[drone-list] GAO: Addressing Privacy Concerns for Integration of UAS into National Airspace

[John Young]

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-981

Full report: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648348.pdf

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Measuring Progress and Addressing Potential 
Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration into the National Airspace 
System

GAO-12-981, Sep 14, 2012

What GAO Found

Progress has been made, but additional work is needed to overcome many of 
the obstacles to the safe integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) 
that GAO identified in 2008. GAO reported in 2008 that UAS could not meet 
the aviation safety requirements developed for manned aircraft and that 
this posed several obstacles to safe and routine operation in the national 
airspace system. These obstacles still exist and include the inability for 
UAS to sense and avoid other aircraft and airborne objects in a manner 
similar to manned aircraft; vulnerabilities in the command and control of 
UAS operations; the lack of technological and operational standards needed 
to guide safe and consistent performance of UAS; and final regulations to 
accelerate the safe integration of UAS into the national airspace system. 
The Joint Planning and Development Office of the FAA has provided UAS 
stakeholders with a framework to collaborate and coordinate their UAS 
integration efforts.

Congress set forth specific requirements and deadlines in the FAA  
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 for FAA to safely accelerate UAS  
integration. FAA, in coordination with stakeholders, has begun making  
progress toward completing those requirements, but has missed one deadline 
and could miss others. Many of the requirements entail significant work, 
including completing planning efforts and issuing a final rule for small 
UAS. Most of the requirements are to be achieved by December 2015. While 
FAA has taken steps to meet them, it is uncertain when the national 
airspace system will be prepared to accommodate UAS given that these 
efforts are occurring simultaneously and without monitoring to assess the 
quality of progress over time toward the deadlines Congress established. 
Better monitoring can help FAA understand what has been achieved and what 
remains to be done and can also help keep Congress informed about this 
significant change to the aviation landscape.

Concerns about national security, privacy, and the interference in Global 
Positioning-System (GPS) signals have not been resolved and may influence 
acceptance of routine access for UAS in the national airspace system. The 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) has the authority to regulate security of all modes of 
transportation, including non-military UAS. Working with FAA and other 
federal agencies, TSA implements security procedures, such as airspace 
restrictions like those limiting operations into and out of Ronald Reagan 
National Airport. In 2008, GAO recommended that TSA examine the security  
implications of non-military UAS. According to a TSA official, it recently 
reviewed its UAS related advisories and determined that they are still 
applicable. TSA has not provided information on its efforts to mitigate 
security implications of UAS, and GAO believes TSA should act on this 
recommendation. Stakeholder privacy concerns include the potential for 
increased amounts of government surveillance using technologies placed on 
UAS, the collection and use of such data, and potential violations of 
constitutional Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and 
seizures. Currently, no federal agency has specific statutory 
responsibility to regulate privacy matters relating to UAS for the entire 
federal government. Some stakeholders have suggested that DHS or the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) might be better positioned to address privacy 
issues since they generally stem from the operational uses of UAS for 
governmental surveillance and law enforcement purposes. Working proactively 
to address security and privacy concerns could help prevent further delays 
in UAS integration. Finally, non-military UAS GPS signals are unencrypted, 
risking potential interruption of the command and control of UAS.


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