managing and protecting nyms....
StealthMonger
StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net
Tue Nov 10 02:49:41 PST 2009
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John Case <case at sdf.lonestar.org> writes:
> On Fri, 6 Nov 2009, StealthMonger wrote:
>> Please explain other ways to be practically untraceable.
> [...]
> Never touch the account, save through Tor. So it's the same model you use
> with a nym-server, but whereas all of your obfuscation is after your email
> account, all of this obfuscation is prior to the email account (through
> Tor).
Tor is not practically untraceable. The Tor documentation asserts:
... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic
correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe
both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume,
quickly linking the initiator to her destination.
http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf
Use of a nym server is practically untraceable because of the high
random latency and mixing with other traffic provided by the
anonymizing remailers through which a nym server is controlled.
-- StealthMonger
<StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net>
--
stealthmail: Scripts to hide whether you're doing email, or when,
or with whom.
mailto:stealthsuite at nym.mixmin.net
Finger for key.
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