Iran exit point

[Matej Kovacic]

Hi,

> Of  course  of course... But in a country like Iran where ALL internet
access  are  hardly monitored and filtered, where clients have to show their
ID  to  enter an internet cafe and where all their data will be recorded, I
would like to understand how a TOR node can be run, unless it receives the
clearance of the administration!
>
> Any explaination?

I was living in former Socialistic Republic of Yugoslavia. We had a rule
that every user of a modem (for dial-up) should be registered by the
national telecom. The official reason was that there are some technical
issues which require registration. But it was a question of totalitarian
control, of course.

I have never registered and never had any problems - and the same was
with anybody I knew. I have heard similar stories with users using
strong encryption in France (which was prohibited).

So my explanation is that the control is probalby not so strict. And
sometimes it is possible to get a clearance routinely - officials
usually do not understand technical details and you just say something
that seems reasonably and get clearance.

But on the other side Iran could be sniffing Tor exit traffic to steal
some valuable information (industrial espionage for instance), or to
just annoy west governments (ok, less likely, but you never know).

However, I would say that internet communications in Iran are much more
monitored by the NSA than by Iranian government... :-))

bye, Matej

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]