for MUA use. And is there a way retrieve monthly attachment gz's without needing to fetch per attachment? Also, how is the 'since inception' archive project coming? From juan.g71 at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 23:22:05 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 03:22:05 -0300 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <53CF9306.80505@cathalgarvey.me> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> <53CF9306.80505@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <53d0a4de.538f3a0a.1b42.ffffcec0@mx.google.com> On Wed, 23 Jul 2014 11:48:38 +0100 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> wrote: > "Closed source" is exactly the same as "something in the source code > to hide from the user". Never, ever trust closed source code. I see that kind of aassertions endlessly repeated. They seem rather baseless. "Closed source" means that if you want to audit something, you need to use a disassembler. > > On 23/07/14 05:24, unixninja92 wrote: > > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar > > to cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of > > being audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It > > tries to use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go > > through their servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio > > and video chat. They claim they don't keep any logs that could > > identify users. > > > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more > > secure/trustworthy than skype to me. > > > > [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ > > > From cyberkiller8 at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 21:47:29 2014 From: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?IsWBdWthc3ogXCJDeWJlciBLaWxsZXJcIiBLb3JwYWxza2ki?=) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 06:47:29 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <14351021.WWkIAbKN6v@lapuntu> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> <57537d265357422a84dc49c5bec794fe@cajuntechie.org> <14351021.WWkIAbKN6v@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53D08FE1.1060205@gmail.com> W dniu 23.07.2014 21:40, rysiek pisze: > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 13:29:15 Cypher pisze: >> On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: >>> Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to >>> cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being >>> audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to >>> use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their >>> servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. >>> They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. >>> >>> So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might >>> actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more >>> secure/trustworthy than skype to me. >> >> Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] >> available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and >> runs on just about any platform (including Android). > > Plus, simply does not work, at least when I try it from time to time. :/ > On top of that it's not much configurable, the gui is slow/notresponsive and the widget style is ugly and doesn't itegrate with the rest of my KDE desktop. Jitsi might be good software one day, but it's stil has quite a long way to go. -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com xmpp: cyber_killer at jabster.pl site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/6725477d/attachment.sig> From stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch Wed Jul 23 23:39:35 2014 From: stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch (Stephan Neuhaus) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 08:39:35 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> On 2014-07-23, 23:59, stef wrote: > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > snakeoil: > > not free software > runs in a browser > runs on a smartphone > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys > there is no threat model > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > neglects general sad state of host security > In order to qualify as snake oil according to this definition, do all of these have to be true, or is any criterion sufficient? Because if it's "any", then this https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ is snakeoil, which I think is unfair. (Note that I'm not saying that this is a secure app; I haven't looked at the code. But you can't fault the authors on threat modelling etc. Its only "fault" is that it runs on a smart phone.) Fun, Stephan -- From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 24 00:42:40 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 09:42:40 +0200 Subject: OT: List Archives In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_Wxj_f5YM2qk1EFMK4spO5ouqU0t7W+OYcYLeamWebmA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2_Wxj_f5YM2qk1EFMK4spO5ouqU0t7W+OYcYLeamWebmA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <3134430.KXOYjCfmXq@lapuntu> Dnia czwartek, 24 lipca 2014 03:10:52 grarpamp pisze: > (...) > Also, how is the 'since inception' archive project coming? I guess they need to go deeper. /somebody had to make that pun/ -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/f808948a/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 24 01:46:35 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 09:46:35 +0100 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <05a284bf-5ebf-4c07-9086-a3c9fbeabe17@email.android.com> That is a problem with most desktop or laptop computers, too. I don't think "runs on a smartphone" is practically different from "neglects client endpoint security". A properly built and programmed smartphone is indistinguishable from a regular computer. On 24 July 2014 09:29:11 GMT+01:00, stef <s at ctrlc.hu> wrote: >On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 08:39:35AM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: >> On 2014-07-23, 23:59, stef wrote: >> > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb >to detect >> > snakeoil: >> > >> > not free software >> > runs in a browser >> > runs on a smartphone >> > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private >encryption keys >> > there is no threat model >> > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" >> > neglects general sad state of host security >> > >> >> In order to qualify as snake oil according to this definition, do all >of >> these have to be true, or is any criterion sufficient? > >any is enough, but combo-bonuses are combo-bonuses. > >> Because if it's "any", then this >https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ is >> snakeoil, which I think is unfair. (Note that I'm not saying that >this is a >> secure app; I haven't looked at the code. But you can't fault the >authors on >> threat modelling etc. Its only "fault" is that it runs on a smart >phone.) > >well, you have a baseband stack behind it, and a vendor/provider >delivering >stuff without your consent, etc... > >-- >otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2336 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/aeada7d2/attachment.txt> From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 01:29:11 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:29:11 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Message-ID: <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 08:39:35AM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > On 2014-07-23, 23:59, stef wrote: > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > > snakeoil: > > > > not free software > > runs in a browser > > runs on a smartphone > > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys > > there is no threat model > > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > > neglects general sad state of host security > > > > In order to qualify as snake oil according to this definition, do all of > these have to be true, or is any criterion sufficient? any is enough, but combo-bonuses are combo-bonuses. > Because if it's "any", then this https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ is > snakeoil, which I think is unfair. (Note that I'm not saying that this is a > secure app; I haven't looked at the code. But you can't fault the authors on > threat modelling etc. Its only "fault" is that it runs on a smart phone.) well, you have a baseband stack behind it, and a vendor/provider delivering stuff without your consent, etc... -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From jya at pipeline.com Thu Jul 24 07:38:34 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:38:34 -0400 Subject: Tails vulnerability specific to I2P, not Tor In-Reply-To: <20140724140424.GK26986@leitl.org> References: <20140724140424.GK26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <E1XAK7f-0007Wq-Tm@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Ah, the standard CYA natsec and comsec marketing spiel used by nations, spies and contractors, upgades essential, 24x7x365 monitoring recommended but SHINT happens: At 10:04 AM 7/24/2014, you wrote: >We publicized the fact that we've discovered these issues for a very >simple reason: no user should put full trust into any particular >security solution. By bringing to light the fact that we have found >verifiable flaws in such a widely trusted piece of code, we hope to >remind the Tails userbase that no software is infallible. From tbiehn at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 07:47:45 2014 From: tbiehn at gmail.com (Travis Biehn) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:47:45 -0400 Subject: a catalog of bugs, or "Why to disable assembly optimization" In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Q5K2vQoXZ6PuY8oYkee9mrA=Kr__W1yj1A2PhLfh7HgQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAM_a8JzDYmrp8z5ga3sD2dGnR_PNVhY1a72JpA=b6zUU0UbLvw@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1Q5K2vQoXZ6PuY8oYkee9mrA=Kr__W1yj1A2PhLfh7HgQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAKtE3zdfA5XHpx-+_KgNZ7BK6N+M5MmYRmUd+Bgb788w4dk3xA@mail.gmail.com> So good. So very good. http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/stack:sosp13.pdf Or - a different reason to compile everything yourself. SlowOS plz. -Travis On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 6:58 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko at leastauthority.com> > Date: Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:23 PM > Subject: a catalog of bugs, or "Why to disable assembly optimization" > > > Folks: > > We had already agreed to disable assembly optimizations in pycryptopp, > because there seem to have been a lot of bugs in the optimized > assembly code in the past, and because the added speed really makes no > difference to our uses, as far as I know. > > However, in order to explain and justify to other people (e.g. Debian > packagers) why we are doing this, and why they should consider doing > the same thing themselves, I just read through the entire history of > issues in pycryptopp and classified whether they were runtime errors > (and therefore potential security bugs) or build-time errors > (therefore probably not), and whether they would have been avoided if > we had been disabling assembly optimizations all along. Here are the > results. They clearly show that we should disable the optimized > assembly! About half of all the security-threatening bugs we've had > would never have been an issue if we'd avoided assembly from the > beginning. > > By the way, in my opinion the author of Crypto++, Wei Dai, is an > *exceptionally* skilled, careful, and experienced coder, and I would > assume that if Crypto++ has had this many security-threatening bugs in > its optimized assembly code, then other crypto libraries that also use > optimized assembly code also have at least as many. > > Here's the ticket to track this issue: > > https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/85 > > bugs that cause run-time failures > ================================= > > (These bugs are potential security issues.) > > * would have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/24 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/31 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/45 (three > *different* bugs in the assembly implementation) > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/67 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/84 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/86 > > * unclear if it would have been avoided if we'd used DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/65 > > * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/17 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/44 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/83 > > * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM (but would have been > avoided by using cffi instead of CPython API) > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/19 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/70 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/80 > > * would have been avoided if we *didn't* use DISABLE_ASM! (A bug only > in the non-ASM version!) > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/66 > > > bugs that cause deterministic build or compilation failures > =========================================================== > > (These bugs are *typically* not potential security issues but they can > be, and in any case they are engineering/deployment issues.) > > * would have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/37 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/96 > > * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/22 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/23 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/32 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/39 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/62 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/77 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/78 > > > -- > Regards, > > Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn > > Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep > https://LeastAuthority.com > Freedom matters. > -- Twitter <https://twitter.com/tbiehn> | LinkedIn <http://www.linkedin.com/in/travisbiehn> | GitHub <http://github.com/tbiehn> | TravisBiehn.com <http://www.travisbiehn.com> | Google Plus <https://plus.google.com/+TravisBiehn> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 7351 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/2a0191e7/attachment.txt> From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 01:52:09 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:52:09 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <05a284bf-5ebf-4c07-9086-a3c9fbeabe17@email.android.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> <05a284bf-5ebf-4c07-9086-a3c9fbeabe17@email.android.com> Message-ID: <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 09:46:35AM +0100, Cathal (Phone) wrote: > That is a problem with most desktop or laptop computers, too. I don't think "runs on a smartphone" is practically different from "neglects client endpoint security". A properly built and programmed smartphone is indistinguishable from a regular computer. indeed the hostsec rule is a generalization of the "browser/smartphone" rules, however this is meant for avg people, so i spelled it out explicitly, otherwise it gets misunderstood. -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From zen at freedbms.net Wed Jul 23 19:03:36 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 12:03:36 +1000 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSQWdD-uk-_DV=4ToLYN5W202curSt8mSkjHrBczTgnFqg@mail.gmail.com> On 7/24/14, Ulex Europae <europus at gmail.com> wrote: > At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: >><<http:///>http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-73511096050.html> NSA-proof? Is that even possible unless you: 1) personally pick up your phone off the factory floor production line at random? and 2) Reproducibly build all software on the device and upload your build? and 3) the hardware completely isolates the baseband processor and its os (unless there's a deployable FLOSS baseband stack I'm not aware of)? and that's just for starters. From dal at riseup.net Thu Jul 24 10:59:07 2014 From: dal at riseup.net (Douglas Lucas) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 12:59:07 -0500 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked Message-ID: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi cypherpunks, I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which discussed crowdsourcing research into private surveillance contractors like Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears some of those (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's also what happened to my phone. All of this is written up in my HOPEx report, which y'all might find interesting: http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ Thanks, Douglas -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0UlqAAoJEC+clbKIC3FxAY8P/266ajSxOjPAoFd5Jve5Bd1J HqSBzjO0DLU9kDXIw0s1qxxpj5owwHMdG6K7gzcpmIqc+WU80TOUC96EYCC+fyoT kU3DHvU1RC8VVR+6WS+y5Hn4sxkudiqumFaT8iaY5gePLQUaAvlTxy65FoydHH4I sB7+1wJVamIlygw3qgUMX01N02hs6FTj6gFkd5ZpRlGTrM/1cVsIPr8dq9ySzCAZ MehsJG8rX1lAVSqu+dN6qdkhmXO2EmSAPxcWT+vxnnAOi+t1wWth5jizrwv7sNnv JyB0ItuwPH/JGl3KxWbic666HkUIZkYVTmbwm8fd+ZMZ8zgfEmrHLitnwtlJEe6K l79VDwE9HuyRs8dwBKX2S1AhwccOLmbtgviLWynheJ9uJM0kmx4OLWSGCg0BRioF dkZxxh5W0ocVY++iR4Nqh+aAco71PHgcFLbTSrGT8sePUJhtUEMDoRSIvYE4n+hK bUEzTypcOnKvOm3w6o1iQB6mDkhIwEKB7czRwJdUTYuukC3QwsJ33fUM+Tgxh1y+ G63/bY1QvOwaoskdKtZR10f3+1X4Mo7f9k8qhtcKsi8Pep8KcK5AHmI1bPlbqqkn D+rGm2U3/2chR/zGkQzlD0HuF1SMAMhJKOdol7aUnd4L3YG+sV20c9bpFvAQhhEn +FkTgGIoE/yVewHRtauU =2a9F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 24 05:01:57 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:01:57 +0100 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> <05a284bf-5ebf-4c07-9086-a3c9fbeabe17@email.android.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> Why nott "Windows or MacOS" while we're being explicit? On 24 July 2014 09:52:09 GMT+01:00, stef <s at ctrlc.hu> wrote: >On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 09:46:35AM +0100, Cathal (Phone) wrote: >> That is a problem with most desktop or laptop computers, too. I don't >think "runs on a smartphone" is practically different from "neglects >client endpoint security". A properly built and programmed smartphone >is indistinguishable from a regular computer. > >indeed the hostsec rule is a generalization of the "browser/smartphone" >rules, >however this is meant for avg people, so i spelled it out explicitly, >otherwise it gets misunderstood. > >-- >otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1127 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/6677910f/attachment.txt> From david.vorick at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 11:17:31 2014 From: david.vorick at gmail.com (David Vorick) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:17:31 -0500 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <CAOFDsm3vW1+98FX99BYQE_mZJGbBqTUKBhLq-up0fiTav6QWAg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <CAOFDsm3vW1+98FX99BYQE_mZJGbBqTUKBhLq-up0fiTav6QWAg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAFVRnyokEKhyxtA=PFzk934ZYwjabSMQ6AMzHhX1WaNcdZQDOw@mail.gmail.com> Smartphones have so many problems with them, I really wouldn't feel 'secure' using anything built on top of a smartphone. From the baseband to the OS, there's been a lot of yellow and red flags raised around smartphones. Even a well-audited app I would still be cautious around. There may be nothing wrong with the app itself but I simply don't trust the platform. Smartphones are many steps at multiple layers from being secure. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 476 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/9f61301a/attachment.txt> From demonfighter at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 10:55:13 2014 From: demonfighter at gmail.com (Steve Furlong) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:55:13 -0400 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Message-ID: <CAOFDsm3vW1+98FX99BYQE_mZJGbBqTUKBhLq-up0fiTav6QWAg@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:06 AM, Stephan Neuhaus < stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch> wrote: > > So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a > smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app > has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? > I'd treat it as an indicator, not a certainty. All of stef's rules are indicators, where any one could be raised without the application being a problem. The more that get raised, the more likely the app is snake oil. It's like personnel security -- an employee gambling is not necessarily a problem, but it can indicate a potential security risk. And it's like diagnosing medical or psychiatric conditions -- a lack of empathy for other humans might not mean anything, but it's an indicator for psychopathy. Regarding the security app indicators, good job, stef. And I'll add one: "10000000000-bit encryption!!!!" -- Neca eos omnes. Deus suos agnoscet. -- Arnaud-Amaury, 1209 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1420 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/bcc65e0a/attachment.txt> From dal at riseup.net Thu Jul 24 12:12:25 2014 From: dal at riseup.net (Douglas Lucas) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:12:25 -0500 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked In-Reply-To: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> References: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> Message-ID: <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Oh, and here's the tweet for it. The article talks about my one-on-one with Thomas Drake in the press room, and he retweeted this. https://twitter.com/DouglasLucas/status/492131711451267072 On 07/24/2014 12:59 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: > Hi cypherpunks, > > I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which discussed > crowdsourcing research into private surveillance contractors like > Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears some of those > (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's also what happened to > my phone. All of this is written up in my HOPEx report, which y'all > might find interesting: > > http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ > > Thanks, > > Douglas > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0VqZAAoJEC+clbKIC3FxzLsP/RgJHE85A25f6+TmedxUdEOk U8MOSokhXni4uRP2nyhHjeHEhWQSPtuc/MTp44cYlUjt1ACNNsja4quzp8jh9crY eABKNRDw+X5PdjuzMGLjrZuBxTDSDu69HeWZAeeceEAZ3ve5A3a6Qk9yM8nGWikR I21avnYaOO6F4X9FiWE0Rq9ZdSlm79CUbhAQT3A+wMQzS+krVHitKiP4P8kXda3w gP6ByEl/oqIE/N4WOXfMJX68h8FP4pfdPFmCyveG/A9A+PKPf9EiGCNFNmFqoXU7 1kKqNBkf4ET4UE10cElNBICmTWGh4aKh7LJDKCtuqBT3gAqsSv33nGL/av2kqLce TvThaSJusarOs713WXDo0cyfkPAR1a/yD4OJm/9UP8Fj+Er7fMFCIHLQkrJC7EhK rhEVerSYuoUrx0/Yz+fC+MGLo+ymkunlEeFsIyysoJgPtZcvC2ty5nE6IdZ/l3hJ tXwquv/xJo3uId+aXNTVgZpvAVUcc7W6x7udrXvstMZ+s0X4Qv6W6Uk52yEhu3M3 wzvC4Oc59/0QldIXx6AcFcZlxKLJrgmCXP3gFTqScq7V3GOM5dRVbvsJrRnMf+O0 2nKBy9j9qni0c3++hhCSki/FeLHLYMkAC+Ls3+fv+XB9NlL3ojnOlhnxKI0Gp/4E u3M6gBVu5TPPu7is2c2D =RFAM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From komachi at openmailbox.org Thu Jul 24 07:15:15 2014 From: komachi at openmailbox.org (Anton Nesterov) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:15:15 +0000 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users Message-ID: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network Tor, codename TOR (navy)" ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000008 From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 24 06:40:38 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:40:38 +0100 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> Message-ID: <b8364dff-adb6-4b50-a4b7-732cdf01d07c@email.android.com> Very fair point; accepted! On 24 July 2014 13:55:18 GMT+01:00, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: >Dnia czwartek, 24 lipca 2014 13:01:57 Cathal pisze: >> Why nott "Windows or MacOS" while we're being explicit? > >I think stef's rules are really quite good as rules of thumb. I don't >think >putting "Windows or MacOS" rule there would improve them in any way. > >At the same time I find that the "runs on smartphones" rule actually >does >improve them, simply because "runs on smartphone" is a buzzword. It's >oft-used >today as a marketing ploy, and when I see it my "snakeoil sense" is >actually >tingling. > >I don't get that tingling sensation with "runs on Windows and MacOS" >usually, >because that's usually just a statement of fact, not a marketing >bulletpoint >that can be used as a leverage with masses today. > >-- >Pozdr >rysiek -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1342 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/afd1ba18/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 24 05:55:18 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:55:18 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> Message-ID: <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> Dnia czwartek, 24 lipca 2014 13:01:57 Cathal pisze: > Why nott "Windows or MacOS" while we're being explicit? I think stef's rules are really quite good as rules of thumb. I don't think putting "Windows or MacOS" rule there would improve them in any way. At the same time I find that the "runs on smartphones" rule actually does improve them, simply because "runs on smartphone" is a buzzword. It's oft-used today as a marketing ploy, and when I see it my "snakeoil sense" is actually tingling. I don't get that tingling sensation with "runs on Windows and MacOS" usually, because that's usually just a statement of fact, not a marketing bulletpoint that can be used as a leverage with masses today. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/684a5df3/attachment.sig> From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 24 07:04:24 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 16:04:24 +0200 Subject: Tails vulnerability specific to I2P, not Tor Message-ID: <20140724140424.GK26986@leitl.org> http://blog.exodusintel.com/2014/07/23/silverbullets_and_fairytails/ SILVER BULLETS AND FAIRY TAILS Introduction This week we made mention on Twitter of a zero-day vulnerability we’ve unearthed that affects the popular Tails operating system. As the Tails website states: Tails is a live operating system, that you can start on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card. It aims at preserving your privacy and anonymity, and helps you to: use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship; all connections to the Internet are forced to go through the Tor network; leave no trace on the computer you are using unless you ask it explicitly; use state-of-the-art cryptographic tools to encrypt your files, emails and instant messaging.” This software was largely popularized due to the fact that it was used by whistleblower Edward Snowden. Since then, the OS has garnered much attention and use by a wide range of those seeking anonymity on the Internet. We publicized the fact that we’ve discovered these issues for a very simple reason: no user should put full trust into any particular security solution. By bringing to light the fact that we have found verifiable flaws in such a widely trusted piece of code, we hope to remind the Tails userbase that no software is infallible. Even when the issues we’ve found are fixed by the Tails team, the community should keep in mind that there are most certainly other flaws still present and likely known to others. Our customers use our information for both offensive and defensive purposes to better protect themselves and others. Providing a wide variety of exploit software we help penetration testers effectively test network security and incident response teams. One high profile example occurred last year when Facebook used a zero-day vulnerability to test their teams response to a zero-day attack. The information we provide is also leveraged in defensive purposes providing companies with well documented research for use in IDS and AV signatures for previously unknown threats. We at Exodus are able to do what many software projects cannot, perform security code audits and find exploitable vulnerabilities releasing them to the public. The Vulnerable Component The vulnerability we will be disclosing is specific to I2P. I2P currently boasts about 30,000 active peers. Since I2P has been bundled with Tails since version 0.7, Tails is by far the most widely adopted I2P usage. The I2P vulnerability works on default, fully patched installation of Tails. No settings or configurations need to be changed for the exploit to work. I2P is preconfigured so that all .i2p TLD sites are routed through the I2P network. At a high level I2P traffic is message based similar to IP packets. All communication is encrypted end to end with a total of four layers of encryption. I2P routers (end points) act as cryptographic identifiers, similar to a pair of public keys. I2P is a packet switched network, instead of circuit switched like Tor. This means transparent load balancing of packets across multiple peers. I2P is fully distributed with no centralized resources. There is no distinct separation of servers to nodes, this architecture helps eliminate single points of failure. Demonstration To lend credence to our claims we have created a video that demonstrates de-anonymizing a Tails user: TailsDeAnonymizationTailsDeAnonymization ► Timeline 0:00:00,000 –> 0:00:10,400: Demonstrating IP on listening server, Turning on listening server 0:00:19,000 –> 0:00:25,400: Tails user visiting website icanhazip.com which shows the anonymized IP address 0:00:36,000 –> 0:00:49,400: Showing that we’re indeed using the latest Tails build 1.1 0:00:50,000 –> 0:01:03,400: I2P address being resolved, proof of concept malicious payload being delivered 0:01:30,000 –> 0:01:40,400: Listening server retrieves the Tails user’s de-anonymized IP address (Austin RoadRunner ISP) Note on Disclosure Disclosure of vulnerabilities takes many forms, particularly their shape is adapted to the landscape that the platform is used upon. In the past at Exodus Intelligence, we’ve felt that significant vulnerabilities have been disregarded and have not had the requisite exposure. Through appropriate airing of the issue, we feel that users of such security platforms may come to understand the risks in base-level trust. Even further we hope to break the mold of unconditional trust in a platform. Users should question the tools they use, they should go even further to understand the underlying mechanisms that interlock to grant them security. It’s not enough to have faith upon security, rather to have an understanding of it. If the public thinks Exodus is one of a few entities finding bugs in software, they are grossly misinformed. As is the case with all vulnerabilities we report to vendors, we do not ask for any remuneration. All flaws that we give to vendors are given free of charge. All accusations of extortion perpetuated by those unfamiliar with our business model are completely unfounded. As of publication of this blog post the Tails team and the I2P team have both received all the relevant details and exploit code they require to remediate the vulnerabilities we’ve discovered. Recently a high profile talk on de-anonymization Tor users was pulled from Blackhat due to legal issues. Their talk outlined with a budget of $3000 with some powerful servers and multiple gigabit links they were able to de-anonymize hundreds of thousands of users in ‘a couple of months’. Exodus decided to pick up where this talk left off by letting the community know that there are many other vectors for de-anonymization. The vulnerability we have found is able to perform remote code execution with a specially crafted payload. This payload can be customized to unmask a user and show the public IP address in which the user connected from within ‘a couple of seconds’. Stay Tuned Part two of this blog post will present a technical discussion of the vulnerability. This will be posted once we have confirmed the vulnerabilities in I2P are patched and have been incorporated into Tails. From stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch Thu Jul 24 07:06:03 2014 From: stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch (Stephan Neuhaus) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 16:06:03 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> On 2014-07-24, 14:55, rysiek wrote: > At the same time I find that the "runs on smartphones" rule > actually does improve them, simply because "runs on smartphone" is > a buzzword. It's oft-used today as a marketing ploy, and when I see > it my "snakeoil sense" is actually tingling. So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? Stephan -- From dal at riseup.net Thu Jul 24 15:32:20 2014 From: dal at riseup.net (Douglas Lucas) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 17:32:20 -0500 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked In-Reply-To: <c67e3372028df2a45a8abe819a6c88f8.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> References: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> <c67e3372028df2a45a8abe819a6c88f8.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> Message-ID: <53D18974.5030403@riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi jahlove, not sure if you're the individual (@CaptainKurtis) I just spoke with on Twitter about this, but what seems to fit my jouno/writer/activist use case, which is basically "I need a phone and the ability to live-tweet with pics," would be Replicant on a Neo900 or earlier for the phone component plus Replicant on a tablet-with-camera-and-Twitter of some sort. On 07/24/2014 04:51 PM, jahlove at riseup.net wrote: > I assume that your new phone is going to run replicant.us now, > which was recommended by the Free Software Foundation? > > Oh, and here's the tweet for it. The article talks about my > one-on-one with Thomas Drake in the press room, and he retweeted > this. > > https://twitter.com/DouglasLucas/status/492131711451267072 > > On 07/24/2014 12:59 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: >>>> Hi cypherpunks, >>>> >>>> I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which >>>> discussed crowdsourcing research into private surveillance >>>> contractors like Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears >>>> some of those (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's >>>> also what happened to my phone. All of this is written up in >>>> my HOPEx report, which y'all might find interesting: >>>> >>>> http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0Yl0AAoJEC+clbKIC3Fxu64P+wef8n3GM18rM2ZMP/ldTFZG btU2GA7zIWg8twYJGdZSsi6n6ckGERHAtKzhJaR1vr5OPoP58ywAz02GJATGf/Wn 5B0WfxygiH4lDebjsvC0ofTct5BmhsdtKBfWj/z7sC3hBjSoDt68iqc9nq7rO4c6 2ws2zu3C5MBQ4YmovfWm8u76k/RnUSE7SHzkXJBZPQB6MopOJKTqXqnOx7uQPjx8 +nAplL8DP4TbAxwvL4900BbFZ4Oo7wBvsR0zbND3u0FpKkvj6yYRshWZJ2r9Y77X SBC4FiMJZo6LyMQx7RTc3bFWiLVnsfTQVsZDRYGexbbrKPxXcKCRqHZ3d1fFC9hM tvwlhENIoZTejdtPK2c5lBTmRi9a2PXcIaCKBLaMeLhy6l8i8PUQ+pUvWNylY0ln OQLFTAo+P51zMxFm2OIcF0WatFMhsaMPZAwe2BxVgUFzkf+PQj6PucdjmEqNjGaH dU7qU8HvtDV+wNfcOEDCxgB8jGylN8SuF95MUZK6CJ0cwtljpH08+gn2GCLdRokJ Qhur6Dfotw6ls2da155MsQKlC8NrEI8JYqH09u1aY0sdUpaKxzbFKzQvADqAXIcj nBlGh7YWBN4RF8AnAquHmE9ZHHKvb/OJlMldEbTiS3RRCXyavf69M9r9t7gczp3N 6Nw1r+xMtt0ZuI10tl6o =hnkN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 15:13:32 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 18:13:32 -0400 Subject: Market for secure systems, ICLOAK puts Nix/Tor/TBB/etc on USB raises $95k Message-ID: <CAD2Ti299H8Ga1UeU0ph2omqwNA1BXgLYduP6KnyY86HGApq+3g@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 6:09 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 17:24:22 grarpamp pisze: >> Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] I'll fork this one off to the Tor folks... > Here, have a chuckle: > https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/icloak/icloak-tm-stik-easy-powerful-online-privacy-for-yo > > Hat-tip to all the TAILS/Tor people here. https://icloak.org/ At least it appears from the splashpage to be an open bundling of mostly open tools that are thought reasonably well of, ie: Nix, Tor, GnuPG. As opposed to being some new unheard of closed commercialware. Things like this could serve by dropping more 'crypto by default' on the net at the end user level (even if such users are their own newbie cannon fodder on a learning curve). And spreading Unix also helps shift marketshare and knowledge away from Windows long term. If my two minute read of this one is right, it would be hard to not give them some kudos. I don't know what amounts are typically fundraised and the donor counts, but $95k for something like this seems to indicate a demand for more secure/private systems in general. Maybe a million will sell and send some donations back. From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 09:16:37 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 18:16:37 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Message-ID: <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:06:03PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > On 2014-07-24, 14:55, rysiek wrote: > > At the same time I find that the "runs on smartphones" rule > > actually does improve them, simply because "runs on smartphone" is > > a buzzword. It's oft-used today as a marketing ploy, and when I see > > it my "snakeoil sense" is actually tingling. > > So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a > smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app > has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? it's rule of thumb. right? there might be exceptions (i know of exactly one), which strengthen the rule ;) -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From jahlove at riseup.net Thu Jul 24 14:51:19 2014 From: jahlove at riseup.net (jahlove at riseup.net) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 21:51:19 -0000 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked In-Reply-To: <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> References: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> Message-ID: <c67e3372028df2a45a8abe819a6c88f8.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> I assume that your new phone is going to run replicant.us now, which was recommended by the Free Software Foundation? > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Oh, and here's the tweet for it. The article talks about my one-on-one > with Thomas Drake in the press room, and he retweeted this. > > https://twitter.com/DouglasLucas/status/492131711451267072 > > On 07/24/2014 12:59 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: >> Hi cypherpunks, >> >> I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which discussed >> crowdsourcing research into private surveillance contractors like >> Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears some of those >> (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's also what happened to >> my phone. All of this is written up in my HOPEx report, which y'all >> might find interesting: >> >> http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ >> >> Thanks, >> >> Douglas >> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0VqZAAoJEC+clbKIC3FxzLsP/RgJHE85A25f6+TmedxUdEOk > U8MOSokhXni4uRP2nyhHjeHEhWQSPtuc/MTp44cYlUjt1ACNNsja4quzp8jh9crY > eABKNRDw+X5PdjuzMGLjrZuBxTDSDu69HeWZAeeceEAZ3ve5A3a6Qk9yM8nGWikR > I21avnYaOO6F4X9FiWE0Rq9ZdSlm79CUbhAQT3A+wMQzS+krVHitKiP4P8kXda3w > gP6ByEl/oqIE/N4WOXfMJX68h8FP4pfdPFmCyveG/A9A+PKPf9EiGCNFNmFqoXU7 > 1kKqNBkf4ET4UE10cElNBICmTWGh4aKh7LJDKCtuqBT3gAqsSv33nGL/av2kqLce > TvThaSJusarOs713WXDo0cyfkPAR1a/yD4OJm/9UP8Fj+Er7fMFCIHLQkrJC7EhK > rhEVerSYuoUrx0/Yz+fC+MGLo+ymkunlEeFsIyysoJgPtZcvC2ty5nE6IdZ/l3hJ > tXwquv/xJo3uId+aXNTVgZpvAVUcc7W6x7udrXvstMZ+s0X4Qv6W6Uk52yEhu3M3 > wzvC4Oc59/0QldIXx6AcFcZlxKLJrgmCXP3gFTqScq7V3GOM5dRVbvsJrRnMf+O0 > 2nKBy9j9qni0c3++hhCSki/FeLHLYMkAC+Ls3+fv+XB9NlL3ojnOlhnxKI0Gp/4E > u3M6gBVu5TPPu7is2c2D > =RFAM > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > From stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch Thu Jul 24 13:41:35 2014 From: stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch (Stephan Neuhaus) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 22:41:35 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <53D16F7F.4040003@tik.ee.ethz.ch> On 2014-07-24, 18:16, stef wrote: > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:06:03PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: >> So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a >> smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app >> has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? > > it's rule of thumb. right? there might be exceptions (i know of exactly one), > which strengthen the rule ;) Sorry to insist, but I gave you a concrete app, namely safeslinger: https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ Do you think that it is snake oil? Fun, Stephan PS: The original version is "the exception proves the rule", where "prove" is used in its old meaning of "test". From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 13:54:16 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 22:54:16 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D16F7F.4040003@tik.ee.ethz.ch> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D16F7F.4040003@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Message-ID: <20140724205416.GS6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:41:35PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > On 2014-07-24, 18:16, stef wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:06:03PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > >> So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a > >> smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app > >> has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? > > > > it's rule of thumb. right? there might be exceptions (i know of exactly one), > > which strengthen the rule ;) > > Sorry to insist, but I gave you a concrete app, namely safeslinger: > https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ Do you think that it is snake oil? unless it is being deployed for confidentiality defending against only low level adversaries (but by stating this i already narrowed down the threat-model significantly). i believe so. it is an app, nothing more. -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 14:44:21 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 23:44:21 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140724205416.GS6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D16F7F.4040003@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724205416.GS6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <20140724214421.GT6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:54:16PM +0200, stef wrote: > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:41:35PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > > On 2014-07-24, 18:16, stef wrote: > > > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:06:03PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > > >> So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a > > >> smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app > > >> has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? > > > > > > it's rule of thumb. right? there might be exceptions (i know of exactly one), > > > which strengthen the rule ;) > > > > Sorry to insist, but I gave you a concrete app, namely safeslinger: > > https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ Do you think that it is snake oil? > > unless it is being deployed for confidentiality defending against only low level > adversaries (but by stating this i already narrowed down the threat-model > significantly). i believe so. it is an app, nothing more. not saying that the research and the protocols might be sound. but even much more mature algos that are yet unbroken on a scientific level do not pass the rule of thumb when they're implemented on smartphones. all of matejs concerns apply. the phone is basically a huge side channel. not saying you can't build castles on sand, but their threat model is quite limited. just a few days ago i believe eugen posted a nice list of ios bugdoors. no insult to the product in question, its the underlying platform that's broken. -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 24 15:02:24 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 00:02:24 +0200 Subject: Streisand: Silence censorship. Automate the effect. Message-ID: <2073653.Jv7zRpqM1x@lapuntu> So, this has been floating in my vincinity lately: https://github.com/jlund/streisand Wonder what you wonderful people think of it. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Internet can be a little unfair. It's way too easy for ISPs, telecoms, politicians, and corporations to block access to the sites and information that you care about. But breaking through these restrictions is tough. Or is it? Introducing Streisand A single command sets up a brand new server running a wide variety of anti-censorship software that can completely mask and encrypt all of your Internet traffic. Streisand natively supports the creation of new servers at Amazon EC2, DigitalOcean, Linode, and Rackspace—with more providers coming soon! It also runs on any Debian 7 server regardless of provider, and hundreds of instances can be configured simultaneously using this method. The process is completely automated and only takes about ten minutes, which is pretty awesome when you consider that it would require the average system administrator several days of frustration to set up even a small subset of what Streisand offers in its out-of-the-box configuration. Once your Streisand server is running, you can give the custom connection instructions to friends, family members, and fellow activists. The connection instructions contain an embedded copy of the server's unique SSL certificate, so you only have to send them a single file. Each server is entirely self-contained and comes with absolutely everything that users need to get started, including cryptographically verified mirrors of all common clients. This renders any attempted censorship of default download locations completely ineffective. But wait, there's more... More Features Nginx powers a password-protected and encrypted Gateway that serves as the starting point for new users. The Gateway is accessible over SSL, or as a Tor hidden service. Beautiful, custom, step-by-step client configuration instructions are generated for each new server that Streisand creates. Users can quickly access these instructions through any web browser. The instructions are responsive and look fantastic on mobile phones: Streisand Screenshot The integrity of mirrored software is ensured using SHA-256 checksums, or by verifying GPG signatures if the project provides them. This protects users from downloading corrupted files. All ancillary files, such as OpenVPN configuration profiles, are also available via the Gateway. Current Tor users can take advantage of the additional services Streisand sets up in order to transfer large files or to handle other traffic (e.g. BitTorrent) that isn't appropriate for the Tor network. A unique password, SSL certificate, and SSL private key are generated for each Streisand Gateway. The Gateway instructions and certificate are transferred via SSH at the conclusion of Streisand's execution. Distinct services and multiple daemons provide an enormous amount of flexibility. If one connection method gets blocked there are numerous options available, most of which are resistant to Deep Packet Inspection. All of the connection methods (including L2TP/IPsec and direct OpenVPN connections) are effective against the type of blocking Turkey has been experimenting with. OpenSSH, OpenVPN (wrapped in stunnel), Shadowsocks, and Tor (with obfsproxy and the obfs3 or ScrambleSuit pluggable transports) are all currently effective against China's Great Firewall. Every task has been thoroughly documented and given a detailed description. Streisand is simultaneously the most complete HOWTO in existence for the setup of all of the software it installs, and also the antidote for ever having to do any of this by hand again. All software runs on ports that have been deliberately chosen to make simplistic port blocking unrealistic without causing massive collateral damage. OpenVPN, for example, does not run on its default port of 1194, but instead uses port 636, the standard port for LDAP/SSL connections that are beloved by companies worldwide. L2TP/IPsec is a notable exception to this rule because the ports cannot be changed without breaking client compatibility The IP addresses of connecting clients are never logged. There's nothing to find if a server gets seized or shut down. Services Provided L2TP/IPsec using strongSwan and xl2tpd A randomly chosen pre-shared key and password are generated. Windows, OS X, Android, and iOS users can all connect using the native VPN support that is built into each operating system without installing any additional software. Streisand does not install L2TP/IPsec on Amazon EC2 servers by default because the instances cannot bind directly to their public IP addresses which makes IPsec routing nearly impossible. OpenSSH An unprivileged forwarding user and SSH keypair are generated for sshuttle and SOCKS capabilities. Windows and Android SSH tunnels are also supported, and a copy of the keypair is exported in the .ppk format that PuTTY requires. Tinyproxy is installed and bound to localhost. It can be accessed over an SSH tunnel by programs that do not natively support SOCKS and that require an HTTP proxy, such as Twitter for Android. OpenVPN Self-contained "unified" .ovpn profiles are generated for easy client configuration using only a single file. Multiple clients can easily share the same certificates and keys, but five separate sets are generated by default. Client DNS resolution is handled via Dnsmasq to prevent DNS leaks. TLS Authentication is enabled which helps protect against active probing attacks. Traffic that does not have the proper HMAC is simply dropped. The Dante proxy server is set up as a workaround for a bug in Firefox for Android. Shadowsocks A QR code is generated that can be used to automatically configure the Android and iOS clients by simply taking a picture. You can tag '8.8.8.8' on that concrete wall, or you can glue the Shadowsocks instructions and some QR codes to it instead! Stunnel Listens for and wraps OpenVPN connections. This makes them look like standard SSL traffic and allows OpenVPN clients to successfully establish tunnels even in the presence of Deep Packet Inspection. Unified profiles for stunnel-wrapped OpenVPN connections are generated alongside the direct connection profiles. Detailed instructions are also generated. The stunnel certificate and key are exported in PKCS #12 format so they are compatible with other SSL tunneling applications. Notably, this enables OpenVPN for Android to tunnel its traffic through SSLDroid. OpenVPN in China on a mobile device? Yes! Tor A bridge relay is set up with a random nickname. Obfsproxy is installed and configured, including support for the obfs3 and ScrambleSuit pluggable transports. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140725/749b56a4/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 24 15:46:33 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 00:46:33 +0200 Subject: Market for secure systems, ICLOAK puts Nix/Tor/TBB/etc on USB raises $95k In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti299H8Ga1UeU0ph2omqwNA1BXgLYduP6KnyY86HGApq+3g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti299H8Ga1UeU0ph2omqwNA1BXgLYduP6KnyY86HGApq+3g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1760411.H31tA0UGxX@lapuntu> Dnia czwartek, 24 lipca 2014 18:13:32 grarpamp pisze: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 6:09 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 17:24:22 grarpamp pisze: > >> Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] > > I'll fork this one off to the Tor folks... > > > Here, have a chuckle: > > https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/icloak/icloak-tm-stik-easy-powerful-o > > nline-privacy-for-yo > > > > Hat-tip to all the TAILS/Tor people here. > > https://icloak.org/ > > At least it appears from the splashpage to be an open bundling > of mostly open tools that are thought reasonably well of, ie: Nix, > Tor, GnuPG. As opposed to being some new unheard of closed > commercialware. > Things like this could serve by dropping more 'crypto by default' > on the net at the end user level (even if such users are their own > newbie cannon fodder on a learning curve). And spreading Unix > also helps shift marketshare and knowledge away from Windows > long term. If my two minute read of this one is right, it would be > hard to not give them some kudos. > > I don't know what amounts are typically fundraised and > the donor counts, but $95k for something like this seems > to indicate a demand for more secure/private systems in general. > > Maybe a million will sell and send some donations back. I haven't notice a single mention of TAILS, for example; nor any pledge to support the projects they are basing on. This for me is a very shady business. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140725/db96b776/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 25 13:13:11 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:13:11 -0400 Subject: Fwd: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <201407250036.s6P0a4lO011484@new.toad.com> References: <CAAU2BpZ9fgVJEFE-E0SQqZzpUMf64ES7RgH2YJnnueq2CN3uWw@mail.gmail.com> <1A201DE3-2C6A-4F1C-AC4F-8EF8CB3264FE@gmail.com> <201407250036.s6P0a4lO011484@new.toad.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_g0UoG6axeffaVeC0qdR+RYC_Oq2zWGQxv7TZayJVp9Q@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> Date: Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 8:36 PM Subject: Re: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs To: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk at gmail.com> Cc: "justgold79 at gmail.com" <justgold79 at gmail.com>, "cryptography at metzdowd.com" <cryptography at metzdowd.com> > > For January, we have not received any Nation Security Letters this month. > > On the month you receive one, you stop putting such notices out, and sell t= > he now-useless business. > Yeah, and the judge and prosecutor who get your case will be > helpless before your clever skills at evading them, because they've > never had to deal with literal-minded people trying transparent > dodges to get around the law before. NSL's don't involve a judge. Nor even a prosecutor. They are an investigative tactic, used by the FBI (or the FBI proxying for NSA), long before a prosecutor is usually involved. The more likely it is that you will disclose a government request for snitching on your customers, the less likely it is that that request will ever arrive. Shining sunlight on spook activities is the best way to make them crawl back into their hole. > You will doubtless enjoy the same success as tax protesters do when > they end up in court. And shortly thereafter, you'll enjoy an > all-expenses-paid vacation with free room and board, courtesy of the > US government. Chuckle chuckle, just like the headlines about marijuana reform for decades. First they laugh at you, etc. But the joke doesn't excuse the iron fist you are trying to invoke to influence people. Mr. Kelsey, you usually don't fall to this level of "be afraid, the [government] terrorists are coming" propaganda. Ladar Levison, Mr. Lavabit, the last guy to do exactly what was suggested, is still out walking the streets -- and starting new companies that offer to protect their customers from covert surveillance. As often occurs, the spooks were less interested in smashing a guy who's standing up for the rights of the public, than they were in preventing a detailed public airing of what they were up to when they ran into him. John _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography From guninski at guninski.com Fri Jul 25 07:07:31 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 17:07:31 +0300 Subject: The small print on france.fr Message-ID: <20140725140731.GB3759@sivokote.iziade.m$> http://www.france.fr/en/terms-conditions.html Section: Hypertext links pointing to France.fr --- The France.fr site authorises the inclusion of hypertext links (including deep links) pointing to its pages. However, the France.fr site must be explicitly mentioned in the link's title. The SIG reserves the right to demand the deletion of a link that it thinks does not comply with the purpose or missions of the France.fr site, or, more generally, the ethics of a public portal. This authorisation is valid for any public or private site, with the exception of those publishing polemical, pornographic, anti-Semitic or xenophobic information or information that could offend the sensibilities of most people. --- Appears to me this is official french government site. From l at odewijk.nl Fri Jul 25 09:19:02 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 18:19:02 +0200 Subject: The small print on france.fr In-Reply-To: <20140725140731.GB3759@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140725140731.GB3759@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2r+f7JVqjDF0bpcWmqQqjLc-c1RXHxgdSEAv4P5PPvTSDA@mail.gmail.com> What's the point exactly? Everyone can make arbitrary small print. This one holds no legal meaning, just an indication of preference. Freedom of speech basically goes for hyperlinks too. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 310 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140725/cb05004a/attachment.txt> From crypto at jpunix.net Fri Jul 25 16:57:20 2014 From: crypto at jpunix.net (Crypto) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 18:57:20 -0500 Subject: Help me test =?UTF-8?Q?Alpha=3F?= Message-ID: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> Hello Everyone! If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to set up a FREE email account for you. Please note that the account is NOT anonymous unless you take the necessary precautions! Just contact me directly if you are interested. Features: * SSL 4096 RSA/SHA512 certificate with PFS enabled. Please note this is a self-signed certificate that is for encryption only. * POP3/IMAP supported - same caveats as above. * SpamAssassin learning SPAM filter * Optional YubiKey Authentication * Optional Google Authenticator 2FA authentication * Roundcube web interface If you have any questions or comments please let me know. As I said this is *NOT* anonymous! It's up to you to take the necessary precautions! -- Crypto https://www.digitalocean.com/?refcode=b90b690ca5bb From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Fri Jul 25 10:40:55 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 19:40:55 +0200 Subject: The small print on france.fr In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2r+f7JVqjDF0bpcWmqQqjLc-c1RXHxgdSEAv4P5PPvTSDA@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140725140731.GB3759@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+f7JVqjDF0bpcWmqQqjLc-c1RXHxgdSEAv4P5PPvTSDA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1738343.SKTv2gCDxc@lapuntu> Dnia piątek, 25 lipca 2014 18:19:02 Lodewijk andré de la porte pisze: > What's the point exactly? > > Everyone can make arbitrary small print. This one holds no legal meaning, > just an indication of preference. Freedom of speech basically goes for > hyperlinks too. Case in point: http://rys.io/en/125 http://torrentfreak.com/hyperlinking-is-not-copyright-infringement-eu-court-rules-140213/ -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140725/0882391f/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 25 22:01:56 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 01:01:56 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> > I don't see any technical/cryptological way to defeat the > proposed US law; it looks like a political problem that > needs to be dealt with by political means. Proliferation is a political means. Keep on proliferating, proliferate widely, proliferate fast, get all your friends and business on it, get the public on it, remove the capability for legacy plaintext, and embed and entrench crypto deeper than the Marianas. Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and give them your concerns about backdoors and your freedom/rights, your life being meta'd, recorded, analyzed and stored forever for no good reason (for which an interest in crypto and speech isn't one). Proliferate and speak! On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 5:24 PM, John Denker <jsd at av8n.com> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Today's Gomorrah Post has a long article in the "National Security" > section: > > Ellen Nakashima > "Proliferation of new online communications services > poses hurdles for law enforcement" > http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/proliferation-of-new-online-communications-services-poses-hurdles-for-law-enforcement/2014/07/25/645b13aa-0d21-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html > > I see no particular reason to believe a single word of what > it says. Virtually all of the evidence supporting the main > conclusion is "according FBI officials and others" ... which > puts it in the same category as the "stories" Judy Miller > wrote for the New Ys Times in the runup to the Irag war. > http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/international/middleeast/08IRAQ.html?ex=1121140800&en=76eddceb628af81e&ei=5070 > > Positive reasons for disbelieving the main thrust of that > story is that if the authorities want to search somebody's > bedroom, they can still do it; they just (sometimes!) can't > do it quite so cheaply. That can't do it without getting > up from their comfy armchairs. > > The article contradicts Bill Frantz's assumption that all > present-day crypto is ineffective. I tend to disbelieve > both extremes. I reckon any lock can be picked or drilled > out /if somebody wants to badly enough/ ... but this does > not mean that all locks are completely useless. > > > There is a companion article that lets the cat out of the > bag: > > Ellen Nakashima > "The government wants to wiretap online communications > — or in some cases hack them" > http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/25/the-government-wants-to-wiretap-social-media-or-even-hack-it/ > > Both articles appear to be part of a PR campaign to lay > the groundwork for a new CALEA-on-steroids law that would > reportedly require every ISP and every app developer to > provide hooks to enable armchair/pushbutton wiretapping. > > Before you say that such a law is impossible, especially > in the context of open-source software, let me point out > that most people on earth /already/ live under regimes > where use (or even possession) of an unregistered encryption > device is a serious crime. > > I don't see any technical/cryptological way to defeat the > proposed US law; it looks like a political problem that > needs to be dealt with by political means. > > Tangentially related: On 07/24/2014 09:13 PM, Peter Gutmann > wrote: >> [....] should be preserved somewhere as the standard response to the >> Rumpelstiltskin Defence ("you can't prove I'm using crypto/know the >> keys so you'll have to let me go"). This [imprisonment] perfectly >> sums up what will happen to anyone who wants to try the >> Rumpelstiltskin Defence in court. > > I am certainly not an international lawyer, but we can all read > the plain language of the law. Under the otherwise-Draconian > UK RIP law, the Rumpelstiltskin defense is explicitly allowed: > http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53 > > Also note that if such a defense is not possible, you are already > a criminal, because of the encrypted "message" below, which you > have already received. > a) You don't know the decryption key, although nobody can prove > that you don't. > b) You cannot obtain the key from me or anyone else, because > I destroyed the public key /before/ encrypting the message, > although nobody can prove that I did. > c) Furthermore I can tell you that the plaintext consisted of > 512 bytes of high-grade randomness that wasn't seen or recorded, > although nobody can prove that either. > > I encourage you to forward my "message" to all your legislators, > along with lots of similar messages. > > To say the same thing in more constructive terms: This serves > as an example of /cover traffic/. It allows you to say with > complete sincerity that at least "some" of the data you hold > is undecryptable. > > Adversaries will have to consider the hypothesis that I'm > engaging in some bizarre yet effective steganography, hiding > a tree in the front row of the forest. Nobody can prove /or/ > disprove this hypothesis. > > > - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- > Version: GnuPG v1 > > hQIMA9jh5gIisxa+AQ//T8x3vgxCVqq6cCNln4TW5r8H6JeHqD1txxEy+jOiybvb > mvdcut6uQQqu/eFkV06rK+1K5LoUWemqTpAgz/E7MKtNsvYv4gardebFLRDxgn3v > WW01mc6XKqH+xpDoqabDN+Mc2jeQGhDD+fBBCMCePx/ca8iJ1gjVL93A3L+2AVan > PJFsRsoCx8X/DoUpIQOqCm0XOJrS+anVTrSOdVSo4t/V4QF7yx+51yi4ro26eAz0 > 5vCm+afMQSMIvZcpK54LI+oWUITQGP8ZhD2+B5HsIUh9nmcZjRr5fK+edGe6tS3W > aam0pQHWrkmyyjfKxNVfxK/aujrboHVybF9sP0tN8wUhFh7Tdj8F1e5EtPppXB/p > DoC7O3SQ30HHCCeNSLMErMzsniw+fHmL6zoE/UnkAsQZ1HJvg/9OD/dxJP/BaMwr > RUwG73wKPBp9m5ROs0tRopBNFcRXtM6hg/1i9ZE8IcbZcsgfcGwUdeo4qbYvhtyR > XU1FfQRyIhW7KRXQeWFSmMS1AWYMl0fX6n02qTbTSmUY7bujdEpOH3Dz8ndSKsjK > q0IWmXXcCpc9OGbiwSRhNgbxQBVu2tZ4ntk8vC+deM9itR7CMo94p95gvZQ9H7dU > fTKHb28jel8Y7CL7MYfcXpeO/vZIsj9H5GnJc+pSOuY8ueR/rTauJZux2DlIrwbS > 6QGqzHz6PaJ4NqoeyL7IiMJDNM4panzYqa4/Shfk3fiTol4FDLCdXMtT3V6eiPOn > GKGjjpbZ/3FP9cJrepM5wuHaesWnyoDO96FYTmqNqgw31r3Cg5sn1JrL6hcguN1x > CHc7mu5yTrft98pjk5olWaCyvqco0OqK3aID+IAKVJgfJV/2FWZE8KMpw+NvJosn > g6UwwN4PMUpq+CGgPRyRx12RzyP8iFxp8J8D0nS8H+BMSOA/+E2Mny54zjFrDUsH > amzFM9QlwCIrBQJ50V+OwTDzCnQVXlsbIV9kH6YaZDKo7vFIuyi7myr6mYttbh5o > m6xgSNQMSLDabyvKQ9l1GX9pQGzR0KPQRR/yn/frQDLydz5qhVEWTwprwxwGSBa/ > lVjLWTsYqqwl1SErI/FfTqJuWGSZUWqy2kUOzTmi5DA+tOvbspaghO5Aqxim/emG > Sz0DoRcR74zgUNLAAzUN4aZIBxfsO9HSqIXq9I6fK4cT6VBMYKjaJh23Hf2qOiuA > Z2g5nl+oT5CDzTlzzIMHZmCTkEjtNDAK+lb6SBCp8ScHcjafcm/cO9gNMV4+EBks > PgEm1eutCEpOpGIOHjcsFV1ryZonB8U0VmbpsxqsDE1Y0l1u6bEUKTMeJoHfEeTe > Q4wdo5LxbKt4LGQACopwX4NNdfupdPNT2SyiGCu7Vh+0P78+IEewbpRetW1KpNg3 > MXWd7sWh2tnA9cRzPwYhvUtUsj0L/GXLOKO9bMH8qfivOnsp5lbRnr6KAKoqzn2L > 3g== > =OuR2 > - -----END PGP MESSAGE----- > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1 > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIVAwUBU9LLD/O9SFghczXtAQJedA//UoclobLIQI4cKNu2V/bNIxUxEGb71pXr > QCQJJJQgMbK0kAE9pf6uFldur3m3kDOtPeQEx8AUZ4pS7YEPkE8mDrPxeohYi4i0 > S1yp82EX3JEchZrMDgEveP4C8zqgLg38ie0idL72nPQo2o1D5BpfRFElVA72Z8A1 > 0A9ehua+B9f1g+QKo4wMzPqbfRsHIdOIRELkrniJfRfuIxLY6F4MuiIR5F1YLhJR > TlVjsVUqEFduulO8yBF4A/4QZ1x6QzL47bUYigJwft3YNwbKNshrL8YPhMSgbdjB > BQSoPf93h2RasxKczWalawmTbZaev4kIvBy3EV2S11oy85SqRkAHb/G4f0dq1xI3 > Nc5WTWk+L0Im4Zh0+lqXrBucVvstDsrwEvDRztbrkNaey7p4HKWq+0JQ8zGKxZeq > D4eQD/N89uZLnXV+Q0Gut1w0BHSn7jmYm7TiDiXwk9DBy49i88MYaHocjGtWmLUP > tTSdunXAtOVfRPTJyL47mgbxgsDAyAHFN3CfhmN+PcjaUvrPTvlJ7g6ObdCiAGcr > CEiqKU0QoZTQS9bCkXOeV5LhIvbeh/2P5Ft+4acAAG38oE4/VKJZ+ly49Du4HF6v > LEQFDFJ03WbYRysPIX3J1Krgkza0/wm8Oy0Og27RVfSpVrOV+hPzmgCMURRYz0yS > 21uL+NP/O+o= > =spOA > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > The cryptography mailing list > cryptography at metzdowd.com > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 25 22:59:27 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 01:59:27 -0400 Subject: EFF / applied law mailing list? Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. From oottela at cs.helsinki.fi Sat Jul 26 01:32:26 2014 From: oottela at cs.helsinki.fi (oottela) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 11:32:26 +0300 Subject: Fwd: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_g0UoG6axeffaVeC0qdR+RYC_Oq2zWGQxv7TZayJVp9Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAAU2BpZ9fgVJEFE-E0SQqZzpUMf64ES7RgH2YJnnueq2CN3uWw@mail.gmail.com> <1A201DE3-2C6A-4F1C-AC4F-8EF8CB3264FE@gmail.com> <201407250036.s6P0a4lO011484@new.toad.com> <CAD2Ti2_g0UoG6axeffaVeC0qdR+RYC_Oq2zWGQxv7TZayJVp9Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <fdeb7e216b663994be608ac27d44a9dc@cs.helsinki.fi> Are there any sources to the procedure how NSL's and other subpoenas / gag orders could be used to coerce certificate authorities to hand out their private keys? My guess is the risk for using root certificate of different company for MITM is too high: EFF's SSL observatory would detect it. I'm suprised there has been no leaks about such attacks: It's fairly easy to mitigate, transparent, long term, and extremely effective, even against PFS. Does anyone have guesses or information about how CA's handle their private keys? Are all certificates they sign for companies done on airgapped computers? How high are the security standards of these companies? Markus On 25.07.2014 23:13, grarpamp wrote: > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> > Date: Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 8:36 PM > Subject: Re: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs > To: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk at gmail.com> > Cc: "justgold79 at gmail.com" <justgold79 at gmail.com>, > "cryptography at metzdowd.com" <cryptography at metzdowd.com> > > >> > For January, we have not received any Nation Security Letters this >> month. >> > On the month you receive one, you stop putting such notices out, >> and sell t= >> he now-useless business. > >> Yeah, and the judge and prosecutor who get your case will be >> helpless before your clever skills at evading them, because they've >> never had to deal with literal-minded people trying transparent >> dodges to get around the law before. > > NSL's don't involve a judge. Nor even a prosecutor. They are an > investigative tactic, used by the FBI (or the FBI proxying for NSA), > long before a prosecutor is usually involved. > > The more likely it is that you will disclose a government request for > snitching on your customers, the less likely it is that that request > will ever arrive. Shining sunlight on spook activities is the best > way to make them crawl back into their hole. > >> You will doubtless enjoy the same success as tax protesters do when >> they end up in court. And shortly thereafter, you'll enjoy an >> all-expenses-paid vacation with free room and board, courtesy of the >> US government. > > Chuckle chuckle, just like the headlines about marijuana reform for > decades. First they laugh at you, etc. But the joke doesn't excuse > the iron fist you are trying to invoke to influence people. > Mr. Kelsey, you usually don't fall to this level of "be afraid, the > [government] terrorists are coming" propaganda. > > Ladar Levison, Mr. Lavabit, the last guy to do exactly what was > suggested, is still out walking the streets -- and starting new > companies that offer to protect their customers from covert > surveillance. As often occurs, the spooks were less interested in > smashing a guy who's standing up for the rights of the public, than > they were in preventing a detailed public airing of what they were up > to when they ran into him. > > John > _______________________________________________ > The cryptography mailing list > cryptography at metzdowd.com > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography From tbiehn at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 09:13:50 2014 From: tbiehn at gmail.com (Travis Biehn) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 12:13:50 -0400 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked In-Reply-To: <53D18974.5030403@riseup.net> References: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> <c67e3372028df2a45a8abe819a6c88f8.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> <53D18974.5030403@riseup.net> Message-ID: <CAKtE3zfBBwHnzme+_JR3mJ4FcxEpEFdORcghEJd3YrdBv-LF0g@mail.gmail.com> Well that's weird, I'd think it harder to exfiltrate data a la Hollywood where you can actually see shit happening on your phone's UI rather than you never notice. Actually, it is definitely harder. Travis On Jul 24, 2014 6:48 PM, "Douglas Lucas" <dal at riseup.net> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hi jahlove, not sure if you're the individual (@CaptainKurtis) I just > spoke with on Twitter about this, but what seems to fit my > jouno/writer/activist use case, which is basically "I need a phone and > the ability to live-tweet with pics," would be Replicant on a Neo900 > or earlier for the phone component plus Replicant on a > tablet-with-camera-and-Twitter of some sort. > > On 07/24/2014 04:51 PM, jahlove at riseup.net wrote: > > I assume that your new phone is going to run replicant.us now, > > which was recommended by the Free Software Foundation? > > > > Oh, and here's the tweet for it. The article talks about my > > one-on-one with Thomas Drake in the press room, and he retweeted > > this. > > > > https://twitter.com/DouglasLucas/status/492131711451267072 > > > > On 07/24/2014 12:59 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: > >>>> Hi cypherpunks, > >>>> > >>>> I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which > >>>> discussed crowdsourcing research into private surveillance > >>>> contractors like Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears > >>>> some of those (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's > >>>> also what happened to my phone. All of this is written up in > >>>> my HOPEx report, which y'all might find interesting: > >>>> > >>>> > http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0Yl0AAoJEC+clbKIC3Fxu64P+wef8n3GM18rM2ZMP/ldTFZG > btU2GA7zIWg8twYJGdZSsi6n6ckGERHAtKzhJaR1vr5OPoP58ywAz02GJATGf/Wn > 5B0WfxygiH4lDebjsvC0ofTct5BmhsdtKBfWj/z7sC3hBjSoDt68iqc9nq7rO4c6 > 2ws2zu3C5MBQ4YmovfWm8u76k/RnUSE7SHzkXJBZPQB6MopOJKTqXqnOx7uQPjx8 > +nAplL8DP4TbAxwvL4900BbFZ4Oo7wBvsR0zbND3u0FpKkvj6yYRshWZJ2r9Y77X > SBC4FiMJZo6LyMQx7RTc3bFWiLVnsfTQVsZDRYGexbbrKPxXcKCRqHZ3d1fFC9hM > tvwlhENIoZTejdtPK2c5lBTmRi9a2PXcIaCKBLaMeLhy6l8i8PUQ+pUvWNylY0ln > OQLFTAo+P51zMxFm2OIcF0WatFMhsaMPZAwe2BxVgUFzkf+PQj6PucdjmEqNjGaH > dU7qU8HvtDV+wNfcOEDCxgB8jGylN8SuF95MUZK6CJ0cwtljpH08+gn2GCLdRokJ > Qhur6Dfotw6ls2da155MsQKlC8NrEI8JYqH09u1aY0sdUpaKxzbFKzQvADqAXIcj > nBlGh7YWBN4RF8AnAquHmE9ZHHKvb/OJlMldEbTiS3RRCXyavf69M9r9t7gczp3N > 6Nw1r+xMtt0ZuI10tl6o > =hnkN > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3528 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140726/8a0af4c7/attachment.txt> From bascule at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 13:15:39 2014 From: bascule at gmail.com (Tony Arcieri) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 13:15:39 -0700 Subject: [cryptography] Browser JS (client side) crypto FUD In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKJxyh+Z6v3=UUCKFyTfkEQ8+9-YYjFFrvm9hOKXrhb+g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAHWD2rKJxyh+Z6v3=UUCKFyTfkEQ8+9-YYjFFrvm9hOKXrhb+g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHOTMV+8BFJM9v6vL-Q0j56tSimy5sFDV0wJuMoex6TzNfPpzQ@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: > Is surprisingly often passed around as if it is the end-all to the idea of > client side JS crypto. > > TL;DR: It's a fantastic load of horse crap, mixed in with some extremely > generalized cryptography issues that most people never thought about before > that do not harm JS crypto at all. > What's in the Matasano article is common sense advice. It may seem elementary for some. But you'd be surprised how many sites fit the pattern the Matasano post describes, arguing that they can provide *better* security by serving JavaScript crypto code over easily-MitMed plaintext HTTP. Here are a couple offenders... #3 Google search result for "encrypted chat": http://www.chatcrypt.com/ Not popular by Google results, but a similarly silly effort: http://www.peersm.com/ -- Tony Arcieri -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1710 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140726/033b5a27/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Sat Jul 26 08:03:46 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 17:03:46 +0200 Subject: Browser JS (client side) crypto FUD Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKJxyh+Z6v3=UUCKFyTfkEQ8+9-YYjFFrvm9hOKXrhb+g@mail.gmail.com> http://matasano.com/articles/javascript-cryptography/ Is surprisingly often passed around as if it is the end-all to the idea of client side JS crypto. TL;DR: It's a fantastic load of horse crap, mixed in with some extremely generalized cryptography issues that most people never thought about before that do not harm JS crypto at all. I'm not sure why the guy wrote it. Maybe he's NSA motivated? Maybe he's worked a lot on secure systems and this just gives him the creeps? Maybe he's the kind of guy that thinks <dash>JS</dash> dynamic scripted languages are not a real languages? Somebody, please, give me something to say against people that claim JS client side crypto can just never work! --------------------------------------------------------- Aside from that it's, well, fundamentally moronic to claim that something is "harmful" when you actually means it does nothing, it's also just (almost!) never true that no attacks are prevented. But, let's go with the flow of the article. Rants won't really settle arguments. Two example usages are given. The first is client-side hashing of a password, so that it's never sent in the clear. This is so legitimate it nearly makes me drop my hat, but, the author decides to use HMAC-SHA1 instead of SHA2 for reasons that are fully beyond me. Perhaps just trying to make things less secure? The second is using AES keys to client side encrypt. The author must've thought he was being helpful when he imagined the scheme for this. Or maybe he was drunk. "So you generate an AES key for each note, send it to the user's browser to store locally, forget the key, and let the user wrap and unwrap their data.". Somehow trusting the transport layer is all back in vogue. The only key-generation problem in JS is entropy, which is a problem everywhere tbh. If you really want to ensure entropy, send a random data blob and XOR it with whatever client-side best-shot at randomness. Whatever. The author bluntheadedly claims "They will both fail to secure users". In principle I agree, his methods sucked balls. He, however, blames it on JS. Okay.. Let's go on. REALLY? WHY? > For several reasons, including the following: > 1 Secure delivery of Javascript to browsers is a chicken-egg problem. > 2 Browser Javascript is hostile to cryptography. > 3 The "view-source" transparency of Javascript is illusory. Until those problems are fixed, Javascript isn't a serious crypto research > environment, and suffers for it. (points numbered for pointwise addressing) 1 - Yeah. Duh. What do you think of delivering anything client side? There's the whole SSL infrastructure, if that doesn't cut it for you, well, welcome to the Internet. (I suggest the next article is about how the Internet is fundamentally flawed.) I would suggest, however, that once your delivery pathway is exploited you're fundamentally screwed in every way. You can't communicate anything, you can't authenticate anyone, you really can't *do* anything! So let's leave out the "Javascript" part of this point, and just do whatever we're already doing to alleviate this issue. 2 - This is a conclusion without any basis so far (aside from being.. meaningless to a computer scientist. Hostile?) 3 - Then just look at what data was transferred. Does every crypto application require checkable source? Is any SSL implementation "considered harmful" because nobody is able to flawlessly read the code, no compilers are trusted, etc? Okay so that chapter meant absolutely nothing. The author goes on to try to defend his brabble: "WHAT'S THE "CHICKEN-EGG PROBLEM" WITH DELIVERING JAVASCRIPT CRYPTOGRAPHY? If you don't trust the network to deliver a password, or, worse, don't trust the server not to keep user secrets, you can't trust them to deliver security code. The same attacker who was sniffing passwords or reading diaries before you introduce crypto is simply hijacking crypto code after you do." A fair point against a single thread model. Interestingly the last line does absolutely not have to hold, sniffing (after the fact) and on-the-fly rewriting are worlds apart. Take Tempest of Xkeyscore, for example, they can't do rewrites. They need specialized programs for that. (Conclusion: nope, nothing to see here) The next chapter tries to justify the fallacies made earlier on. Equating a rewrite to a read, ad-homineming the JS crypto "industry" (and failing to distinguish operational security from actual security), and lastly claiming that misplaced trust is bad (which is obvious and unrelated). The next chapter claims SSL is safe, and "real" crypto unlike JS crypto. Then firmly cements his baseless ridicule by claiming that if you use non-JS crypto to make JS crypto work, then obviously there's no point. The next chapter "WHAT'S HARD ABOUT DEPLOYING JAVASCRIPT CRYPTO CODE OVER SSL/TLS?" claims all the page has to be SSL/TLS and that makes it hard. It's not hard and you should already be doing it to have /*any*/ security. Not to mention it's not true, only that interpreted as page contents has to be SSL'ed (eg, images don't need to be transported over SSL). So, point 1 has no merit against JS whatsoever. There's also a lot of FUD-like text that denies reality. Especially the assumption that SSL and desktop programs are somehow more secure. So point 2. (letterized for pointwise addressing) "HOW ARE BROWSERS HOSTILE TO CRYPTOGRAPHY? In a dispriting variety of ways, among them: a - The prevalence of content-controlled code. b - The malleability of the Javascript runtime. c - The lack of systems programming primitives needed to implement crypto. d - The crushing weight of the installed base of users. Each of these issues creates security gaps that are fatal to secure crypto. Attackers will exploit them to defeat systems that should otherwise be secure. There may be no way to address them without fixing browsers." a, c, d are, at first sight, all rubbish. b is a very genuine point however. With prototyping and the like it can be VERY hard to see what's going on. It's an often mentioned thing about JS that it's too powerful in some ways, and it can be true. The same goes for C and memory control. Next chapter confirms that a is rubbish. Chapter after that explains some basic Comp Sci about when you can trust something (and discredits something that can help in a lot of cases, any if you do it correctly (which is too hard)) Chapter after that rehashes the idea that you can't trust the environment unless you trust the whole environment, which is also the same everywhere. (I also refer to trusting the compiler) Next chapter is titled "WELL THEN, COULDN'T I WRITE A SIMPLE BROWSER EXTENSION THAT WOULD ALLOW JAVASCRIPT TO VERIFY ITSELF?". And guess what, the author agrees. You can indeed do this. If you're just doing it for yourself or a single kind of crypto you could also make a plugin for that. Which is what the WhatWG is doing with the HTML5 crypto extension. Then claims crypto is to PGP as programming languages are to Lisp, which is rubbish. The author then goes on to actually talk about random generators. Which are not always required, but who cares, right? Then Secure erase, which is only important if you expect the client device to be exploited. Then ?timing attacks? which is even more specific and can be alleviated easily enough. Then tries to generalize his claim to remove JS specifically from the equation, removing is last viable (but not definitive) arguments. Some hating on key management, which is justified but again bullocks wrt the main argument. (not to mention it's a problem everywhere, and it can be solved like everywhere) Some hate on people running old browsers, which has actually been solved by background-auto-updating by now. (huzzah for all the added insecurity there) Then something about graceful degrading. Which is fair except for him not sufficiently providing any reason JS crypto never works. (and not relevant). He apparently meant this with d. Depends greatly on the deployment situation, but in general it's FUD. "AND WHEN YOU SAID "VIEW-SOURCE TRANSPARENCY WAS ILLUSORY"? We meant that you can't just look at a Javascript file and know that it's secure, even in the vanishingly unlikely event that you were a skilled cryptographer, because of all the reasons we just cited." Yeah. Welcome to programming. There's absolutely no truth to this claim btw. Vagely referring to a large body of rubbish is not an argument. The rest does not even try to take a direct shot anymore. Something about how users that use 100 programs are more likely to find an insecure one than people that use only 2 or 3. He's the kind of guy that claims cracking and rewriting SSL connections is easy, whereas using AES for a secure "cryptosystem" is hard. I don't know what's up with this guy. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 10626 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140726/5d06efc8/attachment.txt> From zen at freedbms.net Sat Jul 26 00:12:51 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 17:12:51 +1000 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> On 7/26/14, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices > mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to > service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs > of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where > real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. There was Groklaw, but that is no more. I have presumed in the past that certain "groundwork" work might be useful for those involved in cases. However, pre-emptive action is difficult due to the number of jurisdictions. Groklaw built on the SCO case, which was a) widely reported, b) struck at the heart of the free/libre software world, c) involved big budged companies, d) continued for a very long time. A very valuable literary-legal resource was created by that effort (other cases were covered to some degrees). I would discourage self-represented defence in cases surrounding Tor/I2P etc, due to the potential significance of adverse consequences to the broader *globabl* free-speech network communities! Self-represented may be ok in conjunction with support from pro-liberty lawyers. This might be quite jurisdiction-sensitive, I don't know. But first and foremost, we have a duty of care to each other in this freedom-speech community, to not hide such cases from those who would be able to support, due to the potential community chilling effects. SO, such a list might be a very useful thing to set up, so that those who might "valantly" charge ahead in a case self-representing, might receive the support and the cautions from supportive lawyers regarding all possible approaches, etc, etc. Regards Zenaan From s at ctrlc.hu Sat Jul 26 08:13:28 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 17:13:28 +0200 Subject: archive ssl key expired Message-ID: <20140726151328.GE6799@ctrlc.hu> to whom it may concern: https://cpunks.org//pipermail/ -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From carimachet at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 11:16:39 2014 From: carimachet at gmail.com (Cari Machet) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 18:16:39 +0000 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> i would be interested to collaborate on making one On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 7:12 AM, Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net> wrote: > On 7/26/14, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > > Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices > > mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to > > service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs > > of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where > > real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. > > > There was Groklaw, but that is no more. > > I have presumed in the past that certain "groundwork" work might be > useful for those involved in cases. > > However, pre-emptive action is difficult due to the number of > jurisdictions. Groklaw built on the SCO case, which was a) widely > reported, b) struck at the heart of the free/libre software world, c) > involved big budged companies, d) continued for a very long time. > > A very valuable literary-legal resource was created by that effort > (other cases were covered to some degrees). > > I would discourage self-represented defence in cases surrounding > Tor/I2P etc, due to the potential significance of adverse consequences > to the broader *globabl* free-speech network communities! > > Self-represented may be ok in conjunction with support from > pro-liberty lawyers. This might be quite jurisdiction-sensitive, I > don't know. > > But first and foremost, we have a duty of care to each other in this > freedom-speech community, to not hide such cases from those who would > be able to support, due to the potential community chilling effects. > > SO, such a list might be a very useful thing to set up, so that those > who might "valantly" charge ahead in a case self-representing, might > receive the support and the cautions from supportive lawyers regarding > all possible approaches, etc, etc. > > Regards > Zenaan > -- Cari Machet NYC 646-436-7795 carimachet at gmail.com AIM carismachet Syria +963-099 277 3243 Amman +962 077 636 9407 Berlin +49 152 11779219 Reykjavik +354 894 8650 Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> 7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187 Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without permission is strictly prohibited. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3302 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140726/66a7e7da/attachment.txt> From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 15:38:08 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 19:38:08 -0300 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> On Sat, 26 Jul 2014 01:01:56 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > > I don't see any technical/cryptological way to defeat the > > proposed US law; it looks like a political problem that > > needs to be dealt with by political means. > > Proliferation is a political means. No it is not. > Keep on proliferating, > proliferate widely, proliferate fast, get all your friends and > business on it, get the public on it, remove the capability > for legacy plaintext, and embed and entrench crypto > deeper than the Marianas. > > Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and > give them your concerns LOLOLOLOL!!!!!1 > about backdoors and > your freedom/rights, your life being meta'd, recorded, > analyzed and stored forever for no good reason > (for which an interest in crypto and speech isn't one). > > Proliferate and speak! > > From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 15:38:46 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 19:38:46 -0300 Subject: EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d42cbd.0382340a.5232.ffff9d00@mx.google.com> On Sat, 26 Jul 2014 01:59:27 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices > mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to > service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs > of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where > real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. I doubt it. That's not how the maffia operates. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 23:01:45 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 02:01:45 -0400 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAOsGNSShxMFrh-tfKYu4w411mGXtWXTFqGN170+-OVvuOGb=7g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSShxMFrh-tfKYu4w411mGXtWXTFqGN170+-OVvuOGb=7g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti280D0tS_g+D8AL0j36v5PZbR9jPTiiFJDC46f_aU5D0Gg@mail.gmail.com> > Juan scrit... > I doubt it. That's not how the maffia operates. Maffia are solely responsible for their image. What better way to repair it. On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 9:43 PM, Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net> wrote: > cases I said applied / best practices... ok, even if that includes hypothetical cases discussion... but not intending extant first person cases. Though it could presumably be used to find assistance therein. > An educational/ literary resource would resemble groklaw it seems. A resource is not a discussion, it's a book, boring, static, and unadapted. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 00:45:20 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 03:45:20 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-ViPLrXvnnvVbcMXWm3yi8VF-2HMMj5RbBYeKhwL6GOw@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 6:38 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > LOLOLOLOL!!!!!1 So easy to troll. > No it is not. The truth, all multifaceted possibilities of such, is why we visit the seer in peyote hut. There are more seats on the floor available my friend. From zen at freedbms.net Sat Jul 26 18:43:47 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 11:43:47 +1000 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSShxMFrh-tfKYu4w411mGXtWXTFqGN170+-OVvuOGb=7g@mail.gmail.com> An educational/ literary resource would resemble groklaw it seems. On 7/27/14, Cari Machet <carimachet at gmail.com> wrote: > i would be interested to collaborate on making one > > > On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 7:12 AM, Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net> wrote: > >> On 7/26/14, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: >> > Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices >> > mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to >> > service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs >> > of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where >> > real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. >> >> >> There was Groklaw, but that is no more. >> >> I have presumed in the past that certain "groundwork" work might be >> useful for those involved in cases. >> >> However, pre-emptive action is difficult due to the number of >> jurisdictions. Groklaw built on the SCO case, which was a) widely >> reported, b) struck at the heart of the free/libre software world, c) >> involved big budged companies, d) continued for a very long time. >> >> A very valuable literary-legal resource was created by that effort >> (other cases were covered to some degrees). >> >> I would discourage self-represented defence in cases surrounding >> Tor/I2P etc, due to the potential significance of adverse consequences >> to the broader *globabl* free-speech network communities! >> >> Self-represented may be ok in conjunction with support from >> pro-liberty lawyers. This might be quite jurisdiction-sensitive, I >> don't know. >> >> But first and foremost, we have a duty of care to each other in this >> freedom-speech community, to not hide such cases from those who would >> be able to support, due to the potential community chilling effects. >> >> SO, such a list might be a very useful thing to set up, so that those >> who might "valantly" charge ahead in a case self-representing, might >> receive the support and the cautions from supportive lawyers regarding >> all possible approaches, etc, etc. >> >> Regards >> Zenaan >> > > > > -- > Cari Machet > NYC 646-436-7795 > carimachet at gmail.com > AIM carismachet > Syria +963-099 277 3243 > Amman +962 077 636 9407 > Berlin +49 152 11779219 > Reykjavik +354 894 8650 > Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> > > 7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187 > > Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the > addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this > information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without > permission is strictly prohibited. > From hozer at hozed.org Sun Jul 27 10:38:29 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 12:38:29 -0500 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users In-Reply-To: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> References: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> Message-ID: <20140727173829.GA22640@nl.grid.coop> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 02:15:15PM +0000, Anton Nesterov wrote: > It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of > Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining > technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network > Tor, codename TOR (navy)" > > ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) > > http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000008 Here's some press about it. http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/russia-announces-111000-bounty-identify-tor-users/?utm_source=o1&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=o1#!bnX9eL I find two things particularly amusing. 1) that russian companies and citizens would have to pay an entry fee 2) CMU dropped their blackhat presenation https://www.blackhat.com/latestintel/07212014-a-schedule-update.html How likely is it the NSA decided to embargoed CMU's presentation so they could keep the data flowing out of Russia via Tor, or does CMU just have a russian company they are going to 'license' this too? From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 27 05:53:51 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 14:53:51 +0200 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> Dnia sobota, 26 lipca 2014 19:38:08 Juan pisze: > > Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and > > give them your concerns > > LOLOLOLOL!!!!!1 Thank you so much for your concrete, well-fleshed and argued positive proposal on what actions can be undertaken. I appreciate a lot that you're not one of the people that just criticise any idea without providing ideas of their own. Refreshing. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140727/c6d12bfe/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 13:20:07 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 16:20:07 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <1406479353.3215.110.camel@terabyte> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <1406479353.3215.110.camel@terabyte> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29rp=OHUj+ocvVpgOfzC4Z74e2di+JioQH1qqPYStBh2w@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 12:42 PM, Benjamin Kreuter <brk7bx at virginia.edu> wrote: > That is probably not going to work. Suppose we lived in such a world > and the government established a "lawful intercept requirement." Ten > years later all the newest software and devices on the market would have > back doors, and only a small group of hackers and activists would be > using good crypto. Even that small group would have to use the > backdoor'd products for day-to-day things like banking. It's about entrenching good crypto and its benefits *before* govt's can react without needing to expend extra effort to rip out said entrenchment. > The government has a lot of experience with phasing out products, even > when it requires coordinating individual households. Analog TV is gone > despite the proliferation of analog receivers. Tetraethyl lead is only > used for niche purposes like aviation, despite the fact that once upon a > time people drive cars designed for leaded fuel. The government could > treat cryptography the same way if it wished. HD was better and opened spectrum, so people didn't rise against buying new TV's, especially for smaller cheaper LED vs CRT. Health was better and cars rusty, so people didn't rise against new cars, especially for cheaper and more fuel economy. Gov't wins when they offer something people want. The sooner you entrench something they want... crypto protection from 'the spies'... the sooner gov't will have a very hard time taking it away. Crypto is like candy to a world of newspawn Snowden babies... hard to pull once given. So start giving it away... https://www.prism-break.org/ > Here in the USA people are convinced that dangerous > criminals are lurking behind every corner Take those cowards you know out to the gun range and show them how to fix their house and cars. Man them up out of irrational fear and into confidence. People are pumped full of FUD, hard to combat directly, so tricky end arounds are needed. Anonymously pamphlet your workplace with EFF. > The importance of privacy and related civil rights are hard to explain > to people who never lived under the Stasi or the Securitate. Apparently Zuckerberg, Saverin, Moskovitz, Sandberg and others of Jewish heritage behind Facebook have forgotten what collecting, processing and benefiting from data on users can turn into. As ones who should know, why are they collecting and not out there 'explaining'? > the NSA. Again, hard to combat. Make it real for them... everything they do is collected, stored, watched... convos, pics, mail, a life of their expressed thoughts... without their consent, forever. Count the cameras on your ride home from work, the junkmail in your post, the ads in your browser. > You should write to your representatives, because that is part of the > power you have. It's also relatively easy to stop by local party offices and ask 'Hey, what are you guys doing about all this spying stuff?'. Presenting issues in person is hard to ignore, I've had good experiences with local official types. From komachi at openmailbox.org Sun Jul 27 11:37:35 2014 From: komachi at openmailbox.org (Anton Nesterov) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 18:37:35 +0000 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users Message-ID: <53D546EF.6060704@openmailbox.org> Troy Benjegerdes wrote: > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 02:15:15PM +0000, Anton Nesterov wrote: >> It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of >> Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining >> technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network >> Tor, codename TOR (navy)" >> >> ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) >> >> http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000008 > > Here's some press about it. > > http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/russia-announces-111000-bounty-identify-tor-users/?utm_source=o1&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=o1#!bnX9eL > > I find two things particularly amusing. > > 1) that russian companies and citizens would have to pay an entry fee It's normal, almost all Russian procurements are like this. Also, it can be only companies that have licenses for access to classified information and for producing wiretapping devices, I'm not sure it can be citizens. Probably it will be some companies like MFI Soft or Norsi Trans who already produce devices Russian mass-surveillance program SORM. There is something more about that companies https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/lawful-interception-the-russian-approach > 2) CMU dropped their blackhat presenation > https://www.blackhat.com/latestintel/07212014-a-schedule-update.html > > How likely is it the NSA decided to embargoed CMU's presentation so they > could keep the data flowing out of Russia via Tor, or does CMU just have > a russian company they are going to 'license' this too? Not very likely. I don't think break Tor costs just $111,500. It seems more like report on existing weaknesses. Also, Russian journalists found some more interesting procurements published same day by same agency, including tender for trojan ( http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000017 ). From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 15:01:01 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 19:01:01 -0300 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> On Sun, 27 Jul 2014 14:53:51 +0200 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > Dnia sobota, 26 lipca 2014 19:38:08 Juan pisze: > > > Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and > > > give them your concerns > > > > LOLOLOLOL!!!!!1 > > Thank you so much for your concrete, well-fleshed and argued positive > proposal on what actions can be undertaken. I appreciate a lot that > you're not one of the people that just criticise any idea without > providing ideas of their own. Refreshing. You understand that you don't have a leg to stand on, right? I'll make it more clear. What you propose is useless, nay, it is counterproductive. Of course you do not want to hear (or read) this. Your reply? You whine because (you say) I don't propose a better solution. Actually, telling you to stop doing something that is counterprductive is in itself a better proposal than yours. But go ahead. Get one more grant for your 'NGO' - bonus points if the grant comes from the pentagon! J. > From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 16:01:09 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 19:01:09 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] Browser JS (client side) crypto FUD In-Reply-To: <20140726185728.GH6725@thunk.org> References: <CAHWD2rKJxyh+Z6v3=UUCKFyTfkEQ8+9-YYjFFrvm9hOKXrhb+g@mail.gmail.com> <20140726185728.GH6725@thunk.org> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29iFBDyMZyLXTyHUAf5smHeu6OiSBYb7nZrj_CFsvK1=g@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso at mit.edu> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 05:03:46PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: >> >> "WHAT'S THE "CHICKEN-EGG PROBLEM" WITH DELIVERING JAVASCRIPT CRYPTOGRAPHY? > Somebody, please, give me something to say against people that claim JS > client side crypto can just never work! // ianG // It's like opportunistic security.. // It specifically defeats mass surveillance... This is a valuable thing. Yes, it's nice and helps. It just needs to come with better disclaimers. Otherwise companies/providers that remain silent on their threat models do nothing but tarnish themselves amongst those that know better. Such silence could backfire. Whether they get used as an bad example in security presentations, or something happens to one or more of their users they effectively sold (or gave) snakeoil to. > Like it or not, the vast majority of people are using some kind of web > based e-mail, whether it's GMail or Yahoo Mail or Hotmail, or > something else. Please provide link to your source that breaks down Email use by HTTP, IMAP/SMTP and legacy POP. And their crypted versions. > I think it's a bit more complicated than you're making it out to be. > Ultimately, the nearly all of the software that people run come from > the network, at one time or another. Even if you are using gpg > running on your linux laptop, where did you get your copy of gpg and > the Linux OS? Odds are, you got it over the network. The problem is the context of where in the network you got the software from, and who you're using it with, and who you're trying to keep in the dark. If your first install or subsequent updates are from your mail, storage, or comms central service provider, etc... that's a major and direct conflict of your security interests. It's why Matasano objects. You don't download your OS from your adversary. On the other hand, if you obtain and use the code independantly of your provider, or the code creates a disinterested decentral P2P infrastructure (Freenet, etc)... then you're in a much better position. You've inserted a layer of independance/abstraction. Similar to installing gnupg to use independantly... https://openpgpjs.org/ http://code.google.com/p/crypto-js/ You should be able to download openpgp.js from the code distribution point, read any audits, check the sig, locally load and permanently lock it into your browser from your plugins directory. And then mail providers should develop a consistant RFC based API from which you interact with them so you don't have to download whatever blob they claim you need. Directly trusting codeloading works fine for internal corporate environments. But it's a really bad idea elsewhere. Examples of careful differences in security model... Holds the keys https://www.hushmail.com/ Provides the code https://encrypt.to/ https://www.bitaddress.org/ https://brainwallet.github.io/ Browser addon (likely dependant on provider webmail scraping 'API': remember attempts to scrape providers that did not offer IMAP/POP.) https://www.mailvelope.com/ Standalone webclient https://whiteout.io/technology.html https://www.mailpile.is/ https://github.com/pagekite/Mailpile Standalone UI https://www.enigmail.net/ From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 15:03:36 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 19:03:36 -0300 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users In-Reply-To: <20140727173829.GA22640@nl.grid.coop> References: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> <20140727173829.GA22640@nl.grid.coop> Message-ID: <53d575fb.a677340a.4f27.ffffd0cb@mx.google.com> On Sun, 27 Jul 2014 12:38:29 -0500 Troy Benjegerdes <hozer at hozed.org> wrote: > 2) CMU dropped their blackhat presenation > https://www.blackhat.com/latestintel/07212014-a-schedule-update.html > > How likely is it the NSA decided to embargoed CMU's presentation so > they could keep the data flowing out of Russia via Tor, or does CMU > just have a russian company they are going to 'license' this too? Oh come on. What kind of nutcase conspiracy theorist would propose such a morally outrageous theory? The US governemnt and its employees (like the tor team for instance) are the good guys. You'll get nowhere if you fail to grasp this basic premise. > > From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 16:30:53 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 19:30:53 -0400 Subject: Fwd: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <53D54320.3080201@casparbowden.net> References: <E1XAWtJ-0001RI-KM@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz> <53D54320.3080201@casparbowden.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-hjX2oH0Znu6ni1-Td_Cz9bYCeDpfcWjWVfR6xN0+2ZA@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Caspar Bowden (lists) <lists at casparbowden.net> Date: Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 2:21 PM Subject: Re: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>, crypto.jmk at gmail.com, justgold79 at gmail.com Cc: cryptography at metzdowd.com On 07/25/14 06:13, Peter Gutmann wrote: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk at gmail.com> writes: Yeah, and the judge and prosecutor who get your case will be helpless before your clever skills at evading them, because they've never had to deal with literal-minded people trying transparent dodges to get around the law before. You will doubtless enjoy the same success as tax protesters do when they end up in court. And shortly thereafter, you'll enjoy an all-expenses- paid vacation with free room and board, courtesy of the US government. This should be preserved somewhere as the standard response to the Rumpelstiltskin Defence ("you can't prove I'm using crypto/know the keys so you'll have to let me go"). This perfectly sums up what will happen to anyone who wants to try the Rumpelstiltskin Defence in court. In UK law, there is a Rumpelstiltskin Defence (and although I am not happy with the result, I caused it to be put there and it is better than nothing) http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2000-06-28a.1006.27#g1007.6 (that's all there is BTW - not aware of anything worthwhile written since, grateful for any refs or cases) see also www.fipr.org/sfs8/bowden.pdf Caspar Bowden _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography From zen at freedbms.net Sun Jul 27 18:33:37 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 11:33:37 +1000 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <3893-Sun27Jul2014115301-0400-eben@harlan.sflc-vpn> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSShxMFrh-tfKYu4w411mGXtWXTFqGN170+-OVvuOGb=7g@mail.gmail.com> <3893-Sun27Jul2014115301-0400-eben@harlan.sflc-vpn> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSQojLdOc5NhP0uE7cqQvE8w9bg4BW7GGFP=iAgyTp+a3A@mail.gmail.com> Eben's emails get rejected from at least one of these lists. If there is a whitelist facility, his email addy ought definitely be on it. On 7/28/14, Eben Moglen <moglen at columbia.edu> wrote: > Yes, but please be careful that people don't rely on the conversation > as legal advice. That should be printed in the footer of every > message that goes through the system: This isn't legal advice, you > can't rely on it. If you have questions, get local legal help AND > etc. From jya at pipeline.com Mon Jul 28 13:30:12 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 16:30:12 -0400 Subject: NSA Systems Abroad Query Message-ID: <E1XBrWL-0006qI-Rk@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net> What is NSA "WB Quad System" for GCHQ, Amberwind (PL), TIGERFIRE (IN), IBIS (AU, JP), GCSB SSO Site (NZ): <http://t.co/AoBG9jyuAY>http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fy13-semiannual-report.pdf This is an NSA travel expenses report. Via Jason Leopold. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 317 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140728/69d9bd41/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Mon Jul 28 16:56:03 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 16:56:03 -0700 Subject: [cryptography] NSA Systems Abroad Query In-Reply-To: <E1XBrWL-0006qI-Rk@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <E1XBrWL-0006qI-Rk@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TR4i9Fs==QexGkbZNTrzmThSeSt=Q3hYoiVpxXuxoxJA@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 1:30 PM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > What is NSA "WB Quad System" my money on: WideBand Quadrature Receiver System (no doubt they build very nice ones...) From l at odewijk.nl Mon Jul 28 09:05:47 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:05:47 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <3 I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: * Exists on many hardware nodes that can be run by untrusted third parties, as the hardware is "tamper evident" and the "cloud computing grid" is self healing and distributing. * Can run programs in a way that geographic location is unknowable - Onion routing, amongst other features, causes programs to seemingly run on every node in the network * Cannot inspect what runs on it - the microkernel programs cannot read what the programs are doing, nor can programs contact one another unless they are instances (that potentially run on another hardware node). * Is fault tolerant, automatically scaling, etc. * Can still be addressed from the Internet or other networks You could run something like your Bitcoin wallet in it. It's really geodistributed, automatically fault tolerant, etc. There's no way to tamper with the programs running, except as specified before a cluster was created. Right now you're always stuck with an insane amount of local law, hardware issues (and features), fault tolerance, accessibility, etc. With this you could run a program in a nigh-perfect vacuum. Your program would be networked, but not in any specific place. Nobody can know what it does, but it can compute and it can communicate as it wishes. Depending on the grid (grids have to be manifactured in one go, checked by several third parties, distributed, set and forget) there's some pricing scheme or whatnot. But it absolutely requires a verified microkernel. I'm *very *excited to see that we're making progress towards it. If you're a secure kernel developer, Onion routing expert, fantastic C coder or technology investor, and this triggered your interests, please contact me! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2062 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140728/e1777e6a/attachment.txt> From eugen at leitl.org Mon Jul 28 09:20:42 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:20:42 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <20140728162042.GN26986@leitl.org> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > news: > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ > site: I'm on their announcement list. Good news, question is who's going to pick it up and build a distro around that. Anyone here use Qubes OS? > http://sel4.systems/ > > AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. > > Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). From guninski at guninski.com Mon Jul 28 08:26:50 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:26:50 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" Message-ID: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> news: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ site: http://sel4.systems/ AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Mon Jul 28 10:26:53 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:26:53 +0100 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <04f23237-6d4a-47a8-83f7-2c429cb2a8af@email.android.com> Theory-wise, a Turing-complete system can emulate any other turing complete system unless the emulatee has an ace up its sleeve; something unique to the hardware that canot be simulated without breaking authenticity. This is probably only *theoretically* possible with quantum computation, but it's *practically* possible with tamperproof hardware: TCMs used for good instead of evil, maybe? On 28 July 2014 18:04:05 GMT+01:00, "Lodewijk andré de la porte" <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: >2014-07-28 18:35 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > >> > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that >verifiably: >> >> verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO >> (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). >> > >Yes, it needs crypto. I said verifably because "proving" an >untamperable >hardware box (IOW: you can only plug it in, nothing else) is what the >spec >says it is, is, well, impossible. > >You'll depend on some observers, audits and where possibly physical >impossibilities, to show that indeed it is what it is. It's not proof, >but >with trust you can verify it. > >It's as good as it gets, but no better. I don't think that'd surprise >anyone. > >Part of the design involves generations. Eventually you'll have a >generation for which something is questionable in a certain way, >nothing to >do about it. Generations will slowly die as the hardware breaks and the >network becomes too small (has too few resources) to uphold anonymity >and >fault-tolerance guarantees. > >Perhaps a generation will be hybrid with blackbloxes mailed to people >and >satellites in space. That generation would be expected to deteriorate >fast >in the first 100 years, and then hardly deteriorate at all for many >after >that. > >All these different grids will have some sort of resource pricing >scheme, >that may guarantee a certain runtime, or may be subject to monthly >renewals >at new market prices or whatnot. It's a very interesting part of the >design. > >But yes, the anonymity profits /greatly/ from crypto. Interestingly I >think >it could well work without crypto, whereas hardly any other designs >could. >It'd lose a lot of convenience though! And P = NP doesn't mean crypto >is >useless, just less nice. At the very least there'll be OTPs! Then there >may >be (quantum) couple RNGs that can generate secure OTPs. I think >there'll >always be ways the newer generations of this idea can continue to >function. > > >> > But it absolutely requires a verified microkernel. I'm *very >*excited to >> > see that we're making progress towards it. >> >> Is it really a progress? >> There are assumption free proofs of False >> in most formal proof systems. >> >> Design flaws like \lor instead of \land >> pass the verification process and later are >> considered design flaws, not bugs in proof IMHO. >> >> Knuth quote: >> "Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved >> it correct, not tried it." > > >It's progress, because now all we need is to specify safely, or find a >way >to prove specifications. The rest is somewhat, maybe, experimentally >operational. It'll depend on how well we use it, but it is a step in >the >right direction! -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 4330 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140728/a3af5d33/attachment.txt> From guninski at guninski.com Mon Jul 28 08:31:16 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:31:16 +0300 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users In-Reply-To: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> References: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> Message-ID: <20140728153116.GB2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 02:15:15PM +0000, Anton Nesterov wrote: > It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of > Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining > technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network > Tor, codename TOR (navy)" > > ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) > > http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000008 According to my conspiracy theory, this is just disinformation to calm down paranoid Tor lusers. They well might be in bed with the american comrades. If the above is false the price appears too low for significant sploit. According to a Snowden leak the NSA wrote in presentation something along the lines: "We can deanonymize some Tor lusers, but we definitely don't won't to scare _all of them_". From l at odewijk.nl Mon Jul 28 10:04:05 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 19:04:05 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-28 18:35 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: > > verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO > (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). > Yes, it needs crypto. I said verifably because "proving" an untamperable hardware box (IOW: you can only plug it in, nothing else) is what the spec says it is, is, well, impossible. You'll depend on some observers, audits and where possibly physical impossibilities, to show that indeed it is what it is. It's not proof, but with trust you can verify it. It's as good as it gets, but no better. I don't think that'd surprise anyone. Part of the design involves generations. Eventually you'll have a generation for which something is questionable in a certain way, nothing to do about it. Generations will slowly die as the hardware breaks and the network becomes too small (has too few resources) to uphold anonymity and fault-tolerance guarantees. Perhaps a generation will be hybrid with blackbloxes mailed to people and satellites in space. That generation would be expected to deteriorate fast in the first 100 years, and then hardly deteriorate at all for many after that. All these different grids will have some sort of resource pricing scheme, that may guarantee a certain runtime, or may be subject to monthly renewals at new market prices or whatnot. It's a very interesting part of the design. But yes, the anonymity profits /greatly/ from crypto. Interestingly I think it could well work without crypto, whereas hardly any other designs could. It'd lose a lot of convenience though! And P = NP doesn't mean crypto is useless, just less nice. At the very least there'll be OTPs! Then there may be (quantum) couple RNGs that can generate secure OTPs. I think there'll always be ways the newer generations of this idea can continue to function. > > But it absolutely requires a verified microkernel. I'm *very *excited to > > see that we're making progress towards it. > > Is it really a progress? > There are assumption free proofs of False > in most formal proof systems. > > Design flaws like \lor instead of \land > pass the verification process and later are > considered design flaws, not bugs in proof IMHO. > > Knuth quote: > "Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved > it correct, not tried it." It's progress, because now all we need is to specify safely, or find a way to prove specifications. The rest is somewhat, maybe, experimentally operational. It'll depend on how well we use it, but it is a step in the right direction! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3465 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140728/e7368d40/attachment.txt> From guninski at guninski.com Mon Jul 28 09:35:27 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 19:35:27 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). > But it absolutely requires a verified microkernel. I'm *very *excited to > see that we're making progress towards it. Is it really a progress? There are assumption free proofs of False in most formal proof systems. Design flaws like \lor instead of \land pass the verification process and later are considered design flaws, not bugs in proof IMHO. Knuth quote: "Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it." From hozer at hozed.org Tue Jul 29 07:31:11 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 09:31:11 -0500 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <20140729143111.GF22640@nl.grid.coop> When you can write an interrupt or page fault handler in rust, let me know. On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 02:03:28PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > That seems suspect. Most obvious security flaws in C are due to > misimplemented C, right? Not the algorithms themselves? So the kernel > can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer overflows > and pointer errors? > > I'll wait until someone redoes it in a language designed for safe > systems programming, like Rust. :) > > On 29/07/14 13:41, Georgi Guninski wrote: > > I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed > > some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to > > on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C > > code invalidate the proofs? > > > > The haskell stuff appear to not contain all > > info about the C code. > > > > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > >> news: > >> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ > >> site: > >> http://sel4.systems/ > >> > >> AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. > >> > >> Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). > > -- > T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA > P: +353876363185 > W: http://indiebiotech.com > pub 4096R/988B9099 2013-02-06 Cathal Garvey (Other accs: onetruecathal at twitter, cathalgarvey at github, cathalgarvey at gitorious, indiebiotech.com) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> > uid Cathal Garvey (Microstatus account) <onetruecathal at twitter.com> > uid Cathal Garvey (Gitorious code hosting account) <cathalgarvey at gitorious.org> > sub 4096R/65B3395F 2013-02-06 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Troy Benjegerdes 'da hozer' hozer at hozed.org 7 elements earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul grid.coop Never pick a fight with someone who buys ink by the barrel, nor try buy a hacker who makes money by the megahash From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 13:53:23 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 13:53:23 -0700 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 12:57 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing anything. > Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the nihilists. anarchism is about autonomy, personal responsibility, utmost liberty. delegating what should not be delegated to corrupt(ing) centralized powers is the source of great harm and suffering across humanity. the heart of anarchism is opposing centralized control and power, whether unitary or hierarchical, in all domains of life. anarchism has the potential to be most robust and most just, in the same way that well built fully decentralized systems are robust against classes of faults endemic in centralized structures. rational anarchy, however, does appear to require a higher class of human animal than currently populates the planet... best regards, From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Tue Jul 29 06:03:28 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 14:03:28 +0100 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> That seems suspect. Most obvious security flaws in C are due to misimplemented C, right? Not the algorithms themselves? So the kernel can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer overflows and pointer errors? I'll wait until someone redoes it in a language designed for safe systems programming, like Rust. :) On 29/07/14 13:41, Georgi Guninski wrote: > I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed > some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to > on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C > code invalidate the proofs? > > The haskell stuff appear to not contain all > info about the C code. > > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: >> news: >> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ >> site: >> http://sel4.systems/ >> >> AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. >> >> Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/655ff37e/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/655ff37e/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Tue Jul 29 07:23:27 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:23:27 +0100 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53D7AE5F.9060106@cathalgarvey.me> On 29/07/14 14:55, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > 2014-07-29 15:03 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > >> So the kernel can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer >> overflows and pointer errors? >> > > No. Care to elaborate? I can mathematically prove any theorem, then implement it in C and segfault the kernel. How is this different? -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/807519b1/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/807519b1/attachment.sig> From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 29 05:41:38 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:41:38 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C code invalidate the proofs? The haskell stuff appear to not contain all info about the C code. On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > news: > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ > site: > http://sel4.systems/ > > AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. > > Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 12:45:45 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:45:45 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <72A00785-C141-4316-8E20-0331306AB9EE@gmail.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <1406479353.3215.110.camel@terabyte> <CAD2Ti29rp=OHUj+ocvVpgOfzC4Z74e2di+JioQH1qqPYStBh2w@mail.gmail.com> <72A00785-C141-4316-8E20-0331306AB9EE@gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29pSgeLpox1-CdCB38V=OuGCU6vDSYtzk-PtLK6wZ4AaQ@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 12:07 PM, John Kelsey <crypto.jmk at gmail.com> wrote: > On the other hand, mass surveillance is one of those issues that > gets a very strong consensus among the people at the top, regardless > of their political party--even if the public as a whole doesn't > like the idea This is because they are in fear of the people. So they feel the need to mass surveil them in order to stay on top of potential issues with their position that could lead to, ultimately, revolt. Why are they in fear? Because they are doing wrong, if not for their own individual selves, for the collective power at the top. Any true servant of the people will have no such fear or need because no one can point any finger at them... they serve, they do not rule. > if both big parties' leadership supports it, who are you going > to vote for, to register your disagreement? You will never, ever, under any circumstance, vote for (in the US) either of the two parties so long as they continually play into an effective one party system. You will only vote for other third and further parties, and rarely choose incumbents among such, unless they are shown to serve the people. You will not fail to vote such thirds unless there is no third candidate. A vote for Dem/Rep (in US) is an obviously wasted vote supporting maintenance of power, the effective 'one party' system... not servants. >> Here in the USA people are convinced that dangerous >> criminals are lurking behind every corner > I don't think this is quite right. Media focus on fear and outrage > because they sell papers and draw eyeballs, and they're easy to do. It is exactly right. Only reason media focus wins is because sheep eyeballs believe and flock to it. It is self reinforcing. Media is especially guilty of choosing to profiteer from these sheep rather than pursue real journalism. You must break that bullshit feedback loop. Hope and Change... lol. From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 29 06:55:38 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:55:38 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-29 15:03 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > So the kernel can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer > overflows and pointer errors? > No. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 583 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/1bd12f25/attachment.txt> From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 12:57:11 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:57:11 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_mdy7kbt=zEDGvfTM5fKoHr=8kTHiZcXaVfFZmVNyO7w@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 6:01 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > You whine because (you say) I don't propose a > better solution. Actually, telling you to stop doing something > that is counterprductive is in itself a better proposal Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing anything. Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Tue Jul 29 07:58:25 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:58:25 +0100 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729143111.GF22640@nl.grid.coop> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> <20140729143111.GF22640@nl.grid.coop> Message-ID: <53D7B691.4060107@cathalgarvey.me> Lol, I haven't even written "hello world" in it yet, but I believe this is exactly the sort of future use-case Rust is for. Perhaps I'm mistaken, but surely someone's dreamt up a more modern take on C with memory safety that can be used instead? On 29/07/14 15:31, Troy Benjegerdes wrote: > When you can write an interrupt or page fault handler in rust, let > me know. > > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 02:03:28PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: >> That seems suspect. Most obvious security flaws in C are due to >> misimplemented C, right? Not the algorithms themselves? So the kernel >> can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer overflows >> and pointer errors? >> >> I'll wait until someone redoes it in a language designed for safe >> systems programming, like Rust. :) >> >> On 29/07/14 13:41, Georgi Guninski wrote: >>> I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed >>> some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to >>> on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C >>> code invalidate the proofs? >>> >>> The haskell stuff appear to not contain all >>> info about the C code. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: >>>> news: >>>> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ >>>> site: >>>> http://sel4.systems/ >>>> >>>> AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. >>>> >>>> Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). >> >> -- >> T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA >> P: +353876363185 >> W: http://indiebiotech.com > >> pub 4096R/988B9099 2013-02-06 Cathal Garvey (Other accs: onetruecathal at twitter, cathalgarvey at github, cathalgarvey at gitorious, indiebiotech.com) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> >> uid Cathal Garvey (Microstatus account) <onetruecathal at twitter.com> >> uid Cathal Garvey (Gitorious code hosting account) <cathalgarvey at gitorious.org> >> sub 4096R/65B3395F 2013-02-06 > > > > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/f8c88359/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/f8c88359/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 13:07:09 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 16:07:09 -0400 Subject: Help me test Alpha? In-Reply-To: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> References: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28wvbpded_rz2gHL9H0yWHdkJ-Myq7N0ww-hhuCt8=-zA@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 7:57 PM, Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: > If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to set up a > Features: Do you offer a long term proposal to the mailsphere for this service? What is its purpose, intended goals, backing, security/compliance posture/plan, ethic, etc. From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 13:10:29 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 16:10:29 -0400 Subject: Help me test Alpha? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti28wvbpded_rz2gHL9H0yWHdkJ-Myq7N0ww-hhuCt8=-zA@mail.gmail.com> References: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> <CAD2Ti28wvbpded_rz2gHL9H0yWHdkJ-Myq7N0ww-hhuCt8=-zA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29CZz3qi7cBq7Km_LVb5v1mCDXTbb6EiVp0WU_fYu82gQ@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 7:57 PM, Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: > If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to set up a > Features: Do you offer a long term proposal to the mailsphere for this service? What is its purpose, intended goals, backing, security/compliance posture/plan (to the user and service), its ethic, politik, etc. From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 29 07:14:13 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 17:14:13 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 07:04:05PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > 2014-07-28 18:35 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > > > > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: > > > > verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO > > (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). > > > > Yes, it needs crypto. I said verifably because "proving" an untamperable > hardware box (IOW: you can only plug it in, nothing else) is what the spec > says it is, is, well, impossible. > Don't think what you wish is possible, but don't mind you dreaming :) IIRC _theoretically_ it is possible to run trusted program on untrusted hardware with the catch that you need some additional "proof" - this was a paper can't find at the moment. From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 29 07:23:39 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 17:23:39 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140729142339.GC2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 03:55:38PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > 2014-07-29 15:03 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > > > So the kernel can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer > > overflows and pointer errors? > > > > No. Yes, I have such kernel and proof ;) From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 29 09:08:04 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 18:08:04 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> > > Care to elaborate? I can mathematically prove any theorem, then > implement it in C and segfault the kernel. How is this different? These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it will work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as specified. But of course the specification may also contain bugs as opposed to the human-intended specification. But this is also something they explain, just read about their proofs and proof system. (This is all IIRC from last time I checked it, which is a pretty while ago) 2014-07-29 16:14 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 07:04:05PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > > 2014-07-28 18:35 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > > > > > > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: > > > > > > verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO > > > (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). > > > > > > > Yes, it needs crypto. I said verifably because "proving" an untamperable > > hardware box (IOW: you can only plug it in, nothing else) is what the > spec > > says it is, is, well, impossible. > > > > Don't think what you wish is possible, but > don't mind you dreaming :) > Aha, but it is possible :) Dream along if you like! IIRC _theoretically_ it is possible to run > trusted program on untrusted hardware > with the catch that you need some additional > "proof" - this was a paper can't find at the > moment. > I think you're talking about trusted computing, and I'm not talking about trusted computing :). I've seen some examples of trusted computing but the operation set was always not Turing complete. It might work, actually, but I don't see how. The system I'm talking about it not just a software system. It also involves hardware. The hardware will be created centrally, in batches. Probably by a third party and certainly checked by several independent observers to make sure it goes according to an open sourced specification. The devices from those batches can be plugged in and maintained by untrusted parties. IOW: they're shipped off to individuals who'll plug them in anywhere. The devices are tamper-proofed to such an extend that that is possible without exposing the sensitive data kept on them. The software that (as verified by the third parties present in manufacture) runs on the devices cannot snoop on the programs running on the system. The devices network together, likely over the Internet but maybe also radio. They Onion route all traffic. Etc. etc. Programs run on them but they cannot know what the program is doing. They're not updateable. They will all slowly fail and to make sure there's still places you can run your software there is generations. So a next batch forms a different computing grid. I'm repeating bits and peaces, but I want to be sure that you can see that it's a hardware design made useful by a software solution to fault proofness and program "location". -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 4661 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/3c39b33d/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 29 09:36:19 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 18:36:19 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2r++cKdMmxatoEM2WpRsUbqvRZyEFZUSEkK2ABamTTFw8w@mail.gmail.com> On Jul 29, 2014 6:14 PM, "Georgi Guninski" <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: > > >These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the > >sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we > >said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it will > >work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as > >specified. > > By browsing the proofs, I have the impression > they don't depend on the C code (and Isabelle > parsing C appears not very trivial, though > possible). > > If I backdoor the C code of the kernel, will > the proof fail? Isn't that the whole idea? It would really change the thing up if there's a backdoor! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 939 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/a8dd3c4c/attachment.txt> From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 29 09:14:18 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 19:14:18 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> >These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the >sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we >said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it will >work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as >specified. By browsing the proofs, I have the impression they don't depend on the C code (and Isabelle parsing C appears not very trivial, though possible). If I backdoor the C code of the kernel, will the proof fail? From juan.g71 at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 15:23:18 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 19:23:18 -0300 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_mdy7kbt=zEDGvfTM5fKoHr=8kTHiZcXaVfFZmVNyO7w@mail.gmail.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> <CAD2Ti2_mdy7kbt=zEDGvfTM5fKoHr=8kTHiZcXaVfFZmVNyO7w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d81d98.538f3a0a.6c3f.1c78@mx.google.com> On Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:57:11 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 6:01 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > > You whine because (you say) I don't propose a > > better solution. Actually, telling you to stop doing > > something that is counterprductive is in itself a better proposal > > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing anything. > Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. You know, apart from the theoretical/logical (and moral) case for anarchism, I also have a less principled remark to make. Actually it's a rather pragmatic, 'realistic' and utilitarian remark : I wouldn't object too much to reformism/gradualism IF it really worked. But if anything, and as matter of cold hard fact, reformism seems to work against freedom. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 15:48:56 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 19:48:56 -0300 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d82395.c8973a0a.3735.24e1@mx.google.com> On Tue, 29 Jul 2014 13:53:23 -0700 coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 12:57 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > > ... > > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing > > anything. Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. > > authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the > nihilists. > > anarchism is about autonomy, personal responsibility, utmost liberty. > delegating what should not be delegated to corrupt(ing) centralized > powers is the source of great harm and suffering across humanity. the > heart of anarchism is opposing centralized control and power, whether > unitary or hierarchical, in all domains of life. > > anarchism has the potential to be most robust and most just, in the > same way that well built fully decentralized systems are robust > against classes of faults endemic in centralized structures. > > rational anarchy, however, does appear to require a higher class of > human animal than currently populates the planet... > "does appear to require a higher class of human animal" Maybe so. But I'm sure you know the next few lines in the play =P If 'humans' are unable to solve their political problems by means of individual cooperation, then a HUMAN and coercitive government is going to make matters worse. People can't actually govern themselves but they can elect other PEOPLE to...governm them. And delegate to their masters an ability they don't have! Now that's some Pristine logic! Sorry, gotta run. Something is burning! (I'm glad I have a few gallons of gas to put the fire out) > > best regards, From sean at alexan.org Tue Jul 29 17:41:00 2014 From: sean at alexan.org (Sean Alexandre) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 20:41:00 -0400 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <53d82395.c8973a0a.3735.24e1@mx.google.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> <53d82395.c8973a0a.3735.24e1@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20140730004100.GA8948@tuzo> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 07:48:56PM -0300, Juan wrote: > On Tue, 29 Jul 2014 13:53:23 -0700 > coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 12:57 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > > > ... > > > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > > > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing > > > anything. Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. > > > > authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the > > nihilists. > > > > anarchism is about autonomy, personal responsibility, utmost liberty. > > delegating what should not be delegated to corrupt(ing) centralized > > powers is the source of great harm and suffering across humanity. the > > heart of anarchism is opposing centralized control and power, whether > > unitary or hierarchical, in all domains of life. > > > > anarchism has the potential to be most robust and most just, in the > > same way that well built fully decentralized systems are robust > > against classes of faults endemic in centralized structures. > > > > rational anarchy, however, does appear to require a higher class of > > human animal than currently populates the planet... > > > > "does appear to require a higher class of human animal" > > Maybe so. But I'm sure you know the next few lines in the play > =P > > If 'humans' are unable to solve their political problems by > means of individual cooperation, then a HUMAN and coercitive > government is going to make matters worse. > > People can't actually govern themselves but they can elect > other PEOPLE to...governm them. And delegate to their masters > an ability they don't have! Now that's some Pristine logic! > > > Sorry, gotta run. Something is burning! (I'm glad I have a few > gallons of gas to put the fire out) And a great zine on all this is: Life Without Law -- An Introduction to Anarchist Politics http://www.tangledwilderness.org/life-without-law/ From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 18:38:56 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 21:38:56 -0400 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29TZ47yRXaLnufR3Y4-kbrRqMo3AYiT0G3YbwPF5FuRQg@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 4:53 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the nihilists. Being relatively closely related / along the same line in some areas, I do often mash them up. Anarchism surely more popularly known/studied than political nihilism. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 19:32:32 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 23:32:32 -0300 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29TZ47yRXaLnufR3Y4-kbrRqMo3AYiT0G3YbwPF5FuRQg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti29TZ47yRXaLnufR3Y4-kbrRqMo3AYiT0G3YbwPF5FuRQg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d857fe.27bb340a.71ef.3e79@mx.google.com> On Tue, 29 Jul 2014 21:38:56 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 4:53 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > > authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the > > nihilists. > > Being relatively closely related / along the same line in > some areas, >I do often mash them up. Anarchism surely > more popularly known/studied than political nihilism. First time I come accross the term 'politica nihilism' google "political nihilism" - About 9,500 results wikitrash "Political nihilism is a branch of nihilism that follows the characteristic nihilist's rejection of non-rationalized or non-proven assertions," Hm. Now I just learnt that "nihilism" actually means something like rationalism??? Sounds off... The way you used "nihilism" in your previous message you seemed to be referring to the philosophy(?) of not "giving a damn about anything", "rejecting any moral value", et cetera. And equating political anarchy (voluntary organization) with what's ordinary known as nihilism is nonsense. This "political nihilism" thing seems like some ad hoc term, or maybe some new 'intelectual' 'fashion' or something, I personally don't find much value in introducing more confusing vocabulary... From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 23:43:35 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 23:43:35 -0700 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <53d857fe.27bb340a.71ef.3e79@mx.google.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti29TZ47yRXaLnufR3Y4-kbrRqMo3AYiT0G3YbwPF5FuRQg@mail.gmail.com> <53d857fe.27bb340a.71ef.3e79@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SN46qu2aj-drRfUQb-sS6crkR9Qx4zuzQWpjm3DRUDzQ@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 7:32 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > First time I come accross the term 'politica nihilism' i find absurdism the proper ism-edit-distance betwixt existentialism and nihilism, to be honest. ... leave political plebicites to the bloviating bourgeoisie ;) From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 05:12:17 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 05:12:17 -0700 Subject: Update your Tors - Tor security advisory: "relay early" traffic confirmation attack Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SJYCZWWgZcZsbHcq72W1JcU7kvcau8aPxCuO=+tzn+vg@mail.gmail.com> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack [see also release notes per below] ''' On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks. The attacking relays joined the network on January 30 2014, and we removed them from the network on July 4. While we don't know when they started doing the attack, users who operated or accessed hidden services from early February through July 4 should assume they were affected. . . . Relays should upgrade to a recent Tor release (0.2.4.23 or 0.2.5.6-alpha), to close the particular protocol vulnerability the attackers used — but remember that preventing traffic confirmation in general remains an open research problem. Clients that upgrade (once new Tor Browser releases are ready) will take another step towards limiting the number of entry guards that are in a position to see their traffic, thus reducing the damage from future attacks like this one. Hidden service operators should consider changing the location of their hidden service. From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 05:25:23 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 05:25:23 -0700 Subject: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22 Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SbY1P3mAi7m4etQ8cwHu1LW0_tJAR_5OF-GG9UX-oUxw@mail.gmail.com> per hddupe some many days hence, [0] requesting public mirrors post-con of copied volumes for Cryptome and other archives, also to be mirrored on Cryptome and other non-affiliated onions. the five deep cryptome'ing petabytes future metropolis mesh near at hand!.... clogging signals directorate capacities like darth cheney's arterial plaque butter, . . . 0. "DEF CON media hard drive duping station - six 1:11 duplication towers / 3 x 4TB mirror tracks (BLUE, GREEN, ORANGE)" - https://defcon.org/html/defcon-22/dc-22-news.html#dc22hddupe From crypto at jpunix.net Wed Jul 30 04:04:03 2014 From: crypto at jpunix.net (Crypto) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:04:03 -0500 Subject: Help me test Alpha? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29CZz3qi7cBq7Km_LVb5v1mCDXTbb6EiVp0WU_fYu82gQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> <CAD2Ti28wvbpded_rz2gHL9H0yWHdkJ-Myq7N0ww-hhuCt8=-zA@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti29CZz3qi7cBq7Km_LVb5v1mCDXTbb6EiVp0WU_fYu82gQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53D8D123.2010804@jpunix.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 7/29/2014 3:10 PM, grarpamp wrote: > On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 7:57 PM, Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: >> If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to >> set up a Features: > > Do you offer a long term proposal to the mailsphere for this > service? What is its purpose, intended goals, backing, > security/compliance posture/plan (to the user and service), its > ethic, politik, etc. > For the time being I'm not offering my site as a bonafide service. I'm just testing private mail solutions. The test server is NOT anonymous as previously mentioned (anonymity is up to the user to define/create). The server is located in Amsterdam and is hosted by Digital Ocean. DO's corporate office is on U.S. soil so as to whether LEO's can request the archived emails from an account is debatable. As it stands I'm just offering it as a free service to anyone that would like to help me test my personal service. While we're on the subject, based on comments from a few people from this list that have subscribed I've updated the following: * Modified the server so that connections using older, insecure protocols has been disabled (RC4 and such) * PFS is now supported for IMAP * SpamAssassin will "learn" SPAM outside of the web browser. For instance if you are using Thunderbird with IMAP and you move a SPAM message to the Junk folder SA will "learn" about it. - -- Crypto https://www.digitalocean.com/?refcode=b90b690ca5bb -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT2NEjAAoJEDhzgt+U8WIyPdQP/0rJanR+1NTVW9bM9cnYGLud KmLeVkz63C96hhfjOWNYHRLgbTAK4iSEB3pgOO/aoaST0AgbibfKIjVJFzndHnM8 hgwWa/EkA2CS7UJjLgNbUZV/kN2/hPra28kORGTrtOX1qI2yUq+acJLSbWtunP2L MmVN5aj6lvOUA6jAGA0zmFfVzlkPxizELifxFZnFD0kV4fVrndoYNxLojYRcMrpJ rP6uKJO2dRiYl+/MXPNFqKp2iK+qckJHDCT5N6S1Xtw3aQMspHyVp+p7gyzVQf3I dtO1CYkbD89BlsZ4deiSgvCqQCl5RaIv4f1wcm5IJXoxqwifpK8QVeB7C/T7UdZ/ Keh1nmsgGao+QHj9FJekmr0cv4kUlX6Uor0iabfsevuJV2ilPCKU2hR3fySEJP8v 5A8ND3x3uHCYyjsayZwKwmWFQy1wJesbzmp+YTSy42SU7iDBUOKGjzLs+Xr3wN45 Kmvrcyg6uDvCdypW3rgJhKm7NR4jUc3sbiz/a2QxVEr6rwu1DpVK/4aTtxi7GAdX srmzOgrMEBhOQQSENKwGwNkeoCtBoZUvY1Msz/C1STqM/oPPPxhj0Fjx0+KKtTXf e7u3uLmbQOgIGEt4eWJN9jTv1ztp0RTgPH0cyi5d1G83IVtR5H/Y8EdNsr5kWOLy O+P4WHFnfbVQxAT3GnR0 =RLaJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 11:29:41 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 14:29:41 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53d81d98.538f3a0a.6c3f.1c78@mx.google.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> <CAD2Ti2_mdy7kbt=zEDGvfTM5fKoHr=8kTHiZcXaVfFZmVNyO7w@mail.gmail.com> <53d81d98.538f3a0a.6c3f.1c78@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_44eGTjoT7Fx-_=EUZ1BoYDP2n=E=ON1oYTBxdUptbFQ@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 6:23 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > I wouldn't object too much to reformism/gradualism IF it really worked. > But if anything, and as matter of cold hard fact, reformism seems to > work against freedom. Yes, reforming the existing inherits and optimizes... the existing. If existing against freedom in parts at its base thought, so does its reform. Whereas coming from a clean slate / revolutionary position may be possible to avoid that to some more degree. From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 14:57:43 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 14:57:43 -0700 Subject: DEF CON nostalgia [was: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Qh9kM1mVYqNYCWx9uHkKiN+7fRRy48ZGx8p5sPOBp1cA@mail.gmail.com> a hollow, decrepit shell of its former self.. ... oh the 0ld days, ;) "We'd appreciate some more ethics." - GOBBLES - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAJSxOzrD1g [ GOBBLES Security - still disappointed in 2014 ... ] ---- regarding the current line up: https://defcon.org/html/defcon-22/dc-22-speakers.html "Detecting Bluetooth Surveillance Systems" - what about RFID? "Dropping Docs on Darknets: How People Got Caught" - see also, EPICFAIL "How to Disclose an Exploit Without Getting in Trouble" - if you thought ice cream had many flavors, welcome to the brave new world of 'responsible disclosure'! "NSA Playset: PCIe" - the lack of any VT-d mention makes for mediocre. TAO tools better include a VM breakout and uCode errata exploitation. (spoiler alert - i don't think this is actually dropping NSA exploits) "The Monkey in the Middle: A pentesters guide to playing in traffic" - this middle perspective, however, is absolutely a tailored favorite. a gift that keeps on giving... "Investigating PowerShell Attacks" - this is now pointless, what with pass the hash dead. IT'S ALL OVER, JUST GO HOME. *sobbing* [c.f. http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/penetesting/pass-the-hash-is-dead-long-live-pass-the-hash/ ] "Screw Becoming A Pentester - When I Grow Up I Want To Be A Bug Bounty Hunter!" - one step further to enlightenment. the industry that should not exist; better yet to become build engineer or test automationer or devops devotee and build security in at unsexy day jobs for not fame and not riches. #hashtagInfosuckprotipyolo "In the forest of knowledge with 1o57" - nothing to say here other than i'm selling 1o57's uber badge for bitcoin to highest bidder. come find me :P~ "RF Penetration Testing, Your Air Stinks" - my discriminator for a delicious sw defined deployment: a) new grc blocks or custom sdr pipeline? b) wideband and full duplex? c) opportunistic and ad-hoc capabilities? - if you answered no to any of the following please try again, with more harder! [c.f. http://www.pervices.com/buy-crimson/ dual 10GigE, 100kHz – 6GHz, <= 800MHz bandwidth, 4 x (16 bit, 370 MSPS ADCs), 2 x (quad channel, 16 bit, 2500 MSPS DAC), 10MHz, 10ppb, reference OCXO] P.P.S. if you want do your own training on "WB Quad System" without travel to FVEY facilities this is how ;) "Panel - Diversity in Information Security" - i was not invited to this panel. credibility lost. "Android Hacker Protection Level 0" - because more fingers in the dike is more fingers. "Blinding The Surveillance State" - i am soliciting donations for premium consulting expertise. i don't think Soghoian's free advice will be instrumental, but Cowboy Alexander has some sweet new shit (you get what you pay for? :) [ c.f. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/29/the_crypto_king_of_the_NSA_goes_corporate_keith_alexander_patents ] "Summary of Attacks Against BIOS and Secure Boot" - aka, why to coreboot and kill AMT with fire. ok Intel chipsec peeps i got bones to pick SEE YOU IN VEGAS --- how about the talks you want so much but will never see? those billions for your discretion clearly benefiting profitability over pervasive security. best regards, From tedks at riseup.net Wed Jul 30 15:13:54 2014 From: tedks at riseup.net (Ted Smith) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 15:13:54 -0700 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <1406758434.9329.16.camel@anglachel> On Tue, 2014-07-29 at 19:14 +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > >These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the > >sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we > >said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it will > >work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as > >specified. > > By browsing the proofs, I have the impression > they don't depend on the C code (and Isabelle > parsing C appears not very trivial, though > possible). > > If I backdoor the C code of the kernel, will > the proof fail? In short, as others have said, you're wrong about the lack of dependency. See: http://www.nicta.com.au/pub?doc=7371 -- Sent from Ubuntu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 836 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140730/23f68825/attachment.sig> From hozer at hozed.org Wed Jul 30 14:45:04 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 16:45:04 -0500 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <53D7B691.4060107@cathalgarvey.me> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> <20140729143111.GF22640@nl.grid.coop> <53D7B691.4060107@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <20140730214504.GG22640@nl.grid.coop> Go read http://jvns.ca/blog/2014/03/12/the-rust-os-story/ and start writing your own malloc If we had a L4-compatible kernel written in Rust that would be pretty damn cool. Now I just need to find someone to bill to play with this... On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 03:58:25PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > Lol, I haven't even written "hello world" in it yet, but I believe this > is exactly the sort of future use-case Rust is for. Perhaps I'm > mistaken, but surely someone's dreamt up a more modern take on C with > memory safety that can be used instead? > > On 29/07/14 15:31, Troy Benjegerdes wrote: > > When you can write an interrupt or page fault handler in rust, let > > me know. > > > > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 02:03:28PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > >> That seems suspect. Most obvious security flaws in C are due to > >> misimplemented C, right? Not the algorithms themselves? So the kernel > >> can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer overflows > >> and pointer errors? > >> > >> I'll wait until someone redoes it in a language designed for safe > >> systems programming, like Rust. :) > >> > >> On 29/07/14 13:41, Georgi Guninski wrote: > >>> I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed > >>> some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to > >>> on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C > >>> code invalidate the proofs? > >>> > >>> The haskell stuff appear to not contain all > >>> info about the C code. > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > >>>> news: > >>>> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ > >>>> site: > >>>> http://sel4.systems/ > >>>> > >>>> AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. > >>>> > >>>> Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). > >> > >> -- > >> T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA > >> P: +353876363185 > >> W: http://indiebiotech.com > > > >> pub 4096R/988B9099 2013-02-06 Cathal Garvey (Other accs: onetruecathal at twitter, cathalgarvey at github, cathalgarvey at gitorious, indiebiotech.com) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> > >> uid Cathal Garvey (Microstatus account) <onetruecathal at twitter.com> > >> uid Cathal Garvey (Gitorious code hosting account) <cathalgarvey at gitorious.org> > >> sub 4096R/65B3395F 2013-02-06 > > > > > > > > > > -- > T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA > P: +353876363185 > W: http://indiebiotech.com > pub 4096R/988B9099 2013-02-06 Cathal Garvey (Other accs: onetruecathal at twitter, cathalgarvey at github, cathalgarvey at gitorious, indiebiotech.com) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> > uid Cathal Garvey (Microstatus account) <onetruecathal at twitter.com> > uid Cathal Garvey (Gitorious code hosting account) <cathalgarvey at gitorious.org> > sub 4096R/65B3395F 2013-02-06 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Troy Benjegerdes 'da hozer' hozer at hozed.org 7 elements earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul grid.coop Never pick a fight with someone who buys ink by the barrel, nor try buy a hacker who makes money by the megahash From hozer at hozed.org Wed Jul 30 15:15:02 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 17:15:02 -0500 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2r++cKdMmxatoEM2WpRsUbqvRZyEFZUSEkK2ABamTTFw8w@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r++cKdMmxatoEM2WpRsUbqvRZyEFZUSEkK2ABamTTFw8w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140730221502.GH22640@nl.grid.coop> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 06:36:19PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > On Jul 29, 2014 6:14 PM, "Georgi Guninski" <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: > > > > >These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the > > >sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we > > >said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it > will > > >work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as > > >specified. > > > > By browsing the proofs, I have the impression > > they don't depend on the C code (and Isabelle > > parsing C appears not very trivial, though > > possible). > > > > If I backdoor the C code of the kernel, will > > the proof fail? > > Isn't that the whole idea? It would really change the thing up if there's a > backdoor! /* * Copyright 2014 under AGPLv3, Troy Benjegerdes, <add your name> * as a derivative work of http://q3u.be/patent/q3ube * claim 9, A process for producing a new physical computer hardware design * utilizing a software program running on an existing design that contains all * software and specifications to produce a derivative physical design. * (recursive hardware) */ Well, technically, I suspect the proof would never complete running because the hash signature(s) of the backdoored kernel will not match the signature etched in silicon on the open-source hardware, and it will immediately wipe any crypto keys when there is a kernel hash check failure. Of course, if you fix any of the backdoors that existed when the silicon mask was generated the hash check will fail too. C'est la vie /* * end copyright notice */ You'll need to hurry up and get your backdoors in kernels, compilers, and EDA tools before we get this implemented. I think you've got 5-15 years yet before that window closes. Eventually I predict various intelligence agencies will eventually work together to validate the trusted open-source hardware, either because they actually understand the value, or because activist hacker groups rewrite their legislative funding mandates using existing backdoors. Lodewijk, please write this stuff down (preferably as patent claims) so we have the original open-source hardware prior art documented and protected before some corporate IP pirates find it. From guninski at guninski.com Wed Jul 30 08:22:41 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 18:22:41 +0300 Subject: Update your Tors - Tor security advisory: "relay early" traffic confirmation attack In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1SJYCZWWgZcZsbHcq72W1JcU7kvcau8aPxCuO=+tzn+vg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SJYCZWWgZcZsbHcq72W1JcU7kvcau8aPxCuO=+tzn+vg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140730152241.GA2517@sivokote.iziade.m$> Someone here ranted against Tor and he was called a troll IIRC... Ironically they discovered it on 4.7 :) On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 05:12:17AM -0700, coderman wrote: > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack > [see also release notes per below] > ''' > On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying > to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who > operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying > Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks. > > The attacking relays joined the network on January 30 2014, and we > removed them from the network on July 4. While we don't know when they > started doing the attack, users who operated or accessed hidden > services from early February through July 4 should assume they were > affected. > . > . > . > Relays should upgrade to a recent Tor release (0.2.4.23 or > 0.2.5.6-alpha), to close the particular protocol vulnerability the > attackers used — but remember that preventing traffic confirmation in > general remains an open research problem. Clients that upgrade (once > new Tor Browser releases are ready) will take another step towards > limiting the number of entry guards that are in a position to see > their traffic, thus reducing the damage from future attacks like this > one. Hidden service operators should consider changing the location of > their hidden service. From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 20:00:49 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 20:00:49 -0700 Subject: DEF CON nostalgia [was: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Qh9kM1mVYqNYCWx9uHkKiN+7fRRy48ZGx8p5sPOBp1cA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Qh9kM1mVYqNYCWx9uHkKiN+7fRRy48ZGx8p5sPOBp1cA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TVTtTditivE6G+9dh372ccWsioLLqTZwDtmBUeg9fibA@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 2:57 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> said some shit: > ... > "You are the worst kind of person! Criticizing these Defcon Presenters for less than perfect communicating of work they have put a lots of work in to. What have you done to make the security community better or teach students how to better practice Security? Shut up if you only message is negativity! Until you are an expert in all Security I don't care about your opinion Asshole Coderman!" [ED: sics' be included.] i'm sorry, my coping mechanisms are limited. you must assume the right filters. program terminated. --- in all seriousness, as for teaching others, surely i do this much more badly than most. missing experience combined with lack of teaching knowledge a starting point position. there is no How Children Succeed (Paul Tough) for How Children Nuture The Hack. there is no "the smartest kids in the world and how they got that way" (Amanda Ripley) for the skilledest hacker kids in the world and how they hack that way. there is no Building a Better Teacher (Elizabeth Green) for Building a Better InfoSec Mentor and Research Leadership Culture. inspiring more STEM in general a challenge, infosec same and then additional complexities and complications... [0] regarding DEF CON specifically, the joy always and will be the people and conversations. while i may harp on the talks in dark humor, the con as a whole is premium despite oversold and diluted trends to current. DEF CON++ :) --- last but not least, a 8x512G Samsung 840Pro SSD single dumb logical drive in full bay enclosure works best for throughput. what throughput can you reach in this setup? TBD: host mainboard w/ 12TB DDR3 slotting ala COPACOBANA; formal request for DEF CON 23 volume mirror operations - PCIe x16 lanes to memory resident copy of content.. for SCIENCE! re: "DEF CON media hard drive duping station - six 1:11 duplication towers / 3 x 4TB mirror tracks (BLUE, GREEN, ORANGE)" - https://defcon.org/html/defcon-22/dc-22-news.html#dc22hddupe best regards, #1 DEF CON FAN RLY checking into moderation queue. [1] 0. <re: infosec resources for learning and teaching others> perhaps best retort an abridged collection for just this. the set of what i've found useful a good base of usefullness to others. ETA: unknown until post-Vegas. suggestions solicitied! 1. "Meta: List moderation" [ you can make it nicer here as per http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Jul/56 :] From coderman at gmail.com Thu Jul 31 06:47:23 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 06:47:23 -0700 Subject: Identity Intelligence Message-ID: <CAJVRA1R0vWqNuSGV1oL4aDEtbs2=0DWbHdgN4R7ijzcg5XEk_w@mail.gmail.com> XKeyScore classifiers for your data exhaust, --- http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/07/identity-intel/ "Identity Intelligence and Special Operations" - Posted on Jul.30, 2014 by Steven Aftergood "Identity intelligence” is a relatively new intelligence construct that refers to the analysis and use of personal information, including biometric and forensic data among others, to identify intelligence targets of interest and to deny them anonymity. The term began to appear a few years ago and was included, for example, in a 2012 Defense Intelligence Agencybriefing package. Since then it has quickly propagated throughout U.S. military and intelligence operations. ... The new DoD doctrine on Special Operations — Joint Publication 3-05, dated 16 July 2014 — includes further discussion of identity intelligence (I2) in the special operations context: “I2 is the collection, analysis, exploitation, and management of identity attributes and associated technologies and processes. The identification process utilizes biometrics-enabled intelligence (BEI), forensics-enabled intelligence (FEI), information obtained through document and media exploitation (DOMEX), and combat information and intelligence to identify a person or members of a group.” “I2 fuses identity attributes (biological, biographical, behavioral, and reputational information related to individuals) and other information and intelligence associated with those attributes collected across all intelligence disciplines….” “USSOCOM [US Special Operations Command] exploits biometric, forensic, document and media data collections and integrates the data with all-source intelligence to locate and track unattributed identities across multiple or disparate instances. Intelligence collections are processed through the appropriate DOD and interagency databases, exploited to produce intelligence, and then disseminated to deployed SOF and throughout the interagency. I2 products enable real-time decisions in special operations worldwide.” ... “Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk,” JP 3-05 says. ... From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 31 10:32:46 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 13:32:46 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] You can't trust any of your hardware In-Reply-To: <2B974078-E72F-4DEF-B8A5-5524571CA3B0@lrw.com> References: <CFFFD650.1513%michael.borodiansky@vmturbo.com> <2B974078-E72F-4DEF-B8A5-5524571CA3B0@lrw.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_5NshoPUhm1zmQCFcfYCKww-bimpBkmUcTjbo1O3LYow@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> wrote: > http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/ > The full talk/paper don't seem to be available yet, but they (a) figured out > how to write malware that attacks a system via something plugged into its > USB port (no, it doesn't depend on AUTORUN); (b) flipped that around and > figured out how to replace the firmware on a USB device from the host. I > wouldn't have thought (b) was possible - after all, how many firmware > updates for USB devices have you ever seen? - but I guess it's handy at the > end of manufacturing, and gets left open because ... who would ever think of > attacking it? > > On further reflection, though, I realized that the only thing new here is > that they actually went and built a full-cycle virus. All the rest was done > a couple of years ago: Apple published an update for its (USB) keyboards - > http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4010 - and someone reverse-engineered it and > figured out how to upload any code they liked - > https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/CHEN/BHUSA09-Chen-RevAppleFirm-PAPER.pdf > > The fun never ends.... Just like BIOS/HDD firmware APT's, the updateability of firmware on USB controllers is nothing new... even thumbdrives come with firmware 'deleted' or fast formatted off their media, dd(1)... it just took a while to make it fun for the entire family. flashboot.ru phison.com usb mass production tool BadUSB BadBIOS spritesmods.com hddhack From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 31 10:48:53 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 13:48:53 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] You can't trust any of your hardware In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_5NshoPUhm1zmQCFcfYCKww-bimpBkmUcTjbo1O3LYow@mail.gmail.com> References: <CFFFD650.1513%michael.borodiansky@vmturbo.com> <2B974078-E72F-4DEF-B8A5-5524571CA3B0@lrw.com> <CAD2Ti2_5NshoPUhm1zmQCFcfYCKww-bimpBkmUcTjbo1O3LYow@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28iVDVXfkMdzx1zZndpO32bdhLXwAt_uaJhHvnoDucqgA@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 1:32 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > flashboot.ru > phison.com > usb mass production tool > BadUSB > BadBIOS > spritesmods.com hddhack www.usbdev.ru/files/phison www.usb-disk.ru/prog.php http://read.pudn.com/downloads149/doc/fileformat/641957/Phison%20MPTool%20MP2232%20v1.06.00/Production%20Tool%20-%20USB%202K%20User%20Manual%20v1.2C%20%28China%20Colour%29.pdf Have phun! From guninski at guninski.com Thu Jul 31 06:13:38 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 16:13:38 +0300 Subject: DEF CON nostalgia [was: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TVTtTditivE6G+9dh372ccWsioLLqTZwDtmBUeg9fibA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Qh9kM1mVYqNYCWx9uHkKiN+7fRRy48ZGx8p5sPOBp1cA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1TVTtTditivE6G+9dh372ccWsioLLqTZwDtmBUeg9fibA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140731131338.GA2877@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 08:00:49PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 2:57 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> said some shit: > best regards, > #1 DEF CON FAN RLY checking into moderation queue. [1] > > > > 0. <re: infosec resources for learning and teaching others> > perhaps best retort an abridged collection for just this. the set of > what i've found useful a good base of usefullness to others. ETA: > unknown until post-Vegas. suggestions solicitied! > > 1. "Meta: List moderation" > [ you can make it nicer here as per > http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Jul/56 :] Fyodor's Full Disclosure is heavily moderated. He stops me at SMTP level. Quite likely he will sell the list the way aleph1 did with Bugtraq. (I am not posting on FFD). From lists at cooperq.com Thu Jul 31 19:15:11 2014 From: lists at cooperq.com (Cooper Quintin) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 19:15:11 -0700 Subject: Encrypt iPhone calls app In-Reply-To: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> References: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53DAF82F.4070603@cooperq.com> Moxie and crew have a history of writing some pretty fantastic crypto software! In the past they have written redphone (Signal is the iOS version of this) and text secure, both of which are IMO some of the best crypto software out there right now. Aditionally signal is free (as in beer and in freedom) and open source. I would wholeheartedly recommend Signal. My only caveat would be that since it is so new there are likely some pretty serious bugs that have not been discovered yet. On 07/31/2014 06:40 PM, Henry Rivera wrote: > Can someone please give me your appraisal of Signal. I'm not noticing the red flags that we see all too often in such sales pitches. > > https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal/?t=dXNlcmlkPTU1MjE5NjEwLGVtYWlsaWQ9ODkxOQ== From 4chaos.onelove at gmail.com Thu Jul 31 18:40:50 2014 From: 4chaos.onelove at gmail.com (Henry Rivera) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 21:40:50 -0400 Subject: Encrypt iPhone calls app Message-ID: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> Can someone please give me your appraisal of Signal. I'm not noticing the red flags that we see all too often in such sales pitches. https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal/?t=dXNlcmlkPTU1MjE5NjEwLGVtYWlsaWQ9ODkxOQ== From dhill+cpunks at mindcry.org Thu Jul 31 20:26:26 2014 From: dhill+cpunks at mindcry.org (David Hill) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 23:26:26 -0400 Subject: Encrypt iPhone calls app In-Reply-To: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> References: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140801032626.GB26171@9ac286446c9be08c809eca57f261c57c5d28508f92702bc3> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 09:40:50PM -0400, Henry Rivera wrote: > Can someone please give me your appraisal of Signal. I'm not noticing the red flags that we see all too often in such sales pitches. > > https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal/?t=dXNlcmlkPTU1MjE5NjEwLGVtYWlsaWQ9ODkxOQ== You cannot secure cellphones.

From jerry at jerryrw.com Tue Jul 1 08:27:14 2014 From: jerry at jerryrw.com (Jerry) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2014 11:27:14 -0400 Subject: PayPal and Proton Mail Message-ID: Paypal Freezes $275K fundraiser for encrypted mail startup; not sure if encryption is legal. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/paypal-protonmail-freeze/ https://protonmail.ch/ From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 1 19:20:44 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2014 22:20:44 -0400 Subject: PayPal and Proton Mail In-Reply-To: <53B2FAC6.7030704@entersection.org> References: <53B2FAC6.7030704@entersection.org> Message-ID: On Tue, Jul 1, 2014 at 2:15 PM, Gregory Foster wrote: > protonmail.ch This appears to be just one of many startups offering non-solutions. >From what I can tell, you are loading the code they provide on the fly into your browser to execute crypto ops on your behalf. That is just plain bad. Remember hushmail? When you give up your environment to the same parties providing your service, you give up the game. And it's centralized, few will choose different passphrases, etc. https://protonmail.ch/blog/protonmail-threat-model/ "There are more difficult to use, but more secure solutions out there, which are more appropriate for Snowden’s use case." For one, you're better off learning and using some underlying tools like these instead... https://www.gnupg.org/ https://www.enigmail.net/ https://protonmail.ch/sign_up.php -> https://protonmail.ch/invite "Notification Email (Required) - Used only to contact you about our public beta. This should be your current email (Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo!, etc) - not your new protonmail email. ... Your notification email will not be linked to your ProtonMail account - it is only used for communicating with you during our beta and will be removed from our system after the beta." This is a failure of implied and stated privacy ethics. Invites are linked. And it should not be asked for in the first place. Thus never on the system and no trust needed. "response to our open beta has maxed our server capacity. We're working hard to add more servers While open and honest if true, this does not inspire systems confidence. "I think it is safe to say if we were NSA funded, we wouldn’t need to be going around competing for 100k startup awards" Actually, that is precisely what you'd want to do. There's no architecture whitepaper. And so on, etc... It's a useful service and a step in the game. Just be exactly sure of what it is and what it is not. And you should not rely on service providers to be the sole source of your answer to that question either. > ProtonMail's public Bitcoin address: > https://blockchain.info/address/1Q1nhq1NbxPYAbw1BppwKbCqg58ZqMb9A8?filter=2 I'd rather fund something like... "The next gen P2P secure email solution" From gfoster at entersection.org Wed Jul 2 09:11:07 2014 From: gfoster at entersection.org (Gregory Foster) Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2014 11:11:07 -0500 Subject: PayPal and Proton Mail In-Reply-To: References: <53B2FAC6.7030704@entersection.org> Message-ID: <53B42F1B.40905@entersection.org> On Tue, Jul 1, 2014 at 2:15 PM, Gregory Foster wrote: > https://protonmail.ch/blog/paypal-freezes-protonmail-campaign-funds/ On 7/1/14, 9:20 PM, grarpamp wrote: > This appears to be just one of many startups offering non-solutions... I did not intend to advocate use of the service, rather I wanted to share the news that PayPal had lifted the freeze. This story caught my attention because it reminded me of another time when PayPal mysteriously found itself engaging in economic warfare. http://www.wired.com/2010/12/paypal-wikileaks/ On Tue, Jul 1, 2014 at 2:15 PM, Gregory Foster wrote: > ProtonMail's public Bitcoin address: > https://blockchain.info/address/1Q1nhq1NbxPYAbw1BppwKbCqg58ZqMb9A8?filter=2 On 7/1/14, 9:20 PM, grarpamp wrote: > I'd rather fund something like... > "The next gen P2P secure email solution" And while I do encourage support for this project---which is distinct from use, and perhaps for no other reason than PayPal's unintentional endorsement---my intent was to point out the means to avoid direct subjection to the written and unwritten policies of the existing corrupt global financial institutions. With that said, the critical eyeballs which cypherpunks bring to bear on projects is invaluable. However, the reflexive rejection of closed source projects and the reflexive acceptance of open source projects is a bit too Manichean for my world view. There is merit to both approaches in different contexts. It's helpful to remember that information propagates through a channel in non-quantum entangled systems, so even if it emerges from closed source software or hardware it can be observed. Heartbleed established a helpful corollary to Eric Raymond's belief that "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow": you will never get enough eyeballs because people are lazy and assume that someone else is doing the work. Therefore, take as given that all code sucks, both closed and open source. Then at least you will not be surprised when you find out it's almost always true, and you can enjoy the amplified pleasure of genuine surprise when you encounter projects that really are solid. I think it's beautiful to see and support the proliferation of work occurring to address the new normal of no privacy, both closed and open source. The slumbering cypherpunk spirit has awakened. gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster at entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ From tbiehn at gmail.com Wed Jul 2 11:57:01 2014 From: tbiehn at gmail.com (Travis Biehn) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2014 14:57:01 -0400 Subject: Tor In-Reply-To: <20140630224340.00006b93@unknown> References: <20140629180402.00007cb6@unknown> <6885202.SpEd5tlOii@lapuntu> <20140520201315.00000c4d@unknown> <4502977.PQn2iEyROi@lapuntu> <20140630224340.00006b93@unknown> Message-ID: Juan, Thanks for taking the time to reply to my e-mail and welcome to the mailing list. I'll try harder next time! -Travis On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 9:43 PM, Juan wrote: > On Tue, 01 Jul 2014 01:53:29 +0200 > rysiek wrote: > > > > > > ¨rysek¨ ¨Oh, come on. I'm sure Juan has created a much > > > better and much more independent project than Tor,¨ > > > > It's "rysiek". > > Oh I am so sorry my lord. > > > > > > > > What I´ve done or have not done has nothing to do with the > > > facts I mentioned and the soundness of my analysis. > > > > How do we know you're not funded by the NSA to sow dissent in the > > community, > > What community? The community of tax funded parasites who > pretend to be freedom fighters? =) > > Notice > > a) the NSA has no interest in attacking those. They are their > own people after all =) > > b) you are an enlightened __________ (fill in the blank) who > doesnt believe in conspiracy theories. Or you just dont believe > in them when it suits you? > > > > >smearing good projects and burning precious time of people > > involved in them? Not that it happens, right? Right? > > Oh my god. It is a conspiracy against tor!!! > > > > http://yro.slashdot.org/story/14/02/25/0359246/nsa-and-ghcq-employing-shills-to-poison-web-forum-discourse > > > > > And yes. I, personally, am much more independent > > > than people on the payroll of the US government, go figure. > > > > Nobody gives a fuck, go figure. :) > > Yeah I get that you are ¨nobody¨ =) > > > > > > > > > > -- Twitter | LinkedIn | GitHub | TravisBiehn.com | Google Plus -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2983 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Wed Jul 2 09:41:25 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2014 18:41:25 +0200 Subject: Court =?utf-8?B?4oCTIE9mZmljaWE=?= =?utf-8?Q?l?= statement part #1 Message-ID: <20140702164125.GA26986@leitl.org> Apologies, not sure this has been posted already in the thread, I'm backlogged. https://rdns.im/court-official-statement-part-1 Court – Official statement part #1 Posted on July 2, 2014 by Will As seen possibly here, or here i lost the Tor case and was sentenced to 3 years probation (instead of 3 months jail) and all fees (court and experts, Assumption ~30000EUR, not less than 20k for sure). The sentence is based on §12 which allows for anyone to be dealt with as perpetrator (which is a pretty dictatorial law IMO) and this is based on that i knew it *could* possibly be used for criminal activity (in this case child pornography). I won’t write much more yet before i have the written ruling (i do not even know my probation terms yet) but merely want to explain why i won’t appeal this sentence: First would be that I simply can’t afford it anymore, donations covered a lot of lawyer fees but i had to use my entire money on this case as well, i’m now bankrupt and the garnishment (a rare word, DE: Pfändung) of my income (to pay the 20k+ costs) does not help with it either. I have high medical costs as well besides which are more important. I’m not really interested in more external funding due to taxation issues with larger amounts (and i do not want *another* crime on me). – Second is that i just want to be done with this, i had now years of “issues” (i would write “harassment” but then i get sued again for sure) (Ex: Citing my boss to the police for questioning (x3); physically monitoring my boss in Vienna; citing friends to the police for questioning (x2); confiscation of bank transaction data; Polish extradiction threats for hacking cases there (x2); citing me for useless questioning causing lawyer costs (x5+) etc. etc.) – It’s now finally over and besides the cost i CAN live with this sentence, it does not show up in police registers and won’t be an issue for work and alike in the future. – Third is the mental component, this years of “horror” changed a lot up to me being hospitalized (x3…) with paranoid schizophrenia (which was a wrong diagnosis, but still it’s not helpful if you HAVE to assume permanent monitoring of everything), PTSD (among other issues) and now taking medication – It took it’s toll, including me getting fired for being in the clinic/sick stay for a long time, i just can’t afford to loose my job or go the clinic again even if i actually should be still there. – Fourth is the attention, media and personal – I don’t really like any attention on myself, especially when others should get it (like some public cause, Pirateparty or alike). – So this is it for now, stay tuned for more in a few days. From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 2 16:22:37 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 01:22:37 +0200 Subject: PayPal and Proton Mail In-Reply-To: References: <53B2FAC6.7030704@entersection.org> Message-ID: <4954101.dJtRxW1pyj@lapuntu> Dnia wtorek, 1 lipca 2014 22:20:44 grarpamp pisze: > I'd rather fund something like... > "The next gen P2P secure email solution" You mean like RetroShare? -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From gutemhc at gmail.com Wed Jul 2 22:49:00 2014 From: gutemhc at gmail.com (Gutem) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 02:49:00 -0300 Subject: PayPal and Proton Mail In-Reply-To: <4954101.dJtRxW1pyj@lapuntu> References: <53B2FAC6.7030704@entersection.org> <4954101.dJtRxW1pyj@lapuntu> Message-ID: RetroShare is a good player, but it's too buggy for "Average Joe"... And it's more like an IM than an Email. - Gutem ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Registered Linux User: 562142 https://keybase.io/gutem/key.asc PGP Fingerprint: 2522 ECFA DCD2 FF52 3AAB D2A1 154E 14CD E1A6 97BF 2014-07-02 20:22 GMT-03:00 rysiek : > Dnia wtorek, 1 lipca 2014 22:20:44 grarpamp pisze: > > I'd rather fund something like... > > "The next gen P2P secure email solution" > > You mean like RetroShare? > > -- > Pozdr > rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1166 bytes Desc: not available URL: From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 2 23:51:36 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 02:51:36 -0400 Subject: The next gen P2P secure email solution [paypal/protonmail] Message-ID: On Wed, Jul 2, 2014 at 7:22 PM, rysiek wrote: > Dnia wtorek, 1 lipca 2014 22:20:44 grarpamp pisze: >> I'd rather fund something like... >> "The next gen P2P secure email solution" [1] > You mean like RetroShare? http://retroshare.sourceforge.net/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retroshare RetroShare seems geared more to private groups of users doing a variety of things, even if that rides among a larger set of peers. So maybe not designed/optimized for global message delivery at huge scale? I generally meant something similar to what's in the prior thread having this subject [1]. Using completely new/different technology than old email as we know it today (with the exception of your MUA tools that you might still plug into the new tech). RetroShare would qualify as new tech to consider and work forward with, as would any of these and friends... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitmessage http://i2pbote.i2p.us/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I2P#E-mail http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TorChat https://freenetproject.org/freemail.html http://dee.su/cables https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet https://pond.imperialviolet.org/ ... From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 01:11:15 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 04:11:15 -0400 Subject: PayPal and Proton Mail In-Reply-To: <4954101.dJtRxW1pyj@lapuntu> References: <53B2FAC6.7030704@entersection.org> <4954101.dJtRxW1pyj@lapuntu> Message-ID: > Gregory Foster wrote: > reflexive acceptance of open source projects Not so much, ie: one must still evaluate them too. > I think it's beautiful to see and support the proliferation of work > occurring to address ... privacy ... [with open source] Yes. > [with closed source]. Pretty products, onesheets, and test vectors. Yes, they're nice and do help in overall movement towards an all encrypted world. They're worth recommending. However, caveat trust and whatever other issues to the recommendee. This applies equally to opensource. Seeing mail providers basically advertise 'you can trust us' to their end users (with whatever backing reasons they have (which btw are typically as full of holes as your typical privacy policy))... that's what should give people pause to think carefully. This, re: proton... which would you rather hear, and which do you hear? - Warning: We detected a breach that injected snake oil into your browser. - Warning: We can inject snake oil into into your browser at will. Any provider who tells you they offer an email service in which they can make your email trustably secure for you, regardless of how they claim to do it, is a liar. Period. You are the trust root, only you can secure your email. So those who want better will need to use provider independant encryption tools. And the best you'll ever get with them under [1] is encrypting everything but the 'envelope to' (which you must expose for delivery), and the authenticated 'envelope from' (which they, being the centralized rulers they are, will require). More self help tools... https://www.mailvelope.com/ https://whiteout.io/ > the new normal of no privacy Any fixes on centralized clearnet 'email', beyond everyone using self help tools, will always have these trust issues now. As with Banks/Paypal vs Bitcoin, remove the delegation of trust to the central provider... by removing the central provider from the equation. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email > The slumbering cypherpunk spirit has awakened. > @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ http://entersection.com/posts/1238-charlie-chaplin-on-the-patrimony-of-greed-and-its-conquest ? From coderman at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 04:11:45 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 04:11:45 -0700 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list In-Reply-To: <20140703094214.GF26986@leitl.org> References: <20140703094214.GF26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Eugen Leitl Date: Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 2:42 AM Subject: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/XKeyscore-Quellcode-Tor-Nutzer-werden-von-der-NSA-als-Extremisten-markiert-und-ueberwacht-2248328.html All accesses (several 100 k/day) to Tor directory authorities (at least some IPs hardcoded, Sebastian Hahn one of the targets) intercepted and logged, Tor users are considered extremists (hello, self-fullfilling prophecy at work here, no doubt intended for further justify operation budgets) according to comments in the source and shortlisted for further surveillance (email intercept explicitly mentioned) and attempted deanonymization. Conclusion: the world needs way more extremists. If they want cake, they should get it in abundance. Further suggestion: we need an online database to deanonymize intelligence operatives. We need their faces, their license plates, their home addresses, and any dirt you can get on them. Name them, and shame them. From coderman at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 04:35:09 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 04:35:09 -0700 Subject: XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details requested Message-ID: request for more (english speaking) details on QUELLCODE part of XKeyScore(XKS) http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/nsa/us-geheimdienst-spionierte-deutschen-studenten-aus-36657402.bild.html specifically subsequent tasking associated with selected anonyms... From list at sysfu.com Thu Jul 3 08:26:37 2014 From: list at sysfu.com (Seth) Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 08:26:37 -0700 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list Message-ID: On Thu, 03 Jul 2014 04:11:45 -0700, coderman wrote: > Subject: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all > Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list I use Tor for just about all my daily web browsing. I also run a Tor relay from home. Even run my own mail server, XMPP and Friendica nodes from home. Guess that makes me an ultra-extremist. The irony? I only decided to start using Tor by default for everything once I became aware of the near total nature of passive surveillance. So if using Tor makes me an 'extremist' well, please accept this heartfelt; _ _____ _____ _ __ __ ____ __ ____ _ _ _____ _ _ _____ | | |_ _/ ____| |/ / | \/ \ \ / / | _ \ /\ | | | | / ____| | \ | |/ ____| /\ | | | || | | ' / | \ / |\ \_/ / | |_) | / \ | | | | | (___ | \| | (___ / \ | | | || | | < | |\/| | \ / | _ < / /\ \ | | | | \___ \ | . ` |\___ \ / /\ \ | |____ _| || |____| . \ | | | | | | | |_) / ____ \| |____| |____ ____) | | |\ |____) / ____ \ |______|_____\_____|_|\_\ |_| |_| |_| |____/_/ \_\______|______|_____/ |_| \_|_____/_/ \_\ Really there's nothing to lose at this point by encrypting and anonymizing every bit that leaves every computer you own. If NSA wants to own my devices I'll keep cycling them out on a regular basis with new and used gear I pay for in cash and pick up in person. > Conclusion: the world needs way more extremists. If they want cake, they > should get it in abundance. I remember reading somewhere that on any given day in the 'United State' there are a couple hundred thousand active Tor users. We should add GnuNET, I2P, CJDNS, CurveCP and many more to that list. I am Spartacus!!! -- Seth I <3 nicely trimmed email replies From coderman at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 09:26:52 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 09:26:52 -0700 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list In-Reply-To: References: <53b57339.a4f8420a.17ce.50b2SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 9:11 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: > ... > Here is some of the source code:... merci beaucoup :) From griffin at cryptolab.net Thu Jul 3 06:56:07 2014 From: griffin at cryptolab.net (Griffin Boyce) Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 09:56:07 -0400 Subject: tools used by intelligence analysts In-Reply-To: <20140703131613.GJ26986@leitl.org> References: <20140703131613.GJ26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <26ebfd1e9a4edd4756866edf60622452@cryptolab.net> This is very useful, thanks for sharing. I'd also add MATLAB to the list of tools used -- keep in mind that "intelligence analyst" is extremely broad as a descriptor. Some of these people are low-level ex-military 35F types, some have a classical statistics research background, some are social scientists, some are dataviz experts, some are linguists. So try to distinguish between these and offer sources when you can. Oh, and Cellebrite devices for mobile data collection. best, Griffin On 2014-07-03 09:16, Eugen Leitl `wrote: > *ORA for network analysis http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/ > Pentaho for data transformation http://www.pentaho.com/ > Rapid Miner for data mining http://sourceforge.net/projects/rapidminer/ > Orange for data visualisations and analysis http://orange.biolab.si/ > Maltego for the analysis of networks between people, companies, > websites, etc. http://www.paterva.com/web6/products/maltego.php > Apache Hadoop for large-scale, distributed computing and analysis > > Axis Pro > http://www.textronsystems.com/products/advanced-information/axis-pro > Starlight http://starlight.pnnl.gov/ > Analyst's Notebook > http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/analysts-notebook-family > Palantir http://www.palantir.com/products/ > > XPLR witk Reddit plugin > https://pay.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfReddit/comments/1um89b/preddit_a_subreddit_recommender_with_xplr/[2] > Tiny Tiny Rss http://tt-rss.org/redmine/projects/tt-rss/wiki > Pligg http://pligg.com/ > Twitter, Reddit, ... > > ARC GIS > CPOF http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_Post_of_the_Future > > Metasploit > > Oryon http://sourceforge.net/projects/oryon/ (?) > Investigative Dashboard https://investigativedashboard.org/ (?) From drwho at virtadpt.net Thu Jul 3 09:59:23 2014 From: drwho at virtadpt.net (The Doctor) Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 09:59:23 -0700 Subject: tools used by intelligence analysts In-Reply-To: <26ebfd1e9a4edd4756866edf60622452@cryptolab.net> References: <20140703131613.GJ26986@leitl.org> <26ebfd1e9a4edd4756866edf60622452@cryptolab.net> Message-ID: <53B58BEB.9010101@virtadpt.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 07/03/2014 06:56 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote: > This is very useful, thanks for sharing. I'd also add MATLAB to > the list of tools used -- keep in mind that "intelligence analyst" > is MATLAB is additionally useful due to the fact that one of its toolkits (PPT - Parallel Processing Toolkit) has two useful features. First, the PPT lets the user distribute computations making use of those libraries across every machine registered with the licensing server that also has a license for the PPT. Second, the PPT lets the user make use of CUDA-enabled graphics cards on each of those workstations as well. For crunching very large data sets in a more reasonable period of time it's an excellent tool. It stomped NumPy and SciPy into the dirt when we compared them. Expensive as hell, though. - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/ PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ "Did I fall asleep?" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTtYvrAAoJED1np1pUQ8RkXpAQAJBMj0mrHQkAj0ptyyHHzutb pGq2ZCg8bd+98zkWQq02LkAWI/BHSk92/uBq31I4Ea9HYCLHxMityqzX7t1Fg8Li 96gDQPW3ERtbT+w+zbjuFbdm8SAMsXpwVzfdGmqikBKaMglvLukQb2f9rGm8Y13a E6IXZdhT/qPuePUwpxCpZPNRHLNv0D7/jDnLDCmsvo0hsjDqpe1JXQcms8bwHpCB ca+emTYG53VbnasKE22jkCCaKCx1wdCYgD1ET584XpWC7o6mJtT7pvBpOnhbYX+7 aET7DaR5zbTvGaoE7Gnpip5jrd3TRK2ODbp2penzO/jE2CyCSmhE4rieQKQ+V2fn bMcvRso201csWbPEyfaijssi2EnSVhRSzL6O9TNNE34CTR9RW/DBuGfLiehVZ4HH OqW7wr6jGSnay14shMrWjv9Vzc2NwfY5foVwISMbElAzU3UzxplWGCsW5Pey3PMj MMIYUb2j+D5nAf2ACOuPyrXUI43q0Fyb0VX2/cJgQSZVGwx3jw+w1dAVblViOsRX do8Ju2UbB+W//eTb9NVcNca7SXt2Ww4NynGqLCggwH5QFv/C7u0mJ2UceHE2BFZT PSJMsXwe+xeE2rGrBQwiWLznoigeHHFaGVtd37FmoNlKl72QDiqCqDtX/7EOVVbQ 3QE9uHIgwvo6wyr1ZdfX =R168 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 3 02:12:15 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 10:12:15 +0100 Subject: REVERSE ENGINEERING NSA SPY =?UTF-8?B?4oCYUkVUUk8gUkVGTEVDVE8=?= =?UTF-8?B?UuKAmSBHQURHRVRTIFdJVEggVEhFIEhBQ0tSRg==?= In-Reply-To: <20140703083816.GE26986@leitl.org> References: <20140703083816.GE26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <53B51E6F.3060908@cathalgarvey.me> So, what happens if you induce a high-power alternating current in the cable that's resonant with their little aerials (while disconnected from your devices, obviously!); wouldn't that kill the transistors and "bleach" the cable? Who wants to make up some "cable bleachers" that we can clip onto our monitor cables prior to use? :) More interesting as a long-term solution would be crypto-keyboards; USB-HID devices that can somehow set up an authenticated crypto-stream for keystrokes to the computer, to defeat hardware keyloggers. Same might be possible for display and other cables, but USB-HID keyboards might be low-hanging fruit for such an endeavor as so many consumer-end microcontrollers do USB-HID out of the box, like Arduino Leonardo/Micro, are USB-powered, and have the processing power for crypto. On 03/07/14 09:38, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > http://www.rtl-sdr.com/reverse-engineering-nsa-spy-retro-reflector-gadgets-hackrf/ > > REVERSE ENGINEERING NSA SPY ‘RETRO REFLECTOR’ GADGETS WITH THE HACKRF > > In 2013 whistleblower Edward Snowden leaked (along with other documents) some > information about the American National Security Agencies (NSA) spy tools. > One such group of tools named ‘retro reflectors’ has recently been > investigated and reverse engineered by Micheal Ossmann, the security > researcher behind the recently available for preorder HackRF software defined > radio. The HackRF is a SDR similar to the RTL-SDR, but with better > performance and transmit capabilities. > > Newscientist Magazine has written an article about Ossmann’s work here. From > their article a retro reflectors are described in the following quote. > > One reflector, which the NSA called Ragemaster, can be fixed to a computer’s > monitor cable to pick up on-screen images. Another, Surlyspawn, sits on the > keyboard cable and harvests keystrokes. After a lot of trial and error, > Ossmann found these bugs can be remarkably simple devices – little more than > a tiny transistor and a 2-centimetre-long wire acting as an antenna. > > The HackRF comes in to play in the following quote > > Ossmann found that using the radio [HackRF] to emit a high-power radar signal > causes a reflector to wirelessly transmit the data from keystrokes, say, to > an attacker. The set-up is akin to a large-scale RFID- chip system. Since the > signals returned from the reflectors are noisy and often scattered across > different bands, SDR’s versatility is handy, says Robin Heydon at Cambridge > Silicon Radio in the UK. > > Ossmann will present his work at this years Defcon conference in August. > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From jacob at appelbaum.net Thu Jul 3 05:01:15 2014 From: jacob at appelbaum.net (Jacob Appelbaum) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 12:01:15 +0000 Subject: [tor-talk] XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details requested In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi, On 7/3/14, coderman wrote: > request for more (english speaking) details on QUELLCODE part of > XKeyScore(XKS) > > http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/nsa/us-geheimdienst-spionierte-deutschen-studenten-aus-36657402.bild.html > > specifically subsequent tasking associated with selected anonyms... > -- More information will be published shortly, including a long technical English story with source code and a video this evening on German TV. Here are the first bits of our story: http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/nsa-xkeyscore-100.html http://www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/morgenmagazin/politik/deutsche-im-visier-der-nsa-100.html http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/archiv/2014/Quellcode-entschluesselt-Beweis-fuer-NSA-Spionage-in-Deutschland,nsa224.html Stay tuned for the next two publications which will happen in the next twelve hours. All the best, Jacob From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 09:32:32 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 12:32:32 -0400 Subject: PayPal and Proton Mail In-Reply-To: <53B57559.6090304@entersection.org> References: <53B2FAC6.7030704@entersection.org> <4954101.dJtRxW1pyj@lapuntu> <53B57559.6090304@entersection.org> Message-ID: >>> The slumbering cypherpunk spirit has awakened. >> http://entersection.com/posts/1238-charlie-chaplin-on-the-patrimony-of-greed-and-its-conquest > [Why this quotation] Machinery, liberty, democracy, torture, humanity, kindess, unity of fight, etc... Perhaps memes of, or thoughts for, the cypherpunk. From jya at pipeline.com Thu Jul 3 09:47:37 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 12:47:37 -0400 Subject: NSA targets the privacy-conscious In-Reply-To: <20140703152947.GK26986@leitl.org> References: <20140703152947.GK26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: It's gratifying to see more detailed technical information about the Snowden files extracted from the 3% released. If the 97% is being researched for counterspying technology under cover of the 3% pubic debate decoy, that would be consistent with how spies work (as do researchers). Consider that is what highly trained Snowden has directed in a masterful chess game heading for checkmating NSA not just embarassing it by easily technical bypass of court rooms and technically-limited media. Outplaying the media is spy course 101. Using media as cover for secret research is 102. That is what is taught in best of research labs outplaying spies playing media playing spies. HOPE has several speakers addressing lively shenanigans of counterspying July 20-23. Followed by Aspen Security Forum days later sharing tips on spying the counterspies, naming Snowen as betrayer 101. That would be consistent of spywork to demonize one's own to deeper implant and penetrate most effectively well below the easy to find implants and penetrations. Will Snowden win the game he's rigged for whomever? Will EFF ACLU NSA be winners or losers or revealed by Snowden as one and same? NGOs are as government privileged as the media. Not to overlook TOR. From coderman at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 13:24:14 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 13:24:14 -0700 Subject: NSA targets the privacy-conscious In-Reply-To: References: <20140703152947.GK26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 9:47 AM, John Young wrote: > ... sharing tips on spying the counterspies, i for one am most concerned about spying the counter-counter-spies. ... note that no cryptome.org fingerprint yet leaked; perhaps JYA successfully signal jamming the collection colossus through copious cross pollination. make or break it kickstartmonth - clearly dampened; "Pledge now for Priority KeyScore Profile!" best regards, From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 11:05:09 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 14:05:09 -0400 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 Message-ID: You Don't Have to be the NSA to Break Tor: Deanonymizing Users on a Budget Alexander Volynkin / Michael McCord [...] Looking for the IP address of a Tor user? Not a problem. Trying to uncover the location of a Hidden Service? Done. We know because we tested it, in the wild... In this talk, we demonstrate how the distributed nature, combined with newly discovered shortcomings in design and implementation of the Tor network, can be abused to break Tor anonymity. In our analysis, we've discovered that a persistent adversary with a handful of powerful servers and a couple gigabit links can de-anonymize hundreds of thousands Tor clients and thousands of hidden services within a couple of months. The total investment cost? Just under $3,000. During this talk, we will quickly cover the nature, feasibility, and limitations of possible attacks, and then dive into dozens of successful real-world de-anonymization case studies, ranging from attribution of botnet command and control servers, to drug-trading sites, to users of kiddie porn places. The presentation will conclude with lessons learned and our thoughts on the future of security of distributed anonymity networks. From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 3 05:46:48 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 14:46:48 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details requested In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20140703124648.GG26986@leitl.org> On Thu, Jul 03, 2014 at 04:35:09AM -0700, coderman wrote: > request for more (english speaking) details on QUELLCODE part of XKeyScore(XKS) > > http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/nsa/us-geheimdienst-spionierte-deutschen-studenten-aus-36657402.bild.html > > specifically subsequent tasking associated with selected anonyms... According to fefe who's seen the source it's just a selector http://blog.fefe.de/?ts=ad4bdd72 From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 3 06:16:13 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 15:16:13 +0200 Subject: tools used by intelligence analysts Message-ID: <20140703131613.GJ26986@leitl.org> *ORA for network analysis http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/ Pentaho for data transformation http://www.pentaho.com/ Rapid Miner for data mining http://sourceforge.net/projects/rapidminer/ Orange for data visualisations and analysis http://orange.biolab.si/ Maltego for the analysis of networks between people, companies, websites, etc. http://www.paterva.com/web6/products/maltego.php Apache Hadoop for large-scale, distributed computing and analysis Axis Pro http://www.textronsystems.com/products/advanced-information/axis-pro Starlight http://starlight.pnnl.gov/ Analyst's Notebook http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/analysts-notebook-family Palantir http://www.palantir.com/products/ XPLR witk Reddit plugin https://pay.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfReddit/comments/1um89b/preddit_a_subreddit_recommender_with_xplr/[2] Tiny Tiny Rss http://tt-rss.org/redmine/projects/tt-rss/wiki Pligg http://pligg.com/ Twitter, Reddit, ... ARC GIS CPOF http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_Post_of_the_Future Metasploit Oryon http://sourceforge.net/projects/oryon/ (?) Investigative Dashboard https://investigativedashboard.org/ (?) From jacob at appelbaum.net Thu Jul 3 09:11:39 2014 From: jacob at appelbaum.net (Jacob Appelbaum) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 16:11:39 +0000 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list In-Reply-To: References: <53b57339.a4f8420a.17ce.50b2SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: On 7/3/14, coderman wrote: > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 8:36 AM, coderman wrote: >> ... >> i presume you mean as below: >> (more a translation than additional QUELLCODE info though ;) > Here is some of the source code: http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt Happy hacking, Jacob From cindy.baginski at piratenpartei-nms.de Thu Jul 3 09:03:01 2014 From: cindy.baginski at piratenpartei-nms.de (Cindy) Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 18:03:01 +0200 Subject: cypherpunks Digest, Vol 13, Issue 4 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <53B57EB5.5000500@piratenpartei-nms.de> cypherpunks-request at cpunks.org schrieb: > Send cypherpunks mailing list submissions to > cypherpunks at cpunks.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://cpunks.org/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > cypherpunks-request at cpunks.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > cypherpunks-owner at cpunks.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of cypherpunks digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details requested (coderman) > 2. Re: [tor-talk] XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details > requested (Jacob Appelbaum) > 3. Re: XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details requested > (Eugen Leitl) > 4. tools used by intelligence analysts (Eugen Leitl) > 5. Re: tools used by intelligence analysts (Griffin Boyce) > 6. Re: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA > marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance > list (Seth) > 7. NSA targets the privacy-conscious (Eugen Leitl) > 8. Re: [tor-talk] Tor Exit Operator convicted in Austrian lower > court (Zenaan Harkness) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 04:35:09 -0700 > From: coderman > To: cpunks , tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > Subject: XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details requested > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > request for more (english speaking) details on QUELLCODE part of XKeyScore(XKS) > > http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/nsa/us-geheimdienst-spionierte-deutschen-studenten-aus-36657402.bild.html > > specifically subsequent tasking associated with selected anonyms... > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 12:01:15 +0000 > From: Jacob Appelbaum > To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > Cc: cpunks > Subject: Re: [tor-talk] XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details > requested > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Hi, > > On 7/3/14, coderman wrote: >> request for more (english speaking) details on QUELLCODE part of >> XKeyScore(XKS) >> >> http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/nsa/us-geheimdienst-spionierte-deutschen-studenten-aus-36657402.bild.html >> >> specifically subsequent tasking associated with selected anonyms... >> -- > More information will be published shortly, including a long technical > English story with source code and a video this evening on German TV. > > Here are the first bits of our story: > > http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/nsa-xkeyscore-100.html > http://www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/morgenmagazin/politik/deutsche-im-visier-der-nsa-100.html > http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/archiv/2014/Quellcode-entschluesselt-Beweis-fuer-NSA-Spionage-in-Deutschland,nsa224.html > > Stay tuned for the next two publications which will happen in the next > twelve hours. > > All the best, > Jacob > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 14:46:48 +0200 > From: Eugen Leitl > To: cypherpunks at cpunks.org > Subject: Re: XKeyscore-Quellcode: more english details requested > Message-ID: <20140703124648.GG26986 at leitl.org> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > On Thu, Jul 03, 2014 at 04:35:09AM -0700, coderman wrote: >> request for more (english speaking) details on QUELLCODE part of XKeyScore(XKS) >> >> http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/nsa/us-geheimdienst-spionierte-deutschen-studenten-aus-36657402.bild.html >> >> specifically subsequent tasking associated with selected anonyms... > According to fefe who's seen the source it's just a selector > http://blog.fefe.de/?ts=ad4bdd72 > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 15:16:13 +0200 > From: Eugen Leitl > To: cypherpunks at cpunks.org > Subject: tools used by intelligence analysts > Message-ID: <20140703131613.GJ26986 at leitl.org> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > *ORA for network analysis http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/ > Pentaho for data transformation http://www.pentaho.com/ > Rapid Miner for data mining http://sourceforge.net/projects/rapidminer/ > Orange for data visualisations and analysis http://orange.biolab.si/ > Maltego for the analysis of networks between people, companies, websites, etc. http://www.paterva.com/web6/products/maltego.php > Apache Hadoop for large-scale, distributed computing and analysis > > Axis Pro http://www.textronsystems.com/products/advanced-information/axis-pro > Starlight http://starlight.pnnl.gov/ > Analyst's Notebook http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/analysts-notebook-family > Palantir http://www.palantir.com/products/ > > XPLR witk Reddit plugin https://pay.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfReddit/comments/1um89b/preddit_a_subreddit_recommender_with_xplr/[2] > Tiny Tiny Rss http://tt-rss.org/redmine/projects/tt-rss/wiki > Pligg http://pligg.com/ > Twitter, Reddit, ... > > ARC GIS > CPOF http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_Post_of_the_Future > > Metasploit > > Oryon http://sourceforge.net/projects/oryon/ (?) > Investigative Dashboard https://investigativedashboard.org/ (?) > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 5 > Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 09:56:07 -0400 > From: Griffin Boyce > To: cypherpunks at cpunks.org > Subject: Re: tools used by intelligence analysts > Message-ID: <26ebfd1e9a4edd4756866edf60622452 at cryptolab.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed > > This is very useful, thanks for sharing. I'd also add MATLAB to the > list of tools used -- keep in mind that "intelligence analyst" is > extremely broad as a descriptor. Some of these people are low-level > ex-military 35F types, some have a classical statistics research > background, some are social scientists, some are dataviz experts, some > are linguists. So try to distinguish between these and offer sources > when you can. > > Oh, and Cellebrite devices for mobile data collection. > > best, > Griffin > > > On 2014-07-03 09:16, Eugen Leitl `wrote: >> *ORA for network analysis http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/ >> Pentaho for data transformation http://www.pentaho.com/ >> Rapid Miner for data mining http://sourceforge.net/projects/rapidminer/ >> Orange for data visualisations and analysis http://orange.biolab.si/ >> Maltego for the analysis of networks between people, companies, >> websites, etc. http://www.paterva.com/web6/products/maltego.php >> Apache Hadoop for large-scale, distributed computing and analysis >> >> Axis Pro >> http://www.textronsystems.com/products/advanced-information/axis-pro >> Starlight http://starlight.pnnl.gov/ >> Analyst's Notebook >> http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/analysts-notebook-family >> Palantir http://www.palantir.com/products/ >> >> XPLR witk Reddit plugin >> https://pay.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfReddit/comments/1um89b/preddit_a_subreddit_recommender_with_xplr/[2] >> Tiny Tiny Rss http://tt-rss.org/redmine/projects/tt-rss/wiki >> Pligg http://pligg.com/ >> Twitter, Reddit, ... >> >> ARC GIS >> CPOF http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_Post_of_the_Future >> >> Metasploit >> >> Oryon http://sourceforge.net/projects/oryon/ (?) >> Investigative Dashboard https://investigativedashboard.org/ (?) > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 6 > Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 08:26:37 -0700 > From: Seth > To: cpunks , coderman > Subject: Re: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA > marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-15"; delsp="yes"; > format="flowed" > > On Thu, 03 Jul 2014 04:11:45 -0700, coderman wrote: > >> Subject: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all >> Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list > I use Tor for just about all my daily web browsing. > > I also run a Tor relay from home. Even run my own mail server, XMPP and > Friendica nodes from home. > > Guess that makes me an ultra-extremist. > > The irony? I only decided to start using Tor by default for everything > once I became aware of the near total nature of passive surveillance. > > So if using Tor makes me an 'extremist' well, please accept this heartfelt; > _ _____ _____ _ __ __ ____ __ ____ _ _ > _____ _ _ _____ > | | |_ _/ ____| |/ / | \/ \ \ / / | _ \ /\ | | | | / > ____| | \ | |/ ____| /\ > | | | || | | ' / | \ / |\ \_/ / | |_) | / \ | | | | | > (___ | \| | (___ / \ > | | | || | | < | |\/| | \ / | _ < / /\ \ | | | | > \___ \ | . ` |\___ \ / /\ \ > | |____ _| || |____| . \ | | | | | | | |_) / ____ \| |____| |____ > ____) | | |\ |____) / ____ \ > |______|_____\_____|_|\_\ |_| |_| |_| |____/_/ > \_\______|______|_____/ |_| \_|_____/_/ \_\ > > Really there's nothing to lose at this point by encrypting and anonymizing > every bit that leaves every computer you own. > > If NSA wants to own my devices I'll keep cycling them out on a regular > basis with new and used gear I pay for in cash and pick up in person. > >> Conclusion: the world needs way more extremists. If they want cake, they >> should get it in abundance. > I remember reading somewhere that on any given day in the 'United State' > there are a couple hundred thousand active Tor users. We should add > GnuNET, I2P, CJDNS, CurveCP and many more to that list. > > I am Spartacus!!! https://www.piratenpartei.de/2014/07/03/neuer-piraten-geschaeftsfuehrer-sichere-kommunikation-macht-uns-nicht-zu-terroristen/ Best regards Pirate Party Germany Cindy From 42 at enigmabox.net Thu Jul 3 10:19:53 2014 From: 42 at enigmabox.net (42) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 19:19:53 +0200 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list In-Reply-To: References: <53b57339.a4f8420a.17ce.50b2SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20140703191953.905abf1a59665e75df9e6905@enigmabox.net> On Thu, 3 Jul 2014 16:11:39 +0000 Jacob Appelbaum wrote: > Here is some of the source code: > > http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt Can we have the full source code please? And where did *you* get that? Now that everyone knows that they are being flagged when visiting the Tor website or using Tor - people hesitate to use it. A step backward? All the best, 42 From zen at freedbms.net Thu Jul 3 08:34:02 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 01:34:02 +1000 Subject: [tor-talk] Tor Exit Operator convicted in Austrian lower court In-Reply-To: References: <20140701174228.61787hk50z2lhmgw@www.vfemail.net> <53B47174.6040507@torservers.net> <53B4D3BD.2040106@torservers.net> Message-ID: (Thread start: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/033573.html ) On 7/3/14, Anders Andersson wrote: > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 5:53 AM, Moritz Bartl wrote: >> On 07/02/2014 11:00 PM, Anders Andersson wrote: >>> Unfortunately he doesn't seem to want to take this further, so the >>> ruling will stand. It's his choice, but it could be a very bad >>> deterrent to other potential exit node operators in Austria. >> >> We are in contact with William, and quite possibly there is the option >> of following this further with another Austrian operator who >> self-reports himself, with our help. Please everyone give us time to >> look into this together with some lawyers. > > Thank you! That's amazing! I'm quite sure that the support you get > from the Tor community when running an exit node really helps in > giving people the courage to do so. Agreed, great news. In hindsight, it is clear that we as a community have an interest to build a resource of amicus curiae briefs - friend of the court briefs. So PLEASE make moves in the direction of contributing and collecting documents which may be relevant to future cases - at the least a simple collection of legal docs. We have an interest in protecting our free-speech networks (Tor, I2P etc), legally as well as technologically and politically. The Torproject.org website does a good job IMHO of presenting the social case for free-speech networks. No matter the circumstances of a particular case (a particular free speech node operator), we the global free-speech promoting and free-speech facilitating community, have an interest to advise the courts regarding matters of technology and free speech, in order to maximise the sanity of the outcomes brought about by our courts (and yes, another operators courts are as good as mine, in terms of global impact). For example a tor-network node operator charged for actual illegal activity, should not cause legal suppression of free-speech networks in general. To kick things off, here's the gist of what I have in mind (this is in no way directly responsive to the case that started this thread, which I know nothing about): " In this matter an individual has been charged with a [criminal] offence. The case of a matter of an individual committing a proven criminal defamation or incitement must not be used by the court to suppress free speech generally by way of the court's power of judicial sanction. Similarly in this case the [Defendant] was the operator of a 'digital communications facility' which facility was a node in a free-speech network, in particular the [Tor|I2P} free speech network; where the operator is found by this court to have committed unlawful acts, then this court must only target those unlawful acts when it makes its determinations, by way of this court's power of judicial sanction exercised according to law; and this court must not reach beyond those unlawful acts in its determinations/ rulings/ sanctions; if the court exercises its power in reaching beyond those unlawful acts then such exercise of judicial power is likely to undermine confidence in the court by all other operators of the free-speech network and by users of the free speech network. A ruling by this court will be seen by many humans around the world, both operators of free speech nodes in the free speech networks, as well as by users and by potential users of free speech networks around the world. In this case, the rulings of this court are visible globally, and shall be watched by many; there is therefore a great burden upon this court in this case, and this court therefore has a special duty of care when it makes its rulings/ determinations, to be conservative and cautious, in particular regarding any general deterrents this court might ordinarily be minded to create by its rulings which deterrents might unintentionally dampen confidence in this court and/ or confidence in the courts generally to protect our human rights including freedom of communication. This court must be especially careful in its rulings in this matter, since the court is in a position to bring about chilling effects upon the liberties of not only those humans within its immediate jurisdictions, but also upon the broader global community. " (A glosary, localisation, much enhancement and other legal polishing would be required of course, along with subroutined/ separate submissions regarding each relevant law, and regarding each relevant precedent in the jurisdiction in question and/ or in jurisdictions relevant (some cases/precedents are so poignant, so timeless, that they apply all over the world, e.g. the Credit River Decision, as well as the trial of William Penn).) Such advice or briefs to the court are ideally tailored to each particular country/jurisdiction. However, even a brief prepared for some country other than the country at issue, is likely to be useful to those attempting to create a brief for a particular case in another country, and may even be directly useful as a filing in its own right, at least if the language is the same :) Regarding the filing of briefs, we need standing to file; that is, we need an interest in the matter which interest is seen by the court. In some countries particular organisations may be ideal for the filing of such briefs, such as the FSF and EFF (USA) and EFA (Australia). In other countries, if there is no directly applicable organisation, then a "designated representative of the Torproject" who is resident in that country, may have standing to make such a filing. Alternatively, a local human-rights-friendly politician may be amenable to making the filing on behalf of their constituent(s) (that's us). Finally, in general any individual should have standing to make such a filing, since we have an interest in our own human rights - free speech is a fundamental human right - so we should also aim for the preparation and collection of briefs file-able by ourselves. Take notice, we HAVE A DUTY OF CARE to each other, and to the broader community, to contact Torproject and/ or others in this community, if ever we find ourselves in a court case involving the operation of any free speech network node (I2P, Tor, exit or relay), in order that those in the community who have an interest, ie the rest of us (at least those of us in the same country), are given the opportunity to make our interest known to the respective court(s) in that jurisdiction, by way of filing appropriate and standardized briefs. Zenaan From scott at sbce.org Fri Jul 4 09:02:07 2014 From: scott at sbce.org (Scott Blaydes) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 11:02:07 -0500 Subject: messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> You will know this has worked when a wall of the NSA’s Utah Data Center bulges and bursts spilling bits and bytes all over the desert. On Jul 4, 2014, at 9:56 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/jamming-xkeyscore_4.html?m=1 > > Errata Security > > Advanced persistent cybersecurity > > Friday, July 04, 2014 > > Jamming XKeyScore > > Back in the day there was talk about "jamming echelon" by adding keywords to email that the echelon system was supposedly looking for. We can do the same thing for XKeyScore: jam the system with more information than it can handle. (I enumerate the bugs I find in the code as "xks-00xx"). > > > For example, when sending emails, just send from the address "bridges at torproject.org" and in the email body include: > > https://bridges.torproject.org/ > bridge = 0.0.0.1:443 > bridge = 0.0.0.2:443 > bridge = 0.0.0.3:443 > ... > > Continue this for megabytes worth of bridges (xks-0001), and it'll totally mess up XKeyScore. It has no defense against getting flooded with information like this, as far as I can see. > > > Note that the regex only cares about 1 to 3 digit numbers, that means the following will be accepted by the system (xks-0002): > > bridge = 75.748.86.91:80 > > The port number matches on 2 to 4 digits ([0-9]{2,4}). Therefore, bridges with port numbers below 10 and above 9999 will be safe. I don't know if this code reflect a limitation in Tor, or but assuming high/low ports are possible, this can be used to evade detection (xks-0011). > > Strangely, when the port number is parsed, it'll capture the first non-digit character after the port number (xks-0012). This is normally whitespace, but we could generate an email with 256 entries, trying every possible character. A character like < or ' might cause various problems in rendering on an HTML page or generating SQL queries. > > > You can also jam the system with too many Onion addresses (xks-0003), but there are additional ways to screw with those. When looking for Onion addresses, the code uses a regex that contains the following capture clause: > > ([a-z]+):\/\/) > > This is looking for a string like "http://" or "https://", but the regex has no upper bounds (xks-0004) and there is no validation. Thus, you can include "goscrewyourself://o987asgia7gsdfoi.onion:443/" in network traffic, and it'll happily insert this into the database. But remember that "no upper bounds" means just that: the prefix can be kilobytes long, megabytes long, or even gigabytes long. You can open a TCP connection to a system you feel the NSA is monitoring, send 5 gigabytes of lower-case letters, followed by the rest of the Onion address, and see what happens. I mean, there is some practical upper bound somewhere in the system,, and when you hit it, there's a good chance bad things will happen. > > Likewise, the port number for Onion address is captured by the regex (d+), meaning any number of digits (xks-0005). Thus, we could get numbers that overflow 16-bits, 32-bits, 64-bits, or 982745987-bits. Very long strings of digits (megabytes) at this point might cause bad things to happen within the system. > > There is an extra-special thing that happens when the schema part of the Onion address is exactly 16-bytes long (xks-0006). This will cause the address and the scheme to reverse themselves when inserted into the database. Thus, we can insert digits into the scheme field. This might foul up later code that assumes schemes only contain letters, because only letters match in the regex. > > > In some protocol fields, the regexes appear to be partial matches. The system appears to match on HTTP servers with "mixminion" anywhere in the name. Thus, we start causing lots of traffic to go to our domains, such as "mixminion.robertgraham.com", that will cause their servers to fill up with long term storage of sessions they don't care about (xks-0007) > > > Let's talk X.509, and the following code: > > fingerprint('anonymizer/tor/bridge/tls') = > ssl_x509_subject('bridges.torproject.org') or > ssl_dns_name('bridges.torproject.org'); > > Code that parses X.509 certificates is known to be flaky as all get out. The simplest thing to do is find a data center you feel the NSA can monitor, and then setup a hostile server that can do generic fuzzing of X.509 certificates, trying to crash them. > > It's likely that whatever code is parsing X.509 certificates is not validating them. Thus, anybody can put certificates on their servers claiming to be 'bridges.torproject.org' (xks-0008). It's likely that the NSA is parsing SSL on all ports, so just pick a random port on your server not being used for anything else, create a self-signed CERT claiming to be "bridges.torproject.org', then create incoming links to that port from other places so at least search-engines will follow that link and generate traffic. This will cause the NSA database of bridges to fill up with bad information -- assuming it's not already full from people screwing with the emails as noted above :). > > >

> > Putting the above code in a web page like this one will cause every visitor to trigger a search for TAILS in the XKeyScore rules. The more people who do this, the less useful it becomes to the NSA (xks-0009) in labeling people as suspicious. Likewise, putting tails.boum.org/<.title> in your webpages will cause the same effect, even when CSS/JavaScript makes such a title invisible. > > > In theory, the NSA should only be monitoring foreign traffic, and not traffic originating from the United States (or, apparently, the other five-eyes). So here is the fun thing (xks-0010): run your jamming tools from United States IP addresses against those servers in Iran you know the NSA is monitoring. Since the code should already be ignoring the traffic because it originates from the United States, then they can't complain if you've filled up their databases full of Tor Onion and bridge addresses. > > Robert Graham -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 842 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140704/bf67161d/attachment.sig> From wb8foz at nrk.com Fri Jul 4 09:24:09 2014 From: wb8foz at nrk.com (David) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 12:24:09 -0400 Subject: messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> Message-ID: <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> On 7/4/14 12:02 PM, Scott Blaydes wrote: > You will know this has worked when a wall of the NSA’s Utah Data Center > bulges and bursts spilling bits and bytes all over the desert. But will they then get shut down by the EPA? From nathan at squimp.com Fri Jul 4 04:59:14 2014 From: nathan at squimp.com (Nathan Andrew Fain) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 13:59:14 +0200 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list In-Reply-To: <CAFggDF2kQnBtsMr3tJYxijXwyrHRhX5JBpm6b3NbjpoJFfAw=g@mail.gmail.com> References: <53b57339.a4f8420a.17ce.50b2SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> <CAJVRA1TtTrizkaH03_pMr4rWnpnp67UpRyU=xTQ-nkD51B_40g@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1QJt0muygvVPiw+iFvtWb6kd_kNgGw8c7zjwmbWH4c8Rg@mail.gmail.com> <CAFggDF2kQnBtsMr3tJYxijXwyrHRhX5JBpm6b3NbjpoJFfAw=g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53B69712.2090909@squimp.com> what was the last modification time for these filters? or is that unclear? On 03/07/2014 18:11, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: > On 7/3/14, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >> On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 8:36 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> >> wrote: >>> ... i presume you mean as below: (more a translation than >>> additional QUELLCODE info though ;) >> > > Here is some of the source code: > > http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt > > Happy hacking, Jacob > From nathan at squimp.com Fri Jul 4 05:15:34 2014 From: nathan at squimp.com (Nathan Andrew Fain) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 14:15:34 +0200 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> "Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, Deanonymization" Alex Biryukov, Ivan Pustogarov, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf the two seem very similar. in the case of the paper linked amazon services were utilized. or perhaps someone can explain where the two research groups differ? On 03/07/2014 20:05, grarpamp wrote: > You Don't Have to be the NSA to Break Tor: Deanonymizing Users on a > Budget Alexander Volynkin / Michael McCord > > [...] Looking for the IP address of a Tor user? Not a problem. > Trying to uncover the location of a Hidden Service? Done. We know > because we tested it, in the wild... > > In this talk, we demonstrate how the distributed nature, combined > with newly discovered shortcomings in design and implementation of > the Tor network, can be abused to break Tor anonymity. In our > analysis, we've discovered that a persistent adversary with a > handful of powerful servers and a couple gigabit links can > de-anonymize hundreds of thousands Tor clients and thousands of > hidden services within a couple of months. The total investment > cost? Just under $3,000. During this talk, we will quickly cover > the nature, feasibility, and limitations of possible attacks, and > then dive into dozens of successful real-world de-anonymization > case studies, ranging from attribution of botnet command and > control servers, to drug-trading sites, to users of kiddie porn > places. The presentation will conclude with lessons learned and our > thoughts on the future of security of distributed anonymity > networks. > From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 11:47:13 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 14:47:13 -0400 Subject: [tor-talk] messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28XUPfoNK2PTwVAg164MSoCuw1hUZzYDcR4qGLz5ykG9Q@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 10:56 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/jamming-xkeyscore_4.html?m=1 Good work, glad someone had time to really dig in, perhaps even drawing on some comments from others in the early buzz such as https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/033695.html > Andreas Krey >> grarpamp >> http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt >> 2) rules100... this thing likely has more N00 rulesets as well. > Er, no. ndr.de always uses URLs with 100 or similar in them. > (No idea why.) That is not the original file name. Ahh, good to know, thanks. From eugen at leitl.org Fri Jul 4 06:15:32 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 15:15:32 +0200 Subject: [tor-dev] XKeyscore rules probably are from Snowden, after all Message-ID: <20140704131531.GN26986@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Maxim Kammerer <mk at dee.su> ----- From wahspilihp at gmail.com Thu Jul 3 22:47:26 2014 From: wahspilihp at gmail.com (Philip Shaw) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 15:17:26 +0930 Subject: SSL Co-op In-Reply-To: <1714525.rN0PzF0okU@lapuntu> References: <1714525.rN0PzF0okU@lapuntu> Message-ID: <16E3D954-1049-4A27-9FCB-395196DD5444@gmail.com> On 26 Jun 2014, at 5:51 , rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > So, > > this has been proposed: > http://www.hezmatt.org/~mpalmer/blog/2014/06/05/ssl-certificate-cooperative.html > http://www.hezmatt.org/~mpalmer/blog/2014/06/25/moving-forward-with-an-ssl-coop.html > http://www.sslcoop.org/ > > "The vision of the SSL Co-operative is to be a professionally-operated, > member-controlled globally-trusted Certification Authority, serving the > identity verification and management needs of its members. > > At present, this initiative is in the analysis and planning stage. > Investigation is underway to determine the full set of costs involved, both > financial and temporal. > > If you think a member-controlled CA that puts the interests of its members, > and that of the Internet community, ahead of profits is a good idea, and > might consider being a member if it gets off the ground, I would appreciate > it if you would fill out a short survey letting me know a little bit about > your organisation, to ensure that the co-op best serves your needs.” http://www.cacert.org seems to be an attempt to do something like that, but there are two catches: * CACert association membership is by nomination by pre-existing members, rather than being everyone with a certificate (or, perhaps more practically, open to everyone with a certificate). * It hasn’t complied with the CA/Browser Forum rules, so isn’t included in any of the four main browser certificate lists. I’m not sure how professional their operation is either: their class 1 certificates are issued robotically (although that doesn’t make them any worse than some for-profit CAs), and I haven’t actually looked into the verification they offer for class 3 certs. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 535 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140704/1f155917/attachment.sig> From mk at dee.su Fri Jul 4 05:40:01 2014 From: mk at dee.su (Maxim Kammerer) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 15:40:01 +0300 Subject: [tor-dev] XKeyscore rules probably are from Snowden, after all Message-ID: <CAHsXYDBdwVu6dcmY1NETphzPa6PBLBsEaVT2rH0nCkrZ4b2SJg@mail.gmail.com> There has been some speculation that the recent XKeyscore rule leaks [1] do not come from Snowden — particularly, by Schneier [2]. I believe that there is a good case that the leaks do come from Snowden, since it is possible to pinpoint the date range when the rule sources [3] have been last updated. The earliest possible date is 2011-08-08, when the Linux Journal writeup about Tails [4], referenced by the glob pattern "linuxjournal.com/content/linux*" has been published. The pattern is not a generic Linux Journal filter, as implied in [1]. The likely latest possible date is 2012-02-28, when "maatuska" directory authority has changed its IP [5]. A less likely upper bound is 2012-09-21, when "Faravahar" directory authority has been added [6]. NSA either took the 8 authorities from the actual consensus, or picked them from Tor's sources [7]. However, Tor sources list more than 8 authorities, and are not properly maintained (e.g., see entry for "moria1" wrt. its last .34/.39 octet tweaks), so I doubt NSA would use that. Moreover, it is hard to miss the port number in the sources, whereas NSA did miss that some authorities do not (and did not) use ports 80/443. E.g., "moria1" (the MIT campus server mentioned in [1]) would not be matched as a Tor authority by the rules. Snowden most likely tried to contact Greenwald at the end of 2012 [8], which is entirely consistent with the above. Another NSA employee leaking XKeyscore rules after being inspired by Snowden's leaks, would have probably downloaded a more up-to-date rules file. Cross-posting to tor-dev, in case I got any historical directory authority changes wrong. [1] http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html [2] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/07/nsa_targets_pri.html [3] http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt [4] http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/linux-distro-tales-you-can-never-be-too-paranoid [5] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2012-February/003312.html [6] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5749 [7] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/src/or/config.c [8] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/laura-poitras-snowden.html -- Maxim Kammerer Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev at lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 13:05:29 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 16:05:29 -0400 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 8:15 AM, Nathan Andrew Fain <nathan at squimp.com> wrote: > "Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, > Deanonymization" > Alex Biryukov, Ivan Pustogarov, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann > http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf > > the two seem very similar. in the case of the paper linked amazon > services were utilized. or perhaps someone can explain where the two > research groups differ? Yes, clearly an extension, optimization, or new work along the lines of the above paper. Perhaps more interesting is this dilemma... > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/033693.html > "They wanted a NDA, so most Tor Project's core contributors don't know > what's in the air." So we have at least one core person who knows. Now assuming this presentation [1] is in fact 'Really Bad News' for, at minimum, Hidden Services... will the details of it be leaked in order to 'save' HS operators/users before CERTs/GOVs/LEAs/Vigilantes/Spies and the thought police have time to get at them (or what unexposed elements still remain of them)? This is premised upon CERT's typical cozy relationships with LEA's, naturally leading to sharing with them what are potentially ... 'tested ... in the wild ... dozens of successful real-world de-anonymization case studies, ranging from attribution of' ... really diskliked things. Particularly cases of human harm where it is only natural to seek intervention. Then there are the cases worthy of every possible protection outlined here... https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en Therein lies the dilemma. What do you do? [Note that even if the above relationships, or desire to intervene, do not exist... said spies and their actors are likely to monitor the full research details, and know who in the public knows as well. This could lead to shorter time constraints on all sides.] [1] Which I forgot to link in the OP, thanks Matthew. https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#you-dont-have-to-be-the-nsa-to-break-tor-deanonymizing-users-on-a-budget From nathan at squimp.com Fri Jul 4 07:38:20 2014 From: nathan at squimp.com (Nathan Andrew Fain) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 16:38:20 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized Message-ID: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> Based on the xkeyscore rules does anyone have some idea of the technology being utilized? Looking at the mapreduce::plugin definition I get the impression Hadoop is in use. Hadoop provides a stream interface for Map Reduce functions letting one utilize any program or language of their choosing [1-example]. Can with more knowledge of distributed data technologies confirm this? 1. http://cs.smith.edu/dftwiki/index.php/Hadoop_Tutorial_2.2_--_Running_C++_Programs_on_Hadoop see also slide 5: http://cecs.wright.edu/~tkprasad/courses/cs707/ProgrammingHadoop.pdf <quote> cat input | grep | sort | unique -c | cat > output Input | Map | Shuffle & Sort | Reduce | Output </quote> From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 13:52:52 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 16:52:52 -0400 Subject: Disk Firmware Data Exfiltration Backdoor / NSA IRATEMONK Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29EQ43VjnRVBjxC5N2OD855eArEAtpA17AEJK5MnDRLPw@mail.gmail.com> http://s3.eurecom.fr/docs/acsac13_zaddach.pdf http://s3.eurecom.fr/~zaddach/docs/Recon14_HDD.pdf http://s3.eurecom.fr/publications.html Always interesting when public, and presumably secret, research are lined up beside each other (recon slides). From eugen at leitl.org Fri Jul 4 07:56:41 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 16:56:41 +0200 Subject: messing with XKeyScore Message-ID: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/jamming-xkeyscore_4.html?m=1 Errata Security Advanced persistent cybersecurity Friday, July 04, 2014 Jamming XKeyScore Back in the day there was talk about "jamming echelon" by adding keywords to email that the echelon system was supposedly looking for. We can do the same thing for XKeyScore: jam the system with more information than it can handle. (I enumerate the bugs I find in the code as "xks-00xx"). For example, when sending emails, just send from the address "bridges at torproject.org" and in the email body include: https://bridges.torproject.org/ bridge = 0.0.0.1:443 bridge = 0.0.0.2:443 bridge = 0.0.0.3:443 ... Continue this for megabytes worth of bridges (xks-0001), and it'll totally mess up XKeyScore. It has no defense against getting flooded with information like this, as far as I can see. Note that the regex only cares about 1 to 3 digit numbers, that means the following will be accepted by the system (xks-0002): bridge = 75.748.86.91:80 The port number matches on 2 to 4 digits ([0-9]{2,4}). Therefore, bridges with port numbers below 10 and above 9999 will be safe. I don't know if this code reflect a limitation in Tor, or but assuming high/low ports are possible, this can be used to evade detection (xks-0011). Strangely, when the port number is parsed, it'll capture the first non-digit character after the port number (xks-0012). This is normally whitespace, but we could generate an email with 256 entries, trying every possible character. A character like < or ' might cause various problems in rendering on an HTML page or generating SQL queries. You can also jam the system with too many Onion addresses (xks-0003), but there are additional ways to screw with those. When looking for Onion addresses, the code uses a regex that contains the following capture clause: ([a-z]+):\/\/) This is looking for a string like "http://" or "https://", but the regex has no upper bounds (xks-0004) and there is no validation. Thus, you can include "goscrewyourself://o987asgia7gsdfoi.onion:443/" in network traffic, and it'll happily insert this into the database. But remember that "no upper bounds" means just that: the prefix can be kilobytes long, megabytes long, or even gigabytes long. You can open a TCP connection to a system you feel the NSA is monitoring, send 5 gigabytes of lower-case letters, followed by the rest of the Onion address, and see what happens. I mean, there is some practical upper bound somewhere in the system,, and when you hit it, there's a good chance bad things will happen. Likewise, the port number for Onion address is captured by the regex (d+), meaning any number of digits (xks-0005). Thus, we could get numbers that overflow 16-bits, 32-bits, 64-bits, or 982745987-bits. Very long strings of digits (megabytes) at this point might cause bad things to happen within the system. There is an extra-special thing that happens when the schema part of the Onion address is exactly 16-bytes long (xks-0006). This will cause the address and the scheme to reverse themselves when inserted into the database. Thus, we can insert digits into the scheme field. This might foul up later code that assumes schemes only contain letters, because only letters match in the regex. In some protocol fields, the regexes appear to be partial matches. The system appears to match on HTTP servers with "mixminion" anywhere in the name. Thus, we start causing lots of traffic to go to our domains, such as "mixminion.robertgraham.com", that will cause their servers to fill up with long term storage of sessions they don't care about (xks-0007) Let's talk X.509, and the following code: fingerprint('anonymizer/tor/bridge/tls') = ssl_x509_subject('bridges.torproject.org') or ssl_dns_name('bridges.torproject.org'); Code that parses X.509 certificates is known to be flaky as all get out. The simplest thing to do is find a data center you feel the NSA can monitor, and then setup a hostile server that can do generic fuzzing of X.509 certificates, trying to crash them. It's likely that whatever code is parsing X.509 certificates is not validating them. Thus, anybody can put certificates on their servers claiming to be 'bridges.torproject.org' (xks-0008). It's likely that the NSA is parsing SSL on all ports, so just pick a random port on your server not being used for anything else, create a self-signed CERT claiming to be "bridges.torproject.org', then create incoming links to that port from other places so at least search-engines will follow that link and generate traffic. This will cause the NSA database of bridges to fill up with bad information -- assuming it's not already full from people screwing with the emails as noted above :). <img src="http://www.google.com/?q=tails+usb" /> Putting the above code in a web page like this one will cause every visitor to trigger a search for TAILS in the XKeyScore rules. The more people who do this, the less useful it becomes to the NSA (xks-0009) in labeling people as suspicious. Likewise, putting <title>tails.boum.org/<.title> in your webpages will cause the same effect, even when CSS/JavaScript makes such a title invisible. In theory, the NSA should only be monitoring foreign traffic, and not traffic originating from the United States (or, apparently, the other five-eyes). So here is the fun thing (xks-0010): run your jamming tools from United States IP addresses against those servers in Iran you know the NSA is monitoring. Since the code should already be ignoring the traffic because it originates from the United States, then they can't complain if you've filled up their databases full of Tor Onion and bridge addresses. Robert Graham From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 14:04:01 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 17:04:01 -0400 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> On 7/4/14, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#you-dont-have-to-be-the-nsa-to-break-tor-deanonymizing-users-on-a-budget I2P is a tool that likely presents the nearest analog to Tor's hidden services (.i2p) to the user. Usable in much the same way. Always good to be familiar with and have other options out there. And see that they receive community research and review efforts too. http://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor From hozer at hozed.org Fri Jul 4 16:21:21 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 18:21:21 -0500 Subject: NSA targets the privacy-conscious In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TX8461nayt4uC28=cDuSTgabFAG4=rfrUJB=3K4F3_Ew@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140703152947.GK26986@leitl.org> <E1X2kAT-0000Ax-U0@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAJVRA1TX8461nayt4uC28=cDuSTgabFAG4=rfrUJB=3K4F3_Ew@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140704232121.GL3180@nl.grid.coop> On Thu, Jul 03, 2014 at 01:24:14PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 9:47 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > > ... sharing tips on spying the counterspies, > > i for one am most concerned about spying the counter-counter-spies. > > ... note that no cryptome.org fingerprint yet leaked; perhaps JYA > successfully signal jamming the collection colossus through copious > cross pollination. JYA & cryptome is not really business sensitive 'material non-public information'. However, if you want advance tips to pass on to your VC buddies you'd flag some software developers for big business http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/nsa-linux-journal-extremist-forum-and-its-readers-get-flagged-extra-surveillance Then you go with phase two and connect that data to high frequency trading algorithms to properly anonymize the ill-gotten gains, and then proceed to launder, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/venture-capitalist-tim-draper-wins-bitcoin-auction/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 rinse, repeat From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 16:00:03 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 19:00:03 -0400 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Paweł Zegartowski <pzegar at gmail.com> wrote: > I2P (aka Invisible Internet Protocol) is designed to be "a real undernet" > Using I2P to acces a "standard" Internet but in anonymous way is much less Right, in the likely context of the subject exploit, I referred only to the similar .onion/.i2p hidden constructs that available for users. Binding to and using them is a bit different of course but it all works. And the .i2p's are generally as 'efficient' (speedy) in use regarding initial connect, latency and bandwidth, if not better. (A lot of filesharing is on i2p.) Bootstrapping into the net does take a while though. And of course as with any other darknet you should run a 'non-exit' relay to help out. i2p does have 'exits' you can compare to tor as well. Anyone can run an exit. But users have first find one on a wiki list or somesuch, and then manually configure their i2p to use it. Consider it like a bolt on proxy. Last I checked one comes preconfigured but as such expect it to be far overloaded. No reason there can't be many, there just aren't. > http://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor From guninski at guninski.com Fri Jul 4 09:07:05 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 19:07:05 +0300 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized In-Reply-To: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> References: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> Message-ID: <20140704160705.GA2481@sivokote.iziade.m$> Another question: How much traffic they are monitoring with these definitions? All visible? Almost all except the u$a? I suspect the above will require quite large hardware. I suppose this is a matter of importance for the dear NSA. To paraphrase a Susan Sontag quote [1] ``Most people in this society who aren't actively terrorists are, at best, reformed or potential terrorists.'' [1] http://thinkexist.com/quotation/most_people_in_this_society_who_aren-t_actively/220423.html On Fri, Jul 04, 2014 at 04:38:20PM +0200, Nathan Andrew Fain wrote: > Based on the xkeyscore rules does anyone have some idea of the > technology being utilized? > > Looking at the mapreduce::plugin definition I get the impression > Hadoop is in use. Hadoop provides a stream interface for Map Reduce > functions letting one utilize any program or language of their > choosing [1-example]. Can with more knowledge of distributed data > technologies confirm this? > > 1. > http://cs.smith.edu/dftwiki/index.php/Hadoop_Tutorial_2.2_--_Running_C++_Programs_on_Hadoop > see also slide 5: > http://cecs.wright.edu/~tkprasad/courses/cs707/ProgrammingHadoop.pdf > <quote> > cat input | grep | sort | unique -c | cat > output > Input | Map | Shuffle & Sort | Reduce | Output > </quote> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Fri Jul 4 10:22:26 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 19:22:26 +0200 Subject: messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> Message-ID: <1835869.E5psAZDHl5@lapuntu> Dnia piątek, 4 lipca 2014 12:24:09 David pisze: > On 7/4/14 12:02 PM, Scott Blaydes wrote: > > You will know this has worked when a wall of the NSA’s Utah Data Center > > bulges and bursts spilling bits and bytes all over the desert. > > But will they then get shut down by the EPA? A THOUSAND EYES, TWISTED TAIL, EPA! EPA! TRAPPED FOREVER! -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140704/233e10ca/attachment.sig> From jya at pipeline.com Fri Jul 4 17:15:14 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 20:15:14 -0400 Subject: NSA targets the privacy-conscious In-Reply-To: <20140704232121.GL3180@nl.grid.coop> References: <20140703152947.GK26986@leitl.org> <E1X2kAT-0000Ax-U0@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAJVRA1TX8461nayt4uC28=cDuSTgabFAG4=rfrUJB=3K4F3_Ew@mail.gmail.com> <20140704232121.GL3180@nl.grid.coop> Message-ID: <E1X3Dcb-0007ct-Fd@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Clamoring to get on NSA hit lists for popular support and corresponding business, researching, teaching, litigating and speaking opportunities is a frenzy. Once it was a booster being on the FBI hit lists, then CIA, then KGB, then MI5 and/or MI6, then Mossad, then Savak, then Cheney, then Bin Laden, then AQ in Yemen, now Glenn Greenwald is swamped with applicants to be put on list of names of US persons who are desperate to be surveilled for starring roles in the multiple scripts of the Snowden blockbusters, with many more digital Che's in the pipeline. Snowden's mom has not yet, in public, rolled out a campaign for evelasting fame and profit for her darling like Assange's mother and various fathers. Ed's dad has had his team going full blast for a year, in concert with ACLU, EFF, Plato Cacheris and a gaggle of natsec sharks and stunt arrangers, the red phones are hot between DC and Moscow to set up beamings of Snowden for queues of ass-kissers eager to be photographed with his metadata-rich talking head. US attorneys in Eastern Virginia, DC, Southern NY and Northern CA are wagering on who gets Assange, who gets Snowden, who gets Greenwald, who gets Poitras, Appelbaum and unnamed co-conspirators along with the dudes at EFF for orchestrating Ed's seduction, purloining and dashings from Japan to Maryland to Hawaii to Hong Kong to Moscow. Other ex-NSA patriots are in heavy demand to beef up the lightweight Snowden with dark musings on what the young man had no access to but they did and will never ever tell. Behind the legal and media shindigs technical agents are working the outliers, FOI minions, CCC, Pirates, Torrents, Drops, Jabbers, chats, IP2s, the invisible -- really -- of dark nets to gather intel on counterspying apparatus and IO errors. This is Phase 1. At 07:21 PM 7/4/2014, you wrote: >On Thu, Jul 03, 2014 at 01:24:14PM -0700, coderman wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 9:47 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > > > ... sharing tips on spying the counterspies, > > > > i for one am most concerned about spying the counter-counter-spies. > > > > ... note that no cryptome.org fingerprint yet leaked; perhaps JYA > > successfully signal jamming the collection colossus through copious > > cross pollination. > >JYA & cryptome is not really business sensitive 'material non-public >information'. However, if you want advance tips to pass on to your >VC buddies you'd flag some software developers for big business >http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/nsa-linux-journal-extremist-forum-and-its-readers-get-flagged-extra-surveillance > >Then you go with phase two and connect that data to high frequency >trading algorithms to properly anonymize the ill-gotten gains, and >then proceed to launder, >http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/venture-capitalist-tim-draper-wins-bitcoin-auction/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 >rinse, >repeat From guninski at guninski.com Fri Jul 4 10:23:22 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 20:23:22 +0300 Subject: messing with XKeyScore In-Reply-To: <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> References: <20140704145641.GP26986@leitl.org> <88301F56-A159-4E79-8E19-E78B7B43F01C@sbce.org> <53B6D529.6080409@nrk.com> Message-ID: <20140704172322.GB2481@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Fri, Jul 04, 2014 at 12:24:09PM -0400, David wrote: > On 7/4/14 12:02 PM, Scott Blaydes wrote: > > >You will know this has worked when a wall of the NSA’s Utah Data Center > >bulges and bursts spilling bits and bytes all over the desert. > > > But will they then get shut down by the EPA? Not sure I understand correctly, but a positive answer to the first question would imply to me the Game Of Life works correctly no matter what EPA means/does. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Fri Jul 4 21:54:26 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 01:54:26 -0300 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> "BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000" Oh, come on. That is 'FUD"! A conspiracy theory!! Those guys didn't create tor, so they shouldn't be hacking it!!! FUCK THEM. Tor is a project of the US government, the most righteous and clever organization on the planet, and the invincible defenders of free speech. Their anonymity network is simply unassailable. $3000? Please. Look, their own site says "Protect your privacy. Defend yourself against network surveillance and traffic analysis."[1] See? Using tor you can defend yourself against TRAFFIC ANALYSIS! There you have it. How on earth can tor be vulnerable to trivial traffic analysis when their site says just the opposite? HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid liars! You freedom hating commies! and so on and so forth... [1] https://www.torproject.org/ (yes! Now I feel like a real phd who wrote an email with a [] numbered footnote) From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Sat Jul 5 01:18:12 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 09:18:12 +0100 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <53B7B4C4.70103@cathalgarvey.me> Funny, nobody else responded that way. On 05/07/14 05:54, Juan wrote: > > "BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000" > > Oh, come on. That is 'FUD"! A conspiracy theory!! Those guys didn't > create tor, so they shouldn't be hacking it!!! FUCK THEM. > > Tor is a project of the US government, the most righteous and clever > organization on the planet, and the invincible defenders of free speech. > > Their anonymity network is simply unassailable. $3000? Please. > > Look, their own site says > > "Protect your privacy. Defend yourself against network surveillance and > traffic analysis."[1] > > > See? Using tor you can defend yourself against TRAFFIC ANALYSIS! There > you have it. How on earth can tor be vulnerable to trivial traffic > analysis when their site says just the opposite? > > HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid > liars! You freedom hating commies! > > > and so on and so forth... > > > [1] > https://www.torproject.org/ > > > (yes! Now I feel like a real phd who wrote an email with a [] numbered > footnote) > > > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/742260c4/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/742260c4/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Sat Jul 5 01:20:34 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 09:20:34 +0100 Subject: Spam more i2p outproxies? (Was: Re: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000) In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53B7B552.4090701@cathalgarvey.me> > I checked one comes preconfigured but as such expect > it to be far overloaded. No reason there can't be many, > there just aren't. Quite right, there's no reason why there can't be more, except for the liability of actually hosting those exits. OTOH, there are now plenty of hosts who accept bitcoin for hosting in countries that probably don't give a damn about outproxies, so why not crowdfund a set of dedicated high-bandwidth outproxies? On 05/07/14 00:00, grarpamp wrote: > On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Paweł Zegartowski <pzegar at gmail.com> wrote: >> I2P (aka Invisible Internet Protocol) is designed to be "a real undernet" >> Using I2P to acces a "standard" Internet but in anonymous way is much less > > Right, in the likely context of the subject exploit, I referred only to > the similar .onion/.i2p hidden constructs that available for users. > Binding to and using them is a bit different of course but it all works. > And the .i2p's are generally as 'efficient' (speedy) in use regarding > initial connect, latency and bandwidth, if not better. (A lot of filesharing > is on i2p.) Bootstrapping into the net does take a while though. And > of course as with any other darknet you should run a 'non-exit' relay > to help out. > > i2p does have 'exits' you can compare to tor as well. > Anyone can run an exit. But users have first find one > on a wiki list or somesuch, and then manually configure > their i2p to use it. Consider it like a bolt on proxy. Last > I checked one comes preconfigured but as such expect > it to be far overloaded. No reason there can't be many, > there just aren't. > >> http://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/da4df436/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/da4df436/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sat Jul 5 01:50:26 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 10:50:26 +0200 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <3809175.sgfKXsGOB8@lapuntu> Dnia sobota, 5 lipca 2014 01:54:26 Juan pisze: > "BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000" > > Oh, come on. That is 'FUD"! A conspiracy theory!! Those guys didn't > create tor, so they shouldn't be hacking it!!! FUCK THEM. > > Tor is a project of the US government, the most righteous and clever > organization on the planet, and the invincible defenders of free speech. > > Their anonymity network is simply unassailable. $3000? Please. > > Look, their own site says > > "Protect your privacy. Defend yourself against network surveillance and > traffic analysis."[1] > > > See? Using tor you can defend yourself against TRAFFIC ANALYSIS! There > you have it. How on earth can tor be vulnerable to trivial traffic > analysis when their site says just the opposite? > > HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid > liars! You freedom hating commies! > > > and so on and so forth... See, the thing is: the fact that somebody submitted such a talk doesn't mean it holds any water yet. I will gladly have a look at the documents and the talk to see, what the problem is. Once we know that, we'll see if the Tor guys can fix it, or not. There have been several "deanonimize Tor" talks over the years. Some where pure bull, some held some water and caused changes to Tor. That's the normal lifecycle of any complicated project. But ah, why am I feeding the trolls? :) > (yes! Now I feel like a real phd who wrote an email with a [] numbered > footnote) Good for you. :) -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/22fb7011/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sat Jul 5 03:55:21 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 12:55:21 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized In-Reply-To: <20140704160705.GA2481@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> <20140704160705.GA2481@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <3915223.CRxYkLzkWp@lapuntu> Dnia piątek, 4 lipca 2014 19:07:05 Georgi Guninski pisze: > Another question: > > How much traffic they are monitoring with these definitions? > All visible? > Almost all except the u$a? Well, some definitions contain Five Eyes country codes as negative matching rules (i.e. IPs from Five Eyes countries will *not* get matched), others do not have this condition. I find this very surprising as it suggests that Five Eyes and other exclusion rules are possibly defined on a per-fingerprint basis; I would have thought these would rather be implemented somewhere higher-up (i.e. some post- processing/post-filtering) so that IPs from Five Eyes don't get accidentally snatched due to somebody forgetting to include the rule in their fingerprint. On the other hand, I guess it can also be the other way around: NSA doesn't give a flying fsck about Five Eyes and the policy is to "grab everything, nobody will know anyway"; the "do not include Five Eyes IPs" rule in one of the fingerprints would then be an overzealous technician including it in the fingerprint because they thought they should ("we don't spy on our friends", etc). Fun stuff either way. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/029c92e5/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 5 11:29:08 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 14:29:08 -0400 Subject: Spam more i2p outproxies? (Was: Re: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000) In-Reply-To: <53B7B552.4090701@cathalgarvey.me> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <53B69AE6.80102@squimp.com> <CAD2Ti29CTh=ow9Kpum377iR6bafvR_howCew=oC95n3AuQsJaQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_gd1K+NZhm1QfOe3=qyGuBoz2nPySuoCCc8amDNg4eTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAEcD9QdH9G-g6BBQfP5aq8HwAy-8mKBNb5=Cy2C6v+bugV9v6w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> <53B7B552.4090701@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-oaQBzonT6whCF2UQu702zv1vBosBhGGJLqusEfvwJug@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 4:20 AM, Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> wrote: > Quite right, there's no reason why there can't be more, except for the > liability of actually hosting those exits. OTOH, there are now plenty of > hosts who accept bitcoin for hosting in countries that probably don't > give a damn about outproxies, so why not crowdfund a set of dedicated > high-bandwidth outproxies? Legally, in most western / sane countries, there are provider/carrier/isp exceptions exits fall into such that running exits (tor/i2p/vpn/proxies) is not a problem... Tor has about 1000 of them. And if you follow torproject.org, torservers.net, noisebridge.net, accessnow.org, you'll find lots of donation and funding efforts. eff.org runs PR challenges. This all applies to I2P and other projects, they could join together in these efforts, and develop some more of their own as well. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 5 11:51:54 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 14:51:54 -0400 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28ki1yJy+ChdB3-vd1xA+0Fyipgr=i8fjj0OkOMRyH-Qw@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 2:13 PM, Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> wrote: > https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore There's some sort of old and hopefully irrelevant spat here: http://www.tox-chat.com/ From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Sat Jul 5 11:13:11 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 19:13:11 +0100 Subject: Tox.im Message-ID: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Anyone looked this over? I only just discovered it, but it seems nice: * P2P * Encrypted * Voice/Video/Chat/Files * GPL'd https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore It's written mostly in C(++) with a dash of assembly, which worries me security wise.. -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/0ec034a4/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/0ec034a4/attachment.sig> From l at odewijk.nl Sat Jul 5 10:52:59 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 19:52:59 +0200 Subject: On trolls - was Re: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <CAOsGNSTJJCMcG7LCUyOHuN5RSc_mqtVF8tVLWnzeXkTwY0UtPw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAOsGNSTJJCMcG7LCUyOHuN5RSc_mqtVF8tVLWnzeXkTwY0UtPw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKGNMGtjPtK8UQ39Day8xfAYqsP65kkH98m1VwBGEobKg@mail.gmail.com> What about humanity hating nihilists? Think they're crazy? Just thinking in a way that defines "they" is the real insanity here. Maybe you should think before you judge. God! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 308 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/138d87a4/attachment.txt> From geert at desk.nl Sat Jul 5 11:29:38 2014 From: geert at desk.nl (Geert Lovink) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 20:29:38 +0200 Subject: open the snowden files In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29EQ43VjnRVBjxC5N2OD855eArEAtpA17AEJK5MnDRLPw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti29EQ43VjnRVBjxC5N2OD855eArEAtpA17AEJK5MnDRLPw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <BF5745F2-BF44-49FB-BA13-744FF7BB79F7@desk.nl> (fwd. from the nettime mailinglist /geert) from: Krystian Woznicki <kw at berlinergazette.de> the snowden files are of public interest. but only a small circle of people is able to access, read, analyze, interpret and publish them. and only a very small percentage of those files has been made available to the public. those who belong to the small circle of people, tend to argue that this has to do with security reasons. so one could say, that the leaked files have been "secured" in order to prevent bigger harm. yet, in the very sense that "data is the oil of the 21 century" one can also say, that the snowden files have been privatised by people who try to exploit them according to their own interests. what can be done about this situation? are we able to find a way to "open" this data? and in the course of this create a modell for future leaks? many researchers, activistis and technology experts (not to speak of other journalists than the "few luckey ones") have a great interest to work with those files. imagine the historical impact on sciences, social movements and it-infrastructures, if those files would serve as material to study and learn from in the respective areas. the snowden story has been a great, exceptional media narrative -- if only for its unusual duration (unfolding over the course of more than a year and stimulating a variety of debates). but the fact, that material, that one brave whistleblower considered to be worth of public interest, has been "secured" or "privatised", rendering again unaccessible what previously has been unaccessible -- doesn't this fact add a very unsettling layer to the narrative, turning the success story into somewhat of a tragedy? yesterday at the netzwerk recherche conference in hamburg (the great gathering of the investigative community) i confronted luke harding (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luke_Harding) with this question. prior to my intervention harding had already hinted at some very obvious limitations of the ongoing investigation, alluding to various reasons why those "few lucky ones" are incapable to deal with the investigation challenge in an approriate manner: "we are not technical experts" or "after two hours your eyes pop out". inspite of this, harding seemed unprepared to refelect the possibility to open the small circle of analysts dealing with the snowden files. to paraphrasie his response: yes, it is a dilemma, that only few people can look at the snowden files and draw their own conclusions. however this limitation is a natural result of their very precarious nature (files containing state secrets) and a consequence of the massive pressure by the government. nonetheless, 'if you have a special project' you could contact alan rusbridger and probably get him to provide you with the requested material... a request for files -- such a request is usually directed towards somewhat obscure organistions and corporations and it is usually articulated by the press (deploying the freedom of information law or other legal instruments); such a request is usually denied at first. and as the histrory of investigative journalism shows: one must fight for one's right to access for information including going to court. such a request for files is an important, if not the most important, instrument *for the press*. but now it is the press itself (respectively some of its representatives) towards which such a request needs to be articulated. this is absurd and prompts many questions, including: to whom are organisations like the guardian accountable? a couple of things one could do about it: * such requests may seem futile, but they are an instrument and as the experience shows, one can win the fight. * one can consider to complain at e.g. the press complaints commission with regard to media corporations exercising exclusive control over the files -- in germany for example this sort of (quasi-monopolistic) control violates the so called presserat-kodex. * last but not least: one should work out a concept/model for transferring those files into the public domain -- taking also into account the obvious problems of "security" and "government pressure". it would be great of we could start a debate about in order to build a case for the future of handling big data leaks in a more democratic and sustainable manner. i will also write a german version of this post for berlinergazette.de and i am more than happy to include some of your responses into that version. best wishes, krystian # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime at kein.org From zen at freedbms.net Sat Jul 5 04:54:18 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 21:54:18 +1000 Subject: On trolls - was Re: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 Message-ID: <CAOsGNSTJJCMcG7LCUyOHuN5RSc_mqtVF8tVLWnzeXkTwY0UtPw@mail.gmail.com> On 7/5/14, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > Dnia sobota, 5 lipca 2014 01:54:26 Juan pisze: >> HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid >> liars! You freedom hating commies! So what are us freedom hating democrats s'posed ta do? What about freedom loving commies? Or free loving hippies? What if I'm just a communist in my beliefs and am sittin' on the fence about all those individual freedom things? >> and so on and so forth... Indeed :) > See, the thing is: the fact that somebody submitted such a > talk doesn't mean it holds any water yet. ... Of course, but the point is: > some held some water and caused changes to Tor. > That's the normal lifecycle of any complicated project. Did I mention, you made a good point? > But ah, why am I feeding the trolls? :) Because trolls are juicy. And ripe for comedy. And we all enjoy a good spit roast now and then. :? From felix at tribut.de Sat Jul 5 13:10:29 2014 From: felix at tribut.de (Felix Eckhofer) Date: Sat, 05 Jul 2014 22:10:29 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <1b178da0f0b1155ac3086a34ea2c82dd@tribut.de> Hey. Am 05.07.2014 20:13, schrieb Cathal Garvey: > https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore > > It's written mostly in C(++) with a dash of assembly, which worries me > security wise.. There's no assembly (that I could find). Github just mis-classifies Makefile.inc as assembly. It does depend of libvpx though which uses assembly liberally. Last time I tried to play around with it, it was far from usable. Not sure how much progress was made in the meantime. felix From s at ctrlc.hu Sat Jul 5 13:36:50 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 22:36:50 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <20140705203650.GG6997@ctrlc.hu> On Sat, Jul 05, 2014 at 07:13:11PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > Anyone looked this over? I only just discovered it, but it seems nice: afaics there's a traffic analysis weakness in all messages, it discloses both public keys of the peers in public: https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore/blob/master/docs/updates/Crypto.md#crypto-request-packets -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From l at odewijk.nl Sat Jul 5 14:35:18 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2014 23:35:18 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> I apologize for the wording in the following post. I feel entirely unmotivated to do anything but write down what I think of in a fairly-hack-and-slash-and-mash manner and I am sort of fatigued and sort of boosted on caffeine (which helps remedy sleepiness and increases focus but does nothing for the intellectual fatigue I'm experiencing after a good 8 hours of mind-bending geometric programming***, tips welcome). 2014-07-05 20:13 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > * P2P > * Encrypted > Tor/network layer ish stuff > * Voice/Video/Chat/Files > Application layer stuff > * GPL'd > You could give me a steaming pile of NSA honeytrap codepies, as long as it's GPL I'll trust it with my life and love it feverishly. (joke) If anyone ever steals this idea I'll point to this e-mail and claim it was originally mine and it stuck in your head until you thought it was yours**: Just write the communications layer. Expose it through a socket on the local machine. Let's say the port will be 33742 (actually a good port number) (say "eel for tee too") and one can talk modern-JSON-over-an-HTTP-subset with it. Platform dependent high-performance stuff like COM objects, maybe some RPC, etc. are optional. This little daemon/server maintains the connection to whatever P2P network is currently thought to be neat. It may or may not also do DNS-ish stuff and (if that's the popular P2P thing) it can have a keyring with trusted peers (aka "friends"). Once you have that you can communicate in an abstracted form. You can send messages that will pop out on the other side to registered listeners (method of registration is pretty much irrelevant, but let's say it's either directly by subscribing to 33742 or by some other sockety means). The service rendered is "you give me a destination (as per my spec) and a message and I will make sure it gets there without anyone really knowing if it was us". So it's like TOR, but a little more explicit and less proxy-like. You might wonder, why not proxy like? I like it because I never know whether something is going through the proxy or not. I'd prefer the application saying "Golly, where is 33742?" than going "You know, I swear we had this proxy arrangement.... Oh well". 33742 will also* do trickle connections and arbitrarily decide that a certain application is getting snailservice today. A few (~5?) trickle connections will always be kept cheerfully active, ticking away a few kbps of random data, and the occasional fully crypted packet that looks just like random data. Add some sort of meshing thingy on top of it, and the requirement that snailservice packets should be snailserviced with at least an 80% chance and voila every frikkin packet has plausible deniability ("I got it over trickles/snailservice!"). Then, to make it attractive to actually use it, you write *SEVERAL DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS WITH SPECIFIC PURPOSES*, because you want to do *one thing, and do it right*. One of these things should be an IMAP server, because letter-secret is very nice indeed. Why? * Performance * Simplicity * Stability * Security * Modularity * Ease of extension * Separation of concerns The best part? The longer you think of it, the better the idea becomes. * if it's good 337. ** or the idea spread from someone that had this or a variation going on. The point is that I claim this idea. It's not very original because really it's just Tor++ with some reasonable processing, but that's what we usually call an original idea so I'll just claim it anyway. (Antartica is mine too btw, really) *** If you do enough geometric programming you start to notice that perhaps "space", geometry and coordinates and things like that, are probably not at all as natural as they seem to be. Graphics programming gives a similar sense. Collisions just aren't .. ¿ natural? Crypto really makes mathematical sense, but geometry, man! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 6031 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140705/5add6ad8/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 6 00:56:17 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 09:56:17 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1868188.ScVqno3VsH@lapuntu> Dnia sobota, 5 lipca 2014 23:35:18 Lodewijk andré de la porte pisze: > I apologize for the wording in the following post. I feel entirely > unmotivated to do anything but write down what I think of in a > fairly-hack-and-slash-and-mash manner and I am sort of fatigued and sort of > boosted on caffeine (which helps remedy sleepiness and increases focus but > does nothing for the intellectual fatigue I'm experiencing after a good 8 > hours of mind-bending geometric programming***, tips welcome). > > 2014-07-05 20:13 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > > * P2P > > * Encrypted > > Tor/network layer ish stuff > > > * Voice/Video/Chat/Files > > Application layer stuff > > > * GPL'd > > You could give me a steaming pile of NSA honeytrap codepies, as long as > it's GPL I'll trust it with my life and love it feverishly. (joke) > > If anyone ever steals this idea I'll point to this e-mail and claim it was > originally mine and it stuck in your head until you thought it was yours**: > > > Just write the communications layer. Expose it through a socket on the > local machine. Let's say the port will be 33742 (actually a good port > number) (say "eel for tee too") and one can talk > modern-JSON-over-an-HTTP-subset with it. > > Platform dependent high-performance stuff like COM objects, maybe some RPC, > etc. are optional. > > This little daemon/server maintains the connection to whatever P2P network > is currently thought to be neat. It may or may not also do DNS-ish stuff > and (if that's the popular P2P thing) it can have a keyring with trusted > peers (aka "friends"). > > Once you have that you can communicate in an abstracted form. You can send > messages that will pop out on the other side to registered listeners > (method of registration is pretty much irrelevant, but let's say it's > either directly by subscribing to 33742 or by some other sockety means). > > The service rendered is "you give me a destination (as per my spec) and a > message and I will make sure it gets there without anyone really knowing if > it was us". So it's like TOR, but a little more explicit and less > proxy-like. > > You might wonder, why not proxy like? I like it because I never know > whether something is going through the proxy or not. I'd prefer the > application saying "Golly, where is 33742?" than going "You know, I swear > we had this proxy arrangement.... Oh well". > > 33742 will also* do trickle connections and arbitrarily decide that a > certain application is getting snailservice today. A few (~5?) trickle > connections will always be kept cheerfully active, ticking away a few kbps > of random data, and the occasional fully crypted packet that looks just > like random data. Add some sort of meshing thingy on top of it, and the > requirement that snailservice packets should be snailserviced with at least > an 80% chance and voila every frikkin packet has plausible deniability ("I > got it over trickles/snailservice!"). > > > Then, to make it attractive to actually use it, you write *SEVERAL > DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS WITH SPECIFIC PURPOSES*, because you want to do *one > thing, and do it right*. One of these things should be an IMAP server, > because letter-secret is very nice indeed. > > > Why? > * Performance > * Simplicity > * Stability > * Security > * Modularity > * Ease of extension > * Separation of concerns > > The best part? The longer you think of it, the better the idea becomes. > > * if it's good 337. > ** or the idea spread from someone that had this or a variation going on. > The point is that I claim this idea. It's not very original because really > it's just Tor++ with some reasonable processing, but that's what we usually > call an original idea so I'll just claim it anyway. (Antartica is mine too > btw, really) > *** If you do enough geometric programming you start to notice that perhaps > "space", geometry and coordinates and things like that, are probably not at > all as natural as they seem to be. Graphics programming gives a similar > sense. Collisions just aren't .. ¿ natural? Crypto really makes > mathematical sense, but geometry, man! That all seems like MaidSAFE: http://maidsafe.net/ -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/cc4322d6/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 10:42:55 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 13:42:55 -0400 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 5:35 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: > Just write the communications layer. Expose it through a socket on the local > machine. Let's say the port will be 33742 (actually a good port number) (say > > This little daemon/server maintains the connection to whatever P2P network > is currently thought to be neat. It may or may not also do DNS-ish stuff and > (if that's the popular P2P thing) it can have a keyring with trusted peers > (aka "friends"). > > Once you have that you can communicate in an abstracted form. You can send Yes, I've always felt the level of interop among crypto darknets is arbitrarily far less than ideal. Everybody seems to want to make their own user protocol for umm, say, the simple act of sending a message. And with all these different vertical darknet silos, you'll never be able to seamlessly cross message your friends on some other nets you also happen to be running. Then even if you got a pluggable *user* protocol for messaging, surfing, storage ironed out and made, you still have the problem of *backend* dest (and src) addressing. ie: There are at least four, maybe six nets I know of that can present an IPv6 tunnel interface to the user. Making it dead simple to securely route all your traffic into the darknet[s], or the entire set of darknets based on CIDR block addressing into them. But no, right now they overlap and conflict :( And without IPv6, they use different native addressing schemes. This begs for a serious sitdown conference amongst darknets to see what better cooperative user and backend interfaces might be possible. Or at least create one grand DHT based middleware addressing shim between them and the user (and preferably one that presents IPv6 tun interface, you know... because every app on the planet can speak that these days. Which is a big adoption win.) > You could give me a steaming pile of NSA honeytrap codepies Mmm, pies, me hungry. From sdw at lig.net Sun Jul 6 15:09:30 2014 From: sdw at lig.net (Stephen D. Williams) Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 15:09:30 -0700 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rLfbWWvN=e9DkJ0b7KFGcD4Nx3BdJOx625aHbStHBB7Fg@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rKxRM5So=EbFYh8ORzUZPpo3mz0inAQw5T+2AEvSp-UeQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rLfbWWvN=e9DkJ0b7KFGcD4Nx3BdJOx625aHbStHBB7Fg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53B9C91A.30003@lig.net> Let me know if you want a collaborator. I have a few things to get off my queue too. On 7/6/14, 12:28 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > > One of these months I will continue work on a paper reg. semantic addressing and a true IP layer replacement. I feel bad > having talked about it for /years/ now, but life and inexperience haven't really allowed me to make a great paper out of it. > One of these months. > > > One of these months I will also write about a federated protocol that feels a lot like twitter meets IRC meets Wordpress meets > e-mail meets FidoNet. It's all really the same problem anyway, you know? > > One of these months. -- Stephen D. Williams sdw at lig.net stephendwilliams at gmail.com LinkedIn: http://sdw.st/in V:650-450-UNIX (8649) V:866.SDW.UNIX V:703.371.9362 F:703.995.0407 AIM:sdw Skype:StephenDWilliams Yahoo:sdwlignet Resume: http://sdw.st/gres Personal: http://sdw.st facebook.com/sdwlig twitter.com/scienteer -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2479 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/598ab843/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Sun Jul 6 07:36:25 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 16:36:25 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1868188.ScVqno3VsH@lapuntu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> <1868188.ScVqno3VsH@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKWuyuvYJx3ZhSsLFA+1OUEP5_uF3bN-4b7Qi9XYdwQPg@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-06 9:56 GMT+02:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: > That all seems like MaidSAFE: > http://maidsafe.net/ > Maidsafe is trying to be the cloud but P2P. At Bitcoin2014 I asked as to why they wanted a blockchain/consistency, that guy didn't know (nice guy though), left my e-mail address and didn't hear back. It definitely rings a similar bell, it sure did with me when I heard about it. I've even pointed to it when saying how things could also be. Overall I'm underwhelmed by the design and I think it tries to do too much. I think It's not fundamental/simple enough. I think Blockchain style consensus is expensive and not required. Only reason I can think off is that they want premined coins or something. There's a whole flux of not-really-working-yet ideas that use the blockchain for no reason other than having premined coins and some P2P framework. It's interesting and good to see that blockchain-tech is such a key for people's creativity. And it's a shame that it's probably not the right tool for the job in most cases. (Consensus is overrated! Who needs it? You just need things to work the way you want them for you. What do you care how it looks to people you never deal with?) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1882 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/8067146a/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 10:11:45 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 19:11:45 +0200 Subject: XKeyScore code authenticity - genuine [was: messing with XKeyScore] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RVnA1kamSg=at=7kHsLD4EpnJKV0fyw4g9n6Ygs0p_Xg@mail.gmail.com> the theme of messing with XKeyScore is amusing[0], but more to the point i was asked to respond to some concerns of authenticity made in a different post: "Validating XKeyScore code" http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/validating-xkeyscore-code.html i'm trying to keep this feedback technical, as i don't like much of Graham's reasoning. (i do however approve of his use of "Great Man" in the Voldemort sense, in reference to Cowboy Alexander[1]) his claim that "we believe the code partly fake and that it came from the Snowden treasure trove." should be ammended: "we believe the code deprecated, and that it came from the Snowden archives" onward! --- first segment of summary, by point: # Point 1) "The signatures are old (2011 to 2012), so it fits within the Snowden timeframe, and is unlikely to be a recent leak." - agreed. # Point 2) "The code is weird, as if they are snippets combined from training manuals rather than operational code. That would mean it is “fake”." - false; the code is valid and deprecated (can be used as example) rather than false. the technical detail. as a programmer, i know that a regexp rule like: ''' extractors: {{ bridges[] = /bridge\s([0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}):?([0-9]{2,4}?[^0-9])/; }} ''' is both written by a novice regexp'er, and also took them a bit of time. more than they'd spend on an example. for another example, ''' for (size_t i=0; i < bridges.size(); ++i) { std::string address = bridges[i][0] + ":" + bridges[i][1]; DB[SCHEMA_OLD]["tor_bridge"] = address; DB.apply(); DB[SCHEMA_NEW]["tor_ip"] = bridges[i][0]; DB[SCHEMA_NEW]["tor_port_or"] = bridges[i][1]; DB[SCHEMA_NEW]["tor_flags"] = FLAGS; DB.apply(); } ''' why two commits here to backend changes? as a programmer i understand why this is done, but as a purely fictitious example the double commit is pointless noise. # Point 3) "The story makes claims about the source that are verifiably false, leading us to believe that they may have falsified the origin of this source code." - false how does limited misunderstanding arcane technicalities invalidate the entirety? if this were true, Robert Graham would be a complete imbecile, rather than technically competent and occasionally wrong. # Point 4) "The code is so domain specific that it probably is, in some fashion, related to real XKeyScore code – if fake, it's not completely so." - false. as stated above, these rules are deprecated rather than fictitiously constructed. (and perhaps referenced in training materials for utilizing the particular language engines demonstrated) as explained above, and i will go into more detail later (i wager i have more big data experience and DPI experience than Mr. Graham the DPI expert does in this domain alone[2] ;) last but not least, this speaks to the need for greater technical expertise to be applied to the leaked archives. if anything, the nature of domain specific details discussed here show that not just generalists, but an army of specialists, will ultimately be needed to properly parse and protect based upon the archives as yet revealed. best regards, --- 0. "" for those with "Jam Eschelon Day" nostalgia ;) ^- see whole thread from "messing with XKeyScore" 1. "The character assassination of Keith Alexander" '... People have criticized calling him a "great man". I'm quoting the Harry Potter movie here people, where the guy who sells Harry's[sic] wand points out that Voldermort was a great wizard,[sic] a great and terrible wizard' http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/06/the-character-assassination-of-keith.html 2. "XKeyScore: it's not attacking Tor" '... I am an expert in deep packet inspection (DPI). I've written a system vaguely similar to this XKeyScore system here: (ferret). I find the conclusions in this story completely unwarranted, though the technical information cited by this story is pretty good. I suggest future stories about the NSA's deep packet inspection actually consult with engineers who've written DPI code before making wild claims.' http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/xkeyscore-its-not-attacking-tor.html From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 10:30:01 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 19:30:01 +0200 Subject: XKeyScore code authenticity - genuine [was: messing with XKeyScore] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RVnA1kamSg=at=7kHsLD4EpnJKV0fyw4g9n6Ygs0p_Xg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RVnA1kamSg=at=7kHsLD4EpnJKV0fyw4g9n6Ygs0p_Xg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SPoP4cOMjuZXbCBYRdgQ=8P2wrc31wsmfJiT6438FYHw@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 7:11 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > a regexp rule like: > ''' > extractors: {{ > bridges[] = > /bridge\s([0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}):?([0-9]{2,4}?[^0-9])/; > }} > ''' > is both written by a novice regexp'er, and also took them a bit of > time. more than they'd spend on an example. i should have clarified this statement. this is code someone wrote to get a job done. they are pulling bridge addresses out of text (email bodies?) and getting a job done. this is fine code and similar to what you'd see in any production environment. this is not what a regexp guru would use to show their ability to tightly match with sparse efficiency. it is also not so simple that a non-PCRE fluent person would use it as a fictitious example. to be clear: all signs point to this being real code a person wrote to get a job done - parse out bridge addresses from text. the signs point toward this code being legitimate depricated code, even if not currently useful. the code do not point toward this being a non-fictitious example, and it seems Robert even alludes to as much with. "One interesting thing to note about the port number is that it captures the first non-digit character after the number as well. This is obvious[sic] a bug, but since it's usually whitespace, one that doesn't impact the system." - implying he believes this is a legitimate rule, and also not written by an expert. best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 10:33:11 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 19:33:11 +0200 Subject: XKeyScore code authenticity - genuine [was: messing with XKeyScore] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1SPoP4cOMjuZXbCBYRdgQ=8P2wrc31wsmfJiT6438FYHw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RVnA1kamSg=at=7kHsLD4EpnJKV0fyw4g9n6Ygs0p_Xg@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SPoP4cOMjuZXbCBYRdgQ=8P2wrc31wsmfJiT6438FYHw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SNqzDZt3J_RS5EjZOFm8qms7vg-0c4zjVB91Fb6igJCQ@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 7:30 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > the code do not point toward this being a non-fictitious example, i meant "non-functional, fictitious example" of course. and with that, i will leave my further comments to a later, more sober date... airport security, here i come! :P best regards, From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 6 11:25:27 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 20:25:27 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 13:42:55 grarpamp pisze: > On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 5:35 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: > > Just write the communications layer. Expose it through a socket on the > > local machine. Let's say the port will be 33742 (actually a good port > > number) (say > > > > This little daemon/server maintains the connection to whatever P2P network > > is currently thought to be neat. It may or may not also do DNS-ish stuff > > and (if that's the popular P2P thing) it can have a keyring with trusted > > peers (aka "friends"). > > > > Once you have that you can communicate in an abstracted form. You can send > > Yes, I've always felt the level of interop among crypto darknets is > arbitrarily far less than ideal. Everybody seems to want to make their > own user protocol for umm, say, the simple act of sending a message. > And with all these different vertical darknet silos, you'll never be able to > seamlessly cross message your friends on some other nets you also happen to > be running. Then even if you got a pluggable *user* protocol for messaging, > surfing, storage ironed out and made, you still have the problem of > *backend* dest (and src) addressing. ie: There are at least four, maybe six > nets I know of that can present an IPv6 tunnel interface to the user. > Making it dead simple to securely route all your traffic into the > darknet[s], or the entire set of darknets > based on CIDR block addressing into them. But no, right now they overlap and > conflict :( And without IPv6, they use different native addressing schemes. > > This begs for a serious sitdown conference amongst darknets to see what > better cooperative user and backend interfaces might be possible. Or at > least create one grand DHT based middleware addressing shim between > them and the user (and preferably one that presents IPv6 tun interface, you > know... because every app on the planet can speak that these days. > Which is a big adoption win.) Absolutely. Without serious and seamless interoperability, we have no way of actually getting people to use these solutions. "Nobody's there" × tens of solutions/networks. This is, by the way, a huge problem in the free and open decentralised/federated crowd. Consider this e-mail exchange: http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-fedsocweb/2013May/0058.html -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/fec260f5/attachment.sig> From l at odewijk.nl Sun Jul 6 12:27:28 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 21:27:28 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rKTce8ZmiyLRXqhDetD=4MWu_rfwk-431VYYaZ67KbooQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2_tByjU3hvrj1vuSYLvT1DWuN3rme+5sFf6SQk2c_YV=A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKxRM5So=EbFYh8ORzUZPpo3mz0inAQw5T+2AEvSp-UeQ@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-06 19:42 GMT+02:00 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com>: > IPv6 To be honest, too centralized and too arbitrary. It's odd to declare IP(v6) addresses bullocks that simply. It's in our systems and in our thinking. But really, universally unique addresses are just a dream. The only address I think makes sense is derived off a public key. Any other address should be network-topology-semantic, not assigned by committee. That way there's real identity (private-publickey) and real address/location (place dependent or similar address) One of these months I will continue work on a paper reg. semantic addressing and a true IP layer replacement. I feel bad having talked about it for *years* now, but life and inexperience haven't really allowed me to make a great paper out of it. One of these months. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1317 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140706/3d16a781/attachment.txt> From odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net Sun Jul 6 22:44:35 2014 From: odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net (Odinn Cyberguerrilla) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 22:44:35 -0700 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <aa127cad451e99c78e91f8e1cb309f45.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> Ahhh. The smell of fresh lawsuits in the morning. > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-28185149 > > """ > US enhanced airport security checks target electronics in latest > stretch for Total Information Awareness > - not by the BBC 6 July 2014 Last updated at 28:45 GMT > > > Frustrated by technically savvy privacy extremists using encryption to > protect confidentiality of their data, the United States is preparing > a particularly clever ruse to rummage through your digital detritus. > > The US announced new security measures last week, apparently in > response to a terror threat, but gave hints that multiple privacy > enhancing technology conferences occurring this summer were of the > utmost interest. > > Analysts say the changes have been couched in a conceit made to appear > to be in response to intelligence that Islamic militants in Syria and > Yemen developing bombs that could evade airport security. > > "It's really clever if you think about it.", one anonymous expert on > the wiki explained. "First, they put the real terrorists on notice, > adding to operational paranoia. But second, they get to enable every > device crossing the border at their discretion with minimal concern!" > > When asked for comment, the National Security Agency replied they > could 'neither confirm nor deny any knowledge of "mobile phones"'. > [EDITORS' NOTE: The NSA asked us to use scare quotes and not normal > quotes, yet in a brave show of defiance we stood up for our readership > and refused. "" Take that NSA! With Love, The Editors.] > > "During the security examination, officers may also ask that owners > power up some devices, including cell phones," it said. "All devices > must be fully unlocked and past any full disk encryption > authentication to properly test the battery." > > "Powerless devices will not be permitted on board the aircraft. The > traveller may also undergo additional screening once the device is > powered on and keyed up to be sure it is working correctly in > CUSTOMS." > > Reuters news agency reported that officials had singled out mobile > phones made by Apple and Samsung for extra checks. Apparently these > devices are most often used by developers and other privacy > extremists. > > More as this story develops. Back to you, Tom. > From alfiej at fastmail.fm Sun Jul 6 14:38:04 2014 From: alfiej at fastmail.fm (Alfie John) Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 23:38:04 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized In-Reply-To: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> References: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> Message-ID: <1404682684.15101.138637861.601B9425@webmail.messagingengine.com> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014, at 04:38 PM, Nathan Andrew Fain wrote: > Based on the xkeyscore rules does anyone have some idea of the > technology being utilized? > > Looking at the mapreduce::plugin definition I get the impression > Hadoop is in use. Hadoop provides a stream interface for Map Reduce > functions letting one utilize any program or language of their > choosing [1-example]. Can with more knowledge of distributed data > technologies confirm this? It's been known for a while that the NSA are using Hadoop (June 9, 2013)[1]: "The NSA's advances have come in the form of programs developed on the West Coast—a central one was known by the quirky name Hadoop—that enable intelligence agencies to cheaply amplify computing power, U.S. and industry officials said." Also, from the Hadoop 2014 speaker lineup [2]: "Joey Echeverria is Cloudera`s Chief Architect for Public Sector where he coordinates with Cloudera`s Customers and Partners as well as Cloudera`s Product, Engineering, and Field teams to speed up the time it takes to move Hadoop applications to production. Previously Joey was a Principal Solutions Architect where he worked directly with customers to deploy production Hadoop clusters and solve a diverse range of business and technical problems. Joey joined Cloudera from the NSA where he worked on data mining, network security, and clustered data processing using Hadoop." Alfie [1] http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323495604578535290627442964?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424127887323495604578535290627442964.html [2] http://hadoopsummit.org/san-jose/speakers/ -- Alfie John alfiej at fastmail.fm From odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net Sun Jul 6 23:49:34 2014 From: odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net (Odinn Cyberguerrilla) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2014 23:49:34 -0700 Subject: BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000 In-Reply-To: <3809175.sgfKXsGOB8@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti28UgXbB6wEry3VZjaWg4-8j7Ddi6stAfP7y+DrXWQn-0A@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fZOOa+zUdBOy3hApyW9tqd-GH3vkNfYWhkg17aWqk_Q@mail.gmail.com> <53b78429.a91eec0a.3232.32b2@mx.google.com> <3809175.sgfKXsGOB8@lapuntu> Message-ID: <8fc0083aed183b57bfc45fe083e36b65.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> This sort of conversation has been going on for at least a year. I don't feel as though it's fresh or new. Mid-June of 2014 I responded to this same sort of thing when it was mentioned with respect to possible effects on Darkwallet on another list that I'm on. This is more or less the substance of my response, I've copied it here: > http://www.coindesk.com/eavesdropping-attack-can-unmask-60-bitcoin-clients/ > > Is this something DW can protect against? > _______________________________________________ > unSYSTEM mailing list: http://unsystem.net > https://mailinglists.dyne.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/unsystem > > Technically, what the attack really will do is unmask certain IPs and ISPs, bitcoin isn't anonymous, hence, darkwallet, bytecoin, zerocash, etc. The question becomes is darkwallet and / or anyone using stealth a-la http://sx.dyne.org/stealth.html identifiable (or at least is either their client identifiable even if other information may not be) through said attacks as described at: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.7418v2.pdf In this article, partially what is described is the following: "the attack requires establishing 1008 connections and sending a few MBytes in data. This can be repeated for all Bitcoin servers, thus prohibiting all Tor connections for 24 hours at the cost of a million connections and less than 1 GByte of trac." The reference to "servers" is presumably indicating servers which are running Tor and through which something of the Bitcoin network is also transiting through or about. It seems as though if someone wanted to they could target personal computers or servers, although the likelihood of finding much useful information is unlikely, unless someone already knows something about who they are going after and is interested in additional, related information. This was covered in a previous study, here: http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_11.pdf See originally posted content which appeared _before_ fincrypto14 at: http://miki.it/pdf/thesis.pdf and http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/~baldoni/ssd2013/lezioneseminari_diluna.pdf and http://indigo.uic.edu/bitstream/handle/10027/10144/Spagnuolo_Michele.pdf?sequence=1 "The goal of the Clusterizer is to nd groups of addresses that belong to the same user. It incrementally reads the blockchain DB and generates-updates clusters of addresses using two heuristics, detailed in 3.2. The first heuristic exploits transactions with multiple inputs, while the second leverages the concept of \change" in transactions" (from the BitIodine paper) And so on and so forth. Standard clustering and correlation methods infer usernames associated with addresses. Etc. (My suggestion upon thinking about this further was to suggest that Darkwallet development collaborate closely with Tor developers and the Zerocash developers on this issue to find logical solutions. It seemed to be an issue but not one that is insurmountable. Further, it seemed to me that what would be key to the attack referenced in the coindesk article is the following:) "Whenever a peer receives a malformed message, it increases the penalty score of the IP address from which the message came (if a client uses Tor, than the message will obviously come from on of the Tor exit nodes). When this score exceeds 100, the sender's IP is banned for 24 hours." Knowing this and other things about the attack, solutions can be crafted to make such attacks more difficult, not just adding "random delays after transactions" as the paper's authors suggested, assuming DW collaboration with Tor developers and perhaps use of zero knowledge proofs. See also the following: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=309073.msg7303979#msg7303979 (has something about libsnark and zero knowledge proofs) https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7r4osQgWVqKTHdxTlowUVpsVmJRcjF3Y3dtcTVscFhEaW5F/view?sle=true (TorPath to TorCoin) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/4079 (my issue in bitcoin/bitcoin) > Dnia sobota, 5 lipca 2014 01:54:26 Juan pisze: >> "BlackHat2014: Deanonymize Tor for $3000" >> >> Oh, come on. That is 'FUD"! A conspiracy theory!! Those guys didn't >> create tor, so they shouldn't be hacking it!!! FUCK THEM. >> >> Tor is a project of the US government, the most righteous and clever >> organization on the planet, and the invincible defenders of free speech. >> >> Their anonymity network is simply unassailable. $3000? Please. >> >> Look, their own site says >> >> "Protect your privacy. Defend yourself against network surveillance and >> traffic analysis."[1] >> >> >> See? Using tor you can defend yourself against TRAFFIC ANALYSIS! There >> you have it. How on earth can tor be vulnerable to trivial traffic >> analysis when their site says just the opposite? >> >> HA! I bet you are so crazy as to think that the tor guys are stupid >> liars! You freedom hating commies! >> >> >> and so on and so forth... > > See, the thing is: the fact that somebody submitted such a talk doesn't > mean > it holds any water yet. I will gladly have a look at the documents and the > talk to see, what the problem is. Once we know that, we'll see if the Tor > guys > can fix it, or not. > > There have been several "deanonimize Tor" talks over the years. Some where > pure bull, some held some water and caused changes to Tor. That's the > normal > lifecycle of any complicated project. > > But ah, why am I feeding the trolls? :) > >> (yes! Now I feel like a real phd who wrote an email with a [] numbered >> footnote) > > Good for you. :) > > -- > Pozdr > rysiek From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 21:24:23 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 00:24:23 -0400 Subject: Interoperating the DarkNets [was: Tox] Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28fbEby30ZyxVk_z0SVQurqbkXBxaOphWdASeaQQJ1Kag@mail.gmail.com> >From this thread: https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/004957.html On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 3:27 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: > 2014-07-06 19:42 GMT+02:00 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com>: >> IPv6 > To be honest, too centralized There's nothing centralized about it at all. You generate your own rfc4193 IPv6/48. It's random so still check with other projects to be 100% sure before going live, and there's even an open registry to help with that. The problem is when people like cjdns blindly stake the other whole available even wider fc00::/8 as their own without thinking about interop (well if you actually need the bits that is, but with accepted crypto starting at 128 / 2048, 120 bits is no more valid width than 80. and with the DHT below this native width limitation is moot). > and too arbitrary. > It's odd to declare IP(v6) addresses bullocks that simply. It's in our > systems and in our thinking. The reason to declare IPv6 on a tun interface on your host is so users can run whatever IPv6 enabled app users want to run, on whatever darknet, right now, today. Darknet projects should be coding good darknets, not duplicating existing writing user facing apps for them (browser's, mua's, login's, fileshare's, git's, wiki's, webserver's, etc). > But really, universally unique addresses are just a dream. The only address > I think makes sense is derived off a public key. Any other address should be > network-topology-semantic, not assigned by committee. That way there's real > identity (private-publickey) and real address/location (place dependent or > similar address) An IPv6/48 is big enough to hold every user on every darknet simultaneously. But yes, we cannot arbitrate control central the map from IPv6 addr to user (truly, their darknet internal wide address / PKI key). So DHT... darknet user picks random IPv6 addr as their own key, adds in each of their darknet addresses with sigs over it [1] as values. Now you have the needed interop map. You need to label and rewrite packets to/from each darknet with this scheme, but that is easy part. [1] To be flexible in binding, one darknet per port/range, or one per whole IP. The DHT could hosted over any darknet, or it's own special darknet. > One of these months I will continue work on a paper reg. semantic addressing > and a true IP layer replacement. I feel bad having talked about it for years > now, but life and inexperience haven't really allowed me to make a great > paper out of it. One of these months. The problem with IP stack replacements to something really wide (eg: 512) is you then have to produce a library and beg all the above user apps to link it and handle it... not going to happen. Or write your own apps which takes the whole variety of apps/life on clearnet and crushes it into your few apps... not fun. So replacement = limitation and poor adoption. From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 15:33:22 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 00:33:22 +0200 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics Message-ID: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-28185149 """ US enhanced airport security checks target electronics in latest stretch for Total Information Awareness - not by the BBC 6 July 2014 Last updated at 28:45 GMT Frustrated by technically savvy privacy extremists using encryption to protect confidentiality of their data, the United States is preparing a particularly clever ruse to rummage through your digital detritus. The US announced new security measures last week, apparently in response to a terror threat, but gave hints that multiple privacy enhancing technology conferences occurring this summer were of the utmost interest. Analysts say the changes have been couched in a conceit made to appear to be in response to intelligence that Islamic militants in Syria and Yemen developing bombs that could evade airport security. "It's really clever if you think about it.", one anonymous expert on the wiki explained. "First, they put the real terrorists on notice, adding to operational paranoia. But second, they get to enable every device crossing the border at their discretion with minimal concern!" When asked for comment, the National Security Agency replied they could 'neither confirm nor deny any knowledge of "mobile phones"'. [EDITORS' NOTE: The NSA asked us to use scare quotes and not normal quotes, yet in a brave show of defiance we stood up for our readership and refused. "" Take that NSA! With Love, The Editors.] "During the security examination, officers may also ask that owners power up some devices, including cell phones," it said. "All devices must be fully unlocked and past any full disk encryption authentication to properly test the battery." "Powerless devices will not be permitted on board the aircraft. The traveller may also undergo additional screening once the device is powered on and keyed up to be sure it is working correctly in CUSTOMS." Reuters news agency reported that officials had singled out mobile phones made by Apple and Samsung for extra checks. Apparently these devices are most often used by developers and other privacy extremists. More as this story develops. Back to you, Tom. From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 15:38:26 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 00:38:26 +0200 Subject: XKeyscore rules - technology utilized In-Reply-To: <1404682684.15101.138637861.601B9425@webmail.messagingengine.com> References: <53B6BC5C.9010307@squimp.com> <1404682684.15101.138637861.601B9425@webmail.messagingengine.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RyxWP6MHDBtALA1xWM7hkMyQc7Bt6fjnpkLq5UQz3i5Q@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 11:38 PM, Alfie John <alfiej at fastmail.fm> wrote: > ... > It's been known for a while that the NSA are using Hadoop (June 9, > 2013)[1]: > > "The NSA's advances have come in the form of programs developed on the > West Coast—a central one was known by the quirky name Hadoop—that > enable intelligence agencies to cheaply amplify computing power, U.S. > and industry officials said." Hadoop made the Utah data center ;) [ now if only all that computing was actually performed in the public interest ... ] From davispuh at gmail.com Sun Jul 6 21:00:54 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 07:00:54 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: > Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: > > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification created? I > > know about XMPP, but nothing more... > > Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: > https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview > > And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, BuddyCloud > (XMPP- > based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. Some of > them > are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing strong > symptoms of the NIH syndrome. > > Which is absurd. > > -- > Pozdr > rysiek that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for social network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must have majority of people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise without people they are totally useless so currently we're stuck with no-so-great applications/protocols only because everyone already are on them like Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list there were discussion about a polyglot protocol/application which could support all networks so users wouldn't be forced to migrate which I think is essential because a lot of people won't bother. There was mention to Sockethub <http://sockethub.org/>which seems quite cool, only for a bit different use case I would say. Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee <http://bitlbee.org> it is a gateway between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with friends on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet on your Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports OTR. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2305 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/1dfeb252/attachment.txt> From tom at ritter.vg Mon Jul 7 05:52:59 2014 From: tom at ritter.vg (Tom Ritter) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 08:52:59 -0400 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics In-Reply-To: <20140707181058.731411b7b0336d3f0e68399c@mega-nerd.com> References: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> <20140707181058.731411b7b0336d3f0e68399c@mega-nerd.com> Message-ID: <CA+cU71k3qkGUfb6ON48h5RcsNEd8w_KJuZNVmgUSEBxfMvb1rQ@mail.gmail.com> On 7 July 2014 04:10, Erik de Castro Lopo <mle+tools at mega-nerd.com> wrote: >> "During the security examination, officers may also ask that owners >> power up some devices, including cell phones," it said. "All devices >> must be fully unlocked and past any full disk encryption >> authentication to properly test the battery." > > The "All devices ....." part now seems to be missing from that article. > > What's going on? The text in the email is satire/commentary and not actual reporting. -tom From edhelas at movim.eu Mon Jul 7 00:11:24 2014 From: edhelas at movim.eu (edhelas) Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2014 09:11:24 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Hi everyone, I'm working on the Movim project since 2008, our aim is to create a full social network on top of the XMPP protocol. As I see again, the guys of the Tox project are trying to reinvent the wheel… again. Now, to do IM, we have Skype, BBM, Line, WhatsApp, MSN, QQ, AIM, ICQ, IRC, XMPP, Facebook Messenger… Same for the social networks as Davis said (PumpIO, TentIO…) I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and improve it, and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all theses things : - Standard IM + chatroom - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC on Movim) - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) - Geolocation - Vcard4 support - SASL2 authentication - OTR support - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) - and so on… XMPP can do a lot more than just IM, it's a full social-communication protocol it just need to be implemented, tested and debugged :) Tim On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 6:00 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: > 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: >> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: >> > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification >> created? I >> > know about XMPP, but nothing more... >> >> Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: >> https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview >> >> And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, >> BuddyCloud (XMPP- >> based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. >> Some of them >> are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing >> strong >> symptoms of the NIH syndrome. >> >> Which is absurd. >> >> -- >> Pozdr >> rysiek > > that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for social > network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must have > majority of people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise without > people they are totally useless so currently we're stuck with > no-so-great applications/protocols only because everyone already are > on them like Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list there were > discussion about a polyglot protocol/application which could support > all networks so users wouldn't be forced to migrate which I think is > essential because a lot of people won't bother. There was mention to > Sockethub which seems quite cool, only for a bit different use case I > would say. > Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee it is a gateway > between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with friends > on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet on your > Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports OTR. > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3637 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/94e3d650/attachment.txt> From odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net Mon Jul 7 10:08:38 2014 From: odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net (Odinn Cyberguerrilla) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 10:08:38 -0700 Subject: open the snowden files In-Reply-To: <BF5745F2-BF44-49FB-BA13-744FF7BB79F7@desk.nl> References: <CAD2Ti29EQ43VjnRVBjxC5N2OD855eArEAtpA17AEJK5MnDRLPw@mail.gmail.com> <BF5745F2-BF44-49FB-BA13-744FF7BB79F7@desk.nl> Message-ID: <10124769faf8f7842b448d34c6041764.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> This comes to mind: https://twitter.com/Cryptomeorg/status/485504337968246784 (Your e-mail was featured on Cryptome twitter) See also: https://twitter.com/Cryptomeorg/status/483353469789556739 Supposedly Cryptome will do a July dump, but not clear as to what exactly is to be released. > (fwd. from the nettime mailinglist /geert) > > from: Krystian Woznicki <kw at berlinergazette.de> > > the snowden files are of public interest. but only a small circle of > people is able to access, read, analyze, interpret and publish them. and > only a very small percentage of those files has been made available to > the public. > > those who belong to the small circle of people, tend to argue that this > has to do with security reasons. so one could say, that the leaked files > have been "secured" in order to prevent bigger harm. yet, in the very > sense that "data is the oil of the 21 century" one can also say, that > the snowden files have been privatised by people who try to exploit them > according to their own interests. > > what can be done about this situation? are we able to find a way to > "open" this data? and in the course of this create a modell for future > leaks? > > many researchers, activistis and technology experts (not to speak of > other journalists than the "few luckey ones") have a great interest to > work with those files. imagine the historical impact on sciences, social > movements and it-infrastructures, if those files would serve as material > to study and learn from in the respective areas. > > the snowden story has been a great, exceptional media narrative -- if > only for its unusual duration (unfolding over the course of more than a > year and stimulating a variety of debates). but the fact, that material, > that one brave whistleblower considered to be worth of public interest, > has been "secured" or "privatised", rendering again unaccessible what > previously has been unaccessible -- doesn't this fact add a very > unsettling layer to the narrative, turning the success story into > somewhat of a tragedy? > > yesterday at the netzwerk recherche conference in hamburg (the great > gathering of the investigative community) i confronted luke harding > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luke_Harding) with this question. > > prior to my intervention harding had already hinted at some very obvious > limitations of the ongoing investigation, alluding to various reasons > why those "few lucky ones" are incapable to deal with the investigation > challenge in an approriate manner: "we are not technical experts" or > "after two hours your eyes pop out". inspite of this, harding seemed > unprepared to refelect the possibility to open the small circle of > analysts dealing with the snowden files. > > to paraphrasie his response: yes, it is a dilemma, that only few people > can look at the snowden files and draw their own conclusions. however > this limitation is a natural result of their very precarious nature > (files containing state secrets) and a consequence of the massive > pressure by the government. nonetheless, 'if you have a special > project' you could contact alan rusbridger and probably get him to > provide you with the requested material... > > a request for files -- such a request is usually directed towards > somewhat obscure organistions and corporations and it is usually > articulated by the press (deploying the freedom of information law or > other legal instruments); such a request is usually denied at first. and > as the histrory of investigative journalism shows: one must fight for > one's right to access for information including going to court. > > such a request for files is an important, if not the most important, > instrument *for the press*. but now it is the press itself (respectively > some of its representatives) towards which such a request needs to be > articulated. this is absurd and prompts many questions, including: > > to whom are organisations like the guardian accountable? > > a couple of things one could do about it: > > * such requests may seem futile, but they are an instrument and as the > experience shows, one can win the fight. > > * one can consider to complain at e.g. the press complaints commission > with regard to media corporations exercising exclusive control over the > files -- in germany for example this sort of (quasi-monopolistic) > control violates the so called presserat-kodex. > > * last but not least: one should work out a concept/model for > transferring those files into the public domain -- taking also into > account the obvious problems of "security" and "government pressure". > > it would be great of we could start a debate about in order to build a > case for the future of handling big data leaks in a more democratic and > sustainable manner. > > i will also write a german version of this post for berlinergazette.de > and i am more than happy to include some of your responses into that > version. > > best wishes, > > krystian > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime at kein.org > > > From grarpamp at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 12:46:24 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 15:46:24 -0400 Subject: [tor-talk] washingtonpost.com: In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the foreigners who are In-Reply-To: <1404687822.96654.YahooMailNeo@web140806.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> References: <CAOsGNSSZH_JWrRVwdhZAEsO7cMdFhFnKz_FTd2E8Wuxa_Xe4xA@mail.gmail.com> <53B94C25.2030709@cryptopathie.eu> <1404658233.56244.YahooMailNeo@web140806.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53B97681.5090302@cryptopathie.eu> <1404671221.40896.YahooMailNeo@web140805.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53B99868.8050604@gmx.com> <1404679159.29806.YahooMailNeo@web140805.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53B9BCC2.5060505@gmx.com> <1404687822.96654.YahooMailNeo@web140806.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29Y0QecMb6Qpi1vSQERfwHdNYKQwsUnEJFvxxYAZmiM4Q@mail.gmail.com> >>> ... >> Or, there could be a "secret society" that largely runs NH & wants better privacy? >> ... On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 7:03 PM, C B <cb736 at yahoo.com> wrote: > ... > It is easier to do things here because it is a small state. > New Hampshire has the largest state legislative body in the country, and pays them $100/year (plus mileage). But our state motto is "Live Free or Die" and we take it seriously http://freestateproject.org/ From davispuh at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 06:06:47 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 16:06:47 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically use asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network stack, OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you use. So by changing plaintext to other payload such as XMPP we introduce another layer but this layer could be parsed in a sandbox / virtual machine thus even if you receive malicious message it couldn't exploit other parts of your system and it would work exactly like that simple plaintext protocol. Now but what if there's a bug in cryptography library, well you have already lost even with your basic plaintext protocol... 2014-07-07 11:41 GMT+03:00 stef <s at ctrlc.hu>: > On Mon, Jul 07, 2014 at 09:11:24AM +0200, edhelas wrote: > > I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and improve > it, > > and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all theses things : > > - Standard IM + chatroom > > - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC on > > Movim) > > - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) > > - Geolocation > > - Vcard4 support > > - SASL2 authentication > > - OTR support > > - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) > > - and so on… > > i dunno, but xml based protocol (attack surface), geolocation (privacy), > video/audio conferencing (traffic analysis), etc are all attributes i do > not > want in a secure communication protocol and a protocol that supports these > is > considered bloated. also the huge amounts of known/guessable plaintext in > xmpp > are quite worrisome. i agree NIH is bad, but xmpp is as bad for a > post-snowden > adversary model. > > -- > otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2525 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/daa0d991/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Mon Jul 7 07:55:37 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2014 16:55:37 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: > I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack > surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you > create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically use > asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any > features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network stack, > OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you > use. Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface beyond these problems... how exactly? I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there might be salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/4e0d7a68/attachment.sig> From mle+tools at mega-nerd.com Mon Jul 7 01:10:58 2014 From: mle+tools at mega-nerd.com (Erik de Castro Lopo) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 18:10:58 +1000 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140707181058.731411b7b0336d3f0e68399c@mega-nerd.com> coderman wrote: > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-28185149 <snip> > "During the security examination, officers may also ask that owners > power up some devices, including cell phones," it said. "All devices > must be fully unlocked and past any full disk encryption > authentication to properly test the battery." The "All devices ....." part now seems to be missing from that article. What's going on? Erik -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Erik de Castro Lopo http://www.mega-nerd.com/ From edhelas at movim.eu Mon Jul 7 10:44:07 2014 From: edhelas at movim.eu (edhelas) Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2014 19:44:07 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSxSzF19Wz7XXWCppRievQ_YOEVBz8Fr8e+MG88Oyb=fAw@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <CAOE4rSxSzF19Wz7XXWCppRievQ_YOEVBz8Fr8e+MG88Oyb=fAw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1404755047.15776.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Hi Davis, Thank you very much for this awesome feedback, having constructives criticizes like this helps me a lot :) I'll try to explain my choices for some of them. I agree with your first comment, there's clearly a lack of communication. But, I'm currently working on the 0.8 release and on a fundraising (on Kickstarter) before the end of summer. I'll create a thread on Reddit and talk about it theses next couple of weeks ;) For the video, I don't have skills to do a nice looking one. But if you have tips, do not hesitate to share them with me. For PHP, the choice was made a couple of years ago and the aim was to install Movim on quite all the servers (I love Ruby on Rails but deploying a RoR application can be quite difficult for some administrators). We also tried to built Movim on top of differents PHP frameworks (Zend, Symfony and more recently Laravel). The thing is that Movim works in a really special way (the connexion is kept open with the XMPP server using BOSH threw long polling requests so I have to do session synchronisation en prevent session-lock… all in PHP) so it cannot be ported easily on a "classical MVC" framework. We also use our own internal widget system with event handling (when a specific XMPP stanza is handled). I'll take a look at the sanitizer.rb file and try to find a proper way to sanitize the strings, maybe use an external library for that ;) Having a public/ folder is also planned for the 1.0 version but I need to refactor a couple of stuffs in the app to make it works properly. I'm also using the PSR standard (http://www.php-fig.org/) especially for the library loading (using composer) and the logger. I've already moved parts of Movim to independant libraries to modularize the project ;) I'm trying to move from Bazaar to Git but I mave a couple of issues when I convert the commit-history tree. Also I'm looking for a proper way to handle the internationalisation (Launchpad has a ship-in system for that). We are also one of the most advanced XMPP client, with a really nice implementation of the standard (all the currently implemented XEP are listed here : http://wiki.movim.eu/en:dev:protocol_implementations). I'm working with the XMPP Standard Fundation to standardise and improve the XMPP protocol. Thanks again ! edhelas On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 7:18 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: > 2014-07-07 10:11 GMT+03:00 edhelas <edhelas at movim.eu>: >> Hi everyone, >> >> I'm working on the Movim project since 2008, our aim is to create a >> full social network on top of the XMPP protocol. As I see again, the >> guys of the Tox project are trying to reinvent the wheel… again. >> Now, to do IM, we have Skype, BBM, Line, WhatsApp, MSN, QQ, AIM, >> ICQ, IRC, XMPP, Facebook Messenger… >> >> Same for the social networks as Davis said (PumpIO, TentIO…) >> >> I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and >> improve it, and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all >> theses things : >> - Standard IM + chatroom >> - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC >> on Movim) >> - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) >> - Geolocation >> - Vcard4 support >> - SASL2 authentication >> - OTR support >> - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) >> - and so on… >> >> XMPP can do a lot more than just IM, it's a full >> social-communication protocol it just need to be implemented, tested >> and debugged :) >> >> Tim >> >> On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 6:00 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> >> wrote: >>> 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: >>>> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: >>>> > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification >>>> created? I >>>> > know about XMPP, but nothing more... >>>> >>>> Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: >>>> https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview >>>> >>>> And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, >>>> BuddyCloud (XMPP- >>>> based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. >>>> Some of them >>>> are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing >>>> strong >>>> symptoms of the NIH syndrome. >>>> >>>> Which is absurd. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Pozdr >>>> rysiek >>> >>> that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for >>> social network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must >>> have majority of people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise >>> without people they are totally useless so currently we're stuck >>> with no-so-great applications/protocols only because everyone >>> already are on them like Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list >>> there were discussion about a polyglot protocol/application which >>> could support all networks so users wouldn't be forced to migrate >>> which I think is essential because a lot of people won't bother. >>> There was mention to Sockethub which seems quite cool, only for a >>> bit different use case I would say. >>> Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee it is a gateway >>> between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with >>> friends on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet >>> on your Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports >>> OTR. >>> > okay so I've quickly reviewed Movim, idea is really good and it seems > to be nice, but I haven't yet tried to run it, will do that someday. > It looks like you haven't really marketed it good enough because this > is first time I hear about it despite it being an somewhat old > project. For example Tox is pretty new but it's already quite popular > and I keep hearing about it every few months. I would suggest to post > more on various social sites, forums and just let people know it > exists (eg. post to Reddit) Another thing I would suggest is add a > video to website of example usage so people could see how it is > actually used, explain various features and such as users might not > immediately discover some features. > > Now I'll tell a few things, but that's only my personal opinion and > most likely a lot of people won't agree with it. So anyway firstly > I'm not a fan of PHP, it's just generally awful language (see > http://phpsadness.com/ and look at PHP src :D), I know it because > I've been writing it for like 7+ years but now 2-3 years I'm PHP-less > and happy about it :) Next it looks like you aren't using any PHP > framework but self-developed one which gives you more work than is > needed and obviously it's less battletested. But overall code itself > is nice and pretty, correctly uses MVC pattern. Bad things are that > you don't have separate public directory for frontend and anyone can > access PHP files directly, view templates for example > (https://pod.movim.eu/app/views/admin.tpl) it's not a big deal, but > still not good idea (running version https://pod.movim.eu/VERSION). > Then in some places HTML tags and entities are used directly rather > than proper Unicode which isn't a good idea and it means that string > isn't later escaped and if it gets mixed together with user-input or > translation strings there's a place for XSS. The worse thing probably > is that sanitization is based on regexp blacklists/filters, I'm > talking about StringHelper.php, I didn't look how it's actually used, > but still even without trying I'm pretty sure it would be possible to > find XSS there, why? because Rails framework over 5 years have had > ~20 XSS vulnerabilities and it's extremely good framework used by > dozens of projects and reviewed regularly, and it's even based on > whitelists, but still uses regexps for that which isn't good and I > wonder why no one does proper SGML parsing which they should. Just > take a look at sanitizer.rb to see how non-trivial it is. Anyway the > whole idea of sanitization is wrong, you should just escape all text > and don't try to guess which tags you should render. I suggest any > web developer to read OWASP from A to Z it's a must for any web > developer. Then there's `?>` PHP end tags used at end of various > files which are useless and can introduce problems like famous > "headers already sent" warning. So seems that's about it with my > quick look, but I might have forgotten to mention some things. > Another thing I don't like is that AGPL is used, I really dislike all > GPL family, but that's just me and I rather prefer copyfree so if > there's similar projects then I'll rather contribute to MIT than any > GPL variant :P And I'm not a fan of Bazaar nor LaunchPad but that's > not the worst thing (someone should ban CVS and SVN :D) > > So to sum up about Movim, good parts: > Good idea > Quite decent code, MVC used correctly > Localization support > Pretty website > Open Source > Active development > SCM is used > and bad: > > Not enough known, marketed > PHP is used > No PHP framework used but self-developed one > Some questionable and potentially vulnerable code in some places > Scripts and files accessible directly > Not my favorite (un)license > > But yeah keep it up and continue developing it ;) I might use it some > day... > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 11334 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/1730c24b/attachment.txt> From davispuh at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 10:18:07 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 20:18:07 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSxSzF19Wz7XXWCppRievQ_YOEVBz8Fr8e+MG88Oyb=fAw@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-07 10:11 GMT+03:00 edhelas <edhelas at movim.eu>: > Hi everyone, > > I'm working on the Movim project since 2008, our aim is to create a full > social network on top of the XMPP protocol. As I see again, the guys of the > Tox project are trying to reinvent the wheel… again. Now, to do IM, we have > Skype, BBM, Line, WhatsApp, MSN, QQ, AIM, ICQ, IRC, XMPP, Facebook > Messenger… > > Same for the social networks as Davis said (PumpIO, TentIO…) > > I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and improve > it, and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all theses things : > - Standard IM + chatroom > - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC on > Movim) > - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) > - Geolocation > - Vcard4 support > - SASL2 authentication > - OTR support > - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) > - and so on… > > XMPP can do a lot more than just IM, it's a full social-communication > protocol it just need to be implemented, tested and debugged :) > > Tim > > On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 6:00 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: > > 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: > >> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: >> > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification created? I >> > know about XMPP, but nothing more... >> >> Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: >> https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview >> >> And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, BuddyCloud >> (XMPP- >> based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. Some of >> them >> are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing strong >> symptoms of the NIH syndrome. >> >> Which is absurd. >> >> -- >> Pozdr >> rysiek > > > that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for social > network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must have majority of > people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise without people they are > totally useless so currently we're stuck with no-so-great > applications/protocols only because everyone already are on them like > Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list there were discussion about a > polyglot protocol/application which could support all networks so users > wouldn't be forced to migrate which I think is essential because a lot of > people won't bother. There was mention to Sockethub > <http://sockethub.org/>which seems quite cool, only for a bit different > use case I would say. > Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee <http://bitlbee.org> it > is a gateway between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with > friends on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet on your > Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports OTR. > > okay so I've quickly reviewed Movim, idea is really good and it seems to be nice, but I haven't yet tried to run it, will do that someday. It looks like you haven't really marketed it good enough because this is first time I hear about it despite it being an somewhat old project. For example Tox is pretty new but it's already quite popular and I keep hearing about it every few months. I would suggest to post more on various social sites, forums and just let people know it exists (eg. post to Reddit) Another thing I would suggest is add a video to website of example usage so people could see how it is actually used, explain various features and such as users might not immediately discover some features. Now I'll tell a few things, but that's only my personal opinion and most likely a lot of people won't agree with it. So anyway firstly I'm not a fan of PHP, it's just generally awful language (see http://phpsadness.com/ and look at PHP src :D), I know it because I've been writing it for like 7+ years but now 2-3 years I'm PHP-less and happy about it :) Next it looks like you aren't using any PHP framework but self-developed one which gives you more work than is needed and obviously it's less battletested. But overall code itself is nice and pretty, correctly uses MVC pattern. Bad things are that you don't have separate public directory for frontend and anyone can access PHP files directly, view templates for example ( https://pod.movim.eu/app/views/admin.tpl) it's not a big deal, but still not good idea (running version https://pod.movim.eu/VERSION). Then in some places HTML tags and entities are used directly rather than proper Unicode which isn't a good idea and it means that string isn't later escaped and if it gets mixed together with user-input or translation strings there's a place for XSS. The worse thing probably is that sanitization is based on regexp blacklists/filters, I'm talking about StringHelper.php, I didn't look how it's actually used, but still even without trying I'm pretty sure it would be possible to find XSS there, why? because Rails framework over 5 years have had ~20 XSS vulnerabilities and it's extremely good framework used by dozens of projects and reviewed regularly, and it's even based on whitelists, but still uses regexps for that which isn't good and I wonder why no one does proper SGML parsing which they should. Just take a look at sanitizer.rb <https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/master/actionview/lib/action_view/vendor/html-scanner/html/sanitizer.rb#L72> to see how non-trivial it is. Anyway the whole idea of sanitization is wrong, you should just escape all text and don't try to guess which tags you should render. I suggest any web developer to read OWASP <https://www.owasp.org> from A to Z it's a must for any web developer. Then there's `?>` PHP end tags used at end of various files which are useless and can introduce problems like famous "headers already sent" warning. So seems that's about it with my quick look, but I might have forgotten to mention some things. Another thing I don't like is that AGPL is used, I really dislike all GPL family, but that's just me and I rather prefer copyfree <http://copyfree.org> so if there's similar projects then I'll rather contribute to MIT than any GPL variant :P And I'm not a fan of Bazaar nor LaunchPad but that's not the worst thing (someone should ban CVS and SVN :D) So to sum up about Movim, good parts: - Good idea - Quite decent code, MVC used correctly - Localization support - Pretty website - Open Source - Active development - SCM is used and bad: - Not enough known, marketed - PHP is used - No PHP framework used but self-developed one - Some questionable and potentially vulnerable code in some places - Scripts and files accessible directly - Not my favorite (un)license But yeah keep it up and continue developing it ;) I might use it some day... -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 8695 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/e5e11335/attachment.txt> From davispuh at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 10:52:58 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 20:52:58 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSxK6M21WHcrgSJFP=i7kEnT0gZ=jRni7tdDuE0MTAA21A@mail.gmail.com> security is always a trade-off with convenience/usability and IMO that layer on top of plaintext protocol would be minimal comparing to already your OS surface. And if you go in that direction then why not go further? develop a basic custom minimalistic OS (in a way that compiled code could be verified in case of compiler backdoor) for just single purpose for secure messaging. It could be booted from CD-ROM or read-only flash, would self-verify itself and PC hardware for known anomalies, present you with a hash of environment so you've memorized it and if it ever changes you know someone have touched something on your PC, maybe BIOS, maybe other firmware maybe your boot medium etc. Then you would plugin your security token with encrypted GPG key and you could securely message. But actually no, you wouldn't use just general purpose computer, you would have developed a custom computer from ground-up with every single chip and transistor to be verifiable and it would serve only this single purpose of secure messaging. But now what if your friend doesn't do the same? it's all bets off and you've lost because it will be easier to "attach" to other end than you. Anyway I see a reason for both of these use cases, encrypted feature full messaging and just extremely secure basic plaintext messaging. But if you go with latter then I wouldn't stop in middle that is I wouldn't use same general OS but something trimmed down. I think currently Tails is pretty good and it comes with Pidgin OTR and you can use it over IRC network which is basically a simple plaintext protocol so your case is already covered I think. So for this first case of feature full messaging, XMPP seems to be a good choice. 2014-07-07 17:55 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: > Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: > > I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack > > surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you > > create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically > use > > asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any > > features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network stack, > > OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you > > use. > > Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface > beyond > these problems... how exactly? > > I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there might > be > salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? > > -- > Pozdr > rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3180 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/7afb5772/attachment.txt> From davispuh at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 11:19:03 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1404755047.15776.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <1905994.9AY2VPz29W@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSxB9nGesxWOsUBnBVHe7D5kf4yxr7_ivoSWoC5+sPQShg@mail.gmail.com> <40141628.DH0kgvvaSQ@lapuntu> <CAOE4rSzrHSsJa8AE99sQXDnJMOmsWX1YMugurzxh6cdYuwgLgw@mail.gmail.com> <1404717084.15115.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <CAOE4rSxSzF19Wz7XXWCppRievQ_YOEVBz8Fr8e+MG88Oyb=fAw@mail.gmail.com> <1404755047.15776.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSyagocHwPLre997CA7BC6ERboVJDdwj6gOSJG_kKhUu_g@mail.gmail.com> sounds great :) well, about frameworks I've tried really a lot of them over years and I was satisfied only with FuelPHP <http://fuelphp.com/> which I think is the best one IMO, but I haven't heard about Laravel, seems to be really new. About FuelPHP I really like idea of HMVC and it's very useful. But as I said I haven't done anything with PHP for few years now. But generally you've to choose framework when starting a project as it's usually not easy to change it later. Yeah I forgot to mention that it's really good that you're using Composer and have good object orientated code structure. About internationalization it depends which parts you want to cover. If translated strings then look at transifex.com <http://www.transifex.com> and crowdin.net they both offer free solutions to open source projects and are quite good. If you want localized date and time formats then use CLDR <http://cldr.unicode.org/> you can either write a script to directly get data from them or use some already made libraries for PHP, I don't know for PHP, but for Ruby there's ruby-cldr <https://github.com/svenfuchs/ruby-cldr> and twitter-cldr-rb <https://github.com/twitter/twitter-cldr-rb>, for example ruby-cldr can export CLDR data to yaml files and then you could parse and use those in PHP. (twitter-cldr also uses that same exported data from ruby-cldr) 2014-07-07 20:44 GMT+03:00 edhelas <edhelas at movim.eu>: > Hi Davis, > > Thank you very much for this awesome feedback, having constructives > criticizes like this helps me a lot :) I'll try to explain my choices for > some of them. > > I agree with your first comment, there's clearly a lack of communication. > But, I'm currently working on the 0.8 release and on a fundraising (on > Kickstarter) before the end of summer. I'll create a thread on Reddit and > talk about it theses next couple of weeks ;) > > For the video, I don't have skills to do a nice looking one. But if you > have tips, do not hesitate to share them with me. > > For PHP, the choice was made a couple of years ago and the aim was to > install Movim on quite all the servers (I love Ruby on Rails but deploying > a RoR application can be quite difficult for some administrators). We also > tried to built Movim on top of differents PHP frameworks (Zend, Symfony and > more recently Laravel). > The thing is that Movim works in a really special way (the connexion is > kept open with the XMPP server using BOSH threw long polling requests so I > have to do session synchronisation en prevent session-lock… all in PHP) so > it cannot be ported easily on a "classical MVC" framework. We also use our > own internal widget system with event handling (when a specific XMPP stanza > is handled). > > I'll take a look at the sanitizer.rb file and try to find a proper way to > sanitize the strings, maybe use an external library for that ;) > > Having a public/ folder is also planned for the 1.0 version but I need to > refactor a couple of stuffs in the app to make it works properly. > > I'm also using the PSR standard (http://www.php-fig.org/) especially for > the library loading (using composer) and the logger. I've already moved > parts of Movim to independant libraries to modularize the project ;) > > I'm trying to move from Bazaar to Git but I mave a couple of issues when I > convert the commit-history tree. Also I'm looking for a proper way to > handle the internationalisation (Launchpad has a ship-in system for that). > > We are also one of the most advanced XMPP client, with a really nice > implementation of the standard (all the currently implemented XEP are > listed here : http://wiki.movim.eu/en:dev:protocol_implementations). I'm > working with the XMPP Standard Fundation to standardise and improve the > XMPP protocol. > > Thanks again ! > > edhelas > > > On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 7:18 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: > > 2014-07-07 10:11 GMT+03:00 edhelas <edhelas at movim.eu>: > >> Hi everyone, >> >> I'm working on the Movim project since 2008, our aim is to create a full >> social network on top of the XMPP protocol. As I see again, the guys of the >> Tox project are trying to reinvent the wheel… again. Now, to do IM, we have >> Skype, BBM, Line, WhatsApp, MSN, QQ, AIM, ICQ, IRC, XMPP, Facebook >> Messenger… >> >> Same for the social networks as Davis said (PumpIO, TentIO…) >> >> I really think that we need to focus on an existent standard and improve >> it, and for me XMPP seem to be the perfect protocol for all theses things : >> - Standard IM + chatroom >> - Video/Audio conferencing (with Jingle, we are using it with WebRTC on >> Movim) >> - Pubsub (for newsfeeds, blogging) >> - Geolocation >> - Vcard4 support >> - SASL2 authentication >> - OTR support >> - Full encryption between the servers (https://xmpp.net/list.php) >> - and so on… >> >> XMPP can do a lot more than just IM, it's a full social-communication >> protocol it just need to be implemented, tested and debugged :) >> >> Tim >> >> On lun., juil. 7, 2014 at 6:00 , Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: >> >> 2014-07-06 23:28 GMT+03:00 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl>: >> >>> Dnia niedziela, 6 lipca 2014 22:25:59 piszesz: >>> > hmm, I wonder are there any such open protocol specification created? I >>> > know about XMPP, but nothing more... >>> >>> Well, there's the Diaspora protocol: >>> https://wiki.diasporafoundation.org/Federation_protocol_overview >>> >>> And... StatusNet/OStatus, PumpIO, TentIO, ActivityStreams, BuddyCloud >>> (XMPP- >>> based, I guess), and quite a few others I don't really remember. Some of >>> them >>> are related, all are incompatible. And all the devs are showing strong >>> symptoms of the NIH syndrome. >>> >>> Which is absurd. >>> >>> -- >>> Pozdr >>> rysiek >> >> >> that indeed is stupid and so no one have solved it yet... for social >> network or basically any IM/chat/etc to be usable it must have majority of >> people (eg. your friends) users there, otherwise without people they are >> totally useless so currently we're stuck with no-so-great >> applications/protocols only because everyone already are on them like >> Facebook and Skype. On that mailing list there were discussion about a >> polyglot protocol/application which could support all networks so users >> wouldn't be forced to migrate which I think is essential because a lot of >> people won't bother. There was mention to Sockethub >> <http://sockethub.org/>which seems quite cool, only for a bit different >> use case I would say. >> Another thing I would like to mention is BitlBee <http://bitlbee.org> it >> is a gateway between various IM/chat networks and IRC so you can chat with >> friends on Facebook using your favorite IRC client, or post a tweet on your >> Twitter and use various other protocols. It even supports OTR. >> >> okay so I've quickly reviewed Movim, idea is really good and it seems to > be nice, but I haven't yet tried to run it, will do that someday. It looks > like you haven't really marketed it good enough because this is first time > I hear about it despite it being an somewhat old project. For example Tox > is pretty new but it's already quite popular and I keep hearing about it > every few months. I would suggest to post more on various social sites, > forums and just let people know it exists (eg. post to Reddit) Another > thing I would suggest is add a video to website of example usage so people > could see how it is actually used, explain various features and such as > users might not immediately discover some features. > > Now I'll tell a few things, but that's only my personal opinion and most > likely a lot of people won't agree with it. So anyway firstly I'm not a fan > of PHP, it's just generally awful language (see http://phpsadness.com/ > and look at PHP src :D), I know it because I've been writing it for like 7+ > years but now 2-3 years I'm PHP-less and happy about it :) Next it looks > like you aren't using any PHP framework but self-developed one which gives > you more work than is needed and obviously it's less battletested. But > overall code itself is nice and pretty, correctly uses MVC pattern. Bad > things are that you don't have separate public directory for frontend and > anyone can access PHP files directly, view templates for example ( > https://pod.movim.eu/app/views/admin.tpl) it's not a big deal, but still > not good idea (running version https://pod.movim.eu/VERSION). Then in > some places HTML tags and entities are used directly rather than proper > Unicode which isn't a good idea and it means that string isn't later > escaped and if it gets mixed together with user-input or translation > strings there's a place for XSS. The worse thing probably is that > sanitization is based on regexp blacklists/filters, I'm talking about StringHelper.php, > I didn't look how it's actually used, but still even without trying I'm > pretty sure it would be possible to find XSS there, why? because Rails > framework over 5 years have had ~20 XSS vulnerabilities and it's extremely > good framework used by dozens of projects and reviewed regularly, and it's > even based on whitelists, but still uses regexps for that which isn't good > and I wonder why no one does proper SGML parsing which they should. Just > take a look at sanitizer.rb > <https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/master/actionview/lib/action_view/vendor/html-scanner/html/sanitizer.rb#L72> > to see how non-trivial it is. Anyway the whole idea of sanitization is > wrong, you should just escape all text and don't try to guess which tags > you should render. I suggest any web developer to read OWASP > <https://www.owasp.org> from A to Z it's a must for any web developer. > Then there's `?>` PHP end tags used at end of various files which are > useless and can introduce problems like famous "headers already sent" > warning. So seems that's about it with my quick look, but I might have > forgotten to mention some things. Another thing I don't like is that AGPL > is used, I really dislike all GPL family, but that's just me and I rather > prefer copyfree <http://copyfree.org> so if there's similar projects then > I'll rather contribute to MIT than any GPL variant :P And I'm not a fan of > Bazaar nor LaunchPad but that's not the worst thing (someone should ban CVS > and SVN :D) > > So to sum up about Movim, good parts: > > - Good idea > - Quite decent code, MVC used correctly > - Localization support > - Pretty website > - Open Source > - Active development > - SCM is used > > and bad: > > - Not enough known, marketed > - PHP is used > - No PHP framework used but self-developed one > - Some questionable and potentially vulnerable code in some places > - Scripts and files accessible directly > - Not my favorite (un)license > > > But yeah keep it up and continue developing it ;) I might use it some > day... > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 13728 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140707/0f26a1ec/attachment.txt> From cyberkiller8 at gmail.com Mon Jul 7 23:03:06 2014 From: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?IsWBdWthc3ogXCJDeWJlciBLaWxsZXJcIiBLb3JwYWxza2ki?=) Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2014 08:03:06 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: > Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: >> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack >> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you >> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically use >> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any >> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network stack, >> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you >> use. > > Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface beyond > these problems... how exactly? > > I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there might be > salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an already established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal looking from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These are imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new (again :-P ). -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com xmpp: cyber_killer at jabster.pl site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/edf9bca3/attachment.sig> From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 10:07:10 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 10:07:10 -0700 Subject: US enhanced airport security checks target electronics In-Reply-To: <CA+cU71k3qkGUfb6ON48h5RcsNEd8w_KJuZNVmgUSEBxfMvb1rQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1R1-NsKRL+Q+wv9-wcpzoHrSvmn0vyPQaAdaqjKP2upaw@mail.gmail.com> <20140707181058.731411b7b0336d3f0e68399c@mega-nerd.com> <CA+cU71k3qkGUfb6ON48h5RcsNEd8w_KJuZNVmgUSEBxfMvb1rQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RKeBTw7iF-QXQrSed1=Gs1OKj+cMU36LoU+HBgOMyFKQ@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 5:52 AM, Tom Ritter <tom at ritter.vg> wrote: > ... > The text in the email is satire/commentary and not actual reporting. thanks Tom. perhaps i need to be more full disclosure on my mocking ripostes.. (reality so fscked it's hard to tell the difference? ;) for the record, i sailed through customs with two laptops, three phones, one tablet, and one high performance Noctar SDR card without any trouble. (and a pelican 1550 checked bag full of stinky clothes) i would be curious to know if anyone encounters a border crossing this summer where powered on electronics are then taken from you for :"further inspection". From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 12:08:19 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 12:08:19 -0700 Subject: data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 11:29 AM, Geert Lovink <geert at desk.nl> wrote: > ... > the snowden files are of public interest. but only a small circle of > people is able to access, read, analyze, interpret and publish them. and > only a very small percentage of those files has been made available to > the public... > > what can be done about this situation? are we able to find a way to > "open" this data? and in the course of this create a modell for future > leaks? > .. > prior to my intervention harding had already hinted at some very obvious > limitations of the ongoing investigation, alluding to various reasons > why those "few lucky ones" are incapable to deal with the investigation > challenge in an approriate manner: "we are not technical experts" or > "after two hours your eyes pop out". inspite of this, harding seemed > unprepared to refelect the possibility to open the small circle of > analysts dealing with the snowden files. an impasse of extremes, a full or limited dump off the table. let's find a middle ground. how best to proceed? > * last but not least: one should work out a concept/model for > transferring those files into the public domain -- taking also into > account the obvious problems of "security" and "government pressure". > > it would be great of we could start a debate about in order to build a > case for the future of handling big data leaks in a more democratic and > sustainable manner. very great indeed. what kind of tools would make the journalists involved more effective and productive? 1. using the leaks currently published, devise a framework for "data mining" the leak documents, aka, generating metadata from the data and operating various matches and relevance across the metadata to narrow the search and aggregate related efforts or technologies across their compartmentalized worlds. 2. #1 requires that there is an index of special terms, techniques, suppliers, code names, algorithms, etc. that used to generate the metadata for deeper search and tie to general themes of surveillance. 3. extrapolating from current leaks, also look toward recent advancements and specific technical tell tales of interest. doping silicon as tailored access technique? this could refer to compromised runs of security processors for desired targets. etc. 4. justifying technical detail specifically. we have seen so little technical detail of the source code / hardware design level. how best to justify source code - explaining that the language choice, the nature of the algorithms, the structure of the distributed computing upon which it runs all conveys critical technical details important to understand what part of our technologies are compromised, and guiding the fixes required to protect against such compromises? in short, it would behoove us to build tools to make the journalists more effective, rather than bitch about not being included in the inner circle. (sadly, many good knowledge discovery tools are proprietary and applied to open source intelligence) what types of features would you want such a leak-assistant software to have? what types of existing tools, if any, would provide these capabilities? best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 13:11:44 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 13:11:44 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 1:05 PM, Griffin Boyce <griffin at cryptolab.net> wrote: > One approach is to take the existing public data, make some assumptions > (educated guesses) and do additional research on top of that. It's what I'm > doing right now. It's also what led to the original cointelpro revelations. > Before the follow-up research, it was a meaningless acronym. > > Find, extrapolate, expand. hi Griffin! this is the type of effort i was hoping to see undertaken. when you say "additional research", is this organic or structured? tool assisted or old skewl? i too have been building up some terms and technologies, but yet to put it into any structured format with context, as part of my post is to see how others are handling the vast complexity and extensive compartmentalization embodied in the leaks to date. i also would like to pursue this research anonymously, on hidden services rather than public sites or email. best regards, From zen at freedbms.net Tue Jul 8 01:25:53 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 18:25:53 +1000 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> On 7/8/14, "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" <cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> wrote: > W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: >> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: >>> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack >>> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you >>> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically >>> use >>> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any >>> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network >>> stack, >>> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you >>> use. >> >> Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface >> beyond >> these problems... how exactly? >> >> I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there might >> be >> salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? > > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an already > established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal looking > from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially > privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These are > imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new (again > :-P ). As has been said over the decades: start correct, 'good' easy to maintain code, secure of course, and optimize later, eg 1-1 mapping from XMPP (XML I assume?) to say msgpack: MessagePack: http://msgpack.org/ - a fast, binary replacement for JSON Such optimizations ought be behind a library anyway! (From user app point of view.) As someone else said, think of the stack, separate the concerns: IP, user addressing, persistence of ids, persistence of addresses, crypting, dht, distributed storage, libs, user apps. For impatient programmers wanting instant gratification, work on one layer in the stack. From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 15:27:18 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 18:27:18 -0400 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 4:11 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 1:05 PM, Griffin Boyce <griffin at cryptolab.net> wrote: >> One approach is to take the existing public data, make some assumptions >> (educated guesses) and do additional research on top of that. It's what I'm >> doing right now. It's also what led to the original cointelpro revelations. >> Before the follow-up research, it was a meaningless acronym. >> >> Find, extrapolate, expand. > > this is the type of effort i was hoping to see undertaken. > > when you say "additional research", is this organic or structured? > tool assisted or old skewl? > > i too have been building up some terms and technologies, but yet to > put it into any structured format with context, as part of my post is > to see how others are handling the vast complexity and extensive > compartmentalization embodied in the leaks to date. > > i also would like to pursue this research anonymously, on hidden > services rather than public sites or email. To do any of this you will need to collect all the releases of docs and images to date, in their original format (not AP newsspeak), in one place. Then dedicate much time to normalizing, convert to one format and import into tagged document store, etc. Yes, this could be hosted on the darknet. From davispuh at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 09:05:22 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 19:05:22 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> yeah I agree that using XML was bad idea in XMPP design, there's no good reason to use it, but XMPP is already thought out unlike any new protocol. But actually I think could use same XMPP protocol and just map on different encoding. What is XML? basically it's just a language for data mapping (an encoding) and it would be perfectly possible to use same XMPP protocol concepts and map them on different data structure. And this is the thing I think should be pursued for. Which encoding to use is debatable. I would say using Google Protocol Buffers <https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/> are perfect for network protocols. I haven't investigated how good is MessagePack, but it could be usable too. Only about JSON and similar I don't like that they're "type-less", they have just some basic data types like String, Number etc and you loose information that way, say you've uint32 and you store and transmit that with JSON and on other end it will be probably int64 because that CPU is 64bit, of course you could find shortest fitting type, but that's not practical because you don't know limits of this field, maybe next message it will be bigger. In Protobuf there's types for everything int32, unit64 and so on. 2014-07-08 11:25 GMT+03:00 Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net>: > On 7/8/14, "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" <cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> > wrote: > > W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: > >> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: > >>> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack > >>> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if you > >>> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say basically > >>> use > >>> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any > >>> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network > >>> stack, > >>> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol you > >>> use. > >> > >> Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface > >> beyond > >> these problems... how exactly? > >> > >> I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there > might > >> be > >> salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? > > > > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an already > > established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal looking > > from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially > > privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These are > > imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new (again > > :-P ). > > As has been said over the decades: start correct, 'good' easy > to maintain code, secure of course, and optimize later, > eg 1-1 mapping from XMPP (XML I assume?) to say msgpack: > MessagePack: http://msgpack.org/ - a fast, binary replacement for JSON > > Such optimizations ought be behind a library anyway! > (From user app point of view.) > > As someone else said, think of the stack, separate the concerns: > IP, user addressing, persistence of ids, persistence of addresses, > crypting, dht, distributed storage, libs, user apps. > > For impatient programmers wanting instant gratification, > work on one layer in the stack. > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 4063 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/7157386d/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 8 11:05:11 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 20:05:11 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rLygoPKkKh3_Do4G9Y-D698R3MyTugO3Y0i-oRFiv7Esw@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-08 18:05 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com>: > XMPP design, I used XMPP with facebook chat. It didn't support even a quarter of the cookiejar of features. This was with Pidgin, afaik the only serious rich crossplatform manyprotocol chat program. So forgive me for being a little underwhelmed on the protocol itself. It is also by design the most common denominator, with extensions infrequently supported (read: less useful). The most common denominator is of course chat and user accounts. But chat is not the atomic networked message that we're talking about. VOIP over base64 also seems kind of like banging your head into the wall. It feels pretty good though, because it means state of the art can be improved. It gives some reason for the current state of things. We have a go-to solution, why improve? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1392 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/06056f50/attachment.txt> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Tue Jul 8 12:22:23 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2014 20:22:23 +0100 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> Biggest FAIL in json is lack of binary. I think a quick extension to bencoding is in order: "u<len>" prefix for utf8, "b<len>" for binary. Other types are pretty generally useful as-is. Replace "d", "l" and "e" with curly and square braces for readability. Bencoding's structure and basic idea is nice as it's terse and understandable, but also easy to make security guarantees about: length prefix, and on parse errors just dump the input and error out. Minimal overhead for raw binary, which is what you want for crypto, file transfers, and VoiP streams. Trivial to write in any language so rapidly portable, and can be coded recursively with relative ease without sacrificing understandability or security (much). Thoughts? Bencoding 2.0? On 8 July 2014 17:05:22 GMT+01:00, "Dāvis Mosāns" <davispuh at gmail.com> wrote: >yeah I agree that using XML was bad idea in XMPP design, there's no >good >reason to use it, but XMPP is already thought out unlike any new >protocol. >But actually I think could use same XMPP protocol and just map on >different >encoding. What is XML? basically it's just a language for data mapping >(an >encoding) and it would be perfectly possible to use same XMPP protocol >concepts and map them on different data structure. And this is the >thing I >think should be pursued for. Which encoding to use is debatable. I >would >say using Google Protocol Buffers ><https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/> are perfect for >network >protocols. I haven't investigated how good is MessagePack, but it could >be >usable too. Only about JSON and similar I don't like that they're >"type-less", they have just some basic data types like String, Number >etc >and you loose information that way, say you've uint32 and you store and >transmit that with JSON and on other end it will be probably int64 >because >that CPU is 64bit, of course you could find shortest fitting type, but >that's not practical because you don't know limits of this field, maybe >next message it will be bigger. In Protobuf there's types for >everything >int32, unit64 and so on. > > > > >2014-07-08 11:25 GMT+03:00 Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net>: > >> On 7/8/14, "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" ><cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: >> >> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: >> >>> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes >attack >> >>> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even >if you >> >>> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say >basically >> >>> use >> >>> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without >any >> >>> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, >network >> >>> stack, >> >>> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging >protocol you >> >>> use. >> >> >> >> Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack >surface >> >> beyond >> >> these problems... how exactly? >> >> >> >> I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as >there >> might >> >> be >> >> salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? >> > >> > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an >already >> > established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal >looking >> > from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially >> > privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These >are >> > imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new >(again >> > :-P ). >> >> As has been said over the decades: start correct, 'good' easy >> to maintain code, secure of course, and optimize later, >> eg 1-1 mapping from XMPP (XML I assume?) to say msgpack: >> MessagePack: http://msgpack.org/ - a fast, binary replacement for >JSON >> >> Such optimizations ought be behind a library anyway! >> (From user app point of view.) >> >> As someone else said, think of the stack, separate the concerns: >> IP, user addressing, persistence of ids, persistence of addresses, >> crypting, dht, distributed storage, libs, user apps. >> >> For impatient programmers wanting instant gratification, >> work on one layer in the stack. >> >> -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 5390 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/8bbe950b/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 8 13:18:07 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 22:18:07 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKcav1ty4pMjcqPE3c2KJA3CjPUhtc6L-52_Va2DguR_A@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-08 21:22 GMT+02:00 Cathal (Phone) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > Thoughts? Bencoding 2.0? tl;dr: I think it's a good idea, but it is offensive in a vague way. --- It's really unfun to suddenly see binary in your JSON file. Both for automated software that parses HTML (or something) and for people that use text editors. The motivation for JSON isn't that it's easy and not too inefficient. It's cleaner and more generic than XML. It's also faster to write because the { and } are always written in code (you find them more easily). It's just XML but a bit better. If you want efficiency you could take to templated binary blobs. It wouldn't actually be that hard, either, once we have some tools to do it. You could even have a dual request, where you request "file.binary" and "filelayout.json", where a JSON file describes the shape of the binary information file. It is actually a good idea. Definitely better than any alternatives (all none of them). Just need plugins for text editors to hide the binary when you're viewing it. And find some way to prevent binary overflow. You know how C coders love to believe a length field, then do something bad and everything goes poof. Maybe port over how attachments work in e-mail. Actually, please don't it's awful. But it shows the sort of trouble you get. It's great for some applications. I don't like that it would be good for the wrong applications too. I also think we should harness more off the power we already have, instead of thinking of new ways that are easier-but-not-actually-much-easier. I think I'd rather have a way to put JSON in front of my binary file, than a way to put binary into my JSON file. It'd be great for metadata for images, actually I've seen XML in front of PNG's and GIFS. We could use a .BJSN, a format for a (JSON, Binary) tuple. References may be better than embedding; flexibility in delivery and storage, respects both formats more, keeps JSON simpler. That's the only really valid concern I can come up with. It depends on the application field. As a webdeveloper I can see the utility and also the difficulty of good support. I think of previous trouble with binary overflow, and how it can get really really messy. I'm pro-possibility though! We should be able to do it, and leave it wherever we think that's bad. Maybe we should start calling it "JSON Transfer Protocol", though! I'm a little under the weather atm so please forgive my awkward verbosity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3362 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/87ab4624/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 8 13:31:06 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 22:31:06 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-08 21:53 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com>: > Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in C/C++ > using typical char * null-terminated string, how'll pass this JSON to > someone? because well NUL... At the parser level you would find a "b" character that's not between brackets, signalling a binary header is coming. A binary header is actually just the number of bytes that follow in binary format. The following bytes are then a binary file, to be assigned to a string as if it were a variable. We have a binarybuffer in javascript, that sort of thing. It would contain the NULL byte if you like it to. That may break some parsers, but this is the real life. Parsers must deal with malformed input securely already > being unaware of bencoding2 should not cause problems. If the length-indicating thingy is short of what it should binary will spill over into your JSON document. It may represent perfectly fine JSON, and thus opens up binary overflow as a possible JSON hack. Someone that can alter that number can already hack your JSON, so that doesn't actually change any attack profile. If it's too long it will gobble up your JSON file, which opens up reading the rest of the file and maybe even into random memory and treating it as a file in your JSON. That's much more serious but requires the JSON parser to have bugs. The thing is that if you don't cut yourself in the fingers it can be nice to have a knife. If you don't write some pretty obvious bugs you will be fine. I think it's much more serious that you have to serve the BJSON completely as a binary file. It's not like you can dump it onto a webpage anymore. You can't slip it into your normal HTTP text transfer bodies either, has to work with attachments. Attachments should be secure when facing malformed transfers* etc. Inconvenient, but not the end. * It would be pretty wack to mess with the HTTP protocol. Maybe you could confuse a keep-alive connection to serve a file before it should be, confusing a webapp or sending a redirect. Haven't really looked into it and haven't really heard about it either. Maybe servers are just secure enough against those attacks? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2876 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/a54dd4da/attachment.txt> From davispuh at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 12:53:06 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 22:53:06 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> I think it's unreal/unpractical and not worth going for and there's just no benefits for it (just use proper binary serialization), JSON was meant as human-readable serialization format and introducing binary format there, then what was the point of using JSON in first place? Why not just some proper binary serialization? (eg. Protobuf). It just really seems that people throw a lot of stuff on JSON, XML and others even if it was never intended to be used for those purposes. There are different tools each for it's own specific purpose and people should not abuse them. Current JSON parsers treat " as special token to separate strings, so if you want to include " in JSON you've to escape, so it will be "\"" and now with any binary encoding you're complicating this because either you've to escape " or track whether you're inside binary data or not and it will crash for non-binary aware parsers. Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in C/C++ using typical char * null-terminated string, how'll pass this JSON to someone? because well NUL... 2014-07-08 22:22 GMT+03:00 Cathal (Phone) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > Biggest FAIL in json is lack of binary. I think a quick extension to > bencoding is in order: "u<len>" prefix for utf8, "b<len>" for binary. Other > types are pretty generally useful as-is. Replace "d", "l" and "e" with > curly and square braces for readability. > > Bencoding's structure and basic idea is nice as it's terse and > understandable, but also easy to make security guarantees about: length > prefix, and on parse errors just dump the input and error out. Minimal > overhead for raw binary, which is what you want for crypto, file transfers, > and VoiP streams. Trivial to write in any language so rapidly portable, and > can be coded recursively with relative ease without sacrificing > understandability or security (much). > > Thoughts? Bencoding 2.0? > > > On 8 July 2014 17:05:22 GMT+01:00, "Dāvis Mosāns" <davispuh at gmail.com> > wrote: >> >> yeah I agree that using XML was bad idea in XMPP design, there's no good >> reason to use it, but XMPP is already thought out unlike any new protocol. >> But actually I think could use same XMPP protocol and just map on different >> encoding. What is XML? basically it's just a language for data mapping (an >> encoding) and it would be perfectly possible to use same XMPP protocol >> concepts and map them on different data structure. And this is the thing I >> think should be pursued for. Which encoding to use is debatable. I would >> say using Google Protocol Buffers >> <https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/> are perfect for >> network protocols. I haven't investigated how good is MessagePack, but it >> could be usable too. Only about JSON and similar I don't like that they're >> "type-less", they have just some basic data types like String, Number etc >> and you loose information that way, say you've uint32 and you store and >> transmit that with JSON and on other end it will be probably int64 because >> that CPU is 64bit, of course you could find shortest fitting type, but >> that's not practical because you don't know limits of this field, maybe >> next message it will be bigger. In Protobuf there's types for everything >> int32, unit64 and so on. >> >> >> >> >> 2014-07-08 11:25 GMT+03:00 Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net>: >> >>> On 7/8/14, "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" <cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> > W dniu 07.07.2014 16:55, rysiek pisze: >>> >> Dnia poniedziałek, 7 lipca 2014 16:06:47 Dāvis Mosāns pisze: >>> >>> I don't agree, I think XMPP could be good solution, while yes attack >>> >>> surface is quite large but it will be in any case, because even if >>> you >>> >>> create the very minimalist chat protocol possible (let's say >>> basically >>> >>> use >>> >>> asymmetric cryptography for messages which are plaintext without any >>> >>> features) you still can have bugs in cryptography library, network >>> >>> stack, >>> >>> OS/kernel. This part will be same no matter what messaging protocol >>> you >>> >>> use. >>> >> >>> >> Exactly. And that's an argument for NOT minimizing the attack surface >>> >> beyond >>> >> these problems... how exactly? >>> >> >>> >> I mean, your argument is basically: "don't wash your hands, as there >>> might >>> >> be >>> >> salmonella in the eggs anyway". Dafuq? >>> > >>> > I'm going to defend XMPP too, but on the grounds that it's an already >>> > established and widely used protocol, the overhead is minimal looking >>> > from a modern point of view (even when not using the potentially >>> > privacy-risky elements) and it was designed to be extendable. These are >>> > imo good arguments to use xmpp instead of creating something new (again >>> > :-P ). >>> >>> As has been said over the decades: start correct, 'good' easy >>> to maintain code, secure of course, and optimize later, >>> eg 1-1 mapping from XMPP (XML I assume?) to say msgpack: >>> MessagePack: http://msgpack.org/ - a fast, binary replacement for JSON >>> >>> Such optimizations ought be behind a library anyway! >>> (From user app point of view.) >>> >>> As someone else said, think of the stack, separate the concerns: >>> IP, user addressing, persistence of ids, persistence of addresses, >>> crypting, dht, distributed storage, libs, user apps. >>> >>> For impatient programmers wanting instant gratification, >>> work on one layer in the stack. >>> >>> >> > -- > Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 6976 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140708/008456ed/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 07:04:06 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 07:04:06 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 3:27 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > To do any of this you will need to collect all the releases of docs > and images to date, in their original format (not AP newsspeak), > in one place. Then dedicate much time to normalizing, convert to > one format and import into tagged document store, etc. Yes, this > could be hosted on the darknet. indeed. i will also be hosting the complete cryptome archive on hidden site, as it too is part of this corpus to feed into a normalization and extraction engine of great justice. i am using the various python image processing libraries to accomplish this but any language or tool could be useful. i had hoped to distribute the cryptome archives further during the Paris hackfest, alas, unexpected events conspired otherwise. anyone who would like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how they anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) From cyberkiller8 at gmail.com Tue Jul 8 22:30:56 2014 From: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?IsWBdWthc3ogXCJDeWJlciBLaWxsZXJcIiBLb3JwYWxza2ki?=) Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 07:30:56 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> W dniu 08.07.2014 22:31, Lodewijk andré de la porte pisze: > 2014-07-08 21:53 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com > <mailto:davispuh at gmail.com>>: > > Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in (---snip the technical discussion about a new protocol---) > secure enough against those attacks? Stop right there... It's really nice that so many of you got into the spirit and start thinking about how to change xmpp to make it something new, but what are you achieving here? It will end up being a new protocol, incompatible with existing xmpp, it will take a few years to finish the spec, then another 10+ years until any meaningful applications start using it (if at all)... So yeah, except being "coder porn" it does nothing to help the problem here and now. I agree that xmpp is not perfect, it has some problems of its own, but it is an already established and widely used and standard protocol, with lots of implementations. From a practical point of view the best course of action to get something fast is to use it, and put whatever new stuff there is needed inside xmpp, keeping it compatible with the existing spec. A technically pretty proto won't help, today’s world has a huge problem with taking anything new. Better to stay with existing stuff, make it maybe less efficient because of it, but it will be here fast, when it's needed. Plus being less efficient is a no issue today, with fast machines (you can use compression on the fly, yes really :-P ), loads of storage, broadband connections (even the 3G data caps are getting larger and larger each year), etc. People are sending gigabytes of binary files in base64 each day in email messages, so why even care? ;-) In my opinion the bottom line is - a small addition to existing xmpp has a far larger chance of being widely adopted (by applications and by the users) than a completely new protocol. And despite how awesome coder one might be - you won't be able to write all those implementations yourself or convince the masses to switch (again!). -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com xmpp: cyber_killer at jabster.pl site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140709/c942c78a/attachment.sig> From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 08:36:29 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 08:36:29 -0700 Subject: distributing Cryptome June 2014 [was: data mine the snowden files] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 7:04 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > anyone who would like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how they > anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) based on feedback, here is what i intend: 1. A torrent of: USB-1.rar USB-2.rar Update-13-1231.rar each of these have an accompanying signature from John. i will include a magnet URI. 2. The same files on a hidden service with nginx and HTTP/1.1 range request capable (resume-able) 3. An extracted collection of all relevant files, which can be rsync'ed from hidden service or browsed directly. note that this is a point in time archive from June 2014. please donate to John as i hate to think i would be taking revenue from his pocket with this setup! best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 08:39:36 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 08:39:36 -0700 Subject: Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RtA=wN5T6DQOZfQsqXU=WZkxSQpCsw5V-DyqC-uZ4B=w@mail.gmail.com> latest from The Intercept: https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/ a choice excerpt: """ The FBI—which is listed as the “responsible agency” for surveillance on the five men—has a controversial record when it comes to the ethnic profiling of Muslim-Americans. According to FBI training materials uncovered by Wired in 2011, the bureau taught agents to treat “mainstream” Muslims as supporters of terrorism, to view charitable donations by Muslims as “a funding mechanism for combat,” and to view Islam itself as a “Death Star” that must be destroyed if terrorism is to be contained. John Guandolo, a former FBI counterterrorism official who takes credit for developing a training program for agents on the “Muslim Brotherhood and their subversive movement in the United States,” told The Intercept that he participated in investigations of some of the individuals whose email accounts were monitored. Echoing the “red under every bed” hysteria of the McCarthy era, Guandolo believes that “hundreds” of covert members of the Muslim Brotherhood are active in the United States, that some of them have succeeded in infiltrating the Pentagon, and that CIA director John Brennan is a secret Muslim. Other former and current federal officials say such beliefs are not representative of the FBI or Justice Department. But blatant prejudice against Muslim-Americans is also documented in the Snowden archive. In one 2005 document, intelligence community personnel are instructed how to properly format internal memos to justify FISA surveillance. In the place where the target’s real name would go, the memo offers a fake name as a placeholder: “Mohammed Raghead.” """ best regards, Brother Coder Raghead Muhammed From gfoster at entersection.org Wed Jul 9 09:43:30 2014 From: gfoster at entersection.org (Gregory Foster) Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 11:43:30 -0500 Subject: The Facebook "Experiment" (was <nettime> Facebook's Mood Study: Orwellian newspeak 2.0) In-Reply-To: <20140709120759.GC26986@leitl.org> References: <20140709120759.GC26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <53BD7132.9080806@entersection.org> On 7/9/14, 7:07 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > [SCG (Jul 1)] Facebook's Psychological Experiments Connected to Department of Defense > Research on Civil Unrest > http://scgnews.com/facebooks-psychological-experiments-connected-to-department-of-defense-research-on-civil-unrest Thanks for sending this, Eugen. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - "Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks" by Adam D. I. Kramera, Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeffrey T. Hancock: http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full US Department of Defense - The Minerva Research Initiative: http://minerva.dtic.mil/ > There have been rumors that the research described in the recent publication "Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks" (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 111 no. 24) was funded by the Department of Defense or its Minerva Research Initiative. This is not the case. Though a study co-author did receive a Minerva grant in the past, that effort was unrelated to the research of interest. > > The Minerva Research Initiative is committed to ensuring informed consent by its research subjects and abides by all human subject protection regulations for its domestic and international work alike. For further questions or any press inquiries, please contact DOD Public Affairs. Here's some insight on the Minerva Research Initiative (HT the article Eugen sent): Guardian - Earth Insight (Jun 12) - "Pentagon preparing for mass civil breakdown" by @nafeezahmed: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/12/pentagon-mass-civil-breakdown Jeffrey T. Hancock was one of the co-authors of the Facebook study. He was funded by the DoD's Minerva Research Initiative in 2009 to research "Modeling Discourse and Social Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes". http://infosci.cornell.edu/faculty/jeffrey-hancock The authors of the Facebook study thanked Cornell colleague Michael Macy for his feedback. Macy is currently funded by the DoD's Minerva Research Initiative in 2014 to study "Tracking Critical-Mass Outbreaks in Social Contagions". http://infosci.cornell.edu/faculty/michael-macy Here's all of the funded research: http://minerva.dtic.mil/funded.html gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster at entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ From keithl at kl-ic.com Wed Jul 9 11:43:47 2014 From: keithl at kl-ic.com (Keith Lofstrom) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 11:43:47 -0700 Subject: [Server-sky] Server sky and social architecture Message-ID: <20140709184347.GA5290@gate.kl-ic.com> Inspired by a brief conversation with Cory Doctorow at his presentation 2014 July 8, Tuesday: http://server-sky.com/CodeLawHardware Keith -- Keith Lofstrom keithl at keithl.com _______________________________________________ Server-sky mailing list Server-sky at lists.server-sky.com http://lists.server-sky.com/mailman/listinfo/server-sky ----- End forwarded message ----- Code is Law, Hardware is Code's Language CodeLawHardware The Law of Law is language. If your language is richly metaphorical and contains the word "schadenfreude", you will annex the Sudetenland, gas most of your ethnic minorities, and a surviving ethnic outlier will use your language to express general relativity. Other languages better express other crimes and concepts. A linguist will tell you all languages can express all concepts - languages are Turing complete - but this fashionable conceit does not tell us why different cultures do different things. Code is law. Hardware is the language and law of code. Code can only do what hardware permits. A Turing complete machine can manufacture any set of symbols from any other set, but those symbols cannot go where the hardware doesn't connect. In 1990 I designed a chip, a non-blocking crossbar routing device, for the startup I-Cube Design Systems. This chip routed signals from any pin to any other pin, and could route 240 inputs to any combination of 240 other outputs. But it also had fanout - it could route an input to two or more outputs. 160 inputs could become 320 outputs. This was useful for the original task - hardware logic simulation. When the original logic simulator customers became enmired in patent lawsuits, I-Cube found a new customer, another small startup called Cisco. Cisco's routers distributed the backbone of the early internet, and still route most of it. I realize, decades later, that I made one of the architectural decisions that allows the NSA to watch you as you read this webpage. Cisco's routers flowed bitstreams, not "packets", a software metaphor for a time-bounded sequence of bits. Packet headers told the router which flow got the bits, the router told the crossbar device which path the bits should take. Sending the bits to more than one place was implicit in how the hardware worked, because the hardware had fanout. Cisco remains, I-Cube was killed by incompetent venture capitalists. I'm not party to how Cisco designs routers today, but fanout is implicit in dataflow, hardware can stream one transmitter to multiple receivers, tracelessly. Software is merely "judicial opinion" applied to that hardware, and we non-electrical macroscopic human beings only have opinions, not sure knowledge, about how the bits are actually moving and transforming from memory location to other (possibly multiple) memory locations. Software can encrypt - or it can pretend to. Software becomes machine instructions via a compiler. Dennis Ritchie taught us that a compiler emits machine instructions chosen by the compiler author, who can override the decisions of the source code author. The hardware author can override both. The hard disk manufacturer decides what firmware bytes go on the boot tracks of your hard drive, the disk firmware decides what bytes you actually get to your RAM from which disk track, and this firmware is invisible to the machine code it dispenses. In an age of Viterbi coding and VLSI disk chips, even a hardware logic analyzer may not tell you what's actually on the boot tracks. For sure knowledge, you will need your own hardware, either your own replacement disk chips or a focused ion beam milling system (FIB) to take apart the disk chips and learn what they actually do. The economics of chip production make it impossibly expensive to give everyone a different chip architecture, though you can cheaply individualize every chip (another of my inventions, see http://siidtech.com ). If there is a ghost in the hardware machine, it is in all the machines, and those versed in VLSI, equipped with FIB, can find the ghosts. The individuality can be perfectly hidden, and cannot be unmasked without destroying the chip. Puzzling out a proprietary design is possible but time-consuming, perhaps costing as much as the original design. Verifying that an open source hardware design is faithfully replicated in silicon is relatively easy, and could be automated, perhaps as cheap as sequencing a genome. We do not do so, because software designers pretend the substrate does not exist, or is logically identical to all other substrates, and thus not worth controlling or verifying (doctors and pharmaceutical companies share the same pretense). Open source hardware can also encrypt, and properly-designed hardware can encrypt without fanout (no feasible side channel attacks). If we choose, we can build individual hardware that encrypts each keystroke and decrypts it at each screen, whether the path between is centimeters or megameters. With proper hardware, you can still use Gmail for your mail host, but your messages are gibberish to Google, and to whoever they share the messages with. Google banner ads can be ignored by your decrypter. Google would starve, so they want to make your software and hardware "for free", protecting their product (which is you). Hardware geeks will still need to re-examine (identical) copies of the hardware from time to time, to make sure the hardware matches specification, and crypto geeks will need to frequently re-examine the specification to make sure it is mathematically correct. And sometimes the hardware will be invalid, and we will need to replace it with new hardware. But a billion transistors costs pennies from Intel, which Amazon can get to you overnight. Why this matters to Server Sky Server sky will use far fewer routers. Access to server sky arrays will be trigonometric, agile antenna pointing, not packet routing via DNS and border gateway protocol; if the array is above the horizon and has what you want, you can talk to it directly without intermediaries, and your conversation can be encrypted end-to-end. Of course, each end can have fanout, with either the orbiting array or your ground terminal copying your conversation to your Designated Overlord. Each end can have a fanout of zero, censorship applied by that same (or different) Designated Overlord. No man-in-the-middle attacks when there is only vacuum and Maxwell's equations between sender and receiver. Orbital mechanics, Doppler shift, and twelve-nines-accurate shared clocks provide link authentication that cannot be spoofed without reshaping space-time. There will be Designated Overlords - in the US, we call the overlords "Google" and "Hollywood", in China the overlords are the Communist Party and/or the People's Liberation Army. People can't seem to live without chains, sigh. But we must design our hardware so the overlords are explicit in the design, few in number, and subject to organized social opinion (which may be more true for China than the US, though I love Google more than the PLA). This matters because the Server Sky team will make the design decisions now that will shape the hardware for decades, until the next big re-architecting (the last two were the Bell network, and internet protocol). These decisions should be informed by every capable brain on the planet. They should not be made by me, nor by my handful of smart but fallible collaborators. The best minds work elsewhere, and the best minds, if they know what's good for them, will get involved while the future is still conceptual and easy to shape. After launch, we can still replace all the satellites and all the ground terminals and all the end-user gear, but this is costly, and even the best minds don't have the money and persuasiveness to make this happen often. Better to get it approximately right the first time, and make it plug-upgradable. This webpage is an appeal for help. Bad social design is easy, and regrettably common. Hardware is easy compared to competent social design. I beg you to help design the future you and your descendants will live in. I goofed up once, I would rather not do it again. From jya at pipeline.com Wed Jul 9 09:17:15 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 12:17:15 -0400 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Message-ID: <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Tag the Cryptome Archive: "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." At 10:58 AM 7/9/2014, you wrote: >What about a Torrent ? We can easily share the >magnet everywhere (Reddit, Twitter ). > >On mer., juil. 9, 2014 at 4:04 , coderman <codderman at gmail.com> wrote: >>On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 3:27 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: >>... To do any of this you will need to collect >>all the releases of docs and images to date, in >>their original format (not AP newsspeak), in >>one place. Then dedicate much time to >>normalizing, convert to one format and import >>into tagged document store, etc. Yes, this could be hosted on the darknet. >> >>indeed. i will also be hosting the complete >>cryptome archive on hidden site, as it too is >>part of this corpus to feed into a >>normalization and extraction engine of great >>justice. i am using the various python image >>processing libraries to accomplish this but any >>language or tool could be useful. i had hoped >>to distribute the cryptome archives further >>during the Paris hackfest, alas, unexpected >>events conspired otherwise. anyone who would >>like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how >>they anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1590 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140709/dc8a2dda/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Wed Jul 9 03:17:31 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 12:17:31 +0200 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rJt55_FiCNruwkoJ-_YKav9H+PSdhEjM8D7rTpzko4YDQ@mail.gmail.com> On Jul 9, 2014 7:44 AM, Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski < cyberkiller8 at gmail.com> wrote: > It's really nice that so many of you got into the spirit and start > thinking about how to change xmpp to make it something new, but what are > you achieving here? We're being more fundamental and will achieve better and more modular results because of it. The protocol has a different aim than XMPP. > another 10+ years until any meaningful applications start using it (if > at all)... So yeah, except being "coder porn" it does nothing to help > the problem here and now. Concentrated pessimism? Why not both? Just make an XMPP bridge. Facebook does that, Google might be doing that (or proprietary extensions), who doesn't? > I agree that xmpp is not perfect, it has some problems of its own, but > it is an already established and widely used and standard protocol, with > lots of implementations. From a practical point of view the best course > of action to get something fast is to use it, and put whatever new stuff > there is needed inside xmpp, keeping it compatible with the existing spec. Why didn't XMPP do that? What do you mean widely used? IRC is widely used. XMPP is not normally used with the user knowing it is XMPP. It's under the hood technology. > A technically pretty proto won't help, today’s world has a huge problem > with taking anything new. Which is because of a lack of "polymorphic protocols". > fast machines (you can use compression on the fly, yes really :-P ), loads of > storage, broadband connections (even the 3G data caps are getting larger > and larger each year), etc. People are sending gigabytes of binary files > in base64 each day in email messages, so why even care? ;-) Nobody ever said it will be efficient. But aside from that, there's scale to worry about. You're also missing how people usually send data in binary to hotmail or gmail, then they perform whatever voodoo they perform. So, actually, most people send their e-mail attachments in binary. The rest would probably really want to, but nobody is making the standard any better. Why would they? They can do whatever they want without worrying about compatibility because they own so much market share. A new standard may have been used inside and between the mayor e-mail providers, would you know? > In my opinion the bottom line is - a small addition to existing xmpp has > a far larger chance of being widely adopted (by applications and by the > users) than a completely new protocol. And despite how awesome coder one > might be - you won't be able to write all those implementations yourself > or convince the masses to switch (again!). There is no masses using XMPP. Masses of coders, maybe, and they will use the best tool for the job. All the extensions have succeeded in making any XMPP app lacking in usability. I sure haven't found any nice XMPP clients, nice enough to compare with native clients. In fact I'm willing to bet everyone in the western world uses FB, Google chat and MSN (slackers and slowpokes). They all have limited XMPP implementations, they native clients do more. And there's no good app for interacting with XMPP. Pidgin really isn't good, it's just the only one out there. And it is still in the MSN era. I've switched to Office 2013 from Libre/OpenOffice and it really is in a different league all together. And it sucks that it is. But what can we do? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3979 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140709/f72d68f9/attachment.txt> From eugen at leitl.org Wed Jul 9 05:23:28 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 14:23:28 +0200 Subject: BPjM blacklist reversed Message-ID: <20140709122328.GG26986@leitl.org> https://bpjmleak.neocities.org/ tl;dr: Germany has a censorship federal agency called BPjM which maintains a secret list of about 3000 URLs. To keep the list secret it is distributed in the form of md5 or sha1 hashes as the "BPJM-Modul". They think this is safe. This leak explains in detail that it is in fact very easy to extract the hashed censorship list from home routers or child protection software and calculate the cleartext entries. It provides a first analysis of the sometimes absurd entries on such a governmental Internet censorship list. From edhelas at movim.eu Wed Jul 9 07:58:05 2014 From: edhelas at movim.eu (edhelas) Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 16:58:05 +0200 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> What about a Torrent ? We can easily share the magnet everywhere (Reddit, Twitter…). On mer., juil. 9, 2014 at 4:04 , coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 3:27 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: >> ... >> To do any of this you will need to collect all the releases of docs >> and images to date, in their original format (not AP newsspeak), >> in one place. Then dedicate much time to normalizing, convert to >> one format and import into tagged document store, etc. Yes, this >> could be hosted on the darknet. > > indeed. i will also be hosting the complete cryptome archive on hidden > site, as it too is part of this corpus to feed into a normalization > and extraction engine of great justice. i am using the various python > image processing libraries to accomplish this but any language or tool > could be useful. > > i had hoped to distribute the cryptome archives further during the > Paris hackfest, alas, unexpected events conspired otherwise. > > anyone who would like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how they > anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1244 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140709/2136fbbc/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 18:35:50 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 18:35:50 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Tec5NQr-iCF0bhUCuyuzTvBsMWPJQqECY8QQ_0xO9dGQ@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 9:17 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > Tag the Cryptome Archive: "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use > it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in > complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and > Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." see attached. onion before torrent; rest TBD. also: http://cryptome.org/donations.htm best regards, -------------- next part -------------- Cryptome Donation Required - http://cryptome.org/donations.htm "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." Index: 0eb8551d977dde4f4193b3a16dedcd18f01e854e371e96623d33dd5b9519e413 *USB-1.rar 9653d105293b9f77d5b0067d51a35ed286a7f50a0b37b3ea2bd78c092caab584 *USB-2.rar 7e798bb2b09cac49181aa7c12170e03fc3d3cf69a73d9e1b04171c80910e7525 Update-13-1231.rar 80652978f46ef6e6f26bd2bec406349ef766ad1722fc81d9f7575148edc6324f wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip c56f0fd30924f7398ca9e20c098acced50766d3325754f29014dd33029ebf351 wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip 9d2aa03048c60eec2c94d45293d4e95977a94f3477a4701f6ee2ef7ec888a7c9 WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip *- these files have a detached signature from key 0xB650572B8B3BF75C "Cryptome <cryptome at earthlink.net>" -------------- next part -------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iL4EABEKAGYFAlO97OxfFIAAAAAALgAoaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldDQxQzEyQjhDMzA3RDdFMjE5OEFBNTc4MTY1 QTg0N0U3QzJCOTM4MEMACgkQZahH58K5OAxW4AEAgBKvsQz16zQyBsXbAl+qluiL 5/p3BtEPTLWSW6V5gTsA/1i8gatIPCAA3TXwTHRabvScVJ16CuIMkWm7Pb6QPIhJ =XcIm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 17:17:59 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 20:17:59 -0400 Subject: distributing Cryptome June 2014 [was: data mine the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_HapN34Wa=s+nsfoSqtLD+7jBUGS_7oVnMJfVJuaTpjQ@mail.gmail.com> > Could you do tarballs or zip files, rather than rar files? They're > much easier to deal with than recent rars using free software (the > only program I know that will do it is unar[0], which depends on > loads of GNUstep stuff). > 0. http://wakaba.c3.cx/s/apps/unarchiver.html Disrupting the originals inhibits verification with others who possess mailings and should be avoided. Supplementation is fine. There's this if you don't mind blobs. http://www.rarlab.com/download.htm RAR is proprietary. ZIP is not compact. Assuming Cryptome's working platform is not an opensource Unix, I'd definitely consider switching to 7z, which works on or is shipped with Linux/Win/BSD/Mac, is opensource, and produces great compression ratios. xz is another fine choice. There are probably prettier GUI's for lzma/lzma2 out there if desired. http://www.7-zip.org/download.html http://tukaani.org/xz/ 917504 1.xz lzma2 1718180 1.7z lzma 1873481 1.rar proprietary 2247179 1.bz2 b-w-huff 3341315 1.gz lz 3345104 1.zip lz 13323604 1.tar (wget src) From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 17:38:10 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 20:38:10 -0400 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28soTT9W13V0jFR3yF_AAGGc=MOUg_PbEVhg3FebMKYfQ@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 12:17 PM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > Tag the Cryptome Archive: "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use > it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in > complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and > Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." Cryptome and JYA's curation, words, and work are important and a monument in their own right. Nuff said. As with other works in this class, I agree with this and other preservation, distribution and downstream analysis efforts. And with carrying whatever tag and preface he so wishes to be carried with them. Please ensure such frontmatter is attached. From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 18:04:46 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 21:04:46 -0400 Subject: distributing Cryptome June 2014 [was: data mine the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RMXmphYK+bqNs8sZ8p2AEm33vj5Eq=rzzCT_U1-Lim0A@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2--pBcoSph1CTev_pAsGZE-=z--C85Zx_brbnWHMDLbLQ@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 11:36 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 7:04 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >> ... >> anyone who would like to host mirrors is welcome to tell me how they >> anticipate mirroring ~30G of data as quickly as possible. :) Please put a contact key on your darknet announce. > based on feedback, here is what i intend: > > 1. A torrent of: > USB-1.rar > USB-2.rar > Update-13-1231.rar > each of these have an accompanying signature from John. OpenPGP at its best. > Griffin Boyce said: > Also keep in mind that it's possible to spy on who downloads these > just by seeding the torrent and monitoring connections to your box. So > it's certainly not anonymous. I'd say hidden service first, a website > second, and torrent third. Please no clearnet website/dumps for files. You're not teaching anyone how to use crypto tools by giving them the easy way out. Make them download and use Tor, I2P, Freenet, gnupg, sha256, whatever. You can put those instructions on clearnet if you want. > i will include a magnet URI. As for torrent... Tor doesn't have much of a darknet torrent community. I'd suggest seeding it on I2P, whereby others might pick it up there and seed on clearnet. > 2. The same files on a hidden service with nginx and HTTP/1.1 range > request capable (resume-able) The original files can be rsync'ed as well. You may want to do 500MiB split(1)'s if resumes of large files become a problem (2GiB limit bugs, etc). > note that this is a point in time archive from June 2014. > > please donate to John as i hate to think i would be taking revenue > from his pocket with this setup! I still have Cryptome CD's :) From davispuh at gmail.com Wed Jul 9 15:27:14 2014 From: davispuh at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?RMSBdmlzIE1vc8SBbnM=?=) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 01:27:14 +0300 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rJt55_FiCNruwkoJ-_YKav9H+PSdhEjM8D7rTpzko4YDQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> <CAHWD2rJt55_FiCNruwkoJ-_YKav9H+PSdhEjM8D7rTpzko4YDQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOE4rSzQOdjTMMurtQAWv3+kx35KG2KDuzd2i53tKKZpdrp8GQ@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-08 23:31 GMT+03:00 Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl>: > 2014-07-08 21:53 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com>: > > Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in C/C++ >> using typical char * null-terminated string, how'll pass this JSON to >> someone? because well NUL... > > > At the parser level you would find a "b" character that's not between > brackets, signalling a binary header is coming. A binary header is actually > just the number of bytes that follow in binary format. The following bytes > are then a binary file, to be assigned to a string as if it were a > variable. We have a binarybuffer in javascript, that sort of thing. It > would contain the NULL byte if you like it to. > > [...] > > I think it's much more serious that you have to serve the BJSON completely > as a binary file. It's not like you can dump it onto a webpage anymore. You > can't slip it into your normal HTTP text transfer bodies either, has to > work with attachments. Attachments should be secure when facing malformed > transfers* etc. Inconvenient, but not the end. > > A lot of protocols are text based, often implemented using C strings and that's what I mean, you can't embed a JSON with binary data containing NUL there (because NUL will terminate that string), so you handle it like typical binary file and then what's the point of JSON to use in first place, because I don't see how it can be any better than any other proper binary data. Such binary JSON gives only overhead but no advantages. 2014-07-09 7:25 GMT+03:00 Bill Stewart <billstewart at pobox.com>: > I haven't used it in years, but I was always quite fond of XDR > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/External_Data_Representation > Sun's External Data Representation coding from the 80s, RFC-1014. > Defines a bunch of variable types, and gives you tools for packing and > unpacking them. > > It's actually pretty good, but there are reasons why Protobuf was created and used instead. The main benefit of Protobuf is that it's easily extendable and can have optional fields. If you add or remove optional fields to server all old clients will still work like nothing have changed. But with XDR you can't do that unless you add another layer on top of it, but that's more work comparing to just taking Protobuf and using it. Also currently Protobuf is much more popular and have more libraries available for dozens of langauges. 2014-07-09 8:30 GMT+03:00 "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" < cyberkiller8 at gmail.com>: > > It's really nice that so many of you got into the spirit and start > thinking about how to change xmpp to make it something new, but what are > you achieving here? It will end up being a new protocol, incompatible > with existing xmpp, it will take a few years to finish the spec, then > another 10+ years until any meaningful applications start using it (if > at all)... So yeah, except being "coder porn" it does nothing to help > the problem here and now. > > The goal would be to create smaller overhead and thus be more performance effective. Also it doesn't have to be incompatible. It could be incorporated in XMPP so that new applications could use it but other's just use same legacy XMPP and everything keeps working fine and people wouldn't know what's happening under the hood, nor they would care. And I think it would be trivial to convince people to use and enable this "Binary" XMPP mode (if it's implemented in their client) which makes their chat client app to use 100x times less bandwidth and 50x times less CPU time (spent in parsing), thus your phone's battery would last longer. And yes XML overhead is that big. > A technically pretty proto won't help, today’s world has a huge problem > with taking anything new. Better to stay with existing stuff, make it > maybe less efficient because of it, but it will be here fast, when it's > needed. Plus being less efficient is a no issue today, with fast > machines (you can use compression on the fly, yes really :-P ), loads of > storage, broadband connections (even the 3G data caps are getting larger > and larger each year), etc. People are sending gigabytes of binary files > in base64 each day in email messages, so why even care? ;-) > > I guess you don't know that nothing is ever fast or good enough. People will always want things faster. What about real-time video call in 4k @ 60 FPS ? It's unreal to imagine this in XMPP unless some really good binary protocol is used so that it's not your software that creates a bottleneck, but if it does then your software is bad and why would I use it over other that can do it, the one that was designed for it, for example see Elemental Demonstrates 4K HEVC Video at 60 fps in London <http://www.streamingmediaglobal.com/Articles/Editorial/Featured-Articles/Elemental-Demonstrates-4K-HEVC-Video-at-60-fps-in-London-93707.aspx> Anyway, I must admit that I haven't studied XMPP enough to know how good or bad it is, but always should try to minimize any overhead, basically you want to process as little as possible. Here straight from wiki, weaknesses: - Does not support Quality of Service (QoS) - XMPP does not have the ability to set the timing flow of messages, preventing XMPP from becoming practical for many embedded distributed realtime, Machine-to-Machine, or IoT applications. - High overhead for embedded applications - As a text based protocol, XMPP has a relatively high computing and network overhead. - In-band binary data transfer is inefficient - Binary data must be first base64 encoded before it can be transmitted in-band. Therefore any significant amount of binary data (e.g., file transfers) is best transmitted out-of-band, using in-band messages to coordinate. The best example of this is the Jingle <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jingle_%28protocol%29> XMPP Extension Protocol, XEP-0166 <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0166.html>. This issue are being adressed by the experimental XEP-0322: Efficient XML Interchange (EXI) Format <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0322.html>. that sounds really really bad. But it's not all lost, Jingle <http://xmpp.org/about-xmpp/technology-overview/jingle/> actually seems good as it have option to switch to Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-time_Transport_Protocol> and then it's just pure binary stream with minimal overhead. And looks like they are aware of these issues as EXI is being developed, but still while it's a big step forward, it will never beat pure binary protocol. Also from wiki, this is good idea: A perhaps more efficient transport for real-time messaging is WebSocket <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebSocket>, a web technology providing for bi-directional, full-duplex communications channels over a single TCP connection. Experimental implementations of XMPP over WebSocket exist, and a (now-expired) Internet-Draft documenting this approach was published at the IETF but not yet standardized. In my opinion the bottom line is - a small addition to existing xmpp has > a far larger chance of being widely adopted (by applications and by the > users) than a completely new protocol. And despite how awesome coder one > might be - you won't be able to write all those implementations yourself > or convince the masses to switch (again!). > > Maybe yes, maybe no. I think if you've written specification in very clear and understandable way and if you've reference implementation library which everyone could just link against and if your protocol does it better than current existing solutions then I don't see why it wouldn't get adapted. Besides you don't need it implemented everywhere, you need it so that it's in application you use and you could contribute there yourself. 2014-07-09 13:17 GMT+03:00 Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl>: > [...] > > There is no masses using XMPP. Masses of coders, maybe, and they will use > the best tool for the job. > > All the extensions have succeeded in making any XMPP app lacking in > usability. I sure haven't found any nice XMPP clients, nice enough to > compare with native clients. > That's true indeed, currently there aren't any decent XMPP client (atleast I'm not aware of any). I mean from user's usability point (UX/UI). There are good either proprietary clients (eg. Skype) or good open source clients (eq. Quassel) that doesn't support XMPP :D In fact I'm willing to bet everyone in the western world uses FB, Google > chat and MSN (slackers and slowpokes). They all have limited XMPP > implementations, they native clients do more. And there's no good app for > interacting with XMPP. > About which Western wold you're talking about? I don't know, but I would assume that in Europe, Skype would be one of the most popular clients. Atleast here MSN never was a thing and everyone have always been using Skype and almost everyone still does. FB isn't really used that much (here we've better alternative). And about Google Talk only some people are aware that it even exists. I know that in Russia it's ICQ and in China it's QQ that's dominating there. Anyway I think they don't implement XMPP because it's too much work for too small benefit. Also then how they would compete with others if they would be limited with XMPP if it doesn't do something that they want to do. So own protocol might be safer bet for a lot of companies. By the way Google Talk dropped XMPP support <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/google-abandons-open-standards-instant-messaging> . I actually really hoped that Tox would succeed so that I could drop Skype and convince others to do same :D But now I'm not so sure if there will be some replacement in nearest future. Actually I think one of reason why Tox created new protocol and didn't used XMPP is that generally XMPP consists of client-server architecture and P2P support is only with extension which isn't widely known nor implemented much. Also XMPP seems way too complicated than it should be. Pidgin really isn't good, it's just the only one out there. And it is still > in the MSN era. I've switched to Office 2013 from Libre/OpenOffice and it > really is in a different league all together. And it sucks that it is. But > what can we do? > I personally don't like Pidgin too. And about Office and LibreOffice they both have their own advantages and disadvantages but I wouldn't say that any of them would be significantly better or worse than other. Also it's nothing to do with open souirce, it's just we've more users that want everything to be perfect without any effort for free than go and help and contribute to projects. Ok, so anyway I've come to conclusion that I'm not sure anymore whether it's better to try to fix XMPP or just create new much simpler and better protocol. But in any case we really should summarize all our points about what's bad in XMPP and send them to XMPP group and see if they're willing to fix them and accept our proposals. If we want to create a new protocol, then I've few ideas about it. Firstly it's really a shame that a lot of things are getting reinvented over and over again. So the main goal would be don't reinvent stuff but reuse as much as possible from existing things. It would help a lot as there's libraries for already everything and would just have to combine them. Next, think about high-level differences between instant message, group message, offline chat message, email, SMS, MMS, mailing list. What are differences? Actually if you think about it, there are no differences at all, it's the same message being delivered in various ways. But why single protocol couldn't handle it all? In fact it could. We're already using browser for all of that. It's just that there's no specification to unify it all in single protocol. Imagine if we wouldn't need a separate application for IRC, for email nor for other chats. It all could be handled by one general protocol. And why stop here, actually calls, sound and video are also exactly same. There's no really difference between text or sound/video, it's just a data and it depends only how you interpret it. Also security, there's only one option, just encrypt it all before sending. It's just so simple. This next generation protocol would be a superset of typical media protocols and thus it wouldn't matter anymore what other people use. You would just use some middle-ware protocol layer that would translate that foreign protocol to this next-gen protocol and you simply use your favorite client. From user's point of view it doesn't matter at all which protocol is used under the hood. So the main features and design goals of this protocol should be: - Support for peer-to-peer and client-server architectures over both TCP and UDP - Lightweight, minimal overhead, generally be just pass-thru - Efficient encoding, basically binary streams - Encryption by default with option for OTR - Data stream itself can contain anything: text, images, sound, video, animations, screen sharing (and even remote desktop control would be possible) - Dozens of events: joined, left, started typing and so on - One to one and one to many streams - maybe more things So how that all would be possible? It's extremely simple. In client-server architecture, open connection to server, establish TLS (for example) now send this next-gen protocol header message (to specify what kind of data you're sending) and then send your data, it could be for example a raw Theora <http://www.theora.org/> stream (directly from your camera) or just a text message. Then server just relays it to all parties. I don't think it could be any simpler and nothing will beat this in terms of performance. You've just some basic dependencies and what would be the reason to complicate this? It's trivial to implement as there's already libraries for those. In case of offline messages server would just store them and in fact it could do same for sound and videos too. You know Vine, Snapchat? what about YouTube, Soundcloud, basically it could support them all. IMO this is millions worth idea :D It's worth looking at WebSockets <https://www.websocket.org/>, WebRTC <http://www.webrtc.org> and probably other standards. I really don't understand why currently it all have been made so complicated because it isn't. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 18104 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/105a73d3/attachment.txt> From hettinga at gmail.com Thu Jul 10 03:37:21 2014 From: hettinga at gmail.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 06:37:21 -0400 Subject: [Server-sky] Server sky and social architecture In-Reply-To: <20140710090654.GV26986@leitl.org> References: <20140710090654.GV26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <D54FF7F8-CCF8-4A0B-A89B-BC6154D1282B@gmail.com> On Jul 10, 2014, at 5:06 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > Keith Lofstrom Lord. I met Keith at the 1983 SSI Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing, where he was pitching the LaunchLoop. Bob is old. :-) Cheers, RAH -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 496 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/261cf291/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 10 00:59:19 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 08:59:19 +0100 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <CAOE4rSzQOdjTMMurtQAWv3+kx35KG2KDuzd2i53tKKZpdrp8GQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> <20140707084122.GQ6997@ctrlc.hu> <CAOE4rSwC55WuYLNRtV5ihZOoVakcaFeV6Z4_a--2nV3d7nOk-g@mail.gmail.com> <1997735.1n1TTR1eli@lapuntu> <53BB899A.40408@gmail.com> <CAOsGNSS1H87C666NJKNi7SQaftkxZkRhq6JOoS6NwyZsS5vaKg@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzEMCjRo57VQfP2gQ4xrCpKLxKd23XvH0YxH7ZE7jCnmQ@mail.gmail.com> <969fa7d4-d6b4-4d5c-bbbf-c5d7b6482746@email.android.com> <CAOE4rSziWQxm-3W6UP_hCAJN1u3stPbqn-nSXEu7oxcKYjVf_w@mail.gmail.com> <CAHWD2rL9gJv30n8AsjqF-ngbmu0F61jZRnCLTyX3k4OyoR8m2g@mail.gmail.com> <53BCD390.9040303@gmail.com> <CAHWD2rJt55_FiCNruwkoJ-_YKav9H+PSdhEjM8D7rTpzko4YDQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAOE4rSzQOdjTMMurtQAWv3+kx35KG2KDuzd2i53tKKZpdrp8GQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53BE47D7.8080900@cathalgarvey.me> > A lot of protocols are text based, often implemented using C strings and > that's what I mean, you can't embed a JSON with binary data containing NUL > there (because NUL will terminate that string), so you handle it like > typical binary file and then what's the point of JSON to use in first > place, because I don't see how it can be any better than any other proper > binary data. Such binary JSON gives only overhead but no advantages. You can also shove NUL bytes into any other transfer encoding to make headaches for the recipient, it's not an encoding-specific problem. It's up to the author of a decoder to account for their language's issues. In C, you'd have to treat the data as binary, not a string, to avoid NUL termination, and only decode (safely) that which is explicitly described as a UTF8 string by leading with "u"; if that contains premature NULs, it's an error condition. On 09/07/14 23:27, Dāvis Mosāns wrote: > 2014-07-08 23:31 GMT+03:00 Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl>: > >> 2014-07-08 21:53 GMT+02:00 Dāvis Mosāns <davispuh at gmail.com>: >> >> Also what about NUL bytes? I bet most parsers are implemented in C/C++ >>> using typical char * null-terminated string, how'll pass this JSON to >>> someone? because well NUL... >> >> >> At the parser level you would find a "b" character that's not between >> brackets, signalling a binary header is coming. A binary header is actually >> just the number of bytes that follow in binary format. The following bytes >> are then a binary file, to be assigned to a string as if it were a >> variable. We have a binarybuffer in javascript, that sort of thing. It >> would contain the NULL byte if you like it to. >> >> [...] >> >> I think it's much more serious that you have to serve the BJSON completely >> as a binary file. It's not like you can dump it onto a webpage anymore. You >> can't slip it into your normal HTTP text transfer bodies either, has to >> work with attachments. Attachments should be secure when facing malformed >> transfers* etc. Inconvenient, but not the end. >> >> > A lot of protocols are text based, often implemented using C strings and > that's what I mean, you can't embed a JSON with binary data containing NUL > there (because NUL will terminate that string), so you handle it like > typical binary file and then what's the point of JSON to use in first > place, because I don't see how it can be any better than any other proper > binary data. Such binary JSON gives only overhead but no advantages. > > > 2014-07-09 7:25 GMT+03:00 Bill Stewart <billstewart at pobox.com>: > >> I haven't used it in years, but I was always quite fond of XDR >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/External_Data_Representation >> Sun's External Data Representation coding from the 80s, RFC-1014. >> Defines a bunch of variable types, and gives you tools for packing and >> unpacking them. >> >> > It's actually pretty good, but there are reasons why Protobuf was created > and used instead. The main benefit of Protobuf is that it's easily > extendable and can have optional fields. If you add or remove optional > fields to server all old clients will still work like nothing have changed. > But with XDR you can't do that unless you add another layer on top of it, > but that's more work comparing to just taking Protobuf and using it. Also > currently Protobuf is much more popular and have more libraries available > for dozens of langauges. > > > 2014-07-09 8:30 GMT+03:00 "Łukasz \"Cyber Killer\" Korpalski" < > cyberkiller8 at gmail.com>: > >> >> It's really nice that so many of you got into the spirit and start >> thinking about how to change xmpp to make it something new, but what are >> you achieving here? It will end up being a new protocol, incompatible >> with existing xmpp, it will take a few years to finish the spec, then >> another 10+ years until any meaningful applications start using it (if >> at all)... So yeah, except being "coder porn" it does nothing to help >> the problem here and now. >> >> > The goal would be to create smaller overhead and thus be more performance > effective. Also it doesn't have to be incompatible. It could be > incorporated in XMPP so that new applications could use it but other's just > use same legacy XMPP and everything keeps working fine and people wouldn't > know what's happening under the hood, nor they would care. And I think it > would be trivial to convince people to use and enable this "Binary" XMPP > mode (if it's implemented in their client) which makes their chat client > app to use 100x times less bandwidth and 50x times less CPU time (spent in > parsing), thus your phone's battery would last longer. And yes XML overhead > is that big. > > >> A technically pretty proto won't help, today’s world has a huge problem >> with taking anything new. Better to stay with existing stuff, make it >> maybe less efficient because of it, but it will be here fast, when it's >> needed. Plus being less efficient is a no issue today, with fast >> machines (you can use compression on the fly, yes really :-P ), loads of >> storage, broadband connections (even the 3G data caps are getting larger >> and larger each year), etc. People are sending gigabytes of binary files >> in base64 each day in email messages, so why even care? ;-) >> >> > I guess you don't know that nothing is ever fast or good enough. People > will always want things faster. What about real-time video call in 4k @ 60 > FPS ? It's unreal to imagine this in XMPP unless some really good binary > protocol is used so that it's not your software that creates a bottleneck, > but if it does then your software is bad and why would I use it over other > that can do it, the one that was designed for it, for example see Elemental > Demonstrates 4K HEVC Video at 60 fps in London > <http://www.streamingmediaglobal.com/Articles/Editorial/Featured-Articles/Elemental-Demonstrates-4K-HEVC-Video-at-60-fps-in-London-93707.aspx> > > Anyway, I must admit that I haven't studied XMPP enough to know how good or > bad it is, but always should try to minimize any overhead, basically you > want to process as little as possible. > > Here straight from wiki, weaknesses: > > - Does not support Quality of Service (QoS) > - XMPP does not have the ability to set the timing flow of messages, > preventing XMPP from becoming practical for many embedded distributed > realtime, Machine-to-Machine, or IoT applications. > - High overhead for embedded applications > - As a text based protocol, XMPP has a relatively high computing and > network overhead. > - In-band binary data transfer is inefficient > - Binary data must be first base64 encoded before it can be > transmitted in-band. Therefore any significant amount of binary > data (e.g., > file transfers) is best transmitted out-of-band, using in-band > messages to > coordinate. The best example of this is the Jingle > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jingle_%28protocol%29> XMPP Extension > Protocol, XEP-0166 <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0166.html>. This > issue are being adressed by the experimental XEP-0322: Efficient XML > Interchange (EXI) Format <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0322.html>. > > > that sounds really really bad. But it's not all lost, Jingle > <http://xmpp.org/about-xmpp/technology-overview/jingle/> actually seems > good as it have option to switch to Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-time_Transport_Protocol> and then it's > just pure binary stream with minimal overhead. And looks like they are > aware of these issues as EXI is being developed, but still while it's a big > step forward, it will never beat pure binary protocol. > > Also from wiki, this is good idea: > > A perhaps more efficient transport for real-time messaging is WebSocket > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebSocket>, a web technology providing for > bi-directional, full-duplex communications channels over a single TCP > connection. Experimental implementations of XMPP over WebSocket exist, and > a (now-expired) Internet-Draft documenting this approach was published at > the IETF but not yet standardized. > > > In my opinion the bottom line is - a small addition to existing xmpp has >> a far larger chance of being widely adopted (by applications and by the >> users) than a completely new protocol. And despite how awesome coder one >> might be - you won't be able to write all those implementations yourself >> or convince the masses to switch (again!). >> >> > Maybe yes, maybe no. I think if you've written specification in very clear > and understandable way and if you've reference implementation library which > everyone could just link against and if your protocol does it better than > current existing solutions then I don't see why it wouldn't get adapted. > Besides you don't need it implemented everywhere, you need it so that it's > in application you use and you could contribute there yourself. > > > 2014-07-09 13:17 GMT+03:00 Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl>: > >> [...] >> >> There is no masses using XMPP. Masses of coders, maybe, and they will use >> the best tool for the job. >> >> All the extensions have succeeded in making any XMPP app lacking in >> usability. I sure haven't found any nice XMPP clients, nice enough to >> compare with native clients. >> > That's true indeed, currently there aren't any decent XMPP client (atleast > I'm not aware of any). I mean from user's usability point (UX/UI). There > are good either proprietary clients (eg. Skype) or good open source clients > (eq. Quassel) that doesn't support XMPP :D > > In fact I'm willing to bet everyone in the western world uses FB, Google >> chat and MSN (slackers and slowpokes). They all have limited XMPP >> implementations, they native clients do more. And there's no good app for >> interacting with XMPP. >> > About which Western wold you're talking about? I don't know, but I would > assume that in Europe, Skype would be one of the most popular clients. > Atleast here MSN never was a thing and everyone have always been using > Skype and almost everyone still does. FB isn't really used that much (here > we've better alternative). And about Google Talk only some people are aware > that it even exists. I know that in Russia it's ICQ and in China it's QQ > that's dominating there. Anyway I think they don't implement XMPP because > it's too much work for too small benefit. Also then how they would compete > with others if they would be limited with XMPP if it doesn't do something > that they want to do. So own protocol might be safer bet for a lot of > companies. By the way Google Talk dropped XMPP support > <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/google-abandons-open-standards-instant-messaging> > . > > > I actually really hoped that Tox would succeed so that I could drop Skype > and convince others to do same :D But now I'm not so sure if there will be > some replacement in nearest future. Actually I think one of reason why Tox > created new protocol and didn't used XMPP is that generally XMPP consists > of client-server architecture and P2P support is only with extension which > isn't widely known nor implemented much. Also XMPP seems way too > complicated than it should be. > > Pidgin really isn't good, it's just the only one out there. And it is still >> in the MSN era. I've switched to Office 2013 from Libre/OpenOffice and it >> really is in a different league all together. And it sucks that it is. But >> what can we do? >> > I personally don't like Pidgin too. And about Office and LibreOffice they > both have their own advantages and disadvantages but I wouldn't say that > any of them would be significantly better or worse than other. Also it's > nothing to do with open souirce, it's just we've more users that want > everything to be perfect without any effort for free than go and help and > contribute to projects. > > > Ok, so anyway I've come to conclusion that I'm not sure anymore whether > it's better to try to fix XMPP or just create new much simpler and better > protocol. But in any case we really should summarize all our points about > what's bad in XMPP and send them to XMPP group and see if they're willing > to fix them and accept our proposals. > > If we want to create a new protocol, then I've few ideas about it. Firstly > it's really a shame that a lot of things are getting reinvented over and > over again. So the main goal would be don't reinvent stuff but reuse as > much as possible from existing things. It would help a lot as there's > libraries for already everything and would just have to combine them. Next, > think about high-level differences between instant message, group message, > offline chat message, email, SMS, MMS, mailing list. What are differences? > Actually if you think about it, there are no differences at all, it's the > same message being delivered in various ways. But why single protocol > couldn't handle it all? In fact it could. We're already using browser for > all of that. It's just that there's no specification to unify it all in > single protocol. Imagine if we wouldn't need a separate application for > IRC, for email nor for other chats. It all could be handled by one general > protocol. And why stop here, actually calls, sound and video are also > exactly same. There's no really difference between text or sound/video, > it's just a data and it depends only how you interpret it. Also security, > there's only one option, just encrypt it all before sending. It's just so > simple. > > This next generation protocol would be a superset of typical media > protocols and thus it wouldn't matter anymore what other people use. You > would just use some middle-ware protocol layer that would translate that > foreign protocol to this next-gen protocol and you simply use your favorite > client. From user's point of view it doesn't matter at all which protocol > is used under the hood. > > So the main features and design goals of this protocol should be: > > - Support for peer-to-peer and client-server architectures over both TCP > and UDP > - Lightweight, minimal overhead, generally be just pass-thru > - Efficient encoding, basically binary streams > - Encryption by default with option for OTR > - Data stream itself can contain anything: text, images, sound, video, > animations, screen sharing (and even remote desktop control would be > possible) > - Dozens of events: joined, left, started typing and so on > - One to one and one to many streams > - maybe more things > > > So how that all would be possible? It's extremely simple. In client-server > architecture, open connection to server, establish TLS (for example) now > send this next-gen protocol header message (to specify what kind of data > you're sending) and then send your data, it could be for example a raw > Theora <http://www.theora.org/> stream (directly from your camera) or just > a text message. Then server just relays it to all parties. > > I don't think it could be any simpler and nothing will beat this in terms > of performance. You've just some basic dependencies and what would be the > reason to complicate this? It's trivial to implement as there's already > libraries for those. In case of offline messages server would just store > them and in fact it could do same for sound and videos too. You know Vine, > Snapchat? what about YouTube, Soundcloud, basically it could support them > all. IMO this is millions worth idea :D > > > It's worth looking at WebSockets <https://www.websocket.org/>, WebRTC > <http://www.webrtc.org> and probably other standards. > > > I really don't understand why currently it all have been made so > complicated because it isn't. > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/243194fb/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/243194fb/attachment.sig> From deoxyt2 at lacamaradegas.cl Thu Jul 10 07:17:37 2014 From: deoxyt2 at lacamaradegas.cl (deoxyt2) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 10:17:37 -0400 Subject: Chile, project to modify the penal code. Message-ID: <BLU436-SMTP257C70BF619780B80C57FA1960E0@phx.gbl> Attached document [es] which attempts to modify the penal code of Chile, which involves reducing the freedom of expression in our country. A part of the amendments says: Add how numeral 3rd of article 261 of the title VI: Those who make threats or utter insults against the authority by means of electronic platforms, either textual or graphical, form being considered as aggravating circumstance that don't do it with your true identity or that attempt to impede the identification of the computer from which the message spreads. Regards. deoxyt2.- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: proyecto modifica c?digo penal.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 14519 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140710/5007d9be/attachment.docx> From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 10 02:06:55 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 11:06:55 +0200 Subject: [Server-sky] Server sky and social architecture Message-ID: <20140710090654.GV26986@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Keith Lofstrom <keithl at kl-ic.com> ----- From blibbet at gmail.com Thu Jul 10 15:54:51 2014 From: blibbet at gmail.com (Blibbet) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 15:54:51 -0700 Subject: tools used by intelligence analysts In-Reply-To: <26ebfd1e9a4edd4756866edf60622452@cryptolab.net> References: <20140703131613.GJ26986@leitl.org> <26ebfd1e9a4edd4756866edf60622452@cryptolab.net> Message-ID: <20140710155451.14838b20@dbox> > This is very useful, thanks for sharing. There's a mostly-annual semantic technology conference called STIDS (Semantic Technology for Intelligence, Defense, and Security), formerly called OIC (Ontologies for the Intelligence Community). First day is public, second day is secret. Focuses on using semantic network technologies for national security issues. http://stids.c4i.gmu.edu/index.php The list of sponsors and vendors, and most of the presentations are from companies talking about how well their products work, are useful to find out companies that analyze various metadata. It's funny how many are based on open source technologies, like Semantic MediaWiki. :-) From coderman at gmail.com Thu Jul 10 17:29:42 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 17:29:42 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Tec5NQr-iCF0bhUCuyuzTvBsMWPJQqECY8QQ_0xO9dGQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAJVRA1Tec5NQr-iCF0bhUCuyuzTvBsMWPJQqECY8QQ_0xO9dGQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1S=LwGugvi3Oggk4OoUmkyX7zaLjtgp6U5CAaVYc0dAdQ@mail.gmail.com> -------------- next part -------------- Cryptome Donation Required - http://cryptome.org/donations.htm Donation also provides current archive as this selection is not current, and increasingly out of date by the day. - "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." - Index: 0eb8551d977dde4f4193b3a16dedcd18f01e854e371e96623d33dd5b9519e413 *USB-1.rar 9653d105293b9f77d5b0067d51a35ed286a7f50a0b37b3ea2bd78c092caab584 *USB-2.rar 7e798bb2b09cac49181aa7c12170e03fc3d3cf69a73d9e1b04171c80910e7525 Update-13-1231.rar b63e185c21232724f9c90238496b9122a46d492752d56f690200fab6fe9fb6ed Update-14-0206-0602.tar.rar 6e5146b4c53f61b555822eda90e70a20a8050fe3dbf0bd3a084a042a36bdd3b1 Cryptome-Update-13-0701-to-13-1202.tgz 80652978f46ef6e6f26bd2bec406349ef766ad1722fc81d9f7575148edc6324f wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip c56f0fd30924f7398ca9e20c098acced50766d3325754f29014dd33029ebf351 wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip 9d2aa03048c60eec2c94d45293d4e95977a94f3477a4701f6ee2ef7ec888a7c9 WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip *- these files have a detached signature by presumed key 0xB650572B8B3BF75C "Cryptome <cryptome at earthlink.net>" - Recommended Usage: # Requires Tor running and http proxy to Tor at 127.0.0.1:8888 export onions="sek42kxkbjuivxws.onion ajzxwgtrtws7zwyg.onion wpv2bxujoctsmzcn.onion aiyu6uyckomxt2ld.onion kvrvzxgdutjcjxqw.onion hz5sj76rh3avsmfc.onion jt7klzczup6hrtes.onion 3qcs4cqbsrfdz7xa.onion" export files="Update-13-1231.rar Update-14-0206-0602.tar.rar USB-1.rar USB-2.rar wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip Cryptome-Update-13-0701-to-13-1202.tgz" for cfile in `echo $files`; do export olist="" for chost in `echo $onions`; do export olist="${olist} http://${chost}/cryptome-july2014/${cfile}" done echo "Retrieving $cfile ..." aria2c \ --all-proxy=127.0.0.1:8123 \ --continue=true --always-resume=true \ --retry-wait=30 --timeout=120 \ --summary-interval=3 \ --max-connection-per-server=2 --max-concurrent-downloads=8 \ -o "$cfile" `echo $olist` done -------------- next part -------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iL4EABEKAGYFAlO/L2BfFIAAAAAALgAoaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldDQxQzEyQjhDMzA3RDdFMjE5OEFBNTc4MTY1 QTg0N0U3QzJCOTM4MEMACgkQZahH58K5OAyvjgEAjX5aggjFGl2sIHqzBZanMYiV pQ6Wm9EaH1UvPHkt4CgBAKTqhhj77W4aNfkafuqxXM9pgUaBBhT3pnKe64I0vaGs =jqsm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net Thu Jul 10 22:39:12 2014 From: nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net (Nicolas Bourbaki) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 07:39:12 +0200 Subject: GeoIP is a threat to democracy Message-ID: <53BF7880.5050807@riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 It seemed logical that old-world media companies would want to restrict access to content on the Internet. GeoIP was then used to induce distribution barriers analogous to those found offline so that existing models of rent extraction could survive. And while this is something most of us would be fine with leaving to the invisible hand of the market we can not take the same stance when governments start to use these measures to dictate who is a citizen, and who is not, and who is provided civil liberties and who is not. This is what the XKeyscore rules made clear was happening and will continue to happen in the future. The internet standards and governing bodies cannot relinquish themselves of political responsibility any longer. The structure of a protocol will dictate our behavior and in this world there is no such thing as an agnostic protocol. The term "neutrality" is false. In the context of service providers battling with media providers over who gets a larger share of rent from consumers, "neutrality" may be the agreed upon term but the policies that result from this debate will have real impact on our behavior, the ethics of the protocol, and our liberties. Once a neutral protocol is understood as an oxymoron standards bodies with charters claiming to serve the betterment of all nations, corporations and consumers should be clearly seen for what they are: a new Tower of Babel. Those of us still placing stones one on top of the other within these institutions should take a moment to look at our work and ask what are we actually doing. In 2010 the DHS went against their own charter and hijacked ICANN's to take down hundreds of domains for unclear copyright claims. Why is ICANN still relevant when decentralized models could easily replace them when supported by either the EU, Google or Firefox? And when the NSA can with absolutely no oversight claim that the location of an IP in some table dictates who gets civil liberties, why have we not replaced BGP or at least begun to build parallel models within universities or like minded corporations that could support reverse tunnels through collision free identities similar to Tor's onion service handles? The number of protocols that falsely advertised as agnostic are many. We should be ashamed that it took such a scandal as pervasive western surveillance to awaken us to this falsehood when so many, living under more hostel regimes, have lived with the tools of oppression we built into these protocols from the very start. If we cannot convince our institutions to take fixing these falsehoods seriously by considering civil liberties within the protocol, and overcome the obstacles of legacy systems, and work for support for parallel models, than at least we can hasten the demise of this Babel to start anew. Indeed this may sadden optimists such as Larry Page and others that are waiting for technology to become our messiah. But as Benjamin Franklin would say, those who would trade liberated networks for efficient networks deserve neither. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTv3iAAAoJEHi6xtksL8/uJo4P/jf7RVFFJKtUD5VmEzWUr7eK 2B74/ksSqjJWyqHCVcWCRVIQpokzgBq6cwITNRky8ahh0I1+4NORJVOj++n9b6d0 4Wv2mihZpEdIOLOZZESSYgb05L9rPXuX8HTdOtWkbFgpcofXqO59Q1Y6xOKhdZlI 2PwZTXUkmnqycv7cE1n6GgYrR41M+RZzXSiEEHqeVi3pbfYGEaTTX78vcmYzmMGP E7NlJzUvwWRLZMnX9+RN0qUiZQsqKRhOYwfl3Pj7XOo7GNlUqGcphY+cQUHTSNf5 i3HZbblq3UDCAQ7kWFiX+yj5NGVAyfUVBYxJx0/RrJf5zcG9JfzKPXuOtlfeq/yF G9SJ+qCydnCzDmdZCphw0pcGOZnDRBPQzUjd+bdjpBbv2y76Jz3zKzj3Jv1QjkeN NMaw7fGfJ4uTCddFJv2gLdgB0BZta6shhqBoca3k03qWJAmKkp4/559ApoZo8Eyz Gg8+iwPQPsew/2SpXtV6uj1jyLcy36jM1F0IC4OkfGwAFyHJ+Xy/QQehJLlZ+yPO r+aLDIN1+a1ydLINCcv9OhVQCuUO9vfPah0TB2Jql+kD05MNfMnDtTMYVgQaMlcd o+QOj9U2fhVN5qWpMWoxathO0k+L1nwIMUqpMi6GOMS9wqw8pUCdoBhDka/FElQG 50CdY4PooGDfOksxeF+G =3CPP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From eugen at leitl.org Fri Jul 11 03:36:00 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:36:00 +0200 Subject: The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control Message-ID: <20140711103600.GA26986@leitl.org> http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William Binney – that's a 'totalitarian mentality' Antony Loewenstein theguardian.com, Friday 11 July 2014 00.54 BST William Binney testifies before a German inquiry into surveillance. Photograph: Getty Images William Binney is one of the highest-level whistleblowers to ever emerge from the NSA. He was a leading code-breaker against the Soviet Union during the Cold War but resigned soon after September 11, disgusted by Washington’s move towards mass surveillance. On 5 July he spoke at a conference in London organised by the Centre for Investigative Journalism and revealed the extent of the surveillance programs unleashed by the Bush and Obama administrations. “At least 80% of fibre-optic cables globally go via the US”, Binney said. “This is no accident and allows the US to view all communication coming in. At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are recorded and stored in the US. The NSA lies about what it stores.” The NSA will soon be able to collect 966 exabytes a year, the total of internet traffic annually. Former Google head Eric Schmidt once argued that the entire amount of knowledge from the beginning of humankind until 2003 amount to only five exabytes. Binney, who featured in a 2012 short film by Oscar-nominated US film-maker Laura Poitras, described a future where surveillance is ubiquitous and government intrusion unlimited. “The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control”, Binney said, “but I’m a little optimistic with some recent Supreme Court decisions, such as law enforcement mostly now needing a warrant before searching a smartphone.” He praised the revelations and bravery of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and told me that he had indirect contact with a number of other NSA employees who felt disgusted with the agency’s work. They’re keen to speak out but fear retribution and exile, not unlike Snowden himself, who is likely to remain there for some time. Unlike Snowden, Binney didn’t take any documents with him when he left the NSA. He now says that hard evidence of illegal spying would have been invaluable. The latest Snowden leaks, featured in the Washington Post, detail private conversations of average Americans with no connection to extremism. It shows that the NSA is not just pursuing terrorism, as it claims, but ordinary citizens going about their daily communications. “The NSA is mass-collecting on everyone”, Binney said, “and it’s said to be about terrorism but inside the US it has stopped zero attacks.” The lack of official oversight is one of Binney’s key concerns, particularly of the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Fisa), which is held out by NSA defenders as a sign of the surveillance scheme's constitutionality. “The Fisa court has only the government’s point of view”, he argued. “There are no other views for the judges to consider. There have been at least 15-20 trillion constitutional violations for US domestic audiences and you can double that globally.” A Fisa court in 2010 allowed the NSA to spy on 193 countries around the world, plus the World Bank, though there’s evidence that even the nations the US isn’t supposed to monitor – Five Eyes allies Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – aren’t immune from being spied on. It’s why encryption is today so essential to transmit information safely. Binney recently told the German NSA inquiry committee that his former employer had a “totalitarian mentality” that was the "greatest threat" to US society since that country’s US Civil War in the 19th century. Despite this remarkable power, Binney still mocked the NSA’s failures, including missing this year’s Russian intervention in Ukraine and the Islamic State’s take-over of Iraq. The era of mass surveillance has gone from the fringes of public debate to the mainstream, where it belongs. The Pew Research Centre released a report this month, Digital Life in 2025, that predicted worsening state control and censorship, reduced public trust, and increased commercialisation of every aspect of web culture. It’s not just internet experts warning about the internet’s colonisation by state and corporate power. One of Europe’s leading web creators, Lena Thiele, presented her stunning series Netwars in London on the threat of cyber warfare. She showed how easy it is for governments and corporations to capture our personal information without us even realising. Thiele said that the US budget for cyber security was US$67 billion in 2013 and will double by 2016. Much of this money is wasted and doesn't protect online infrastructure. This fact doesn’t worry the multinationals making a killing from the gross exaggeration of fear that permeates the public domain. Wikileaks understands this reality better than most. Founder Julian Assange and investigative editor Sarah Harrison both remain in legal limbo. I spent time with Assange in his current home at the Ecuadorian embassy in London last week, where he continues to work, release leaks, and fight various legal battles. He hopes to resolve his predicament soon. At the Centre for Investigative Journalism conference, Harrison stressed the importance of journalists who work with technologists to best report the NSA stories. “It’s no accident”, she said, “that some of the best stories on the NSA are in Germany, where there’s technical assistance from people like Jacob Appelbaum.” A core Wikileaks belief, she stressed, is releasing all documents in their entirety, something the group criticised the news site The Intercept for not doing on a recent story. “The full archive should always be published”, Harrison said. With 8m documents on its website after years of leaking, the importance of publishing and maintaining source documents for the media, general public and court cases can’t be under-estimated. “I see Wikileaks as a library”, Assange said. “We’re the librarians who can’t say no.” With evidence that there could be a second NSA leaker, the time for more aggressive reporting is now. As Binney said: “I call people who are covering up NSA crimes traitors”. From rodionraskolnikov at riseup.net Fri Jul 11 09:36:51 2014 From: rodionraskolnikov at riseup.net (Rodion Raskolnikov) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:36:51 -0400 Subject: Chile, project to modify the penal code. In-Reply-To: <BLU436-SMTP257C70BF619780B80C57FA1960E0@phx.gbl> References: <BLU436-SMTP257C70BF619780B80C57FA1960E0@phx.gbl> Message-ID: <cf4ac3ea-b7e0-48a1-8451-c1fa38015c6a@email.android.com> http://m.biobiochile.cl/notas/2014/07/11/sabag-retirara-proyecto-sobre-memes-de-internet-no-me-fije-lo-que-habian-redactado-mis-asesores.shtml Sabag has decided to remove the bill from the chamber. But I'm sure the right will push this in some other way... On July 10, 2014 10:17:37 AM GMT-04:00, deoxyt2 <deoxyt2 at lacamaradegas.cl> wrote: >Attached document [es] which attempts to modify the penal code of >Chile, >which involves reducing the freedom of expression in our country. > >A part of the amendments says: > >Add how numeral 3rd of article 261 of the title VI: >Those who make threats or utter insults against the authority by means >of electronic platforms, either textual or graphical, form being >considered as aggravating circumstance that don't do it with your true >identity or that attempt to impede the identification of the computer >from which the message spreads. > >Regards. > >deoxyt2.- -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1485 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140711/650337b8/attachment.txt> From jtmurphy at cmu.edu Fri Jul 11 12:13:43 2014 From: jtmurphy at cmu.edu (James Murphy) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 14:13:43 -0500 Subject: Universities giving personal health information to NSA Message-ID: <53C03767.1000305@cmu.edu> Seen in: http://www.healthyhorns.utexas.edu/IMAGES/pdf/privacypractices.pdf http://www.cmhc.utexas.edu/ppn.html What Are Other Way UHS [University Health Services] May Use Your PHI [Personal Health Information]? - National security and intelligence activities. No warrant, no judge, just "activities." A quick search shows that this privacy policy is spreading. How can I stop it? I get the feeling calling management's phone isn't going to do much. -- James T. Murphy III jtmurphy at cmu.edu PGP Key-ID: 0x67E3BC49, available at keys.gnupg.net, pgp.mit.edu. From skquinn at rushpost.com Fri Jul 11 15:24:38 2014 From: skquinn at rushpost.com (Shawn K. Quinn) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 17:24:38 -0500 Subject: Tox.im In-Reply-To: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> References: <53B84037.7030406@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <1405117478.3765.4.camel@klax> On Sat, 2014-07-05 at 19:13 +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > Anyone looked this over? I only just discovered it, but it seems nice: > * P2P > * Encrypted > * Voice/Video/Chat/Files > * GPL'd > > https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore > > It's written mostly in C(++) with a dash of assembly, which worries me > security wise.. Tried this out with a friend last night. I'm disappointed so far, even given this is an alpha. Maybe I'm using the wrong client (Venom) but I don't see any way to do video or voice chat. I'm keeping it to send files encrypted as I'm not sure if Pidgin's OTR encrypts file transfers as well (guessing not) as well as keep testing it to try and find bugs. -- Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn at rushpost.com> From coderman at gmail.com Fri Jul 11 22:19:20 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 22:19:20 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] data mine the snowden files [was: open the snowden files] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1S=LwGugvi3Oggk4OoUmkyX7zaLjtgp6U5CAaVYc0dAdQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SkOWK3ZK3As2KeCE7uvEyBFEq-HzwvPGhNyOh+XaWR1g@mail.gmail.com> <c58a3586-05b7-4f0f-92f2-ba6920221fab@email.android.com> <CAJVRA1T513mW6Cfn=3ULEjDGyw5HC=zsR1f8G+DqFC8xvbnMsQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-fs6Od=g1vnXqB44kJpFcJt79iGqDX3Sg0zeHTeR6WBA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SgK1bjo7SDmqFBo9X2SdYkXZQSo6MHBXSHOUPd4D62ew@mail.gmail.com> <1404917885.4762.1@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> <E1X4uX9-0006Rl-UI@elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAJVRA1Tec5NQr-iCF0bhUCuyuzTvBsMWPJQqECY8QQ_0xO9dGQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1S=LwGugvi3Oggk4OoUmkyX7zaLjtgp6U5CAaVYc0dAdQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RKbx7s0qZPBC+bR0d8xWn4tipKu46X5FfvqZ-kgnGaPw@mail.gmail.com> added example privoxy config as http_proxy to Tor, add sig note for Update 13. no further updates on list; contact direct if issues encountered. best regards, -------------- next part -------------- Cryptome Donation Required - http://cryptome.org/donations.htm Donation also provides current archive as this selection is not current, and increasingly out of date by the day. - "This is a trap, witting and unwitting. Do not use it or use at own risk. Source and this host is out to pwon and phuck you in complicity with global Internet authorities. Signed Batshit Cryptome and Host, 9 July 2014, 12:16ET." - https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/005020.html - Index: 0eb8551d977dde4f4193b3a16dedcd18f01e854e371e96623d33dd5b9519e413 *USB-1.rar 9653d105293b9f77d5b0067d51a35ed286a7f50a0b37b3ea2bd78c092caab584 *USB-2.rar 7e798bb2b09cac49181aa7c12170e03fc3d3cf69a73d9e1b04171c80910e7525 *Update-13-1231.rar b63e185c21232724f9c90238496b9122a46d492752d56f690200fab6fe9fb6ed Update-14-0206-0602.tar.rar 6e5146b4c53f61b555822eda90e70a20a8050fe3dbf0bd3a084a042a36bdd3b1 Cryptome-Update-13-0701-to-13-1202.tgz 80652978f46ef6e6f26bd2bec406349ef766ad1722fc81d9f7575148edc6324f wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip c56f0fd30924f7398ca9e20c098acced50766d3325754f29014dd33029ebf351 wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip 9d2aa03048c60eec2c94d45293d4e95977a94f3477a4701f6ee2ef7ec888a7c9 WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip *- these files have a detached signature by presumed key 0xB650572B8B3BF75C "Cryptome <cryptome at earthlink.net>" append '.sig' for signature files. - Recommended usage: # apt-get install privoxy tor nano /etc/privoxy/config --- begin-cut /etc/privoxy/config --- # Tor Privoxy configuration # NOTE: toggle=0 disables all privacy rewrite protections toggle 0 confdir /etc/privoxy logdir /var/log/privoxy logfile logfile hostname hostname.example.org listen-address 127.0.0.1:8118 enable-remote-toggle 0 enable-remote-http-toggle 0 enable-edit-actions 0 enforce-blocks 0 forwarded-connect-retries 0 accept-intercepted-requests 0 allow-cgi-request-crunching 0 split-large-forms 0 keep-alive-timeout 5 socket-timeout 300 max-client-connections 256 # # for Tor browser bundle #forward-socks5 / 127.0.0.1:9150 . # for Tor upstream forward-socks5 / 127.0.0.1:9050 . --- end-cut --- Aria2 download: # Requires Tor running and http proxy to Tor at 127.0.0.1:8118 export onions="sek42kxkbjuivxws.onion ajzxwgtrtws7zwyg.onion wpv2bxujoctsmzcn.onion aiyu6uyckomxt2ld.onion kvrvzxgdutjcjxqw.onion hz5sj76rh3avsmfc.onion jt7klzczup6hrtes.onion 3qcs4cqbsrfdz7xa.onion" export files="Update-13-1231.rar Update-14-0206-0602.tar.rar USB-1.rar USB-2.rar wikileaks-bank-julius-baer.zip wikileaks-safekeep-to-08-0210.zip WikiLeaks-State-Dept-Cables-xyz.zip Cryptome-Update-13-0701-to-13-1202.tgz" for cfile in `echo $files`; do export olist="" for chost in `echo $onions`; do export olist="${olist} http://${chost}/cryptome-july2014/${cfile}" done echo "Retrieving $cfile ..." aria2c \ --all-proxy=127.0.0.1:8118 \ --continue=true --always-resume=true \ --retry-wait=30 --timeout=120 \ --summary-interval=3 \ --max-connection-per-server=2 --max-concurrent-downloads=8 \ -o "$cfile" `echo $olist` done -------------- next part -------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iL4EABEKAGYFAlPAxEBfFIAAAAAALgAoaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldDQxQzEyQjhDMzA3RDdFMjE5OEFBNTc4MTY1 QTg0N0U3QzJCOTM4MEMACgkQZahH58K5OAxNnwD/QgupHQOtNx6RNsF1nJR2n9FB qXRhdIYxwbTbTzAji8MA/0XAy3vpsS/V7TR2MmS1Lrhvyg7UHrcBZVZlu36hYWaU =fdiR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 11 22:11:54 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 01:11:54 -0400 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] Message-ID: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> > Sayeth James Murphy: > ... > A quick search shows that this privacy policy is spreading. > How can I stop it? I get the feeling calling management's phone isn't > going to do much. No corp/edu/gov entity intrinsically gives a fuck about your privacy, and their only incentive is covering their ass and kissing others. Sorry to break it to ya bro. The only ones that give a fuck are the people, and the people need to provide said entities with drastically more convincing incentives than the current set. Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. It's now or never. From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 11 23:39:42 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 02:39:42 -0400 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <53c0cd12.b0e7ec0a.70ff.ffff87df@mx.google.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> <53c0cd12.b0e7ec0a.70ff.ffff87df@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-g55C693mTmjWJazEpm=AP9jqhhOY7issXcijP8Fk16g@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 1:56 AM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > wha ha ha ha > fuckingly clueless assertion of the day... Who loves Juan, I do :) Never take a cpunk at face value. Certainly not in politik. Get deeper. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Fri Jul 11 22:56:16 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 02:56:16 -0300 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53c0cd12.b0e7ec0a.70ff.ffff87df@mx.google.com> On Sat, 12 Jul 2014 01:11:54 -0400 > Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. > It's now or never. wha ha ha ha fuckingly clueless assertion of the day... From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 12 11:13:51 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 11:13:51 -0700 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SS_97c1JpRy86-DeNTsub-w=tiW1NWtK_FqT-7nSq+4Q@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 10:11 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. on my list right after: "produce blockbuster feature film on game theory and key management" best regards, Crypto Reagan From blibbet at gmail.com Sat Jul 12 11:47:22 2014 From: blibbet at gmail.com (Blibbet) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 11:47:22 -0700 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140712114722.0fe27133@dbox> > Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. > It's now or never. Check out the Pirate Party. IMO, it should be called the Hacker Party, or the Technology Party. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pirate_Party In a few days, or when our Open Video volunteer finishes postproduction, look on at the TA3M Seattle web site for an URL to last month's talk from a Seattle-area Pirate Party organizer. <https://wiki.openitp.org/events:techno-activism_3rd_mondays:seattle/> From nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net Sat Jul 12 18:15:53 2014 From: nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net (nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 18:15:53 -0700 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] Message-ID: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements attempting to play the game within the construct of behavior most expected. The establishment of a party itself with intent for longevity is entirely unnecessary for what needs to be done. Most people here should understand that ignoring ones own brand by removing it entirely from the picture gives greater focus to a singular ideal. Don't mistake this rhetoric for revolution. It is only that Democracy has plenty of room for trolling and no one has really figured this out yet. Unbeknownst to most people born within the past 20+ years they were all born with dual citizenship. First to their analog nationality and second to the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Estate. Yochai Benkler expands on this definition when describing Wikileaks as part of the Networked Fourth Estate. That is, media institutions not beholden to any particular nation. I would extend this further to include people that took upon themselves an alternate understanding of rights, social norms, governance and behaviors as experienced through the network as an unwritten constitution. This is not just hackers and cypherpunks but many internet users as a whole. It includes *every* internet user that found any form of solace or confidence through the liberated network. At this moment in time you could be an American, European, South African or Brazilian and all will collectively notice that this alternate constitution is under attack, even if its existence is unknown. The Pirate Party most certainly attempts to represent this 4th estate. I applaud them. The reason they might fail to fix the most significant problems we currently face is due to their quest for longevity and a brand. We do not need 4 or 10 years to fix these problems. We only need 100 days. On 12/07/2014 20:47, Blibbet wrote: >> Cypherpunks should run for office and disrupt this shit. >> It's now or never. > > Check out the Pirate Party. IMO, it should be called the > Hacker Party, or the Technology Party. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pirate_Party > > In a few days, or when our Open Video volunteer finishes > postproduction, look on at the TA3M Seattle web site for an > URL to last month's talk from a Seattle-area Pirate Party > orginizer. > <https://wiki.openitp.org/events:techno-activism_3rd_mondays:seattle/> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTwd0qAAoJEHi6xtksL8/uzYUP/173TrgtoO7b3Ph+2juBtQcm x9f/KOF/qs/gGaGv8857QOiVUV+KefbMTvg6D4cuPXDIT+VKeMbg1tLDyOCMjLZE zHoToj/UA70J8j66LZN3B+LmNpdxhJijBQfiZBas7yUd2/NHZKbHkBXjUy4jrR++ jRv/DgNeLDQe/EVabQvFJYv397WRpegxJonJmuUSOKS48jCy07hnAEyopJgDQOhd I8iUYH6YtcAZ47kiMxrYgMX4W7Xm4eolpqLWXxGdwB8gmxGxTkoQYM4vorYYzMib EQGvLgVYeMVEmWPQuJ9X4JQJR4BThBiCx5/O1lqdR0akA23Vtm6RAkW+QSm/SqL4 Fxv1ryUCZk/dxOgbaYprBgm5UbhBmAoC1GN9oz4HzGwFIwWmaCnfzM2p7jIGIUb3 LtgUwXya9rxv8ihXDISwIEu8iqYzI4kkJeFUBCh9WyJXPXjc9T1JAW+BQ7T+hKjb 9W9Q7VAMGkFaW4dsmpm/47ZIQnBVU3IyJzk9P3gEYZE1lFleejsvyZL02WPjT7QJ 12gd7QzEoXD2SAjpDQV0Wp0v/OyrUkCV84G6xDDtxnlEfKFYzbjadikyedOss9e9 NzUp4r2QztY/wP/ZyEALlV0yaU53Jv9GRB5OHWdDxv8iWWSIe1Xa/JIFY+ztP9Me ffknV+yAnaIT/DxPjSnz =D7gB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 14:07:48 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 18:07:48 -0300 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-g55C693mTmjWJazEpm=AP9jqhhOY7issXcijP8Fk16g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti297LoUcAQ9L6WCVsijyCA2SrzNFQ818aQLrcyFw3PgTBg@mail.gmail.com> <53c0cd12.b0e7ec0a.70ff.ffff87df@mx.google.com> <CAD2Ti2-g55C693mTmjWJazEpm=AP9jqhhOY7issXcijP8Fk16g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53c2f419.2843ec0a.10a6.ffffc69c@mx.google.com> On Sat, 12 Jul 2014 02:39:42 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 1:56 AM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > > wha ha ha ha > > fuckingly clueless assertion of the day... > > Who loves Juan, I do :) Thanks grarpamp ^-^ We should not forget that jesus, who lives in a little white house, loves us all. > Never take a cpunk at face value. > Certainly not in politik. > Get deeper. Oh, OK. I guess somewhat cryptic remarks are to be expected from people who like cryptography =P From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 16:01:11 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 19:01:11 -0400 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. In-Reply-To: <DUB121-W17EB3FAAD5225D4888132EC80B0@phx.gbl> References: <d31648d2e60f70c5195e991fd0b07cb7@openmailbox.org> <DUB121-W17EB3FAAD5225D4888132EC80B0@phx.gbl> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29zXxuUoEkFgnxKLk6JRfKbON5nJm0rqByGHVNvgO96EA@mail.gmail.com> Trillions? ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Mark McCarron <mark.mccarron at live.co.uk> Date: Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 9:27 AM Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. To: "tor-talk at lists.torproject.org" <tor-talk at lists.torproject.org> I can answer this: 1. The IP addresses can be connected to an ISP and physical address should the need arise. It allows the NSA to "rewind the tape" so to speak. That is why there has been a push for data retention at ISPs. Given that in the EU governments are seeking 2 years, it would indicate that the platform can rewind internet activity for at least that long. 2. Tor is a communications platform, the NSA's job is to monitor communications and intercept military planning that effects either itself or its partners. Secure global communications and computing is now a commodity, whereas it was mainly a state-only capability. Thus, the average user is now coming up against intelligence agencies, rather than state actors alone. Leaving blind spots would be dangerous to national security as it provides opportunities for planning and coordination. So, there is a legitimate case here and no one denies it. The real problem is that in the absence of a genuine international threat and by that I mean someone on the scale of Russia/China, these systems are being directed against groups with limited capabilities. Those groups are now being defined as national security threats to justify budgets and to filter money into particular black projects. Revelations by Snowden and other releases are merely a distraction to where the money is really going. Did no one notice trillions are being drained from the US economy into some unidentified military project for the last decade or more??? It would seem to indicate that there is a Manhatten-style project underway. Regards, Mark McCarron > Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 23:14:30 +0000 > From: simonsnake at openmailbox.org > To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > Subject: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. > > I have two questions about the recent revelations that the NSA has been > collecting data about Tor users. > > I would like to hear from those with personal knowledge and experience > such as Jacob, Roger, Mike, etc. > > AIUI, from the stories in the German media > (http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html) and Wired > (http://www.wired.com/2014/07/nsa-targets-users-of-privacy-services/), > the NSA has logged the IP of everyone who ever accessed: > a) a directory server. > b) an entry node. > c) bridges.torproject.org > d) requested an email of bridges. > e) the tor website itself (except from five eyes countries). > > This is viable as the NSA runs the Quantum network which allows it to > intercept traffic to whichever sites it desires before that traffic > arrives at its destination. > > Two questions: > > 1. What would be the purpose of collecting a vast trove of IP addresses? > In my case, my IP could be tied to my real name since I send emails via > SMTP which will contain my IP, email address, real name, etc. That said, > IP addresses are dynamic. I don't know how easy it would be to identify > most people via an IP. Of course, one way would be to ask the ISP > directly. But, whether tied to a real identity or not, what's the point? > What does it achieve? They also gather the IP address for those who > access any number of proxy services such as MegaProxy and > FreeProxies.org. Would they not just end up with a massive database of > (mostly dynamic) IPs? > > 2. What is the attitude that encourages the gathering of this > information? Is it: because they can? Or do they truly believe that > anyone who uses Tor is dangerous? Bear in mind that Tor was developed > and is still funded by the US government. No-one can deny that > dissidents in unfree countries use it. So, even if you assume that a > high percentage of users are bad people, what about the dissidents in > the Middle East or wherever? What is the psychology here? I'm sure > people like Roger are in regular contact with some government types. > Perhaps he can shed some light on the motivation? > > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk From apx.808 at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 16:34:53 2014 From: apx.808 at gmail.com (APX 808) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 20:34:53 -0300 Subject: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29zXxuUoEkFgnxKLk6JRfKbON5nJm0rqByGHVNvgO96EA@mail.gmail.com> References: <d31648d2e60f70c5195e991fd0b07cb7@openmailbox.org> <DUB121-W17EB3FAAD5225D4888132EC80B0@phx.gbl> <CAD2Ti29zXxuUoEkFgnxKLk6JRfKbON5nJm0rqByGHVNvgO96EA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAFZYV3OAefoCpQuLJ5DnoJZg4fyzRmZyYMa_suG6Uu3+V-qcxg@mail.gmail.com> >Mark McCarron said: >Did no one notice trillions are being drained from the US economy into some unidentified military project for the last decade or more??? >It would seem to indicate that there is a Manhatten-style project underway. Do you have more details/links about that? Thanks Cheerz http://apx808.blogspot.com On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 8:01 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > Trillions? > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Mark McCarron <mark.mccarron at live.co.uk> > Date: Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 9:27 AM > Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. > To: "tor-talk at lists.torproject.org" <tor-talk at lists.torproject.org> > > > I can answer this: > > 1. The IP addresses can be connected to an ISP and physical address > should the need arise. It allows the NSA to "rewind the tape" so to > speak. That is why there has been a push for data retention at ISPs. > Given that in the EU governments are seeking 2 years, it would > indicate that the platform can rewind internet activity for at least > that long. > > 2. Tor is a communications platform, the NSA's job is to monitor > communications and intercept military planning that effects either > itself or its partners. Secure global communications and computing is > now a commodity, whereas it was mainly a state-only capability. Thus, > the average user is now coming up against intelligence agencies, > rather than state actors alone. Leaving blind spots would be > dangerous to national security as it provides opportunities for > planning and coordination. So, there is a legitimate case here and no > one denies it. The real problem is that in the absence of a genuine > international threat and by that I mean someone on the scale of > Russia/China, these systems are being directed against groups with > limited capabilities. Those groups are now being defined as national > security threats to justify budgets and to filter money into > particular black projects. Revelations by Snowden and other releases > are merely a distraction to where the money is really going. > Did no one notice trillions are being drained from the US economy > into some unidentified military project for the last decade or more??? > > It would seem to indicate that there is a Manhatten-style project underway. > > Regards, > > Mark McCarron > > > Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 23:14:30 +0000 > > From: simonsnake at openmailbox.org > > To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > > Subject: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. > > > > I have two questions about the recent revelations that the NSA has been > > collecting data about Tor users. > > > > I would like to hear from those with personal knowledge and experience > > such as Jacob, Roger, Mike, etc. > > > > AIUI, from the stories in the German media > > (http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html) and Wired > > (http://www.wired.com/2014/07/nsa-targets-users-of-privacy-services/), > > the NSA has logged the IP of everyone who ever accessed: > > a) a directory server. > > b) an entry node. > > c) bridges.torproject.org > > d) requested an email of bridges. > > e) the tor website itself (except from five eyes countries). > > > > This is viable as the NSA runs the Quantum network which allows it to > > intercept traffic to whichever sites it desires before that traffic > > arrives at its destination. > > > > Two questions: > > > > 1. What would be the purpose of collecting a vast trove of IP > addresses? > > In my case, my IP could be tied to my real name since I send emails via > > SMTP which will contain my IP, email address, real name, etc. That said, > > IP addresses are dynamic. I don't know how easy it would be to identify > > most people via an IP. Of course, one way would be to ask the ISP > > directly. But, whether tied to a real identity or not, what's the point? > > What does it achieve? They also gather the IP address for those who > > access any number of proxy services such as MegaProxy and > > FreeProxies.org. Would they not just end up with a massive database of > > (mostly dynamic) IPs? > > > > 2. What is the attitude that encourages the gathering of this > > information? Is it: because they can? Or do they truly believe that > > anyone who uses Tor is dangerous? Bear in mind that Tor was developed > > and is still funded by the US government. No-one can deny that > > dissidents in unfree countries use it. So, even if you assume that a > > high percentage of users are bad people, what about the dissidents in > > the Middle East or wherever? What is the psychology here? I'm sure > > people like Roger are in regular contact with some government types. > > Perhaps he can shed some light on the motivation? > > > > > > -- > > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk at lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 6838 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140713/a57784be/attachment.txt> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 20:18:29 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 23:18:29 -0400 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> References: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29yZh_p+JCwr1sONPGmfhNXrDq04eW5MJOvN7KyCxFNrw@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 5:35 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > Dnia sobota, 12 lipca 2014 18:15:53 nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net pisze: >> The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements > I couldn't agree more, and the sad state of Pirate Party here in Poland: > Same shit is going on in Germany and Sweden, AFAIK. Pirate Party movement is > in deep crisis in Europe. Forgetting the actual failures in execution, you're simply not going to gain much public acceptance (votes) among the masses, or earn influence by them, by calling yourselves the 'pirate' or 'punks' party. Well, except by luck and whim. At least call yourselves something relatively benign on the books so that you can then choose to carry whatever banner suits each audience. Disruption, when you have insufficient force outright, implies subterfuge and sleight of hand. Get deeper. From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 13 14:35:06 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2014 23:35:06 +0200 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> References: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> Message-ID: <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> Dnia sobota, 12 lipca 2014 18:15:53 nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net pisze: > The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements > attempting to play the game within the construct of behavior most > expected. The establishment of a party itself with intent for > longevity is entirely unnecessary for what needs to be done. Most > people here should understand that ignoring ones own brand by > removing it entirely from the picture gives greater focus to a > singular ideal. Don't mistake this rhetoric for revolution. It is > only that Democracy has plenty of room for trolling and no one has > really figured this out yet. > > Unbeknownst to most people born within the past 20+ years they were > all born with dual citizenship. First to their analog nationality > and second to the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Estate. > Yochai Benkler expands on this definition when describing Wikileaks > as part of the Networked Fourth Estate. That is, media institutions > not beholden to any particular nation. I would extend this further > to include people that took upon themselves an alternate understanding > of rights, social norms, governance and behaviors as experienced > through the network as an unwritten constitution. This is not just > hackers and cypherpunks but many internet users as a whole. It > includes *every* internet user that found any form of solace or > confidence through the liberated network. At this moment in time > you could be an American, European, South African or Brazilian and > all will collectively notice that this alternate constitution is > under attack, even if its existence is unknown. > > The Pirate Party most certainly attempts to represent this 4th > estate. I applaud them. The reason they might fail to fix the > most significant problems we currently face is due to their > quest for longevity and a brand. We do not need 4 or 10 years > to fix these problems. We only need 100 days. I couldn't agree more, and the sad state of Pirate Party here in Poland: http://rys.io/en/119 ...only amplifies that. I mean, when I hear them saying things like "first we need to get to the Parliament to be able to do anything", I feel like I'm going to throw up. Same shit is going on in Germany and Sweden, AFAIK. Pirate Party movement is in deep crisis in Europe. So that got me thinking about parties as a system hack: http://rys.io/en/80 http://rys.io/en/78 I think it's worth a try. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140713/3a28e9b0/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 13 22:57:28 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 07:57:28 +0200 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29yZh_p+JCwr1sONPGmfhNXrDq04eW5MJOvN7KyCxFNrw@mail.gmail.com> References: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> <CAD2Ti29yZh_p+JCwr1sONPGmfhNXrDq04eW5MJOvN7KyCxFNrw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <2073850.n1LFRd6Irl@lapuntu> Dnia niedziela, 13 lipca 2014 23:18:29 grarpamp pisze: > On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 5:35 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > > Dnia sobota, 12 lipca 2014 18:15:53 nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net pisze: > >> The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements > > > > I couldn't agree more, and the sad state of Pirate Party here in Poland: > > Same shit is going on in Germany and Sweden, AFAIK. Pirate Party movement > > is in deep crisis in Europe. > > Forgetting the actual failures in execution, you're simply not going > to gain much public acceptance (votes) among the masses, or earn > influence by them, by calling yourselves the 'pirate' or 'punks' party. > Well, except by luck and whim. At least call yourselves something > relatively benign on the books so that you can then choose to carry > whatever banner suits each audience. I disagree. The Pirate Party got a lot of media attention thanks to the name, and got a strong support in the beginning. The current crisis is not due to the name, but due to the fact the PP abandoned quite a lot of their original core issues (filesharing, data protection, privacy, etc). > Disruption, when you have insufficient force outright, implies subterfuge > and sleight of hand. Get deeper. But the PP created a hell of a disruption. Some big parties today have integrated some elements of the original PP platform into their programmes, which is a success regardless of what happens with PP now. However, I'm a big supporter of the idea of creating a single, strong Commons Party, assimilating the Greens and the Pirate Parties across Europe (and further) into a single force. When one thinks about it, it makes sense. On some level the Greens and PP have similar core values: protecting the commons -- be it environmental, or digital. They cooperate closely on several issues in the EU already, and yet go to elections separately. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140714/1751e65e/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Mon Jul 14 01:42:02 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 09:42:02 +0100 Subject: Cypherpunks for Office [Edu/corp giving personal information to NSA/whoever] In-Reply-To: <2073850.n1LFRd6Irl@lapuntu> References: <96d2e5adeb68f78780dc3fd3db023b2e.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <2658979.7mN2DhKRMZ@lapuntu> <CAD2Ti29yZh_p+JCwr1sONPGmfhNXrDq04eW5MJOvN7KyCxFNrw@mail.gmail.com> <2073850.n1LFRd6Irl@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53C397DA.9050006@cathalgarvey.me> > When one thinks about it, it makes sense. On some level the Greens > and PP have similar core values: protecting the commons -- > be it environmental, or digital. They cooperate closely on several > issues in the EU already, and yet go to elections separately. Sure, but the greens are fairly anti-evidence, whereas I see a lot more focus on evidence-based policy in the pirate parties. If you asked the greens to adopt evidence-based policy, they'd implode because they'd have to accept nuclear and GE, and abandon pushing stupid things like homeopathy to state medical boards. There is a growing rebellion within the green movement, I think; I've spoken to senior greens recently who are preparing to start pushing evidence based green policy, but it'll be a longer journey; they have to warm up their voting base to the idea or they simply die. Most of their voters are die-hard organics-and-ear-candles greenpeace-donating hippies, the genuine environmentalists who understand the basics of..well, reality..are in the minority. OTOH the pirate parties (who, let's remember, are technically part of the EU Greens meta-party), in a debate, could pull out statistics and scientific studies backing their positions; it made it difficult to discard their arguments or to take the other guy's position without seeming like a bought politician (of course, the bought politicians did anyway). And yea; major parties are now taking the PP line. Even Neelie Kroes, an EU Commissioner, is coming out and delivering speeches on how we criminalise normal activity by making "piracy" illegal. So they may share a lot, but I don't think the two are compatible yet. Soon, I hope; I'd like to resume calling myself a green without being regarded as someone who supports falsified research, romanticises subsistence farming, and rejects every possible solution that features words with more than two syllables. Long live the pirates! ;) Cathal On 14/07/14 06:57, rysiek wrote: > Dnia niedziela, 13 lipca 2014 23:18:29 grarpamp pisze: >> On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 5:35 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> >> wrote: >>> Dnia sobota, 12 lipca 2014 18:15:53 nicolasbourbaki at riseup.net >>> pisze: >>>> The Pirate Party and Cypherpunks party are populous movements >>> >>> I couldn't agree more, and the sad state of Pirate Party here in >>> Poland: Same shit is going on in Germany and Sweden, AFAIK. >>> Pirate Party movement is in deep crisis in Europe. >> >> Forgetting the actual failures in execution, you're simply not >> going to gain much public acceptance (votes) among the masses, or >> earn influence by them, by calling yourselves the 'pirate' or >> 'punks' party. Well, except by luck and whim. At least call >> yourselves something relatively benign on the books so that you can >> then choose to carry whatever banner suits each audience. > > I disagree. The Pirate Party got a lot of media attention thanks to > the name, and got a strong support in the beginning. The current > crisis is not due to the name, but due to the fact the PP abandoned > quite a lot of their original core issues (filesharing, data > protection, privacy, etc). > >> Disruption, when you have insufficient force outright, implies >> subterfuge and sleight of hand. Get deeper. > > But the PP created a hell of a disruption. Some big parties today > have integrated some elements of the original PP platform into their > programmes, which is a success regardless of what happens with PP > now. > > However, I'm a big supporter of the idea of creating a single, strong > Commons Party, assimilating the Greens and the Pirate Parties across > Europe (and further) into a single force. > > When one thinks about it, it makes sense. On some level the Greens > and PP have similar core values: protecting the commons -- be it > environmental, or digital. They cooperate closely on several issues > in the EU already, and yet go to elections separately. > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140714/351f07c6/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140714/351f07c6/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Mon Jul 14 11:55:40 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 14:55:40 -0400 Subject: [tor-talk] Questions about NSA monitoring of Tor users. In-Reply-To: <20140714120146.GL26986@leitl.org> References: <20140714120146.GL26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_JMwAVjGgR18VU53ScKJHKSsMjpq-5MRj8L=7L+4E0+Q@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 14, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > ----- Forwarded message from Mirimir <mirimir at riseup.net> ----- >>> From: Mark McCarron <mark.mccarron at live.co.uk> >>> Did no one notice trillions are being drained from the US economy >>> into some unidentified military project for the last decade or more??? >>> >>> It would seem to indicate that there is a Manhatten-style project underway. >>> do you have any links or additional info about this? beyond the vague >> sense of large black budgets, I'm not sure exactly what you might be >> referring to. > Well, the modern NSA _is_ a Manhattan-scale project. According to > So, even counting cleanup costs, they're comparable. > Perhaps Mark can add some specifics that haven't come out yet. > http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/29/your-cheat-sheet-to-americas-secret-intelligence-budget/ http://www.martingrandjean.ch/data-visualization-top-secret-us-intelligence-budget/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_intelligence_budget https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Intelligence_Community They're comparable but already reasonably well "identified" and with reasonably known budgets... Manhattan/Hanford, wars, Intel Community Budget, Social Programs, and so on. This new claim of "some unidentified military project for the last decade or more" to the '$trillions' size needs substantiated. That's $100+B/yr of new money, rather hard to hide. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_megaprojects https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Economy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_federal_budget From uwecerron at gmail.com Tue Jul 15 07:21:14 2014 From: uwecerron at gmail.com (Uwe Cerron) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 10:21:14 -0400 Subject: Experts report potential software "back doors" in U.S. standards In-Reply-To: <20140715133815.GT26986@leitl.org> References: <20140715133815.GT26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAM0iPqMTgZtz7rGYhQ1wo9ffzt7Jh_kZULbm-fdQO9zj=gOq4g@mail.gmail.com> Hello, I was wondering what are your opinions on an open source project i am developing decentralbank.com, i began building it as a colored coins bitcoin wallet complementary to open transactions audit servers,which act as multisignature wallets among other things,if colored coins were used people would exchange the rights to the bitcoin stored in the audit server and skip transaction fees, i thought this would be very useful for low income countries where the transaction fee may seem exorbitant. I will be using open transactions technology and will be expanding audit servers which allow multi signature deposits to support colored coin definitions as a way to create a decentralized asset definition storage for colored coins. I was wondering if you guys think there is demand for this or am i just wasting my efforts? The repo is open source and located here https://github.com/DecentralBank Open transactions audit servers are part of the voting pools scheme for those of you who don't know here is the link http://opentransactions.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Voting_Pools Thanks, Uwe Cerron On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 9:38 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > > > http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/usa-nsa-software-idUSL2N0PP2BM20140715 > > Experts report potential software "back doors" in U.S. standards > > BY JOSEPH MENN > > SAN FRANCISCO, July 14 Mon Jul 14, 2014 8:58pm EDT > > (Reuters) - U.S. government standards for software may enable spying by the > National Security Agency through widely used coding formulas that should be > jettisoned, some of the country's top independent experts concluded in > papers > released on Monday. > > Such mathematical formulas, or curves, are an arcane but essential part of > most technology that prevents interception and hacking, and the National > Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been legally required to > consult with the NSA's defensive experts in approving them and other > cryptography standards. > > But NIST's relationship with the spy agency came under fire in September > after reports based on documents from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden > pointed to one formula in particular as a Trojan horse for the NSA. > > NIST discontinued that formula, called Dual Elliptic Curve, and asked its > external advisory board and a special panel of experts to make > recommendations that were published on Monday alongside more stinging > conclusions by the individual experts. > > Noting the partially obscured hand of the NSA in creating Dual Elliptic > Curve > - which Reuters reported was most broadly distributed by security firm RSA > [USN:nL2N0JZ1B6] - the group delved into the details of how it and other > NIST > standards emerged. It found incomplete documentation and poor explanations > in > some cases; in others material was withheld pending legal review. > > As a whole, the panels recommended that NIST review its obligation to > confer > with the NSA and seek legal changes "where it hinders its ability to > independently develop the best cryptographic standards to serve not only > the > United States government but the broader community." > > They also urged NIST to weigh the advice of individual task force members > who > made more dramatic suggestions, such as calling for the replacement of a > larger set of curves approved for authenticating users, in part because > they > were selected through unclear means by the NSA. > > "It is possible that the specified curves contain a back door somehow," > said > Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Ron Rivest, a co-founder of > RSA and the source of the letter R in its name. Though the curves could be > fine, he wrote, "it seems prudent to assume the worst and transition away." > > More broadly, Rivest wrote, "NIST should ask the NSA for full disclosure > regarding all existing standards... If NSA refuses to answer such an > inquiry, > then any standard developed with significant NSA input should be assumed to > be `tainted,'" absent proof of security acceptable to outsiders. > > In an email exchange, Rivest told Reuters that "NIST needs to have a > process > whereby evidence is publicly presented" about how the curves were chosen. > > The curves faulted on Monday had been questioned by outsiders after media > reports in September said the NSA could break much widely used security > software, without detailing which ones or how. "These curves are ubiquitous > in commercial cryptography," Johns Hopkins University professor Matthew > Green > said in an interview. "If you connected to Google or Facebook today, you > probably used one." > > Rivest's long association with RSA, now part of electronic storage maker > EMC > Corp, made his remarks more poignant. But prominent task force colleagues > including Internet co-creator Vint Cerf and Ed Felten, former chief > technologist at Federal Trade Commission, also gave strongly worded > verdicts > on the Department of Commerce unit. > > "It cannot be accepted that NIST's responsibilities should be co-opted by > the > NSA's intelligence mission," wrote Cerf, who now works at Google Inc. > > While Rivest called the internal history of Dual Elliptic Curve a "smoking > gun" with an "almost certain" NSA back door, Felten wrote that NSA might > not > remain alone in its ability to use it and other possible NIST-approved > holes > for spying. > > In each of three cases, including Dual Elliptic Curve and the more common > curves faulted by Rivest, Felten said the suspected back door access > "reduces > the security of users against attack by other adversaries, including > organized crime groups or foreign intelligence services." > > The NSA might have been able to generate curves that pass cursory security > tests but are still breakable through the aid of sheer computing power, > because it can try millions of curves and get a few that fit its goals. > But a > researcher working for another country could discover the flaw, Felten > said. > > In the case of the curves approved under the FIPS 186 standard for > authenticating digital signatures, NIST should start over and pick its own > curves publicly rather than relying on the NSA, Felten and others said. > > Several experts said NIST had to hire more cryptographers and strengthen > its > internal processes to avoid relying on NSA. > > NIST acting Director Willie May agreed in a statement, saying his agency > "must strengthen its in-house cryptography capabilities to ensure we can > reach independent conclusions about the merits of specific algorithms or > standards." > > NIST did not respond to a Reuters email asking about the fate of the > suspect > curves. (Reporting by Joseph Menn; Editing by Ken Wills) > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 8426 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140715/01f9858a/attachment.txt> From dan at geer.org Tue Jul 15 11:31:55 2014 From: dan at geer.org (dan at geer.org) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 14:31:55 -0400 Subject: The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:36:00 +0200." <20140711103600.GA26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <20140715183155.59BDC22813B@palinka.tinho.net> > The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control This is not the NSA's goal. This is the goal of those for whom the NSA works even if their deal includes giving both Congress & POTUS plausible deniability about just whose goals are whose. --dan From eugen at leitl.org Tue Jul 15 06:38:15 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 15:38:15 +0200 Subject: Experts report potential software "back doors" in U.S. standards Message-ID: <20140715133815.GT26986@leitl.org> http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/usa-nsa-software-idUSL2N0PP2BM20140715 Experts report potential software "back doors" in U.S. standards BY JOSEPH MENN SAN FRANCISCO, July 14 Mon Jul 14, 2014 8:58pm EDT (Reuters) - U.S. government standards for software may enable spying by the National Security Agency through widely used coding formulas that should be jettisoned, some of the country's top independent experts concluded in papers released on Monday. Such mathematical formulas, or curves, are an arcane but essential part of most technology that prevents interception and hacking, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been legally required to consult with the NSA's defensive experts in approving them and other cryptography standards. But NIST's relationship with the spy agency came under fire in September after reports based on documents from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden pointed to one formula in particular as a Trojan horse for the NSA. NIST discontinued that formula, called Dual Elliptic Curve, and asked its external advisory board and a special panel of experts to make recommendations that were published on Monday alongside more stinging conclusions by the individual experts. Noting the partially obscured hand of the NSA in creating Dual Elliptic Curve - which Reuters reported was most broadly distributed by security firm RSA [USN:nL2N0JZ1B6] - the group delved into the details of how it and other NIST standards emerged. It found incomplete documentation and poor explanations in some cases; in others material was withheld pending legal review. As a whole, the panels recommended that NIST review its obligation to confer with the NSA and seek legal changes "where it hinders its ability to independently develop the best cryptographic standards to serve not only the United States government but the broader community." They also urged NIST to weigh the advice of individual task force members who made more dramatic suggestions, such as calling for the replacement of a larger set of curves approved for authenticating users, in part because they were selected through unclear means by the NSA. "It is possible that the specified curves contain a back door somehow," said Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Ron Rivest, a co-founder of RSA and the source of the letter R in its name. Though the curves could be fine, he wrote, "it seems prudent to assume the worst and transition away." More broadly, Rivest wrote, "NIST should ask the NSA for full disclosure regarding all existing standards... If NSA refuses to answer such an inquiry, then any standard developed with significant NSA input should be assumed to be `tainted,'" absent proof of security acceptable to outsiders. In an email exchange, Rivest told Reuters that "NIST needs to have a process whereby evidence is publicly presented" about how the curves were chosen. The curves faulted on Monday had been questioned by outsiders after media reports in September said the NSA could break much widely used security software, without detailing which ones or how. "These curves are ubiquitous in commercial cryptography," Johns Hopkins University professor Matthew Green said in an interview. "If you connected to Google or Facebook today, you probably used one." Rivest's long association with RSA, now part of electronic storage maker EMC Corp, made his remarks more poignant. But prominent task force colleagues including Internet co-creator Vint Cerf and Ed Felten, former chief technologist at Federal Trade Commission, also gave strongly worded verdicts on the Department of Commerce unit. "It cannot be accepted that NIST's responsibilities should be co-opted by the NSA's intelligence mission," wrote Cerf, who now works at Google Inc. While Rivest called the internal history of Dual Elliptic Curve a "smoking gun" with an "almost certain" NSA back door, Felten wrote that NSA might not remain alone in its ability to use it and other possible NIST-approved holes for spying. In each of three cases, including Dual Elliptic Curve and the more common curves faulted by Rivest, Felten said the suspected back door access "reduces the security of users against attack by other adversaries, including organized crime groups or foreign intelligence services." The NSA might have been able to generate curves that pass cursory security tests but are still breakable through the aid of sheer computing power, because it can try millions of curves and get a few that fit its goals. But a researcher working for another country could discover the flaw, Felten said. In the case of the curves approved under the FIPS 186 standard for authenticating digital signatures, NIST should start over and pick its own curves publicly rather than relying on the NSA, Felten and others said. Several experts said NIST had to hire more cryptographers and strengthen its internal processes to avoid relying on NSA. NIST acting Director Willie May agreed in a statement, saying his agency "must strengthen its in-house cryptography capabilities to ensure we can reach independent conclusions about the merits of specific algorithms or standards." NIST did not respond to a Reuters email asking about the fate of the suspect curves. (Reporting by Joseph Menn; Editing by Ken Wills) From jya at pipeline.com Tue Jul 15 13:19:25 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 16:19:25 -0400 Subject: The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control In-Reply-To: <20140715183155.59BDC22813B@palinka.tinho.net> References: <Your message of "Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:36:00 +0200." <20140711103600.GA26986@leitl.org> <20140715183155.59BDC22813B@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <E1X79C6-0005ko-FG@elasmtp-dupuy.atl.sa.earthlink.net> This is a crucial observation and NSA cannot deny the deniability of its commanding superiors and budget axe-persons. One possibility which recurs in NSA history is that individuals inside will have the courage or opportunity to explain how this actually works, verging on virgin suicide. Limited as always by draconian secrecy agreements which imperil disclosers with retribution of being pilloried as Betrayers of the Trust in NSA domestication journals. This looming retribution is what induces hemming and hawing by former insiders -- interlaced with inhuman clarity of not going too far, top secrets activate brain-implanted recorders -- who spill some beans but not all, always followed by an assertion you can never know what I know, recorder beeps damn tootin. As with Edward Snowden, Thomas Drake, William Binney, et al. Nobody beeps like that here. Bleeping predators who exploit former insiders without sharing the risk are despicable scoundrels, not motherfucking cowards, cowering behind privileges of press, law, religion, and, oh my sweet James Jesus: Judas-duplicitous cryptology, finger-pointng brayers extraordinaire, verily in thrall to kings-coined, oversexed In-Q-Televangelists. At 02:31 PM 7/15/2014, you wrote: > > The ultimate goal of the NSA is total population control > >This is not the NSA's goal. This is the goal of those for whom the >NSA works even if their deal includes giving both Congress & POTUS >plausible deniability about just whose goals are whose. > >--dan From eugen at leitl.org Tue Jul 15 09:31:11 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 18:31:11 +0200 Subject: Rainforest Connection and WildLeaks Message-ID: <20140715163110.GW26986@leitl.org> Interesting uses of old mobile phones https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/topherwhite/rainforest-connection-phones-turned-to-forest-guar (I'm sure you'll how this be made applicable in other contexts (say, urban environment) and with other modifications). One group hopes to end poaching, WikiLeaks-style http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-07-14/one-group-hopes-end-poaching-wikileaks-style From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 15 22:32:11 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 01:32:11 -0400 Subject: The next gen P2P secure email solution ["meta" data] Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-BGWarRU1rbLeyhdiOwdvuYS-AVaquWEfXBmeb-mpaPw@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 5:03 PM, John Denker <jsd at av8n.com> wrote: > http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-July/022150.html > It seems to me that the binary distinction between "metadata" and > other data is a crock. As a glaring example of the problem, common > protocols for encrypted email encrypt only the main body of the > message, leaving /all/ the headers unencrypted. This is a serious > security breach, as discussed below [*]. > > We can do better than this. We need to do better than this. > > At first glance, one might think that "data is data" and we should > not distinguish "metadata" from other data, but actually I wish to > go in the other direction, and distinguish /more/ classes of data. > ... > Let's be clear: A great deal of the stuff that appears in RFC822 > headers is not needed for delivery of the message, and MUST NOT > be sent in the clear. > ... > To say the same thing another way: Assume the law of the jungle. > The only privacy rights you have are the ones you can enforce on > your own, using the strength of your cryptography. Well, when you give up those rights by still disclosing your source IP and trusting your 'destination organization' [aka provider] with address info regarding you and who you're mailing... it's not much of a solution. Put in as many classes as you want... besides the body of the message which you control, you can't fix centralized Email. Here's another class of provider and browser based non solutions... https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/004894.html There's a thread of this subject ongoing that acknowledges Email can't really be fixed against the issues of the day... and discusses other possible messaging designs towards a next gen solution... https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2013-December/002638.html https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/004900.html The goal is likely one or both of these over an anonymous P2P network... o direct delivery to your recipients online node. o stored delivery to same (push or pull, only exposes destination). More interesting than wasting time on futility of old Email. From bluelotus at openmailbox.org Wed Jul 16 04:19:47 2014 From: bluelotus at openmailbox.org (Bluelotus) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 07:19:47 -0400 Subject: BadBIOS forensics Message-ID: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora CD, infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), infected external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting forensics. I wrote threads on my limited ability to perform forensics in /r/badBIOS subreddit of reddit.com. My other threads are in other subreddits. Look at my submit history. My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted. From demonfighter at gmail.com Wed Jul 16 07:41:34 2014 From: demonfighter at gmail.com (Steve Furlong) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 10:41:34 -0400 Subject: BadBIOS forensics In-Reply-To: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> References: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CAOFDsm0Oh4X8UA7ihdj7MAyYQ90vUPV3wXxgn8uirBqJs3L2cw@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 7:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> wrote: > I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora CD, infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), infected external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting forensics Forensics is fine, I suppose, but wouldn't it be better to donate them to some organization that you don't like? The reelection committee for some politician you don't like, a lobbying group whose position you despise, or a charity which is conspicuous for high overhead might be deserving recipients. (Not on topic, but I never donate cash to charities or other not-for-profits. I've done various support work (as a paid consultant) for quite a few NFPs, including work on their accounting databases, and every single one had funny business going on with the money. Not necessarily covering up pilferage by corporation bosses, though there was some of that, but always overhead that was much higher than reported. And usually the total compensation of the bosses was much higher than reported, if you include non-trivial expenses like paid-for cars. I'm not interested in putting money in the pocket of someone with three times my income while they poor-mouth to get more donations.) -- Neca eos omnes. Deus suos agnoscet. -- Arnaud-Amaury, 1209 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1728 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140716/0c3c9fbf/attachment.txt> From scott at sbce.org Wed Jul 16 19:43:02 2014 From: scott at sbce.org (Scott Blaydes) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 21:43:02 -0500 Subject: Keybase.io Message-ID: <FD44079F-9E63-44DD-9BD7-6681CE3F9A93@sbce.org> I know Keybase.io is old news, but I still have a couple of invites if anyone in interested. Bonus if your request is encrypted. Thank you, Scott Blaydes ========================\ /---------------------------------------------------------- scott at sbce.org \ / *BSD/Linux Advocate crypto user GPG 096EECF0D8A2381E \/ Society for Better Computing Ethics gpg key on keyserver / \ http://sbce.org/ -------------------------------------------/ \================================== -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 842 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140716/0e664baf/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 17 00:35:47 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 03:35:47 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <20140716224117.DF1BB22810A@palinka.tinho.net> References: <20140716224117.DF1BB22810A@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28uFoH2Xinsd9PwHK-n7xLCwmHF2tSpX6GsOgkWbXciOg@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 6:41 PM, <dan at geer.org> wrote: > http://www.cnbc.com/id/101841875 > Breyer also predicted big things for digital currencies. > > He said the leader in the field may not end up being bitcoin, which > is the most prominent name now but has faced price volatility, theft > and scandal over the past year. Other providers will emerge. > > "I have zero doubt in the next five to seven years that we will see > at least half a dozen multibillion dollar digital currency companies," > he said. All currencies and property exhibit volatility, scandal and theft. It is a laugh to suggest otherwise, especially for anything 'new'. And of course there will be new digital currency 'companies'. Let's just call them what they will be, large central banks and govt's. But none of them will have the property that their currency is not under their control. Other than the obivous head start bitcoin has in the digital currency game, that is what bitcoin offers philosophically... freedom from control. No company can or will offer that with their currency. And people are choosing freedom to the tune of roughly $100M moved per day [1] when they could just as easily use the current centralized digital currencies of CC/ACH/wire. If bitcoin itself ends up not scaling well enough, or being anonymous enough, or resistant enough to centralization... another decentral digital currency will do better and take its place. The only real question is, will a decentralized currency such as bitcoin beat the centralizers in the race to global adoption by the masses? And similarly to reach point of no return adoption before centralizers realize it's too late to say no? You really don't want to let big central things emerge (here $trillion-dollar corps), bad things always happen with that. [1] http://bitcoincharts.com/bitcoin/ http://blockchain.info/charts http://www.coindesk.com/ From demonfighter at gmail.com Thu Jul 17 04:19:00 2014 From: demonfighter at gmail.com (Steve Furlong) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 07:19:00 -0400 Subject: BadBIOS forensics In-Reply-To: <1864806.Uu4lpW7xK6@lapuntu> References: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> <CAOFDsm0Oh4X8UA7ihdj7MAyYQ90vUPV3wXxgn8uirBqJs3L2cw@mail.gmail.com> <1864806.Uu4lpW7xK6@lapuntu> Message-ID: <CAOFDsm3JypoSJfWpZPTV+M+X6k5LoTkRL_DgGDR8x2ukvtso-A@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 6:49 AM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > The way it is, you don't have such control. So you would be giving these away > to some orgs you don't like hoping this will get them in hot water with the > NSA/the government. > ... > Either way, a bad, bad idea Oh, agreed. I was joking when I suggested spreading the malware. (People keep telling me that my (alleged) sense of humor will get me in trouble one of these days. Meh, hasn't happened yet.) > I work in an NGO that tries to be at least > partially funded by donations, and it's fucking hard. I'd say it's a case of the 10% making the rest look bad, but really, every single NFP whose accounting I've seen has had something to hide. It's not always excessive perqs for the bosses (and only for the bosses; one of the things to hide is just how much the boss's little extras cost while she tells the staff that there just isn't the money to give any of them pay raises this year), sometimes it's just the level of overhead. One person was telling me that they needed to conceal their overhead level because if they reported the actual level they would lose donations to "more efficient" charities ... who also were lying in their financials. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1660 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/784dcf12/attachment.txt> From nettime at kein.org Thu Jul 17 00:59:02 2014 From: nettime at kein.org (nettime's blockwart) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 09:59:02 +0200 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT Message-ID: <mailman.4606.1575949103.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org> http://www.warwickshire.police.uk/currentIssues/campaigns/suspectreport Terrorists have to live somewhere. They store their equipment and materials somewhere. They need vehicles. They have people who help them - and these people might come and go at strange times of the day and night. They may make unusual financial transactions or use false documents to hide their real identities. They may be behaving differently to how you've known them to behave in the past. If you suspect it, report it. You can also give non-urgent information that may assist police investigations online through www.online.police.uk. Van – Terrorists need transport. If you work in commercial vehicle hire or sales, has a sale or rental made you suspicious? Passport – Terrorists use multiple identities. Do you know someone with documents in different names for no obvious reason? Mobile phone – Terrorists need communication. Anonymous, pay-as-you-go and stolen mobiles are typical. Have you seen someone with large quantities of mobile phones? Has it made you suspicious? Camera – Terrorists need information. Observation and surveillance help terrorists plan attacks. Have you seen anyone taking pictures of security arrangements? Chemicals – Do you know someone buying large or unusual quantities of chemicals for no obvious reason? Mask and goggles – Terrorists use protective equipment. Handling chemicals is dangerous. Maybe you’ve seen goggles or masks dumped somewhere. Credit card – Terrorists need funding. Cheque and credit card fraud are ways terrorists generate cash. Have you seen any suspicious transactions? Computer – Terrorists use computers. Do you know someone who visits terrorist-related websites? Suitcase – Terrorists need to travel. Meetings training and planning can take place anywhere. Do you know someone who travels but is vague about where they are going? Padlock – Terrorists need storage. Lock-ups, garages and sheds can all be used by terrorists to store equipment. Are you suspicious of anyone renting a commercial property? # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime at kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- From tom at vondein.org Thu Jul 17 02:03:26 2014 From: tom at vondein.org (Tom) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 11:03:26 +0200 Subject: Mathematicians discuss severing ties to the NSA Message-ID: <20140717090326.GA11885@r4> FYI: http://www.ams.org/notices/201406/rnoti-p623.pdf -- This message has been scanned for viruses and dangerous content by MailScanner, and is believed to be clean. From demonfighter at gmail.com Thu Jul 17 08:22:27 2014 From: demonfighter at gmail.com (Steve Furlong) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 11:22:27 -0400 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT In-Reply-To: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> References: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 7:16 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > /s/terrist/spook >> Terrorists have to live somewhere. Indeed. And so do police. And politicians, and bureaucrats and TSA gropers. Get out and talk to your neighbors and find out what they do for a living. If they're evasive, there's a good chance they work for the government. (Or are drug dealers or something, but at least in the US, the number of government employees greatly exceeds even the highest estimates of the number of drug dealers.) This information may come in useful someday. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 766 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/e73892d5/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 17 03:40:27 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 12:40:27 +0200 Subject: Mathematicians discuss severing ties to the NSA In-Reply-To: <20140717090326.GA11885@r4> References: <20140717090326.GA11885@r4> Message-ID: <1582334.vLpvnVs2p8@lapuntu> Dnia czwartek, 17 lipca 2014 11:03:26 Tom pisze: > FYI: http://www.ams.org/notices/201406/rnoti-p623.pdf Interesting, thanks for the link! -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/7cd15f6c/attachment.sig> From wb8foz at nrk.com Thu Jul 17 09:44:28 2014 From: wb8foz at nrk.com (David) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 12:44:28 -0400 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT In-Reply-To: <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> On 7/17/14 11:22 AM, Steve Furlong wrote: > If they're evasive, there's a good chance they work for the government. Or they think you do..... From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 17 03:49:22 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 12:49:22 +0200 Subject: BadBIOS forensics In-Reply-To: <CAOFDsm0Oh4X8UA7ihdj7MAyYQ90vUPV3wXxgn8uirBqJs3L2cw@mail.gmail.com> References: <1422fa0d-1c37-4443-820e-54e7d5f3c77b@email.android.com> <CAOFDsm0Oh4X8UA7ihdj7MAyYQ90vUPV3wXxgn8uirBqJs3L2cw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1864806.Uu4lpW7xK6@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 16 lipca 2014 10:41:34 Steve Furlong pisze: > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 7:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> > > wrote: > > I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora > > CD, infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), > infected external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting > forensics > > > Forensics is fine, I suppose, but wouldn't it be better to donate them to > some organization that you don't like? The reelection committee for some > politician you don't like, a lobbying group whose position you despise, or > a charity which is conspicuous for high overhead might be deserving > recipients. No. I feel an internal disgust at such an idea. Had you full control of the bugs/implants and could actually get the info/data out and then leak it to Wikileaks/whatever, then it would have a shred of sense, because you could use these tools as a force for good. The way it is, you don't have such control. So you would be giving these away to some orgs you don't like hoping this will get them in hot water with the NSA/the government. There are two scenarios here. Either you'd be de facto giving a present to the NSA -- and I don't feel like giving the NSA presents; or, it would be an org that works with the NSA, or at least is conducive to whatever the gov does -- hence, the implant-gathered data would not be used. Of course you could also hit a potential whistleblower within such an organisation, which would be even worse. Either way, a bad, bad idea. Forensics is the way here. > (Not on topic, but I never donate cash to charities or other > not-for-profits. I've done various support work (as a paid consultant) for > quite a few NFPs, including work on their accounting databases, and every > single one had funny business going on with the money. Not necessarily > covering up pilferage by corporation bosses, though there was some of that, > but always overhead that was much higher than reported. And usually the > total compensation of the bosses was much higher than reported, if you > include non-trivial expenses like paid-for cars. I'm not interested in > putting money in the pocket of someone with three times my income while > they poor-mouth to get more donations.) Sorry you had bad experiences. I work in an NGO that tries to be at least partially funded by donations, and it's fucking hard. We want to be funded by donations because being funded by grants or sponsors is always a "strings attached" situation, and we need to be as independent as possible. Employees here get decent, but not high, pay, and there are no perks like paid-for cars. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/574206bc/attachment.sig> From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 17 04:16:40 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 13:16:40 +0200 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT Message-ID: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> /s/terrist/spook ----- Forwarded message from nettime's blockwart <nettime at kein.org> ----- From jya at pipeline.com Thu Jul 17 10:37:41 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 13:37:41 -0400 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT In-Reply-To: <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> References: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> Message-ID: <E1X7pcj-00007i-Kd@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net> We all work for government unless tax avoiders. Latest guesstimate is 33-45% of pay goes to governments at all levels and those subsidized by governments. Some argue we will all become full-time government workers happily having DoD do what's necessary to bring in 100% revenue by piracy. Reason: citizen tax squeeze is rising as wealthy and corporations shed tax burden by NGOs, off-shore evasion, moving HQs overseas, hiring, manufacturing and financing overseas, massaging taxation laws, bribing revenuers and office holders, increasing crackdown on citizen tax deductions, hiring more private police to intimidate those asking for better pay, offloading environmental crimes to taxpayers, buying legislators to enact favors for high-profit, high-income beneficiaries, controlling and ffixing elections to pack offices with sleazes who work for them before, during and after holding office. That's the short list. Look at your tax due instructions for the long one. Or if youngster, your student debt draconian provisions. Dream of being on the dole by holding political office, or NGO, from which you can escape the long list and shift it to citizens wondering if the increasing shit shower ever stopping. At 12:44 PM 7/17/2014, you wrote: >On 7/17/14 11:22 AM, Steve Furlong wrote: > >>If they're evasive, there's a good chance they work for the government. > >Or they think you do..... > From tommy at collison.ie Thu Jul 17 14:07:00 2014 From: tommy at collison.ie (Tommy Collison) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 14:07:00 -0700 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> Hi Rich, hi list -- I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would love to say hi to whoever's around. TC <tommycollison.com> On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: > Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? > > Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! > > R > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 536 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/ab700075/attachment.sig> From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 17 06:09:14 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 15:09:14 +0200 Subject: the NSA revelations all in one chart Message-ID: <20140717130914.GD26986@leitl.org> http://projects.propublica.org/nsa-grid/ The NSA Revelations All in One Chart This is a plot of the NSA programs revealed in the past year according to whether they are bulk or targeted, and whether the targets of surveillance are foreign or domestic. Most of the programs fall squarely into the agency’s stated mission of foreign surveillance, but some – particularly those that are both domestic and broad-sweeping – are more controversial. Just as with the New York Magazine approval matrix that served as our inspiration, the placement of each program is based on judgments and is approximate. For more details, read our FAQ or listen to our podcast. Also, take our quiz to test your NSA knowledge. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Thu Jul 17 12:31:29 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 16:31:29 -0300 Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT In-Reply-To: <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> References: <20140717111639.GC26986@leitl.org> <CAOFDsm3G-qgMKATyLSXE8Yeo=Ehozv_u0BRtL=awcJjDvCjpvQ@mail.gmail.com> <53C7FD6C.5080408@nrk.com> Message-ID: <53c82379.0938ec0a.354b.55de@mx.google.com> On Thu, 17 Jul 2014 12:44:28 -0400 David <wb8foz at nrk.com> wrote: > On 7/17/14 11:22 AM, Steve Furlong wrote: > > > If they're evasive, there's a good chance they work for the > > government. > > Or they think you do..... > +1 From rich at openwatch.net Thu Jul 17 13:34:14 2014 From: rich at openwatch.net (Rich Jones) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 16:34:14 -0400 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE Message-ID: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! R -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 173 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/39e04edf/attachment.txt> From aestetix at aestetix.com Thu Jul 17 14:14:34 2014 From: aestetix at aestetix.com (aestetix) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 17:14:34 -0400 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> Message-ID: <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I'm here! I'm speaking at 11pm on saturday in Olson (http://x.hope.net/schedule.html#updatesfro). Would love to have crypto/privacy folks come. On 7/17/14, 5:07 PM, Tommy Collison wrote: > Hi Rich, hi list -- > > I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights > advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, > which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would > love to say hi to whoever's around. > > TC <tommycollison.com> > > On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: >> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? >> >> Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! >> >> R >> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTyDy5AAoJEOrRfDwkjbpTc+kH/0Z4VvDALMluN5hRwFsgOHm3 u0ZGX3sCqj6mgRN1x6dmtSEmvAwHcnUBnjam7SObew1FsNOWixuN6VuGQCN0FhXF Bifgt6so56XGnF2nNbT7jsfealzlGWQS9EL9otqSwrqGHf8mdRVB4oeehRb+4YU0 mHlZyNOvidmqHQiE0xPUlGn4ATEkcliD1mcFHJ77+kwkDkBX0iDic94hF9KuLOoX wipJvBdMNsUeZfibBHrmK55dEHCVn8mZ1ZXX5KyCnyInjQQM+LacjBZQkCE5IIuE ir7KS4P/Jqi+7P6nGao36lNCa5ImSveBBDG77hT3+a1osvS1d/ojx1dWb22eZTE= =O+gt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From griffin at cryptolab.net Thu Jul 17 14:32:05 2014 From: griffin at cryptolab.net (Griffin Boyce) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 17:32:05 -0400 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> Message-ID: <5e8bbf39-fc7f-4dba-a7f9-c974400e00dd@email.android.com> I'll be there, sometimes kicking it in NoisySquare =) I'm the androgyne in the political shirt. On July 17, 2014 5:14:34 PM EDT, aestetix <aestetix at aestetix.com> wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > >I'm here! I'm speaking at 11pm on saturday in Olson >(http://x.hope.net/schedule.html#updatesfro). Would love to have >crypto/privacy folks come. > >On 7/17/14, 5:07 PM, Tommy Collison wrote: >> Hi Rich, hi list -- >> >> I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights >> advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, >> which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would >> love to say hi to whoever's around. >> >> TC <tommycollison.com> >> >> On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: >>> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? >>> >>> Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! >>> >>> R >>> >> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) >Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > >iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTyDy5AAoJEOrRfDwkjbpTc+kH/0Z4VvDALMluN5hRwFsgOHm3 >u0ZGX3sCqj6mgRN1x6dmtSEmvAwHcnUBnjam7SObew1FsNOWixuN6VuGQCN0FhXF >Bifgt6so56XGnF2nNbT7jsfealzlGWQS9EL9otqSwrqGHf8mdRVB4oeehRb+4YU0 >mHlZyNOvidmqHQiE0xPUlGn4ATEkcliD1mcFHJ77+kwkDkBX0iDic94hF9KuLOoX >wipJvBdMNsUeZfibBHrmK55dEHCVn8mZ1ZXX5KyCnyInjQQM+LacjBZQkCE5IIuE >ir7KS4P/Jqi+7P6nGao36lNCa5ImSveBBDG77hT3+a1osvS1d/ojx1dWb22eZTE= >=O+gt >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2369 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/ddd3c9d3/attachment.txt> From gbnewby at pglaf.org Thu Jul 17 18:47:30 2014 From: gbnewby at pglaf.org (Greg Newby) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 18:47:30 -0700 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <5e8bbf39-fc7f-4dba-a7f9-c974400e00dd@email.android.com> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> <5e8bbf39-fc7f-4dba-a7f9-c974400e00dd@email.android.com> Message-ID: <20140718014730.GA49636@pglaf.org> I'm going to be helping out backstage etc. as in the past. The guy in the blue suit. The program is fantastic. Workshops...vendors...art... all kinds of stuff! -- Greg On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 05:32:05PM -0400, Griffin Boyce wrote: > I'll be there, sometimes kicking it in NoisySquare =) I'm the androgyne in the political shirt. > > > On July 17, 2014 5:14:34 PM EDT, aestetix <aestetix at aestetix.com> wrote: > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Hash: SHA1 > > > >I'm here! I'm speaking at 11pm on saturday in Olson > >(http://x.hope.net/schedule.html#updatesfro). Would love to have > >crypto/privacy folks come. > > > >On 7/17/14, 5:07 PM, Tommy Collison wrote: > >> Hi Rich, hi list -- > >> > >> I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights > >> advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, > >> which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would > >> love to say hi to whoever's around. > >> > >> TC <tommycollison.com> > >> > >> On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: > >>> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? > >>> > >>> Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! > >>> > >>> R > >>> > >> > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > >Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) > >Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > > > >iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTyDy5AAoJEOrRfDwkjbpTc+kH/0Z4VvDALMluN5hRwFsgOHm3 > >u0ZGX3sCqj6mgRN1x6dmtSEmvAwHcnUBnjam7SObew1FsNOWixuN6VuGQCN0FhXF > >Bifgt6so56XGnF2nNbT7jsfealzlGWQS9EL9otqSwrqGHf8mdRVB4oeehRb+4YU0 > >mHlZyNOvidmqHQiE0xPUlGn4ATEkcliD1mcFHJ77+kwkDkBX0iDic94hF9KuLOoX > >wipJvBdMNsUeZfibBHrmK55dEHCVn8mZ1ZXX5KyCnyInjQQM+LacjBZQkCE5IIuE > >ir7KS4P/Jqi+7P6nGao36lNCa5ImSveBBDG77hT3+a1osvS1d/ojx1dWb22eZTE= > >=O+gt > >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > -- > Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 17 09:54:26 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 18:54:26 +0200 Subject: Leaked GCHQ catalog of exploit tools for manipulation and mass surveillance Message-ID: <20140717165426.GF26986@leitl.org> http://blogs.computerworld.com/privacy/24145/leaked-gchq-catalog-exploit-tools-manipulation-and-mass-surveillance?source=CTWNLE_nlt_security_2014-07-17 Leaked GCHQ catalog of exploit tools for manipulation and mass surveillance By Darlene Storm July 16, 2014 1:22 PM EDTAdd a comment Just as civil liberties groups challenge the legality of the UK intelligence agency’s mass surveillance programs, a catalog of exploit tools for monitoring and manipulation is leaked online. The Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG), a department within the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), “develops the majority of effects capabilities” for UK’s NSA-flavored intelligence agency. First Look Media first published the Snowden-leaked Wikipedia-like document full of covert tools used by GCHQ for surveillance and propaganda. JTRIG tools and techniques help British spies “seed the internet with false information, including the ability to manipulate the results of online polls,” monitor social media posts, and launch attacks ranging from denial of service, to call bombing phones, to disabling users' accounts on PCs. Devil’s Handshake, Dirty Devil, Reaper and Poison Arrow are but a few vicious-sounding JTRIG system tools, but the naming convention for others are just inane like Bumblebee Dance, Techno Viking and Jazz Fusion. Perhaps the British spies were hungry when coming up with Fruit Bowl, Spice Island, Nut Allergy, and Berry Twister? Most of the tools are "fully operational, tested and reliable,” according to the 2012 JTRIG Manual, but "Don't treat this like a catalog. If you don't see it here, it doesn't mean we can't build it." Like the previously leaked TAO exploits, it’s an eye-opener as to exploits that GCHQ can deploy. GCHQ spy tools, techniques and exploits in JTRIG manual Some of the especially invasive tools that are “either ready to fire or very close to being ready” include: Angry Pirate can “permanently disable a target’s account on their computer.” Stealth Moose can “disrupt” a target’s “Windows machine. Logs of how long and when the effect is active.” Sunblock can “deny functionality to send/receive email or view material online.” Swamp Donkey “silently” finds and encrypts all predefined types of files on a target’s machine. Tracer Fire is an “Office document that grabs the targets machine info, files, logs, etc and posts it back to GCHQ.” Gurkhas Sword is a tool for “beaconed Microsoft Office documents to elicit a targets IP address.” Tornado Alley is a delivery system aimed at Microsoft Excel "to silently extract and run an executable on a target's machine." Changeling provides UK spies with the “ability to spoof any email address and send email under that identity.” Glassback gets a target’s IP by “pretending to be a spammer and ringing them. Target does not need to answer.” Denial of Service: Rolling Thunder uses P2P for distributed denial of service. Predators Face is used for “targeted denial of service against web servers.” Silent Movie provides “targeted denial of service against SSH services.” Other JTRIG exploits include Screaming Eagle, “a tool that processes Kismet data into geolocation information” and Chinese Firecracker for “overt brute login attempts against online forums.” Hacienda is a “port scanning tool designed to scan an entire country or city” before identifying IP locations and adding them to an “Earthling database.” Messing with cellphones: Burlesque can “send spoofed SMS text messages.” Cannonball can “send repeated text messages to a single target.” Concrete Donkey can “scatter an audio message to a large number of telephones, or repeatedly bomb a target number with the same message.” Deer Stalker provides a way to silently call a satellite and GSM phone “to aid geolocation.” Imperial Barge can connect two target phones together in a call. Mustang “provides covert access to the locations of GSM cell towers.” Scarlet emperor is used for denial of service against targets’ phones via call bombing. Scrapheap Challenge provides “perfect spoofing of emails from BlackBerry targets.” Top Hat is “a version of Mustang and Dancing Bear techniques that allows us to pull back cell tower and Wi-Fi locations targeted against particular areas.” Vipers Tongue is another denial of service tool but it’s aimed at satellite or GSM phone calls. Manipulation and propaganda Bomb Bay can “increase website hits/rankings.” Gateway can “artificially increase traffic to a website;” Slipstream can “inflate page views on websites.” Underpass “can change the outcome of online polls.” Badger can mass deliver email messages “to support an Information Operations campaign.” Gestator can amplify a “given message, normally video, on popular multimedia websites” like YouTube. The “production and dissemination of multimedia via the web in the course of information operations” can be accomplished with Skyscraper. There are also various tools to censor or report “extremist” content. Online surveillance of social networks Godfather collects public data from Facebook. While Spring Bishop finds private photos of targets on Facebook, Reservoir allows the collection of various Facebook information. Clean Sweep can “masquerade Facebook wall posts for individuals or entire countries.” Birdstrike monitors and collects Twitter profiles. Dragon’s Snout collects Paltalk group chats. Airwolf collects YouTube videos, comments and profiles. Bugsy collects users’ info off Google+. Fatyak is about collecting data from LinkedIn. Goodfella is a “generic framework to collect public data from online social networks.” Elate monitors a target's use of UK's eBay. Mouth finds, collects and downloads a user’s files from achive.org. Photon Torpedo can “actively grab the IP address of an MSN messenger user.” Pitbull is aimed at large scale delivery of tailored messages to IM services. Miniature Hero is about exploiting Skype. The description states, “Active Skype capability. Provision of real time call records (SkypeOut and SkypetoSkype) and bidirectional instant messaging. Also contact lists.” If that’s not enough mass-scale surveillance and manipulation to irk you, there are more weaponized tricks and techniques in the JTRIG Manual. From lists at cooperq.com Thu Jul 17 19:45:51 2014 From: lists at cooperq.com (Cooper Quintin) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 22:45:51 -0400 Subject: CPunks @ HOPE In-Reply-To: <20140718014730.GA49636@pglaf.org> References: <CADJYzxLLvunXiDEC+YLo+qFW_Du0FbhOhFOzZNYZSUnV7u0upg@mail.gmail.com> <53C83AF4.50201@collison.ie> <53C83CBA.7070508@aestetix.com> <5e8bbf39-fc7f-4dba-a7f9-c974400e00dd@email.android.com> <20140718014730.GA49636@pglaf.org> Message-ID: <53C88A5F.9000904@cooperq.com> I'll be around, giving a workshop about crypto for noobs. Helping people set up OTR and stuff. On 07/17/2014 09:47 PM, Greg Newby wrote: > I'm going to be helping out backstage etc. as in the past. > The guy in the blue suit. > > The program is fantastic. Workshops...vendors...art... > all kinds of stuff! > -- Greg > > On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 05:32:05PM -0400, Griffin Boyce wrote: >> I'll be there, sometimes kicking it in NoisySquare =) I'm the androgyne in the political shirt. >> >> >> On July 17, 2014 5:14:34 PM EDT, aestetix <aestetix at aestetix.com> wrote: > I'm here! I'm speaking at 11pm on saturday in Olson > (http://x.hope.net/schedule.html#updatesfro). Would love to have > crypto/privacy folks come. > > On 7/17/14, 5:07 PM, Tommy Collison wrote: > >>>> Hi Rich, hi list -- > >>>> > >>>> I'll be there! Giving a lightning talk about digital rights > >>>> advocacy on US campuses (aka <studentsagainstsurveillance.com>, > >>>> which we launched at NYU with EFF's help) on Friday at 4pm. Would > >>>> love to say hi to whoever's around. > >>>> > >>>> TC <tommycollison.com> > >>>> > >>>> On 7/17/14, 1:34 PM, Rich Jones wrote: > >>>>> Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? > >>>>> > >>>>> Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! > >>>>> > >>>>> R > >>>>> > >>>> >> >> -- >> Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2600 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140717/83cf26e4/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Fri Jul 18 06:16:09 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 06:16:09 -0700 Subject: Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Shfw4w4dq4f0qzr8RMHcJNg6npxdxLGUyGCy5sB4bAdw@mail.gmail.com> "Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections" A request for all security conscious organizations handling vulnerability reports to deploy privacy enhancing technologies. --- With the Snowden disclosures and Google's Project Zero on the minds of security professionals everywhere, it is time to evaluate one more aspect of this renewed focus on 0day and targeted attacks: vulnerability submission to vendors. [0][1] Software vulnerabilities of use to nation states and espionage organizations are recognized as a threat to privacy and basic human rights. Their impact no longer dismissable or discounted given evidence of misuse. I will not discuss hardware vulnerabilities in this treatment as they entail different considerations and constraints. [2] Reporting vulnerabilities of this nature in turn requires strong privacy protections commensurate with the five and six digit monetary values they command, and the adversaries intent on discouraging their discovery or mitigation. [3][4] --- Therefore, any organization handling vulnerability reports must support strong privacy for vulnerability submission. This is mandatory even if most or all issues received via this channel are not 0day, not high value, and entail very little risk to users. The characteristics of a strong private reporting method are: - Email must not be used. In the best circumstances email leaks too much information. In common situations it is passed around clear text, trivially interfered with, and winds through software with huge usability and vulnerability problems. Email for initial security vulnerability reporting must cease immediately. [5][6] - Public web systems for vulnerability reporting must not be used. Like email, this leaks too much information and is vulnerable to a wide array of attacks destroying any privacy intended. [7][8] - Submission of reports via hidden site required. This has become fashionable in media organizations as the "secure drop" for whistleblowers, and it is equally apropriate for vulnerability reporting. This significantly raises the cost of surveilling a vulnerability reporting service, and ensures that passive interception of reported vulnerabilities is impossible. [9] - Encryption of submitted reports required. PGP and GPG are wonderful tools, despite encrypted email being a dismal failure. While the hidden drop may protect the privacy of the reporter, encryption of the report content to specific vulnerability researchers' keys ensures privacy to the receiver. A compromise of the hidden site must not lead to access of reported vulnerabilities. [10] - Submitter anonymity the default. Submissions and communication must accomodate an anonymous identity. If a researcher wishes to claim credit they must opt-in and provide additional information. No psuedonymous account requirements, no key linking across submissions. - Obfuscated disclosure should be available if desired. Capturing 0day in the wild used for espionage or cyber effects is a rare event. Publicly disclosing when, where, and how you obtained such captures ensures you're likely never to see any others. Researchers in position to observe and inspect such events should be able to report the vulnerabilities without credit and without indicating the origin. A vendor could provide a "cover story" for how the vulnerability was discovered internally, to best protect sources' ability to continue to discover these types of weaponized exploits in the wild. Finally, it goes without saying that this privacy applies during reporting and mitigation phases of defect resolution. Once a patch is prepared and public the details of the vulnerability should be public as well, via email list, public blog, or any other useful medium. --- As participants in the security industry it behooves us all to set an example for others and to demonstrate a committment to security and privacy via action. Security conscious organizations handling vulnerability reports can support strong privacy and send a clear message deploying private reporting methods described above. Security researchers must demand strong privacy from organizations they collaborate with, even in the most trivial or minor of circumstances, so that infrequent severe vulnerabilities may also be reported in confidence. Privacy is a basic human right we must all support. Let's demonstrate our support by using privacy enhancing technologies to resolve risks to privacy! best regards, 0. "The NSA Revelations All in One Chart" https://projects.propublica.org/nsa-grid/ 1. "Announcing Project Zero" No link as the announcement is only supported over HTTP; attempt HTTPS and you're redirected to plain-text. This is an embarassment that should be fixed, Google Project Zero! (the other plain-text sites below have not unreasonable exuses ;) 2. "New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms but they are also enabling unparalleled invasions of privacy" https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy 3. "A Declaration of Cyber-War" http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104 '''On July 15, the day Stuxnet’s existence became widely known, the Web sites of two of the world’s top mailing lists for newsletters on industrial-control-systems security fell victim to distributed-denial-of-service attacks...''' 4. "The Real Story of Stuxnet" http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet '''Just as Kaspersky’s engineers were tricking Gauss into communicating with their own servers, those very servers suddenly went down,...''' 5. "Universal Email Encryption Specification" http://ritter.vg/blog-uee_email_encryption.html 6. "Pond" (not like email) https://pond.imperialviolet.org/tech.html 7. "Bullrun (decryption program)" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_%28decryption_program%29 8. "How secure is HTTPS today? How often is it attacked?" https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/how-secure-https-today 9. "How the NSA Attacks Tor/Firefox Users With QUANTUM and FOXACID" https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_att.html (this is what a hard to attack system looks like, and keeping disclosure entirely within the network from clients to hidden sites amplifies the difficulty significantly.) 10. "The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture" https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3724.txt From coderman at gmail.com Fri Jul 18 06:55:37 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 06:55:37 -0700 Subject: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload In-Reply-To: <E1X86cZ-00060q-A0@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <53C82098.7090108@yahoo.com> <20140717191931.GL4258@hexapodia.org> <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.gmail.com> <E1X86cZ-00060q-A0@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1T4+0-8VFK902zTXLbuUnZgHjEKy=-rGvR8JAFf6u+Wmg@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 4:46 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > ... > No nonsense Omidyar has bet $200 million on peddling security > products generated by his $50 million investment in insecurity > scare news via Snowden cornicopia of NSA scare programs, which > in turn have received huge boosts of counter-Snowden actions > by the usual suspects of mil-com-spy-edu-org-hackers. modern security analysis requires ever increasing skills and knowledge, driving the pool of practitioners ever smaller. combined with demand from government and private industry for private research, paying researchers to work in the light rather than [REDACTED] a hard sell. this is one aspect of Project Zero i am keen to monitor, as the initial recruiting is top talent and top dollar. research to harden software against advanced threats and analyze advanced attacks encountered almost always locked behind non-disclosure, confidentiality, classification constraints. independent security research and state-of-the-art security research at odds, increasingly so, day by day. > Nothing like it since 9/11. Thank you, Edward Snowden, thank > you media, for prolonging godsent cyber fear and salvation. > Dust off cyber Pearl Harbor posters for Defcon, HOPE, Blackhat, > this very sordid squat. an industry in sorry shape[0] and much volatility, for sure. Google's "Announcing Project Zero" post itself only accessible via plain-text, attempts to https redirected back to plainly observable and trivially tamper-able. that mathematicians are having an introspective moment to consider their role in mass privacy violations, and in turn advocating for employment outside such private industries is a telling contrast to the relative silence in infosec where developing weaponized exploits, not just precursors or components, has yet to generate an honest and open discussion. "Mathematicians Urge Colleagues To Refuse To Work For The NSA" http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/05/mathematicians-urge-colleagues-to-refuse-to-work-for-the-nsa/ From jya at pipeline.com Fri Jul 18 04:46:36 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 07:46:36 -0400 Subject: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.g mail.com> References: <53C82098.7090108@yahoo.com> <20140717191931.GL4258@hexapodia.org> <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <E1X86cZ-00060q-A0@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Some, maybe all, of those sitting on Snowden docs would/are selling to the highest bidder for other clandestine hacks. The fundamental purpose of security is to do that lulling, gulling and smiling at the ease with which trust can be exploited when a manufactured crisis drives the fearful into gaping maws of protection. The especially private kind, the higher the secrecy the higher the price, is most effective. Fake highest classification markings obligatory. The frenzy to exploit Snowden revelations, tiny as they are, has saved the security industry -- mil-com-spy-edu-org-hackers -- from post-2-war decline. BTW, what are the odds all parties to the Snowden boondoggle are placing on hot war cyberwar to surpass the cool stinking-poo of AV and security vendors planting malware to foster upticks of market? No nonsense Omidyar has bet $200 million on peddling security products generated by his $50 million investment in insecurity scare news via Snowden cornicopia of NSA scare programs, which in turn have received huge boosts of counter-Snowden actions by the usual suspects of mil-com-spy-edu-org-hackers. Nothing like it since 9/11. Thank you, Edward Snowden, thank you media, for prolonging godsent cyber fear and salvation. Dust off cyber Pearl Harbor posters for Defcon, HOPE, Blackhat, this very sordid squat. >this is exactly why some who have received these payloads are sitting >on them, rather than disclosing. > >it is more useful to mitigate privately, and observe how/when an >exploit is used, > than burn it publicly for zero effective security improvement. > >(the less scrupulous would sell to highest bidder for other clandestine hacks) > > >better ideas welcome! > > >best regards, >-- >Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. >Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: >https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. >Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing >moderator at companys at stanford.edu. From jya at pipeline.com Fri Jul 18 08:19:58 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 11:19:58 -0400 Subject: Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections, Re: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Shfw4w4dq4f0qzr8RMHcJNg6npxdxLGUyGCy5sB4bAdw@mail.g mail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Shfw4w4dq4f0qzr8RMHcJNg6npxdxLGUyGCy5sB4bAdw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <E1X89x2-0004gZ-Ie@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> On two related threads: It's a challenge to work counter-spying without access to all of Snowden's alleged, note alleged -- nobody knows except Ed how many or where multiply-accumulated and -stashed from 2008-2013 and afterwards -- documents. But parsing the unknown, imagining and acting on possibilities, is the purpose counter-spying as well as spying. Failure expected, narrowing it for modest utility, no lasting triumph. Privacy as elusive as security. It could be, has been, argued that open source coding, like the Internet, is a ploy, or decoy, like comsec standards committees and spy oversight committees, even, some claim, Tor and PKC, AV and Blacknet, so forth and so on paraded here for Internet dog years. Duplicity, buyer beware and who watches the watchers inherent, is that not the wee chihuahua way of survival against greater powers of Fort Huachuca whisperers, GMO vegetables, fracked minerals, DoD-fabricated asteroids and black hos of nightsweat zombies. Whistling in the dark, whistleblowing sunshine, coding out of sight except for sneaky supra-Tempest io-germs gnawing backbone taps into HUMINT dervishing switch doctors. From eugen at leitl.org Fri Jul 18 03:24:15 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 12:24:15 +0200 Subject: interesting thread on BND intercept at DE-CIX on denog@ Message-ID: <20140718102415.GL26986@leitl.org> The netops are not amused. You need to be a list member in order to access the archive. http://lists.denog.de/mailman/private/denog/2014-July/002049.html From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 15:12:33 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 15:12:33 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> wrote: > ... > My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted. and now they're getting thoroughly cleaned, see attached. please note for all future reference that suspect materials should be delivered in person, even at cost of a plane ticket. so much for that inquiry, :/ best regards, (attached interdiction of shipment from Washington State to Oregon via Florida - usually they at least try to make it look plausible, heh) https://peertech.org/files/fedex-fail.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: fedex-fail.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 25539 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140719/605b16db/attachment.jpg> From bryan at thestarbucks.com Sat Jul 19 17:20:45 2014 From: bryan at thestarbucks.com (Bryan Starbuck) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 17:20:45 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <B8AA3FD7-264B-481D-909C-5C1E9FF5EF84@thestarbucks.com> I like buying a computer in a surprise visit to an apple store or a store that sells windows computers. Best, -Bryan Bryan Starbuck On Jul 19, 2014, at 3:12 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> wrote: >> ... >> My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted. > > and now they're getting thoroughly cleaned, see attached. > > please note for all future reference that suspect materials should be > delivered in person, even at cost of a plane ticket. > > so much for that inquiry, :/ > > > best regards, > > (attached interdiction of shipment from Washington State to Oregon via > Florida - usually they at least try to make it look plausible, heh) > https://peertech.org/files/fedex-fail.jpg > <fedex-fail.jpg> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2820 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140719/64e3f12e/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 17:25:52 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 17:25:52 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1QMGkfR-ffN=GMMM2dFxb-_kf9+hx4-au+FKmyUz_qkSQ@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Bryan Starbuck <bryan at thestarbucks.com> wrote: > I like buying a computer in a surprise visit to an apple store or a store > that sells windows computers. agreed; on site ad-hoc cash purchases the best procurement technique. not infallible by any means, but at least avoids some known problems like this amusing scenario. (shipments from the Seattle Amazon warehouse to Kansas before delivery to Oregon was also funny.) repeat for emphasis: - keep chain of custody of sensitive hardware at all times - never procure or ship through mail. at one point, priority same day air would get a pass, but even this no longer suitable. best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 17:31:10 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 17:31:10 -0700 Subject: first reference to "data diodes" in NSA documents or leaks Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TYOLtjS1t9b2rBovysUxLgt3oKxCVMy1D7NEV+fTYn2g@mail.gmail.com> i am trying to find the first reference to "data diodes" in any NSA documents or leaks. bonus points for background on where this technical structure originated and why :) best regards, From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 18:20:18 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 18:20:18 -0700 Subject: Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TESDg6D7HVoBOoqx6MTXhO2V_DiFRsNOhok0AAbvNWhw@mail.gmail.com> doubt this will surprise anyone; iOS intentionally designed to support surveillance. --- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287614000036 "Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices" by Jonathan Zdziarski Abstract The iOS operating system has long been a subject of interest among the forensics and law enforcement communities. With a large base of interest among consumers, it has become the target of many hackers and criminals alike, with many celebrity thefts (For example, the recent article “How did Scarlett Johansson's phone get hacked?”) of data raising awareness to personal privacy. Recent revelations (Privacy scandal: NSA can spy on smart phone data, 2013 and How the NSA spies on smartphones including the BlackBerry) exposed the use (or abuse) of operating system features in the surveillance of targeted individuals by the National Security Agency (NSA), of whom some subjects appear to be American citizens. This paper identifies the most probable techniques that were used, based on the descriptions provided by the media, and today's possible techniques that could be exploited in the future, based on what may be back doors, bypass switches, general weaknesses, or surveillance mechanisms intended for enterprise use in current release versions of iOS. More importantly, I will identify several services and mechanisms that can be abused by a government agency or malicious party to extract intelligence on a subject, including services that may in fact be back doors introduced by the manufacturer... ''' From bryan at thestarbucks.com Sat Jul 19 18:42:12 2014 From: bryan at thestarbucks.com (Bryan Starbuck) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 18:42:12 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1QMGkfR-ffN=GMMM2dFxb-_kf9+hx4-au+FKmyUz_qkSQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1QMGkfR-ffN=GMMM2dFxb-_kf9+hx4-au+FKmyUz_qkSQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <D4761877-2306-43BE-B088-11F24046C14C@thestarbucks.com> If you don’t mind saying, can you say if you are a US citizen? (Probably) Do you work on an open source project like TOR? Do you think they do that because you do development? I’d love if we build a profile of who they actively perform hardware attacks on. They likely repeat this on categories of people (TOR devs, employees at CAs, etc.). Even if you can give a vague category (crypto-currency vs open source file system encryption, etc.) That one lady on twitter was a TOR dev. I’d love us to deduce as many patterns as possible, so those people can be incredibly diligent. Best, -Bryan Bryan Starbuck | Bryan at TheStarbucks.com On Jul 19, 2014, at 5:25 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Bryan Starbuck <bryan at thestarbucks.com> wrote: >> I like buying a computer in a surprise visit to an apple store or a store >> that sells windows computers. > > > agreed; on site ad-hoc cash purchases the best procurement technique. > not infallible by any means, but at least avoids some known problems > like this amusing scenario. > > (shipments from the Seattle Amazon warehouse to Kansas before delivery > to Oregon was also funny.) > > > repeat for emphasis: > - keep chain of custody of sensitive hardware at all times > - never procure or ship through mail. at one point, priority same day > air would get a pass, but even this no longer suitable. > > > best regards, -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3522 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140719/3f7a9984/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 19:23:06 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 19:23:06 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] In-Reply-To: <D4761877-2306-43BE-B088-11F24046C14C@thestarbucks.com> References: <CAJVRA1QMGkfR-ffN=GMMM2dFxb-_kf9+hx4-au+FKmyUz_qkSQ@mail.gmail.com> <D4761877-2306-43BE-B088-11F24046C14C@thestarbucks.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TvbCphaZm9WwMCq6BzgV=7xF_ywrUQ10rqV81PzCZVyg@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 6:42 PM, Bryan Starbuck <bryan at thestarbucks.com> wrote: > ... > I’d love us to deduce as many patterns as possible, so those people can be > incredibly diligent. yes i am a citizen, and as for those at risk of scrutiny (shipments, border crossings, etc.) any of the following activities has been demonstrated to put you under scrutiny: - developing privacy enhancing technologies - administering high value networks or computer systems - documentaries and journalism adversarial to some big business or government - cryptology of any form - technical surveillance and operational security interests - hobbyists in domains including drones, rockets, airplanes - information security and network security professionals - running cryptome.org - many, many, more. it most cases, it seems that drawing attention to attempts to intimidate diminishes or ceases the intrusions. as for deducing patterns, perhaps the useful metric would be a trend up or down. best regards, From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 19:15:40 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 23:15:40 -0300 Subject: Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TESDg6D7HVoBOoqx6MTXhO2V_DiFRsNOhok0AAbvNWhw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TESDg6D7HVoBOoqx6MTXhO2V_DiFRsNOhok0AAbvNWhw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53cb2530.461bec0a.4529.ffff9525@mx.google.com> On Sat, 19 Jul 2014 18:20:18 -0700 coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > doubt this will surprise anyone; iOS intentionally designed to support > surveillance. > > --- > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287614000036 $ 31.50 ? > > "Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in > iOS devices" > by Jonathan Zdziarski > > Abstract > > The iOS operating system has long been a subject of interest among the > forensics and law enforcement communities. With a large base of > interest among consumers, it has become the target of many hackers and > criminals alike, with many celebrity thefts (For example, the recent > article “How did Scarlett Johansson's phone get hacked?”) of data > raising awareness to personal privacy. Recent revelations (Privacy > scandal: NSA can spy on smart phone data, 2013 and How the NSA spies > on smartphones including the BlackBerry) exposed the use (or abuse) of > operating system features in the surveillance of targeted individuals > by the National Security Agency (NSA), of whom some subjects appear to > be American citizens. This paper identifies the most probable > techniques that were used, based on the descriptions provided by the > media, and today's possible techniques that could be exploited in the > future, based on what may be back doors, bypass switches, general > weaknesses, or surveillance mechanisms intended for enterprise use in > current release versions of iOS. More importantly, I will identify > several services and mechanisms that can be abused by a government > agency or malicious party to extract intelligence on a subject, > including services that may in fact be back doors introduced by the > manufacturer... > ''' > From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 00:07:47 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 00:07:47 -0700 Subject: minimum viable toolset for low level malware forensics [was: BadBIOS forensics] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1S=O9Yq1KeL_C2-T4fKeSHC1C8xvD3GKg4pM-kE3V3pkA@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:19 AM, Bluelotus <bluelotus at openmailbox.org> wrote: > ... > I wrote threads on my limited ability to perform forensics for those technical, the minimum viable toolset for identifying low level subversive programming is: - a solid base (clean hw, clean installs, clean environment) in a separate location with RF shielding. (a closed metal barn out in the country, for example. if you're a geek you love the thought of a faraday closet ;) - instrumented runtime (e.g. volatility memory forensics, system performance profiling, all to append only storage) on any systems you are using as suspect to attack. - obstructed runtime (see thread on "how to hack your systems before someone else") - this is optional; a modified system that appears to be vulnerable / stock condition will exhibit undefined behavior under attempted enabling, sometimes. otherwise it may be difficult to identify a successful infection. - direct flash memory pinout rig (specs for all chips including flash memory associated with BIOS, integrated management controllers, network devices, I/O ports, keyboard, trac pad or mouse, HD/DVD/CD drives, graphics memory, wifi, 4g, and bluetooth wireless adapters will be needed you're programming an FPGA to perform reads directly from the flash chips. converting flash memory into high level block storage the next black art upward. - wide band high performance software defined radio. you will be building custom GNU radio blocks and running many from third party repositories or research projects. you are using a two stage process, where wide sweeps and auto ranging are applied to sample swaths of signal of interest to storage. then parallel processing on other hardware or later time (off-use-hours) extracting known / useful data and anomalies for further analysis. - in-line network archival, shaping, and cut-out for link to internet / local network. this works best as a zero visibility transparent ethernet bridge with ARP spoofing and ether mangling at each end. that does not speak IP at all. the shaping is used to squelch suspect or unexpected peak traffic (both a signalling system for malicious activity and a means to constrain the reach once compromised) as per the kit above, you are instrumenting a system to observe its runtime behavior on an external audit system. this is because the advanced attacks inject into processes and ring0, persisting only what is needed / chosen (enabling hooks). you need to capture the active payloads that are delivered on-demand in host memory space. you are observing the network and RF space for anomalies and discrepancies. for example, a wifi radio disabled yet still emitting into 2.4Ghz/5.xGhz spectrum. network captures also provide evidence to correlate with malicious memory, for example identifying a payload delivered over the network, with keys from volatility used to decrypt the encrypted communications containing the payload identified in memory. you are (sometimes destructively) sampling all flash memory as parts of advanced payloads persist outside of the OS and storage level interface visibility. (stealth at bus/bios level). discrepancies in blocks that should not have changed, executable code segments where not expected, strange carvings of wear leveling around "protected" offsets. all of these are indicators for further scrutiny and instruction level reversing (if corresponding to microcontroller programming instructions for manipulating streams read or written to and from device, for example :) last but not least, you are not getting attached to any hardware, because at any moment you may find it all suspect and have to replace all laptops, desktops, routers, printers, mobile devices, storage media, media servers, smart televisions, and god forbid you installed one of those intelligent thermostats. [ laugh for sanity, then go back and read the list, and then understand that the far end of the nation state malware asymptote is full of freaky exotics. i also hope you never hit that level of "all systems go" *grin* ] best regards, From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 22:45:35 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 01:45:35 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <53CADD1C.4090906@av8n.com> References: <53CADD1C.4090906@av8n.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2983FzywxXRJ52Kv=_0z=248muZxVCpaaC4p8MxCVLhhA@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 5:03 PM, John Denker <jsd at av8n.com> wrote: > AFAICT, a lot of existing protocols were designed to resist > passive eavesdropping. In contrast, the idea of large-scale > MITM attacks was sometimes considered tin-foil-hat paranoia. > To this day, standard Ubuntu Firefox trusts 162 different > authorities (including the Hong Kong Post Office) to certify > /anything and everything/. > > In the /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla directory, only one > of 163 root certificates has any v3 Name Constraints at all. > Why Ubuntu and Firefox tolerate this is beyond me; I can > understand trusting Microsoft to sign Microsoft-related stuff, > but allowing them to sign /anything and everything/ ?!????!! The mozilla bundle includes about 150. It would be nice if the new cert observatoris publish a count of how many end certs they see each root cert covers... a topN list of sorts. Then you could save some time by including the N of your choice into your 'empty by default' list. I think the distribution would be severly skewed to maybe top 10 or 15 covers most any place. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 22:56:23 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 01:56:23 -0400 Subject: Rainforest Connection and WildLeaks Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_NOH_ahTuvViG7i1XHKmofS1r6rSPETyWyWgWq7Q_tRw@mail.gmail.com> Nice to have Eugen back, wherever did he go? Thanks for posting this applied tech ink. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 19 23:21:21 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 02:21:21 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <20140717200256.8837.qmail@joyce.lan> References: <CAD2Ti28uFoH2Xinsd9PwHK-n7xLCwmHF2tSpX6GsOgkWbXciOg@mail.gmail.com> <20140717200256.8837.qmail@joyce.lan> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 4:02 PM, John Levine <johnl at iecc.com> wrote: >>But none of them will have the property that their currency is not >>under their control. Other than the obvious head start bitcoin has >>in the digital currency game, that is what bitcoin offers >>philosophically... freedom from control. > > I realize that's the theory, but in reality, there is a mining pool > that could easily grow to be more than half of all the miners, at > which point it could start ignoring blocks from outside the pool, > which would be to the benefit of people inside the pool. So long as > the cost of joining the pool remained small, e.g., if you join you > still get 98% of the coins you mine, this looks to me like it would be > a stable situation, no matter how much outsiders complained about how > awful it was. Thing is, having seen the possibilities, people actually *want* this freedom from central control, in a bad way, and they're willing to act to get it. They also realize that if they, and the entire community, don't act together to maintain the decentralization they have... then it's over. That's why ghash.io (the largest pool) just announced that they will not exceed 40%. Down from 55% to 32% now... http://www.coindesk.com/ghash-commits-40-hashrate-cap-bitcoin-mining-summit/ http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-mining-detente-ghash-io-51-issue/ http://blockchain.info/pools And why BTC isn't exactly rushing to support regulation... http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1ygcil/as_requested_im_ben_lawsky_superintendent_of_the/ http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2aycxs/hi_this_is_ben_lawsky_at_nydfs_here_are_the/ http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2b1jpl/dear_ben_lawsky_thank_you_for_the_totalitarian/ Further, again, since people want decentral, if some large entity does manage a BTC takeover, no problem... all users ok with that will stay with the now central coin, and the free decentral people will just exchange their coin (or fork) into whatever is the current decentral coin. Repeat as needed. So far BTC has a good history of actively cooperating to avoiding central. Excepting mining companies (ie: the 10% corps, who have made similar self limiting statements), the VC money seems to stay out of the coin itself and is being placed in surrounding service ventures... exchanges, banking, processors, wallets, retail. In the end years from now, maybe only three coin will remain... - A World central - A State central - A World decentral/anon/etc With all of them being roughly similar in acceptance, volatility, etc. > There also remain long term questions about the technical viability of > Bitcoin, most notably whether people will still find it interesting > after the transaction cost rises. (If a transaction costs a dollar, > there's a lot of other options with much less price volatility.) People spend more than a dollar to post mail, or drive to the store. It will be a long time before the ASIC and electric cost to clear a transaction (at whatever network transaction demand rate) exceeds palatability, if ever. Pick a projected compute power, node count, required tx rate (at 100% utilization) and then basically figure gigawatt and gigahash dollars per tx. http://www.coinometrics.com/bitcoin/btix https://bitmaintech.com/productDetail.htm?pid=00020140704023505485N5SxDMkW0693 https://medium.com/@interdome/how-much-electricity-does-bitcoin-use-c350bd84c64e http://organofcorti.blogspot.nl/ A guesstimate with current state and data? - Installing double current hashrate to take 50+% costs about $130M in retail hardware alone. Less for a real deployment. - About $10k/hr to power it. More for cooling, support, bandwidth. - About $0.40/tx-current spread over a year. Much less if running at 100% tx rate capacity. Up to twice more due to doubling current hashrate. Right now that amount is being covered by coin mining profit. The future taper of coin production vs then current market value of coin vs tx fees will be interesting. And ASIC platforms have yet to reach performance plateau. The base tx cost is cost of the coin algorithm to support a given required tx rate. That seems quite low. The race (difficulty) to claim the tx fee profit drives it up. Yet the hardware market is open, yielding a level playing field. So as long as the required tx rate can be met affordably within the algorithm, this is unlikely to be an issue. Cost of tx rates also naturally moderate the proportion of users amongst each payment system. It remains to be seen, once all the various BTC costs are fully optimized, if BTC can handle tx rates approaching the credit cards. Even if not, that doesn't keep it from utility at its own natural rate limit. Some seriously big players don't seem to have any problem with BTC... http://www.coindesk.com/computer-giant-dell-now-accepts-bitcoin/ > To me Bitcoin is very interesting as an experiment. It shows that > within certain parameters, the distributed proof of work model is > viable. I doubt that anyone anticipated the grotesque amount of > computing resources that people would throw at it, or that there would > be mining pools. > > The model is likely useful for applications like distributed notary, > particularly if there are several mutually suspicious groups > participating which makes it less likely that any one of them could > take over. > > It's also impressive to see the number of economically ignorant > enthusiasts who imagine there is something innovative or disruptive > about a commodity bubble, which is what Bitcoin is. Well, since BTC is nothing but experimental scrap metal, please be sure to send yours (and that of all your central fiat loving friends) off for proper recycling to my recycle bin here... btc:1C96B6DszNqnX4KRzveu6BKRuznmmdFhdm Liked or learned something from the links, etc? Tips go here, I'll buy a miner / tx processor, or do something generally useful... btc:1D6rPeQUETfGpSp2JB2oojJUC8GiURyhp7 From crypto at jpunix.net Sun Jul 20 07:12:38 2014 From: crypto at jpunix.net (Crypto) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 09:12:38 -0500 Subject: New XMPP servers Message-ID: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello Everyone! For those that are using secure XMPP clients (Jitsi and the like) I'd like to announce two new Prosody servers. Both are located in the Netherlands and are available for public use. If you would like to try them out they are located at chat.jpunix.net and chat.cpunk.us. Both are fully-featured. Give them a try if you're so inclined! - -- Crypto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTy85WAAoJEDhzgt+U8WIyBAkQAK3+TXmPU6z7Pj8ZbnHBg5cB p2xLfXJuWbObrF4Dd8izbsFGcir1zJw6E/hfyNLD9gZQGhRmvvsQWP3LkWuo6spF 1r92QAumNZQP6hRjKcgvPH28sBKXg8GElW78v+vDUlggpym/UBNXqxxsA6JDXPRT LPwzuqCBayHsA0ghY2TrBy73yLURjJzaJOayd2QWBRcNtEt30NFxU0uu3jkVmsX7 ovqqmFIekNiuiecYFad2+9bH/rt5BsMz6jFZIVhVaXueb9GeQO/Qmu1IXp8yxnS4 XAHDa+5tuUbZDzYvSuwLGdIJpMUxaxnoKQiXEDTNal7cyNt3xkKHXjOIav2eElx1 VD/l4mbTbfn3k8QgtMl1fUJS8o35vHurpF7Yjw/uG/sAy1G2XRG85VoF4vKP08OX /QgZr4LXR9U1uX912Zbf6gjNXsqtOQMP3JL0oa13AzAdT3WKwPJcWOCU2feD5eDh 0uT1rzUk1sS4qfveI1cG45HKz31ayNl2pYX58VXN9F7VtR4F/xPW9FjwG80cm1yv a99OvN1M01GQqUAGh+dj+VKHmPRhux61dpVErgi6viV3Ev5Bb/JvDc7uIGoO/ZcJ 48N/sQjVsABqYFD4yTDm6GrsLeG1OaYXOlhzrwHxPTUsMEJE8BnB4Z6NAVt7PocH LsYy+G/0yoSU8zTHsRBq =7ba8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From crypto at jpunix.net Sun Jul 20 09:45:56 2014 From: crypto at jpunix.net (Crypto) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 11:45:56 -0500 Subject: New XMPP servers In-Reply-To: <CAGxBuBV4YVKCyQTyKAUMr+HMRab9MMg9sOo5Y69+AhFTWb3vFg@mail.gmail.com> References: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> <CAGxBuBV4YVKCyQTyKAUMr+HMRab9MMg9sOo5Y69+AhFTWb3vFg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53CBF244.2030304@jpunix.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 7/20/2014 10:20 AM, Damian Fossi wrote: > Thank you > > > On 20 July 2014 09:42, Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: > > Hello Everyone! > > For those that are using secure XMPP clients (Jitsi and the like) > I'd like to announce two new Prosody servers. Both are located in > the Netherlands and are available for public use. If you would like > to try them out they are located at chat.jpunix.net and > chat.cpunk.us. Both are fully-featured. Give them a try if you're > so inclined! You're very welcome! Just to be sure, I run chat.jpunix.net. chat.cpunk.us is a sister site that is under different management. - -- Crypto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTy/JEAAoJEDhzgt+U8WIybXMP/0jOSMr+F3NAeahDgluDNcyl /TZ4jjEpsjECCAz8ivNAh2ARo1gLcncPZ+8LsItNzHNLu9tUrubeET2hxx2OLb77 Ojzs021KV2d2x0ewIlhvJoWi5ZuPFghZ6CrjTFRNpyhwKe5a6iHkpwkJD+QEHY8T hvH9rMubdHwxK9G6RlsNTYavJ8qMj02JNpGbhEaisgeT0N4T+/QMEn2nqPC0Dczf egFZJFfU0vjRZcrT+3Xd6njBOaNzONzewEbVvdyB9TrKuVwNJK76YTEsIixl4rmA MQSSf45Zq5KHEhauO26K/2Cn7bx7CurIErfXkzpnbdf2XJWazcJMjZtnyZUMHudd zn5zjq2iwjDReRA6WZaGO2phCGXp8J4xew6aBvM+ReINff1pKkYdOuAOPRZqIWzW kql4K4z1Ye4IalioIu+I4tnPsUDd/gijpyh5hZwUPeWXfiTMcQr0wpzlXHCnyxHp waRaFI5qub9qu6GekMFuU/IEnJFfRSql0bTakszqS5oegupNLUTPbyxY3P77Wojt oRrRKkeWK2GvDBMd5mjgZ05Qgpp+lDe3JCTXpL4vfuCyC3c+RJ1ZG4sLA+potSBs wKCuMHZbE0Zi86NggQiPPKPE5GCBG3g6DVRl2yQgTNS29IlWbqfC5iT2JZHdv1x5 Qm01qb8iE9yQPe6s0YvD =Kfsq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From carimachet at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 07:02:27 2014 From: carimachet at gmail.com (Cari Machet) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 14:02:27 +0000 Subject: Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices In-Reply-To: <53cb2530.461bec0a.4529.ffff9525@mx.google.com> References: <CAJVRA1TESDg6D7HVoBOoqx6MTXhO2V_DiFRsNOhok0AAbvNWhw@mail.gmail.com> <53cb2530.461bec0a.4529.ffff9525@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAGRDzQXnvUf4=ZO75y-jSod6t6mobipPyaxFrUeETXG+Dvz+7A@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 2:15 AM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, 19 Jul 2014 18:20:18 -0700 > coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > > > doubt this will surprise anyone; iOS intentionally designed to support > > surveillance. > > > > --- > > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287614000036 > > > $ 31.50 ? > what are you referencing please? > > > > > > > > "Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in > > iOS devices" > > by Jonathan Zdziarski > > > > Abstract > > > > The iOS operating system has long been a subject of interest among the > > forensics and law enforcement communities. With a large base of > > interest among consumers, it has become the target of many hackers and > > criminals alike, with many celebrity thefts (For example, the recent > > article "How did Scarlett Johansson's phone get hacked?") of data > > raising awareness to personal privacy. Recent revelations (Privacy > > scandal: NSA can spy on smart phone data, 2013 and How the NSA spies > > on smartphones including the BlackBerry) exposed the use (or abuse) of > > operating system features in the surveillance of targeted individuals > > by the National Security Agency (NSA), of whom some subjects appear to > > be American citizens. This paper identifies the most probable > > techniques that were used, based on the descriptions provided by the > > media, and today's possible techniques that could be exploited in the > > future, based on what may be back doors, bypass switches, general > > weaknesses, or surveillance mechanisms intended for enterprise use in > > current release versions of iOS. More importantly, I will identify > > several services and mechanisms that can be abused by a government > > agency or malicious party to extract intelligence on a subject, > > including services that may in fact be back doors introduced by the > > manufacturer... > > ''' > > > > > -- Cari Machet NYC 646-436-7795 carimachet at gmail.com AIM carismachet Syria +963-099 277 3243 Amman +962 077 636 9407 Berlin +49 152 11779219 Reykjavik +354 894 8650 Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> 7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187 Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without permission is strictly prohibited. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3721 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/3654faee/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 20 08:38:55 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 17:38:55 +0200 Subject: New XMPP servers In-Reply-To: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> References: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> Message-ID: <6698793.CpWEIIHNNk@lapuntu> Dnia niedziela, 20 lipca 2014 09:12:38 Crypto pisze: > Hello Everyone! > > For those that are using secure XMPP clients (Jitsi and the like) I'd > like to announce two new Prosody servers. Both are located in the > Netherlands and are available for public use. If you would like to try > them out they are located at chat.jpunix.net and chat.cpunk.us. Both > are fully-featured. Give them a try if you're so inclined! Thank you. This is great news, and we need more people ready and willing to run XMPP, e-mail and other services servers. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/0a44f646/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 20 08:45:20 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 17:45:20 +0200 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28uFoH2Xinsd9PwHK-n7xLCwmHF2tSpX6GsOgkWbXciOg@mail.gmail.com> <20140717200256.8837.qmail@joyce.lan> <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1924759.2PFzfidjzr@lapuntu> Dnia niedziela, 20 lipca 2014 02:21:21 grarpamp pisze: > On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 4:02 PM, John Levine <johnl at iecc.com> wrote: > >>But none of them will have the property that their currency is not > >>under their control. Other than the obvious head start bitcoin has > >>in the digital currency game, that is what bitcoin offers > >>philosophically... freedom from control. > >> > > I realize that's the theory, but in reality, there is a mining pool > > that could easily grow to be more than half of all the miners, at > > which point it could start ignoring blocks from outside the pool, > > which would be to the benefit of people inside the pool. So long as > > the cost of joining the pool remained small, e.g., if you join you > > still get 98% of the coins you mine, this looks to me like it would be > > a stable situation, no matter how much outsiders complained about how > > awful it was. > > Thing is, having seen the possibilities, people actually *want* > this freedom from central control, in a bad way, and they're willing > to act to get it. They also realize that if they, and the entire > community, don't act together to maintain the decentralization they > have... then it's over. That's why ghash.io (the largest pool) just > announced that they will not exceed 40%. Down from 55% to 32% now... While I applaud ghash.io's self-regulation (!), I do not in general believe in self-regulation. "We promise we will not abuse the system" only works as long as the payout from having the system not collapsing is (by the self-regulating potential abuser) deemed higher than the one-off payout from collapsing the system and running away with the spoils. This is not a good base for a monetary system, I'd say. ;) -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/5a8e6261/attachment.sig> From edhelas at movim.eu Sun Jul 20 08:53:03 2014 From: edhelas at movim.eu (edhelas) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 17:53:03 +0200 Subject: New XMPP servers In-Reply-To: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> References: <53CBCE56.9090107@jpunix.net> Message-ID: <1405871583.615.0@smtp.etu.univ-nantes.fr> Hi ! That's a great new ! I'm always happy to see new XMPP servers instance. Prosody is a great choice. With the Movim we are building a social network on top of the XMPP protocol and we are using Metronome, a fork of prosody with some fix and great features (full Pubsub/PEP support especially). If you are interested to set-up a Movim instance on one (or both !) of your servers, do not hesitate to mail me (or via XMPP, my JID is the same as my email adress ;)). I'm also looking for new independant pods in The Netherlands, most of the Movim instances are currently hosted in France (https://pod.movim.eu/?q=pods). Regards, edhelas On dim., juil. 20, 2014 at 4:12 , Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hello Everyone! > > For those that are using secure XMPP clients (Jitsi and the like) I'd > like to announce two new Prosody servers. Both are located in the > Netherlands and are available for public use. If you would like to try > them out they are located at chat.jpunix.net and chat.cpunk.us. Both > are fully-featured. Give them a try if you're so inclined! > > - -- > Crypto > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTy85WAAoJEDhzgt+U8WIyBAkQAK3+TXmPU6z7Pj8ZbnHBg5cB > p2xLfXJuWbObrF4Dd8izbsFGcir1zJw6E/hfyNLD9gZQGhRmvvsQWP3LkWuo6spF > 1r92QAumNZQP6hRjKcgvPH28sBKXg8GElW78v+vDUlggpym/UBNXqxxsA6JDXPRT > LPwzuqCBayHsA0ghY2TrBy73yLURjJzaJOayd2QWBRcNtEt30NFxU0uu3jkVmsX7 > ovqqmFIekNiuiecYFad2+9bH/rt5BsMz6jFZIVhVaXueb9GeQO/Qmu1IXp8yxnS4 > XAHDa+5tuUbZDzYvSuwLGdIJpMUxaxnoKQiXEDTNal7cyNt3xkKHXjOIav2eElx1 > VD/l4mbTbfn3k8QgtMl1fUJS8o35vHurpF7Yjw/uG/sAy1G2XRG85VoF4vKP08OX > /QgZr4LXR9U1uX912Zbf6gjNXsqtOQMP3JL0oa13AzAdT3WKwPJcWOCU2feD5eDh > 0uT1rzUk1sS4qfveI1cG45HKz31ayNl2pYX58VXN9F7VtR4F/xPW9FjwG80cm1yv > a99OvN1M01GQqUAGh+dj+VKHmPRhux61dpVErgi6viV3Ev5Bb/JvDc7uIGoO/ZcJ > 48N/sQjVsABqYFD4yTDm6GrsLeG1OaYXOlhzrwHxPTUsMEJE8BnB4Z6NAVt7PocH > LsYy+G/0yoSU8zTHsRBq > =7ba8 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2321 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/471385d6/attachment.txt> From bryan at thestarbucks.com Sun Jul 20 18:40:50 2014 From: bryan at thestarbucks.com (Bryan Starbuck) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 18:40:50 -0700 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti295WACp0i4+c1Os94-9mBBV6S9SGR6QTb5fL+16udTKXg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> <20140720161205.55408.qmail@joyce.lan> <CAD2Ti295WACp0i4+c1Os94-9mBBV6S9SGR6QTb5fL+16udTKXg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <71CD9553-C7B6-4702-A650-BA80A18CBD87@thestarbucks.com> > And similarly to reach point of no return adoption before centralizers realize it's too late to say no? There will always be some set of benefits to crypto-currencies that won’t exist elsewhere. So their growth will just happen, no matter what. The question is just if “centralizers” throw their entrepreneurial citizens in jail, when they build these benefits for fellow citizens. But even when they do that, it will still grow in other countries and by other entrepreneurs. Soon it will be illegal to publish open source software in some cases. That would be the only way to stop a future Satoshi from releasing a next generation of bitcoin. That is where “centralizers saying no” or “centralizers stopping it” means they must throw people who publish open source software in jail. Best, -Bryan Bryan Starbuck | Bryan at TheStarbucks.com On Jul 20, 2014, at 4:00 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: >> This is wandering away from crypto > > No better way to naysay BTC than to break the crypto and wash > everyone out. $Billions gone, and a permanent seat in the research > hall of fame ;-) (BTW, where are the BTC insurance companies...) > >>> announced that they will not exceed 40%. Down from 55% to 32% now... > >> That's not surprising. Bitcoin is a speculative asset, and at this >> point the Bitcoin fans have a shared interest in keeping its price up. >> The story that nobody's in charge is one of the things that makes >> people want to buy it, so, well, sure. In the admittedly unlikely >> event that there are enough contracts or debts denominated in Bitcoin >> that there were significant non-speculative demand, things could >> change. > > I'd agree that actual market float outstanding is thin right now. > Yet different from purely propping things up, speculation is all > about assessing future value and making moves accordingly today... > > https://ciphrex.com/archive/bofa-bitcoin.pdf > http://honestnode.com/bitcoin-fair-value-a-first-assessment/ > http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-2014-report/ > http://www.coindesk.com/state-of-bitcoin-q2-2014-report-expanding-bitcoin-economy/ > >> This is what's technically known as "marketing BS". Dell accepts >> dollars. They have a deal with Coinbase in which Coinbase takes the >> risk of raising dollars by selling Bitcoins in return for a commission > > Not so fast! Yes, Dell accepts dollars (subject to whatever BTC > holdback they, like Overstock, may be specifying). However obtaining > those dollars is totally dependant on Coinbase's ability to convert > BTC to dollars on exchange or privately. And Coinbase is surely > nowhere near whole enough from commissions to be able to back their > contracts against any significant outstanding float in a long price > dive situation. Therefore Dell *is* in the BTC game before dollars > on these sales, regardless of the denomination they're booking. So > is everyone else who 'accepts' BTC. Dell and others are large > companies, with well paid accountants and lawyers... it takes more > than whim of 'marketing BS' for them to put a BTC sticker on their > door. > > >>>> volatility >> but if >> there's another collapse in the Bitcoin market > > The BTC market has been in a fairly steady log uptrend over the > long term. The 'collapses' people speak of are, in that context, > spikes returning to normal. All new markets and properties undergo > price discovery. It's a continual process. Ever watch the NYSE, > it's volatile too. > >> the distributed notary idea seems likely to be useful for something > > There is no 'useful for this or useful for that' concerning things > riding on top of this tech... the underlying model, including the > social contract aspects, either works for all uses, or for none. > It's either broken or it's not. > >> but it's never going to replace real money. > > Neither will credit/debit cards. Nor is your fiat paper of choice > 'real money' either, it's just called money by default. (Probably > because the next default, real property, is hard to fit in your > pocket.) Digital currencies will, like 'money', operate in the layer > above real property. > > Again, here's the recycle bin for your trash, this time I'll even > waive the recycling fee... ;) > btc:1C96B6DszNqnX4KRzveu6BKRuznmmdFhdm > > >> On re, replies on: Ghash.io, 50%, takeovers, self regulation... > > > 50% is not a magical binary breakpoint, it merely permits more > influence as the share moves along the scale from 50% to 100%. > > Right now, the $130M plus expenses (or $27M plus for ghash) that > is needed to reach 50% seems to not be worth it to anyone. > > Who is graphing the cost-to-50%? And the cost-to-50% to market cap, > volume, and quantity ratios? Those would be interesting and important > graphs to watch. > > $130M is nothing to someone who wants to own a currency. So why > hasn't it happened to BTC yet? Perhaps because the value of BTC > owes a lot to its decentralization. If so, and you take that away, > you're risking your own value before you start. And risking an > exodus fork. > > Just as easy as it was to add BTC to Dell's checkout in N days time, > adding another currency is easy if yours (or your takeover) fails, > or customers continue to demand a decentral one. > > And you're not going to win a takeover anyways because no one will > tolerate you blocking their transactions... no entity survives > having 50, 40, 30 percent of its users in abject protest against > theft, loss of value and service, and principle. Among other things, > you'd be prosecuted, sued, DDoS'd off the net, badmouthed, and > forked against. > > Probably better to start your own digital currency and put $115M > into marketing and $15M into central hardware. > > >> Also, were such a thing in the works, I wouldn't count on the >> people involved publicly broadcasting their intentions on Twitter. > > That only applies to mining 'companies'. Mining 'pools' derive > their share from the users who elect to use them. Of course a > pool could become a company. And a company could uphold the > social contract. > > The Ghash was a remarkable social contract event by both shedding > users and users leaving. It's happened before, and each time it > does it underscores the importance of the contract to the currency > to everyone involved. > > In the end, if anyone succeeds in taking/making any private/centralized > coin, there will be some users who follow it, and some people who > reject it in favor of other decentral coin. > > Digital banking and transacting has been done for decades. Banks > could have made ACH/Wire compellingly attractive to users and the > marketplace. But they waited, and didn't, and lost the chance... > just like telcos lost the internet and music lost itself. > > As with those things, crypto in the 90's and overlay networks today, > what is really being tested with BTC along with the tech, are meta > concepts such as freedom, regulation, where value is stored, law, > etc. > > At the moment it would be quite hard to say decentral digital > currency is failing or holds little long term prospect. > > You can fund more drunken rambling here... :) > btc:1D6rPeQUETfGpSp2JB2oojJUC8GiURyhp7 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 9897 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/832db77d/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 18:47:00 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 18:47:00 -0700 Subject: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> the stream at http://new.livestream.com/internetsociety2/hopex2 less than optimal. "Johannes of art tech group monochrom will indulge in a public rant about hacker culture and why it has to be saved from itself." and other enumerated unusefullness :) [ no telling when http://store.2600.com/videos.html will update, BTC for digital please? ] --- speaking of Fuckyouhackerfucks, http://trouble.org/?p=1013 <him> do you even know what this is? <her> a bitcoin QRcode <him> ... From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 16:00:52 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 19:00:52 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved? In-Reply-To: <20140720161205.55408.qmail@joyce.lan> References: <CAD2Ti282-UFPNxVZLYq5k4+zPrKrVZKtfoHyotEWPOvLb7ih5Q@mail.gmail.com> <20140720161205.55408.qmail@joyce.lan> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti295WACp0i4+c1Os94-9mBBV6S9SGR6QTb5fL+16udTKXg@mail.gmail.com> > This is wandering away from crypto No better way to naysay BTC than to break the crypto and wash everyone out. $Billions gone, and a permanent seat in the research hall of fame ;-) (BTW, where are the BTC insurance companies...) >> announced that they will not exceed 40%. Down from 55% to 32% now... > That's not surprising. Bitcoin is a speculative asset, and at this > point the Bitcoin fans have a shared interest in keeping its price up. > The story that nobody's in charge is one of the things that makes > people want to buy it, so, well, sure. In the admittedly unlikely > event that there are enough contracts or debts denominated in Bitcoin > that there were significant non-speculative demand, things could > change. I'd agree that actual market float outstanding is thin right now. Yet different from purely propping things up, speculation is all about assessing future value and making moves accordingly today... https://ciphrex.com/archive/bofa-bitcoin.pdf http://honestnode.com/bitcoin-fair-value-a-first-assessment/ http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-2014-report/ http://www.coindesk.com/state-of-bitcoin-q2-2014-report-expanding-bitcoin-economy/ > This is what's technically known as "marketing BS". Dell accepts > dollars. They have a deal with Coinbase in which Coinbase takes the > risk of raising dollars by selling Bitcoins in return for a commission Not so fast! Yes, Dell accepts dollars (subject to whatever BTC holdback they, like Overstock, may be specifying). However obtaining those dollars is totally dependant on Coinbase's ability to convert BTC to dollars on exchange or privately. And Coinbase is surely nowhere near whole enough from commissions to be able to back their contracts against any significant outstanding float in a long price dive situation. Therefore Dell *is* in the BTC game before dollars on these sales, regardless of the denomination they're booking. So is everyone else who 'accepts' BTC. Dell and others are large companies, with well paid accountants and lawyers... it takes more than whim of 'marketing BS' for them to put a BTC sticker on their door. >>> volatility > but if > there's another collapse in the Bitcoin market The BTC market has been in a fairly steady log uptrend over the long term. The 'collapses' people speak of are, in that context, spikes returning to normal. All new markets and properties undergo price discovery. It's a continual process. Ever watch the NYSE, it's volatile too. > the distributed notary idea seems likely to be useful for something There is no 'useful for this or useful for that' concerning things riding on top of this tech... the underlying model, including the social contract aspects, either works for all uses, or for none. It's either broken or it's not. > but it's never going to replace real money. Neither will credit/debit cards. Nor is your fiat paper of choice 'real money' either, it's just called money by default. (Probably because the next default, real property, is hard to fit in your pocket.) Digital currencies will, like 'money', operate in the layer above real property. Again, here's the recycle bin for your trash, this time I'll even waive the recycling fee... ;) btc:1C96B6DszNqnX4KRzveu6BKRuznmmdFhdm > On re, replies on: Ghash.io, 50%, takeovers, self regulation... 50% is not a magical binary breakpoint, it merely permits more influence as the share moves along the scale from 50% to 100%. Right now, the $130M plus expenses (or $27M plus for ghash) that is needed to reach 50% seems to not be worth it to anyone. Who is graphing the cost-to-50%? And the cost-to-50% to market cap, volume, and quantity ratios? Those would be interesting and important graphs to watch. $130M is nothing to someone who wants to own a currency. So why hasn't it happened to BTC yet? Perhaps because the value of BTC owes a lot to its decentralization. If so, and you take that away, you're risking your own value before you start. And risking an exodus fork. Just as easy as it was to add BTC to Dell's checkout in N days time, adding another currency is easy if yours (or your takeover) fails, or customers continue to demand a decentral one. And you're not going to win a takeover anyways because no one will tolerate you blocking their transactions... no entity survives having 50, 40, 30 percent of its users in abject protest against theft, loss of value and service, and principle. Among other things, you'd be prosecuted, sued, DDoS'd off the net, badmouthed, and forked against. Probably better to start your own digital currency and put $115M into marketing and $15M into central hardware. > Also, were such a thing in the works, I wouldn't count on the > people involved publicly broadcasting their intentions on Twitter. That only applies to mining 'companies'. Mining 'pools' derive their share from the users who elect to use them. Of course a pool could become a company. And a company could uphold the social contract. The Ghash was a remarkable social contract event by both shedding users and users leaving. It's happened before, and each time it does it underscores the importance of the contract to the currency to everyone involved. In the end, if anyone succeeds in taking/making any private/centralized coin, there will be some users who follow it, and some people who reject it in favor of other decentral coin. Digital banking and transacting has been done for decades. Banks could have made ACH/Wire compellingly attractive to users and the marketplace. But they waited, and didn't, and lost the chance... just like telcos lost the internet and music lost itself. As with those things, crypto in the 90's and overlay networks today, what is really being tested with BTC along with the tech, are meta concepts such as freedom, regulation, where value is stored, law, etc. At the moment it would be quite hard to say decentral digital currency is failing or holds little long term prospect. You can fund more drunken rambling here... :) btc:1D6rPeQUETfGpSp2JB2oojJUC8GiURyhp7 From griffin at cryptolab.net Sun Jul 20 19:19:01 2014 From: griffin at cryptolab.net (Griffin Boyce) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 22:19:01 -0400 Subject: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> I've got the video and can upload it asap. ~ Griffin On July 20, 2014 9:47:00 PM EDT, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >the stream at http://new.livestream.com/internetsociety2/hopex2 less >than optimal. > >"Johannes of art tech group monochrom will indulge in a public rant >about hacker culture and why it has to be saved from itself." and >other enumerated unusefullness :) > >[ no telling when http://store.2600.com/videos.html will update, BTC >for digital please? ] > >--- > >speaking of Fuckyouhackerfucks, http://trouble.org/?p=1013 ><him> do you even know what this is? ><her> a bitcoin QRcode ><him> ... -- Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1197 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/96aa84b7/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 20 13:55:57 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 22:55:57 +0200 Subject: Video meme hunt: hackers Message-ID: <14349984.2Bs7lofdlx@lapuntu> Hi guys, if I want to introduce the anarchist approach by showing this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SGyAnXfd4Yg and the diggers' approach by showing this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3toLwGs7o-k then what short video you would recommend for introducing the hacker approach? -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/c2bce41d/attachment.sig> From rich at openwatch.net Sun Jul 20 20:41:22 2014 From: rich at openwatch.net (Rich Jones) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 23:41:22 -0400 Subject: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing In-Reply-To: <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> References: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> Message-ID: <CADJYzxKksrtKLG5SpgpeVy2joPvrvHQoL=deoq8XG9YZvjiWBg@mail.gmail.com> I was kind of disappointed by it.. normally Johannes is very funny, but this was just kind of rambling Marxist SJW stuff without much imperative or self-awareness.. or maybe the coffee hadn't hit me yet.. On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 10:19 PM, Griffin Boyce <griffin at cryptolab.net> wrote: > I've got the video and can upload it asap. > > ~ Griffin > > > On July 20, 2014 9:47:00 PM EDT, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >> >> the stream at http://new.livestream.com/internetsociety2/hopex2 less >> than optimal. >> >> "Johannes of art tech group monochrom will indulge in a public rant >> >> about hacker culture and why it has to be saved from itself." and >> other enumerated unusefullness :) >> >> [ no telling when http://store.2600.com/videos.html will update, BTC >> >> for digital please? ] >> >> --- >> >> speaking of Fuckyouhackerfucks, http://trouble.org/?p=1013 >> <him> do you even know what this is? >> <her> a bitcoin QRcode >> >> <him> ... >> >> > -- > Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos. > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1920 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140720/fc7d302b/attachment.txt> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 22:24:57 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 01:24:57 -0400 Subject: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing In-Reply-To: <CADJYzxKksrtKLG5SpgpeVy2joPvrvHQoL=deoq8XG9YZvjiWBg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> <CADJYzxKksrtKLG5SpgpeVy2joPvrvHQoL=deoq8XG9YZvjiWBg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti284PHpjmHPz32VCmD1mhZgFY4MktHt1kGMxxnm+15Zkeg@mail.gmail.com> Obvious link for anyone interested in overall theme... https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=johannes+grenzfurthner From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 23:01:41 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 02:01:41 -0400 Subject: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Hidden service policies In-Reply-To: <53CC736C.80600@riseup.net> References: <CANEZrP2jriLF-mXYTg=B5kjJ2_PPOzNOZVrnRXc_T1gH7pA1MQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti2-qM4eqH+6Oy4QJb3NHYMBmSGQQFL=HAfGpTxv4=gz4xw@mail.gmail.com> <53CC736C.80600@riseup.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29CP01BiEC-7fQnwQ_fSfeqEOj47LxDtm=4JGyvLZJEbg@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Thomas White <thomaswhite at riseup.net> wrote: > Mike Hearn, > Simple. If you start filtering anything at all, regardless of what it > is ... then I will > block any connection of your relays to mine > ... > Freedom isn't free unless it is > totally free and a selective reading policy through Tor is not just a > bad idea as stated below, I find it outright insulting to me and > everyone else who cares about the free and open internet. The fact > somebody has the audacity to come to a project like Tor and propose > blacklisting mechanisms is jaw-dropping. > ... > As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin > tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify > "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you. Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of many discussions from that suggestion is here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=333824.0 > so while you are reading this, let me know if you run any relays so I > can avoid them. router riker 207.12.89.16 9001 0 0 fingerprint 8657 6CF6 AA84 496F 62C0 5AFE 9F26 8962 A5F0 B2BD contact Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> accept *:8333 reject *:* Normally I would thank exits for passing BTC traffic, but now I'm unsure of this one (and a few others), especially given that's the only exit policy of the above node. To identify anon (Tor) coins for marking and tracking? From coderman at gmail.com Mon Jul 21 02:29:52 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 02:29:52 -0700 Subject: Fwd: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1QOEJ8NZByWf-uZMWdoQNng7HSZ1jxm77Gtx0dMcXD10Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Rv6pUuHUdktBbBx-yywZ=rJVebiPGTGBuoXVRrS4z8JA@mail.gmail.com> <b4a2428a-06b2-4f35-b5ca-415a993d0bb2@email.android.com> <CADJYzxKksrtKLG5SpgpeVy2joPvrvHQoL=deoq8XG9YZvjiWBg@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1QOEJ8NZByWf-uZMWdoQNng7HSZ1jxm77Gtx0dMcXD10Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RDDx0zde4vZwEgwq6b6-jQNfvr_viWP8zaSOfx92aLNg@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: coderman <coderman at gmail.com> Date: Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 2:28 AM Subject: Re: request for video and transcript - Fuckhackerfucks! An Audience Bashing To: Rich Jones <miserlou at gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 8:41 PM, Rich Jones <rich at openwatch.net> wrote: > I was kind of disappointed by it.. normally Johannes is very funny, but this > was just kind of rambling Marxist SJW stuff without much imperative or > self-awareness.. or maybe the coffee hadn't hit me yet.. i expected nothing, and enjoyed a shared frustration. best regards, "This e-postcard powered by Google Wuffie" "This e-postcard best viewed in G+" From coderman at gmail.com Mon Jul 21 02:35:21 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 02:35:21 -0700 Subject: DropItLike Message-ID: <CAJVRA1RKRgC5COw-UzGdxwyWs3JZJ1H4hmb8ghr0sQR-QBFA=g@mail.gmail.com> https://github.com/mozilla/DropItLike From martin.rublik at gmail.com Sun Jul 20 23:12:29 2014 From: martin.rublik at gmail.com (Martin Rublik) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 08:12:29 +0200 Subject: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2983FzywxXRJ52Kv=_0z=248muZxVCpaaC4p8MxCVLhhA@mail.gmail.com> References: <53CADD1C.4090906@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2983FzywxXRJ52Kv=_0z=248muZxVCpaaC4p8MxCVLhhA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53CCAF4D.9040602@gmail.com> On 20. 7. 2014 7:45, grarpamp wrote: ... > The mozilla bundle includes about 150. It would be nice if the > new cert observatoris publish a count of how many end certs > they see each root cert covers... a topN list of sorts. Then you > could save some time by including the N of your choice into your > 'empty by default' list. I think the distribution would be severly > skewed to maybe top 10 or 15 covers most any place. > Here is one visualization http://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/trust-tree/ and the discussion as well https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/observatory/2012-December/000669.html Martin From eric at konklone.com Mon Jul 21 06:48:32 2014 From: eric at konklone.com (Eric Mill) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 09:48:32 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] miniLock seems pretty interesting Message-ID: <CANBOYLVg=Dndusthy82zbksDwyVupdHU9BaSL1mE6199FbvmYQ@mail.gmail.com> I saw this announced at HOPE X this weekend: http://minilock.io/ It uses curve25519 <http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html>, which requires much smaller keys (32 or 64 bits) to ensure security -- and so it basically just demands a strong passphrase from the user from which can be derived a strong private key. The developer has a video <http://vimeo.com/101237413> and slides <http://minilock.io/files/HOPEX.pdf> to go along with it, and in general focused his energy on persuading the audience that JavaScript crypto is a necessary and achievable part of the future. -- Eric -- konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone> _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- From s at ctrlc.hu Mon Jul 21 03:13:04 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 12:13:04 +0200 Subject: DropItLike In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RKRgC5COw-UzGdxwyWs3JZJ1H4hmb8ghr0sQR-QBFA=g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1RKRgC5COw-UzGdxwyWs3JZJ1H4hmb8ghr0sQR-QBFA=g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140721101304.GB6799@ctrlc.hu> On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 02:35:21AM -0700, coderman wrote: > https://github.com/mozilla/DropItLike quite disappointing (but then i have no expectations when it comes to mozilla), looks like mostly a pile of libtech crap to m -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From eugen at leitl.org Mon Jul 21 07:31:35 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:31:35 +0200 Subject: potential leak on Torpedo Message-ID: <20140721143135.GU26986@leitl.org> https://pay.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/2b8oq3/please_read_if_you_usedepend_on_tor_never_before/ Please read if you use/depend on Tor. Never before seen FH information. (self.TOR) submitted 16 hours ago * by Deepthroat2 [+1] Hello everyone, I have some information that I have been dying to share for months, but due to the circumstances, and to avoid detection, I had to wait for some time before I was able to safely make this post. My goal here is to provide information that I know is credible and for the Tor community to use it as they see fit, due to the nature of my work, and the severe penalties associated with breaking the rules and giving out information you aren't supposed too, I have no way of verifying or proving anything to you that I say here, I understand if find me less than credible, however, this is essentially a PSA, and you can take it for what it's worth to you. Just about one year ago, the Tor community was shaken by a Firefox exploit which utilized a javascript exploit and an old vulnerbility in the Tor Browser Bundle to unmask some users of Freedom Hosting. There has been rampant misinformation, and speculation to the point that I felt like pulling my hair out, or just simply bursting out into laughter when reading some of the outlandish claims made by people who have little to no idea what they are talking about. Today, I will set the record straight. The FH exploit was a government engineered, and deployed exploit that was designed in response to former Director Mueller's fustration at an earlier child pornography case in which the FBI was ridiculed for being unable to ascertain the source of child pornography, for those who aren't familiar with this case, it involved a man who had accessed child pornography by accident on a Tor hidden service, and then brought his desktop computer to the office, explaining what had happened and that he subsequently preformed a "Full wipe" on the disk. The agent who took the report had limited knowledge about Tor, however, at the time he knew that any directed effort to identify a specific Tor user was hopeless, and in the report he indicated that "There is currently no known way to ascertain the location of a Tor user, thus, no investigative leads exsist." This got leaked to the press, and they had a field day, hinting at the incompetency of the Bureau. Needless to say, the FBI had it's ego hurt quite badly by this public display of incompetency. Then Director Mueller directed the CEOS (Child exploitation and obscenity section) to find a way to penetrate the layers of protection provided by Tor, and to come up with a fesible way to conduct a sting operation in order to bring these people to justice. The FBI had previously conducted a sting on viewers of child pornography in a case out of Nebraska, that resulted in the arrest of about 25 people. This was the first successful take down of CP consumers that were utilizing a Tor hidden service. One of the errors that I see alot on these forums and others was that the Nebraska take down was done in a similar fashion to the FH exploit, with the code being deployed onto the pages of the boards, however, this is not the case. From my understanding, the Nebraska field office was able to find the actual server, take it over covertly, then upload a series of files that purported to be child pornography, but actually contained nothing but encrypted gibberish. They were video files that were embedded with code that called back to a computer that recorded the IP address of the requestor, date and time similar to the way windows media player attempts to recall album information and cover art for music cds and such. These were files that the user actually had to download and attempt to open. This is why the service was run for weeks, and only 25 people were identified as users. This method was described by the techs who deployed it as a "NIT" or "Network Investigational Tool". Now for Freedom Hosting.... The javascript exploit could not be deployed directly on the servers which Mr. Marques was using due to either technical reasons, or legal requirements by the AUSA in Maryland. So the decision was made to clone the services exactly, and transport then to the home of the FBI CEOS in the Greenbelt division of Maryland. This location was picked specifically because sentencing in this district for Child Pornography crimes is more severe. It was July 31st of 2013 when the exploit actually went live, and tried to identify criminals. It was installed previously, however, there were technical problems early on and the code had to be revised 3 times before it was running as intended, it ran for about 11 days before being shut down. The amount of people identified by this exploit is still a closely gaurded secret, with only agents having a direct "Need to know" being privy to this information. Howver, the victory dance was short lived as news started flowing around that the evidence may not be admissible in court, due to the manner in which it was collected, among other reasons. Although proper warrants were issued, it would take atleast 4-7 years to comb through the list of suspects, and question, arrest each one. The major problem is that after about 12 months, the courts start to presume your evidence is prejudicial to the defendant because you're supposed to have an indictment and serve it on the defendant within 30 days, and that just wasn't possible. You can request an extension of this time, however you must present a new, fresh reason for doing so..."We still aren't ready" doesn't cut it. There is no statue of limitations for the crime of "Accessing with intent to view child pornography" so barring any other limitations, the FBI can come after someone 10-15 years later. The AUSA became uncomfortable with the prospects of his legal case against the exploitees of FH and went to the US Attorney. There was disagreement as to whether or not the evidence would be viable, however, the operation went on anyways. One of the victims of the FH exploit was a man by the name of Grant Klein from Vermont. The Bureau had made arrangements with the local police for assistance with the raid (This is pretty much standard operation procedure, and is done for the saftey of the agents, as well as to maintain professional courtesy. Local cops get butt hurt when you arrest people on their turf without them knowing). The FBI had provided the local police with court documents and the affidavit of arrest regarding the cirsumstances of Mr. Klein's warrant, which they promptly posted onto their press release against the wishes of the FBI. This resulted in the termination of atleast one employee from local PD. He was raided and before even being asked a question ,he began spewing a confession. His home was searched, and a desktop computer with no hard disk was found, as well a laptop computer belonging to his wife Susan. There was no illegal materials found on these, however, he had a smartphone in the drawer of a nightstand which contained illegal images of minors. He was arrested and charged with 3 seperate crimes. To make a long story short, the FH related charges were dropped because the FBI had crossed a legal line by offering up child pornography de novo, by shutting down the server, then bringing it back online hosting real CP. They were uncomfortable with the prospects of this case, and were able to use a leon good faith exception to admit the evidence they found on his phone to make a single possession charge stick, however, he agreed to plead guilty. The rest of the leads which lead to foreign nationals were then distributed accordingly to the various LEA's. Also, earlier this wekk, the UK police arrested 660 people as part of Operation Notarise. The operation name of the FBI takedown in Nebraska was "Operation Torpedo" This was a cute poke at both the method they used, and the users they targeted Torpedo - Navy missile Tor Pedo - Tor Pedophile. -DT moar comments on Reddit From coderman at gmail.com Mon Jul 21 16:40:14 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:40:14 -0700 Subject: shipment interdiction [was: BadBIOS forensics] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TnTff11ortxDbNR8H0O5g2rQm5w6FF179+Yski9CT0kA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1QG97sjXRSRFsmyXAXhjxy-paX5qTQCb77H=qskLc2r=A@mail.gmail.com> latest update, details of note: stated pick-up date is after actual pick up date. (Friday pickup, Saturday indication of interdiction, Monday "claimed" pickup) "Package received after final location pickup has occurred. Scheduled for pickup next business day." is code for scrutiny. https://peertech.org/files/fedex-fail2.jpg it appears that more complicated "jobs" may need to go to specific offices (e.g. physical modifications or cleaning, rather than substitution with ready implanted replacements) who else has fun shipping tales? :) On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 3:12 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: >... > (attached interdiction of shipment from Washington State to Oregon via > Florida - usually they at least try to make it look plausible, heh) > https://peertech.org/files/fedex-fail.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: fedex-fail2.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 57856 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140721/39f0d065/attachment.jpg> From guninski at guninski.com Mon Jul 21 08:21:48 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 18:21:48 +0300 Subject: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <53C82098.7090108@yahoo.com> <20140717191931.GL4258@hexapodia.org> <CAJVRA1RjtY+5rMhmPeB_L8C8br1iVtbgv4YJJ=u1-N0xcMC5fQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140721152148.GA2785@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 12:32:26PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 12:19 PM, Andy Isaacson <adi at hexapodia.org> wrote: > > ... > > And once you've patched this bug, FOXACID will update to issue another > > 0day. > > > > It's worth doing, for sure! Patching bugs makes us all incrementally > > safer. > > > > But don't pretend that patching the specific attack your adversary is > > currently using will disable or even seriously inconvenience the > > adversary. > > > this is exactly why some who have received these payloads are sitting > on them, rather than disclosing. > > it is more useful to mitigate privately, and observe how/when an > exploit is used, > than burn it publicly for zero effective security improvement. > > (the less scrupulous would sell to highest bidder for other clandestine hacks) > > > better ideas welcome! > > > best regards, /me agrees with this. how would the dear NSA respond to a target who ``borrowed'' the sploits, trolls them and advertises vulnerable to the borrowed sploits configuration, yet the borrowed sploits don't work? (the advertised configuration is not at all vulnerable to the borrowed sploits). From eugen at leitl.org Mon Jul 21 09:25:04 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 18:25:04 +0200 Subject: [Cryptography] miniLock seems pretty interesting Message-ID: <20140721162504.GX26986@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Eric Mill <eric at konklone.com> ----- From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 01:51:32 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 01:51:32 -0700 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws In-Reply-To: <20140722083014.GB26986@leitl.org> References: <20140722083014.GB26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1T61-9U9AsYn4wgvzpyKJoQnJ2176HdYfZW+QSju2wpCw@mail.gmail.com> thanks Eugen! ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> Date: Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM Subject: [tor-talk] Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org, Liberation Technologies <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu> https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140721/11362227955/carnegie-mellon-kills-black-hat-talk-about-identifying-tor-users.shtml Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws from the questionable-legality dept There's some buzz in security circles today after it came out that a session at the upcoming Black Hat Conference entitled "You Don't Have to be the NSA to Break Tor: Deanonymizing Users on a Budget" by Michael McCord and Alexander Volynkin (both of whom work for Carnegie-Mellon University and CERT) had been pulled from the conference at the request of CMU. A Black Hat spokeswoman told Reuters that the talk had been canceled at the request of lawyers for Carnegie-Mellon University, where the speakers work as researchers. A CMU spokesman had no immediate comment. There's been plenty of speculation about what's going on, but Chris Soghoian has a pretty good thesis that the researchers likely didn't have institutional approval or consent of the users they were identifying, meaning that they were potentially violating wiretapping statutes. As he notes, running a Tor server to try to spy on Tor traffic without talking to lawyers is a very bad idea. While it hasn't yet been confirmed that this is what happened, it certainly is a pretty sensible theory. Of course, none of that changes the fact that it's possible to identify some Tor users. But... that's also not particularly new. In fact, we've discussed in the past how the feds can identify Tor users. Tor adds an important layer of protection, but there are plenty of ways that you can still be identified while using Tor. Just ask Russ Ulbricht. The problem isn't so much Tor itself but how people use it -- and the simple fact is that most people use it in a way that will eventually reveal who they are. While it's not definite, it seems likely that this is what the talk would have revealed. Shutting it down wasn't any sort of big attempt to cover up this fact, but perhaps it was to protect the researchers and CMU (potentially) from a lawsuit for violating wiretapping laws. From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Tue Jul 22 02:42:41 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 11:42:41 +0200 Subject: Fwd: [tor-talk] Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1T61-9U9AsYn4wgvzpyKJoQnJ2176HdYfZW+QSju2wpCw@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140722083014.GB26986@leitl.org> <CAJVRA1T61-9U9AsYn4wgvzpyKJoQnJ2176HdYfZW+QSju2wpCw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <3142613.dUzchBGUPq@lapuntu> Dnia wtorek, 22 lipca 2014 01:51:32 coderman pisze: > thanks Eugen! > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> > Date: Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM > Subject: [tor-talk] Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About > Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws > To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org, Liberation Technologies > <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu> > > > > https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140721/11362227955/carnegie-mellon-kills > -black-hat-talk-about-identifying-tor-users.shtml > > Carnegie Mellon Kills Black Hat Talk About Identifying Tor Users -- Perhaps > Because It Broke Wiretapping Laws Damn. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140722/7bc925a7/attachment.sig> From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 12:48:35 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 12:48:35 -0700 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors In-Reply-To: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 5:21 AM, Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: > Alleged IOS backdoors > > http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf > > Identifying Back Doors, Attack > Points, and Surveillance > Mechanisms in iOS Devices note that Google is no better. back in 2011 i reported the abuse of Google Voice Search as easily accessible (no permissions required) and excellent for eavesdropping (always on should not be possible). the more things change, the more they stay the same ;) best regards, --- '... nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack' http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4923 """ Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These approaches get data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking permissions. This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch permission bypassing attacks from a zero permission Android application (VoicEmployer) through the speaker. The idea of GVS-Attack utilizes an Android system built-in voice assistant module -- Google Voice Search. Through Android Intent mechanism, VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice Search to the foreground, and then plays prepared audio files (like "call number 1234 5678") in the background. Google Voice Search can recognize this voice command and execute corresponding operations. With ingenious designs, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote control without any permission. Also we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google Search app, which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary numbers even when the phone is securely locked with password. A prototype of VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of GVS-Attack in real world. In theory, nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack. This study may inspire application developers and researchers rethink that zero permission doesn't mean safety and the speaker can be treated as a new attack surface. """ From eugen at leitl.org Tue Jul 22 04:45:36 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 13:45:36 +0200 Subject: HackRF will likely start shipping in August Message-ID: <20140722114536.GD26986@leitl.org> (the tinfoilhatterati will understand and rejoice) https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/ HackRF One is now available for pre-order from: HakShop (US) NooElec (US/CA) Hacker Warehouse (US) Ada's Technical Books (US) Wall of Sheep (US) Store4Geeks (SE) Passion Radio Shop (FR) Passion Radio Shop UK (UK) TAPR (US) iSource Asia (CN) WiMo (DE) Pre-ordered units will ship immediately after all rewards have shipped to Kickstarter backers, estimated July 2014. For the latest information on development and manufacturing, follow the Kickstarter updates. From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 22 05:21:37 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 15:21:37 +0300 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors Message-ID: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> Alleged IOS backdoors http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf Identifying Back Doors, Attack Points, and Surveillance Mechanisms in iOS Devices JONATHAN ZDZIARSKI From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 15:58:16 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 15:58:16 -0700 Subject: Fwd: a catalog of bugs, or "Why to disable assembly optimization" In-Reply-To: <CAM_a8JzDYmrp8z5ga3sD2dGnR_PNVhY1a72JpA=b6zUU0UbLvw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAM_a8JzDYmrp8z5ga3sD2dGnR_PNVhY1a72JpA=b6zUU0UbLvw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Q5K2vQoXZ6PuY8oYkee9mrA=Kr__W1yj1A2PhLfh7HgQ@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko at leastauthority.com> Date: Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:23 PM Subject: a catalog of bugs, or "Why to disable assembly optimization" Folks: We had already agreed to disable assembly optimizations in pycryptopp, because there seem to have been a lot of bugs in the optimized assembly code in the past, and because the added speed really makes no difference to our uses, as far as I know. However, in order to explain and justify to other people (e.g. Debian packagers) why we are doing this, and why they should consider doing the same thing themselves, I just read through the entire history of issues in pycryptopp and classified whether they were runtime errors (and therefore potential security bugs) or build-time errors (therefore probably not), and whether they would have been avoided if we had been disabling assembly optimizations all along. Here are the results. They clearly show that we should disable the optimized assembly! About half of all the security-threatening bugs we've had would never have been an issue if we'd avoided assembly from the beginning. By the way, in my opinion the author of Crypto++, Wei Dai, is an *exceptionally* skilled, careful, and experienced coder, and I would assume that if Crypto++ has had this many security-threatening bugs in its optimized assembly code, then other crypto libraries that also use optimized assembly code also have at least as many. Here's the ticket to track this issue: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/85 bugs that cause run-time failures ================================= (These bugs are potential security issues.) * would have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/24 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/31 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/45 (three *different* bugs in the assembly implementation) - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/67 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/84 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/86 * unclear if it would have been avoided if we'd used DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/65 * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/17 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/44 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/83 * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM (but would have been avoided by using cffi instead of CPython API) - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/19 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/70 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/80 * would have been avoided if we *didn't* use DISABLE_ASM! (A bug only in the non-ASM version!) - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/66 bugs that cause deterministic build or compilation failures =========================================================== (These bugs are *typically* not potential security issues but they can be, and in any case they are engineering/deployment issues.) * would have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/37 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/96 * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/22 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/23 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/32 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/39 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/62 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/77 - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/78 -- Regards, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep https://LeastAuthority.com Freedom matters. From cryptomars at cryptoparty.fr Tue Jul 22 08:13:33 2014 From: cryptomars at cryptoparty.fr (Cryptoparty Marseille) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 17:13:33 +0200 Subject: web based shared secret symmetric encryption application Message-ID: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> Hi! I'm looking for a decent free and open source application that would work similarly to "Hushmail Express message" (https://help.hushmail.com/entries/351388-I-have-received-an-encrypted-email-from-Hushmail-how-do-I-read-it-) that would allow me to deposit an encrypted message on an apache web server that would be decrypted by the recipient using a shared secret (that's already established, so I don't need a key exchange mechanism). I read Tony's posts and his blog article (http://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto) and I'm well aware that browser based encryption is not optimal but I'm just looking for something slightly more secure than plain text email that could be used by an end user not willing to install GPG, not an NSA proof secure system. The (apache2/debian7) web server is physically under my control, I'm the only root (I hope! :-) and SSL/TLS is enabled. Thanks for your advice. cryptomars -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 897 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140722/0b4d6136/attachment.sig> From cyberkiller8 at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 08:34:31 2014 From: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?IsWBdWthc3ogXCJDeWJlciBLaWxsZXJcIiBLb3JwYWxza2ki?=) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 17:34:31 +0200 Subject: web based shared secret symmetric encryption application In-Reply-To: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> References: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> Message-ID: <53CE8487.8050009@gmail.com> W dniu 22.07.2014 17:13, Cryptoparty Marseille pisze: > Hi! > > I'm looking for a decent free and open source application that would > work similarly to "Hushmail Express message" > (https://help.hushmail.com/entries/351388-I-have-received-an-encrypted-email-from-Hushmail-how-do-I-read-it-) > that would allow me to deposit an encrypted message on an apache web > server that would be decrypted by the recipient using a shared secret > (that's already established, so I don't need a key exchange mechanism). > > I read Tony's posts and his blog article > (http://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto) and I'm well aware > that browser based encryption is not optimal but I'm just looking for > something slightly more secure than plain text email that could be used > by an end user not willing to install GPG, not an NSA proof secure system. > > The (apache2/debian7) web server is physically under my control, I'm the > only root (I hope! :-) and SSL/TLS is enabled. > > Thanks for your advice. > Have you looked at ZeroBin and 0bin? They do more or less what you described. -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com xmpp: cyber_killer at jabster.pl site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140722/5a5b9b5b/attachment.sig> From rdohm321 at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 09:54:49 2014 From: rdohm321 at gmail.com (Randolph) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 18:54:49 +0200 Subject: web based shared secret symmetric encryption application In-Reply-To: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> References: <53CE7F9D.9000808@cryptoparty.fr> Message-ID: <CAEvNM8nd59+Kr9k0QNrXg0z+b50w2k1M=G3=EnYrgc6fhFMChA@mail.gmail.com> hi, you might want to have a look at the "Email Institution" Function of http://goldbug.sf.net this enables you to create within a p2p email system a virtual host, which is hosting your key and message. so the storage is not an encrypted apache, but a virtual institution email provider on the network. This is not browserbased, but clientbased. you can evaluate it within a cryptoparty at Marseille. In case this is not the fuction you want, you might want to look at the Rosetta CryptoPad, which is encrypting the message and then you can post it in any pastebin and your friend can grabb it there at any time and decrypt. so this can be done in a browser. Regards Randolph 2014-07-22 17:13 GMT+02:00 Cryptoparty Marseille <cryptomars at cryptoparty.fr>: > Hi! > > I'm looking for a decent free and open source application that would > work similarly to "Hushmail Express message" > (https://help.hushmail.com/entries/351388-I-have-received-an-encrypted-email-from-Hushmail-how-do-I-read-it-) > that would allow me to deposit an encrypted message on an apache web > server that would be decrypted by the recipient using a shared secret > (that's already established, so I don't need a key exchange mechanism). > > I read Tony's posts and his blog article > (http://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto) and I'm well aware > that browser based encryption is not optimal but I'm just looking for > something slightly more secure than plain text email that could be used > by an end user not willing to install GPG, not an NSA proof secure system. > > The (apache2/debian7) web server is physically under my control, I'm the > only root (I hope! :-) and SSL/TLS is enabled. > > Thanks for your advice. > > cryptomars > From juan.g71 at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 15:25:15 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 19:25:15 -0300 Subject: HackRF will likely start shipping in August In-Reply-To: <20140722114536.GD26986@leitl.org> References: <20140722114536.GD26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <53cee3a3.c9ad3a0a.63b7.18ae@mx.google.com> On Tue, 22 Jul 2014 13:45:36 +0200 Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > > (the tinfoilhatterati will understand and rejoice) > > https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/ Looks nice. Is it backdoored? > > HackRF One is now available for pre-order from: > > HakShop (US) > NooElec (US/CA) > Hacker Warehouse (US) > Ada's Technical Books (US) > Wall of Sheep (US) > Store4Geeks (SE) > Passion Radio Shop (FR) > Passion Radio Shop UK (UK) > TAPR (US) > iSource Asia (CN) > WiMo (DE) > > Pre-ordered units will ship immediately after all rewards have > shipped to Kickstarter backers, estimated July 2014. For the latest > information on development and manufacturing, follow the Kickstarter > updates. From unixninja92 at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 21:24:22 2014 From: unixninja92 at gmail.com (unixninja92) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 00:24:22 -0400 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? Message-ID: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more secure/trustworthy than skype to me. [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 722 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/3a58ed2c/attachment.txt> From fosforo at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 22:51:53 2014 From: fosforo at gmail.com (Fosforo) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 02:51:53 -0300 Subject: HackRF will likely start shipping in August In-Reply-To: <53cee3a3.c9ad3a0a.63b7.18ae@mx.google.com> References: <20140722114536.GD26986@leitl.org> <53cee3a3.c9ad3a0a.63b7.18ae@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAH8ZuZrxCCW6cJQ2RjS-6xMvPv2z1JXyB63oDEUssXF8PgVhKQ@mail.gmail.com> sources can be audited, about the chips, need an optical microscope and surgeon hands - I do not have both. -- []s Fosforo ------------------------------------------------------------- "Se eu tiver oito horas pra cortar uma arvore, passarei seis afiando meu machado." -Abraham Lincoln ------------------------------------------------------------- On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, 22 Jul 2014 13:45:36 +0200 > Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote: > > > > > (the tinfoilhatterati will understand and rejoice) > > > > https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/ > > Looks nice. Is it backdoored? > > > > > > > > > HackRF One is now available for pre-order from: > > > > HakShop (US) > > NooElec (US/CA) > > Hacker Warehouse (US) > > Ada's Technical Books (US) > > Wall of Sheep (US) > > Store4Geeks (SE) > > Passion Radio Shop (FR) > > Passion Radio Shop UK (UK) > > TAPR (US) > > iSource Asia (CN) > > WiMo (DE) > > > > Pre-ordered units will ship immediately after all rewards have > > shipped to Kickstarter backers, estimated July 2014. For the latest > > information on development and manufacturing, follow the Kickstarter > > updates. > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1876 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/5b881d8e/attachment.txt> From pzegar at gmail.com Tue Jul 22 22:25:08 2014 From: pzegar at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?Pawe=C5=82_Zegartowski?=) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 07:25:08 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAEcD9QdS6wTsBYBKeMw33fgQ-Hg--C1uPnNk768A_pv2RpmGkg@mail.gmail.com> Even if technicaly they're so anonymous and afe as they claim to be, they won't be an alternative for skype without accounts and "friend lists" etc. It is just to hard to use for "average user". Imagine when every time when you would like to chat or call someone via skype, instead of make a double click on his position on the list, you would have to let him know you want to speak, agree code and wait till he get to the website... its quite problematic. Zegar On 23 July 2014 06:24, unixninja92 <unixninja92 at gmail.com> wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use > P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. > Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they > don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more secure/trustworthy > than skype to me. > > [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ > -- Pozdrawiam, Paweł Zegartowski -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1710 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/0ab461b2/attachment.txt> From jya at pipeline.com Wed Jul 23 07:17:56 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 10:17:56 -0400 Subject: Tor developers vow to fix bug that can uncloak users In-Reply-To: <20140723122236.GG26986@leitl.org> References: <20140723122236.GG26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <E1X9xMl-0006tN-Os@elasmtp-galgo.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Terrible instance of official censorship by intimidation of an educational institution. Another nail in the coffin of TOR, just about nailed shut. Fortunately better alternatives are in the works, and more after those. High success and popularity assures a security system will be compromised and a stake must be driven into the hearts of promoters, repeatedly as with vampires. At 08:22 AM 7/23/2014, you wrote: >http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/tor-developers-vow-to-fix-bug-that-can-uncloak-users/ > > >Tor developers vow to fix bug that can uncloak users > >Weakness was topic of talk abruptly pulled from security conference. From bluelotus at openmailbox.org Wed Jul 23 08:10:18 2014 From: bluelotus at openmailbox.org (Bluelotus) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 11:10:18 -0400 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors In-Reply-To: <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <d0f9f999-7971-4166-8fc1-a4402f4f6137@email.android.com> Dpnt have to go back as far as 1990's. This month, I purchased a Palm Treo 705p, released in 2006. External antenna, superior voice quality and qwerty keyboard. WebOS doesnt capture MAC addresses of nearby wifi devices like iphones, ipads, android and Windows do. No FM radio to hack air gapped computers. For articles see my submit history on reddit.com under user nme BadBIOSvictim. Verizon does not activate older phones. PagePlusCellular.com does. My other phone is a Palm Pre2 for the above reasons. Released in 2011. On July 23, 2014 10:04:13 AM EDT, Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: >Are dumb phones sufficiently secure? >Say something monochrome from the 90's? >Heard rumors operators can update the >firmware on a lot of models, not sure >how true is this. > >On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:48:35PM -0700, coderman wrote: >> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 5:21 AM, Georgi Guninski ><guninski at guninski.com> wrote: >> > Alleged IOS backdoors >> > >> > >http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf >> > >> > Identifying Back Doors, Attack >> > Points, and Surveillance >> > Mechanisms in iOS Devices >> >> note that Google is no better. back in 2011 i reported the abuse of >> Google Voice Search as easily accessible (no permissions required) >and >> excellent for eavesdropping (always on should not be possible). >> >> the more things change, the more they stay the same ;) >> >> best regards, >> >> >> --- >> >> '... nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services >> Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack' >> >> >> http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4923 >> """ >> Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform >> focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device >> components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These approaches get >> data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking >> permissions. >> >> This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch >permission >> bypassing attacks from a zero permission Android application >> (VoicEmployer) through the speaker. The idea of GVS-Attack utilizes >an >> Android system built-in voice assistant module -- Google Voice >Search. >> Through Android Intent mechanism, VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice >> Search to the foreground, and then plays prepared audio files (like >> "call number 1234 5678") in the background. Google Voice Search can >> recognize this voice command and execute corresponding operations. >> With ingenious designs, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access >> privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote >> control without any permission. >> >> Also we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google Search >app, >> which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary numbers even >> when the phone is securely locked with password. A prototype of >> VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of >> GVS-Attack in real world. In theory, nearly all Android devices >> equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by >GVS-Attack. >> This study may inspire application developers and researchers rethink >> that zero permission doesn't mean safety and the speaker can be >> treated as a new attack surface. >> """ From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Wed Jul 23 03:48:38 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 11:48:38 +0100 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53CF9306.80505@cathalgarvey.me> "Closed source" is exactly the same as "something in the source code to hide from the user". Never, ever trust closed source code. On 23/07/14 05:24, unixninja92 wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use > P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. > Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they > don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more secure/trustworthy > than skype to me. > > [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/64a57109/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/64a57109/attachment.sig> From eugen at leitl.org Wed Jul 23 03:13:28 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 12:13:28 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140723101328.GF26986@leitl.org> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 12:24:22AM -0400, unixninja92 wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use > P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. > Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they > don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more secure/trustworthy > than skype to me. RetroShare has quite good P2P audio. It's not properly audited though, caveat emptor. > [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 09:46:40 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: Compromise of Soviet codes in WWII Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_DMR1ttzh_AcPeBVu8FodQiYZFztGL34uR0638nyYWoQ@mail.gmail.com> http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2014/07/compromise-of-soviet-codes-in-wwii.html Overview of Soviet cryptosystems The secretive Soviet state used various cryptosystems in order to secure its communications from outsiders. The task of preparing and evaluating cipher procedures was handled by two main Soviet organizations, the NKVD’s 5th Department and the Army’s 8th department of the main intelligence directorate GRU. In the 1920’s simple substitution systems were used and these were solved by ... From cypher at cpunk.us Wed Jul 23 11:29:15 2014 From: cypher at cpunk.us (Cypher) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 13:29:15 -0500 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype =?UTF-8?Q?alternative=3F?= In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <57537d265357422a84dc49c5bec794fe@cajuntechie.org> On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to > use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their > servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. > They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more > secure/trustworthy than skype to me. Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and runs on just about any platform (including Android). [1] www.jitsi.org Cypher From eugen at leitl.org Wed Jul 23 05:22:36 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 14:22:36 +0200 Subject: Tor developers vow to fix bug that can uncloak users Message-ID: <20140723122236.GG26986@leitl.org> http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/tor-developers-vow-to-fix-bug-that-can-uncloak-users/ Tor developers vow to fix bug that can uncloak users Weakness was topic of talk abruptly pulled from security conference. by Dan Goodin - July 22 2014, 8:15pm CEST Developers of the Tor privacy service say they're close to fixing a weakness that researchers for an abruptly canceled conference presentation said provides a low-cost way for adversaries to deanonymize hundreds of thousands of users. The talk previously scheduled for next month's Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas was titled "You Don't Have to be the NSA to Break Tor: Deanonymizing Users on a Budget." The abstract said that the hack cost less than $3,000 and could uncloak hundreds of thousands of users. On Monday, Black Hat organizers said the presentation was canceled at the request of attorneys from Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), where the researchers were employed, as well as the Software Engineering Institute (SEI). The attorneys said only that the materials to be presented "have not yet been approved by CMU/SEI for public release." Researchers Alexander Volynkin and Michael McCord have yet to explain why their talk was pulled. Tor officials responded by saying that they're working on an update for individual Tor relay nodes that will close the unspecified security hole. "Based on our current plans, we'll be putting out a fix that relays can apply that should close the particular bug they found," Tor project leader Roger Dingledine wrote in an e-mail to Tor users. "The bug is a nice bug, but it isn't the end of the world. And of course these things are never as simple as 'close that one bug and you're 100% safe.'" He said the fix was complicated because the researchers didn't provide all the technical details when privately informing Tor officials of the vulnerability. "We've been trying to find delicate ways to explain that we think we know what they did, but also it sure would have been smoother if they'd opted to tell us everything," he wrote. "The main reason for trying to be delicate is that I don't want to discourage future researchers from telling us about neat things that they find. I'm currently waiting for them to answer their mail so I can proceed." In a previous e-mail, Dingledine said Tor developers "informally" received some materials related to the vulnerability. He went on to say Tor officials played no role in the cancellation of the Black Hat talk. "We did not ask Black Hat or CERT to cancel the talk. We did (and still do) have questions for the presenter and for CERT about some aspects of the research, but we had no idea the talk would be pulled before the announcement was made," he wrote. CMU is affiliated with CERT, which coordinates security disclosures between researchers and affected parties. A CMU spokesman contacted Monday didn't elaborate on the reasons for pulling the talk. From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 23 07:44:00 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 16:44 +0200 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors In-Reply-To: <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <12557311.IadWnVgEYq@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 17:04:13 Georgi Guninski pisze: > Are dumb phones sufficiently secure? > Say something monochrome from the 90's? > Heard rumors operators can update the > firmware on a lot of models, not sure > how true is this. There's always the question of baseband, for example, but regardless of it and many other things, the attack surface is much, much, much smaller. You *won't* be keeping your e-mails, full contacts info, etc., on the phone, simply because it is unable to cater for such a use. Hence, you will be this much safer, at the very least. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/a3cfeb31/attachment.sig> From guninski at guninski.com Wed Jul 23 07:04:13 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 17:04:13 +0300 Subject: Alleged IOS backdoors In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140722122137.GA2402@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAJVRA1TviwUWtinfph_=AJocjw9tr4RgC+rUhoHRjP=NCNsqUg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140723140413.GA2508@sivokote.iziade.m$> Are dumb phones sufficiently secure? Say something monochrome from the 90's? Heard rumors operators can update the firmware on a lot of models, not sure how true is this. On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:48:35PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 5:21 AM, Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: > > Alleged IOS backdoors > > > > http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf > > > > Identifying Back Doors, Attack > > Points, and Surveillance > > Mechanisms in iOS Devices > > note that Google is no better. back in 2011 i reported the abuse of > Google Voice Search as easily accessible (no permissions required) and > excellent for eavesdropping (always on should not be possible). > > the more things change, the more they stay the same ;) > > best regards, > > > --- > > '... nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services > Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack' > > > http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4923 > """ > Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform > focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device > components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These approaches get > data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking > permissions. > > This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch permission > bypassing attacks from a zero permission Android application > (VoicEmployer) through the speaker. The idea of GVS-Attack utilizes an > Android system built-in voice assistant module -- Google Voice Search. > Through Android Intent mechanism, VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice > Search to the foreground, and then plays prepared audio files (like > "call number 1234 5678") in the background. Google Voice Search can > recognize this voice command and execute corresponding operations. > With ingenious designs, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access > privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote > control without any permission. > > Also we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google Search app, > which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary numbers even > when the phone is securely locked with password. A prototype of > VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of > GVS-Attack in real world. In theory, nearly all Android devices > equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack. > This study may inspire application developers and researchers rethink > that zero permission doesn't mean safety and the speaker can be > treated as a new attack surface. > """ From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 14:24:22 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 17:24:22 -0400 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:29 PM, Cypher <cypher at cpunk.us> wrote: > On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: >> >> Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to >> cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being >> audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to >> use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their >> servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. >> They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. >> >> So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might >> actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more >> secure/trustworthy than skype to me. > > > Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] > available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and runs on > just about any platform (including Android). > > [1] www.jitsi.org > Eugen says... > RetroShare has quite good P2P audio. It's not properly audited though, > caveat emptor. Ditto. Though it will take some time not just for the open source community to pick which projects to audit under limited resources, but to even develop a real auditing framework within itself to do that under. It's a huge undertaking and responsibility in its own right. Further, what's with crap like gruveo.com, goldbug.sf.net [1], protonmail.ch, and so many more (especially the 'Look, we just solved Email encryption' crowd)? And of the partly open hw/sw stack vendor types like BlackPhone? What are we, some free debunkment service for shills, charlatans, closed source, browser/app/phone loaded crypto/exec environments provided by the service provider instead of reasonably disinterested third parties, keys disclosed, Web3.0, looks like a phone, junk? Sure, ok, it's good that we are, but the dearth of CrapWare and ProCrap analysts and marketers popping up out there lately is ridiculous. And I'm not laying down a universal CrapWare blanket, some of the stuff we see is pretty good, but simply fails to clearly, publicly, and obviously state to its users what risks their model does not cover. That's lack of care, obliviousness, lying, or profiteering... so it lands itself back in Crap territory. To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. Though the makeup of their lists is perhaps not yet complete/ideal, you'd be better off picking anything from prism-break.org, yes say Jitsi, than this type of Crapware. We should make prism-locked.org just to list all the junk out there. It's good to have more crypto used in the world, but let's at least try to make and promote strong and open solutions. [1] I and others have been displeased with their, shall we say, 'community involvement'. As with the attempts at parallel compilation and auditing of Truecrypt, has anyone attempted that with their code? Tried to contact them? Seen any presentations? Know who they are? Open development? Etc? People say OpenPGP and crypto is hard for user adoption, no gui's for grandma, etc. So when potentially interesting gui tools appear, it's a shame many of them choose to draw these questions and thus seriously limit and tarnish their forward prospectus. At least Gruveo appears to have already answered those questions. From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 14:42:02 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 17:42:02 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <53CCAF4D.9040602@gmail.com> References: <53CADD1C.4090906@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2983FzywxXRJ52Kv=_0z=248muZxVCpaaC4p8MxCVLhhA@mail.gmail.com> <53CCAF4D.9040602@gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti298LiGhhLX1O09-qNHiZUbTZjGXirMU=DZxm5nXQC_RVQ@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 2:12 AM, Martin Rublik <martin.rublik at gmail.com> wrote: > On 20. 7. 2014 7:45, grarpamp wrote: > ... >> The mozilla bundle includes about 150. It would be nice if the >> new cert observatoris publish a count of how many end certs >> they see each root cert covers... a topN list of sorts. Then you >> could save some time by including the N of your choice into your >> 'empty by default' list. I think the distribution would be severly >> skewed to maybe top 10 or 15 covers most any place. >> > > Here is one visualization http://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/trust-tree/ and the > discussion as well > https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/observatory/2012-December/000669.html Neat. I should have worded better as to be visualizing the tree from the roots to the AlexaTop500, plus selected other sets such as all universities, all global $Gigacorps, etc. http://www.alexa.com/topsites From s at ctrlc.hu Wed Jul 23 08:45:34 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 17:45:34 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140723154534.GG6799@ctrlc.hu> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 12:24:22AM -0400, unixninja92 wrote: > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to use > P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their servers. > Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. They claim they > don't keep any logs that could identify users. this paragraph rings so many alarmbells that writing this should have already answered your question, no? -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From gizmoguy1 at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 10:16:51 2014 From: gizmoguy1 at gmail.com (John Preston) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:16:51 +0100 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? Message-ID: <1406135811.2025.2.camel@gmail.com> You can find the results of my inquiry below. ¬_¬ -------- Forwarded Message -------- > From: Art Matsak <art at gruveo.com> > To: John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> > Subject: Re: Security specifics > Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:34:28 +0200 > > Hi John, > > Thank you for your interest in Gruveo. Gruveo uses WebRTC, an open technology for browser realtime communication. You can find details on its security architecture here: > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-10 > > Please note that WebRTC is work in progress and its specifications may change in the future. > > To answer your other questions, Gruveo is a proprietary product. > > Best regards, > > Art Matsak > Founder and CEO > Gruveo > https://www.gruveo.com > > > On 23 Jul 2014, at 18:19, John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> wrote: > > > From: John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> > > Subject: Security specifics > > > > Message Body: > > Hey all, > > > > Like the idea, but I'd like to know about the specifics of how Gruveo is designed. Specifically: > > * what is the threat model? > > * what are the network protocol specifications? Packet formats, ciphers and modes, and semantics all critically determine the security of the system. > > * who owns the IP, and how is it licensed? > > * what's the development model like? > > > > Thanks for your time, :) > > John > > > > -- > > This mail is sent via contact form on Gruveo https://www.gruveo.com > > From bmanning at isi.edu Wed Jul 23 18:21:21 2014 From: bmanning at isi.edu (manning bill) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:21:21 -0700 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <E6855C3A-818E-42C1-AEC6-966DF6E33DAD@isi.edu> it is being delivered. will let folks know /bill PO Box 12317 Marina del Rey, CA 90295 310.322.8102 On 23July2014Wednesday, at 18:11, Ulex Europae <europus at gmail.com> wrote: > At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: > >> < http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-73511096050.html> > > > It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? > > Ulex > From alfiej at fastmail.fm Wed Jul 23 15:31:23 2014 From: alfiej at fastmail.fm (Alfie John) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:31:23 -0400 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <1406154683.2425.144992333.68B01022@webmail.messagingengine.com> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014, at 05:59 PM, stef wrote: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to > detect > snakeoil: > > not free software > runs in a browser > runs on a smartphone > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption > keys > there is no threat model > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > neglects general sad state of host security I like the idea of this. Are there any check lists out there that can be used to qualify if software is safe? Flipping what Stef wrote, so far we have: - Must be open source - Must be run on the client's machine - Must use non-shared, private key Alfie -- Alfie John alfiej at fastmail.fm From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Wed Jul 23 10:58:16 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:58:16 +0100 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <1406135811.2025.2.camel@gmail.com> References: <1406135811.2025.2.camel@gmail.com> Message-ID: <17b33633-4de0-4e17-94b7-9c819b8d564f@email.android.com> So, snakeoil of the highest order, then. On 23 July 2014 18:16:51 GMT+01:00, John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> wrote: >You can find the results of my inquiry below. ¬_¬ > >-------- Forwarded Message -------- >> From: Art Matsak <art at gruveo.com> >> To: John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> >> Subject: Re: Security specifics >> Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 18:34:28 +0200 >> >> Hi John, >> >> Thank you for your interest in Gruveo. Gruveo uses WebRTC, an open >technology for browser realtime communication. You can find details on >its security architecture here: >> >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-10 >> >> Please note that WebRTC is work in progress and its specifications >may change in the future. >> >> To answer your other questions, Gruveo is a proprietary product. >> >> Best regards, >> >> Art Matsak >> Founder and CEO >> Gruveo >> https://www.gruveo.com >> >> >> On 23 Jul 2014, at 18:19, John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> wrote: >> >> > From: John Preston <gizmoguy1 at gmail.com> >> > Subject: Security specifics >> > >> > Message Body: >> > Hey all, >> > >> > Like the idea, but I'd like to know about the specifics of how >Gruveo is designed. Specifically: >> > * what is the threat model? >> > * what are the network protocol specifications? Packet formats, >ciphers and modes, and semantics all critically determine the security >of the system. >> > * who owns the IP, and how is it licensed? >> > * what's the development model like? >> > >> > Thanks for your time, :) >> > John >> > >> > -- >> > This mail is sent via contact form on Gruveo https://www.gruveo.com >> > -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2509 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/d1b68be7/attachment.txt> From alfiej at fastmail.fm Wed Jul 23 16:30:43 2014 From: alfiej at fastmail.fm (Alfie John) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 19:30:43 -0400 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> Message-ID: <1406158243.15417.145007837.0FE9636C@webmail.messagingengine.com> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014, at 06:34 PM, rysiek wrote: > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 23:59:25 stef pisze: > > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > > > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > > > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > > > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > > > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > > > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > > snakeoil: > > > > not free software > > runs in a browser > > runs on a smartphone > > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption > > keys there is no threat model > > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > > neglects general sad state of host security > > So very true. Can we have it named as "stef's six rules of snakeoilness" > and > spread around? I'm serious, this is important. I've always been a fan of the Spam Solution checklist: https://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt Maybe Stef's six rules can be expanded into something like this. Alfie -- Alfie John alfiej at fastmail.fm From europus at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 18:11:14 2014 From: europus at gmail.com (Ulex Europae) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 21:11:14 -0400 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com > References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: ><<http:///>http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-73511096050.html> It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? Ulex -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 354 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/e4b5b8e9/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 23 12:40:59 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 21:40:59 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <57537d265357422a84dc49c5bec794fe@cajuntechie.org> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> <57537d265357422a84dc49c5bec794fe@cajuntechie.org> Message-ID: <14351021.WWkIAbKN6v@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 13:29:15 Cypher pisze: > On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: > > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > > cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > > audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to > > use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their > > servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. > > They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. > > > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more > > secure/trustworthy than skype to me. > > Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] > available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and > runs on just about any platform (including Android). Plus, simply does not work, at least when I try it from time to time. :/ -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/f44c86d9/attachment.sig> From jya at pipeline.com Wed Jul 23 19:01:06 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 22:01:06 -0400 Subject: Increased and Diverse Disclosure Initiatives Needed Message-ID: <E1XA8J1-0001Vo-NV@elasmtp-dupuy.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Cryptome has canceled the Kickstarter. Following the purpose of the kickstarter it urges support for increased and diverse disclosure initiatives. A few suggestions: 1. Many more and diverse disclosure initiatives are needed to broaden public participation, to diversify content and to increase unpaid access. 2. They should be novel and unexpected. 3. They should evolve and avoid being static, preferrably brand-free. 4. These may be online, offline or neither, inventive and variable. 5. They may be short- or long-lived or episodic and erratic. 6. Might be hit and run, for a single disclosure or unpredictable series. 7. Provided by individuals, groups or variable. 8. Funded by individuals, groups or variable. 9. Anonymous, nonymous, pseudononymous or variable. 10. Legal, extra-legal, quasi-legal, pushing against legal or variable. 11. Low-key, low-profile, low-recognition, the opposite or variable. 12. Reputable, disreputable or variable. 13. Risky, dangerous, outrageous, the opposite or variable. 14. Citizens' duty should be to disclose, resist secrecy, official secrecy most so. From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Wed Jul 23 15:40:39 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 23:40:39 +0100 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <53D039E7.9070704@cathalgarvey.me> > neglects general sad state of host security You mean user host (client endpoint security, for most people nonexistent) or server host? Because at least with the latter, a clever design or threat-model can make server-client pretty secure by simply making the server zero-knowledge. I used to be a total P2P hippie, and P2P is still my preference aesthetically and for reasons of simple resilience, but I no longer regard server-client as an automatic fail, provided the server is zero-knowledge. So, encrypted XMPP/Jingle (Jitsi) is good, whereas lol-not-really-encrypted-server-sees-all Mumble is not. On 23/07/14 22:59, stef wrote: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: >> To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. >> 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very >> interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, >> but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those >> parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > snakeoil: > > not free software > runs in a browser > runs on a smartphone > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys > there is no threat model > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > neglects general sad state of host security > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/c2770c2c/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140723/c2770c2c/attachment.sig> From s at ctrlc.hu Wed Jul 23 14:59:25 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 23:59:25 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect snakeoil: not free software runs in a browser runs on a smartphone the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys there is no threat model uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" neglects general sad state of host security -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 23 15:09:59 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 00:09:59 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <8473412.hccbPQBTms@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 17:24:22 grarpamp pisze: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:29 PM, Cypher <cypher at cpunk.us> wrote: > > On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: > >> Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to > >> cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being > >> audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to > >> use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their > >> servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. > >> They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. > >> > >> So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > >> actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more > >> secure/trustworthy than skype to me. > > > > Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] > > available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and runs > > on just about any platform (including Android). > > > > [1] www.jitsi.org > > > > Eugen says... > > RetroShare has quite good P2P audio. It's not properly audited though, > > caveat emptor. > > Ditto. Though it will take some time not just for the open source > community to pick which projects to audit under limited resources, > but to even develop a real auditing framework within itself to do that > under. It's a huge undertaking and responsibility in its own right. > > Further, what's with crap like gruveo.com, goldbug.sf.net [1], > protonmail.ch, and so many more (especially the 'Look, we just solved Email > encryption' crowd)? And of the partly open hw/sw stack vendor types like > BlackPhone? Here, have a chuckle: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/icloak/icloak-tm-stik-easy-powerful-online-privacy-for-yo Hat-tip to all the TAILS/Tor people here. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/501adf4d/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Wed Jul 23 15:34:24 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 00:34:24 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 23:59:25 stef pisze: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > snakeoil: > > not free software > runs in a browser > runs on a smartphone > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption > keys there is no threat model > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > neglects general sad state of host security So very true. Can we have it named as "stef's six rules of snakeoilness" and spread around? I'm serious, this is important. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/663581ac/attachment.sig> From s at ctrlc.hu Wed Jul 23 16:02:03 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 01:02:03 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D039E7.9070704@cathalgarvey.me> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D039E7.9070704@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <20140723230203.GM6799@ctrlc.hu> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 11:40:39PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > > neglects general sad state of host security > > You mean user host (client endpoint security, for most people > nonexistent) + -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From s at ctrlc.hu Wed Jul 23 16:08:31 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 01:08:31 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <4902103.t8ZQegeb4h@lapuntu> Message-ID: <20140723230831.GN6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 12:34:24AM +0200, rysiek wrote: > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 23:59:25 stef pisze: > > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > > > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > > > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > > > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > > > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > > > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. > > > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > > snakeoil: > > > > not free software > > runs in a browser > > runs on a smartphone > > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption > > keys there is no threat model > > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > > neglects general sad state of host security > > So very true. Can we have it named as "stef's six rules of snakeoilness" and > spread around? I'm serious, this is important. "7 rules of thumb against snakeoil" is good enough. pls note it's really 7 rules. ;) -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 23:42:53 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 02:42:53 -0400 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <E6855C3A-818E-42C1-AEC6-966DF6E33DAD@isi.edu> References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> <E6855C3A-818E-42C1-AEC6-966DF6E33DAD@isi.edu> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-P8LU9eyr10v5fAL4siaLkwTY33WN7-qPiwFVFeVG_NA@mail.gmail.com> > On 23July2014Wednesday, at 18:11, Ulex Europae <europus at gmail.com> wrote: >>> < http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-73511096050.html> >> It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 9:21 PM, manning bill <bmanning at isi.edu> wrote: > it is being delivered. will let folks know http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/06/exclusive-a-review-of-the-blackphone-the-android-for-the-paranoid/ https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/06/blackphone.html https://www.blackphone.ch/ https://blog.silentcircle.com/category/blackphone/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackphone Though it's more consumer oriented and the price is lower, blackphone isn't the first to market a crypto phone to the public, these guys have been around for many years... lately doing a GSM+Android combo as well... http://www.cryptophone.de/ And a couple companies claim to be building 'open' hardware phones, I'd call them 'more/mostly' open. I forget their links at the moment :( I see these cute silent* demo screens of one or two word 'verification strings' with this and tech like ZRTP, that's not even close to OPIE strength. I'd rather be able to see and read a full real hash, key import/export, etc. Maybe the option is there, I don't know yet. No doubt because these sorts of companies bury all their real tech docs deep behind glitzy Web3.0 splash, (points finger at blackphone.ch, ahem!) https://source.android.com/ https://guardianproject.info/ https://github.com/SilentCircle https://github.com/WhisperSystems https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/guardian-dev/2014-January/003055.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/search?q=silentcircle I don't much care what they've done with opensource Android and things riding on top of it, since anyone like Guardian can do that as a project. Blackphone does have some Cell, Server, VoIP, etc stacks deployed to complement the phone, that's handy and takes $capital. But what I really want to know is: - What phone make and model is it based on? - About how, if at all, they've managed to open (or claim to certify, reverse engineer, substitute open replacements, or somehow control) the closed Android blobs and/or the closed phone firmware/hardware below that??? That's would be the real progress, and worth buying as an integrated system (I'd definitely buy that progress), but only if it was open in turn. Does Blackphone accept BTC? I was begging for BTC the other day... :) Thanks Bill, we'll need more than a few quality reviews of the security model of the system as a whole. If this phone and company does well, maybe it will use its power to leverage that progress as time goes on, but it only matters if it's open. And for where you need Cell based voice/data connectivity, I'd like to see them offer a GSM hotspot wifi tether so you don't have to trust the cell baseband (now unused, or even physically neutered) on your device (phone/pad/tablet) as much. From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 23:52:10 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 02:52:10 -0400 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-P8LU9eyr10v5fAL4siaLkwTY33WN7-qPiwFVFeVG_NA@mail.gmail.com> References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> <E6855C3A-818E-42C1-AEC6-966DF6E33DAD@isi.edu> <CAD2Ti2-P8LU9eyr10v5fAL4siaLkwTY33WN7-qPiwFVFeVG_NA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28_mP3ViiCap8ZvAh_=4s1Qv=FAvdBi4NESgCsnqeRPrw@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 2:42 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > really want to know is: > - What phone make and model is it based on? - What hardware changes did they make to it, whether OEM to order, or locally? > - About how, if at all, they've managed to open (or claim to > certify, reverse engineer, substitute open replacements, or somehow control) > the closed Android blobs and/or the closed phone firmware/hardware below > that??? From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 00:10:52 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 03:10:52 -0400 Subject: OT: List Archives Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_Wxj_f5YM2qk1EFMK4spO5ouqU0t7W+OYcYLeamWebmA@mail.gmail.com> Can mailman be configured to include the 'To:' and 'Cc:' addresses in the archive gz's? It would add some needed context when locally combining/splitting multiple lists for MUA use. And is there a way retrieve monthly attachment gz's without needing to fetch per attachment? Also, how is the 'since inception' archive project coming? From juan.g71 at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 23:22:05 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 03:22:05 -0300 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <53CF9306.80505@cathalgarvey.me> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> <53CF9306.80505@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <53d0a4de.538f3a0a.1b42.ffffcec0@mx.google.com> On Wed, 23 Jul 2014 11:48:38 +0100 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> wrote: > "Closed source" is exactly the same as "something in the source code > to hide from the user". Never, ever trust closed source code. I see that kind of aassertions endlessly repeated. They seem rather baseless. "Closed source" means that if you want to audit something, you need to use a disassembler. > > On 23/07/14 05:24, unixninja92 wrote: > > Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar > > to cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of > > being audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It > > tries to use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go > > through their servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio > > and video chat. They claim they don't keep any logs that could > > identify users. > > > > So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might > > actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more > > secure/trustworthy than skype to me. > > > > [1] https://www.gruveo.com/ > > > From cyberkiller8 at gmail.com Wed Jul 23 21:47:29 2014 From: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?IsWBdWthc3ogXCJDeWJlciBLaWxsZXJcIiBLb3JwYWxza2ki?=) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 06:47:29 +0200 Subject: Gruveo, more secure skype alternative? In-Reply-To: <14351021.WWkIAbKN6v@lapuntu> References: <CAMUDxHK6dUXYcemS1bjT4bOMfLBpArSy7Ee4Cd-5Fdku1+Xchg@mail.gmail.com> <57537d265357422a84dc49c5bec794fe@cajuntechie.org> <14351021.WWkIAbKN6v@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53D08FE1.1060205@gmail.com> W dniu 23.07.2014 21:40, rysiek pisze: > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 13:29:15 Cypher pisze: >> On 2014-07-22 23:24, unixninja92 wrote: >>> Recently found Gruveo[1]. Allows easy video and audio calls similar to >>> cryptocat. Unfortunately not open source and makes no mention of being >>> audited. Otherwise looks very interesting and promising. It tries to >>> use P2P to make calls, and if it fails, then it will go through their >>> servers. Uses WebRTC for end to end encrypted audio and video chat. >>> They claim they don't keep any logs that could identify users. >>> >>> So the question is, is this an NSA honey pot or something that might >>> actually be trustworthy? It seems at least a bit more >>> secure/trustworthy than skype to me. >> >> Why even consider closed alternatives when you have things like Jitsi[1] >> available? It's open source, does secure voice, video, and text, and >> runs on just about any platform (including Android). > > Plus, simply does not work, at least when I try it from time to time. :/ > On top of that it's not much configurable, the gui is slow/notresponsive and the widget style is ugly and doesn't itegrate with the rest of my KDE desktop. Jitsi might be good software one day, but it's stil has quite a long way to go. -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: cyberkiller8 at gmail.com xmpp: cyber_killer at jabster.pl site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/6725477d/attachment.sig> From stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch Wed Jul 23 23:39:35 2014 From: stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch (Stephan Neuhaus) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 08:39:35 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> On 2014-07-23, 23:59, stef wrote: > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > snakeoil: > > not free software > runs in a browser > runs on a smartphone > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys > there is no threat model > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > neglects general sad state of host security > In order to qualify as snake oil according to this definition, do all of these have to be true, or is any criterion sufficient? Because if it's "any", then this https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ is snakeoil, which I think is unfair. (Note that I'm not saying that this is a secure app; I haven't looked at the code. But you can't fault the authors on threat modelling etc. Its only "fault" is that it runs on a smart phone.) Fun, Stephan -- From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 24 00:42:40 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 09:42:40 +0200 Subject: OT: List Archives In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_Wxj_f5YM2qk1EFMK4spO5ouqU0t7W+OYcYLeamWebmA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2_Wxj_f5YM2qk1EFMK4spO5ouqU0t7W+OYcYLeamWebmA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <3134430.KXOYjCfmXq@lapuntu> Dnia czwartek, 24 lipca 2014 03:10:52 grarpamp pisze: > (...) > Also, how is the 'since inception' archive project coming? I guess they need to go deeper. /somebody had to make that pun/ -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/f808948a/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 24 01:46:35 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 09:46:35 +0100 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <05a284bf-5ebf-4c07-9086-a3c9fbeabe17@email.android.com> That is a problem with most desktop or laptop computers, too. I don't think "runs on a smartphone" is practically different from "neglects client endpoint security". A properly built and programmed smartphone is indistinguishable from a regular computer. On 24 July 2014 09:29:11 GMT+01:00, stef <s at ctrlc.hu> wrote: >On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 08:39:35AM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: >> On 2014-07-23, 23:59, stef wrote: >> > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb >to detect >> > snakeoil: >> > >> > not free software >> > runs in a browser >> > runs on a smartphone >> > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private >encryption keys >> > there is no threat model >> > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" >> > neglects general sad state of host security >> > >> >> In order to qualify as snake oil according to this definition, do all >of >> these have to be true, or is any criterion sufficient? > >any is enough, but combo-bonuses are combo-bonuses. > >> Because if it's "any", then this >https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ is >> snakeoil, which I think is unfair. (Note that I'm not saying that >this is a >> secure app; I haven't looked at the code. But you can't fault the >authors on >> threat modelling etc. Its only "fault" is that it runs on a smart >phone.) > >well, you have a baseband stack behind it, and a vendor/provider >delivering >stuff without your consent, etc... > >-- >otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2336 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/aeada7d2/attachment.txt> From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 01:29:11 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:29:11 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Message-ID: <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 08:39:35AM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > On 2014-07-23, 23:59, stef wrote: > > exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect > > snakeoil: > > > > not free software > > runs in a browser > > runs on a smartphone > > the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys > > there is no threat model > > uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" > > neglects general sad state of host security > > > > In order to qualify as snake oil according to this definition, do all of > these have to be true, or is any criterion sufficient? any is enough, but combo-bonuses are combo-bonuses. > Because if it's "any", then this https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ is > snakeoil, which I think is unfair. (Note that I'm not saying that this is a > secure app; I haven't looked at the code. But you can't fault the authors on > threat modelling etc. Its only "fault" is that it runs on a smart phone.) well, you have a baseband stack behind it, and a vendor/provider delivering stuff without your consent, etc... -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From jya at pipeline.com Thu Jul 24 07:38:34 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:38:34 -0400 Subject: Tails vulnerability specific to I2P, not Tor In-Reply-To: <20140724140424.GK26986@leitl.org> References: <20140724140424.GK26986@leitl.org> Message-ID: <E1XAK7f-0007Wq-Tm@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Ah, the standard CYA natsec and comsec marketing spiel used by nations, spies and contractors, upgades essential, 24x7x365 monitoring recommended but SHINT happens: At 10:04 AM 7/24/2014, you wrote: >We publicized the fact that we've discovered these issues for a very >simple reason: no user should put full trust into any particular >security solution. By bringing to light the fact that we have found >verifiable flaws in such a widely trusted piece of code, we hope to >remind the Tails userbase that no software is infallible. From tbiehn at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 07:47:45 2014 From: tbiehn at gmail.com (Travis Biehn) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:47:45 -0400 Subject: a catalog of bugs, or "Why to disable assembly optimization" In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Q5K2vQoXZ6PuY8oYkee9mrA=Kr__W1yj1A2PhLfh7HgQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAM_a8JzDYmrp8z5ga3sD2dGnR_PNVhY1a72JpA=b6zUU0UbLvw@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1Q5K2vQoXZ6PuY8oYkee9mrA=Kr__W1yj1A2PhLfh7HgQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAKtE3zdfA5XHpx-+_KgNZ7BK6N+M5MmYRmUd+Bgb788w4dk3xA@mail.gmail.com> So good. So very good. http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/stack:sosp13.pdf Or - a different reason to compile everything yourself. SlowOS plz. -Travis On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 6:58 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko at leastauthority.com> > Date: Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:23 PM > Subject: a catalog of bugs, or "Why to disable assembly optimization" > > > Folks: > > We had already agreed to disable assembly optimizations in pycryptopp, > because there seem to have been a lot of bugs in the optimized > assembly code in the past, and because the added speed really makes no > difference to our uses, as far as I know. > > However, in order to explain and justify to other people (e.g. Debian > packagers) why we are doing this, and why they should consider doing > the same thing themselves, I just read through the entire history of > issues in pycryptopp and classified whether they were runtime errors > (and therefore potential security bugs) or build-time errors > (therefore probably not), and whether they would have been avoided if > we had been disabling assembly optimizations all along. Here are the > results. They clearly show that we should disable the optimized > assembly! About half of all the security-threatening bugs we've had > would never have been an issue if we'd avoided assembly from the > beginning. > > By the way, in my opinion the author of Crypto++, Wei Dai, is an > *exceptionally* skilled, careful, and experienced coder, and I would > assume that if Crypto++ has had this many security-threatening bugs in > its optimized assembly code, then other crypto libraries that also use > optimized assembly code also have at least as many. > > Here's the ticket to track this issue: > > https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/85 > > bugs that cause run-time failures > ================================= > > (These bugs are potential security issues.) > > * would have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/24 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/31 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/45 (three > *different* bugs in the assembly implementation) > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/67 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/84 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/86 > > * unclear if it would have been avoided if we'd used DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/65 > > * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/17 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/44 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/83 > > * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM (but would have been > avoided by using cffi instead of CPython API) > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/19 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/70 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/80 > > * would have been avoided if we *didn't* use DISABLE_ASM! (A bug only > in the non-ASM version!) > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/66 > > > bugs that cause deterministic build or compilation failures > =========================================================== > > (These bugs are *typically* not potential security issues but they can > be, and in any case they are engineering/deployment issues.) > > * would have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/37 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/96 > > * would not have been avoided by DISABLE_ASM: > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/22 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/23 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/32 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/39 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/62 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/77 > - https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/pycryptopp/ticket/78 > > > -- > Regards, > > Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn > > Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep > https://LeastAuthority.com > Freedom matters. > -- Twitter <https://twitter.com/tbiehn> | LinkedIn <http://www.linkedin.com/in/travisbiehn> | GitHub <http://github.com/tbiehn> | TravisBiehn.com <http://www.travisbiehn.com> | Google Plus <https://plus.google.com/+TravisBiehn> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 7351 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/2a0191e7/attachment.txt> From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 01:52:09 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:52:09 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <05a284bf-5ebf-4c07-9086-a3c9fbeabe17@email.android.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> <05a284bf-5ebf-4c07-9086-a3c9fbeabe17@email.android.com> Message-ID: <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 09:46:35AM +0100, Cathal (Phone) wrote: > That is a problem with most desktop or laptop computers, too. I don't think "runs on a smartphone" is practically different from "neglects client endpoint security". A properly built and programmed smartphone is indistinguishable from a regular computer. indeed the hostsec rule is a generalization of the "browser/smartphone" rules, however this is meant for avg people, so i spelled it out explicitly, otherwise it gets misunderstood. -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From zen at freedbms.net Wed Jul 23 19:03:36 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 12:03:36 +1000 Subject: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof" In-Reply-To: <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> References: <1389950750.79148.YahooMailNeo@web141202.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> <53d05d2b.479b420a.43fb.ffff99fa@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSQWdD-uk-_DV=4ToLYN5W202curSt8mSkjHrBczTgnFqg@mail.gmail.com> On 7/24/14, Ulex Europae <europus at gmail.com> wrote: > At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: >><<http:///>http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-73511096050.html> NSA-proof? Is that even possible unless you: 1) personally pick up your phone off the factory floor production line at random? and 2) Reproducibly build all software on the device and upload your build? and 3) the hardware completely isolates the baseband processor and its os (unless there's a deployable FLOSS baseband stack I'm not aware of)? and that's just for starters. From dal at riseup.net Thu Jul 24 10:59:07 2014 From: dal at riseup.net (Douglas Lucas) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 12:59:07 -0500 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked Message-ID: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi cypherpunks, I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which discussed crowdsourcing research into private surveillance contractors like Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears some of those (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's also what happened to my phone. All of this is written up in my HOPEx report, which y'all might find interesting: http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ Thanks, Douglas -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0UlqAAoJEC+clbKIC3FxAY8P/266ajSxOjPAoFd5Jve5Bd1J HqSBzjO0DLU9kDXIw0s1qxxpj5owwHMdG6K7gzcpmIqc+WU80TOUC96EYCC+fyoT kU3DHvU1RC8VVR+6WS+y5Hn4sxkudiqumFaT8iaY5gePLQUaAvlTxy65FoydHH4I sB7+1wJVamIlygw3qgUMX01N02hs6FTj6gFkd5ZpRlGTrM/1cVsIPr8dq9ySzCAZ MehsJG8rX1lAVSqu+dN6qdkhmXO2EmSAPxcWT+vxnnAOi+t1wWth5jizrwv7sNnv JyB0ItuwPH/JGl3KxWbic666HkUIZkYVTmbwm8fd+ZMZ8zgfEmrHLitnwtlJEe6K l79VDwE9HuyRs8dwBKX2S1AhwccOLmbtgviLWynheJ9uJM0kmx4OLWSGCg0BRioF dkZxxh5W0ocVY++iR4Nqh+aAco71PHgcFLbTSrGT8sePUJhtUEMDoRSIvYE4n+hK bUEzTypcOnKvOm3w6o1iQB6mDkhIwEKB7czRwJdUTYuukC3QwsJ33fUM+Tgxh1y+ G63/bY1QvOwaoskdKtZR10f3+1X4Mo7f9k8qhtcKsi8Pep8KcK5AHmI1bPlbqqkn D+rGm2U3/2chR/zGkQzlD0HuF1SMAMhJKOdol7aUnd4L3YG+sV20c9bpFvAQhhEn +FkTgGIoE/yVewHRtauU =2a9F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 24 05:01:57 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:01:57 +0100 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140723215925.GL6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D0AA27.1040009@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724082911.GO6799@ctrlc.hu> <05a284bf-5ebf-4c07-9086-a3c9fbeabe17@email.android.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> Why nott "Windows or MacOS" while we're being explicit? On 24 July 2014 09:52:09 GMT+01:00, stef <s at ctrlc.hu> wrote: >On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 09:46:35AM +0100, Cathal (Phone) wrote: >> That is a problem with most desktop or laptop computers, too. I don't >think "runs on a smartphone" is practically different from "neglects >client endpoint security". A properly built and programmed smartphone >is indistinguishable from a regular computer. > >indeed the hostsec rule is a generalization of the "browser/smartphone" >rules, >however this is meant for avg people, so i spelled it out explicitly, >otherwise it gets misunderstood. > >-- >otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1127 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/6677910f/attachment.txt> From david.vorick at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 11:17:31 2014 From: david.vorick at gmail.com (David Vorick) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:17:31 -0500 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <CAOFDsm3vW1+98FX99BYQE_mZJGbBqTUKBhLq-up0fiTav6QWAg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <CAOFDsm3vW1+98FX99BYQE_mZJGbBqTUKBhLq-up0fiTav6QWAg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAFVRnyokEKhyxtA=PFzk934ZYwjabSMQ6AMzHhX1WaNcdZQDOw@mail.gmail.com> Smartphones have so many problems with them, I really wouldn't feel 'secure' using anything built on top of a smartphone. From the baseband to the OS, there's been a lot of yellow and red flags raised around smartphones. Even a well-audited app I would still be cautious around. There may be nothing wrong with the app itself but I simply don't trust the platform. Smartphones are many steps at multiple layers from being secure. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 476 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/9f61301a/attachment.txt> From demonfighter at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 10:55:13 2014 From: demonfighter at gmail.com (Steve Furlong) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:55:13 -0400 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Message-ID: <CAOFDsm3vW1+98FX99BYQE_mZJGbBqTUKBhLq-up0fiTav6QWAg@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:06 AM, Stephan Neuhaus < stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch> wrote: > > So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a > smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app > has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? > I'd treat it as an indicator, not a certainty. All of stef's rules are indicators, where any one could be raised without the application being a problem. The more that get raised, the more likely the app is snake oil. It's like personnel security -- an employee gambling is not necessarily a problem, but it can indicate a potential security risk. And it's like diagnosing medical or psychiatric conditions -- a lack of empathy for other humans might not mean anything, but it's an indicator for psychopathy. Regarding the security app indicators, good job, stef. And I'll add one: "10000000000-bit encryption!!!!" -- Neca eos omnes. Deus suos agnoscet. -- Arnaud-Amaury, 1209 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1420 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/bcc65e0a/attachment.txt> From dal at riseup.net Thu Jul 24 12:12:25 2014 From: dal at riseup.net (Douglas Lucas) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:12:25 -0500 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked In-Reply-To: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> References: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> Message-ID: <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Oh, and here's the tweet for it. The article talks about my one-on-one with Thomas Drake in the press room, and he retweeted this. https://twitter.com/DouglasLucas/status/492131711451267072 On 07/24/2014 12:59 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: > Hi cypherpunks, > > I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which discussed > crowdsourcing research into private surveillance contractors like > Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears some of those > (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's also what happened to > my phone. All of this is written up in my HOPEx report, which y'all > might find interesting: > > http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ > > Thanks, > > Douglas > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0VqZAAoJEC+clbKIC3FxzLsP/RgJHE85A25f6+TmedxUdEOk U8MOSokhXni4uRP2nyhHjeHEhWQSPtuc/MTp44cYlUjt1ACNNsja4quzp8jh9crY eABKNRDw+X5PdjuzMGLjrZuBxTDSDu69HeWZAeeceEAZ3ve5A3a6Qk9yM8nGWikR I21avnYaOO6F4X9FiWE0Rq9ZdSlm79CUbhAQT3A+wMQzS+krVHitKiP4P8kXda3w gP6ByEl/oqIE/N4WOXfMJX68h8FP4pfdPFmCyveG/A9A+PKPf9EiGCNFNmFqoXU7 1kKqNBkf4ET4UE10cElNBICmTWGh4aKh7LJDKCtuqBT3gAqsSv33nGL/av2kqLce TvThaSJusarOs713WXDo0cyfkPAR1a/yD4OJm/9UP8Fj+Er7fMFCIHLQkrJC7EhK rhEVerSYuoUrx0/Yz+fC+MGLo+ymkunlEeFsIyysoJgPtZcvC2ty5nE6IdZ/l3hJ tXwquv/xJo3uId+aXNTVgZpvAVUcc7W6x7udrXvstMZ+s0X4Qv6W6Uk52yEhu3M3 wzvC4Oc59/0QldIXx6AcFcZlxKLJrgmCXP3gFTqScq7V3GOM5dRVbvsJrRnMf+O0 2nKBy9j9qni0c3++hhCSki/FeLHLYMkAC+Ls3+fv+XB9NlL3ojnOlhnxKI0Gp/4E u3M6gBVu5TPPu7is2c2D =RFAM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From komachi at openmailbox.org Thu Jul 24 07:15:15 2014 From: komachi at openmailbox.org (Anton Nesterov) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:15:15 +0000 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users Message-ID: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network Tor, codename TOR (navy)" ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000008 From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Thu Jul 24 06:40:38 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:40:38 +0100 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> Message-ID: <b8364dff-adb6-4b50-a4b7-732cdf01d07c@email.android.com> Very fair point; accepted! On 24 July 2014 13:55:18 GMT+01:00, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: >Dnia czwartek, 24 lipca 2014 13:01:57 Cathal pisze: >> Why nott "Windows or MacOS" while we're being explicit? > >I think stef's rules are really quite good as rules of thumb. I don't >think >putting "Windows or MacOS" rule there would improve them in any way. > >At the same time I find that the "runs on smartphones" rule actually >does >improve them, simply because "runs on smartphone" is a buzzword. It's >oft-used >today as a marketing ploy, and when I see it my "snakeoil sense" is >actually >tingling. > >I don't get that tingling sensation with "runs on Windows and MacOS" >usually, >because that's usually just a statement of fact, not a marketing >bulletpoint >that can be used as a leverage with masses today. > >-- >Pozdr >rysiek -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1342 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/afd1ba18/attachment.txt> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 24 05:55:18 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:55:18 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> Message-ID: <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> Dnia czwartek, 24 lipca 2014 13:01:57 Cathal pisze: > Why nott "Windows or MacOS" while we're being explicit? I think stef's rules are really quite good as rules of thumb. I don't think putting "Windows or MacOS" rule there would improve them in any way. At the same time I find that the "runs on smartphones" rule actually does improve them, simply because "runs on smartphone" is a buzzword. It's oft-used today as a marketing ploy, and when I see it my "snakeoil sense" is actually tingling. I don't get that tingling sensation with "runs on Windows and MacOS" usually, because that's usually just a statement of fact, not a marketing bulletpoint that can be used as a leverage with masses today. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140724/684a5df3/attachment.sig> From eugen at leitl.org Thu Jul 24 07:04:24 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 16:04:24 +0200 Subject: Tails vulnerability specific to I2P, not Tor Message-ID: <20140724140424.GK26986@leitl.org> http://blog.exodusintel.com/2014/07/23/silverbullets_and_fairytails/ SILVER BULLETS AND FAIRY TAILS Introduction This week we made mention on Twitter of a zero-day vulnerability we’ve unearthed that affects the popular Tails operating system. As the Tails website states: Tails is a live operating system, that you can start on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card. It aims at preserving your privacy and anonymity, and helps you to: use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship; all connections to the Internet are forced to go through the Tor network; leave no trace on the computer you are using unless you ask it explicitly; use state-of-the-art cryptographic tools to encrypt your files, emails and instant messaging.” This software was largely popularized due to the fact that it was used by whistleblower Edward Snowden. Since then, the OS has garnered much attention and use by a wide range of those seeking anonymity on the Internet. We publicized the fact that we’ve discovered these issues for a very simple reason: no user should put full trust into any particular security solution. By bringing to light the fact that we have found verifiable flaws in such a widely trusted piece of code, we hope to remind the Tails userbase that no software is infallible. Even when the issues we’ve found are fixed by the Tails team, the community should keep in mind that there are most certainly other flaws still present and likely known to others. Our customers use our information for both offensive and defensive purposes to better protect themselves and others. Providing a wide variety of exploit software we help penetration testers effectively test network security and incident response teams. One high profile example occurred last year when Facebook used a zero-day vulnerability to test their teams response to a zero-day attack. The information we provide is also leveraged in defensive purposes providing companies with well documented research for use in IDS and AV signatures for previously unknown threats. We at Exodus are able to do what many software projects cannot, perform security code audits and find exploitable vulnerabilities releasing them to the public. The Vulnerable Component The vulnerability we will be disclosing is specific to I2P. I2P currently boasts about 30,000 active peers. Since I2P has been bundled with Tails since version 0.7, Tails is by far the most widely adopted I2P usage. The I2P vulnerability works on default, fully patched installation of Tails. No settings or configurations need to be changed for the exploit to work. I2P is preconfigured so that all .i2p TLD sites are routed through the I2P network. At a high level I2P traffic is message based similar to IP packets. All communication is encrypted end to end with a total of four layers of encryption. I2P routers (end points) act as cryptographic identifiers, similar to a pair of public keys. I2P is a packet switched network, instead of circuit switched like Tor. This means transparent load balancing of packets across multiple peers. I2P is fully distributed with no centralized resources. There is no distinct separation of servers to nodes, this architecture helps eliminate single points of failure. Demonstration To lend credence to our claims we have created a video that demonstrates de-anonymizing a Tails user: TailsDeAnonymizationTailsDeAnonymization ► Timeline 0:00:00,000 –> 0:00:10,400: Demonstrating IP on listening server, Turning on listening server 0:00:19,000 –> 0:00:25,400: Tails user visiting website icanhazip.com which shows the anonymized IP address 0:00:36,000 –> 0:00:49,400: Showing that we’re indeed using the latest Tails build 1.1 0:00:50,000 –> 0:01:03,400: I2P address being resolved, proof of concept malicious payload being delivered 0:01:30,000 –> 0:01:40,400: Listening server retrieves the Tails user’s de-anonymized IP address (Austin RoadRunner ISP) Note on Disclosure Disclosure of vulnerabilities takes many forms, particularly their shape is adapted to the landscape that the platform is used upon. In the past at Exodus Intelligence, we’ve felt that significant vulnerabilities have been disregarded and have not had the requisite exposure. Through appropriate airing of the issue, we feel that users of such security platforms may come to understand the risks in base-level trust. Even further we hope to break the mold of unconditional trust in a platform. Users should question the tools they use, they should go even further to understand the underlying mechanisms that interlock to grant them security. It’s not enough to have faith upon security, rather to have an understanding of it. If the public thinks Exodus is one of a few entities finding bugs in software, they are grossly misinformed. As is the case with all vulnerabilities we report to vendors, we do not ask for any remuneration. All flaws that we give to vendors are given free of charge. All accusations of extortion perpetuated by those unfamiliar with our business model are completely unfounded. As of publication of this blog post the Tails team and the I2P team have both received all the relevant details and exploit code they require to remediate the vulnerabilities we’ve discovered. Recently a high profile talk on de-anonymization Tor users was pulled from Blackhat due to legal issues. Their talk outlined with a budget of $3000 with some powerful servers and multiple gigabit links they were able to de-anonymize hundreds of thousands of users in ‘a couple of months’. Exodus decided to pick up where this talk left off by letting the community know that there are many other vectors for de-anonymization. The vulnerability we have found is able to perform remote code execution with a specially crafted payload. This payload can be customized to unmask a user and show the public IP address in which the user connected from within ‘a couple of seconds’. Stay Tuned Part two of this blog post will present a technical discussion of the vulnerability. This will be posted once we have confirmed the vulnerabilities in I2P are patched and have been incorporated into Tails. From stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch Thu Jul 24 07:06:03 2014 From: stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch (Stephan Neuhaus) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 16:06:03 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> On 2014-07-24, 14:55, rysiek wrote: > At the same time I find that the "runs on smartphones" rule > actually does improve them, simply because "runs on smartphone" is > a buzzword. It's oft-used today as a marketing ploy, and when I see > it my "snakeoil sense" is actually tingling. So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? Stephan -- From dal at riseup.net Thu Jul 24 15:32:20 2014 From: dal at riseup.net (Douglas Lucas) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 17:32:20 -0500 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked In-Reply-To: <c67e3372028df2a45a8abe819a6c88f8.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> References: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> <c67e3372028df2a45a8abe819a6c88f8.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> Message-ID: <53D18974.5030403@riseup.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi jahlove, not sure if you're the individual (@CaptainKurtis) I just spoke with on Twitter about this, but what seems to fit my jouno/writer/activist use case, which is basically "I need a phone and the ability to live-tweet with pics," would be Replicant on a Neo900 or earlier for the phone component plus Replicant on a tablet-with-camera-and-Twitter of some sort. On 07/24/2014 04:51 PM, jahlove at riseup.net wrote: > I assume that your new phone is going to run replicant.us now, > which was recommended by the Free Software Foundation? > > Oh, and here's the tweet for it. The article talks about my > one-on-one with Thomas Drake in the press room, and he retweeted > this. > > https://twitter.com/DouglasLucas/status/492131711451267072 > > On 07/24/2014 12:59 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: >>>> Hi cypherpunks, >>>> >>>> I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which >>>> discussed crowdsourcing research into private surveillance >>>> contractors like Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears >>>> some of those (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's >>>> also what happened to my phone. All of this is written up in >>>> my HOPEx report, which y'all might find interesting: >>>> >>>> http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0Yl0AAoJEC+clbKIC3Fxu64P+wef8n3GM18rM2ZMP/ldTFZG btU2GA7zIWg8twYJGdZSsi6n6ckGERHAtKzhJaR1vr5OPoP58ywAz02GJATGf/Wn 5B0WfxygiH4lDebjsvC0ofTct5BmhsdtKBfWj/z7sC3hBjSoDt68iqc9nq7rO4c6 2ws2zu3C5MBQ4YmovfWm8u76k/RnUSE7SHzkXJBZPQB6MopOJKTqXqnOx7uQPjx8 +nAplL8DP4TbAxwvL4900BbFZ4Oo7wBvsR0zbND3u0FpKkvj6yYRshWZJ2r9Y77X SBC4FiMJZo6LyMQx7RTc3bFWiLVnsfTQVsZDRYGexbbrKPxXcKCRqHZ3d1fFC9hM tvwlhENIoZTejdtPK2c5lBTmRi9a2PXcIaCKBLaMeLhy6l8i8PUQ+pUvWNylY0ln OQLFTAo+P51zMxFm2OIcF0WatFMhsaMPZAwe2BxVgUFzkf+PQj6PucdjmEqNjGaH dU7qU8HvtDV+wNfcOEDCxgB8jGylN8SuF95MUZK6CJ0cwtljpH08+gn2GCLdRokJ Qhur6Dfotw6ls2da155MsQKlC8NrEI8JYqH09u1aY0sdUpaKxzbFKzQvADqAXIcj nBlGh7YWBN4RF8AnAquHmE9ZHHKvb/OJlMldEbTiS3RRCXyavf69M9r9t7gczp3N 6Nw1r+xMtt0ZuI10tl6o =hnkN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 24 15:13:32 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 18:13:32 -0400 Subject: Market for secure systems, ICLOAK puts Nix/Tor/TBB/etc on USB raises $95k Message-ID: <CAD2Ti299H8Ga1UeU0ph2omqwNA1BXgLYduP6KnyY86HGApq+3g@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 6:09 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 17:24:22 grarpamp pisze: >> Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] I'll fork this one off to the Tor folks... > Here, have a chuckle: > https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/icloak/icloak-tm-stik-easy-powerful-online-privacy-for-yo > > Hat-tip to all the TAILS/Tor people here. https://icloak.org/ At least it appears from the splashpage to be an open bundling of mostly open tools that are thought reasonably well of, ie: Nix, Tor, GnuPG. As opposed to being some new unheard of closed commercialware. Things like this could serve by dropping more 'crypto by default' on the net at the end user level (even if such users are their own newbie cannon fodder on a learning curve). And spreading Unix also helps shift marketshare and knowledge away from Windows long term. If my two minute read of this one is right, it would be hard to not give them some kudos. I don't know what amounts are typically fundraised and the donor counts, but $95k for something like this seems to indicate a demand for more secure/private systems in general. Maybe a million will sell and send some donations back. From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 09:16:37 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 18:16:37 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Message-ID: <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:06:03PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > On 2014-07-24, 14:55, rysiek wrote: > > At the same time I find that the "runs on smartphones" rule > > actually does improve them, simply because "runs on smartphone" is > > a buzzword. It's oft-used today as a marketing ploy, and when I see > > it my "snakeoil sense" is actually tingling. > > So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a > smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app > has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? it's rule of thumb. right? there might be exceptions (i know of exactly one), which strengthen the rule ;) -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From jahlove at riseup.net Thu Jul 24 14:51:19 2014 From: jahlove at riseup.net (jahlove at riseup.net) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 21:51:19 -0000 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked In-Reply-To: <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> References: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> Message-ID: <c67e3372028df2a45a8abe819a6c88f8.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> I assume that your new phone is going to run replicant.us now, which was recommended by the Free Software Foundation? > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Oh, and here's the tweet for it. The article talks about my one-on-one > with Thomas Drake in the press room, and he retweeted this. > > https://twitter.com/DouglasLucas/status/492131711451267072 > > On 07/24/2014 12:59 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: >> Hi cypherpunks, >> >> I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which discussed >> crowdsourcing research into private surveillance contractors like >> Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears some of those >> (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's also what happened to >> my phone. All of this is written up in my HOPEx report, which y'all >> might find interesting: >> >> http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ >> >> Thanks, >> >> Douglas >> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0VqZAAoJEC+clbKIC3FxzLsP/RgJHE85A25f6+TmedxUdEOk > U8MOSokhXni4uRP2nyhHjeHEhWQSPtuc/MTp44cYlUjt1ACNNsja4quzp8jh9crY > eABKNRDw+X5PdjuzMGLjrZuBxTDSDu69HeWZAeeceEAZ3ve5A3a6Qk9yM8nGWikR > I21avnYaOO6F4X9FiWE0Rq9ZdSlm79CUbhAQT3A+wMQzS+krVHitKiP4P8kXda3w > gP6ByEl/oqIE/N4WOXfMJX68h8FP4pfdPFmCyveG/A9A+PKPf9EiGCNFNmFqoXU7 > 1kKqNBkf4ET4UE10cElNBICmTWGh4aKh7LJDKCtuqBT3gAqsSv33nGL/av2kqLce > TvThaSJusarOs713WXDo0cyfkPAR1a/yD4OJm/9UP8Fj+Er7fMFCIHLQkrJC7EhK > rhEVerSYuoUrx0/Yz+fC+MGLo+ymkunlEeFsIyysoJgPtZcvC2ty5nE6IdZ/l3hJ > tXwquv/xJo3uId+aXNTVgZpvAVUcc7W6x7udrXvstMZ+s0X4Qv6W6Uk52yEhu3M3 > wzvC4Oc59/0QldIXx6AcFcZlxKLJrgmCXP3gFTqScq7V3GOM5dRVbvsJrRnMf+O0 > 2nKBy9j9qni0c3++hhCSki/FeLHLYMkAC+Ls3+fv+XB9NlL3ojnOlhnxKI0Gp/4E > u3M6gBVu5TPPu7is2c2D > =RFAM > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > From stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch Thu Jul 24 13:41:35 2014 From: stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch (Stephan Neuhaus) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 22:41:35 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <53D16F7F.4040003@tik.ee.ethz.ch> On 2014-07-24, 18:16, stef wrote: > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:06:03PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: >> So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a >> smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app >> has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? > > it's rule of thumb. right? there might be exceptions (i know of exactly one), > which strengthen the rule ;) Sorry to insist, but I gave you a concrete app, namely safeslinger: https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ Do you think that it is snake oil? Fun, Stephan PS: The original version is "the exception proves the rule", where "prove" is used in its old meaning of "test". From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 13:54:16 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 22:54:16 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <53D16F7F.4040003@tik.ee.ethz.ch> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D16F7F.4040003@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Message-ID: <20140724205416.GS6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:41:35PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > On 2014-07-24, 18:16, stef wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:06:03PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > >> So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a > >> smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app > >> has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? > > > > it's rule of thumb. right? there might be exceptions (i know of exactly one), > > which strengthen the rule ;) > > Sorry to insist, but I gave you a concrete app, namely safeslinger: > https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ Do you think that it is snake oil? unless it is being deployed for confidentiality defending against only low level adversaries (but by stating this i already narrowed down the threat-model significantly). i believe so. it is an app, nothing more. -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From s at ctrlc.hu Thu Jul 24 14:44:21 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 23:44:21 +0200 Subject: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] In-Reply-To: <20140724205416.GS6799@ctrlc.hu> References: <CAD2Ti29TCDxLyPaVJiZHN8vHz1mvDAuVB0DV2vmf4Z--a6gzfQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140724085208.GP6799@ctrlc.hu> <7a8ae744-48da-4257-bc51-6928e4f5e98b@email.android.com> <156247777.L6rFcDFZ53@lapuntu> <53D112CB.4000805@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724161637.GQ6799@ctrlc.hu> <53D16F7F.4040003@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <20140724205416.GS6799@ctrlc.hu> Message-ID: <20140724214421.GT6799@ctrlc.hu> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:54:16PM +0200, stef wrote: > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:41:35PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > > On 2014-07-24, 18:16, stef wrote: > > > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:06:03PM +0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > > >> So if I mention to you that a certain app just happens to run on a > > >> smartphone, your Spidey-sense would be tingling, no matter if the app > > >> has had excellent threat modelling, code audit etc? > > > > > > it's rule of thumb. right? there might be exceptions (i know of exactly one), > > > which strengthen the rule ;) > > > > Sorry to insist, but I gave you a concrete app, namely safeslinger: > > https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/ Do you think that it is snake oil? > > unless it is being deployed for confidentiality defending against only low level > adversaries (but by stating this i already narrowed down the threat-model > significantly). i believe so. it is an app, nothing more. not saying that the research and the protocols might be sound. but even much more mature algos that are yet unbroken on a scientific level do not pass the rule of thumb when they're implemented on smartphones. all of matejs concerns apply. the phone is basically a huge side channel. not saying you can't build castles on sand, but their threat model is quite limited. just a few days ago i believe eugen posted a nice list of ios bugdoors. no insult to the product in question, its the underlying platform that's broken. -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 24 15:02:24 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 00:02:24 +0200 Subject: Streisand: Silence censorship. Automate the effect. Message-ID: <2073653.Jv7zRpqM1x@lapuntu> So, this has been floating in my vincinity lately: https://github.com/jlund/streisand Wonder what you wonderful people think of it. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Internet can be a little unfair. It's way too easy for ISPs, telecoms, politicians, and corporations to block access to the sites and information that you care about. But breaking through these restrictions is tough. Or is it? Introducing Streisand A single command sets up a brand new server running a wide variety of anti-censorship software that can completely mask and encrypt all of your Internet traffic. Streisand natively supports the creation of new servers at Amazon EC2, DigitalOcean, Linode, and Rackspace—with more providers coming soon! It also runs on any Debian 7 server regardless of provider, and hundreds of instances can be configured simultaneously using this method. The process is completely automated and only takes about ten minutes, which is pretty awesome when you consider that it would require the average system administrator several days of frustration to set up even a small subset of what Streisand offers in its out-of-the-box configuration. Once your Streisand server is running, you can give the custom connection instructions to friends, family members, and fellow activists. The connection instructions contain an embedded copy of the server's unique SSL certificate, so you only have to send them a single file. Each server is entirely self-contained and comes with absolutely everything that users need to get started, including cryptographically verified mirrors of all common clients. This renders any attempted censorship of default download locations completely ineffective. But wait, there's more... More Features Nginx powers a password-protected and encrypted Gateway that serves as the starting point for new users. The Gateway is accessible over SSL, or as a Tor hidden service. Beautiful, custom, step-by-step client configuration instructions are generated for each new server that Streisand creates. Users can quickly access these instructions through any web browser. The instructions are responsive and look fantastic on mobile phones: Streisand Screenshot The integrity of mirrored software is ensured using SHA-256 checksums, or by verifying GPG signatures if the project provides them. This protects users from downloading corrupted files. All ancillary files, such as OpenVPN configuration profiles, are also available via the Gateway. Current Tor users can take advantage of the additional services Streisand sets up in order to transfer large files or to handle other traffic (e.g. BitTorrent) that isn't appropriate for the Tor network. A unique password, SSL certificate, and SSL private key are generated for each Streisand Gateway. The Gateway instructions and certificate are transferred via SSH at the conclusion of Streisand's execution. Distinct services and multiple daemons provide an enormous amount of flexibility. If one connection method gets blocked there are numerous options available, most of which are resistant to Deep Packet Inspection. All of the connection methods (including L2TP/IPsec and direct OpenVPN connections) are effective against the type of blocking Turkey has been experimenting with. OpenSSH, OpenVPN (wrapped in stunnel), Shadowsocks, and Tor (with obfsproxy and the obfs3 or ScrambleSuit pluggable transports) are all currently effective against China's Great Firewall. Every task has been thoroughly documented and given a detailed description. Streisand is simultaneously the most complete HOWTO in existence for the setup of all of the software it installs, and also the antidote for ever having to do any of this by hand again. All software runs on ports that have been deliberately chosen to make simplistic port blocking unrealistic without causing massive collateral damage. OpenVPN, for example, does not run on its default port of 1194, but instead uses port 636, the standard port for LDAP/SSL connections that are beloved by companies worldwide. L2TP/IPsec is a notable exception to this rule because the ports cannot be changed without breaking client compatibility The IP addresses of connecting clients are never logged. There's nothing to find if a server gets seized or shut down. Services Provided L2TP/IPsec using strongSwan and xl2tpd A randomly chosen pre-shared key and password are generated. Windows, OS X, Android, and iOS users can all connect using the native VPN support that is built into each operating system without installing any additional software. Streisand does not install L2TP/IPsec on Amazon EC2 servers by default because the instances cannot bind directly to their public IP addresses which makes IPsec routing nearly impossible. OpenSSH An unprivileged forwarding user and SSH keypair are generated for sshuttle and SOCKS capabilities. Windows and Android SSH tunnels are also supported, and a copy of the keypair is exported in the .ppk format that PuTTY requires. Tinyproxy is installed and bound to localhost. It can be accessed over an SSH tunnel by programs that do not natively support SOCKS and that require an HTTP proxy, such as Twitter for Android. OpenVPN Self-contained "unified" .ovpn profiles are generated for easy client configuration using only a single file. Multiple clients can easily share the same certificates and keys, but five separate sets are generated by default. Client DNS resolution is handled via Dnsmasq to prevent DNS leaks. TLS Authentication is enabled which helps protect against active probing attacks. Traffic that does not have the proper HMAC is simply dropped. The Dante proxy server is set up as a workaround for a bug in Firefox for Android. Shadowsocks A QR code is generated that can be used to automatically configure the Android and iOS clients by simply taking a picture. You can tag '8.8.8.8' on that concrete wall, or you can glue the Shadowsocks instructions and some QR codes to it instead! Stunnel Listens for and wraps OpenVPN connections. This makes them look like standard SSL traffic and allows OpenVPN clients to successfully establish tunnels even in the presence of Deep Packet Inspection. Unified profiles for stunnel-wrapped OpenVPN connections are generated alongside the direct connection profiles. Detailed instructions are also generated. The stunnel certificate and key are exported in PKCS #12 format so they are compatible with other SSL tunneling applications. Notably, this enables OpenVPN for Android to tunnel its traffic through SSLDroid. OpenVPN in China on a mobile device? Yes! Tor A bridge relay is set up with a random nickname. Obfsproxy is installed and configured, including support for the obfs3 and ScrambleSuit pluggable transports. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140725/749b56a4/attachment.sig> From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Thu Jul 24 15:46:33 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 00:46:33 +0200 Subject: Market for secure systems, ICLOAK puts Nix/Tor/TBB/etc on USB raises $95k In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti299H8Ga1UeU0ph2omqwNA1BXgLYduP6KnyY86HGApq+3g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti299H8Ga1UeU0ph2omqwNA1BXgLYduP6KnyY86HGApq+3g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1760411.H31tA0UGxX@lapuntu> Dnia czwartek, 24 lipca 2014 18:13:32 grarpamp pisze: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 6:09 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > > Dnia środa, 23 lipca 2014 17:24:22 grarpamp pisze: > >> Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] > > I'll fork this one off to the Tor folks... > > > Here, have a chuckle: > > https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/icloak/icloak-tm-stik-easy-powerful-o > > nline-privacy-for-yo > > > > Hat-tip to all the TAILS/Tor people here. > > https://icloak.org/ > > At least it appears from the splashpage to be an open bundling > of mostly open tools that are thought reasonably well of, ie: Nix, > Tor, GnuPG. As opposed to being some new unheard of closed > commercialware. > Things like this could serve by dropping more 'crypto by default' > on the net at the end user level (even if such users are their own > newbie cannon fodder on a learning curve). And spreading Unix > also helps shift marketshare and knowledge away from Windows > long term. If my two minute read of this one is right, it would be > hard to not give them some kudos. > > I don't know what amounts are typically fundraised and > the donor counts, but $95k for something like this seems > to indicate a demand for more secure/private systems in general. > > Maybe a million will sell and send some donations back. I haven't notice a single mention of TAILS, for example; nor any pledge to support the projects they are basing on. This for me is a very shady business. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140725/db96b776/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 25 13:13:11 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:13:11 -0400 Subject: Fwd: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <201407250036.s6P0a4lO011484@new.toad.com> References: <CAAU2BpZ9fgVJEFE-E0SQqZzpUMf64ES7RgH2YJnnueq2CN3uWw@mail.gmail.com> <1A201DE3-2C6A-4F1C-AC4F-8EF8CB3264FE@gmail.com> <201407250036.s6P0a4lO011484@new.toad.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_g0UoG6axeffaVeC0qdR+RYC_Oq2zWGQxv7TZayJVp9Q@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> Date: Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 8:36 PM Subject: Re: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs To: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk at gmail.com> Cc: "justgold79 at gmail.com" <justgold79 at gmail.com>, "cryptography at metzdowd.com" <cryptography at metzdowd.com> > > For January, we have not received any Nation Security Letters this month. > > On the month you receive one, you stop putting such notices out, and sell t= > he now-useless business. > Yeah, and the judge and prosecutor who get your case will be > helpless before your clever skills at evading them, because they've > never had to deal with literal-minded people trying transparent > dodges to get around the law before. NSL's don't involve a judge. Nor even a prosecutor. They are an investigative tactic, used by the FBI (or the FBI proxying for NSA), long before a prosecutor is usually involved. The more likely it is that you will disclose a government request for snitching on your customers, the less likely it is that that request will ever arrive. Shining sunlight on spook activities is the best way to make them crawl back into their hole. > You will doubtless enjoy the same success as tax protesters do when > they end up in court. And shortly thereafter, you'll enjoy an > all-expenses-paid vacation with free room and board, courtesy of the > US government. Chuckle chuckle, just like the headlines about marijuana reform for decades. First they laugh at you, etc. But the joke doesn't excuse the iron fist you are trying to invoke to influence people. Mr. Kelsey, you usually don't fall to this level of "be afraid, the [government] terrorists are coming" propaganda. Ladar Levison, Mr. Lavabit, the last guy to do exactly what was suggested, is still out walking the streets -- and starting new companies that offer to protect their customers from covert surveillance. As often occurs, the spooks were less interested in smashing a guy who's standing up for the rights of the public, than they were in preventing a detailed public airing of what they were up to when they ran into him. John _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography From guninski at guninski.com Fri Jul 25 07:07:31 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 17:07:31 +0300 Subject: The small print on france.fr Message-ID: <20140725140731.GB3759@sivokote.iziade.m$> http://www.france.fr/en/terms-conditions.html Section: Hypertext links pointing to France.fr --- The France.fr site authorises the inclusion of hypertext links (including deep links) pointing to its pages. However, the France.fr site must be explicitly mentioned in the link's title. The SIG reserves the right to demand the deletion of a link that it thinks does not comply with the purpose or missions of the France.fr site, or, more generally, the ethics of a public portal. This authorisation is valid for any public or private site, with the exception of those publishing polemical, pornographic, anti-Semitic or xenophobic information or information that could offend the sensibilities of most people. --- Appears to me this is official french government site. From l at odewijk.nl Fri Jul 25 09:19:02 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 18:19:02 +0200 Subject: The small print on france.fr In-Reply-To: <20140725140731.GB3759@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140725140731.GB3759@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2r+f7JVqjDF0bpcWmqQqjLc-c1RXHxgdSEAv4P5PPvTSDA@mail.gmail.com> What's the point exactly? Everyone can make arbitrary small print. This one holds no legal meaning, just an indication of preference. Freedom of speech basically goes for hyperlinks too. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 310 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140725/cb05004a/attachment.txt> From crypto at jpunix.net Fri Jul 25 16:57:20 2014 From: crypto at jpunix.net (Crypto) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 18:57:20 -0500 Subject: Help me test =?UTF-8?Q?Alpha=3F?= Message-ID: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> Hello Everyone! If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to set up a FREE email account for you. Please note that the account is NOT anonymous unless you take the necessary precautions! Just contact me directly if you are interested. Features: * SSL 4096 RSA/SHA512 certificate with PFS enabled. Please note this is a self-signed certificate that is for encryption only. * POP3/IMAP supported - same caveats as above. * SpamAssassin learning SPAM filter * Optional YubiKey Authentication * Optional Google Authenticator 2FA authentication * Roundcube web interface If you have any questions or comments please let me know. As I said this is *NOT* anonymous! It's up to you to take the necessary precautions! -- Crypto https://www.digitalocean.com/?refcode=b90b690ca5bb From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Fri Jul 25 10:40:55 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 19:40:55 +0200 Subject: The small print on france.fr In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2r+f7JVqjDF0bpcWmqQqjLc-c1RXHxgdSEAv4P5PPvTSDA@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140725140731.GB3759@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+f7JVqjDF0bpcWmqQqjLc-c1RXHxgdSEAv4P5PPvTSDA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1738343.SKTv2gCDxc@lapuntu> Dnia piątek, 25 lipca 2014 18:19:02 Lodewijk andré de la porte pisze: > What's the point exactly? > > Everyone can make arbitrary small print. This one holds no legal meaning, > just an indication of preference. Freedom of speech basically goes for > hyperlinks too. Case in point: http://rys.io/en/125 http://torrentfreak.com/hyperlinking-is-not-copyright-infringement-eu-court-rules-140213/ -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140725/0882391f/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 25 22:01:56 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 01:01:56 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> > I don't see any technical/cryptological way to defeat the > proposed US law; it looks like a political problem that > needs to be dealt with by political means. Proliferation is a political means. Keep on proliferating, proliferate widely, proliferate fast, get all your friends and business on it, get the public on it, remove the capability for legacy plaintext, and embed and entrench crypto deeper than the Marianas. Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and give them your concerns about backdoors and your freedom/rights, your life being meta'd, recorded, analyzed and stored forever for no good reason (for which an interest in crypto and speech isn't one). Proliferate and speak! On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 5:24 PM, John Denker <jsd at av8n.com> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Today's Gomorrah Post has a long article in the "National Security" > section: > > Ellen Nakashima > "Proliferation of new online communications services > poses hurdles for law enforcement" > http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/proliferation-of-new-online-communications-services-poses-hurdles-for-law-enforcement/2014/07/25/645b13aa-0d21-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html > > I see no particular reason to believe a single word of what > it says. Virtually all of the evidence supporting the main > conclusion is "according FBI officials and others" ... which > puts it in the same category as the "stories" Judy Miller > wrote for the New Ys Times in the runup to the Irag war. > http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/international/middleeast/08IRAQ.html?ex=1121140800&en=76eddceb628af81e&ei=5070 > > Positive reasons for disbelieving the main thrust of that > story is that if the authorities want to search somebody's > bedroom, they can still do it; they just (sometimes!) can't > do it quite so cheaply. That can't do it without getting > up from their comfy armchairs. > > The article contradicts Bill Frantz's assumption that all > present-day crypto is ineffective. I tend to disbelieve > both extremes. I reckon any lock can be picked or drilled > out /if somebody wants to badly enough/ ... but this does > not mean that all locks are completely useless. > > > There is a companion article that lets the cat out of the > bag: > > Ellen Nakashima > "The government wants to wiretap online communications > — or in some cases hack them" > http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/25/the-government-wants-to-wiretap-social-media-or-even-hack-it/ > > Both articles appear to be part of a PR campaign to lay > the groundwork for a new CALEA-on-steroids law that would > reportedly require every ISP and every app developer to > provide hooks to enable armchair/pushbutton wiretapping. > > Before you say that such a law is impossible, especially > in the context of open-source software, let me point out > that most people on earth /already/ live under regimes > where use (or even possession) of an unregistered encryption > device is a serious crime. > > I don't see any technical/cryptological way to defeat the > proposed US law; it looks like a political problem that > needs to be dealt with by political means. > > Tangentially related: On 07/24/2014 09:13 PM, Peter Gutmann > wrote: >> [....] should be preserved somewhere as the standard response to the >> Rumpelstiltskin Defence ("you can't prove I'm using crypto/know the >> keys so you'll have to let me go"). This [imprisonment] perfectly >> sums up what will happen to anyone who wants to try the >> Rumpelstiltskin Defence in court. > > I am certainly not an international lawyer, but we can all read > the plain language of the law. Under the otherwise-Draconian > UK RIP law, the Rumpelstiltskin defense is explicitly allowed: > http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53 > > Also note that if such a defense is not possible, you are already > a criminal, because of the encrypted "message" below, which you > have already received. > a) You don't know the decryption key, although nobody can prove > that you don't. > b) You cannot obtain the key from me or anyone else, because > I destroyed the public key /before/ encrypting the message, > although nobody can prove that I did. > c) Furthermore I can tell you that the plaintext consisted of > 512 bytes of high-grade randomness that wasn't seen or recorded, > although nobody can prove that either. > > I encourage you to forward my "message" to all your legislators, > along with lots of similar messages. > > To say the same thing in more constructive terms: This serves > as an example of /cover traffic/. It allows you to say with > complete sincerity that at least "some" of the data you hold > is undecryptable. > > Adversaries will have to consider the hypothesis that I'm > engaging in some bizarre yet effective steganography, hiding > a tree in the front row of the forest. Nobody can prove /or/ > disprove this hypothesis. > > > - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- > Version: GnuPG v1 > > hQIMA9jh5gIisxa+AQ//T8x3vgxCVqq6cCNln4TW5r8H6JeHqD1txxEy+jOiybvb > mvdcut6uQQqu/eFkV06rK+1K5LoUWemqTpAgz/E7MKtNsvYv4gardebFLRDxgn3v > WW01mc6XKqH+xpDoqabDN+Mc2jeQGhDD+fBBCMCePx/ca8iJ1gjVL93A3L+2AVan > PJFsRsoCx8X/DoUpIQOqCm0XOJrS+anVTrSOdVSo4t/V4QF7yx+51yi4ro26eAz0 > 5vCm+afMQSMIvZcpK54LI+oWUITQGP8ZhD2+B5HsIUh9nmcZjRr5fK+edGe6tS3W > aam0pQHWrkmyyjfKxNVfxK/aujrboHVybF9sP0tN8wUhFh7Tdj8F1e5EtPppXB/p > DoC7O3SQ30HHCCeNSLMErMzsniw+fHmL6zoE/UnkAsQZ1HJvg/9OD/dxJP/BaMwr > RUwG73wKPBp9m5ROs0tRopBNFcRXtM6hg/1i9ZE8IcbZcsgfcGwUdeo4qbYvhtyR > XU1FfQRyIhW7KRXQeWFSmMS1AWYMl0fX6n02qTbTSmUY7bujdEpOH3Dz8ndSKsjK > q0IWmXXcCpc9OGbiwSRhNgbxQBVu2tZ4ntk8vC+deM9itR7CMo94p95gvZQ9H7dU > fTKHb28jel8Y7CL7MYfcXpeO/vZIsj9H5GnJc+pSOuY8ueR/rTauJZux2DlIrwbS > 6QGqzHz6PaJ4NqoeyL7IiMJDNM4panzYqa4/Shfk3fiTol4FDLCdXMtT3V6eiPOn > GKGjjpbZ/3FP9cJrepM5wuHaesWnyoDO96FYTmqNqgw31r3Cg5sn1JrL6hcguN1x > CHc7mu5yTrft98pjk5olWaCyvqco0OqK3aID+IAKVJgfJV/2FWZE8KMpw+NvJosn > g6UwwN4PMUpq+CGgPRyRx12RzyP8iFxp8J8D0nS8H+BMSOA/+E2Mny54zjFrDUsH > amzFM9QlwCIrBQJ50V+OwTDzCnQVXlsbIV9kH6YaZDKo7vFIuyi7myr6mYttbh5o > m6xgSNQMSLDabyvKQ9l1GX9pQGzR0KPQRR/yn/frQDLydz5qhVEWTwprwxwGSBa/ > lVjLWTsYqqwl1SErI/FfTqJuWGSZUWqy2kUOzTmi5DA+tOvbspaghO5Aqxim/emG > Sz0DoRcR74zgUNLAAzUN4aZIBxfsO9HSqIXq9I6fK4cT6VBMYKjaJh23Hf2qOiuA > Z2g5nl+oT5CDzTlzzIMHZmCTkEjtNDAK+lb6SBCp8ScHcjafcm/cO9gNMV4+EBks > PgEm1eutCEpOpGIOHjcsFV1ryZonB8U0VmbpsxqsDE1Y0l1u6bEUKTMeJoHfEeTe > Q4wdo5LxbKt4LGQACopwX4NNdfupdPNT2SyiGCu7Vh+0P78+IEewbpRetW1KpNg3 > MXWd7sWh2tnA9cRzPwYhvUtUsj0L/GXLOKO9bMH8qfivOnsp5lbRnr6KAKoqzn2L > 3g== > =OuR2 > - -----END PGP MESSAGE----- > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1 > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIVAwUBU9LLD/O9SFghczXtAQJedA//UoclobLIQI4cKNu2V/bNIxUxEGb71pXr > QCQJJJQgMbK0kAE9pf6uFldur3m3kDOtPeQEx8AUZ4pS7YEPkE8mDrPxeohYi4i0 > S1yp82EX3JEchZrMDgEveP4C8zqgLg38ie0idL72nPQo2o1D5BpfRFElVA72Z8A1 > 0A9ehua+B9f1g+QKo4wMzPqbfRsHIdOIRELkrniJfRfuIxLY6F4MuiIR5F1YLhJR > TlVjsVUqEFduulO8yBF4A/4QZ1x6QzL47bUYigJwft3YNwbKNshrL8YPhMSgbdjB > BQSoPf93h2RasxKczWalawmTbZaev4kIvBy3EV2S11oy85SqRkAHb/G4f0dq1xI3 > Nc5WTWk+L0Im4Zh0+lqXrBucVvstDsrwEvDRztbrkNaey7p4HKWq+0JQ8zGKxZeq > D4eQD/N89uZLnXV+Q0Gut1w0BHSn7jmYm7TiDiXwk9DBy49i88MYaHocjGtWmLUP > tTSdunXAtOVfRPTJyL47mgbxgsDAyAHFN3CfhmN+PcjaUvrPTvlJ7g6ObdCiAGcr > CEiqKU0QoZTQS9bCkXOeV5LhIvbeh/2P5Ft+4acAAG38oE4/VKJZ+ly49Du4HF6v > LEQFDFJ03WbYRysPIX3J1Krgkza0/wm8Oy0Og27RVfSpVrOV+hPzmgCMURRYz0yS > 21uL+NP/O+o= > =spOA > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > The cryptography mailing list > cryptography at metzdowd.com > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography From grarpamp at gmail.com Fri Jul 25 22:59:27 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 01:59:27 -0400 Subject: EFF / applied law mailing list? Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. From oottela at cs.helsinki.fi Sat Jul 26 01:32:26 2014 From: oottela at cs.helsinki.fi (oottela) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 11:32:26 +0300 Subject: Fwd: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_g0UoG6axeffaVeC0qdR+RYC_Oq2zWGQxv7TZayJVp9Q@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAAU2BpZ9fgVJEFE-E0SQqZzpUMf64ES7RgH2YJnnueq2CN3uWw@mail.gmail.com> <1A201DE3-2C6A-4F1C-AC4F-8EF8CB3264FE@gmail.com> <201407250036.s6P0a4lO011484@new.toad.com> <CAD2Ti2_g0UoG6axeffaVeC0qdR+RYC_Oq2zWGQxv7TZayJVp9Q@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <fdeb7e216b663994be608ac27d44a9dc@cs.helsinki.fi> Are there any sources to the procedure how NSL's and other subpoenas / gag orders could be used to coerce certificate authorities to hand out their private keys? My guess is the risk for using root certificate of different company for MITM is too high: EFF's SSL observatory would detect it. I'm suprised there has been no leaks about such attacks: It's fairly easy to mitigate, transparent, long term, and extremely effective, even against PFS. Does anyone have guesses or information about how CA's handle their private keys? Are all certificates they sign for companies done on airgapped computers? How high are the security standards of these companies? Markus On 25.07.2014 23:13, grarpamp wrote: > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> > Date: Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 8:36 PM > Subject: Re: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs > To: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk at gmail.com> > Cc: "justgold79 at gmail.com" <justgold79 at gmail.com>, > "cryptography at metzdowd.com" <cryptography at metzdowd.com> > > >> > For January, we have not received any Nation Security Letters this >> month. >> > On the month you receive one, you stop putting such notices out, >> and sell t= >> he now-useless business. > >> Yeah, and the judge and prosecutor who get your case will be >> helpless before your clever skills at evading them, because they've >> never had to deal with literal-minded people trying transparent >> dodges to get around the law before. > > NSL's don't involve a judge. Nor even a prosecutor. They are an > investigative tactic, used by the FBI (or the FBI proxying for NSA), > long before a prosecutor is usually involved. > > The more likely it is that you will disclose a government request for > snitching on your customers, the less likely it is that that request > will ever arrive. Shining sunlight on spook activities is the best > way to make them crawl back into their hole. > >> You will doubtless enjoy the same success as tax protesters do when >> they end up in court. And shortly thereafter, you'll enjoy an >> all-expenses-paid vacation with free room and board, courtesy of the >> US government. > > Chuckle chuckle, just like the headlines about marijuana reform for > decades. First they laugh at you, etc. But the joke doesn't excuse > the iron fist you are trying to invoke to influence people. > Mr. Kelsey, you usually don't fall to this level of "be afraid, the > [government] terrorists are coming" propaganda. > > Ladar Levison, Mr. Lavabit, the last guy to do exactly what was > suggested, is still out walking the streets -- and starting new > companies that offer to protect their customers from covert > surveillance. As often occurs, the spooks were less interested in > smashing a guy who's standing up for the rights of the public, than > they were in preventing a detailed public airing of what they were up > to when they ran into him. > > John > _______________________________________________ > The cryptography mailing list > cryptography at metzdowd.com > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography From tbiehn at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 09:13:50 2014 From: tbiehn at gmail.com (Travis Biehn) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 12:13:50 -0400 Subject: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked In-Reply-To: <53D18974.5030403@riseup.net> References: <53D1496B.3080209@riseup.net> <53D15A99.5070507@riseup.net> <c67e3372028df2a45a8abe819a6c88f8.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> <53D18974.5030403@riseup.net> Message-ID: <CAKtE3zfBBwHnzme+_JR3mJ4FcxEpEFdORcghEJd3YrdBv-LF0g@mail.gmail.com> Well that's weird, I'd think it harder to exfiltrate data a la Hollywood where you can actually see shit happening on your phone's UI rather than you never notice. Actually, it is definitely harder. Travis On Jul 24, 2014 6:48 PM, "Douglas Lucas" <dal at riseup.net> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hi jahlove, not sure if you're the individual (@CaptainKurtis) I just > spoke with on Twitter about this, but what seems to fit my > jouno/writer/activist use case, which is basically "I need a phone and > the ability to live-tweet with pics," would be Replicant on a Neo900 > or earlier for the phone component plus Replicant on a > tablet-with-camera-and-Twitter of some sort. > > On 07/24/2014 04:51 PM, jahlove at riseup.net wrote: > > I assume that your new phone is going to run replicant.us now, > > which was recommended by the Free Software Foundation? > > > > Oh, and here's the tweet for it. The article talks about my > > one-on-one with Thomas Drake in the press room, and he retweeted > > this. > > > > https://twitter.com/DouglasLucas/status/492131711451267072 > > > > On 07/24/2014 12:59 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: > >>>> Hi cypherpunks, > >>>> > >>>> I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which > >>>> discussed crowdsourcing research into private surveillance > >>>> contractors like Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears > >>>> some of those (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's > >>>> also what happened to my phone. All of this is written up in > >>>> my HOPEx report, which y'all might find interesting: > >>>> > >>>> > http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowden-stratfor-and-surprises/ > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT0Yl0AAoJEC+clbKIC3Fxu64P+wef8n3GM18rM2ZMP/ldTFZG > btU2GA7zIWg8twYJGdZSsi6n6ckGERHAtKzhJaR1vr5OPoP58ywAz02GJATGf/Wn > 5B0WfxygiH4lDebjsvC0ofTct5BmhsdtKBfWj/z7sC3hBjSoDt68iqc9nq7rO4c6 > 2ws2zu3C5MBQ4YmovfWm8u76k/RnUSE7SHzkXJBZPQB6MopOJKTqXqnOx7uQPjx8 > +nAplL8DP4TbAxwvL4900BbFZ4Oo7wBvsR0zbND3u0FpKkvj6yYRshWZJ2r9Y77X > SBC4FiMJZo6LyMQx7RTc3bFWiLVnsfTQVsZDRYGexbbrKPxXcKCRqHZ3d1fFC9hM > tvwlhENIoZTejdtPK2c5lBTmRi9a2PXcIaCKBLaMeLhy6l8i8PUQ+pUvWNylY0ln > OQLFTAo+P51zMxFm2OIcF0WatFMhsaMPZAwe2BxVgUFzkf+PQj6PucdjmEqNjGaH > dU7qU8HvtDV+wNfcOEDCxgB8jGylN8SuF95MUZK6CJ0cwtljpH08+gn2GCLdRokJ > Qhur6Dfotw6ls2da155MsQKlC8NrEI8JYqH09u1aY0sdUpaKxzbFKzQvADqAXIcj > nBlGh7YWBN4RF8AnAquHmE9ZHHKvb/OJlMldEbTiS3RRCXyavf69M9r9t7gczp3N > 6Nw1r+xMtt0ZuI10tl6o > =hnkN > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3528 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140726/8a0af4c7/attachment.txt> From bascule at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 13:15:39 2014 From: bascule at gmail.com (Tony Arcieri) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 13:15:39 -0700 Subject: [cryptography] Browser JS (client side) crypto FUD In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKJxyh+Z6v3=UUCKFyTfkEQ8+9-YYjFFrvm9hOKXrhb+g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAHWD2rKJxyh+Z6v3=UUCKFyTfkEQ8+9-YYjFFrvm9hOKXrhb+g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAHOTMV+8BFJM9v6vL-Q0j56tSimy5sFDV0wJuMoex6TzNfPpzQ@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: > Is surprisingly often passed around as if it is the end-all to the idea of > client side JS crypto. > > TL;DR: It's a fantastic load of horse crap, mixed in with some extremely > generalized cryptography issues that most people never thought about before > that do not harm JS crypto at all. > What's in the Matasano article is common sense advice. It may seem elementary for some. But you'd be surprised how many sites fit the pattern the Matasano post describes, arguing that they can provide *better* security by serving JavaScript crypto code over easily-MitMed plaintext HTTP. Here are a couple offenders... #3 Google search result for "encrypted chat": http://www.chatcrypt.com/ Not popular by Google results, but a similarly silly effort: http://www.peersm.com/ -- Tony Arcieri -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1710 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140726/033b5a27/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Sat Jul 26 08:03:46 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 17:03:46 +0200 Subject: Browser JS (client side) crypto FUD Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKJxyh+Z6v3=UUCKFyTfkEQ8+9-YYjFFrvm9hOKXrhb+g@mail.gmail.com> http://matasano.com/articles/javascript-cryptography/ Is surprisingly often passed around as if it is the end-all to the idea of client side JS crypto. TL;DR: It's a fantastic load of horse crap, mixed in with some extremely generalized cryptography issues that most people never thought about before that do not harm JS crypto at all. I'm not sure why the guy wrote it. Maybe he's NSA motivated? Maybe he's worked a lot on secure systems and this just gives him the creeps? Maybe he's the kind of guy that thinks <dash>JS</dash> dynamic scripted languages are not a real languages? Somebody, please, give me something to say against people that claim JS client side crypto can just never work! --------------------------------------------------------- Aside from that it's, well, fundamentally moronic to claim that something is "harmful" when you actually means it does nothing, it's also just (almost!) never true that no attacks are prevented. But, let's go with the flow of the article. Rants won't really settle arguments. Two example usages are given. The first is client-side hashing of a password, so that it's never sent in the clear. This is so legitimate it nearly makes me drop my hat, but, the author decides to use HMAC-SHA1 instead of SHA2 for reasons that are fully beyond me. Perhaps just trying to make things less secure? The second is using AES keys to client side encrypt. The author must've thought he was being helpful when he imagined the scheme for this. Or maybe he was drunk. "So you generate an AES key for each note, send it to the user's browser to store locally, forget the key, and let the user wrap and unwrap their data.". Somehow trusting the transport layer is all back in vogue. The only key-generation problem in JS is entropy, which is a problem everywhere tbh. If you really want to ensure entropy, send a random data blob and XOR it with whatever client-side best-shot at randomness. Whatever. The author bluntheadedly claims "They will both fail to secure users". In principle I agree, his methods sucked balls. He, however, blames it on JS. Okay.. Let's go on. REALLY? WHY? > For several reasons, including the following: > 1 Secure delivery of Javascript to browsers is a chicken-egg problem. > 2 Browser Javascript is hostile to cryptography. > 3 The "view-source" transparency of Javascript is illusory. Until those problems are fixed, Javascript isn't a serious crypto research > environment, and suffers for it. (points numbered for pointwise addressing) 1 - Yeah. Duh. What do you think of delivering anything client side? There's the whole SSL infrastructure, if that doesn't cut it for you, well, welcome to the Internet. (I suggest the next article is about how the Internet is fundamentally flawed.) I would suggest, however, that once your delivery pathway is exploited you're fundamentally screwed in every way. You can't communicate anything, you can't authenticate anyone, you really can't *do* anything! So let's leave out the "Javascript" part of this point, and just do whatever we're already doing to alleviate this issue. 2 - This is a conclusion without any basis so far (aside from being.. meaningless to a computer scientist. Hostile?) 3 - Then just look at what data was transferred. Does every crypto application require checkable source? Is any SSL implementation "considered harmful" because nobody is able to flawlessly read the code, no compilers are trusted, etc? Okay so that chapter meant absolutely nothing. The author goes on to try to defend his brabble: "WHAT'S THE "CHICKEN-EGG PROBLEM" WITH DELIVERING JAVASCRIPT CRYPTOGRAPHY? If you don't trust the network to deliver a password, or, worse, don't trust the server not to keep user secrets, you can't trust them to deliver security code. The same attacker who was sniffing passwords or reading diaries before you introduce crypto is simply hijacking crypto code after you do." A fair point against a single thread model. Interestingly the last line does absolutely not have to hold, sniffing (after the fact) and on-the-fly rewriting are worlds apart. Take Tempest of Xkeyscore, for example, they can't do rewrites. They need specialized programs for that. (Conclusion: nope, nothing to see here) The next chapter tries to justify the fallacies made earlier on. Equating a rewrite to a read, ad-homineming the JS crypto "industry" (and failing to distinguish operational security from actual security), and lastly claiming that misplaced trust is bad (which is obvious and unrelated). The next chapter claims SSL is safe, and "real" crypto unlike JS crypto. Then firmly cements his baseless ridicule by claiming that if you use non-JS crypto to make JS crypto work, then obviously there's no point. The next chapter "WHAT'S HARD ABOUT DEPLOYING JAVASCRIPT CRYPTO CODE OVER SSL/TLS?" claims all the page has to be SSL/TLS and that makes it hard. It's not hard and you should already be doing it to have /*any*/ security. Not to mention it's not true, only that interpreted as page contents has to be SSL'ed (eg, images don't need to be transported over SSL). So, point 1 has no merit against JS whatsoever. There's also a lot of FUD-like text that denies reality. Especially the assumption that SSL and desktop programs are somehow more secure. So point 2. (letterized for pointwise addressing) "HOW ARE BROWSERS HOSTILE TO CRYPTOGRAPHY? In a dispriting variety of ways, among them: a - The prevalence of content-controlled code. b - The malleability of the Javascript runtime. c - The lack of systems programming primitives needed to implement crypto. d - The crushing weight of the installed base of users. Each of these issues creates security gaps that are fatal to secure crypto. Attackers will exploit them to defeat systems that should otherwise be secure. There may be no way to address them without fixing browsers." a, c, d are, at first sight, all rubbish. b is a very genuine point however. With prototyping and the like it can be VERY hard to see what's going on. It's an often mentioned thing about JS that it's too powerful in some ways, and it can be true. The same goes for C and memory control. Next chapter confirms that a is rubbish. Chapter after that explains some basic Comp Sci about when you can trust something (and discredits something that can help in a lot of cases, any if you do it correctly (which is too hard)) Chapter after that rehashes the idea that you can't trust the environment unless you trust the whole environment, which is also the same everywhere. (I also refer to trusting the compiler) Next chapter is titled "WELL THEN, COULDN'T I WRITE A SIMPLE BROWSER EXTENSION THAT WOULD ALLOW JAVASCRIPT TO VERIFY ITSELF?". And guess what, the author agrees. You can indeed do this. If you're just doing it for yourself or a single kind of crypto you could also make a plugin for that. Which is what the WhatWG is doing with the HTML5 crypto extension. Then claims crypto is to PGP as programming languages are to Lisp, which is rubbish. The author then goes on to actually talk about random generators. Which are not always required, but who cares, right? Then Secure erase, which is only important if you expect the client device to be exploited. Then ?timing attacks? which is even more specific and can be alleviated easily enough. Then tries to generalize his claim to remove JS specifically from the equation, removing is last viable (but not definitive) arguments. Some hating on key management, which is justified but again bullocks wrt the main argument. (not to mention it's a problem everywhere, and it can be solved like everywhere) Some hate on people running old browsers, which has actually been solved by background-auto-updating by now. (huzzah for all the added insecurity there) Then something about graceful degrading. Which is fair except for him not sufficiently providing any reason JS crypto never works. (and not relevant). He apparently meant this with d. Depends greatly on the deployment situation, but in general it's FUD. "AND WHEN YOU SAID "VIEW-SOURCE TRANSPARENCY WAS ILLUSORY"? We meant that you can't just look at a Javascript file and know that it's secure, even in the vanishingly unlikely event that you were a skilled cryptographer, because of all the reasons we just cited." Yeah. Welcome to programming. There's absolutely no truth to this claim btw. Vagely referring to a large body of rubbish is not an argument. The rest does not even try to take a direct shot anymore. Something about how users that use 100 programs are more likely to find an insecure one than people that use only 2 or 3. He's the kind of guy that claims cracking and rewriting SSL connections is easy, whereas using AES for a secure "cryptosystem" is hard. I don't know what's up with this guy. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 10626 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140726/5d06efc8/attachment.txt> From zen at freedbms.net Sat Jul 26 00:12:51 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 17:12:51 +1000 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> On 7/26/14, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices > mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to > service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs > of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where > real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. There was Groklaw, but that is no more. I have presumed in the past that certain "groundwork" work might be useful for those involved in cases. However, pre-emptive action is difficult due to the number of jurisdictions. Groklaw built on the SCO case, which was a) widely reported, b) struck at the heart of the free/libre software world, c) involved big budged companies, d) continued for a very long time. A very valuable literary-legal resource was created by that effort (other cases were covered to some degrees). I would discourage self-represented defence in cases surrounding Tor/I2P etc, due to the potential significance of adverse consequences to the broader *globabl* free-speech network communities! Self-represented may be ok in conjunction with support from pro-liberty lawyers. This might be quite jurisdiction-sensitive, I don't know. But first and foremost, we have a duty of care to each other in this freedom-speech community, to not hide such cases from those who would be able to support, due to the potential community chilling effects. SO, such a list might be a very useful thing to set up, so that those who might "valantly" charge ahead in a case self-representing, might receive the support and the cautions from supportive lawyers regarding all possible approaches, etc, etc. Regards Zenaan From s at ctrlc.hu Sat Jul 26 08:13:28 2014 From: s at ctrlc.hu (stef) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 17:13:28 +0200 Subject: archive ssl key expired Message-ID: <20140726151328.GE6799@ctrlc.hu> to whom it may concern: https://cpunks.org//pipermail/ -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt From carimachet at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 11:16:39 2014 From: carimachet at gmail.com (Cari Machet) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 18:16:39 +0000 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> i would be interested to collaborate on making one On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 7:12 AM, Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net> wrote: > On 7/26/14, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > > Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices > > mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to > > service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs > > of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where > > real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. > > > There was Groklaw, but that is no more. > > I have presumed in the past that certain "groundwork" work might be > useful for those involved in cases. > > However, pre-emptive action is difficult due to the number of > jurisdictions. Groklaw built on the SCO case, which was a) widely > reported, b) struck at the heart of the free/libre software world, c) > involved big budged companies, d) continued for a very long time. > > A very valuable literary-legal resource was created by that effort > (other cases were covered to some degrees). > > I would discourage self-represented defence in cases surrounding > Tor/I2P etc, due to the potential significance of adverse consequences > to the broader *globabl* free-speech network communities! > > Self-represented may be ok in conjunction with support from > pro-liberty lawyers. This might be quite jurisdiction-sensitive, I > don't know. > > But first and foremost, we have a duty of care to each other in this > freedom-speech community, to not hide such cases from those who would > be able to support, due to the potential community chilling effects. > > SO, such a list might be a very useful thing to set up, so that those > who might "valantly" charge ahead in a case self-representing, might > receive the support and the cautions from supportive lawyers regarding > all possible approaches, etc, etc. > > Regards > Zenaan > -- Cari Machet NYC 646-436-7795 carimachet at gmail.com AIM carismachet Syria +963-099 277 3243 Amman +962 077 636 9407 Berlin +49 152 11779219 Reykjavik +354 894 8650 Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> 7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187 Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without permission is strictly prohibited. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3302 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140726/66a7e7da/attachment.txt> From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 15:38:08 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 19:38:08 -0300 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> On Sat, 26 Jul 2014 01:01:56 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > > I don't see any technical/cryptological way to defeat the > > proposed US law; it looks like a political problem that > > needs to be dealt with by political means. > > Proliferation is a political means. No it is not. > Keep on proliferating, > proliferate widely, proliferate fast, get all your friends and > business on it, get the public on it, remove the capability > for legacy plaintext, and embed and entrench crypto > deeper than the Marianas. > > Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and > give them your concerns LOLOLOLOL!!!!!1 > about backdoors and > your freedom/rights, your life being meta'd, recorded, > analyzed and stored forever for no good reason > (for which an interest in crypto and speech isn't one). > > Proliferate and speak! > > From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 15:38:46 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 19:38:46 -0300 Subject: EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d42cbd.0382340a.5232.ffff9d00@mx.google.com> On Sat, 26 Jul 2014 01:59:27 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices > mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to > service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs > of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where > real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. I doubt it. That's not how the maffia operates. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sat Jul 26 23:01:45 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 02:01:45 -0400 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAOsGNSShxMFrh-tfKYu4w411mGXtWXTFqGN170+-OVvuOGb=7g@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSShxMFrh-tfKYu4w411mGXtWXTFqGN170+-OVvuOGb=7g@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti280D0tS_g+D8AL0j36v5PZbR9jPTiiFJDC46f_aU5D0Gg@mail.gmail.com> > Juan scrit... > I doubt it. That's not how the maffia operates. Maffia are solely responsible for their image. What better way to repair it. On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 9:43 PM, Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net> wrote: > cases I said applied / best practices... ok, even if that includes hypothetical cases discussion... but not intending extant first person cases. Though it could presumably be used to find assistance therein. > An educational/ literary resource would resemble groklaw it seems. A resource is not a discussion, it's a book, boring, static, and unadapted. From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 00:45:20 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 03:45:20 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-ViPLrXvnnvVbcMXWm3yi8VF-2HMMj5RbBYeKhwL6GOw@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 6:38 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > LOLOLOLOL!!!!!1 So easy to troll. > No it is not. The truth, all multifaceted possibilities of such, is why we visit the seer in peyote hut. There are more seats on the floor available my friend. From zen at freedbms.net Sat Jul 26 18:43:47 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 11:43:47 +1000 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSShxMFrh-tfKYu4w411mGXtWXTFqGN170+-OVvuOGb=7g@mail.gmail.com> An educational/ literary resource would resemble groklaw it seems. On 7/27/14, Cari Machet <carimachet at gmail.com> wrote: > i would be interested to collaborate on making one > > > On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 7:12 AM, Zenaan Harkness <zen at freedbms.net> wrote: > >> On 7/26/14, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: >> > Is there such thing as an applied law / best practices >> > mailing list in the digital field... perhaps suited to >> > service providers, but also covering users, and meta-orgs >> > of digital/privacy/activism/rights, etc? And perhaps where >> > real lawyers might actually participate in discussion. >> >> >> There was Groklaw, but that is no more. >> >> I have presumed in the past that certain "groundwork" work might be >> useful for those involved in cases. >> >> However, pre-emptive action is difficult due to the number of >> jurisdictions. Groklaw built on the SCO case, which was a) widely >> reported, b) struck at the heart of the free/libre software world, c) >> involved big budged companies, d) continued for a very long time. >> >> A very valuable literary-legal resource was created by that effort >> (other cases were covered to some degrees). >> >> I would discourage self-represented defence in cases surrounding >> Tor/I2P etc, due to the potential significance of adverse consequences >> to the broader *globabl* free-speech network communities! >> >> Self-represented may be ok in conjunction with support from >> pro-liberty lawyers. This might be quite jurisdiction-sensitive, I >> don't know. >> >> But first and foremost, we have a duty of care to each other in this >> freedom-speech community, to not hide such cases from those who would >> be able to support, due to the potential community chilling effects. >> >> SO, such a list might be a very useful thing to set up, so that those >> who might "valantly" charge ahead in a case self-representing, might >> receive the support and the cautions from supportive lawyers regarding >> all possible approaches, etc, etc. >> >> Regards >> Zenaan >> > > > > -- > Cari Machet > NYC 646-436-7795 > carimachet at gmail.com > AIM carismachet > Syria +963-099 277 3243 > Amman +962 077 636 9407 > Berlin +49 152 11779219 > Reykjavik +354 894 8650 > Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> > > 7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187 > > Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the > addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this > information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without > permission is strictly prohibited. > From hozer at hozed.org Sun Jul 27 10:38:29 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 12:38:29 -0500 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users In-Reply-To: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> References: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> Message-ID: <20140727173829.GA22640@nl.grid.coop> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 02:15:15PM +0000, Anton Nesterov wrote: > It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of > Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining > technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network > Tor, codename TOR (navy)" > > ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) > > http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000008 Here's some press about it. http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/russia-announces-111000-bounty-identify-tor-users/?utm_source=o1&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=o1#!bnX9eL I find two things particularly amusing. 1) that russian companies and citizens would have to pay an entry fee 2) CMU dropped their blackhat presenation https://www.blackhat.com/latestintel/07212014-a-schedule-update.html How likely is it the NSA decided to embargoed CMU's presentation so they could keep the data flowing out of Russia via Tor, or does CMU just have a russian company they are going to 'license' this too? From rysiek at hackerspace.pl Sun Jul 27 05:53:51 2014 From: rysiek at hackerspace.pl (rysiek) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 14:53:51 +0200 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> Dnia sobota, 26 lipca 2014 19:38:08 Juan pisze: > > Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and > > give them your concerns > > LOLOLOLOL!!!!!1 Thank you so much for your concrete, well-fleshed and argued positive proposal on what actions can be undertaken. I appreciate a lot that you're not one of the people that just criticise any idea without providing ideas of their own. Refreshing. -- Pozdr rysiek -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 316 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140727/c6d12bfe/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 13:20:07 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 16:20:07 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <1406479353.3215.110.camel@terabyte> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <1406479353.3215.110.camel@terabyte> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29rp=OHUj+ocvVpgOfzC4Z74e2di+JioQH1qqPYStBh2w@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 12:42 PM, Benjamin Kreuter <brk7bx at virginia.edu> wrote: > That is probably not going to work. Suppose we lived in such a world > and the government established a "lawful intercept requirement." Ten > years later all the newest software and devices on the market would have > back doors, and only a small group of hackers and activists would be > using good crypto. Even that small group would have to use the > backdoor'd products for day-to-day things like banking. It's about entrenching good crypto and its benefits *before* govt's can react without needing to expend extra effort to rip out said entrenchment. > The government has a lot of experience with phasing out products, even > when it requires coordinating individual households. Analog TV is gone > despite the proliferation of analog receivers. Tetraethyl lead is only > used for niche purposes like aviation, despite the fact that once upon a > time people drive cars designed for leaded fuel. The government could > treat cryptography the same way if it wished. HD was better and opened spectrum, so people didn't rise against buying new TV's, especially for smaller cheaper LED vs CRT. Health was better and cars rusty, so people didn't rise against new cars, especially for cheaper and more fuel economy. Gov't wins when they offer something people want. The sooner you entrench something they want... crypto protection from 'the spies'... the sooner gov't will have a very hard time taking it away. Crypto is like candy to a world of newspawn Snowden babies... hard to pull once given. So start giving it away... https://www.prism-break.org/ > Here in the USA people are convinced that dangerous > criminals are lurking behind every corner Take those cowards you know out to the gun range and show them how to fix their house and cars. Man them up out of irrational fear and into confidence. People are pumped full of FUD, hard to combat directly, so tricky end arounds are needed. Anonymously pamphlet your workplace with EFF. > The importance of privacy and related civil rights are hard to explain > to people who never lived under the Stasi or the Securitate. Apparently Zuckerberg, Saverin, Moskovitz, Sandberg and others of Jewish heritage behind Facebook have forgotten what collecting, processing and benefiting from data on users can turn into. As ones who should know, why are they collecting and not out there 'explaining'? > the NSA. Again, hard to combat. Make it real for them... everything they do is collected, stored, watched... convos, pics, mail, a life of their expressed thoughts... without their consent, forever. Count the cameras on your ride home from work, the junkmail in your post, the ads in your browser. > You should write to your representatives, because that is part of the > power you have. It's also relatively easy to stop by local party offices and ask 'Hey, what are you guys doing about all this spying stuff?'. Presenting issues in person is hard to ignore, I've had good experiences with local official types. From komachi at openmailbox.org Sun Jul 27 11:37:35 2014 From: komachi at openmailbox.org (Anton Nesterov) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 18:37:35 +0000 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users Message-ID: <53D546EF.6060704@openmailbox.org> Troy Benjegerdes wrote: > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 02:15:15PM +0000, Anton Nesterov wrote: >> It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of >> Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining >> technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network >> Tor, codename TOR (navy)" >> >> ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) >> >> http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000008 > > Here's some press about it. > > http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/russia-announces-111000-bounty-identify-tor-users/?utm_source=o1&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=o1#!bnX9eL > > I find two things particularly amusing. > > 1) that russian companies and citizens would have to pay an entry fee It's normal, almost all Russian procurements are like this. Also, it can be only companies that have licenses for access to classified information and for producing wiretapping devices, I'm not sure it can be citizens. Probably it will be some companies like MFI Soft or Norsi Trans who already produce devices Russian mass-surveillance program SORM. There is something more about that companies https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/lawful-interception-the-russian-approach > 2) CMU dropped their blackhat presenation > https://www.blackhat.com/latestintel/07212014-a-schedule-update.html > > How likely is it the NSA decided to embargoed CMU's presentation so they > could keep the data flowing out of Russia via Tor, or does CMU just have > a russian company they are going to 'license' this too? Not very likely. I don't think break Tor costs just $111,500. It seems more like report on existing weaknesses. Also, Russian journalists found some more interesting procurements published same day by same agency, including tender for trojan ( http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000017 ). From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 15:01:01 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 19:01:01 -0300 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> Message-ID: <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> On Sun, 27 Jul 2014 14:53:51 +0200 rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote: > Dnia sobota, 26 lipca 2014 19:38:08 Juan pisze: > > > Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and > > > give them your concerns > > > > LOLOLOLOL!!!!!1 > > Thank you so much for your concrete, well-fleshed and argued positive > proposal on what actions can be undertaken. I appreciate a lot that > you're not one of the people that just criticise any idea without > providing ideas of their own. Refreshing. You understand that you don't have a leg to stand on, right? I'll make it more clear. What you propose is useless, nay, it is counterproductive. Of course you do not want to hear (or read) this. Your reply? You whine because (you say) I don't propose a better solution. Actually, telling you to stop doing something that is counterprductive is in itself a better proposal than yours. But go ahead. Get one more grant for your 'NGO' - bonus points if the grant comes from the pentagon! J. > From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 16:01:09 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 19:01:09 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] Browser JS (client side) crypto FUD In-Reply-To: <20140726185728.GH6725@thunk.org> References: <CAHWD2rKJxyh+Z6v3=UUCKFyTfkEQ8+9-YYjFFrvm9hOKXrhb+g@mail.gmail.com> <20140726185728.GH6725@thunk.org> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29iFBDyMZyLXTyHUAf5smHeu6OiSBYb7nZrj_CFsvK1=g@mail.gmail.com> On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso at mit.edu> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 05:03:46PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: >> >> "WHAT'S THE "CHICKEN-EGG PROBLEM" WITH DELIVERING JAVASCRIPT CRYPTOGRAPHY? > Somebody, please, give me something to say against people that claim JS > client side crypto can just never work! // ianG // It's like opportunistic security.. // It specifically defeats mass surveillance... This is a valuable thing. Yes, it's nice and helps. It just needs to come with better disclaimers. Otherwise companies/providers that remain silent on their threat models do nothing but tarnish themselves amongst those that know better. Such silence could backfire. Whether they get used as an bad example in security presentations, or something happens to one or more of their users they effectively sold (or gave) snakeoil to. > Like it or not, the vast majority of people are using some kind of web > based e-mail, whether it's GMail or Yahoo Mail or Hotmail, or > something else. Please provide link to your source that breaks down Email use by HTTP, IMAP/SMTP and legacy POP. And their crypted versions. > I think it's a bit more complicated than you're making it out to be. > Ultimately, the nearly all of the software that people run come from > the network, at one time or another. Even if you are using gpg > running on your linux laptop, where did you get your copy of gpg and > the Linux OS? Odds are, you got it over the network. The problem is the context of where in the network you got the software from, and who you're using it with, and who you're trying to keep in the dark. If your first install or subsequent updates are from your mail, storage, or comms central service provider, etc... that's a major and direct conflict of your security interests. It's why Matasano objects. You don't download your OS from your adversary. On the other hand, if you obtain and use the code independantly of your provider, or the code creates a disinterested decentral P2P infrastructure (Freenet, etc)... then you're in a much better position. You've inserted a layer of independance/abstraction. Similar to installing gnupg to use independantly... https://openpgpjs.org/ http://code.google.com/p/crypto-js/ You should be able to download openpgp.js from the code distribution point, read any audits, check the sig, locally load and permanently lock it into your browser from your plugins directory. And then mail providers should develop a consistant RFC based API from which you interact with them so you don't have to download whatever blob they claim you need. Directly trusting codeloading works fine for internal corporate environments. But it's a really bad idea elsewhere. Examples of careful differences in security model... Holds the keys https://www.hushmail.com/ Provides the code https://encrypt.to/ https://www.bitaddress.org/ https://brainwallet.github.io/ Browser addon (likely dependant on provider webmail scraping 'API': remember attempts to scrape providers that did not offer IMAP/POP.) https://www.mailvelope.com/ Standalone webclient https://whiteout.io/technology.html https://www.mailpile.is/ https://github.com/pagekite/Mailpile Standalone UI https://www.enigmail.net/ From juan.g71 at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 15:03:36 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 19:03:36 -0300 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users In-Reply-To: <20140727173829.GA22640@nl.grid.coop> References: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> <20140727173829.GA22640@nl.grid.coop> Message-ID: <53d575fb.a677340a.4f27.ffffd0cb@mx.google.com> On Sun, 27 Jul 2014 12:38:29 -0500 Troy Benjegerdes <hozer at hozed.org> wrote: > 2) CMU dropped their blackhat presenation > https://www.blackhat.com/latestintel/07212014-a-schedule-update.html > > How likely is it the NSA decided to embargoed CMU's presentation so > they could keep the data flowing out of Russia via Tor, or does CMU > just have a russian company they are going to 'license' this too? Oh come on. What kind of nutcase conspiracy theorist would propose such a morally outrageous theory? The US governemnt and its employees (like the tor team for instance) are the good guys. You'll get nowhere if you fail to grasp this basic premise. > > From grarpamp at gmail.com Sun Jul 27 16:30:53 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 19:30:53 -0400 Subject: Fwd: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs In-Reply-To: <53D54320.3080201@casparbowden.net> References: <E1XAWtJ-0001RI-KM@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz> <53D54320.3080201@casparbowden.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-hjX2oH0Znu6ni1-Td_Cz9bYCeDpfcWjWVfR6xN0+2ZA@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Caspar Bowden (lists) <lists at casparbowden.net> Date: Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 2:21 PM Subject: Re: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>, crypto.jmk at gmail.com, justgold79 at gmail.com Cc: cryptography at metzdowd.com On 07/25/14 06:13, Peter Gutmann wrote: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk at gmail.com> writes: Yeah, and the judge and prosecutor who get your case will be helpless before your clever skills at evading them, because they've never had to deal with literal-minded people trying transparent dodges to get around the law before. You will doubtless enjoy the same success as tax protesters do when they end up in court. And shortly thereafter, you'll enjoy an all-expenses- paid vacation with free room and board, courtesy of the US government. This should be preserved somewhere as the standard response to the Rumpelstiltskin Defence ("you can't prove I'm using crypto/know the keys so you'll have to let me go"). This perfectly sums up what will happen to anyone who wants to try the Rumpelstiltskin Defence in court. In UK law, there is a Rumpelstiltskin Defence (and although I am not happy with the result, I caused it to be put there and it is better than nothing) http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2000-06-28a.1006.27#g1007.6 (that's all there is BTW - not aware of anything worthwhile written since, grateful for any refs or cases) see also www.fipr.org/sfs8/bowden.pdf Caspar Bowden _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography From zen at freedbms.net Sun Jul 27 18:33:37 2014 From: zen at freedbms.net (Zenaan Harkness) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 11:33:37 +1000 Subject: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list? In-Reply-To: <3893-Sun27Jul2014115301-0400-eben@harlan.sflc-vpn> References: <CAD2Ti2-KYCQgVMo0OBLyD_H2cbWLXt0uwcXO-1rYAFk6VjipKw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSQ0N2H+MM1764XUbduguCup17o1feOBdkdr1ai9Rsh7zA@mail.gmail.com> <CAGRDzQXbd-5cUcfvTRsGWZ+3cky4eU3C=o7y5RU6pa+pToQfGQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAOsGNSShxMFrh-tfKYu4w411mGXtWXTFqGN170+-OVvuOGb=7g@mail.gmail.com> <3893-Sun27Jul2014115301-0400-eben@harlan.sflc-vpn> Message-ID: <CAOsGNSQojLdOc5NhP0uE7cqQvE8w9bg4BW7GGFP=iAgyTp+a3A@mail.gmail.com> Eben's emails get rejected from at least one of these lists. If there is a whitelist facility, his email addy ought definitely be on it. On 7/28/14, Eben Moglen <moglen at columbia.edu> wrote: > Yes, but please be careful that people don't rely on the conversation > as legal advice. That should be printed in the footer of every > message that goes through the system: This isn't legal advice, you > can't rely on it. If you have questions, get local legal help AND > etc. From jya at pipeline.com Mon Jul 28 13:30:12 2014 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 16:30:12 -0400 Subject: NSA Systems Abroad Query Message-ID: <E1XBrWL-0006qI-Rk@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net> What is NSA "WB Quad System" for GCHQ, Amberwind (PL), TIGERFIRE (IN), IBIS (AU, JP), GCSB SSO Site (NZ): <http://t.co/AoBG9jyuAY>http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fy13-semiannual-report.pdf This is an NSA travel expenses report. Via Jason Leopold. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 317 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140728/69d9bd41/attachment.txt> From coderman at gmail.com Mon Jul 28 16:56:03 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 16:56:03 -0700 Subject: [cryptography] NSA Systems Abroad Query In-Reply-To: <E1XBrWL-0006qI-Rk@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <E1XBrWL-0006qI-Rk@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TR4i9Fs==QexGkbZNTrzmThSeSt=Q3hYoiVpxXuxoxJA@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 1:30 PM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote: > What is NSA "WB Quad System" my money on: WideBand Quadrature Receiver System (no doubt they build very nice ones...) From l at odewijk.nl Mon Jul 28 09:05:47 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:05:47 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <3 I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: * Exists on many hardware nodes that can be run by untrusted third parties, as the hardware is "tamper evident" and the "cloud computing grid" is self healing and distributing. * Can run programs in a way that geographic location is unknowable - Onion routing, amongst other features, causes programs to seemingly run on every node in the network * Cannot inspect what runs on it - the microkernel programs cannot read what the programs are doing, nor can programs contact one another unless they are instances (that potentially run on another hardware node). * Is fault tolerant, automatically scaling, etc. * Can still be addressed from the Internet or other networks You could run something like your Bitcoin wallet in it. It's really geodistributed, automatically fault tolerant, etc. There's no way to tamper with the programs running, except as specified before a cluster was created. Right now you're always stuck with an insane amount of local law, hardware issues (and features), fault tolerance, accessibility, etc. With this you could run a program in a nigh-perfect vacuum. Your program would be networked, but not in any specific place. Nobody can know what it does, but it can compute and it can communicate as it wishes. Depending on the grid (grids have to be manifactured in one go, checked by several third parties, distributed, set and forget) there's some pricing scheme or whatnot. But it absolutely requires a verified microkernel. I'm *very *excited to see that we're making progress towards it. If you're a secure kernel developer, Onion routing expert, fantastic C coder or technology investor, and this triggered your interests, please contact me! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2062 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140728/e1777e6a/attachment.txt> From eugen at leitl.org Mon Jul 28 09:20:42 2014 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:20:42 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <20140728162042.GN26986@leitl.org> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > news: > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ > site: I'm on their announcement list. Good news, question is who's going to pick it up and build a distro around that. Anyone here use Qubes OS? > http://sel4.systems/ > > AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. > > Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). From guninski at guninski.com Mon Jul 28 08:26:50 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:26:50 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" Message-ID: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> news: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ site: http://sel4.systems/ AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Mon Jul 28 10:26:53 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal (Phone)) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:26:53 +0100 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <04f23237-6d4a-47a8-83f7-2c429cb2a8af@email.android.com> Theory-wise, a Turing-complete system can emulate any other turing complete system unless the emulatee has an ace up its sleeve; something unique to the hardware that canot be simulated without breaking authenticity. This is probably only *theoretically* possible with quantum computation, but it's *practically* possible with tamperproof hardware: TCMs used for good instead of evil, maybe? On 28 July 2014 18:04:05 GMT+01:00, "Lodewijk andré de la porte" <l at odewijk.nl> wrote: >2014-07-28 18:35 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > >> > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that >verifiably: >> >> verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO >> (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). >> > >Yes, it needs crypto. I said verifably because "proving" an >untamperable >hardware box (IOW: you can only plug it in, nothing else) is what the >spec >says it is, is, well, impossible. > >You'll depend on some observers, audits and where possibly physical >impossibilities, to show that indeed it is what it is. It's not proof, >but >with trust you can verify it. > >It's as good as it gets, but no better. I don't think that'd surprise >anyone. > >Part of the design involves generations. Eventually you'll have a >generation for which something is questionable in a certain way, >nothing to >do about it. Generations will slowly die as the hardware breaks and the >network becomes too small (has too few resources) to uphold anonymity >and >fault-tolerance guarantees. > >Perhaps a generation will be hybrid with blackbloxes mailed to people >and >satellites in space. That generation would be expected to deteriorate >fast >in the first 100 years, and then hardly deteriorate at all for many >after >that. > >All these different grids will have some sort of resource pricing >scheme, >that may guarantee a certain runtime, or may be subject to monthly >renewals >at new market prices or whatnot. It's a very interesting part of the >design. > >But yes, the anonymity profits /greatly/ from crypto. Interestingly I >think >it could well work without crypto, whereas hardly any other designs >could. >It'd lose a lot of convenience though! And P = NP doesn't mean crypto >is >useless, just less nice. At the very least there'll be OTPs! Then there >may >be (quantum) couple RNGs that can generate secure OTPs. I think >there'll >always be ways the newer generations of this idea can continue to >function. > > >> > But it absolutely requires a verified microkernel. I'm *very >*excited to >> > see that we're making progress towards it. >> >> Is it really a progress? >> There are assumption free proofs of False >> in most formal proof systems. >> >> Design flaws like \lor instead of \land >> pass the verification process and later are >> considered design flaws, not bugs in proof IMHO. >> >> Knuth quote: >> "Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved >> it correct, not tried it." > > >It's progress, because now all we need is to specify safely, or find a >way >to prove specifications. The rest is somewhat, maybe, experimentally >operational. It'll depend on how well we use it, but it is a step in >the >right direction! -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 4330 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140728/a3af5d33/attachment.txt> From guninski at guninski.com Mon Jul 28 08:31:16 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 18:31:16 +0300 Subject: Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users In-Reply-To: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> References: <53D114F3.4040004@openmailbox.org> Message-ID: <20140728153116.GB2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 02:15:15PM +0000, Anton Nesterov wrote: > It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of > Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining > technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network > Tor, codename TOR (navy)" > > ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) > > http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumber=0373100088714000008 According to my conspiracy theory, this is just disinformation to calm down paranoid Tor lusers. They well might be in bed with the american comrades. If the above is false the price appears too low for significant sploit. According to a Snowden leak the NSA wrote in presentation something along the lines: "We can deanonymize some Tor lusers, but we definitely don't won't to scare _all of them_". From l at odewijk.nl Mon Jul 28 10:04:05 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 19:04:05 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-28 18:35 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: > > verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO > (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). > Yes, it needs crypto. I said verifably because "proving" an untamperable hardware box (IOW: you can only plug it in, nothing else) is what the spec says it is, is, well, impossible. You'll depend on some observers, audits and where possibly physical impossibilities, to show that indeed it is what it is. It's not proof, but with trust you can verify it. It's as good as it gets, but no better. I don't think that'd surprise anyone. Part of the design involves generations. Eventually you'll have a generation for which something is questionable in a certain way, nothing to do about it. Generations will slowly die as the hardware breaks and the network becomes too small (has too few resources) to uphold anonymity and fault-tolerance guarantees. Perhaps a generation will be hybrid with blackbloxes mailed to people and satellites in space. That generation would be expected to deteriorate fast in the first 100 years, and then hardly deteriorate at all for many after that. All these different grids will have some sort of resource pricing scheme, that may guarantee a certain runtime, or may be subject to monthly renewals at new market prices or whatnot. It's a very interesting part of the design. But yes, the anonymity profits /greatly/ from crypto. Interestingly I think it could well work without crypto, whereas hardly any other designs could. It'd lose a lot of convenience though! And P = NP doesn't mean crypto is useless, just less nice. At the very least there'll be OTPs! Then there may be (quantum) couple RNGs that can generate secure OTPs. I think there'll always be ways the newer generations of this idea can continue to function. > > But it absolutely requires a verified microkernel. I'm *very *excited to > > see that we're making progress towards it. > > Is it really a progress? > There are assumption free proofs of False > in most formal proof systems. > > Design flaws like \lor instead of \land > pass the verification process and later are > considered design flaws, not bugs in proof IMHO. > > Knuth quote: > "Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved > it correct, not tried it." It's progress, because now all we need is to specify safely, or find a way to prove specifications. The rest is somewhat, maybe, experimentally operational. It'll depend on how well we use it, but it is a step in the right direction! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3465 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140728/e7368d40/attachment.txt> From guninski at guninski.com Mon Jul 28 09:35:27 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 19:35:27 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). > But it absolutely requires a verified microkernel. I'm *very *excited to > see that we're making progress towards it. Is it really a progress? There are assumption free proofs of False in most formal proof systems. Design flaws like \lor instead of \land pass the verification process and later are considered design flaws, not bugs in proof IMHO. Knuth quote: "Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it." From hozer at hozed.org Tue Jul 29 07:31:11 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 09:31:11 -0500 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <20140729143111.GF22640@nl.grid.coop> When you can write an interrupt or page fault handler in rust, let me know. On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 02:03:28PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > That seems suspect. Most obvious security flaws in C are due to > misimplemented C, right? Not the algorithms themselves? So the kernel > can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer overflows > and pointer errors? > > I'll wait until someone redoes it in a language designed for safe > systems programming, like Rust. :) > > On 29/07/14 13:41, Georgi Guninski wrote: > > I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed > > some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to > > on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C > > code invalidate the proofs? > > > > The haskell stuff appear to not contain all > > info about the C code. > > > > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > >> news: > >> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ > >> site: > >> http://sel4.systems/ > >> > >> AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. > >> > >> Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). > > -- > T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA > P: +353876363185 > W: http://indiebiotech.com > pub 4096R/988B9099 2013-02-06 Cathal Garvey (Other accs: onetruecathal at twitter, cathalgarvey at github, cathalgarvey at gitorious, indiebiotech.com) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> > uid Cathal Garvey (Microstatus account) <onetruecathal at twitter.com> > uid Cathal Garvey (Gitorious code hosting account) <cathalgarvey at gitorious.org> > sub 4096R/65B3395F 2013-02-06 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Troy Benjegerdes 'da hozer' hozer at hozed.org 7 elements earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul grid.coop Never pick a fight with someone who buys ink by the barrel, nor try buy a hacker who makes money by the megahash From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 13:53:23 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 13:53:23 -0700 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 12:57 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing anything. > Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the nihilists. anarchism is about autonomy, personal responsibility, utmost liberty. delegating what should not be delegated to corrupt(ing) centralized powers is the source of great harm and suffering across humanity. the heart of anarchism is opposing centralized control and power, whether unitary or hierarchical, in all domains of life. anarchism has the potential to be most robust and most just, in the same way that well built fully decentralized systems are robust against classes of faults endemic in centralized structures. rational anarchy, however, does appear to require a higher class of human animal than currently populates the planet... best regards, From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Tue Jul 29 06:03:28 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 14:03:28 +0100 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> That seems suspect. Most obvious security flaws in C are due to misimplemented C, right? Not the algorithms themselves? So the kernel can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer overflows and pointer errors? I'll wait until someone redoes it in a language designed for safe systems programming, like Rust. :) On 29/07/14 13:41, Georgi Guninski wrote: > I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed > some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to > on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C > code invalidate the proofs? > > The haskell stuff appear to not contain all > info about the C code. > > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: >> news: >> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ >> site: >> http://sel4.systems/ >> >> AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. >> >> Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/655ff37e/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/655ff37e/attachment.sig> From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Tue Jul 29 07:23:27 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:23:27 +0100 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53D7AE5F.9060106@cathalgarvey.me> On 29/07/14 14:55, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > 2014-07-29 15:03 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > >> So the kernel can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer >> overflows and pointer errors? >> > > No. Care to elaborate? I can mathematically prove any theorem, then implement it in C and segfault the kernel. How is this different? -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/807519b1/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/807519b1/attachment.sig> From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 29 05:41:38 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:41:38 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C code invalidate the proofs? The haskell stuff appear to not contain all info about the C code. On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > news: > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ > site: > http://sel4.systems/ > > AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. > > Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 12:45:45 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:45:45 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <72A00785-C141-4316-8E20-0331306AB9EE@gmail.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <1406479353.3215.110.camel@terabyte> <CAD2Ti29rp=OHUj+ocvVpgOfzC4Z74e2di+JioQH1qqPYStBh2w@mail.gmail.com> <72A00785-C141-4316-8E20-0331306AB9EE@gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29pSgeLpox1-CdCB38V=OuGCU6vDSYtzk-PtLK6wZ4AaQ@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 12:07 PM, John Kelsey <crypto.jmk at gmail.com> wrote: > On the other hand, mass surveillance is one of those issues that > gets a very strong consensus among the people at the top, regardless > of their political party--even if the public as a whole doesn't > like the idea This is because they are in fear of the people. So they feel the need to mass surveil them in order to stay on top of potential issues with their position that could lead to, ultimately, revolt. Why are they in fear? Because they are doing wrong, if not for their own individual selves, for the collective power at the top. Any true servant of the people will have no such fear or need because no one can point any finger at them... they serve, they do not rule. > if both big parties' leadership supports it, who are you going > to vote for, to register your disagreement? You will never, ever, under any circumstance, vote for (in the US) either of the two parties so long as they continually play into an effective one party system. You will only vote for other third and further parties, and rarely choose incumbents among such, unless they are shown to serve the people. You will not fail to vote such thirds unless there is no third candidate. A vote for Dem/Rep (in US) is an obviously wasted vote supporting maintenance of power, the effective 'one party' system... not servants. >> Here in the USA people are convinced that dangerous >> criminals are lurking behind every corner > I don't think this is quite right. Media focus on fear and outrage > because they sell papers and draw eyeballs, and they're easy to do. It is exactly right. Only reason media focus wins is because sheep eyeballs believe and flock to it. It is self reinforcing. Media is especially guilty of choosing to profiteer from these sheep rather than pursue real journalism. You must break that bullshit feedback loop. Hope and Change... lol. From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 29 06:55:38 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:55:38 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> 2014-07-29 15:03 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > So the kernel can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer > overflows and pointer errors? > No. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 583 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/1bd12f25/attachment.txt> From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 12:57:11 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:57:11 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_mdy7kbt=zEDGvfTM5fKoHr=8kTHiZcXaVfFZmVNyO7w@mail.gmail.com> On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 6:01 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > You whine because (you say) I don't propose a > better solution. Actually, telling you to stop doing something > that is counterprductive is in itself a better proposal Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing anything. Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. From cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me Tue Jul 29 07:58:25 2014 From: cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me (Cathal Garvey) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:58:25 +0100 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729143111.GF22640@nl.grid.coop> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> <20140729143111.GF22640@nl.grid.coop> Message-ID: <53D7B691.4060107@cathalgarvey.me> Lol, I haven't even written "hello world" in it yet, but I believe this is exactly the sort of future use-case Rust is for. Perhaps I'm mistaken, but surely someone's dreamt up a more modern take on C with memory safety that can be used instead? On 29/07/14 15:31, Troy Benjegerdes wrote: > When you can write an interrupt or page fault handler in rust, let > me know. > > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 02:03:28PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: >> That seems suspect. Most obvious security flaws in C are due to >> misimplemented C, right? Not the algorithms themselves? So the kernel >> can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer overflows >> and pointer errors? >> >> I'll wait until someone redoes it in a language designed for safe >> systems programming, like Rust. :) >> >> On 29/07/14 13:41, Georgi Guninski wrote: >>> I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed >>> some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to >>> on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C >>> code invalidate the proofs? >>> >>> The haskell stuff appear to not contain all >>> info about the C code. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: >>>> news: >>>> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ >>>> site: >>>> http://sel4.systems/ >>>> >>>> AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. >>>> >>>> Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). >> >> -- >> T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA >> P: +353876363185 >> W: http://indiebiotech.com > >> pub 4096R/988B9099 2013-02-06 Cathal Garvey (Other accs: onetruecathal at twitter, cathalgarvey at github, cathalgarvey at gitorious, indiebiotech.com) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> >> uid Cathal Garvey (Microstatus account) <onetruecathal at twitter.com> >> uid Cathal Garvey (Gitorious code hosting account) <cathalgarvey at gitorious.org> >> sub 4096R/65B3395F 2013-02-06 > > > > -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x988B9099.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 6176 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/f8c88359/attachment.key> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 901 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/f8c88359/attachment.sig> From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 13:07:09 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 16:07:09 -0400 Subject: Help me test Alpha? In-Reply-To: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> References: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28wvbpded_rz2gHL9H0yWHdkJ-Myq7N0ww-hhuCt8=-zA@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 7:57 PM, Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: > If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to set up a > Features: Do you offer a long term proposal to the mailsphere for this service? What is its purpose, intended goals, backing, security/compliance posture/plan, ethic, etc. From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 13:10:29 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 16:10:29 -0400 Subject: Help me test Alpha? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti28wvbpded_rz2gHL9H0yWHdkJ-Myq7N0ww-hhuCt8=-zA@mail.gmail.com> References: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> <CAD2Ti28wvbpded_rz2gHL9H0yWHdkJ-Myq7N0ww-hhuCt8=-zA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29CZz3qi7cBq7Km_LVb5v1mCDXTbb6EiVp0WU_fYu82gQ@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 7:57 PM, Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: > If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to set up a > Features: Do you offer a long term proposal to the mailsphere for this service? What is its purpose, intended goals, backing, security/compliance posture/plan (to the user and service), its ethic, politik, etc. From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 29 07:14:13 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 17:14:13 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 07:04:05PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > 2014-07-28 18:35 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > > > > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: > > > > verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO > > (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). > > > > Yes, it needs crypto. I said verifably because "proving" an untamperable > hardware box (IOW: you can only plug it in, nothing else) is what the spec > says it is, is, well, impossible. > Don't think what you wish is possible, but don't mind you dreaming :) IIRC _theoretically_ it is possible to run trusted program on untrusted hardware with the catch that you need some additional "proof" - this was a paper can't find at the moment. From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 29 07:23:39 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 17:23:39 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> <CAHWD2rLR31P1OqbZ9+ygdDy5RNDNyKhM0Ky9qM9mN9cOeC62og@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140729142339.GC2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 03:55:38PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > 2014-07-29 15:03 GMT+02:00 Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me>: > > > So the kernel can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer > > overflows and pointer errors? > > > > No. Yes, I have such kernel and proof ;) From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 29 09:08:04 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 18:08:04 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> > > Care to elaborate? I can mathematically prove any theorem, then > implement it in C and segfault the kernel. How is this different? These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it will work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as specified. But of course the specification may also contain bugs as opposed to the human-intended specification. But this is also something they explain, just read about their proofs and proof system. (This is all IIRC from last time I checked it, which is a pretty while ago) 2014-07-29 16:14 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 07:04:05PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > > 2014-07-28 18:35 GMT+02:00 Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>: > > > > > > I have a rough outline for a "cloud computing grid" that verifiably: > > > > > > verifiably? _really_ provable stuff is a very scarce resource IMHO > > > (especially in crypto. do you need crypto? Do you need P \ne NP?). > > > > > > > Yes, it needs crypto. I said verifably because "proving" an untamperable > > hardware box (IOW: you can only plug it in, nothing else) is what the > spec > > says it is, is, well, impossible. > > > > Don't think what you wish is possible, but > don't mind you dreaming :) > Aha, but it is possible :) Dream along if you like! IIRC _theoretically_ it is possible to run > trusted program on untrusted hardware > with the catch that you need some additional > "proof" - this was a paper can't find at the > moment. > I think you're talking about trusted computing, and I'm not talking about trusted computing :). I've seen some examples of trusted computing but the operation set was always not Turing complete. It might work, actually, but I don't see how. The system I'm talking about it not just a software system. It also involves hardware. The hardware will be created centrally, in batches. Probably by a third party and certainly checked by several independent observers to make sure it goes according to an open sourced specification. The devices from those batches can be plugged in and maintained by untrusted parties. IOW: they're shipped off to individuals who'll plug them in anywhere. The devices are tamper-proofed to such an extend that that is possible without exposing the sensitive data kept on them. The software that (as verified by the third parties present in manufacture) runs on the devices cannot snoop on the programs running on the system. The devices network together, likely over the Internet but maybe also radio. They Onion route all traffic. Etc. etc. Programs run on them but they cannot know what the program is doing. They're not updateable. They will all slowly fail and to make sure there's still places you can run your software there is generations. So a next batch forms a different computing grid. I'm repeating bits and peaces, but I want to be sure that you can see that it's a hardware design made useful by a software solution to fault proofness and program "location". -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 4661 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/3c39b33d/attachment.txt> From l at odewijk.nl Tue Jul 29 09:36:19 2014 From: l at odewijk.nl (=?UTF-8?Q?Lodewijk_andr=C3=A9_de_la_porte?=) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 18:36:19 +0200 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <CAHWD2r++cKdMmxatoEM2WpRsUbqvRZyEFZUSEkK2ABamTTFw8w@mail.gmail.com> On Jul 29, 2014 6:14 PM, "Georgi Guninski" <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: > > >These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the > >sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we > >said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it will > >work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as > >specified. > > By browsing the proofs, I have the impression > they don't depend on the C code (and Isabelle > parsing C appears not very trivial, though > possible). > > If I backdoor the C code of the kernel, will > the proof fail? Isn't that the whole idea? It would really change the thing up if there's a backdoor! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 939 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140729/a8dd3c4c/attachment.txt> From guninski at guninski.com Tue Jul 29 09:14:18 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 19:14:18 +0300 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> >These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the >sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we >said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it will >work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as >specified. By browsing the proofs, I have the impression they don't depend on the C code (and Isabelle parsing C appears not very trivial, though possible). If I backdoor the C code of the kernel, will the proof fail? From juan.g71 at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 15:23:18 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 19:23:18 -0300 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_mdy7kbt=zEDGvfTM5fKoHr=8kTHiZcXaVfFZmVNyO7w@mail.gmail.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> <CAD2Ti2_mdy7kbt=zEDGvfTM5fKoHr=8kTHiZcXaVfFZmVNyO7w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d81d98.538f3a0a.6c3f.1c78@mx.google.com> On Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:57:11 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 6:01 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > > You whine because (you say) I don't propose a > > better solution. Actually, telling you to stop doing > > something that is counterprductive is in itself a better proposal > > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing anything. > Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. You know, apart from the theoretical/logical (and moral) case for anarchism, I also have a less principled remark to make. Actually it's a rather pragmatic, 'realistic' and utilitarian remark : I wouldn't object too much to reformism/gradualism IF it really worked. But if anything, and as matter of cold hard fact, reformism seems to work against freedom. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 15:48:56 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 19:48:56 -0300 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d82395.c8973a0a.3735.24e1@mx.google.com> On Tue, 29 Jul 2014 13:53:23 -0700 coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 12:57 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > > ... > > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing > > anything. Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. > > authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the > nihilists. > > anarchism is about autonomy, personal responsibility, utmost liberty. > delegating what should not be delegated to corrupt(ing) centralized > powers is the source of great harm and suffering across humanity. the > heart of anarchism is opposing centralized control and power, whether > unitary or hierarchical, in all domains of life. > > anarchism has the potential to be most robust and most just, in the > same way that well built fully decentralized systems are robust > against classes of faults endemic in centralized structures. > > rational anarchy, however, does appear to require a higher class of > human animal than currently populates the planet... > "does appear to require a higher class of human animal" Maybe so. But I'm sure you know the next few lines in the play =P If 'humans' are unable to solve their political problems by means of individual cooperation, then a HUMAN and coercitive government is going to make matters worse. People can't actually govern themselves but they can elect other PEOPLE to...governm them. And delegate to their masters an ability they don't have! Now that's some Pristine logic! Sorry, gotta run. Something is burning! (I'm glad I have a few gallons of gas to put the fire out) > > best regards, From sean at alexan.org Tue Jul 29 17:41:00 2014 From: sean at alexan.org (Sean Alexandre) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 20:41:00 -0400 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <53d82395.c8973a0a.3735.24e1@mx.google.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> <53d82395.c8973a0a.3735.24e1@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20140730004100.GA8948@tuzo> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 07:48:56PM -0300, Juan wrote: > On Tue, 29 Jul 2014 13:53:23 -0700 > coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 12:57 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > > > ... > > > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > > > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing > > > anything. Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. > > > > authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the > > nihilists. > > > > anarchism is about autonomy, personal responsibility, utmost liberty. > > delegating what should not be delegated to corrupt(ing) centralized > > powers is the source of great harm and suffering across humanity. the > > heart of anarchism is opposing centralized control and power, whether > > unitary or hierarchical, in all domains of life. > > > > anarchism has the potential to be most robust and most just, in the > > same way that well built fully decentralized systems are robust > > against classes of faults endemic in centralized structures. > > > > rational anarchy, however, does appear to require a higher class of > > human animal than currently populates the planet... > > > > "does appear to require a higher class of human animal" > > Maybe so. But I'm sure you know the next few lines in the play > =P > > If 'humans' are unable to solve their political problems by > means of individual cooperation, then a HUMAN and coercitive > government is going to make matters worse. > > People can't actually govern themselves but they can elect > other PEOPLE to...governm them. And delegate to their masters > an ability they don't have! Now that's some Pristine logic! > > > Sorry, gotta run. Something is burning! (I'm glad I have a few > gallons of gas to put the fire out) And a great zine on all this is: Life Without Law -- An Introduction to Anarchist Politics http://www.tangledwilderness.org/life-without-law/ From grarpamp at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 18:38:56 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 21:38:56 -0400 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti29TZ47yRXaLnufR3Y4-kbrRqMo3AYiT0G3YbwPF5FuRQg@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 4:53 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the nihilists. Being relatively closely related / along the same line in some areas, I do often mash them up. Anarchism surely more popularly known/studied than political nihilism. From juan.g71 at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 19:32:32 2014 From: juan.g71 at gmail.com (Juan) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 23:32:32 -0300 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29TZ47yRXaLnufR3Y4-kbrRqMo3AYiT0G3YbwPF5FuRQg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti29TZ47yRXaLnufR3Y4-kbrRqMo3AYiT0G3YbwPF5FuRQg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53d857fe.27bb340a.71ef.3e79@mx.google.com> On Tue, 29 Jul 2014 21:38:56 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 4:53 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote: > > authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the > > nihilists. > > Being relatively closely related / along the same line in > some areas, >I do often mash them up. Anarchism surely > more popularly known/studied than political nihilism. First time I come accross the term 'politica nihilism' google "political nihilism" - About 9,500 results wikitrash "Political nihilism is a branch of nihilism that follows the characteristic nihilist's rejection of non-rationalized or non-proven assertions," Hm. Now I just learnt that "nihilism" actually means something like rationalism??? Sounds off... The way you used "nihilism" in your previous message you seemed to be referring to the philosophy(?) of not "giving a damn about anything", "rejecting any moral value", et cetera. And equating political anarchy (voluntary organization) with what's ordinary known as nihilism is nonsense. This "political nihilism" thing seems like some ad hoc term, or maybe some new 'intelectual' 'fashion' or something, I personally don't find much value in introducing more confusing vocabulary... From coderman at gmail.com Tue Jul 29 23:43:35 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 23:43:35 -0700 Subject: on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"] In-Reply-To: <53d857fe.27bb340a.71ef.3e79@mx.google.com> References: <CAJVRA1TBbgbGcLcY7KN9DX8jBH68h=hsZY4M3Uq9K+uK6nNd1w@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti29TZ47yRXaLnufR3Y4-kbrRqMo3AYiT0G3YbwPF5FuRQg@mail.gmail.com> <53d857fe.27bb340a.71ef.3e79@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SN46qu2aj-drRfUQb-sS6crkR9Qx4zuzQWpjm3DRUDzQ@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 7:32 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > ... > First time I come accross the term 'politica nihilism' i find absurdism the proper ism-edit-distance betwixt existentialism and nihilism, to be honest. ... leave political plebicites to the bloviating bourgeoisie ;) From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 05:12:17 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 05:12:17 -0700 Subject: Update your Tors - Tor security advisory: "relay early" traffic confirmation attack Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SJYCZWWgZcZsbHcq72W1JcU7kvcau8aPxCuO=+tzn+vg@mail.gmail.com> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack [see also release notes per below] ''' On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks. The attacking relays joined the network on January 30 2014, and we removed them from the network on July 4. While we don't know when they started doing the attack, users who operated or accessed hidden services from early February through July 4 should assume they were affected. . . . Relays should upgrade to a recent Tor release (0.2.4.23 or 0.2.5.6-alpha), to close the particular protocol vulnerability the attackers used — but remember that preventing traffic confirmation in general remains an open research problem. Clients that upgrade (once new Tor Browser releases are ready) will take another step towards limiting the number of entry guards that are in a position to see their traffic, thus reducing the damage from future attacks like this one. Hidden service operators should consider changing the location of their hidden service. From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 05:25:23 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 05:25:23 -0700 Subject: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22 Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SbY1P3mAi7m4etQ8cwHu1LW0_tJAR_5OF-GG9UX-oUxw@mail.gmail.com> per hddupe some many days hence, [0] requesting public mirrors post-con of copied volumes for Cryptome and other archives, also to be mirrored on Cryptome and other non-affiliated onions. the five deep cryptome'ing petabytes future metropolis mesh near at hand!.... clogging signals directorate capacities like darth cheney's arterial plaque butter, . . . 0. "DEF CON media hard drive duping station - six 1:11 duplication towers / 3 x 4TB mirror tracks (BLUE, GREEN, ORANGE)" - https://defcon.org/html/defcon-22/dc-22-news.html#dc22hddupe From crypto at jpunix.net Wed Jul 30 04:04:03 2014 From: crypto at jpunix.net (Crypto) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:04:03 -0500 Subject: Help me test Alpha? In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29CZz3qi7cBq7Km_LVb5v1mCDXTbb6EiVp0WU_fYu82gQ@mail.gmail.com> References: <242325bacef5b80510f50b4748406c0b@jpunix.net> <CAD2Ti28wvbpded_rz2gHL9H0yWHdkJ-Myq7N0ww-hhuCt8=-zA@mail.gmail.com> <CAD2Ti29CZz3qi7cBq7Km_LVb5v1mCDXTbb6EiVp0WU_fYu82gQ@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <53D8D123.2010804@jpunix.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 7/29/2014 3:10 PM, grarpamp wrote: > On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 7:57 PM, Crypto <crypto at jpunix.net> wrote: >> If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to >> set up a Features: > > Do you offer a long term proposal to the mailsphere for this > service? What is its purpose, intended goals, backing, > security/compliance posture/plan (to the user and service), its > ethic, politik, etc. > For the time being I'm not offering my site as a bonafide service. I'm just testing private mail solutions. The test server is NOT anonymous as previously mentioned (anonymity is up to the user to define/create). The server is located in Amsterdam and is hosted by Digital Ocean. DO's corporate office is on U.S. soil so as to whether LEO's can request the archived emails from an account is debatable. As it stands I'm just offering it as a free service to anyone that would like to help me test my personal service. While we're on the subject, based on comments from a few people from this list that have subscribed I've updated the following: * Modified the server so that connections using older, insecure protocols has been disabled (RC4 and such) * PFS is now supported for IMAP * SpamAssassin will "learn" SPAM outside of the web browser. For instance if you are using Thunderbird with IMAP and you move a SPAM message to the Junk folder SA will "learn" about it. - -- Crypto https://www.digitalocean.com/?refcode=b90b690ca5bb -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT2NEjAAoJEDhzgt+U8WIyPdQP/0rJanR+1NTVW9bM9cnYGLud KmLeVkz63C96hhfjOWNYHRLgbTAK4iSEB3pgOO/aoaST0AgbibfKIjVJFzndHnM8 hgwWa/EkA2CS7UJjLgNbUZV/kN2/hPra28kORGTrtOX1qI2yUq+acJLSbWtunP2L MmVN5aj6lvOUA6jAGA0zmFfVzlkPxizELifxFZnFD0kV4fVrndoYNxLojYRcMrpJ rP6uKJO2dRiYl+/MXPNFqKp2iK+qckJHDCT5N6S1Xtw3aQMspHyVp+p7gyzVQf3I dtO1CYkbD89BlsZ4deiSgvCqQCl5RaIv4f1wcm5IJXoxqwifpK8QVeB7C/T7UdZ/ Keh1nmsgGao+QHj9FJekmr0cv4kUlX6Uor0iabfsevuJV2ilPCKU2hR3fySEJP8v 5A8ND3x3uHCYyjsayZwKwmWFQy1wJesbzmp+YTSy42SU7iDBUOKGjzLs+Xr3wN45 Kmvrcyg6uDvCdypW3rgJhKm7NR4jUc3sbiz/a2QxVEr6rwu1DpVK/4aTtxi7GAdX srmzOgrMEBhOQQSENKwGwNkeoCtBoZUvY1Msz/C1STqM/oPPPxhj0Fjx0+KKtTXf e7u3uLmbQOgIGEt4eWJN9jTv1ztp0RTgPH0cyi5d1G83IVtR5H/Y8EdNsr5kWOLy O+P4WHFnfbVQxAT3GnR0 =RLaJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From grarpamp at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 11:29:41 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 14:29:41 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement" In-Reply-To: <53d81d98.538f3a0a.6c3f.1c78@mx.google.com> References: <53D2CB10.3010104@av8n.com> <CAD2Ti2-may7Yzp3QW2SX+t0LdbQNtHY9zAkGD_q=cWdTZktnww@mail.gmail.com> <53d42c97.635e3a0a.6ce1.2dea@mx.google.com> <1574390.DTMde0LM7b@lapuntu> <53d57561.0382340a.5232.100f@mx.google.com> <CAD2Ti2_mdy7kbt=zEDGvfTM5fKoHr=8kTHiZcXaVfFZmVNyO7w@mail.gmail.com> <53d81d98.538f3a0a.6c3f.1c78@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_44eGTjoT7Fx-_=EUZ1BoYDP2n=E=ON1oYTBxdUptbFQ@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 6:23 PM, Juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote: > I wouldn't object too much to reformism/gradualism IF it really worked. > But if anything, and as matter of cold hard fact, reformism seems to > work against freedom. Yes, reforming the existing inherits and optimizes... the existing. If existing against freedom in parts at its base thought, so does its reform. Whereas coming from a clean slate / revolutionary position may be possible to avoid that to some more degree. From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 14:57:43 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 14:57:43 -0700 Subject: DEF CON nostalgia [was: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22] Message-ID: <CAJVRA1Qh9kM1mVYqNYCWx9uHkKiN+7fRRy48ZGx8p5sPOBp1cA@mail.gmail.com> a hollow, decrepit shell of its former self.. ... oh the 0ld days, ;) "We'd appreciate some more ethics." - GOBBLES - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAJSxOzrD1g [ GOBBLES Security - still disappointed in 2014 ... ] ---- regarding the current line up: https://defcon.org/html/defcon-22/dc-22-speakers.html "Detecting Bluetooth Surveillance Systems" - what about RFID? "Dropping Docs on Darknets: How People Got Caught" - see also, EPICFAIL "How to Disclose an Exploit Without Getting in Trouble" - if you thought ice cream had many flavors, welcome to the brave new world of 'responsible disclosure'! "NSA Playset: PCIe" - the lack of any VT-d mention makes for mediocre. TAO tools better include a VM breakout and uCode errata exploitation. (spoiler alert - i don't think this is actually dropping NSA exploits) "The Monkey in the Middle: A pentesters guide to playing in traffic" - this middle perspective, however, is absolutely a tailored favorite. a gift that keeps on giving... "Investigating PowerShell Attacks" - this is now pointless, what with pass the hash dead. IT'S ALL OVER, JUST GO HOME. *sobbing* [c.f. http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/penetesting/pass-the-hash-is-dead-long-live-pass-the-hash/ ] "Screw Becoming A Pentester - When I Grow Up I Want To Be A Bug Bounty Hunter!" - one step further to enlightenment. the industry that should not exist; better yet to become build engineer or test automationer or devops devotee and build security in at unsexy day jobs for not fame and not riches. #hashtagInfosuckprotipyolo "In the forest of knowledge with 1o57" - nothing to say here other than i'm selling 1o57's uber badge for bitcoin to highest bidder. come find me :P~ "RF Penetration Testing, Your Air Stinks" - my discriminator for a delicious sw defined deployment: a) new grc blocks or custom sdr pipeline? b) wideband and full duplex? c) opportunistic and ad-hoc capabilities? - if you answered no to any of the following please try again, with more harder! [c.f. http://www.pervices.com/buy-crimson/ dual 10GigE, 100kHz – 6GHz, <= 800MHz bandwidth, 4 x (16 bit, 370 MSPS ADCs), 2 x (quad channel, 16 bit, 2500 MSPS DAC), 10MHz, 10ppb, reference OCXO] P.P.S. if you want do your own training on "WB Quad System" without travel to FVEY facilities this is how ;) "Panel - Diversity in Information Security" - i was not invited to this panel. credibility lost. "Android Hacker Protection Level 0" - because more fingers in the dike is more fingers. "Blinding The Surveillance State" - i am soliciting donations for premium consulting expertise. i don't think Soghoian's free advice will be instrumental, but Cowboy Alexander has some sweet new shit (you get what you pay for? :) [ c.f. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/29/the_crypto_king_of_the_NSA_goes_corporate_keith_alexander_patents ] "Summary of Attacks Against BIOS and Secure Boot" - aka, why to coreboot and kill AMT with fire. ok Intel chipsec peeps i got bones to pick SEE YOU IN VEGAS --- how about the talks you want so much but will never see? those billions for your discretion clearly benefiting profitability over pervasive security. best regards, From tedks at riseup.net Wed Jul 30 15:13:54 2014 From: tedks at riseup.net (Ted Smith) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 15:13:54 -0700 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> Message-ID: <1406758434.9329.16.camel@anglachel> On Tue, 2014-07-29 at 19:14 +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > >These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the > >sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we > >said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it will > >work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as > >specified. > > By browsing the proofs, I have the impression > they don't depend on the C code (and Isabelle > parsing C appears not very trivial, though > possible). > > If I backdoor the C code of the kernel, will > the proof fail? In short, as others have said, you're wrong about the lack of dependency. See: http://www.nicta.com.au/pub?doc=7371 -- Sent from Ubuntu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 836 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/testlist/attachments/20140730/23f68825/attachment.sig> From hozer at hozed.org Wed Jul 30 14:45:04 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 16:45:04 -0500 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <53D7B691.4060107@cathalgarvey.me> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <20140729124138.GA2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <53D79BA0.7000908@cathalgarvey.me> <20140729143111.GF22640@nl.grid.coop> <53D7B691.4060107@cathalgarvey.me> Message-ID: <20140730214504.GG22640@nl.grid.coop> Go read http://jvns.ca/blog/2014/03/12/the-rust-os-story/ and start writing your own malloc If we had a L4-compatible kernel written in Rust that would be pretty damn cool. Now I just need to find someone to bill to play with this... On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 03:58:25PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > Lol, I haven't even written "hello world" in it yet, but I believe this > is exactly the sort of future use-case Rust is for. Perhaps I'm > mistaken, but surely someone's dreamt up a more modern take on C with > memory safety that can be used instead? > > On 29/07/14 15:31, Troy Benjegerdes wrote: > > When you can write an interrupt or page fault handler in rust, let > > me know. > > > > On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 02:03:28PM +0100, Cathal Garvey wrote: > >> That seems suspect. Most obvious security flaws in C are due to > >> misimplemented C, right? Not the algorithms themselves? So the kernel > >> can be theoretically secure but still be packed with buffer overflows > >> and pointer errors? > >> > >> I'll wait until someone redoes it in a language designed for safe > >> systems programming, like Rust. :) > >> > >> On 29/07/14 13:41, Georgi Guninski wrote: > >>> I didn't spend much time on this, just browsed > >>> some proofs. The proofs appear to not depend to > >>> on the C code AFAICT. Would trojanizing the C > >>> code invalidate the proofs? > >>> > >>> The haskell stuff appear to not contain all > >>> info about the C code. > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:26:50PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote: > >>>> news: > >>>> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetecting_kernel_goes_open_source/ > >>>> site: > >>>> http://sel4.systems/ > >>>> > >>>> AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. > >>>> > >>>> Coq sucks much (not counting its developers). > >> > >> -- > >> T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA > >> P: +353876363185 > >> W: http://indiebiotech.com > > > >> pub 4096R/988B9099 2013-02-06 Cathal Garvey (Other accs: onetruecathal at twitter, cathalgarvey at github, cathalgarvey at gitorious, indiebiotech.com) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> > >> uid Cathal Garvey (Microstatus account) <onetruecathal at twitter.com> > >> uid Cathal Garvey (Gitorious code hosting account) <cathalgarvey at gitorious.org> > >> sub 4096R/65B3395F 2013-02-06 > > > > > > > > > > -- > T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA > P: +353876363185 > W: http://indiebiotech.com > pub 4096R/988B9099 2013-02-06 Cathal Garvey (Other accs: onetruecathal at twitter, cathalgarvey at github, cathalgarvey at gitorious, indiebiotech.com) <cathalgarvey at cathalgarvey.me> > uid Cathal Garvey (Microstatus account) <onetruecathal at twitter.com> > uid Cathal Garvey (Gitorious code hosting account) <cathalgarvey at gitorious.org> > sub 4096R/65B3395F 2013-02-06 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Troy Benjegerdes 'da hozer' hozer at hozed.org 7 elements earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul grid.coop Never pick a fight with someone who buys ink by the barrel, nor try buy a hacker who makes money by the megahash From hozer at hozed.org Wed Jul 30 15:15:02 2014 From: hozer at hozed.org (Troy Benjegerdes) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 17:15:02 -0500 Subject: Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free" In-Reply-To: <CAHWD2r++cKdMmxatoEM2WpRsUbqvRZyEFZUSEkK2ABamTTFw8w@mail.gmail.com> References: <20140728152650.GA2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r+c0dA7oxysb69oZEcxcADUPfGLpLd2X0Q3hU1iTxcCHg@mail.gmail.com> <20140728163527.GC2531@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKrwACtitw3CegHehWpbRETHpQN-DABUC59jAYzf20O_w@mail.gmail.com> <20140729141413.GB2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2rKH-DzbJGxj8-yr+0zWc68gvtC=uDVXvBL_tGxzfuMxCw@mail.gmail.com> <20140729161418.GD2848@sivokote.iziade.m$> <CAHWD2r++cKdMmxatoEM2WpRsUbqvRZyEFZUSEkK2ABamTTFw8w@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140730221502.GH22640@nl.grid.coop> On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 06:36:19PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > On Jul 29, 2014 6:14 PM, "Georgi Guninski" <guninski at guninski.com> wrote: > > > > >These proofs tie a meta-specification to the actual code. Look into the > > >sort of proofs they use. Basically they're saying "the code does what we > > >said it has to. Only if we accidentally told it to go skynet on us, it > will > > >work perfectly". Things like segfaults would be pretty clearly not as > > >specified. > > > > By browsing the proofs, I have the impression > > they don't depend on the C code (and Isabelle > > parsing C appears not very trivial, though > > possible). > > > > If I backdoor the C code of the kernel, will > > the proof fail? > > Isn't that the whole idea? It would really change the thing up if there's a > backdoor! /* * Copyright 2014 under AGPLv3, Troy Benjegerdes, <add your name> * as a derivative work of http://q3u.be/patent/q3ube * claim 9, A process for producing a new physical computer hardware design * utilizing a software program running on an existing design that contains all * software and specifications to produce a derivative physical design. * (recursive hardware) */ Well, technically, I suspect the proof would never complete running because the hash signature(s) of the backdoored kernel will not match the signature etched in silicon on the open-source hardware, and it will immediately wipe any crypto keys when there is a kernel hash check failure. Of course, if you fix any of the backdoors that existed when the silicon mask was generated the hash check will fail too. C'est la vie /* * end copyright notice */ You'll need to hurry up and get your backdoors in kernels, compilers, and EDA tools before we get this implemented. I think you've got 5-15 years yet before that window closes. Eventually I predict various intelligence agencies will eventually work together to validate the trusted open-source hardware, either because they actually understand the value, or because activist hacker groups rewrite their legislative funding mandates using existing backdoors. Lodewijk, please write this stuff down (preferably as patent claims) so we have the original open-source hardware prior art documented and protected before some corporate IP pirates find it. From guninski at guninski.com Wed Jul 30 08:22:41 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 18:22:41 +0300 Subject: Update your Tors - Tor security advisory: "relay early" traffic confirmation attack In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1SJYCZWWgZcZsbHcq72W1JcU7kvcau8aPxCuO=+tzn+vg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1SJYCZWWgZcZsbHcq72W1JcU7kvcau8aPxCuO=+tzn+vg@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140730152241.GA2517@sivokote.iziade.m$> Someone here ranted against Tor and he was called a troll IIRC... Ironically they discovered it on 4.7 :) On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 05:12:17AM -0700, coderman wrote: > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack > [see also release notes per below] > ''' > On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying > to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who > operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying > Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks. > > The attacking relays joined the network on January 30 2014, and we > removed them from the network on July 4. While we don't know when they > started doing the attack, users who operated or accessed hidden > services from early February through July 4 should assume they were > affected. > . > . > . > Relays should upgrade to a recent Tor release (0.2.4.23 or > 0.2.5.6-alpha), to close the particular protocol vulnerability the > attackers used — but remember that preventing traffic confirmation in > general remains an open research problem. Clients that upgrade (once > new Tor Browser releases are ready) will take another step towards > limiting the number of entry guards that are in a position to see > their traffic, thus reducing the damage from future attacks like this > one. Hidden service operators should consider changing the location of > their hidden service. From coderman at gmail.com Wed Jul 30 20:00:49 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 20:00:49 -0700 Subject: DEF CON nostalgia [was: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1Qh9kM1mVYqNYCWx9uHkKiN+7fRRy48ZGx8p5sPOBp1cA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Qh9kM1mVYqNYCWx9uHkKiN+7fRRy48ZGx8p5sPOBp1cA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TVTtTditivE6G+9dh372ccWsioLLqTZwDtmBUeg9fibA@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 2:57 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> said some shit: > ... > "You are the worst kind of person! Criticizing these Defcon Presenters for less than perfect communicating of work they have put a lots of work in to. What have you done to make the security community better or teach students how to better practice Security? Shut up if you only message is negativity! Until you are an expert in all Security I don't care about your opinion Asshole Coderman!" [ED: sics' be included.] i'm sorry, my coping mechanisms are limited. you must assume the right filters. program terminated. --- in all seriousness, as for teaching others, surely i do this much more badly than most. missing experience combined with lack of teaching knowledge a starting point position. there is no How Children Succeed (Paul Tough) for How Children Nuture The Hack. there is no "the smartest kids in the world and how they got that way" (Amanda Ripley) for the skilledest hacker kids in the world and how they hack that way. there is no Building a Better Teacher (Elizabeth Green) for Building a Better InfoSec Mentor and Research Leadership Culture. inspiring more STEM in general a challenge, infosec same and then additional complexities and complications... [0] regarding DEF CON specifically, the joy always and will be the people and conversations. while i may harp on the talks in dark humor, the con as a whole is premium despite oversold and diluted trends to current. DEF CON++ :) --- last but not least, a 8x512G Samsung 840Pro SSD single dumb logical drive in full bay enclosure works best for throughput. what throughput can you reach in this setup? TBD: host mainboard w/ 12TB DDR3 slotting ala COPACOBANA; formal request for DEF CON 23 volume mirror operations - PCIe x16 lanes to memory resident copy of content.. for SCIENCE! re: "DEF CON media hard drive duping station - six 1:11 duplication towers / 3 x 4TB mirror tracks (BLUE, GREEN, ORANGE)" - https://defcon.org/html/defcon-22/dc-22-news.html#dc22hddupe best regards, #1 DEF CON FAN RLY checking into moderation queue. [1] 0. <re: infosec resources for learning and teaching others> perhaps best retort an abridged collection for just this. the set of what i've found useful a good base of usefullness to others. ETA: unknown until post-Vegas. suggestions solicitied! 1. "Meta: List moderation" [ you can make it nicer here as per http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Jul/56 :] From coderman at gmail.com Thu Jul 31 06:47:23 2014 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 06:47:23 -0700 Subject: Identity Intelligence Message-ID: <CAJVRA1R0vWqNuSGV1oL4aDEtbs2=0DWbHdgN4R7ijzcg5XEk_w@mail.gmail.com> XKeyScore classifiers for your data exhaust, --- http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/07/identity-intel/ "Identity Intelligence and Special Operations" - Posted on Jul.30, 2014 by Steven Aftergood "Identity intelligence” is a relatively new intelligence construct that refers to the analysis and use of personal information, including biometric and forensic data among others, to identify intelligence targets of interest and to deny them anonymity. The term began to appear a few years ago and was included, for example, in a 2012 Defense Intelligence Agencybriefing package. Since then it has quickly propagated throughout U.S. military and intelligence operations. ... The new DoD doctrine on Special Operations — Joint Publication 3-05, dated 16 July 2014 — includes further discussion of identity intelligence (I2) in the special operations context: “I2 is the collection, analysis, exploitation, and management of identity attributes and associated technologies and processes. The identification process utilizes biometrics-enabled intelligence (BEI), forensics-enabled intelligence (FEI), information obtained through document and media exploitation (DOMEX), and combat information and intelligence to identify a person or members of a group.” “I2 fuses identity attributes (biological, biographical, behavioral, and reputational information related to individuals) and other information and intelligence associated with those attributes collected across all intelligence disciplines….” “USSOCOM [US Special Operations Command] exploits biometric, forensic, document and media data collections and integrates the data with all-source intelligence to locate and track unattributed identities across multiple or disparate instances. Intelligence collections are processed through the appropriate DOD and interagency databases, exploited to produce intelligence, and then disseminated to deployed SOF and throughout the interagency. I2 products enable real-time decisions in special operations worldwide.” ... “Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk,” JP 3-05 says. ... From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 31 10:32:46 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 13:32:46 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] You can't trust any of your hardware In-Reply-To: <2B974078-E72F-4DEF-B8A5-5524571CA3B0@lrw.com> References: <CFFFD650.1513%michael.borodiansky@vmturbo.com> <2B974078-E72F-4DEF-B8A5-5524571CA3B0@lrw.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2_5NshoPUhm1zmQCFcfYCKww-bimpBkmUcTjbo1O3LYow@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> wrote: > http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/ > The full talk/paper don't seem to be available yet, but they (a) figured out > how to write malware that attacks a system via something plugged into its > USB port (no, it doesn't depend on AUTORUN); (b) flipped that around and > figured out how to replace the firmware on a USB device from the host. I > wouldn't have thought (b) was possible - after all, how many firmware > updates for USB devices have you ever seen? - but I guess it's handy at the > end of manufacturing, and gets left open because ... who would ever think of > attacking it? > > On further reflection, though, I realized that the only thing new here is > that they actually went and built a full-cycle virus. All the rest was done > a couple of years ago: Apple published an update for its (USB) keyboards - > http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4010 - and someone reverse-engineered it and > figured out how to upload any code they liked - > https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/CHEN/BHUSA09-Chen-RevAppleFirm-PAPER.pdf > > The fun never ends.... Just like BIOS/HDD firmware APT's, the updateability of firmware on USB controllers is nothing new... even thumbdrives come with firmware 'deleted' or fast formatted off their media, dd(1)... it just took a while to make it fun for the entire family. flashboot.ru phison.com usb mass production tool BadUSB BadBIOS spritesmods.com hddhack From grarpamp at gmail.com Thu Jul 31 10:48:53 2014 From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 13:48:53 -0400 Subject: [Cryptography] You can't trust any of your hardware In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti2_5NshoPUhm1zmQCFcfYCKww-bimpBkmUcTjbo1O3LYow@mail.gmail.com> References: <CFFFD650.1513%michael.borodiansky@vmturbo.com> <2B974078-E72F-4DEF-B8A5-5524571CA3B0@lrw.com> <CAD2Ti2_5NshoPUhm1zmQCFcfYCKww-bimpBkmUcTjbo1O3LYow@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <CAD2Ti28iVDVXfkMdzx1zZndpO32bdhLXwAt_uaJhHvnoDucqgA@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 1:32 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote: > flashboot.ru > phison.com > usb mass production tool > BadUSB > BadBIOS > spritesmods.com hddhack www.usbdev.ru/files/phison www.usb-disk.ru/prog.php http://read.pudn.com/downloads149/doc/fileformat/641957/Phison%20MPTool%20MP2232%20v1.06.00/Production%20Tool%20-%20USB%202K%20User%20Manual%20v1.2C%20%28China%20Colour%29.pdf Have phun! From guninski at guninski.com Thu Jul 31 06:13:38 2014 From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 16:13:38 +0300 Subject: DEF CON nostalgia [was: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22] In-Reply-To: <CAJVRA1TVTtTditivE6G+9dh372ccWsioLLqTZwDtmBUeg9fibA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAJVRA1Qh9kM1mVYqNYCWx9uHkKiN+7fRRy48ZGx8p5sPOBp1cA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1TVTtTditivE6G+9dh372ccWsioLLqTZwDtmBUeg9fibA@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140731131338.GA2877@sivokote.iziade.m$> On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 08:00:49PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 2:57 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> said some shit: > best regards, > #1 DEF CON FAN RLY checking into moderation queue. [1] > > > > 0. <re: infosec resources for learning and teaching others> > perhaps best retort an abridged collection for just this. the set of > what i've found useful a good base of usefullness to others. ETA: > unknown until post-Vegas. suggestions solicitied! > > 1. "Meta: List moderation" > [ you can make it nicer here as per > http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Jul/56 :] Fyodor's Full Disclosure is heavily moderated. He stops me at SMTP level. Quite likely he will sell the list the way aleph1 did with Bugtraq. (I am not posting on FFD). From lists at cooperq.com Thu Jul 31 19:15:11 2014 From: lists at cooperq.com (Cooper Quintin) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 19:15:11 -0700 Subject: Encrypt iPhone calls app In-Reply-To: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> References: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53DAF82F.4070603@cooperq.com> Moxie and crew have a history of writing some pretty fantastic crypto software! In the past they have written redphone (Signal is the iOS version of this) and text secure, both of which are IMO some of the best crypto software out there right now. Aditionally signal is free (as in beer and in freedom) and open source. I would wholeheartedly recommend Signal. My only caveat would be that since it is so new there are likely some pretty serious bugs that have not been discovered yet. On 07/31/2014 06:40 PM, Henry Rivera wrote: > Can someone please give me your appraisal of Signal. I'm not noticing the red flags that we see all too often in such sales pitches. > > https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal/?t=dXNlcmlkPTU1MjE5NjEwLGVtYWlsaWQ9ODkxOQ== From 4chaos.onelove at gmail.com Thu Jul 31 18:40:50 2014 From: 4chaos.onelove at gmail.com (Henry Rivera) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 21:40:50 -0400 Subject: Encrypt iPhone calls app Message-ID: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> Can someone please give me your appraisal of Signal. I'm not noticing the red flags that we see all too often in such sales pitches. https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal/?t=dXNlcmlkPTU1MjE5NjEwLGVtYWlsaWQ9ODkxOQ== From dhill+cpunks at mindcry.org Thu Jul 31 20:26:26 2014 From: dhill+cpunks at mindcry.org (David Hill) Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 23:26:26 -0400 Subject: Encrypt iPhone calls app In-Reply-To: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> References: <44151506-A170-4DE3-AC88-02E54384CEEA@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140801032626.GB26171@9ac286446c9be08c809eca57f261c57c5d28508f92702bc3> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 09:40:50PM -0400, Henry Rivera wrote: > Can someone please give me your appraisal of Signal. I'm not noticing the red flags that we see all too often in such sales pitches. > > https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal/?t=dXNlcmlkPTU1MjE5NjEwLGVtYWlsaWQ9ODkxOQ== You cannot secure cellphones.