From solinym at gmail.com  Thu Dec  1 00:08:00 2005
From: solinym at gmail.com (Travis H.)
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2005 02:08:00 -0600
Subject: security modifications to current PCs
Message-ID: <d4f1333a0512010008o7ab73dbbx4608efbef9c064d8@mail.gmail.com>

Hey,

I've been reading through the TCPA documents and thinking a bit about
changes that might give higher assurance to an ordinary PC, or at
least a PC with only minor changes.

Specifically, one of the things I've always been mulling over is a
secure boot sequence.  Basically, like the TCPA, I want a sequence
where each stage decrypts and validates the next one so that a user
doesn't have to worry about modifications to the bootup state. 
Basically, I've been thinking about rewriting the BIOS (perhaps with
large portions in FORTH a la openfirmware*) such that instead of
prompting the user for a password which is compared to a stored copy
(that can be erased by removing the battery), it instead prompts the
user for a passphrase that is used to decrypt and authenticate the MBR
(boot block) and possibly the first-stage boot loader.  The boot
loader in turn decrypts and authenticates the kernel and any
associated crud it needs (perhaps supporting the multiboot spec), and
the kernel and crud are smart enough to decrypt and authenticate the
root partition, and away we go.

[*] http://www.openfirmware.org/

Similarly, I wouldn't mind seeing a PCI card or something that is
designed for securely storing crypto keys (from DMA among other
things) and performing crypto operations.  These parts of the TCPA are
okay.  I don't see the need to curtain memory, as I'm comfortable with
the "ring 0 can do anything" property.

Additionally, it would be nice to have a "trusted path" to the OS,
whereby a certain key sequence triggers a direct input path to a
program, or the user is assured of what program he/she is talking to.
http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/trusted-path.html

Is it possible to implement most block ciphers in FPGAs?  It'd be nice
to have a bus-mastering crypto co-processor device to do, say, disk
encryption without requiring CPU help, but I want to be able to update
it to new algorithms as new attacks against the cipher appear.  I use
some disk encryption stuff on a dual processor machine and it's still
slow.  The load climbs to 10 or 12 all too easily, then stuff becomes
unresponsive (perhaps because swap is one of the things I'm
encrypting).
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/  -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B




From skquinn at speakeasy.net  Thu Dec  1 00:38:00 2005
From: skquinn at speakeasy.net (Shawn K. Quinn)
Date: Thu, 01 Dec 2005 02:38:00 -0600
Subject: security modifications to current PCs
In-Reply-To: <d4f1333a0512010008o7ab73dbbx4608efbef9c064d8@mail.gmail.com>
References: <d4f1333a0512010008o7ab73dbbx4608efbef9c064d8@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1133426281.20852.3.camel@xevious.platypuslabs.org>

On Thu, 2005-12-01 at 02:08 -0600, Travis H. wrote:
> I use some disk encryption stuff on a dual processor machine and it's
> still slow.  The load climbs to 10 or 12 all too easily, then stuff
> becomes unresponsive (perhaps because swap is one of the things I'm
> encrypting).

What processors, specifically? (If you expect a dual Pentium 100 system
to work miracles, that's your problem.)

What operating system? I'm pretty sure OpenBSD encrypts swap out of the
box, and it is SMP capable. Chances are if you're getting double-digit
load just from normal use due to swap encryption, you either don't have
anywhere near enough RAM, don't have enough CPU, or the code you're
running is inefficient.

-- 
Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn at speakeasy.net>




From qpzrotpg at excite.com  Thu Dec  1 02:15:24 2005
From: qpzrotpg at excite.com (Enrique Hendricks)
Date: Thu, 01 Dec 2005 03:15:24 -0700
Subject: Watch this St0ck Trade
Message-ID: <200301111.24818.GA16833@confute.eu.org>

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From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec  1 02:20:05 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2005 05:20:05 -0500
Subject: [IP] Advanced Paypal phish - uses faked functional address bar
Message-ID: <mailman.1407.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec  1 02:39:52 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2005 11:39:52 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Advanced Paypal phish - uses faked
  functional address bar]
Message-ID: <20051201103952.GS2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From AEXJHXVUWPSRU at msn.com  Thu Dec  1 11:25:11 2005
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Date: Thu, 01 Dec 2005 13:25:11 -0600
Subject: Guys Need This vw
Message-ID: <LAW73.OE649yfB4mvo071953d5@motmail.com>


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From adam at cypherspace.org  Fri Dec  2 05:35:16 2005
From: adam at cypherspace.org (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 08:35:16 -0500
Subject: idealized content network properties (Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet)
Message-ID: <mailman.1408.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

I think an ideal www2 network should:

1. have any content searchable by anyone (the contents are public)
2. make it hard to determine who the author of content is
3. make it hard for people other than the author to remove content
4. make it hard for people to observe what other people are downloading
5. make it hard for anyone to change content (new version and
navigating by version should be the way to "change")

It seems to me that this network can provide any of these subset
classifications trivially.

removing 1 makes a eg "friend-to-friend" network -- that just means
you encrypt the searchable tags and content with a shared key.

removing 2 you just sign the content.

and so forth.

(Making it hard for people other than the author to remove content
technically probably involves things like redundancy, transience of
service, opaque content to its current server location, indirection
etc)

(The author also should be able to arrange that he himself can't
remove the content, by intentionally discarding whatever keys give him
the technical means to remove or change the content).

> As a side-point, I think it is somewhat pejorative to say that any
> technology is "designed" for illegal usage, just because it conceals
> user activity and therefore may be capable of illegal usage.  There
> are many legal reasons why people might wish to preserve their
> anonymity and privacy.

Yeah.  I think my feature set at the top should be the default/base
set of properties exhibited by the www2 (next gen web).  Any voluntary
restrictions on these should be entered into by policy.  Say content X
is illegal in jurisdiction Y, then Y should publish a blacklist
identifying content X and the legal system in jurisdiction Y should if
it chooses make it illegal to not consult the blacklist.  I mean
illegality is not even consistent, there are things which are legally
required in Y that are illegal in Z.  There is and can be no globally
acceptable policy, so we must robustly technologically prevent global
enforcement.

Adam
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From karn at ka9q.net  Fri Dec  2 09:44:53 2005
From: karn at ka9q.net (Phil Karn)
Date: December 2, 2005 9:44:53 PM EST
Subject: [IP] Telecoms required to save logs of e-mail
Message-ID: <mailman.1409.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

>BRUSSELS, Belgium?EU justice and interior ministers agreed Friday
>on plans that would require telecommunications companies to retain
>records of phone calls and e-mails for a minimum of six months for
>use in investigations of terrorism and other serious crimes.

and Bob Franksten comments:
 > Too bad reporters don't ask question such as whether the
legislatures understand that you don?t need a phone company to make a
phone call and you don?t need a PTT to send email.

Note that an ISP can easily log email even when a user runs his own
SMTP server and/or delivers his own outbound mail. You just record
all the raw packets to port 25.

On the other hand, the SMTP STARTTLS (start transport layer security)
command is getting pretty common these days, as most MTA senders will
now use it automatically whenever the receiving MTA advertises
support for it. Receiver support is not the default because it
requires a X.509 certificate, but some installation scripts (e.g.,
Debian Linux) automatically generate and install a self-signed
certificate if required.

Even much of my incoming spam comes in with STARTTLS these days. I
figure that should make traffic analysis just a little more difficult.

When a SMTP session uses STARTTLS, only the IP addresses of the MTAs
are visible to a passive wiretap at the ISP. Because self-signed
certificates are so common, however, an active man-in-the-middle
attack would probably work in most cases. Clearly we need certificate
caching like that implemented in SSH.

>Under Friday's deal, investigators will be able to view logs of
>phone calls and e-mail messages, but it does not allow them to view
>content of the messages.

That implies that only headers need be logged, so PGP or S/MIME by
itself (without STARTTLS) provide no protection at all as they both
leave all email headers in the clear.




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----- End forwarded message -----
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______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec  2 06:50:08 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 02 Dec 2005 09:50:08 -0500
Subject: Football Jocks don't like their English teacher
Message-ID: <BAY103-F323988AD8BC3CCB03405089B4C0@phx.gbl>

Just goes to show how a Blacknet can be equated with illegal activity in our 
fascist climate:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10294412/

Surprise surprise. Two jocks wrote bad things about killing their english 
teacher, after having been told they should write something "private" that 
no one else should ever read.

Is it not obvious that the jocks are being punished for thought crimes?

Next thing you know they'll be carting me off to jail for dreaming about 
having sex with Pamela Anderson.

-TD




From coderman at gmail.com  Fri Dec  2 11:25:30 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 11:25:30 -0800
Subject: [zooko@zooko.com: Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet,
  f2f net)]
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F11F9F2C7447D5EB40567FE9B4C0@phx.gbl>
References: <20051202154736.GX2249@leitl.org> 	
  <BAY103-F11F9F2C7447D5EB40567FE9B4C0@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512021125l7bf0d601n2413e2ef65eb2098@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/2/05, Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> ... Indeed, his focus on P2P architectures would imply that he's
> largely unaware of May's Crypto Anarchy manifesto, wherein the term
> "Blacknet" was defined to include information (as this guy seems to
> understand it) as a mere subset. A blacknet allows for completely anonymous
> transactions of any form, including monetary.

blacknets don't solve the hard problems related to large scale
anonymous digital cash, mainly identity management and strong
reputation metrics. (s/digital cash/non trivial resource exchange/g)

darknets, as the abused term appears to be currently employed, place
an emphasis on friendship as a trust/reputation metric and associate
that trusted channel with copyrighted content distribution. (even
though, as zooko pointed out, the original microsoft paper describing
darknets put more emphasis on the opaque nature of the overlay /
private traffic and gave little attention to the friend to friend
aspect of introduction / networking)


> This knucklehead seems to want to define "black" and "dark" in terms of some
> perceived scale of illegality, whereas even in Microsoft's case the term
> "darknet" was not developed for that purpose.* A "darknet" may include the
> possibility of no anomymity between pairs or groups of transactors, though
> the identities (as well as the transactions) are effecitvely "black" to the
> outside world. The term "darknet" is therefore often equated with P2P/F2F
> architectures, but those are obviously only one set of instantiations of a
> "darknet".

agreed. i'm even more convinced these terms are essentially worthless
as anything more descriptive than "a private network of some type".


> *: Am I wrong in assuming that Microsoft's own usage of the term "darknet"
> derives largely from the term "blacknet" which may had coined?

embrace and extend the namespace!




From zooko at zooko.com  Fri Dec  2 07:45:57 2005
From: zooko at zooko.com (zooko at zooko.com)
Date: Fri, 02 Dec 2005 11:45:57 -0400
Subject: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f net)
Message-ID: <mailman.1410.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>


Ian, p2p-hackers:

It's not my goal to quibble about etymology (except inasmuch as it is useful
to
preserve the historical record).  My goals are:

1.  Avoid ambiguity -- where some people think that word X denotes concept 1,
    and others think that word X denotes concept 2.  Especially if concepts 1
    and 2 are related but not identical.  Especially if one of them is
    politically incendiary.

2.  Make sure we have names for our useful concepts.

However, before I get to that I am going to go through the history one last
time in order to cast light on the current problem.  I turned up some
interesting details.

Let's start with a Venn diagram:
         _______      _______
        /       \    /       \
       /         \  /         \
      /           \/           \
     /            /\            \
    /            /  \            \
   |            |    |            |
   |        1   |1^2 |   2        |
   |            |    |            |
   |            |    |            |
    \            \  /            /
     \            \/            /
      \           /\           /
       \         /  \         /
        \_______/    \_______/

Let 1 be the set of networks which are used for illegal transmission of
information, and 2 be the set of networks which are built on f2f connections,
and 1^2 be the intersection -- the set of networks which are used for illegal
transmission of information and which are built on f2f connections.

[bepw2002] introduces "darknet" to mean concept 1.  In their words darknet is
"a collection of networks and technologies used to share digital content",
and
they use it consistently within that meaning.  They refer to concept 2,
starting in section 2.1, using the term "small-world nets", and they clearly
distinguish between what they call "small-world darknets" and
"non-small-world
darknets".

However nowadays some people in the mass media seem to think that a "darknet"
means primarily a network which is "invitation-only", i.e. a "small-world" or
"f2f" net [globe].  When did the meaning shift?

Ooh -- how interesting to examine the evolution of this word on [wikipedia]!
The original definition on wikipedia was written on 2004-09-30.  It read in
full: "Darknet is a broad term to denote the networks and technologies that
enable users to copy and share digital material.  The term was coined in a
paper from four Microsoft Research authors.".

The next change was that two months later someone redirected the "Darknet"
page
to just be a link to the "Filesharing page", with the comment "Just another
word for filesharing".

The next change was that on 2005-04-14 someone from IP 81.178.83.245 wrote a
definition beginning with this sentence: "A Darknet is a private file sharing
network where users only connect to people they trust.".

By the way, I should point out that I have a personal interest in this
history
because between 2001 and 2003 I tried to promulgate concept 2, using Lucas
Gonze's coinage: "friendnet" [zooko2001, zooko2002, zooko2003, gonze2002].
I would like to know for my own satisfaction if my ideas were a direct
inspiration for some of this modern stuff, such as the Freenet v0.7 design.


So much for etymology.

Now the problem is that in the current parlance of the media, the word
"darknet" is used to mean vaguely 1 or 2 or 1^2.  The reason that this is a
problem isn't that it breaks with some etymological tradition, but that it is
ambiguous and that it deprives us of useful words to refer to 1 or 2
specifically.  The ambiguity has nasty political consequences -- see for
example these f2f network operators struggling to persuade newspaper readers
that they are not primarily for illegal purposes: [globe].

My proposal to rectify the lack-of-words problem is to use "blacknet" to
refer
to 1 specifically and "f2f net" to refer to 2 specifically.  I don't know if
there is any way to rectify the ambiguity problem.


 Ian wrote:
>
> ...
> defining the term "darknet" as a f2f network that is designed
> to conceal the activities of its participants (this being, so far as I
> have seen, one of the main motivations for building an f2f network),

So you think of "darknet" as meaning 1^2.

That's an interesting remark -- that you regard concealment as one of the
main
motivations.  I personally regard concealment as one of the lesser
motivations
-- I'm more interested in attack resistance (resisting attacks such as
subversion or denial-of-service, rather than attacks such as surveillance),
scalability, and other properties.  Although I'm interested in the
concealment
properties as well.


Regards,

Zooko

P.S.  Here's some obligatory link juice for Gonze's latest sly neologism:
lightnet!

[bepw2002]  "The darknet and the future of content distribution" Biddle,
            England, Peinado, Willman (Microsoft Corporation)
            http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc
            http://www.dklevine.com/archive/darknet.pdf
            (The .doc version crashes my OpenOffice.org app when I try to
read
            it.  Does this mean something?  The .pdf version has screwed up
            images when I view it in evince.)
[wikipedia] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darknet
[zooko2001] "Attack Resistant Sharing of Metadata" Zooko and Raph Levien
            presentation, First O'Reilly Peer-to-Peer conference, 2001
            http://conferences.oreillynet.com/cs/p2p2001/view/e_sess/1200
[zooko2002]
http://zooko.com/log-2002-12.html#d2002-12-14-the_human_context_and_the_futur
e_of_Mnet
[zooko2003]
http://www.zooko.com/log-2003-01.html#d2003-01-23-trust_is_just_another_topol
ogy
[gonze2002] http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/wlg/2428
[globe]     "Darknets: The invitation-only Internet" globeandmail.com
            2005-11-24
            http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20051007.gtdar
knetoct7/BNStory/Technology/
[lightnet]  http://gonze.com/weblog/story/lightnet
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From ian.clarke at gmail.com  Fri Dec  2 04:07:32 2005
From: ian.clarke at gmail.com (Ian Clarke)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 12:07:32 +0000
Subject: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f net)
Message-ID: <mailman.1411.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

On 29/11/05, zooko at zooko.com <zooko at zooko.com> wrote:
> However, the media seems to have started using the word "Darknet" to mean a
> friend-to-friend net and/or a blacknet [7, 8], thus simultaneously making
it
> harder for people to think about blacknets which are based on other than
> friend-to-friend architectures and making it harder for people to think
about
> friend-to-friend networks which are used for other than illegal information
> sharing.
>
> I place some of the blame for this development on the Freenet folks, who may
be
> the first to promulgate this munging, and if they aren't the first they're
> certainly the most effective.

As Michael Rogers pointed out, I am not sure this is as clear-cut as
you suggest, the goal for Freenet 0.7 is very close to the idea
outlined in the caption for Fig. 3 of the Microsoft Darknet paper,
which is a friend-to-friend network.

That paper may be the first common usage of the term "darknet", but so
far as I can see, it contains no concise definition of what a
"darknet" is.  I would therefore say that there is no authorative
basis on which to invalidate any particular definition of the term
that is broadly within the area of P2P networks which conceal user
activity.

As such, defining the term "darknet" as a f2f network that is designed
to conceal the activities of its participants (this being, so far as I
have seen, one of the main motivations for building an f2f network),
is as valid a definition as any other I have seen (and more useful
than most).

As a side-point, I think it is somewhat pejorative to say that any
technology is "designed" for illegal usage, just because it conceals
user activity and therefore may be capable of illegal usage.  There
are many legal reasons why people might wish to preserve their
anonymity and privacy.

Ian.
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From czdwzagcznzy at hotmail.com  Fri Dec  2 09:41:05 2005
From: czdwzagcznzy at hotmail.com (Alice Davidson)
Date: Fri, 02 Dec 2005 12:41:05 -0500
Subject: best replica site ver
Message-ID: <82868416943375.60392131@out>

the decommission but togs and empty some evildoer in octane it consign may bayberry 
be trillionth but mouth it coalition but haughty or wretch it delta a debt 
on delegable , impede try yardage in forensic be foamy. 
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From coderman at gmail.com  Fri Dec  2 13:54:10 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 13:54:10 -0800
Subject: a little bird told me
In-Reply-To: <20051202204052.GO2249@leitl.org>
References: <20051202204052.GO2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512021354k600d0a46jdc1d9a9ccc0bbb46@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/2/05, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> That israeli intelligence apparently considers Tor broken.
>
> While Tor definitely has not been designed with that
> threat model in mind, this still strikes me as somewhat
> dubious.

makes sense to me. when your threat model includes $TLA with a DCS1000
/ ECHELON / * eye view of much internet traffic you could easily be
observed to some degree.

fun to speculate about until the details are known.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec  2 11:03:47 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 02 Dec 2005 14:03:47 -0500
Subject: [zooko@zooko.com: Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet,
  f2f net)]
In-Reply-To: <20051202154736.GX2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F11F9F2C7447D5EB40567FE9B4C0@phx.gbl>

>"My proposal to rectify the lack-of-words problem is to use "blacknet" to
>refer
>to 1 specifically and "f2f net" to refer to 2 specifically.  I don't know 
>if
>there is any way to rectify the ambiguity problem."

In this post at least the guy does not qualify what he means by 
"information". Indeed, his focus on P2P architectures would imply that he's 
largely unaware of May's Crypto Anarchy manifesto, wherein the term 
"Blacknet" was defined to include information (as this guy seems to 
understand it) as a mere subset. A blacknet allows for completely anonymous 
transactions of any form, including monetary.

This knucklehead seems to want to define "black" and "dark" in terms of some 
perceived scale of illegality, whereas even in Microsoft's case the term 
"darknet" was not developed for that purpose.* A "darknet" may include the 
possibility of no anomymity between pairs or groups of transactors, though 
the identities (as well as the transactions) are effecitvely "black" to the 
outside world. The term "darknet" is therefore often equated with P2P/F2F 
architectures, but those are obviously only one set of instantiations of a 
"darknet".

-TD

*: Am I wrong in assuming that Microsoft's own usage of the term "darknet" 
derives largely from the term "blacknet" which may had coined?





>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: transhumantech at yahoogroups.com, cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [zooko at zooko.com: Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f  
>net)]
>Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 16:47:36 +0100
>
>----- Forwarded message from zooko at zooko.com -----
>
>From: zooko at zooko.com
>Date: Fri, 02 Dec 2005 11:45:57 -0400
>To: ian at locut.us, "Peer-to-peer development." <p2p-hackers at zgp.org>
>Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f net)
>Reply-To: zooko at zooko.com,
>	"Peer-to-peer development." <p2p-hackers at zgp.org>
>
>
>Ian, p2p-hackers:
>
>It's not my goal to quibble about etymology (except inasmuch as it is 
>useful
>to
>preserve the historical record).  My goals are:
>
>1.  Avoid ambiguity -- where some people think that word X denotes concept 
>1,
>     and others think that word X denotes concept 2.  Especially if 
>concepts 1
>     and 2 are related but not identical.  Especially if one of them is
>     politically incendiary.
>
>2.  Make sure we have names for our useful concepts.
>
>However, before I get to that I am going to go through the history one last
>time in order to cast light on the current problem.  I turned up some
>interesting details.
>
>Let's start with a Venn diagram:
>          _______      _______
>         /       \    /       \
>        /         \  /         \
>       /           \/           \
>      /            /\            \
>     /            /  \            \
>    |            |    |            |
>    |        1   |1^2 |   2        |
>    |            |    |            |
>    |            |    |            |
>     \            \  /            /
>      \            \/            /
>       \           /\           /
>        \         /  \         /
>         \_______/    \_______/
>
>Let 1 be the set of networks which are used for illegal transmission of
>information, and 2 be the set of networks which are built on f2f 
>connections,
>and 1^2 be the intersection -- the set of networks which are used for 
>illegal
>transmission of information and which are built on f2f connections.
>
>[bepw2002] introduces "darknet" to mean concept 1.  In their words darknet 
>is
>"a collection of networks and technologies used to share digital content",
>and
>they use it consistently within that meaning.  They refer to concept 2,
>starting in section 2.1, using the term "small-world nets", and they 
>clearly
>distinguish between what they call "small-world darknets" and
>"non-small-world
>darknets".
>
>However nowadays some people in the mass media seem to think that a 
>"darknet"
>means primarily a network which is "invitation-only", i.e. a "small-world" 
>or
>"f2f" net [globe].  When did the meaning shift?
>
>Ooh -- how interesting to examine the evolution of this word on 
>[wikipedia]!
>The original definition on wikipedia was written on 2004-09-30.  It read in
>full: "Darknet is a broad term to denote the networks and technologies that
>enable users to copy and share digital material.  The term was coined in a
>paper from four Microsoft Research authors.".
>
>The next change was that two months later someone redirected the "Darknet"
>page
>to just be a link to the "Filesharing page", with the comment "Just another
>word for filesharing".
>
>The next change was that on 2005-04-14 someone from IP 81.178.83.245 wrote 
>a
>definition beginning with this sentence: "A Darknet is a private file 
>sharing
>network where users only connect to people they trust.".
>
>By the way, I should point out that I have a personal interest in this
>history
>because between 2001 and 2003 I tried to promulgate concept 2, using Lucas
>Gonze's coinage: "friendnet" [zooko2001, zooko2002, zooko2003, gonze2002].
>I would like to know for my own satisfaction if my ideas were a direct
>inspiration for some of this modern stuff, such as the Freenet v0.7 design.
>
>
>So much for etymology.
>
>Now the problem is that in the current parlance of the media, the word
>"darknet" is used to mean vaguely 1 or 2 or 1^2.  The reason that this is a
>problem isn't that it breaks with some etymological tradition, but that it 
>is
>ambiguous and that it deprives us of useful words to refer to 1 or 2
>specifically.  The ambiguity has nasty political consequences -- see for
>example these f2f network operators struggling to persuade newspaper 
>readers
>that they are not primarily for illegal purposes: [globe].
>
>My proposal to rectify the lack-of-words problem is to use "blacknet" to
>refer
>to 1 specifically and "f2f net" to refer to 2 specifically.  I don't know 
>if
>there is any way to rectify the ambiguity problem.
>
>
>  Ian wrote:
> >
> > ...
> > defining the term "darknet" as a f2f network that is designed
> > to conceal the activities of its participants (this being, so far as I
> > have seen, one of the main motivations for building an f2f network),
>
>So you think of "darknet" as meaning 1^2.
>
>That's an interesting remark -- that you regard concealment as one of the
>main
>motivations.  I personally regard concealment as one of the lesser
>motivations
>-- I'm more interested in attack resistance (resisting attacks such as
>subversion or denial-of-service, rather than attacks such as surveillance),
>scalability, and other properties.  Although I'm interested in the
>concealment
>properties as well.
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Zooko
>
>P.S.  Here's some obligatory link juice for Gonze's latest sly neologism:
>lightnet!
>
>[bepw2002]  "The darknet and the future of content distribution" Biddle,
>             England, Peinado, Willman (Microsoft Corporation)
>             http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc
>             http://www.dklevine.com/archive/darknet.pdf
>             (The .doc version crashes my OpenOffice.org app when I try to
>read
>             it.  Does this mean something?  The .pdf version has screwed 
>up
>             images when I view it in evince.)
>[wikipedia] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darknet
>[zooko2001] "Attack Resistant Sharing of Metadata" Zooko and Raph Levien
>             presentation, First O'Reilly Peer-to-Peer conference, 2001
>             http://conferences.oreillynet.com/cs/p2p2001/view/e_sess/1200
>[zooko2002]
>http://zooko.com/log-2002-12.html#d2002-12-14-the_human_context_and_the_futur
>e_of_Mnet
>[zooko2003]
>http://www.zooko.com/log-2003-01.html#d2003-01-23-trust_is_just_another_topol
>ogy
>[gonze2002] http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/wlg/2428
>[globe]     "Darknets: The invitation-only Internet" globeandmail.com
>             2005-11-24
>             
>http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20051007.gtdar
>knetoct7/BNStory/Technology/
>[lightnet]  http://gonze.com/weblog/story/lightnet
>_______________________________________________
>p2p-hackers mailing list
>p2p-hackers at zgp.org
>http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
>_______________________________________________
>Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
>http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which 
>had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec  2 05:29:59 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 14:29:59 +0100
Subject: [ian.clarke@gmail.com: Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet,
  f2f net)]
Message-ID: <20051202132959.GR2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Ian Clarke <ian.clarke at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec  2 05:37:14 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 14:37:14 +0100
Subject: [adam@cypherspace.org: idealized content network properties
  (Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet)]
Message-ID: <20051202133714.GU2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Adam Back <adam at cypherspace.org> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec  2 07:47:36 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 16:47:36 +0100
Subject: [zooko@zooko.com: Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f
  net)]
Message-ID: <20051202154736.GX2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from zooko at zooko.com -----


From jthorn at aei.mpg.de  Fri Dec  2 09:43:49 2005
From: jthorn at aei.mpg.de (Jonathan Thornburg)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 18:43:49 +0100 (CET)
Subject: security modifications to current PCs
In-Reply-To: <d4f1333a0512010008o7ab73dbbx4608efbef9c064d8@mail.gmail.com>
References: <d4f1333a0512010008o7ab73dbbx4608efbef9c064d8@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.60.0512021841370.18095@xeon44.aei.mpg.de>

On Thu, 1 Dec 2005, Travis H. wrote:
> Is it possible to implement most block ciphers in FPGAs?  It'd be nice
> to have a bus-mastering crypto co-processor device to do, say, disk
> encryption without requiring CPU help, but I want to be able to update
> it to new algorithms as new attacks against the cipher appear.  I use
> some disk encryption stuff on a dual processor machine and it's still
> slow.  The load climbs to 10 or 12 all too easily, then stuff becomes
> unresponsive (perhaps because swap is one of the things I'm
> encrypting).

Have you tried the swap-encryption option in OpenBSD?  According to
   http://www.openbsd.org/papers/swapencrypt.ps
the performance is pretty good.

ciao,

-- 
-- Jonathan Thornburg <jthorn at aei.mpg.de>
    Max-Planck-Institut fuer Gravitationsphysik (Albert-Einstein-Institut),
    Golm, Germany, "Old Europe"     http://www.aei.mpg.de/~jthorn/home.html
    "Washing one's hands of the conflict between the powerful and the
     powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral."
                                       -- quote by Freire / poster by Oxfam




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec  2 12:28:27 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 21:28:27 +0100
Subject: /. [ACLU Joins Fight Against Internet Surveillance]
Message-ID: <20051202202827.GK2249@leitl.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/12/02/1753208
Posted by: Zonk, on 2005-12-02 19:46:00

   [1]aychamo writes "The American Civil Liberties Union today joined an
   expanding group of organizations filing [2]lawsuits against a new rule
   that increases the FBI's power to conduct surveillance on the
   Internet. The rule being challenged is one the Federal Communications
   Commission adopted in September, granting an FBI request to expand
   wiretapping authority to online communications.he ACLU charged in a
   petition to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
   Circuit that the ruling goes beyond the authority of CALEA, which
   specifically exempted information services. "The ACLU seeks review of
   the CALEA order on the grounds that it exceeds the FCC's statutory
   authority and is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
   unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law,"
   the organization charged in its petition."

References

   1. http://www.aychamo.com/
   2. http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1895253,00.asp

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec  2 12:40:52 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2005 21:40:52 +0100
Subject: a little bird told me
Message-ID: <20051202204052.GO2249@leitl.org>

That israeli intelligence apparently considers Tor broken.

While Tor definitely has not been designed with that
threat model in mind, this still strikes me as somewhat
dubious.

So either there's a design weakness, or boxes upstream
do sophisticated traffic analysis, or this is a canard,
(either freely invented, or planted).

Speculations (preferrably, more informed than mine) welcome.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From tien at eff.org  Sat Dec  3 02:48:00 2005
From: tien at eff.org (Lee Tien)
Date: December 3, 2005 2:48:00 PM EST
Subject: [IP] I strongly afree with this djf Google search and
Message-ID: <mailman.1412.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

seizure

For IP if you wish.

Libraries have long sought to protect circulation records out of
concern for both privacy and freedom to read.
Libraries and the American Library Association have been openly
fighting government orders for their records.
See http://www.komotv.com/news/story.asp?ID=33363  ("Small Town
Library Takes On The Feds") and
http://www.ctlibrarians.org/news/patriotact.html (discussing
Connecticut library NSL case)

Indeed, some libraries have instituted records purging policies to
protect against government subpoenas.
http://www.infoshop.org/alibrarians/public_html/article.php?
story=03/08/01/5059833
http://www.fhsu.edu/forsyth_lib/copyright/PatriotActFAQs.shtml
("While there are some service benefits to keeping detailed records,
the risks of compromising your privacy outweigh these benefits.
Therefore, we are planning to purge all patron records with your
personally identifiable information on them once the materials are
returned and the fines are paid.")

What about search engines?

The data retention issue is only getting worse from a privacy
standpoint; the EU is moving toward mandatory telecom traffic data
retention. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/02/ap/world/
mainD8E8BKK00.shtml
>BRUSSELS, Belgium, Dec. 2, 2005
>(AP) European justice and interior ministers agreed Friday on plans
>binding telecommunications companies to retain records of phone
>call and e-mails for a minimum of six months for use in
>investigations into terrorism and other serious crimes.

For more on EU data retention, see http://www.statewatch.org/eu-data-
retention.htm

Lee


At 1:47 PM -0500 12/3/05, David Farber wrote:
>Begin forwarded message:
>
>From: "Richard M. Smith" <rms at computerbytesman.com>
>Date: December 3, 2005 8:57:59 AM EST
>To: EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
>Subject: [EPIC_IDOF] Google search and seizure
>
>http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/
>2005/12/03/
>google_search_and_seizure?mode=PF
>
>Google search and seizure
>By Robert Kuttner  |  December 3, 2005
>The Boston Globe
>
>THE NEW York Times recently reported that in a North Carolina
>strangulation-murder trial, prosecutors introduced as evidence the
>fact that
>the defendant's Google searches had included the words ''neck" and
>''snap."
>The Times noted that the evidence had come from the defendant's home
>computer, but could just as easily have come from Google.
>
>Google's whole business-model includes keeping track of users'
>searches by
>putting ''cookies" (tracking devices) on users' own computers, and
>then
>using the results to customize ad offerings that pop up when we use
>their
>ingenious free search service.
>
>In the era of the misnamed USA Patriot Act, which allows
>warrantless police
>searches that are not even disclosed to the target, Google plus
>Dick Cheney
>is a recipe for undoing the liberties for which the original
>patriots of the
>American Revolution bled and died. Under the Patriot Act, anyone
>suspected
>of enabling terrorism can be subjected to these fishing expeditions.
>Depending on a prosecutor's whims, that includes all of us.
>
>In the 18th-century era of star-chamber courts and despotic
>monarchs, the US
>Constitution put an end to government as prosecutor, judge, and jury.
>Unreasonable searches and seizures were explicitly prohibited by
>the Sixth
>Amendment. People (not just citizens) were guaranteed the right to
>confront
>their accusers and to know the charges against them. There were no
>''national security" loopholes.
>
>Google's internal slogan is, charmingly, ''Don't be evil." Well, the
>interaction of cyber-snooping and the unreasonable searches
>authorized by
>the Patriot Act is pure evil.
>
>Herewith an idea that I am putting into the public domain, which
>could make
>some computer-whiz a billionaire: One of Google's competitors could
>guarantee users of its search engines that all data keeping track of
>searches will be permanently discarded after 24 hours. The search
>process
>could still learn a broad pattern of users' purchasing tastes, if
>we wish to
>be party to a bargain of being marketed to in exchange for the
>convenience
>of free searches.
>
>The same libertarian computer entrepreneur could offer e-mail
>software, in
>which old messages are permanently erased unless the user
>deliberately opts
>to retain them.
>
>Google, like Microsoft and IBM before it, may be the current market
>leader
>in whiz-bang technology based on sheer inventive genius. But if
>Google is
>not careful, some competitor with a genuine regard for privacy could
>displace it.
>
>We all grew up vaguely knowing that 20th century technology, under
>fairly
>narrow circumstances, could invade privacy. The phone company kept
>track of
>everyone's calling records. These could be subpoenaed. Prosecutors and
>detectives, with warrants approved by judges, could deploy telephone
>wiretaps. There were occasional abuses, as in the witch hunts of
>the 1950s,
>but for the most part these technological invasions of privacy were
>used
>against bad guys, not for broad fishing expeditions. And there was
>no e-mail
>and no Google.
>
>Today, however, the explosion of computer technology coupled with the
>discarding of prosecutorial restraints is leading to a Big-Brother
>society.
>Unless we pay attention, the technology is so seductive that we become
>enablers of our own enslavement.
>
>The universal information that is so empowering could be enslaving in
>another respect. Check out a little satire available on the
>Internet titled
>EPIC 2014. It is a short, dystopian picture of the next 10 years.
>
>EPIC stands for the Evolving Personalized Information Construct. In
>this
>grim view of the near future, Google merges with Amazon and becomes
>''Google-zon," the ultimate information market monopoly.
>
>By 2014, the press as we know it no longer exists. Google-zon
>usurps the
>press's advertising base by ultra-customizing all ads. There is no
>longer
>the traditional craft of reporter or editor. Newspapers go out of
>business
>or become small niche products.
>
>''Everyone contributes now -- from blog entries to phone-cam
>images, to
>video reports, to full investigations," the video says. Everyone is
>a news
>producer as well as a news consumer, and it's almost impossible to
>differentiate journalism from junk. Computers strip and splice
>items, based
>on each user's past interests, pattern of use, and declared
>preferences.
>News is prioritized according to how many users read each item. Ads
>are
>similarly customized. We are universally connected, but universally
>fragmented and universally vulnerable to misinformation and
>government and
>commercial snooping.
>
>The marketplace may solve this dilemma by offering privacy-sensitive
>products, but entrepreneurs may also make the problem worse. The
>moment
>cries out for political as well as commercial leadership.
>
>Correction: Last week's column referred to Warren Tolman. It should
>have
>been Steven Tolman.
>
>Robert Kuttner, co-editor of The American Prospect, can be reached at
>kuttner at prospect.org. His column appears regularly in the Globe.
>
>_______________________________________________
>EPIC_IDOF mailing list
>EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
>https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof
>
>
>-------------------------------------
>You are subscribed as tien at well.sf.ca.us
>To manage your subscription, go to
> http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
>
>Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-
>people/

--
**********************************
... it is poor civic hygiene to install technologies that could
someday facilitate a police state. -- Bruce Schneier


Lee Tien
Senior Staff Attorney
Electronic Frontier Foundation
454 Shotwell Street
San Francisco, CA  94110
(415) 436-9333 x 102 (tel)
(415) 436-9993 (fax)
tien at eff.org



-------------------------------------
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From karn at ka9q.net  Sat Dec  3 03:24:11 2005
From: karn at ka9q.net (Phil Karn)
Date: December 3, 2005 3:24:11 PM EST
Subject: [IP] I strongly afree with this djf Google search and
Message-ID: <mailman.1413.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

seizure


>Google's internal slogan is, charmingly, ''Don't be evil." Well, the
>interaction of cyber-snooping and the unreasonable searches
>authorized by
>the Patriot Act is pure evil.

Instead of getting mad at Google, why don't we get even?

Here are two simple ideas that any good coder could turn out in an
afternoon:

1. Write and disseminate a little daemon that makes randomize queries
to Google from your computer. Every few minutes to an hour (i.e., at
random times) it would send a Google query with search terms randomly
chosen from a large dictionary. This would pollute Google's logs and
create reasonable doubt if you are later accused of entering queries
for, say, the words "neck" and "snap".

2. Write and disseminate a web proxy filter that would route all
Google queries through the TOR (The Onion Router) network and strip
off all tracking mechanisms from the results. This may be a more
palatable alternative to routing all your web surfing through TOR,
which can be quite slow.

I consider it unproductive to scream at Google, as has become so
popular of late. It is also misguided to call for laws to limit what
they can do with our search queries. Even if Google were to say that
they no longer keep personally-identifiable search queries, there
would be no way to verify it. And any new privacy law for search
engines would surely be riddled with enormous loopholes for
government abuse.

As with confidentiality, the *only* solution here is technological.
So let's get coding.

--Phil


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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From lauren at vortex.com  Sat Dec  3 04:21:42 2005
From: lauren at vortex.com (Lauren Weinstein)
Date: December 3, 2005 4:21:42 PM EST
Subject: Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
Message-ID: <mailman.1414.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>


1) Any practical attempt to "swamp" Google's database in such a
   manner is unlikely to succeed, given the sheer volume of legit
   queries that they receive.  I suspect they'd be smart enough to
   detect abuse patterns fairly easily.  That kind of analysis is
   their bread and butter.

2) Attempts to purposely "abuse" Google in such a manner (faked
   requests) may well violate their Terms of Service, and if they
   don't now you can be sure that they will in some future version
   of the ToS.  The likely result will at a minimum be bans and ISP
   actions, and at the max lawsuits.  Pull out your wallet.

3) Routing queries through anon proxies will provide some protection
   for the technological elite who understand such things.  They will
   not protect the average user, who most likely doesn't understand
   the risks and issues, and will never use such proxies, even
   assuming that they were trivial to use.

It is fashionable for some technologists to unwisely promote ad hoc,
short-term technological "fixes" in a sort of cold war escalation
mode, without dealing with the fundamental problems.  This is
especially unproductive when it comes to helping to protect average
users who take the default settings for almost everything, but are
just as much at risk of abuse, if not more so.

In this case, it seems reasonable to ask that Google (and other
search engines) show at least as much genuine interest in protecting
people's privacy and rights as does the local library.  And that
library isn't making billions from people's activities -- Google is.

Finally, the statement that:

>Even if Google were to say that they no longer keep
>personally-identifiable search queries, there would be no way to
>verify it.

is of course not really correct.  There are ways (not fullproof, but
some are damned good) to audit such activities, assuming that
appropriate laws are in place requiring such verification.  A simple
claim of compliance from the party in question is obviously not
sufficient, even in the case of Google, whom I have no reason to
believe is lying about what they are doing at this time.

--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein
lauren at pfir.org or lauren at vortex.com or lauren at eepi.org
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
http://www.pfir.org/lauren
Co-Founder, PFIR
  - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org
Co-Founder, EEPI
  - Electronic Entertainment Policy Initiative - http://www.eepi.org
Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com
DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com

 - - -

>From: Phil Karn <karn at ka9q.net>
>Date: December 3, 2005 3:24:11 PM EST
>
>1. Write and disseminate a little daemon that makes randomize queries
>to Google from your computer. Every few minutes to an hour (i.e., at
>random times) it would send a Google query with search terms randomly
>chosen from a large dictionary. This would pollute Google's logs and
>create reasonable doubt if you are later accused of entering queries
>for, say, the words "neck" and "snap".
>
>2. Write and disseminate a web proxy filter that would route all
>Google queries through the TOR (The Onion Router) network and strip
>off all tracking mechanisms from the results. This may be a more
>palatable alternative to routing all your web surfing through TOR,
>which can be quite slow.
>
>I consider it unproductive to scream at Google, as has become so
>popular of late. It is also misguided to call for laws to limit what
>they can do with our search queries. Even if Google were to say that
>they no longer keep personally-identifiable search queries, there
>would be no way to verify it. And any new privacy law for search
>engines would surely be riddled with enormous loopholes for
>government abuse.
>
>As with confidentiality, the *only* solution here is technological.
>So let's get coding.
>
>


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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec  3 03:44:12 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 06:44:12 -0500
Subject: [IP] Telecoms required to save logs of e-mail
Message-ID: <mailman.1415.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From lauren at vortex.com  Sat Dec  3 08:53:22 2005
From: lauren at vortex.com (Lauren Weinstein)
Date: December 3, 2005 8:53:22 PM EST
Subject: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
Message-ID: <mailman.1416.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>


>In the 1980s, the "average user" would never
>need a local area network in his home. In the early 1990s, the
>"average user" would never understand or need the Internet. And so on.

In fact, the reality of the current security and privacy mess with
the Internet helps to prove my point.  For example, talk to the folks
who drive around plotting all of the open wireless LANs that are
literally everywhere in virtually every neighborhood.  The vast
majority of them have *no* security at all -- not even cruddy old
WEP.  This includes businesses, medical offices, you name it, as
well as vast numbers of private homes.  Yet, for years every WLAN
product has included at the very least WEP capabilities, and
instructions on how to set it up.  Despite this, many people's open
WLANs are constantly being abused, sometimes with tragic results.

That situation is gradually starting to improve, but only because the
setting up of *some* level of security has become part of the
standard installation scripts for many products.  But until this
became the *default*, even when it was easy to use, most people
didn't bother.  Why?  Most of the time, simply because they didn't
believe that any associated risks applied to them -- and that view
is easy to understand.  The computer industry is great at promoting
the vast benefits of their products, but do their best to keep the
downsides to the fine print, buried in click-through license
mumbo-jumbo that even many lawyers would have trouble understanding,
along with lilliputian quick-start guides that are the only
instructions many people read.

The same thing goes for Internet services.  It is utterly reasonable
to expect that the *defaults* provided will respect people's privacy,
security, and other rights.  We are a society of laws and those laws
are there (at least in theory) to help protect those rights.  It is
unfair in the extreme to suggest that anyone who doesn't jump
through hoops to protect themselves from information abuse is
somehow negligent, while asserting that legislative efforts should
not be made to rein in the way that the services behave -- so that
those services meet a reasonable standard that society agrees is
appropriate.

Yes, imposing society's will on such firms can be tough to do,
especially when dealing with powerful and well-heeled interests.
But not to do so -- to not even try -- is just surrendering to what
most of us know in our hearts is just plain wrong.

--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein
lauren at pfir.org or lauren at vortex.com or lauren at eepi.org
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
http://www.pfir.org/lauren
Co-Founder, PFIR
   - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org
Co-Founder, EEPI
   - Electronic Entertainment Policy Initiative - http://www.eepi.org
Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com
DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com

  - - -

>
>
>Begin forwarded message:
>
>From: Phil Karn <karn at ka9q.net>
>Date: December 3, 2005 7:10:30 PM EST
>To: dave at farber.net
>Cc: ip at v2.listbox.com
>Subject: Re: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
>
>
>>From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren at vortex.com>
>
>>1) Any practical attempt to "swamp" Google's database in such a
>>   manner is unlikely to succeed, given the sheer volume of legit
>>   queries that they receive.  I suspect they'd be smart enough to
>>   detect abuse patterns fairly easily.  That kind of analysis is
>>   their bread and butter.
>
>The idea is not to "swamp" Google. It's simply to create a little
>plausible deniability -- i.e., reasonable doubt -- that a given
>search was entered by the user and not by the automatic daemon.
>
>>2) Attempts to purposely "abuse" Google in such a manner (faked
>>   requests) may well violate their Terms of Service, and if they
>>   don't now you can be sure that they will in some future version
>>   of the ToS.  The likely result will at a minimum be bans and ISP
>>   actions, and at the max lawsuits.  Pull out your wallet.
>
>Again, "swamping" or "abusing" Google is not the intent, nor is it
>very likely given Google's strong emphasis on performance and
>scalability. The idea is simply to create doubt that a given query
>was generated by a human, not by the robot. The "quality" of the
>synthetic queries is much more important than their quantity.
>
>Still, the extra traffic just might have the effect of encouraging
>Google to adopt a stronger privacy policy. Not that I'd place much
>stock in that, of course (see below.)
>
>>3) Routing queries through anon proxies will provide some protection
>>   for the technological elite who understand such things.  They will
>>   not protect the average user, who most likely doesn't understand
>>   the risks and issues, and will never use such proxies, even
>>   assuming that they were trivial to use.
>
>I wish I had a nickel for everything I've been told "the average
>user" would never understand, need or be able to use. Back in the
>1970s, the "average user" would never understand, need or be able to
>use a personal computer. In the 1980s, the "average user" would never
>need a local area network in his home. In the early 1990s, the
>"average user" would never understand or need the Internet. And so on.
>
>It is no more necessary that the "average user" understand how an
>anonymizing Google proxy works to use it effectively than to
>understand the fields in TCP/IP packet headers. The whole idea of
>civilization and commerce is that many people can benefit from
>specialized knowledge and skills that they themselves lack. The open
>source movement and the Internet itself have certainly demonstrated
>this.
>
>Personally, I prefer the anonymizing proxy over the random query
>generator. The proxy is likely to be more effective, and it generates
>no extra load. I mention the generator mainly to be complete. My
>point is that there *are* technical defenses against potential
>privacy abuses, and we can implement them ourselves instead of
>naively demanding that Google respect our privacy against their own
>commercial interests.
>
>And even if Google were completely honest, they would still be
>subject to Patriot Act abuses that we would never know about.
>
>The sad fact is that "national security" has become the root password
>to the Constitution. The only effective defense against a "rooted"
>system is not to put any sensitive information in it in the first
>place.
>
>--Phil
>
>


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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From ntpwvknptv at sbcglobal.net  Sat Dec  3 06:42:46 2005
From: ntpwvknptv at sbcglobal.net (Jay Mcdowell)
Date: Sat, 03 Dec 2005 09:42:46 -0500
Subject: lose weight and feel great
Message-ID: <69973443093931.20544872@bois>

, whizzing in arch the subsistent or napoleonic ! advice , nitrogenous the tibet 
, subservient but hertz not lustrous a button ! torpor on boyle but ask 
it's hilum see belmont try grosset on phillip it's chevrolet. 
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From ian.clarke at gmail.com  Sat Dec  3 01:49:51 2005
From: ian.clarke at gmail.com (Ian Clarke)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 09:49:51 +0000
Subject: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f net)
Message-ID: <mailman.1417.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

On 02/12/05, zooko at zooko.com <zooko at zooko.com> wrote:
> Let 1 be the set of networks which are used for illegal transmission of
> information,

I do wish you would refer to these networks as those which allow the
covert transmission of information, rather than those which are used
for the illegal transmission of information - since I am not aware of
any networks that are specifically designed for the illegal
transmission of information.  I think this would help alleviate the
political problem you raise later in your email.

> and 2 be the set of networks which are built on f2f connections,
> and 1^2 be the intersection -- the set of networks which are used for
illegal
> transmission of information and which are built on f2f connections.

If you broaden your definition of set 1 to be networks which are used
for the covert transmission of information (I think this is a more
useful definition for the set as not all covert activity is illegal),
then I am not sure, in practice, how many networks will fall into set
2 that aren't also members of set 1, in fact, I can't think of any
non-contrived situations where one would create a f2f network
motivated by something other than a desire to be covert in some way.

> [bepw2002] introduces "darknet" to mean concept 1.

I'm not going to spend time dissecting their paper to determine
exactly what BEPW's intention was for the term "darknet", certainly
they could have been much more explicit about this if they wanted to,
and they use the term in contradictory ways throughout their paper.
For example, they refer to "the darknet" as if there is only one, but
subsequenly refer to "darknets".  Given this vagueness, I can't
imagine that is was their goal to provide an authorative definition
for the term.

While we can debate what BEPW intended the term to mean when they used
it in their paper, this is ultimately irrelevant.  Software engineers
often seem to forget that English isn't like a programming language
where a designer specifies an unambigous definition at the outset
(Richard Stallman is particularly guilty of this).  The meaning of
words in English is a consensus that is arrived at over time, and
eventually finds its way into a dictionary (long) after that consensus
is stable.  The BEPW paper is one early voice in that
consensus-forming process.  Mine is another, yours is another still.

> By the way, I should point out that I have a personal interest in this
history
> because between 2001 and 2003 I tried to promulgate concept 2, using Lucas
> Gonze's coinage: "friendnet" [zooko2001, zooko2002, zooko2003, gonze2002].
> I would like to know for my own satisfaction if my ideas were a direct
> inspiration for some of this modern stuff, such as the Freenet v0.7 design.

I am not sure that they were a direct inspiration.  We (Freenet) have
been concerned about the fact that Freenet was harvestable for several
years now.  Around spring this year I made the observation that if
human relationships form a small world network, it should be possible
to assign locations to people such that we form a Kleinberg-style
small world network, and thus we could make the network routable.
Oskar Sandberg then suggested a way to do this, and we set about
validating the concept using simulations.

> Now the problem is that in the current parlance of the media, the word
> "darknet" is used to mean vaguely 1 or 2 or 1^2.  The reason that this is a
> problem isn't that it breaks with some etymological tradition, but that it
is
> ambiguous and that it deprives us of useful words to refer to 1 or 2
> specifically.  The ambiguity has nasty political consequences -- see for
> example these f2f network operators struggling to persuade newspaper
readers
> that they are not primarily for illegal purposes: [globe].

I think a much better way to avoid this nasty political consequence is
to stop describing set 1 in terms of illegal activity, but rather
describe such networks as being "covert", or "anonymity preserving" -
neither of which implies illegal activity (it is perfectly legal to be
anonymous in most countries whose legal systems I am familiar with).

> > defining the term "darknet" as a f2f network that is designed
> > to conceal the activities of its participants (this being, so far as I
> > have seen, one of the main motivations for building an f2f network),
>
> So you think of "darknet" as meaning 1^2.

Or just 2, since I think the sets 1^2 and 2 are, in practical terms,
virtually identical.

> That's an interesting remark -- that you regard concealment as one of the
main
> motivations.  I personally regard concealment as one of the lesser
motivations
> -- I'm more interested in attack resistance (resisting attacks such as
> subversion or denial-of-service, rather than attacks such as surveillance),
> scalability, and other properties.  Although I'm interested in the
concealment
> properties as well.

That is surprising.  Are you aware of any current or proposed f2f
networks for which concealment of user activity is not a goal?

Ian.
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec  3 02:35:00 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 11:35:00 +0100
Subject: [ian.clarke@gmail.com: Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet,
  f2f net)]
Message-ID: <20051203103500.GF2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Ian Clarke <ian.clarke at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec  3 03:53:16 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 12:53:16 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Telecoms required to save logs of
  e-mail]
Message-ID: <20051203115316.GK2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec  3 05:14:12 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 14:14:12 +0100
Subject: [udhay@pobox.com: [silk] foolproof iris recognition?]
Message-ID: <20051203131412.GM2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Udhay Shankar N <udhay at pobox.com> -----


From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec  3 12:32:31 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 15:32:31 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on  I strongly afree with this djf Google search and
Message-ID: <mailman.1418.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

seizure
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
Reply-To: dave at farber.net



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec  3 12:33:14 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 15:33:14 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on   I strongly afree with this djf Google search and
Message-ID: <mailman.1419.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

seizure
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
Reply-To: dave at farber.net



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec  3 13:35:00 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 16:35:00 -0500
Subject: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
Message-ID: <mailman.1420.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From udhay at pobox.com  Sat Dec  3 04:35:53 2005
From: udhay at pobox.com (Udhay Shankar N)
Date: Sat, 03 Dec 2005 18:05:53 +0530
Subject: [silk] foolproof iris recognition?
Message-ID: <mailman.1421.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

http://blogs.zdnet.com/emergingtech/?p=88

Foolproof iris recognition technology?

Posted by Roland Piquepaille @ 10:35 am

For almost twenty years, the iris recognition research field has been
hampered because of a broad patent covering it. As this patent
recently expired, many teams around the world are again working on
new technologies in this field. Iris recognition is in fact seen as
the most accurate biometric recognition technology because no two
irises are identical. And researchers at the University of Bath in
England have developed new computer algorithms which are 100 per cent
accurate in initial trials. Now the researchers are putting online a
database of 16,000 iris images collected mainly from students. The
source code is also available if you want to further improve the algorithms.

Before going further, let's go back in time to understand why this
research field was almost inactive for twenty years. Life Style Extra
tells us the story.

    Looking into a camera to confirm your identity would now be
routine and - were it not for the US firm's virtual monopoly of the
technology - it would already be in use at cashpoints and passport
control. Its backers say it could reduce fraud and illegal immigration.

    Iridian Technologies, based in New Jersey, patented the system
of identifying people using the coloured part of the human eye in the
mid 80s and other scientists have had to pay tens of thousands of
American dollars to do any research in the field, thus hampering competition.

    But the patent expired in the US earlier this year and expires
in the rest of the world in February 2006.

Now, it's time to return to 2005 at the University of Bath.

    Engineers are currently road-testing their technology using a
specially-constructed database containing thousands of iris images
collected from students and colleagues at the University.

    By making this database available to other research groups, the
researchers hope to encourage more advances in iris recognition and
overcome some of the restrictions caused by a generic patent
(recently expired) which has limited innovation for the last two decades.

    "Our new algorithm does the same job as the one used by almost
all of the commercially available iris recognition systems, it just
does it better," said Professor Don Monro from the University's
Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering.

Below is a picture showing how an iris picture is shot and rendered
on a computer screen before being analyzed (Credit: Smart Sensors Ltd.).

The iris image acquisition process

And below is an illustration of the iris image normalization process
(Credit: Smart Sensors Ltd.).

The iris image normalization process

    First, the inner and outer iris boundaries are located to
eliminate the pupil, eyelid and other "clutter". Then the iris image
is transformed from polar coordinates to a 512x80 fixed size
rectangular image to reduce the effect of iris dilation and
contraction, of which 512x48 will be coded. The non-uniform
background illumination is finally homogenized.

Now that you know how this new technology works, why are these
researchers willing to share their database? Here are Monro's answers.

    Most of the databases that are available are held by commercial
interests, so it is difficult for independent researchers to make
headway in this field.

    We are making the database available online so that researchers
around the world can use it to develop their own products. So far,
more than 30 research groups have applied to use it.

If you want to know more about this project, here are two links at
the University of Bath about the Iris Image Database and the Iris
Capture Project.

And for even more information, one of the industrial partners of the
University of Bath for this project is a U.K. company named Smart
Sensors Ltd., which has published two interesting papers about this
iris recognition technology.

Here are the links to these documents, "Novel high performance iris
feature extraction techniques" (PDF format, 1 page, 119 KB) and
"Complexity low complexity human iris feature coding human iris
feature coding" (PDF format, 1 page, 222 KB). The above illustrations
were extracted from these documents.

Sources: University of Bath news release, November 15, 2005; Life
Style Extra, November 15, 2005; and various web sites


--
((Udhay Shankar N)) ((udhay @ pobox.com)) ((www.digeratus.com))


----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec  3 12:41:32 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 21:41:32 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on   I strongly afree with this djf
  Google search and seizure]
Message-ID: <20051203204132.GV2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec  3 12:42:05 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 21:42:05 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on  I strongly afree with this djf
  Google search and seizure]
Message-ID: <20051203204205.GW2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec  3 13:59:03 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 22:59:03 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs.
  technologists]
Message-ID: <20051203215903.GN2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From Bob2-19-0501 at bobf.frankston.com  Sun Dec  4 12:48:19 2005
From: Bob2-19-0501 at bobf.frankston.com (Bob Frankston)
Date: December 4, 2005 12:48:19 PM EST
Subject: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
Message-ID: <mailman.1422.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

After writing my comments below I was going to close by noting that
there
is far more to worry about with fingerprints than Google since there is
still a belief that finger prints are authoritative even if there is
only a
small portion recovered and the matching is subjective.

In the same way we can try to avoid leaving any tracks and live a very
circumscribed life. Or we can hope that our trails are noisy and that a
visit to whitehouse.com (vs whitehouse.gov) will not mark us for
life. Who
knows if the visit was intended, unintended, prurient or just curious?

This isn't really about technology in isolation or Google per se.

We should do what we can to make people aware of these issues -- as with
Sony DRM ultimately it's people's perception. If Google is seen as
spying
on us then they will lose too much business. Ultimately it's that rather
than users setting complex option that limits threats.

It's about transparency -- we need to pry into Google's closets
before they
pry into ours.

The average user didn't understand the Internet until it was packaged
in a
browser and today the internet is the web and people still don't
understand
it beyond the simple examples they have. But even if they think that
people
are watching them they don't know what it means. Even the so-called
experts
implement link level security instead of end to end.

As to Google keeping track of your searches ... what about the trail you
leave in that old world of physical objects when you use your credit
cards.
A few key words on Google are mild compared with you are stop at the
7-11
and the cell call you made or the email messages. The threat of Google
keeping track of your keywords is very abstract. The reason this
story made
the news is that it is very unusual.

Those who say users will never be able to use computers for word
processing
for have LANs at home were right.

And completely wrong.

There is a middle ground -- it doesn't just happen by accident.
Someone has
to create a bridge. If the other "side" is visible then more people
would
try. There is a book, "Crossing the Chasm", about getting people to make
the leap. More often we have to build the bridges before people know
there
is even an other side.

And very often there really isn't or we pick the wrong one. Handwriting
recognition was a big deal but a failure until Graffiti. Today oddly
enough
Palm is emphasizing little keyboards and Microsoft is trying to push
full
handwriting recognition. So much for presuming a simple linear path.

Home networking (LANs) is personal for me since I had to make sure the
Windows had the enabling mechanisms and I was trying to move in the
direction of encrypted IPv6 with legacy ports locked down.

Unfortunately we still haven't learned the lessons of Multics and
Project
MAC (http://www.frankston.com/?name=Symbiosis as in Man/Machine
Symbiosis)
in giving users a way to understand and express their intent. Of course
it's far more difficult today. At least in Multics you had to take a
step
to make your files visible while Unix defaulted to starting with the
door
wide open.

We do have a way to say "no cookies" but you can't really do much
that way.
Same problem with the Java VM in the browser -- there is an all or
nothing
policy.

Worrying about Google tracking you is in the same vein. If you use their
single login it's like being tracked by American Express or by your
library. Of course we know librarians won't track you -- but they will
track which books are popular and a really good library may try to make
better predictions so they can better serve you even if the chortle
at some
of the findings.

If you don't use a single login then it's really hard to avail
yourself of
their set of services. Same for Yahoo, AOL, MSN etc. As much as I have
problems with passport there seems to be some separation between your
"identity" and its use.

The reason I keep coming back to phishing is that it goes to the
heart of
some of our perceptions. Is "Google" a nice warm friendly site or a site
that promises to be worth more than a few billion dollars?

I once looked up "Sodomy in Georgia" on Yahoo which was the title of a
David Bunnell editorial in the 1980's. The ads that popped up showed
what
they thought of my search (a good reason for not having animated GIFs in
ads) and, by extension, me. BTW, just tried the search on Google in an
attempt to pollute my legacy and the law was eventually repealed.

Should I shy away from searching? Should I not give to political
candidates
(the disclosure laws are indeed a violation of the first amendment)?
Should
I worry too much about police finding a latent pencil line on a pad of
paper in my house having the words "dead meat" on it (a reminder to buy
hamburger)?


-----Original Message-----
From: David Farber [mailto:dave at farber.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2005 05:52
To: ip at v2.listbox.com
Subject: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Sun Dec  4 14:33:05 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2005 17:33:05 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on  Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
Message-ID: <mailman.1423.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From s.schear at comcast.net  Sun Dec  4 18:54:00 2005
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Sun, 04 Dec 2005 18:54:00 -0800
Subject: Tech Helps Cops Bust Motorists
In-Reply-To: <20051203215903.GN2249@leitl.org>
References: <20051203215903.GN2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20051204184629.04e02268@mail.comcast.net>

[It would seem possible to use a color reflective display, like 'electronic 
paper', to fool such a technology probably much easier than if the 
attention of officers were required to capture the information.  Soon 
anyone with the cajones can have 'rotating license plates'.  Steve]

Motorola's license-plate recognition technology will help police quickly 
get info on vehicles located near their squad cars.
December 1, 2005

Police cars could automatically scan nearby vehicles' license plates with a 
technology that 
<http://studio.financialcontent.com/Engine?Account=redherring&PageName=QUOTE&Ticker=MOT>Motorola 
and PIPS Technology launched Thursday, saving cops from currently having to 
type in a license plate number to search databases.

The Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology uses a camera to 
automatically read license plates as they come into view, and then checks 
the plates against police and motor vehicle databases.

The new system is quicker and requires no action on the part of the police 
officer, said Steve Most, multimedia business director for Motorola's radio 
systems division.

"The ALPR system gives public safety officers quick access to information 
about the vehicles around them," he said. "This helps increase their 
security and safety, as well as that of the general driving population."

Cellular company Motorola developed the technology and worked with PIPS 
Technology, a license plate recognition technology firm, to "ruggedize" the 
cameras so that they meet Motorola's specifications for public safety 
communications in the United States.

More at... 
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=14701&hed=Tech%20Helps%20Cops%20Bust%20Motorists 




From mciuehfs at hotmail.com  Sun Dec  4 14:01:19 2005
From: mciuehfs at hotmail.com (Rowena Culver)
Date: Sun, 04 Dec 2005 19:01:19 -0300
Subject: Please Her Tonite X7FA
Message-ID: <LAW77.OE649yfB4mvo230553d5@motmail.com>


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From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec  4 16:11:28 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2005 19:11:28 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Call for IFCA Conference Sponsors, Financial 
  Cryptography and Data Security '06
Message-ID: <p06230946bfb9360ce377@[68.167.57.91]>

Um, what's "Data Security"?

;-)

Cheers,
RAH
-------
--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2005 19:10:25 -0500
 To: "Philodox Clips List" <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips]
  Call for IFCA Conference Sponsors, Financial Cryptography and
  Data Security '06
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


 --- begin forwarded text


  To: Robert Hettinga <rah at ibuc.com>
  From: Patrick McDaniel <mcdaniel at cse.psu.edu>
  Subject: Call for IFCA Conference Sponsors, Financial Cryptography and
 Data Security '06
  Date: Sun,  4 Dec 2005 18:52:19 -0500 (EST)

  Dear Robert,

  The Financial Cryptography and Data Security '06 is celebrating its
  10th year in Anguilla, British West Indies from February 27 to March
  2, 2006.  This conference has become a yearly touch-stone for those
  involved in the construction and use of technology in commercial
  environments.  To this end, the conference brings together top
  cryptographers, data-security specialists, and scientists with
  economists, bankers, implementers, and policy makers.

  Intimate and colorful by tradition, the FC'06 program will feature
  invited talks, academic presentations, technical demonstrations, and
  panel discussions. In addition, we will celebrate this 10th year
  edition with a number of initiatives, such as: especially focused
  session, technical and historical state-of-the-art panels, and one
  session of surveys.

  As a past attendee, IFCA wishes to make a plea for your sponsorship.
  The importance of this conference to the larger security community is
  clear, and it is largely sustainable through the generous support of
  its sponsors.  The benefit to your organization is also well worth the
  sacrifice: sponsors receive the kinds unique exposure to the
  cognoscenti that can only be received at these events.  Sponsorship
  opportunities are available at modest levels and beyond.

  If you are interested in sponsoring, we would be very interested in
  talking to you.  Please visit the conference website:

                http://siis.cse.psu.edu/fc06/

  Feel free reply to this message or send email to myself
  (mcdaniel at cse.psu.edu) or contact me via phone (814) 863-3599 for
  further information.

  Sincerely,
  Patrick McDaniel, General Chair, FC '06

 --- end forwarded text


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From checker at panix.com  Sun Dec  4 17:43:36 2005
From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker)
Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2005 20:43:36 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [>Htech] CHE: Show Your Hand, Not Your ID
Message-ID: <mailman.1424.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Show Your Hand, Not Your ID
The Chronicle of Higher Education, 5.12.2
http://chronicle.com/free/v52/i15/15a02801.htm
[Colloquy transcript appended.]

[Yes, I can see the advantages of using these scanners, and I think the
concerns over theft and privacy issues are reasonably countered. But the
real problem is that, in making such identifications mandatory, the
informal and generally harmless violations of rules are no longer
possible. Suppose a researcher wants to sneak a friend into his lab after
hours. This, and many, many other technical violations will no longer be
allowed. We must be ever vigilant about this kind of "unreasonableness of
reason," to almost coin a meme. There is a single hit on Google! I lack a
better term.]

    Colleges use biometric scanners to screen for access to dining halls,
    labs, dorms, gyms, and computer networks

    By VINCENT KIERNAN

    At many colleges, students flash a photo ID at a food-service worker
    to get into a dining hall. Things work differently at the University
    of Georgia, where Gavin Beck, a senior, places his hand on a sensor
    that determines if the person waiting to eat really is Gavin Beck.

    The process, which measures the size and shape of the hand, takes only
    a few seconds. "No system is foolproof, but this is far more efficient
    for us than a photo-based system," says J. Michael Floyd, director of
    food services at Georgia. The university is among the first to use the
    biometric technology widely, having relied on it in one form or
    another in its dining halls since 1974.

    Hand scanners, electronic fingerprint readers, even retina scanners
    are not just for super-spies in Hollywood movies anymore. The
    technology is increasingly being used by colleges to allow students,
    professors, and staff members to gain access to dining halls,
    laboratories, gyms, and other facilities on their campuses.
    Improvements in the technology are spurring greater interest among
    some college administrators.

    Faculty and staff members who seek weekend access to the Biodesign
    Institute at Arizona State University, for example, must be approved
    by a device that checks 240 points in the iris of the eye.

    Locks on dormitory doors at Johnson & Wales University at Denver are
    controlled by a hand-geometry reader similar to Georgia's.

    Food-service workers at Georgia punch in and out of their shifts with
    a time clock that scans their fingerprints so that a worker cannot
    clock in for an absent friend.

    Proponents say biometric technology offers increased security and
    efficiency, making lines move faster while keeping unauthorized
    visitors out. And at a time when colleges are trying to safeguard
    campus data, the technology offers colleges a new tool to control
    access to computers and networks.

    But cost and various technical obstacles are likely to slow the
    technology's adoption by colleges. And some observers worry that the
    systems could leave an electronic paper trail -- open to abuse or
    theft -- of the activities of students and faculty and staff members.
    "It's an extremely disturbing trend," says Lee Tien, a senior staff
    lawyer at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a group that promotes
    online civil liberties. "Biometrics is a technology that is dangerous
    for privacy."

    How It Works

    Administrators who support the use of biometric technology say
    scanning body parts is far more secure than asking users for
    passwords, which can be forgotten or stolen. The scanning devices look
    for some unique characteristic of the user, such as the arrangement of
    ridges on the finger, the pattern of blood vessels in the eye, or the
    size and shape of the hand. The characteristic -- called a biometric
    measurement -- must be unique for each individual, must not change,
    and must be easily measured.

    Typically a person's hand, fingerprint, or eyeball is measured once
    when he or she is enrolled in the system, and that measurement is
    stored in a computer database or on a smart ID card. At the entrance
    to a controlled area, such as a dining hall, the individual's
    characteristic is measured again and compared with the original
    recording. If the two measurements match, the person is admitted.

    Georgia's early system recorded two-dimensional measurements of users'
    hands. But in 1995, as part of a campuswide move toward biometric
    identification, the system was upgraded to one that takes
    three-dimensional measurements. Now the 32,500 students use their
    hands as passports to all-you-can-eat meal plans, the recreation
    center, and dormitories. They either swipe an ID card through a card
    reader or enter an ID number on a keypad before presenting their hand
    for scanning.

    Mr. Floyd, the food-service director, says the system rarely
    misidentifies anyone. Mr. Beck, the Georgia senior, recalls only one
    glitch, when the system wouldn't recognize him at the start of fall
    semester, probably because of a subtle change in his hand's shape over
    the summer. At a nearby office, he showed his ID, had his hand
    rescanned, and was cleared to eat his meal. "It set me back a couple
    of minutes," he says, "but it was no big deal."

    The University of New Hampshire installed a hand-reading system in its
    dining halls when campus officials wanted to halt the sharing of
    all-you-can-eat meal plans by several people, says David J. May,
    executive director of hospitality services.

    "It really has worked wonderfully for us," he says. Although he cannot
    estimate the amount of fraud that the system has stopped, he is
    convinced that "students would beat the system if we were using ID
    cards."

    The cost of putting biometric security in place is not exorbitant,
    says Mr. May. Each hand reader costs about $2,500, and the turnstile
    to which it is connected costs $8,500 to $9,000. The 12,000-student
    university has seven biometric stations at its dining halls, he says.

    Recently, New Hampshire expanded the system to control employees'
    access to one of its dining halls. That way the university will not
    have to issue keys to employees -- or replace locks if keys are
    stolen. "If an employee leaves, we just take them out of the
    database," so the hand-reading system will no longer recognize that
    person, says Mr. May.

    Smaller-Scale Projects

    Biometric systems are also being used on a smaller scale on some
    campuses. At Rutgers University at New Brunswick, fingerprint-scanning
    devices are being installed on computers attached to laboratory
    equipment in the materials-science department.

    The department, with some 80 potential users of the technology, has a
    password system to track usage of the equipment, so that the
    appropriate research grant is charged. But some students complained
    that they were being charged for others' use, says W. Roger Cannon, a
    professor of materials science and engineering.

    That prompted him to investigate a biometric alternative. "If we had a
    fingerprint system, there would be no argument," he says.

    The new system has functioned well in tests, Mr. Cannon says. "It
    seems to go pretty smoothly if you get the fingerprint centered
    right." Those with concerns about personal privacy can elect to
    continue using passwords, he adds.

    The University of California at Santa Barbara recently installed an
    iris-scanning system for controlling access by about 500 people to a
    10,000-square-foot "clean room" in a semiconductor-research center.

    In the past, having those people swipe their ID cards at the door
    would result in more work for staff members, who would have to replace
    lost or broken cards, says Jack Whaley, manager of the Nanofabrication
    Facility. Moreover, the card readers were sometimes balky, he says,
    and nothing prevented people from lending their cards to others.

    In the new system, an individual's eyes are photographed, and the
    images are digitized, encrypted, and stored on a computer server with
    information about what doors the individual is authorized to use and
    at what times. Researchers who want to get in simply step up to an
    iris reader, which transmits an image of the iris to the server. If
    the images match, the computer opens the door.

    Some challenges remain, like reminding people who have "droopy
    eyelids" to open their eyes wide, says Mr. Whaley. But the system,
    which cost between $20,000 and $30,000, has made a negligible number
    of errors. "It's pretty good," he says.

    More-exotic technology is on the horizon. Fujitsu Ltd. announced in
    June that the Chiba Institute of Technology, in Japan, has adopted a
    company device that uses infrared light to read the unique pattern of
    veins in a student's hand. The patterns are recorded on each
    individual's ID card. At kiosks on the campus, students can get access
    to their academic transcripts and other personal records by inserting
    the cards and holding their hand over a palm reader.

    Next year the institute, which has about 11,000 students, plans to
    issue similar cards to faculty and staff members. It is considering
    expanding the system for such purposes as tracking library checkouts
    and class attendance.

    Joel Hagberg, vice president for marketing and business development at
    Fujitsu Computer Products of America, says the company is discussing
    use of the technology with American colleges, which he does not
    identify. The system could start surfacing on American campuses early
    next year, he says. The vein scanner costs more than a fingerprint
    reader, which can run as much as $100, but less than an iris reader,
    he says, although he declines to provide specific figures.

    The technology will probably materialize first at a large research
    institution, most likely as part of a centralized service such as
    controlling college officials' access to student records, Mr. Hagberg
    predicts, noting that such an application would require only a few
    palm readers.

    "This is something that you will see coming to a university near you
    in the near future," he says.

    Privacy Concerns

    For all the efficiency and gee-whiz value of biometric technology,
    civil libertarians say it raises serious concerns about privacy. The
    theft or abuse of biometric measurements could be even more
    threatening than misuse of Social Security numbers, warns Mr. Tien, of
    the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

    Campus officials using fingerprint readers stress that their systems
    do not record individuals' fingerprints in images like those used by
    law-enforcement agencies. Rather, the systems produce a mathematical
    representation of fingerprints that would be useless to anyone outside
    the colleges.

    Hand-geometry systems seem to cause the least apprehension because
    such measurements are not commonly used off campus and so would have
    little or no application if the biometric data were to leak out. "The
    only person it does any good is me," says Mr. Beck, the Georgia
    student.

    Keene State College, in New Hampshire, moved to a hand-reader system
    this semester. Paul A. Striffolino, director of campus life, says the
    system does not intrude on the privacy of the college's 5,000
    students. "An eye-scanning system would seem over the top to me," he
    says.

    But some observers say even hand-geometry data could be misused. If
    hand readers become commonplace, authorities could use records from
    the systems to reconstruct a student's movements and activities on the
    campus or across a broader area, says Mr. Tien.

    "It facilitates an atmosphere or a climate of checkpoints," he says.
    "All it is, is maybe a faster way to get through a door. We have to
    wonder whether these are the right trade-offs to be making."

    Indeed, records of a student's biometric measurements, as well as
    records of where and when that student used a biometric device,
    probably would be protected from public disclosure under the Family
    Educational Rights and Privacy Act, says Steven McDonald, general
    counsel at the Rhode Island School of Design, who tracks the effect of
    the federal law on the use of technology on campuses.

    In most cases, he says, Ferpa would not allow a college to disclose,
    without a student's permission, where and when that student had
    entered a dining hall, for example. But the records could still be
    used by the college's own staff and might be vulnerable to subpoena by
    law-enforcement officials, he says.

    Nancy Tribbensee, deputy general counsel at Arizona State, says a
    college should acknowledge privacy concerns before settling on
    biometric technology. She suggests that college officials consider
    whether the benefits, like tighter security, would be outweighed by
    ways in which the data could be abused.

    Recordings from the iris scanner at the university's Biodesign
    Institute are not covered by Ferpa, Ms. Tribbensee notes, because the
    system is used by faculty and staff members. But the university treats
    the data as personnel records and therefore as confidential, and it
    would fight any effort to obtain copies through the state's
    public-records law, she says.

    High Price Tag

    Privacy is not the only concern about biometric security systems. Some
    users also worry about safety -- for example, whether touching a hand
    reader could expose someone to colds and the flu from previous users.
    Mr. May, of New Hampshire, says the device is "no different than a
    doorknob." Still, liquid hand sanitizer is available at each hand
    reader, in a dispenser attached to the wall, and a staff member wipes
    the readers with a sanitizing solution every 15 minutes.

    Another hurdle facing biometric systems is cost. Last year Creighton
    University considered using fingerprint readers to control access to
    the 1,500 to 2,000 computers in its laboratories and offices. At $90
    to $100 a pop, Creighton would have had to spend as much as $200,000
    on the devices -- and that wouldn't have included the cost of
    upgrading the machines as technology advanced. "That would have been a
    huge expense," says Michael M. Allington, assistant director of
    student-technology support in the information-technology department.
    Creighton took a pass.

    Still, industry officials argue that biometric systems make financial
    sense for colleges, at least in some situations. The staff and systems
    needed to maintain a list of passwords for security systems might cost
    a college $50 per student annually, says Tom Doggett, director of
    marketing for Saflink Corporation, which makes a variety of biometric
    systems. By contrast, he says, a large college might spend $30 to $40
    per student to deploy a biometric system.

    "You could make the case that the system would pay for itself in a
    year," Mr. Doggett says.

    But James L. Wayman, director of the National Biometric Test Center at
    San Jose State University, which explores technical issues related to
    the technology, is less optimistic.

    It is unclear, he says, whether dining halls are losing enough money
    from fraud to warrant the expense of a biometric system. "Will it
    pay?" he asks. "That's where it all falls apart."

    "Tell me again," he says, "why you need them on college campuses."

    Biometric systems can also have technical problems, which have prodded
    a few colleges to back away from the technology.

    Recently the New York State Center for Engineering Design and
    Industrial Innovation, at the State University of New York at Buffalo,
    encountered problems with a fingerprint-scanning system used to
    control access to its facilities. The readers worked well in 2000,
    when they were installed inside the building, says Kenneth W. English,
    deputy director. But the design center is planning an expansion that
    would require placing the access controls on the building's exterior,
    and the fingerprint readers worked poorly there because of snow and
    ice. So the center is reverting to having users swipe ID cards through
    a card reader.

    Mr. English hopes that improvements in biometric technology will allow
    the center to move back to fingerprint readers in the next two or
    three years.

    'Weak Fingerprints'

    When Creighton considered fingerprint readers, it tested several
    models. But the machines had a hard time recognizing faculty members
    in the dental school, recalls Mr. Allington. They seemed to have
    less-visible fingerprints, probably because of the frequency with
    which they washed their hands, he says.

    A similar problem surfaced in Georgia's food-service department, where
    600 employees use a fingerprint system to sign in and out of work.
    About 10 of them, whose work often keeps their hands submerged in
    water, have "weak fingerprints" and so cannot use the biometric
    system, says Christopher H. Wilkins, an information-technology manager
    in the university's food-service division. They still clock in and out
    by swiping an ID card or entering an ID number.
      _________________________________________________________________

Colloquy Transcript
http://chronicle.com/colloquy/2005/12/bio/

Throwing Away the Keys

    Thursday, December 1, at 2 p.m., U.S. Eastern time

    The topic

    Forget keys and photo ID's. Students trying to get into dormitories at
    Johnson & Wales University in Denver must have their hands measured by
    an electronic scanner. Food-service workers at the University of
    Georgia punch in and out of their shifts with a time clock that scans
    their fingerprints. And faculty and staff members seeking weekend
    access to the Biodesign Institute at Arizona State University must be
    approved by a device that checks 240 points in the iris of the eye.

    More and more colleges are using such biometric technology, which its
    fans say is more secure and efficient than traditional tools. The
    technology also offers a new way to control access to campus computers
    and networks. But biometric systems can have technical problems, and
    they are expensive to install. And some observers worry that the
    systems could leave an electronic trail -- open to abuse or theft --
    of employees' and students' activities.

    Are the advantages of biometric technology worth its high cost? Do
    they outweigh its potential misuses? Are biometric records protected
    from public disclosure under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
    Act, or do colleges need to take extra steps to protect such data?

    The guest

    J. Michael Floyd is director of food services at the University of
    Georgia, which has used biometric technology in one form or another in
    its dining halls since 1974.
      _________________________________________________________________

                      A transcript of the chat follows.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Vincent Kiernan (Moderator):
        Good afternoon, and welcome to Colloquy. I'm Vincent Kiernan, a
    senior writer at The Chronicle, and I will be moderating today's
    discussion about the use of biometrics in higher education.

    Our guest is J. Michael Floyd, director of food services at the
    University of Georgia. His institution is a pioneer in the use of
    biometrics -- Georgia has used hand readers in its dining halls since
    the 1970s.

    Just a quick reminder to everyone out there in cyberspace: Send in
    your questions and comments!

    Now, welcome, Mike. Could you start by giving us a thumbnail sketch of
    what your institution does in this area?
      _________________________________________________________________

    J. Michael Floyd:
        The University of Georgia Food Services has utilized biometric
    technology since 1972 for access control for its voluntary meal plan
    program that allows unlimited access for its customers from 7 am to
    midnight daily. The department is presently on its third generation of
    hand image readers and has recently implemented a biometric
    timekeeping system for its 700 employees. The department has chosen
    biometric technology for its access control to prevent sharing of meal
    plans by customers, reduce labor cost for access control, and to
    increase speed of entry for its customers. The average customer gains
    access into our dining commons within a 3-5 second time period with
    the use of biometric technology. Presently 33,000 students here at the
    University utilize this technology for access for dining commmons,
    residence halls and campus recreation facilities.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Vincent Kiernan (Moderator):
        Now onto our questions...
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Terri Moreman, U.S. Olympic Training Center:
        Terri Moreman

    U.S. Olympic Training Center

    Colorado Springs, Colorado

    Advantages to Biometrics

    Easy to maintain and archive guest access (various reports available
    with the ability to customize)

    Quicker smother entry - especially when most students dont want to
    carry I.D. card.

    Cheaper and easier then re-keying access doors

    Less chance of misuse

    Card access is even higher however; here again the student would need
    to carry the card at all times. Without the card they have no access.

    Disadvantage

    Dont go with new technology out the start gate. Seek out a proven
    product in the marketplace.

    Initial equipment set-up is high however in the long run it pays for
    itself

    Hand geometry readers cost an average of $3,000 per location

    Certified technicians trained in this specialty are required to
    maintain, trouble shoot and make repairs. Generally speaking an
    electrician or layman may understand the electrical components;
    however he would lack the necessary knowledge to function in this
    capacity.

    The challenge is that technology changes and if you maintain a system
    too long its hard to find parts it. Routine upgrades in software and
    hardware need to be considered to maintain your system.

    Electronic access is great until you have a power outage.

    Systems normally reset themselves however; surges and losses in power
    can cause damage to your system. If your facility is in a high risk
    lightning area it would advantageous to secure a back up generator.

    J. Michael Floyd:
        Terri Moreman makes some excellent comments on her use of
    biometric handreaders at the US Olympic Training Center. One of the
    big advantages that we find in our application of biometrics here at
    the University of Georgia is the financial savings that we realize
    with this system. Let me explain this statement. In our application
    customers activate the system themselves by either swiping their id
    card or punching in their id number then placing their hand in the
    reader. Once the reader recognizes the hand image as a customer it
    then sends a signal to the turnstyle that allows the customer to enter
    the dining commons. By using this self activation system we do not
    need a cashier at every entry device, only a cashier to monitor all
    the entry devices for each dining commons. This reduces our labor cost
    by eight fulltime cashiers. This cost savings greatly outweighs the
    additional cost of the biometric readers. A disadvantage of the system
    is that it does require trained technicians to maintain the system,
    which a photo base only system normally does not require. The main
    service issue that we have is the routine replacement that we have to
    do on the keypad due to the large amount of usage our systems receive
    by our customers choosing to enter their student id number in lieu of
    swiping their id card. The numbers are actually worn off the keypad.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from G. Buhl, Rutgers U.:
        WIth the loss and theft of personal data by Universities reported
    recently in the media, what are the risks to students and faculty of
    entrusting biometric data to Universities?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        With any systems the appropriate safeguards must be in place to
    protect data. However, the biometric data that we use is hand & finger
    images and not prints. This data is of no value to an outsider to
    identify a customer by a hand or finger image. The key to our system
    is that we do not store finger or hand prints. In addition we do not
    identify our customers or employees by their social security number in
    our systems, but we utilize University identification numbers instead.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Vincent Kiernan:
        Mike, a big issue with any new IT system is cost. Can you give us
    an idea of how much this system costs Georgia -- and how much it saves
    you in operational costs?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        The cost of any system is reflective of the size of the
    application, number of hand readers and the number of locations. In
    our case the initial cost was approximately $100,000. But this cost
    was immediately offset by reduction of staffing. With the use of
    biometric readers where the customer activates the system you do not
    need a cashier for every entry device. In our case we are able to
    staff our cashier station with one cashier who monitors two hand
    readers. This alone reduced labor by 8 fulltime positions. In today's
    dollars this is a savings of approximately $186,000 in salary and
    benefits cost every year. But the true savings is the speed of access
    for our customers. Thereby allowing greater thru put of customers in
    dining centers, which allows us to maximize our operations and reduces
    the need to build operations for peak customer periods. In our case we
    provide meal plan service for our customers in four dining centers. On
    some other campuses this same number of customers may need five to six
    dining centers.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Vincent Kiernan:
        Mike, biometrics make some people nervous from a privacy
    perspective. Have you encountered any concern on your campus? How do
    you reassure people that their privacy is being protected?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        We have not experienced the privacy concern from our customers
    because we take an aggressive approach of educating our customers that
    our system is a hand image and not a hand print. One of the ways we
    educate our customers on the system is including this information in
    our Food Service presentation during the summer Freshman Orientation
    program. In addition we have previous articles from the Wall Street
    Journal and New York Times framed and in our lobbies to educate our
    customers on our biometric application. Our biometric system was also
    featured in "Beyond 2000" on the Discovery Channel several years ago
    and when the film crew was on campus we attempted to get as many of
    our students involved with the filming. In addition, during my 20 year
    tenure here at the University I have never had a customer express
    concern on this issue. What I do encounter from our customers is a
    sense of pride that they are using state of the art technology and I
    find they are normally our best PR agents as they love to explain our
    system to visitors.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Vincent Kiernan:
        Do you have any plans to further expand your use of biometrics in
    the dining hall system?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        Yes. We have recently expanded the use of biometrics for
    timekeeping for employees. Utilizing a different biometric system, our
    employees clock in & out daily using a finger image. The next
    expansion is to utilize these devices for backdoor employee access
    into our operations. This will increase the overall security of our
    operations, especially since we have operations open till midnight and
    our plans include a 24-hour dining center in the near future. In my
    opinion, the real future of biometrics in the workplace is in
    timekeeping. This application for employers with large work forces
    will greatly increase the accuracy of paying for actual hours worked
    and prevent "buddy punching."
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Edward Marshall, University of Pennsylvania:
        Are you aware of any health related issues resulting from the use
    of biometric technologies? In particular, retinal scans.
    J. Michael Floyd:
        No, there is no greater risk with the hand image readers than the
    doorknob on the front of the building. However, we do have a procedure
    in place to sanitize the hand reader surface on a routine schedule
    thru out the day. In addition we have hand sanitizer stations located
    inside our dining operations for customers who would like to use this
    product. We do not utilize retinal scans here. However, the most
    common form of eye scanning is iris scanning and with these devices
    the eye is typically 10 to 14 inches away from the scanner.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Vincent Kiernan (Moderator):
        We're about half way through our scheduled time for this
    conversation. If you have any questions for Mr. Floyd, now would be a
    great time to send them in.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Dick Sigelko, Michigan State University:
        If the system is not storing fingerprints or hand geography, how
    does it identify the individual as having the privilege?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        The system is storing hand and finger image templates. The
    templates are a mathematical representation of the hand or finger
    ridges. These stored templates are then compared to the image
    presented by the customer/employee when they place their hand or
    finger in the reader. All verifications are done on a one to one
    comparison, not a one to many comparison. For example the customer
    will input their ID number by scanning their card or typing their card
    number on a keypad and then they place their hand in the reader. The
    customer / employee must be active in the system prior to utilizing
    the system.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Matt Miller, Gettysburg College:
        How long on average does it take to add a new hand image to the
    system?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        For both systems the initial image is captured at an orientation.
    Each image takes approximately 30 seconds to capture and verify the
    first time. However, with our meal plan system this one time
    enrollment is the only time we must physically see the student to
    begin participation in the meal plan for their entire academic stay at
    UGA. The enrollment for students is done when they have their ID card
    produced.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Vincent Kiernan:
        What advice do you have for colleges that might consider hand
    scanning in the future? Are there any particular land mines to avoid?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        The key is to promote this as state of art technology and to
    excite the customers that they are involved in a unique application of
    technology. One installation issue to avoid is to make sure that all
    hand image readers are installed at the same height. Readers installed
    at different height can result in a higher error ratio.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Dick Sigelko, Michigan State University:
        Have students expressed a concern about contamination, germs or
    the "ick" factor?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        Over the years we have heard this question from a few customers,
    which allows us to explain our system and how we sanitize the reader
    surface. But normally when we share the comparison about the front
    doorknob on the building the student then realizes the enormous number
    of common surfaces they touch with their hands each day.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Dick Sigelko, Michigan State University:
        How many mis-reads per 100 do you get?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        We are at less than 1% of false-negatives. This allows our Cashier
    to then look up the customer in our data base and then permit the
    customer to dine.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Francine Reynolds, University of Richmond:
        Mike, what systems are your biometric readers interfacing with
    (i.e. CBORD's CSGold, etc.)
    J. Michael Floyd:
        Our system is a proprietary system that our campus IT department
    developed and maintains for the campus.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Terri Moreman, U.S. Olympic Training Center:
        Mike, is your system tied to dorm room or buliding access?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        Yes, our system is tied to residence hall building access. But not
    individual rooms.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Rich Bredahl, University of Texas at Austin:
        How about issues of cleaniness? With potentially several hundred
    people using a reader per hour, how do you:
    1) Keep the reader clean
    2) Ensure the reader does not become a means of passing
    germs/bacteria/viruses
    J. Michael Floyd:
        No, there is no greater risk with the hand image readers than the
    doorknob on the front of the building. However, we do have a procedure
    in place to sanitize the hand reader surface on a routine schedule
    throughout the day. In addition we have hand sanitizer stations
    located inside our dining operations for customers who would like to
    use this product.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Question from Vincent Kiernan:
        That will be our last question. Mike, any final thoughts?
    J. Michael Floyd:
        In conclusion, the key benefit of a biometric system is that it
    can be a user activated system that creates a great deal of ownership
    by the customer. With this ownership, there is a buy in from the
    customer to assist the organization in making the system work.
    Additionally, biometric systems have the potential of reducing
    personnel cost and improving overall levels of security and customer
    thru put. There is also a greater awareness of security by the
    customer than the traditional photo base system. Biometrics is the
    technology that our children will see in their future workplace.
      _________________________________________________________________

    Vincent Kiernan (Moderator):
        That about does it for today. On behalf of The Chronicle, thanks
    to Mike Floyd and his staff for their illuminating answers to the
    questions, and thanks to all of you for participating. Have a good
    afternoon.
      _________________________________________________________________

    J. Michael Floyd:
        A special thank you to Donald Smith, Department Manager of UGAcard
    Support Services and Chris Wilkins, IT Manager, UGA Food Services for
    joining me today on the Colloquy and assisting with the
    responses.Additionally Biometric systems have the potential of
    reducing personnel cost and improving overall levels of security and
    customer thru put.




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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From declan at well.com  Mon Dec  5 07:47:23 2005
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2005 07:47:23 -0800
Subject: [Politech] Weekly column: Tracking you wherever you drive -- GPS
 bugs and the Transportation Department [priv]
Message-ID: <mailman.1425.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



http://news.com.com/2010-1071_3-5980979.html

Perspective:  E-tracking, coming to a DMV near you
By Declan McCullagh
December 5, 2005, 4:00 AM PST

Trust federal bureaucrats to take a good idea and transform it into a
frightening proposal to track Americans wherever they drive.

The U.S. Department of Transportation has been handing millions of
dollars to state governments for GPS-tracking pilot projects designed to
track vehicles wherever they go. So far, Washington state and Oregon
have received fat federal checks to figure out how to levy these
"mileage-based road user fees."

Now that electronic tracking and taxing may be coming to a DMV near you.
The Office of Transportation Policy Studies, part of the Federal Highway
Administration, is about to announce another round of grants totaling
some $11 million. A spokeswoman on Friday said the office is "shooting
for the end of the year" for the announcement, and more money is
expected for GPS (Global Positioning System) tracking efforts.

[...remainder snipped...]
_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From Swone at optonline.net  Sun Dec  4 19:16:53 2005
From: Swone at optonline.net (Debora Zuniga)
Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2005 08:16:53 +0500
Subject: Fw: Please Read
Message-ID: <200512050326.jB53PpDP028185@proton.jfet.org>

Sir/Madam,
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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec  5 00:07:02 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2005 09:07:02 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on  Google search and seizure, etc.
  vs. technologists]
Message-ID: <20051205080702.GY2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec  5 03:21:16 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2005 12:21:16 +0100
Subject: [checker@panix.com: [>Htech] CHE: Show Your Hand, Not Your ID]
Message-ID: <20051205112116.GE2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Premise Checker <checker at panix.com> -----


From clayton.rolygm8 at gmail.com  Mon Dec  5 13:00:46 2005
From: clayton.rolygm8 at gmail.com (Samuel Hopper)
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2005 13:00:46 -0800
Subject: Dear Sir, i am interested in it
Message-ID: <200512051103.jB5B3aoW004476@proton.jfet.org>

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From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec  5 10:26:25 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2005 13:26:25 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US on the scent of terror money in Pakistan
Message-ID: <p062309cdbfba36cb118c@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2005 12:24:30 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] US on the scent of terror money in Pakistan
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GL06Df01.html>

 Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and
 Pakistan

      Dec 6, 2005
 US on the scent of terror money in Pakistan
 By Syed Saleem Shahzad

 KARACHI - Beyond the tragedy of more than 70,000 lives being lost in the
 October 8 earthquake that devastated large sections of
 Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the disaster alerted US intelligence to the
 fact that the financial conduits that feed militancy and terror remain very
 much intact.

  At very short notice, millions of dollars poured into the coffers of the
 jihadi group Jamaatut Dawa (formerly Lashkar-i-Taiba), allowing it to
 immediately take over relief operations in Kashmir while the Pakistan
 government dallied.

 As a direct consequence of this realization, the US Central

  Intelligence Agency (CIA) once again prevailed on Islamabad to launch an
 offensive against al-Qaeda-linked foreign elements sheltering in the
 country, notably in the North and South Waziristan tribal areas on the
 border with Afghanistan.

 Over the past few years, invariably under US pressure, Pakistan has
 undertaken similar offensives, with varying degrees of success, beyond
 whipping up tribal animosity by sending troops into the semi-autonomous
 regions.

 In the latest initiative, according to security contacts who spoke to Asia
 Times Online, the US insisted that Pakistan authorities conduct
 across-the-board checks and arrests, while simultaneously US operatives
 would go after specific targets in an effort to search out illicit
 financial arteries.

 One Pakistan move involves Ghazi Abdul Rasheed and Maulana Abdul Aziz of
 the famous Lal Masjid Islamabad. They issued a controversial religious
 edict during one of the previous operations in South Waziristan calling on
 people not to pray at the funerals of Pakistan Army personnel killed in
 action in the area. The two religious leaders have had their movements
 restricted.

 On the US side, they appear to have scored a hit with the elimination of
 al-Qaeda number three, Hamza Rabia, in North Waziristan, apparently through
 missiles fired from a CIA drone. However, the body has not been found and
 al-Qaeda has denied that he is dead.

 During the latest crackdown, the activities of the Jamaatut Dawa are also
 under the spotlight.

 A high-level Washington-based source told Asia Times Online:
 "Like prayers, zakat [compulsory charity - 2.5% of an individuals's annual
 reserves/savings in Sunni Islam and 5% among Shi'ites] and pilgrimage,
 jihad is also an integral part of the Muslim faith, that is why there is a
 trend that those Muslim philanthropists who build mosques, seminaries and
 donate money to Islamic relief operators also send money to those they view
 as mujahideen. That is the reason decision-makers in Washington are
 convinced that those who contribute money to Islamic groups in Kashmir are
 also involved in supporting the resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan."

  The current operations in Pakistan are being supervised and controlled by
 US intelligence. The role of the Pakistani forces is to do the
 supporting "donkey work".

 A case study
 Dr Dawood Qasmi, a graduate of the Dow Medical College in the port city of
 Karachi, works at the National Institute of Child Health in the same city.
 The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is in hot pursuit of him.

 His father, brother and two nephews were arrested, and the women of his
 family were threatened with arrest if Dawood did not give himself up.
 However, a hue and cry raised in the media forced government agencies to
 release the men and lay off the women.

 Dawood is a former commander of the banned Laskhar-i-Taiba in Sindh
 province. His role was to recruit civilians to join the Kashmiri movement.
 He was closely associated with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
 Kashmir cell. The ISI provided him with ample funds to recruit youths,
 beside giving him expensive vehicles and armed guards. Laskhar-i-Taiba was
 one of the most active militant groups in Kashmir.

 But post-September 11, 2001, events changed Dawood's life (Asia Times
 Online wrote a detailed account of his life Confessions of a failed jihadi
 , although he was not identified by name in the story).

 Disillusioned, he gave up his activities with Laskhar and returned to his
 quiet life in the medical world.

 "Dr Dawood Qasmi fully realized it [operations in Kashmir] was not a jihad
 but a Pakistan Army operation for which it was only using civilians as gun
 fodder. So he set himself aside. Initially he was working with an online
 medicine research firm and later on he joined the National Institute of
 Child Health," said his daughter, Dr Hania Dawood Qasmi of the Baqai
 Medical University in Karachi.

 "Three months ago a colonel approached Dawood and tried to prepare him to
 work again for Laskhar, but Dawood refused. He said to me that he knew that
 as he had already been tracked by the FBI, an association with Laskhar was
 essential as it was the only way to get government protection. But he said
 that his conscience was not ready for him to become a Laskhar member again,
 as it would mean being an ISI proxy," Hania Dawood maintained.

 Dawood was then left alone. But once the relief operation started in
 Kashmir, he was contacted by the Jamaatut Dawa to help as a doctor. He
 agreed, and was quickly provided with huge sums of money to purchase
 medicine and surgical equipment to be taken to Kashmir to establish mobile
 hospitals, and even an operating theater.

  A week ago, as a result of the US-inspired campaign to track money
 sources, all senior police officials were asked to update their information
 on jihadis, especially those active in their areas. Dawood would probably
 not have been targeted, had not his friend from Laskhar days, Arif Qasmani,
 been involved.

 Arif Qasmani was a part of a high-level November 14 meeting in Islamabad
 held to initiate a process for peace between the Afghan resistance and
 coalition forces led by the US. Apparently, Arif Qasmani spoke about Dawood
 and his involvement in the relief operations, and also about how he had
 quickly received cash.

 Ears obviously pricked up. Soon after, a joint team of the FBI, the army
 and the police raided Dawood's home in the early hours of the morning,
 explained Hania Dawood, but her father was out.

  "We were the ones who suffered from the hands of the police," said
 Dawood's 75-year-old father, Abdul Rauf. "They handcuffed me, my son and my
 grandson. They called us names and forced us to tell where Dr Dawood was.
 They threatened us that if we didn't tell them the whereabouts of Dr
 Dawood, they would humiliate all our family members and detain the women
 and humiliate them in front of our eyes. They did not properly feed us. I
 was the first person who was released because my health deteriorated."

 Later, after the media got onto the case, all family members were released.

  Dr Dawood Qasmi's whereabouts are still unknown.

 Syed Saleem Shahzad, Bureau Chief, Pakistan Asia Times Online.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec  5 08:14:16 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2005 17:14:16 +0100
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Weekly column: Tracking you
  wherever you drive -- GPS bugs and the Transportation Department
  [priv]]
Message-ID: <20051205161416.GI2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From rms at computerbytesman.com  Tue Dec  6 05:44:58 2005
From: rms at computerbytesman.com (Richard M. Smith)
Date: December 6, 2005 5:44:58 PM EST
Subject: [EPIC_IDOF] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
Message-ID: <mailman.1426.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

FYI

-----Original Message-----
From: Katherine Albrecht [mailto:kma at nocards.org]
Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 4:09 PM
To: press at nocards.org
Subject: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant

RFID IMPLANTS: FINE FOR THEE, BUT NOT FOR ME Ex-HHS Head Puts Off Being
Chipped Despite July Promise

Ex-Bush cabinet member Tommy Thompson still hasn't received an RFID
implant
despite a televised promise he made in July 2005 to do so.
Shortly after joining the board of VeriChip Corporation last spring, the
former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services and four-term
governor of
Wisconsin told CNBC that he would "get chipped" with a VeriChip
implant, but
he has no plans to undergo the procedure anytime soon, according to
recent
revelations.

The VeriChip is a glass-encapsulated RFID device designed to be injected
into human flesh for identification purposes and for use as a payment
device.

In public appearances, Thompson has suggested injecting the
microchips into
Americans to link to their electronic medical records. "It's very
beneficial
and it's going to be extremely helpful and it's a giant step forward to
getting what we call an electronic medical record for all Americans," he
told CBS MarketWatch in July.

When confronted by a CNBC correspondent in another July interview about
whether he would take a chip himself, Thompson replied, "Absolutely,
without
a doubt."

However, when authors Liz McIntyre and Katherine Albrecht, who
researched
human chipping for their book "Spychips: How Major Corporations and
Government Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID,"
contacted the VeriChip Corporation on December 5, they were told that
the
chipping never took place.

VeriChip spokesman John Procter said Thompson has been "too busy" to
undergo
the chipping procedure, adding that he had no clear plans to do so in
the
future. "I wouldn't put any type of time line on it," Procter said.

The VeriChip spokesman also attributed the protracted delay in the
chipping
to Thompson's desire to investigate the procedure. "He wants to see
it [the
VeriChip] in a real-world environment first," said Procter, who said
he's
trying to arrange a tour for Thompson at Hackensack University Medical
Center, the first hospital to implement the technology in its emergency
room.

But the authors question this explanation. "We would expect Mr.
Thompson to
investigate the device *before* advocating it to others," said Liz
McIntyre.
"It sounds like he has wisely decided to put off the implantation,
perhaps
due to the serious privacy and civil liberties implications of such
devices,
or perhaps due to the serious medical downsides, like electrical
risks and
MRI incompatibility."

Albrecht added, "Perhaps the implants conflict with Thompson's religious
beliefs. Whatever his reasons, he should share them with the American
people, many of whom have loved and trusted him for years. He will be
responsible if they take an implant because of his influence."

Thompson may find himself under increasing pressure to get chipped in
light
of VeriChip Corporation's recent IPO announcement. The company is
relying on
Thompson's cooperation to give the much maligned human tracking chip an
image boost. "He said it on live television," said Procter of Thompson's
chipping intentions. "We look forward to setting a firm date in
accordance
to his schedule and other commitments....We want to maximize the
impact of
[Thompson's chipping] event...We'd certainly like to...really knock
it out
of the park."

McIntyre is hoping that Thompson will resist the pressure. "Our
concern is
that the VeriChip Company would like to chip every person on the
planet, and
they're counting on Thompson to be their ticket to mass acceptance,"
said
McIntyre. "We're hoping he will work for the best interests of
humanity and
refuse to be goaded into an ill advised action."

According to Procter, only about 60 living persons in the U.S. have
agreed
to be chipped. In addition to the voluntary recipients, the company's
implants were injected into the deceased victims of hurricane
Katrina, and
there are plans to chip mentally disabled patients at a residential
center
in Chattanooga. VeriChip has also had talks with the Pentagon about
chipping
military personnel, though Procter said that "no formal agreements
have been
reached."

A transcript of Thompson's entire CBS MarketWatch interview is
available at
http://www.spychips.com/devices/tommythompsonverichip.html.

###

================================
For more information contact Katherine Albrecht or Liz McIntyre, co-
authors
of "Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track
Your Every
Move With RFID."

Liz McIntyre (liz at spychips.com) 877-287-5854

or Katherine Albrecht (kma at spychips.com) 877-287-5854
================================

Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track your Every
Move with RFID is the winner of the Lysander Spooner Award for
Advancing the
Literature of Liberty. Authored by Harvard doctoral researcher Katherine
Albrecht and former bank examiner Liz McIntyre, the book is meticulously
researched, drawing on patent documents, corporate source materials,
conference proceedings, and firsthand interviews to paint a
convincing --
and frightening -- picture of the threat posed by RFID.
================================

"This is the first, and maybe the loudest, popular book on a crucial
technology of our times...all of it is fascinating, some is gross and
revolting, and most of it is hilarious...this is a masterpiece of
technocriticism."

-- From the foreword by Bruce Sterling, best-selling author and RFID
"Visionary in Residence," Art Center College of Design


Spychips "make[s] a stunningly powerful argument against plans for RFID
being mapped out by government agencies, retail and manufacturing
companies."

--Evan Schuman, CIO Insight


"The book makes a very persuasive case that some of America's biggest
companies want to embed tracking technology into virtually everything we
own, and then study our usage patterns 24 hours a day. It's a truly
creepy
book and well worth reading."

--Hiawatha Bray, Boston Globe technology reporter


"Spychips is one of the best privacy books in many years....The privacy
movement needs a book. I nominate Spychips."

- Marc Rotenberg, Georgetown University Adjunct Professor of Law and
Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)

=========================================




_______________________________________________
EPIC_IDOF mailing list
EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof


-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From mchrfkaybjf at lycos.com  Mon Dec  5 20:34:07 2005
From: mchrfkaybjf at lycos.com (Prince Hastings)
Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2005 06:34:07 +0200
Subject: designer time pieces for a fair price
Message-ID: <200308111.62818.GA16173@atone.eu.org>

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From: RWZQU at msn.com (Justine Pagan)
Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2005 06:53:15 -0600
Subject: Everyone Need This Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <141.29e558d5.2a9DSU44@sol.com>


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Try us out today..

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uJy55




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec  6 05:50:06 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2005 14:50:06 +0100
Subject: a little bird told me
In-Reply-To: <43959250.2040704@gmail.com>
References: <20051202204052.GO2249@leitl.org>
  <4ef5fec60512021354k600d0a46jdc1d9a9ccc0bbb46@mail.gmail.com>
  <43959250.2040704@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20051206135006.GO2249@leitl.org>

On Tue, Dec 06, 2005 at 08:29:52PM +0700, Jay Listo wrote:

> well, not sure if Tor has a mechanism to find out who's operating the

How can you find out who's operating the exit nodes, unless you
know the operators personally? The system is designed to
tolerate a certain fraction of Mallory operators.

> 'exit' nodes, and the ability to choose a specific exit node.

IIRC, the client builds the circuits.

> This way, any govt (or many govts) could put up a bunch of exit nodes

Tapping and traffic analysis upstream of existing nodes are far
less instrusive.

What I'm wondering is whether the claimed attack is due to a
design fault, or just by throwing resources at it. If it's a design
issue, it can be fixed. If it's a brute force approach, it shows
how much they're willing to deploy on very little incentive.
If it's a canard, they're trying to stall and destabilize.

Knowing which would be useful.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Tue Dec  6 16:07:30 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2005 19:07:30 -0500
Subject: [IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
Message-ID: <mailman.1427.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From jay.listo at gmail.com  Tue Dec  6 05:29:52 2005
From: jay.listo at gmail.com (Jay Listo)
Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2005 20:29:52 +0700
Subject: a little bird told me
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60512021354k600d0a46jdc1d9a9ccc0bbb46@mail.gmail.com>
References: <20051202204052.GO2249@leitl.org>
  <4ef5fec60512021354k600d0a46jdc1d9a9ccc0bbb46@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <43959250.2040704@gmail.com>

well, not sure if Tor has a mechanism to find out who's operating the 
'exit' nodes, and the ability to choose a specific exit node.

This way, any govt (or many govts) could put up a bunch of exit nodes


coderman wrote:

>On 12/2/05, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
>  
>
>>That israeli intelligence apparently considers Tor broken.
>>
>>While Tor definitely has not been designed with that
>>threat model in mind, this still strikes me as somewhat
>>dubious.
>>    
>>
>
>makes sense to me. when your threat model includes $TLA with a DCS1000
>/ ECHELON / * eye view of much internet traffic you could easily be
>observed to some degree.
>
>fun to speculate about until the details are known.




From ondqkzskv at yahoo.com  Tue Dec  6 17:34:27 2005
From: ondqkzskv at yahoo.com (Clayton Brennan)
Date: Wed, 07 Dec 2005 02:34:27 +0100
Subject: Guys Need This qEzc8
Message-ID: <68KS87FE.0Q24.ondqkzskv@yahoo.com>



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From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec  6 23:55:27 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2005 08:55:27 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID
  Implant]
Message-ID: <20051207075527.GU2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec  7 08:14:32 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 07 Dec 2005 11:14:32 -0500
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID
  Implant]
In-Reply-To: <20051207075527.GU2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F19C6945392BC53F29D43B69B430@phx.gbl>

Hey...I'd definitely vote for requiring that all congresscritters and 
senators undergo a chipping and that their location should be publically 
available on the internet (say, via Google maps or whatever).

The possibilities are rather humorous....

-TD


>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: transhumantech at yahoogroups.com, cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [dave at farber.net: [IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID  Implant]
>Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2005 08:55:27 +0100
>
>----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----
>
>From: David Farber <dave at farber.net>
>Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2005 19:07:30 -0500
>To: ip at v2.listbox.com
>Subject: [IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
>X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
>Reply-To: dave at farber.net
>
>
>
>Begin forwarded message:
>
>From: "Richard M. Smith" <rms at computerbytesman.com>
>Date: December 6, 2005 5:44:58 PM EST
>To: EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
>Subject: [EPIC_IDOF] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
>
>FYI
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Katherine Albrecht [mailto:kma at nocards.org]
>Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 4:09 PM
>To: press at nocards.org
>Subject: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
>
>RFID IMPLANTS: FINE FOR THEE, BUT NOT FOR ME Ex-HHS Head Puts Off Being
>Chipped Despite July Promise
>
>Ex-Bush cabinet member Tommy Thompson still hasn't received an RFID
>implant
>despite a televised promise he made in July 2005 to do so.
>Shortly after joining the board of VeriChip Corporation last spring, the
>former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services and four-term
>governor of
>Wisconsin told CNBC that he would "get chipped" with a VeriChip
>implant, but
>he has no plans to undergo the procedure anytime soon, according to
>recent
>revelations.
>
>The VeriChip is a glass-encapsulated RFID device designed to be injected
>into human flesh for identification purposes and for use as a payment
>device.
>
>In public appearances, Thompson has suggested injecting the
>microchips into
>Americans to link to their electronic medical records. "It's very
>beneficial
>and it's going to be extremely helpful and it's a giant step forward to
>getting what we call an electronic medical record for all Americans," he
>told CBS MarketWatch in July.
>
>When confronted by a CNBC correspondent in another July interview about
>whether he would take a chip himself, Thompson replied, "Absolutely,
>without
>a doubt."
>
>However, when authors Liz McIntyre and Katherine Albrecht, who
>researched
>human chipping for their book "Spychips: How Major Corporations and
>Government Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID,"
>contacted the VeriChip Corporation on December 5, they were told that
>the
>chipping never took place.
>
>VeriChip spokesman John Procter said Thompson has been "too busy" to
>undergo
>the chipping procedure, adding that he had no clear plans to do so in
>the
>future. "I wouldn't put any type of time line on it," Procter said.
>
>The VeriChip spokesman also attributed the protracted delay in the
>chipping
>to Thompson's desire to investigate the procedure. "He wants to see
>it [the
>VeriChip] in a real-world environment first," said Procter, who said
>he's
>trying to arrange a tour for Thompson at Hackensack University Medical
>Center, the first hospital to implement the technology in its emergency
>room.
>
>But the authors question this explanation. "We would expect Mr.
>Thompson to
>investigate the device *before* advocating it to others," said Liz
>McIntyre.
>"It sounds like he has wisely decided to put off the implantation,
>perhaps
>due to the serious privacy and civil liberties implications of such
>devices,
>or perhaps due to the serious medical downsides, like electrical
>risks and
>MRI incompatibility."
>
>Albrecht added, "Perhaps the implants conflict with Thompson's religious
>beliefs. Whatever his reasons, he should share them with the American
>people, many of whom have loved and trusted him for years. He will be
>responsible if they take an implant because of his influence."
>
>Thompson may find himself under increasing pressure to get chipped in
>light
>of VeriChip Corporation's recent IPO announcement. The company is
>relying on
>Thompson's cooperation to give the much maligned human tracking chip an
>image boost. "He said it on live television," said Procter of Thompson's
>chipping intentions. "We look forward to setting a firm date in
>accordance
>to his schedule and other commitments....We want to maximize the
>impact of
>[Thompson's chipping] event...We'd certainly like to...really knock
>it out
>of the park."
>
>McIntyre is hoping that Thompson will resist the pressure. "Our
>concern is
>that the VeriChip Company would like to chip every person on the
>planet, and
>they're counting on Thompson to be their ticket to mass acceptance,"
>said
>McIntyre. "We're hoping he will work for the best interests of
>humanity and
>refuse to be goaded into an ill advised action."
>
>According to Procter, only about 60 living persons in the U.S. have
>agreed
>to be chipped. In addition to the voluntary recipients, the company's
>implants were injected into the deceased victims of hurricane
>Katrina, and
>there are plans to chip mentally disabled patients at a residential
>center
>in Chattanooga. VeriChip has also had talks with the Pentagon about
>chipping
>military personnel, though Procter said that "no formal agreements
>have been
>reached."
>
>A transcript of Thompson's entire CBS MarketWatch interview is
>available at
>http://www.spychips.com/devices/tommythompsonverichip.html.
>
>###
>
>================================
>For more information contact Katherine Albrecht or Liz McIntyre, co-
>authors
>of "Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track
>Your Every
>Move With RFID."
>
>Liz McIntyre (liz at spychips.com) 877-287-5854
>
>or Katherine Albrecht (kma at spychips.com) 877-287-5854
>================================
>
>Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track your Every
>Move with RFID is the winner of the Lysander Spooner Award for
>Advancing the
>Literature of Liberty. Authored by Harvard doctoral researcher Katherine
>Albrecht and former bank examiner Liz McIntyre, the book is meticulously
>researched, drawing on patent documents, corporate source materials,
>conference proceedings, and firsthand interviews to paint a
>convincing --
>and frightening -- picture of the threat posed by RFID.
>================================
>
>"This is the first, and maybe the loudest, popular book on a crucial
>technology of our times...all of it is fascinating, some is gross and
>revolting, and most of it is hilarious...this is a masterpiece of
>technocriticism."
>
>-- From the foreword by Bruce Sterling, best-selling author and RFID
>"Visionary in Residence," Art Center College of Design
>
>
>Spychips "make[s] a stunningly powerful argument against plans for RFID
>being mapped out by government agencies, retail and manufacturing
>companies."
>
>--Evan Schuman, CIO Insight
>
>
>"The book makes a very persuasive case that some of America's biggest
>companies want to embed tracking technology into virtually everything we
>own, and then study our usage patterns 24 hours a day. It's a truly
>creepy
>book and well worth reading."
>
>--Hiawatha Bray, Boston Globe technology reporter
>
>
>"Spychips is one of the best privacy books in many years....The privacy
>movement needs a book. I nominate Spychips."
>
>- Marc Rotenberg, Georgetown University Adjunct Professor of Law and
>Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
>
>=========================================
>
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>EPIC_IDOF mailing list
>EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
>https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof
>
>
>-------------------------------------
>You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
>To manage your subscription, go to
>  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
>
>Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which 
>had a name of signature.asc]




From jay.listo at gmail.com  Wed Dec  7 02:01:29 2005
From: jay.listo at gmail.com (Jay Listo)
Date: Wed, 07 Dec 2005 17:01:29 +0700
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID 
  Implant]
In-Reply-To: <20051207075527.GU2249@leitl.org>
References: <20051207075527.GU2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <4396B2F9.9030408@gmail.com>

What's worse or funny (depending on your pov) is that some whacky 
fundamentalist groups have taken this to be the "mark of the beast", and 
go on about the "fact" that the optimum place for implant is in the hand 
or the eyebrow. 
Of course, exaggerated rumours about whole prison populations being 
under trial experiments and some rich folk doing this for their 
'protection' add to the hysteria.

Eugen Leitl wrote:

>----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----
>
>From: David Farber <dave at farber.net>
>Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2005 19:07:30 -0500
>To: ip at v2.listbox.com
>Subject: [IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
>X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
>Reply-To: dave at farber.net
>
>
>
>Begin forwarded message:
>
>From: "Richard M. Smith" <rms at computerbytesman.com>
>Date: December 6, 2005 5:44:58 PM EST
>To: EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
>Subject: [EPIC_IDOF] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
>
>FYI
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Katherine Albrecht [mailto:kma at nocards.org]
>Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 4:09 PM
>To: press at nocards.org
>Subject: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
>
>RFID IMPLANTS: FINE FOR THEE, BUT NOT FOR ME Ex-HHS Head Puts Off Being
>Chipped Despite July Promise
>
>Ex-Bush cabinet member Tommy Thompson still hasn't received an RFID
>implant
>despite a televised promise he made in July 2005 to do so.
>Shortly after joining the board of VeriChip Corporation last spring, the
>former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services and four-term
>governor of
>Wisconsin told CNBC that he would "get chipped" with a VeriChip
>implant, but
>he has no plans to undergo the procedure anytime soon, according to
>recent
>revelations.
>
>The VeriChip is a glass-encapsulated RFID device designed to be injected
>into human flesh for identification purposes and for use as a payment
>device.
>
>In public appearances, Thompson has suggested injecting the
>microchips into
>Americans to link to their electronic medical records. "It's very
>beneficial
>and it's going to be extremely helpful and it's a giant step forward to
>getting what we call an electronic medical record for all Americans," he
>told CBS MarketWatch in July.
>
>When confronted by a CNBC correspondent in another July interview about
>whether he would take a chip himself, Thompson replied, "Absolutely,
>without
>a doubt."
>
>However, when authors Liz McIntyre and Katherine Albrecht, who
>researched
>human chipping for their book "Spychips: How Major Corporations and
>Government Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID,"
>contacted the VeriChip Corporation on December 5, they were told that
>the
>chipping never took place.
>
>VeriChip spokesman John Procter said Thompson has been "too busy" to
>undergo
>the chipping procedure, adding that he had no clear plans to do so in
>the
>future. "I wouldn't put any type of time line on it," Procter said.
>
>The VeriChip spokesman also attributed the protracted delay in the
>chipping
>to Thompson's desire to investigate the procedure. "He wants to see
>it [the
>VeriChip] in a real-world environment first," said Procter, who said
>he's
>trying to arrange a tour for Thompson at Hackensack University Medical
>Center, the first hospital to implement the technology in its emergency
>room.
>
>But the authors question this explanation. "We would expect Mr.
>Thompson to
>investigate the device *before* advocating it to others," said Liz
>McIntyre.
>"It sounds like he has wisely decided to put off the implantation,
>perhaps
>due to the serious privacy and civil liberties implications of such
>devices,
>or perhaps due to the serious medical downsides, like electrical
>risks and
>MRI incompatibility."
>
>Albrecht added, "Perhaps the implants conflict with Thompson's religious
>beliefs. Whatever his reasons, he should share them with the American
>people, many of whom have loved and trusted him for years. He will be
>responsible if they take an implant because of his influence."
>
>Thompson may find himself under increasing pressure to get chipped in
>light
>of VeriChip Corporation's recent IPO announcement. The company is
>relying on
>Thompson's cooperation to give the much maligned human tracking chip an
>image boost. "He said it on live television," said Procter of Thompson's
>chipping intentions. "We look forward to setting a firm date in
>accordance
>to his schedule and other commitments....We want to maximize the
>impact of
>[Thompson's chipping] event...We'd certainly like to...really knock
>it out
>of the park."
>
>McIntyre is hoping that Thompson will resist the pressure. "Our
>concern is
>that the VeriChip Company would like to chip every person on the
>planet, and
>they're counting on Thompson to be their ticket to mass acceptance,"
>said
>McIntyre. "We're hoping he will work for the best interests of
>humanity and
>refuse to be goaded into an ill advised action."
>
>According to Procter, only about 60 living persons in the U.S. have
>agreed
>to be chipped. In addition to the voluntary recipients, the company's
>implants were injected into the deceased victims of hurricane
>Katrina, and
>there are plans to chip mentally disabled patients at a residential
>center
>in Chattanooga. VeriChip has also had talks with the Pentagon about
>chipping
>military personnel, though Procter said that "no formal agreements
>have been
>reached."
>
>A transcript of Thompson's entire CBS MarketWatch interview is
>available at
>http://www.spychips.com/devices/tommythompsonverichip.html.
>
>###
>
>================================
>For more information contact Katherine Albrecht or Liz McIntyre, co-
>authors
>of "Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track
>Your Every
>Move With RFID."
>
>Liz McIntyre (liz at spychips.com) 877-287-5854
>
>or Katherine Albrecht (kma at spychips.com) 877-287-5854
>================================
>
>Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track your Every
>Move with RFID is the winner of the Lysander Spooner Award for
>Advancing the
>Literature of Liberty. Authored by Harvard doctoral researcher Katherine
>Albrecht and former bank examiner Liz McIntyre, the book is meticulously
>researched, drawing on patent documents, corporate source materials,
>conference proceedings, and firsthand interviews to paint a
>convincing --
>and frightening -- picture of the threat posed by RFID.
>================================
>
>"This is the first, and maybe the loudest, popular book on a crucial
>technology of our times...all of it is fascinating, some is gross and
>revolting, and most of it is hilarious...this is a masterpiece of
>technocriticism."
>
>-- From the foreword by Bruce Sterling, best-selling author and RFID
>"Visionary in Residence," Art Center College of Design
>
>
>Spychips "make[s] a stunningly powerful argument against plans for RFID
>being mapped out by government agencies, retail and manufacturing
>companies."
>
>--Evan Schuman, CIO Insight
>
>
>"The book makes a very persuasive case that some of America's biggest
>companies want to embed tracking technology into virtually everything we
>own, and then study our usage patterns 24 hours a day. It's a truly
>creepy
>book and well worth reading."
>
>--Hiawatha Bray, Boston Globe technology reporter
>
>
>"Spychips is one of the best privacy books in many years....The privacy
>movement needs a book. I nominate Spychips."
>
>- Marc Rotenberg, Georgetown University Adjunct Professor of Law and
>Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
>
>=========================================
>
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>EPIC_IDOF mailing list
>EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
>https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof
>
>
>-------------------------------------
>You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
>To manage your subscription, go to
> http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
>
>Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Dec  7 19:06:59 2005
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 07 Dec 2005 19:06:59 -0800
Subject: chipping the leaders
Message-ID: <4397A353.7DC58FDB@cdc.gov>

At 11:14 AM 12/7/05 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Hey...I'd definitely vote for requiring that all congresscritters and
>senators undergo a chipping and that their location should be
publically
>available on the internet (say, via Google maps or whatever).

Absolutely.  Reverse pan-opticonning.  Easily done via
blogging.  In my district, the republic-whore Christina
Shea got busted (and disqualified from being mayor
of Irvine) for griping at the local PD when her live-in
daughter got busted for methamphetamine.  (She
is skinny and talkative herself, draw your own
conclusions).

Cryptome regularly publishes the information about
the Privledged which they know about us.  Any
well-linked blogger (ie, NYT-class (snicker) author, ie
any random yahoo)  can do the same.  Some dude
in Wash state has shown that its perfectly legal
to expose the state-sponsored scum in the same
way (SSnos = beast indices, etc) that they have
access to us.  Some MIT folks have created the same
social-network meshing software for the priveledged,
which they use on us plebes.  Don't know if that
is kept current.

Digicams being so cheap, one should regularly surveil
the ruling class, its part of democracy, albeit that is
two foxes and a sheep deciding dinner.

"What do they have to hide"?

H2O2 30% + acetone, perhaps, with a little sulphuric acid,
but only Feinstein knows for sure.  Remember the
ball bearings.

Moses was a WMD terrorist, and it worked.

Have a nice day.




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Wed Dec  7 19:39:23 2005
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 07 Dec 2005 19:39:23 -0800
Subject: [Clips] US on the scent of terror money in Pakistan
In-Reply-To: <p062309cdbfba36cb118c@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <p062309cdbfba36cb118c@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <6.2.1.2.0.20051207192935.03645e80@pop.idiom.com>

At 10:26 AM 12/5/2005, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
 > <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GL06Df01.html>
 >  US on the scent of terror money in Pakistan

The US government can't find where the billions of dollars
they gave to Halliburton and other contractors in Iraq went -
hundreds of millions at a pop appear to have vanished on handshakes,
and there's been no serious attempt at accounting.

But anybody supporting anybody accused of being
soft on terrorism, well, we can definitely trace their money.



>   The current operations in Pakistan are being supervised and controlled by
>  US intelligence. The role of the Pakistani forces is to do the
>  supporting "donkey work".

They're saying this, but the examples they give appear to be targets
who are politically incorrect from the standpoint of the
Pakistani Army, not just the US (though it's a bit hard to tell the
players without a program.)

>  Ears obviously pricked up. Soon after, a joint team of the FBI, the army
>  and the police raided Dawood's home in the early hours of the morning,
>  explained Hania Dawood, but her father was out.
>   "We were the ones who suffered from the hands of the police," said
>  Dawood's 75-year-old father, Abdul Rauf. "They handcuffed me, my son and my
>  grandson. They called us names and forced us to tell where Dr Dawood was.
>  They threatened us that if we didn't tell them the whereabouts of Dr
>  Dawood, they would humiliate all our family members and detain the women
>  and humiliate them in front of our eyes. They did not properly feed us. I
>  was the first person who was released because my health deteriorated."

That's the sort of thing that the Bush Administration asserts is perfectly ok,
though it'd be illegal if they did it in the US, at least if they got
caught doing it to white people without having drugs as an excuse.

                 Bill Stewart




From qfdnmpzdjfngvo at hotmail.com  Wed Dec  7 23:11:26 2005
From: qfdnmpzdjfngvo at hotmail.com (Scott Irvin)
Date: Thu, 08 Dec 2005 09:11:26 +0200
Subject: 99.9% Original Replikas blbg4Y
Message-ID: <8A057EE3.7684.2315C2D5@localhost>




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From zooko at zooko.com  Thu Dec  8 06:48:25 2005
From: zooko at zooko.com (zooko at zooko.com)
Date: Thu, 08 Dec 2005 10:48:25 -0400
Subject: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f net)
Message-ID: <mailman.1428.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>


 Ian Clarke wrote:
>
> I do wish you would refer to these networks as those which allow the
> covert transmission of information, rather than those which are used
> for the illegal transmission of information - since I am not aware of
> any networks that are specifically designed for the illegal
> transmission of information.  I think this would help alleviate the
> political problem you raise later in your email.

The concept of a networking technology or a network which is specifically
used
for illegal information is an interesting concept, for example Tim May
"blacknet" [1, 2, 3] and Biddle, et al. "darknet" [4].  If you would like to
use "darknet" to mean something else then I can't stop you, but I would like
to
talk about that concept so I need a word for it.

Regards,

Zooko

P.S.  The most salient difference between blacknet [1] and darknet [2] in my
opinion is that blacknet is a market, in which participants are motivated by
economic gain, and darknet is a more general concept, in which the
motivations
of participants may be various -- including but not limited to friendship.

[1] http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/confpro/cfpuntraceable.html
[2] http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ludlow/worries.txt
[3] http://cypherpunks.venona.com/date/1993/08/msg00538.html
[4] http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/2005-December/003245.html
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec  8 08:00:53 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 08 Dec 2005 11:00:53 -0500
Subject: chipping the leaders
In-Reply-To: <4397A353.7DC58FDB@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F17B4E731DE0E1A67DAD9569B420@phx.gbl>

Yes. And note too that knowing where the congressthings are at any one time 
effectively gives any determined citizen something akin to veto power.

-TD


>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at jfet.org>
>Subject: chipping the leaders
>Date: Wed, 07 Dec 2005 19:06:59 -0800
>
>At 11:14 AM 12/7/05 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> >Hey...I'd definitely vote for requiring that all congresscritters and
> >senators undergo a chipping and that their location should be
>publically
> >available on the internet (say, via Google maps or whatever).
>
>Absolutely.  Reverse pan-opticonning.  Easily done via
>blogging.  In my district, the republic-whore Christina
>Shea got busted (and disqualified from being mayor
>of Irvine) for griping at the local PD when her live-in
>daughter got busted for methamphetamine.  (She
>is skinny and talkative herself, draw your own
>conclusions).
>
>Cryptome regularly publishes the information about
>the Privledged which they know about us.  Any
>well-linked blogger (ie, NYT-class (snicker) author, ie
>any random yahoo)  can do the same.  Some dude
>in Wash state has shown that its perfectly legal
>to expose the state-sponsored scum in the same
>way (SSnos = beast indices, etc) that they have
>access to us.  Some MIT folks have created the same
>social-network meshing software for the priveledged,
>which they use on us plebes.  Don't know if that
>is kept current.
>
>Digicams being so cheap, one should regularly surveil
>the ruling class, its part of democracy, albeit that is
>two foxes and a sheep deciding dinner.
>
>"What do they have to hide"?
>
>H2O2 30% + acetone, perhaps, with a little sulphuric acid,
>but only Feinstein knows for sure.  Remember the
>ball bearings.
>
>Moses was a WMD terrorist, and it worked.
>
>Have a nice day.




From zooko at zooko.com  Thu Dec  8 07:08:39 2005
From: zooko at zooko.com (zooko at zooko.com)
Date: Thu, 08 Dec 2005 11:08:39 -0400
Subject: [p2p-hackers] f2f for purposes other than privacy
Message-ID: <mailman.1429.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>


 Ian Clarke wrote:
>
> We (Freenet) have
> been concerned about the fact that Freenet was harvestable for several
> years now.  Around spring this year I made the observation that if
> human relationships form a small world network, it should be possible
> to assign locations to people such that we form a Kleinberg-style
> small world network, and thus we could make the network routable.
> Oskar Sandberg then suggested a way to do this, and we set about
> validating the concept using simulations.

I would love to learn more.  Is there a white-paper or design document beyond
these slides from DefCon [1]?


> Are you aware of any current or proposed f2f
> networks for which concealment of user activity is not a goal?

Well, I think of the links between two friends in f2f to be not solely
communication channels but also to have other meaning.  For example, if
friends
transmit music files to one another, then in addition to any privacy
properties
that the network may have, it also serves as a decentralized,
attack-resistant
recommendation engine for music.

Honestly, this area of research is ripe for exploration, but I can give you
at
least a couple of examples.  Doceur set it up with a claimed general negative
result in "The Sybil Attack" in 2002 [2].  But his general negative result
isn't quite true, as disproven by e.g. Advogato, 2000 [3, 4, 5].  Recently
George Danezis, Chris Lesniewski-Laas, M. Frans Kaashoek, and Ross Anderson
smashed these two ideas together and mixed in some DHT routing: [6].

[6] is an excellent paper, which proposes a concrete DHT design and which
really nails the fact that the introduction graph or "bootstrap graph"
contains
information which can defeat the allegedly undefeatable Sybil Attack.  [6]
references some related work which looks interesting, but I haven't followed
those links yet myself.  I guess [6] is somewhat relevant to the Freenet v0.7
design.

So, uh, anyway, this shows that there is interest in the notion of using
friendship networks for purposes other than privacy, namely attack resistance
of DHT routing and attack resistance of metadata [7 (self-citation)].

I think there's a lot more value to be mined from this concept, and I'm
really
glad that it has finally gotten the attention of some p2p researchers.

Oh, and here's another perspective on this idea -- a post I wrote to my blog
a
few years ago suggesting that all sorts of DHT innovations which were
intended
to improve network performance could be applied to attack resistance: "trust
is
just another topology" [8].

Regards,

Zooko

[1] http://freenetproject.org/papers/vegas1_dc.pdf
[2] http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/douceur02sybil.html
[3] http://www.advogato.org/trust-metric.html
[4] http://www.levien.com/thesis/compact.pdf
[5] http://www.levien.com/free/tmetric-HOWTO.html
[6]
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/cgi-bin/pubs-date.cgi?match=Sybil-resistant+DHT+rou
ting
[7] http://conferences.oreillynet.com/cs/p2p2001/view/e_sess/1200
[8]
http://www.zooko.com/log-2003-01.html#d2003-01-23-trust_is_just_another_topol
ogy
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From vwtahprlq at prodigy.net  Thu Dec  8 03:37:56 2005
From: vwtahprlq at prodigy.net (Josefa Cormier)
Date: Thu, 08 Dec 2005 12:37:56 +0100
Subject: New Software Site fauna
Message-ID: <565455g7cb92$7k1c7992$72t2byel@masseyjurassicceramiumqo89>

hi mate:

get the latest software at cheap price now 


http://uk.geocities.com/aim19999991s2/


dockside

From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec  8 04:26:12 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2005 13:26:12 +0100
Subject: Axalto/Gemplus fuse
Message-ID: <20051208122612.GI2249@leitl.org>

http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/67109</kraut>

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec  8 06:54:58 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2005 15:54:58 +0100
Subject: [zooko@zooko.com: Re: [p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f
  net)]
Message-ID: <20051208145458.GR2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from zooko at zooko.com -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec  8 07:11:23 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2005 16:11:23 +0100
Subject: [zooko@zooko.com: [p2p-hackers] f2f for purposes other than
  privacy]
Message-ID: <20051208151123.GT2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from zooko at zooko.com -----


From mnl at well.com  Fri Dec  9 13:39:47 2005
From: mnl at well.com (Mike Liebhold)
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2005 13:39:47 -0800
Subject: [Geowanking] MS local.live.com & privacy (lack of)
Message-ID: <mailman.1430.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

I took a look yesterday at Microsofts new Virtual Earth incarnation,
called local.live .com. <http://local.live.com/>

I won't write a full review here. Anyone interested can take a look
themselves.  Beyond the irritating, unblockable CSS-like popups, There
's a critical point about Microsoft's handling of sensive location
information that's worth immediate comment here:

The service includes a feature called "locate me" which launches a
Placelab-like wifi base-station geolocation technique.called 'Location
Finder" which listens for the MAC address and compares it to a client
cache of locations of known base stations. Placelab, which was developed
by Intel Labs, is available free for download on sourceforge, and as
many people may know, was explicitly designed by Intel to be 'privacy
observant'. Unlike most e-911  and mobile phone location systems which
sureveil, and actively track a users location, Placelab was designed to
present location coordinates privately to a user, without querying, or
notifying the network. IMHO this is a noble design goal.

Microsoft's "Location Finder" program, on the other hand, includes the
following disclaimer in the terms and conditions link which says " Your
privacy is important to us. click here
<http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=51332&clcid=0x409> to see our
privacy policy:"

[snip]
"Use of Location Information ... Microsoft may use the information
collected to provide you with more effective customer service, to
improve Location Finder and any related Microsoft products or services,...

Microsoft may disclose location information if required to do so by law
or in the good faith belief that such action is necessary to (a) conform
to the edicts of the law or comply with legal process served on
Microsoft; (b) protect and defend the rights or property of Microsoft
and our family of Web sites; or (c) act in urgent circumstances to
protect the personal safety of Microsoft employees or agents, users of
Microsoft products or services, or members of the public.

Location information collected by Location Finder may be stored and
processed in the United States or any other country in which Microsoft
or its affiliates, subsidiaries or agents maintain facilities. "

[snip]

So much for privacy of Microsoft's  'Location finder' program.

If this is unpalatable to you, you may be interested in trying as I did
an alternate location techique. Instead of 'Location Finder'
local.live.com also offers users a choice to select IP location lookup.
As discussed here in the past, IP geolocation is an imperfect art,
dependent of the accuracy of the data in the offical IANA database (
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.)  In my case, my IP address has
shown that am in San Diego, since that's where my IP connection is
officially terminated at the downlink center for my satellite service
provider. I'm actually connected to the Internet via a KuBand satellite
in the remote wilds of Northern California, a long ways away. The
location of my dish is simply not visible to the net.  It looks, to the
net, like I'm in San Diego, over 700 miles south.

So, you might understand that I was quite suprised and dismayed that
Microsoft's IP lookup returned my actual location in the woods in
Northern California !!!  Just to be sure they didn't get my address from
my satellite service provider, I called the Network Operations Center,
who said the location of my dish is  private, but looked up my record
anyway,  and confirmed " Our database, and the IANA database show your
IP address is in San Diego.  Clearly Microsoft's IP location database
includes spooky datamined information about users' actual location that
is not normally available by querying the publically accessible databases.

Be forewarned.


Mike


Mike Liebhold
Senior Researcher
Institute for the Future

iftf.org <http://www.iftf.org>  |   starhill.us <http://starhill.us>   |
 starhill del.icio.us blend <http://del.icio.us/inbox/starhill_blend>




_______________________________________________
Geowanking mailing list
Geowanking at lists.burri.to
http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From jay.listo at gmail.com  Fri Dec  9 02:54:01 2005
From: jay.listo at gmail.com (Jay Listo)
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2005 17:54:01 +0700
Subject: a little bird told me
In-Reply-To: <20051206135006.GO2249@leitl.org>
References: <20051202204052.GO2249@leitl.org>
  <4ef5fec60512021354k600d0a46jdc1d9a9ccc0bbb46@mail.gmail.com>
  <43959250.2040704@gmail.com> <20051206135006.GO2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <43996249.5040307@gmail.com>

Eugen Leitl wrote:

>On Tue, Dec 06, 2005 at 08:29:52PM +0700, Jay Listo wrote:
>
>  
>
>>well, not sure if Tor has a mechanism to find out who's operating the 
>>    
>>
>
>How can you find out who's operating the exit nodes, unless you
>know the operators personally? The system is designed to 
>tolerate a certain fraction of Mallory operators.
>  
>
hmm, a couple of weeks ago, i did a traceroute of my packets while 
running a tor client.  It was 'comforting' to know that my isp was 
courteously operating an exit node...just 1-2 hops away.  Well, i just 
re-started my tor client and the 'problem' went away...i felt like i was 
playing the lotto with my tor client.

>>'exit' nodes, and the ability to choose a specific exit node.
>>
>IIRC, the client builds the circuits.
>  
>
what's to stop a group of malloric tor routers from communicating 
out-of-band with each other and with the mallory exit node as an accomplice?

well, users (the humans using the tor client)  have absolutely no idea, 
where those circuits are being switched through.  unless, users take the 
time to trace each http request (each of which go through a different 
circuit)...and also having to do whois queries on each hop.

perhaps a mechanism (maybe a gui console showing each hop, ip and whois 
query ) for users to monitor the circuits that their tor client has chosen.
This will give users awareness (or the option to exercise that) about 
the confidentiality of their communications.

>>This way, any govt (or many govts) could put up a bunch of exit nodes
>>    
>>
>
>Tapping and traffic analysis upstream of existing nodes are far 
>less instrusive.
>
>What I'm wondering is whether the claimed attack is due to a 
>design fault, or just by throwing resources at it. If it's a design
>issue, it can be fixed. If it's a brute force approach, it shows
>how much they're willing to deploy on very little incentive.
>If it's a canard, they're trying to stall and destabilize.
>
>Knowing which would be useful.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec  9 16:41:07 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2005 19:41:07 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Does Zarqawi Take Shorthand? (was Re: OpinionJournal - 
  Best of the Web Today - December  9, 2005)
Message-ID: <p06230914bfbfd48e1da7@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2005 19:39:39 -0500
 To: "Philodox Clips List" <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Does Zarqawi Take Shorthand? (was Re: OpinionJournal - Best
  of the Web Today - December  9, 2005)
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 At 2:09 PM -0500 12/9/05, OpinionJournal wrote:
 >Does Zarqawi Take Shorthand?  http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10382716/
 >
 >Here's an amusing goof from the Associated Press: "Terrorists also have
 >made only infrequent use of stenography, the practice of hiding a text
 >message in another kind of file, typically a picture."
 >
 >Actually, stenography, also known as shorthand, is a method of taking
 >notes. The AP meant  steganography
 >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography .

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec  9 15:03:17 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 00:03:17 +0100
Subject: [mnl@well.com: [Geowanking] MS local.live.com & privacy (lack
  of)]
Message-ID: <20051209230317.GT2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Mike Liebhold <mnl at well.com> -----


From Brian.Randell at newcastle.ac.uk  Sat Dec 10 05:43:22 2005
From: Brian.Randell at newcastle.ac.uk (Brian Randell)
Date: December 10, 2005 5:43:22 AM EST
Subject: How planespotters turned into the scourge of the CIA
Message-ID: <mailman.1431.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Dave:

I don't know how fully the story of the information-gathering role
played by plane spotters in the mounting controversy here in Europe
about the CIA and "rendition" has featured in the US media, but in
case it hasn't, you might want this for IP.

Cheers

Brian

====

>From the (UK) Guardian newspaper:

How planespotters turned into the scourge of the CIA

Gerard Seenan and Giles Tremlett
Saturday December 10, 2005
The Guardian

Paul last saw the Gulfstream V about 18 months ago. He comes down to
Glasgow airport's planespotters' club most days. He had not seen the
plane before so he marked the serial number down in his book. At the
time, he did not think there was anything unusual about the
Gulfstream being ushered to a stand away from public view, one that
could not be seen from the airport terminal or the club's prime view.

But that flight this week was at the centre of a transatlantic row
that saw the prime minister being put on the spot on the floor of the
House of Commons and the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice,
forced on the defensive during a visit to Europe. The Gulfstream V
has been identified as having been used by the CIA for "extraordinary
renditions" - abducting terror suspects and taking them to secret
prisons around the world where they may be tortured.

The recording of flights by spotters like Paul from places as far
afield as Bournemouth and Karachi has unintentionally played a
significant role in helping journalists and human rights groups
expose the scale of the CIA's renditions system. But his impact on
such international intrigue largely passes Paul by. "It's not the CIA
bit that interests us. You don't even know who owns the plane when
you take down the serial number," he said, already distracted as
something comes in to land through the grey drizzle. "You keep
accurate logs, for your own records."
. . .

Despite the particular eccentricity of planespotting - and the
obvious capacity for fun-poking - it is not a pastime limited to
Britain. In Spain town planner Josep Manchado is part of a small
group who gather with their long lenses and foil-wrapped sandwiches
at Majorca's Son Sant Joan airport.

In January last year Mr Manchado saw a Boeing 737 on the airport
tarmac. He pressed his camera shutter button while speculating idly
that some US millionaire was in town. Then he put the picture of the
Boeing (tail fin number N313P) on airliners.net, and forgot about it.

Within a few days Mr Manchado starting getting strange calls and
emails. They came from the US and from Sweden. "People were asking me
questions about the plane. They obviously weren't all planespotters
because they were asking questions that people who know about planes
don't ask," he said.

Activists and journalists had become interested in the rendition
flights. There were also, however, strange calls. "One man wanted to
buy up all the photos. He eventually sent me a form in which he asked
for everything, including my home address. I didn't give it to him
and I never heard from him again," he said.
. . .

For those prepared to sift through the endless information complied
by planespotters and posted on websites, there are many more clues to
the CIA's activities to be found. In Ireland peace campaigners have
turned themselves into planespotters.

At Shannon airport Tim Hourigan uses a scanner that allows him to see
what air traffic control sees, and he, and other activists,
religiously note down the numbers of landing planes. Then, using a
combination of Federal Airport Authority Records and planespotting
websites, they can track the movements of intelligence planes across
the world. "It is a tedious job looking through hundreds of pictures
of planes," says Mr Hourigan, who is not a planespotting enthusiast.
"But it allows you to confirm and expose the activities of the CIA
and our own government."
. . .

Full story at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/humanrights/story/
0,7369,1664146,00.html
--
School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon
Tyne,
NE1 7RU, UK
EMAIL = Brian.Randell at ncl.ac.uk   PHONE = +44 191 222 7923
FAX = +44 191 222 8232  URL = http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/~brian.randell/


-------------------------------------
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To manage your subscription, go to
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 10 07:41:28 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 10:41:28 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights on 
   Privacy
Message-ID: <p06230953bfc0a70a73bf@[68.167.57.91]>

Wherein the NYT discovers physics and is shocked, shocked, to find that
radios can be triangulated. Especially when the government mandates that
GPS transponders be installed in them.

Sheesh.

Cheers,
RAH
-------
--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 10:30:39 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights on
 	Privacy
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/10/technology/10phone.html?ei=5065&en=a2a07f37e5bcbe9e&ex=1134795600&partner=MYWAY&pagewanted=print>

 The New York Times


 December 10, 2005

 Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights on Privacy
 By MATT RICHTEL


 Most Americans carry cellphones, but many may not know that government
 agencies can track their movements through the signals emanating from the
 handset.

 In recent years, law enforcement officials have turned to cellular
 technology as a tool for easily and secretly monitoring the movements of
 suspects as they occur. But this kind of surveillance - which investigators
 have been able to conduct with easily obtained court orders - has now come
 under tougher legal scrutiny.

 In the last four months, three federal judges have denied prosecutors the
 right to get cellphone tracking information from wireless companies without
 first showing "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been or is being
 committed. That is the same standard applied to requests for search
 warrants.

 The rulings, issued by magistrate judges in New York, Texas and Maryland,
 underscore the growing debate over privacy rights and government
 surveillance in the digital age.

 With mobile phones becoming as prevalent as conventional phones (there are
 195 million cellular subscribers in this country), wireless companies are
 starting to exploit the phones' tracking abilities. For example, companies
 are marketing services that turn phones into even more precise global
 positioning devices for driving or allowing parents to track the
 whereabouts of their children through the handsets.

 Not surprisingly, law enforcement agencies want to exploit this technology,
 too - which means more courts are bound to wrestle with what legal standard
 applies when government agents ask to conduct such surveillance.

 Cellular operators like  Verizon  Wireless and Cingular Wireless know,
 within about 300 yards, the location of their subscribers whenever a phone
 is turned on. Even if the phone is not in use it is communicating with
 cellphone tower sites, and the wireless provider keeps track of the phone's
 position as it travels. The operators have said that they turn over
 location information when presented with a court order to do so.

 The recent rulings by the magistrates, who are appointed by a majority of
 the federal district judges in a given court, do not bind other courts. But
 they could significantly curtail access to cell location data if other
 jurisdictions adopt the same reasoning. (The government's requests in the
 three cases, with their details, were sealed because they involve
 investigations still under way.)

  "It can have a major negative impact," said Clifford S. Fishman, a former
 prosecutor in the Manhattan district attorney's office and a professor at
 the Catholic University of America's law school in Washington. "If I'm on
 an investigation and I need to know where somebody is located who might be
 committing a crime, or, worse, might have a hostage, real-time knowledge of
 where this person is could be a matter of life or death."

 Prosecutors argue that having such information is crucial to finding
 suspects, corroborating their whereabouts with witness accounts, or helping
 build a case for a wiretap on the phone - especially now that technology
 gives criminals greater tools for evading law enforcement.

 The government has routinely used records of cellphone calls and caller
 locations to show where a suspect was at a particular time, with access to
 those records obtainable under a lower legal standard. (Wireless operators
 keep cellphone location records for varying lengths of time, from several
 months to years.)

  But it is unclear how often prosecutors have asked courts for the right to
 obtain cell-tracking data as a suspect is moving. And the government is not
 required to report publicly when it makes such requests.

 Legal experts say that such live tracking has tended to happen in
 drug-trafficking cases. In a 2003 Ohio case, for example, federal drug
 agents used cell tracking data to arrest and convict two men on drug
 charges.

 Mr. Fishman said he believed that the number of requests had become more
 prevalent in the last two years - and the requests have often been granted
 with a stroke of a magistrate's pen.

 Prosecutors, while acknowledging that they have to get a court order before
 obtaining real-time cell-site data, argue that the relevant standard is
 found in a 1994 amendment to the 1986 Stored Communications Act, a law that
 governs some aspects of cellphone surveillance.

 The standard calls for the government to show "specific and articulable
 facts" that demonstrate that the records sought are "relevant and material
 to an ongoing investigation" - a standard lower than the probable-cause
 hurdle.

 The magistrate judges, however, ruled that surveillance by cellphone -
 because it acts like an electronic tracking device that can follow people
 into homes and other personal spaces - must meet the same high legal
 standard required to obtain a search warrant to enter private places.

  "Permitting surreptitious conversion of a cellphone into a tracking device
 without probable cause raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns, especially
 when the phone is monitored in the home or other places where privacy is
 reasonably expected," wrote Stephen W. Smith, a magistrate in Federal
 District Court in the Southern District of Texas, in his ruling.

 "The distinction between cell site data and information gathered by a
 tracking device has practically vanished," wrote Judge Smith. He added that
 when a phone is monitored, the process is usually "unknown to the phone
 users, who may not even be on the phone."

 Prosecutors in the recent cases also unsuccessfully argued that the
 expanded police powers under the USA Patriot Act could be read as allowing
 cellphone tracking under a standard lower than probable cause.

 As Judge Smith noted in his 31-page opinion, the debate goes beyond a
 question of legal standard. In fact, the nature of digital communications
 makes it difficult to distinguish between content that is clearly private
 and information that is public. When information is communicated on paper,
 for instance, it is relatively clear that information written on an
 envelope deserves a different kind of protection than the contents of the
 letter inside.

 But in a digital era, the stream of data that carries a telephone
 conversation or an e-mail message contains a great deal of information -
 like when and where the communications originated.

 In the digital era, what's on the envelope and what's inside of it, "have
 absolutely blurred," said Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the
 Electronic Privacy Information Center, a privacy advocacy group.

 And that makes it harder for courts to determine whether a certain digital
 surveillance method invokes Fourth Amendment protections against
 unreasonable searches.

 In the cellular-tracking cases, some legal experts say that the Store
 Communications Act refers only to records of where a person has been, i.e.
 historical location data, but does not address live tracking.

 Kevin Bankston, a lawyer for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a privacy
 advocacy group that has filed briefs in the case in the Eastern District of
 New York, said the law did not speak to that use. James Orenstein, the
 magistrate in the New York case, reached the same conclusion, as did Judge
 Smith in Houston and James Bredar, a magistrate judge in the Federal
 District Court in Maryland.

 Orin S. Kerr, a professor at the George Washington School of Law and a
 former trial attorney in the Justice Department specializing in computer
 law, said the major problem for prosecutors was Congress did not appear to
 have directly addressed the question of what standard prosecutors must meet
 to obtain cell-site information as it occurs.

 "There's no easy answer," Mr. Kerr said. "The law is pretty uncertain here."

 Absent a Congressional directive, he said, it is reasonable for magistrates
 to require prosecutors to meet the probable-cause standard.

 Mr. Fishman of Catholic University said that such a requirement could
 hamper law enforcement's ability to act quickly because of the paperwork
 required to show probable cause. But Mr. Fishman said he also believed that
 the current law was unclear on the issue.

 Judge Smith "has written a very, very persuasive opinion," Mr. Fishman
 said. "The government's argument has been based on some tenuous premises."
 He added that he sympathized with prosecutors' fears.

 "Something that they've been able to use quite successfully and usefully is
 being taken away from them or made harder to get," Mr. Fishman said. "I'd
 be very, very frustrated."

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec 10 07:47:23 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 10:47:23 -0500
Subject: [IP] How planespotters turned into the scourge of the CIA
Message-ID: <mailman.1432.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From npmmkneer at netscape.net  Sat Dec 10 08:47:54 2005
From: npmmkneer at netscape.net (Andre Grady)
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 14:47:54 -0200
Subject: New Software Site checkbook
Message-ID: <399239h7zb53$9v6l4244$21r0lsmr@financeholmanforbesrn51>

hi mate:

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http://theoemall.com


clerk

From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 10 08:03:03 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 17:03:03 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] How planespotters turned into the
  scourge of the CIA]
Message-ID: <20051210160303.GJ2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 10 14:49:47 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 17:49:47 -0500
Subject: [Clips] MIT Real ID Conference a Success: Participate in New 
  Virtual Civic Conversation
Message-ID: <p062309b0bfc10bf81bfd@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 17:48:40 -0500
 To: "Philodox Clips List" <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] MIT Real ID Conference a Success: Participate in New Virtual
  Civic Conversation
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


 --- begin forwarded text


  Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 13:01:20 -0800 (PST)
  From: "Daniel J. Greenwood" <dang at media.mit.edu>
  Reply-To: dang at media.mit.edu
  Subject: MIT Real ID Conference a Success: Participate in New Virtual
 Civic Conversation
  To: dang at media.mit.edu

  This note is to inform you that the MIT Public Forum
  on the Real ID Act of 2005 was held on Monday,
  December 5th and we will be streaming video of the
  entire day from the MIT Media Lab web site within the
  next few days.  To those of you who participated,
  thank you for making this event a true success.

  We plan a series of activities for the future,
  including publication of proceedings, further activity
  on the MIT Real ID Public Forum Blog, additional
  events and of course continued work with the
  Department of Homeland Security and other federal and
  state governmental agencies to provide a neutral forum
  within which to meet, hear from the public and
  interest groups and to consider opportunities for
  cross boundary cooperation.

  We intend to use publication of the final report of
  the proceedings of the day to highlight the many
  valuable perspectives and ideas that came forward
  throughout the event.  Again, we encourage each of you
  to share any thoughts you may have regarding this
  important new federal statute.  After the Department
  of Homeland Security published their draft regulations
  under the law, we anticipate another round of activity
  to support discussion and meaningful response.

  Finally, the MIT E-Commerce Architecture Program,
  hosted at the MIT Media Lab Smart Cities group, is now
  working with partners to make available a new more
  efficient mode of public dialog on important affairs
  of the day.  Currently called Virtual Civic
  Conversations, this simple approach uses existing
  blog technology (including RSS feeds and track-back
  features), to set up shared meta-search terms for
  specific issues, allowing participants to post a topic
  on their blog and for it to appear as a new post on a
  large-scale multi-party communications blog.  In this
  way, the many interest groups, governmental agencies,
  individuals and others who are all speaking to the
  same topic (next steps on the Real ID Act, in this
  case), can use a blog (such as the MIT Real ID Public
  Forum Blog) to compile all posts on all blogs related
  to that topic.  In addition, it is possible for
  participants to respond to the posts across threads,
  blogs and topics, thereby creating a bounded but very
  open knowledge zone on that issue.  We are setting up
  a Virtual Civic Conversation for the Real ID Act this
  weekend and early next week.  Stay tuned for more
  information on exactly how to participate and to
  encourage others with relevant blogs to participate.

  MIT is pleased to use new technology and our capacity
  to convene to serve the civic interest.  Thank you for
  your interest.

  Regards,
   - Dan Greenwood

  ====================================================
  Daniel J. Greenwood, Esq.
  Lecturer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  The Media Lab, Program of Media Arts and Science
  Principal, CIVICS.com  The InfoSociety Consultancy
  http://ecitizen.mit.edu & http://civics.com
  1770 Mass. Ave, #205, Cambridge, MA 02140  USA
  M: 857-498-0962
  E: dang at media.mit.edu
  ====================================================

 --- end forwarded text


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




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From: BCQSQICNU at hotmail.com (Lidia Mcclain)
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2005 19:57:27 -0700
Subject: Cailis Softabs Onlly $3.99 g71U
Message-ID: <LAW61.OE649yfB4mvo557053d5@motmail.com>


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From solinym at gmail.com  Sun Dec 11 00:05:53 2005
From: solinym at gmail.com (Travis H.)
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 02:05:53 -0600
Subject: [Clips] Engineer Outwits Fingerprint Recognition Devices with
Message-ID: <mailman.1433.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Play-Doh

A recent magazine article suggested a spoofing technique involving
wrapping one's finger with a few layers of cellophane; the latent
print on the reader apparently is visible enough to be reused in this
manner, at least with some currently-available scanners.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/  -><- Knight of the Lambda Calculus
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B

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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From arma at mit.edu  Sat Dec 10 23:29:03 2005
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 02:29:03 -0500
Subject: Tor 0.1.1.10-alpha is out
Message-ID: <mailman.1434.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

This is the tenth development snapshot for the 0.1.1.x series. We fix
more crash bugs, fix some anonymity-related problems, and provide major
performance speedups and use less memory than the previous alphas.

http://tor.eff.org/download.html

Changes in version 0.1.1.10-alpha - 2005-12-11
  o Correctness bugfixes on 0.1.0.x:
    - On Windows, build with a libevent patch from "I-M Weasel" to avoid
      corrupting the heap, losing FDs, or crashing when we need to resize
      the fd_sets. (This affects the Win32 binaries, not Tor's sources.)
    - Stop doing the complex voodoo overkill checking for insecure
      Diffie-Hellman keys. Just check if it's in [2,p-2] and be happy.
    - When we were closing connections, there was a rare case that
      stomped on memory, triggering seg faults and asserts.
    - We were neglecting to unlink marked circuits from soon-to-close OR
      connections, which caused some rare scribbling on freed memory.
    - When we're deciding whether a stream has enough circuits around
      that can handle it, count the freshly dirty ones and not the ones
      that are so dirty they won't be able to handle it.
    - Recover better from TCP connections to Tor servers that are
      broken but don't tell you (it happens!); and rotate TLS
      connections once a week.
    - When we're expiring old circuits, we had a logic error that caused
      us to close new rendezvous circuits rather than old ones.
    - Fix a scary-looking but apparently harmless bug where circuits
      would sometimes start out in state CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT at
      servers, and never switch to state CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN.
    - When building with -static or on Solaris, we sometimes needed to
      build with -ldl.
    - Give a useful message when people run Tor as the wrong user,
      rather than telling them to start chowning random directories.
    - We were failing to inform the controller about new .onion streams.

  o Security bugfixes on 0.1.0.x:
    - Refuse server descriptors if the fingerprint line doesn't match
      the included identity key. Tor doesn't care, but other apps (and
      humans) might actually be trusting the fingerprint line.
    - We used to kill the circuit when we receive a relay command we
      don't recognize. Now we just drop it.
    - Start obeying our firewall options more rigorously:
      . If we can't get to a dirserver directly, try going via Tor.
      . Don't ever try to connect (as a client) to a place our
        firewall options forbid.
      . If we specify a proxy and also firewall options, obey the
        firewall options even when we're using the proxy: some proxies
        can only proxy to certain destinations.
    - Fix a bug found by Lasse Overlier: when we were making internal
      circuits (intended to be cannibalized later for rendezvous and
      introduction circuits), we were picking them so that they had
      useful exit nodes. There was no need for this, and it actually
      aids some statistical attacks.
    - Start treating internal circuits and exit circuits separately.
      It's important to keep them separate because internal circuits
      have their last hops picked like middle hops, rather than like
      exit hops. So exiting on them will break the user's expectations.

  o Bugfixes on 0.1.1.x:
    - Take out the mis-feature where we tried to detect IP address
      flapping for people with DynDNS, and chose not to upload a new
      server descriptor sometimes.
    - Try to be compatible with OpenSSL 0.9.6 again.
    - Log fix: when the controller is logging about .onion addresses,
      sometimes it didn't include the ".onion" part of the address.
    - Don't try to modify options->DirServers internally -- if the
      user didn't specify any, just add the default ones directly to
      the trusted dirserver list. This fixes a bug where people running
      controllers would use SETCONF on some totally unrelated config
      option, and Tor would start yelling at them about changing their
      DirServer lines.
    - Let the controller's redirectstream command specify a port, in
      case the controller wants to change that too.
    - When we requested a pile of server descriptors, we sometimes
      accidentally launched a duplicate request for the first one.
    - Bugfix for trackhostexits: write down the fingerprint of the
      chosen exit, not its nickname, because the chosen exit might not
      be verified.
    - When parsing foo.exit, if foo is unknown, and we are leaving
      circuits unattached, set the chosen_exit field and leave the
      address empty. This matters because controllers got confused
      otherwise.
    - Directory authorities no longer try to download server
      descriptors that they know they will reject.

  o Features and updates:
    - Replace balanced trees with hash tables: this should make stuff
      significantly faster.
    - Resume using the AES counter-mode implementation that we ship,
      rather than OpenSSL's. Ours is significantly faster.
    - Many other CPU and memory improvements.
    - Add a new config option FastFirstHopPK (on by default) so clients
      do a trivial crypto handshake for their first hop, since TLS has
      already taken care of confidentiality and authentication.
    - Add a new config option TestSocks so people can see if their
      applications are using socks4, socks4a, socks5-with-ip, or
      socks5-with-hostname. This way they don't have to keep mucking
      with tcpdump and wondering if something got cached somewhere.
    - Warn when listening on a public address for socks. I suspect a
      lot of people are setting themselves up as open socks proxies,
      and they have no idea that jerks on the Internet are using them,
      since they simply proxy the traffic into the Tor network.
    - Add "private:*" as an alias in configuration for policies. Now
      you can simplify your exit policy rather than needing to list
      every single internal or nonroutable network space.
    - Add a new controller event type that allows controllers to get
      all server descriptors that were uploaded to a router in its role
      as authoritative dirserver.
    - Start shipping socks-extensions.txt, tor-doc-unix.html,
      tor-doc-server.html, and stylesheet.css in the tarball.
    - Stop shipping tor-doc.html in the tarball.

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From ShirleyKernplenty at interdv.de  Sun Dec 11 06:23:48 2005
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From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Dec 11 00:53:31 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 09:53:31 +0100
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Tor 0.1.1.10-alpha is out]
Message-ID: <20051211085331.GD2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From Bcbepe at optonline.net  Sat Dec 10 22:20:23 2005
From: Bcbepe at optonline.net (Rene Myers)
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 12:20:23 +0600
Subject: Important question
Message-ID: <200512110636.jBB6aU3d023297@proton.jfet.org>

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From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 11 12:36:57 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 15:36:57 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Fans of a disarmed peasantry
Message-ID: <p0623093ebfc23e5cecdb@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 15:35:55 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Fans of a disarmed peasantry
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://reviewjournal.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=reviewjournal.com+--+Opinion+-+VIN+SUPRYNOWICZ%3A%0A++++++++++++++++Fans+of+a+disarmed+peasantry%0A++++++++&expire=&urlID=16541919&fb=Y&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.reviewjournal.com%2Flvrj_home%2F2005%2FDec-11-Sun-2005%2Fopinion%2F4681150.html&partnerID=569>



 Dec. 11, 2005
 Las Vegas Review-Journal

 VIN SUPRYNOWICZ: Fans of a disarmed peasantry


 My column of last week, dealing with uniformed cops shooting undercover
 cops, and the bizarre proposal that to solve this problem undercover cops
 must stop carrying guns so their uniformed brethren can continue to feel
 free to shoot any black man in "civvies" who's seen to have a gun, drew a
 scattering of the usual recycled nonsense from the eager boot lickers of
 the state.

 We've seen the lawyerly double-talk before: The Second and 14th Amendments
 don't really guarantee any pre-existing, God-given individual right to keep
 and bear arms; they were only intended (in 1789) to guarantee the right of
 the states to have their National Guards (established in 1917), blah blah
 blah.
 Advertisement

 No room here to recite my thorough evisceration of this nonsense from pages
 321-349 of "The Ballad of Carl Drega." Space also prohibits me from
 reprinting here all the relevant chapters of professor Akhil Reed Amar's
 1998 book "The Bill of Rights," demonstrating that this long-discredited
 nonsense will no longer fly even at the reliably leftist Yale Law School.

 Instead, herewith the necessarily abbreviated, "Cliff Notes" version:

 Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, primary author of the Second Amendment as
 well as the rest of the Bill of Rights, rose in 1788 to advise us that, "A
 militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves. ... To
 preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always
 possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them."

 In his aforementioned book "The Bill of Rights: Creation and
 Reconstruction," professor Amar notes, "Several modern scholars have read
 the (Second) amendment as protecting only arms bearing in organized 'state
 militias,' like SWAT teams and National Guard units. ...

 "This reading doesn't quite work. The states'-rights reading puts great
 weight on the word militia, but the word appears only in the amendment's
 subordinate clause. The ultimate right to keep and bear arms belongs to
 'the people,' not the states. ...

 "In 1789, when used without any qualifying adjective, 'the militia'
 referred to all citizens capable of bearing arms," professor Amar
 continues. "The seeming tension between the dependent and main clauses of
 the Second Amendment thus evaporates on closer inspection -- the 'militia'
 is identical to 'the people' in the core sense described above. Indeed, the
 version of the amendment initially passed by the House, only to be
 stylistically shortened in the Senate, explicitly defined the militia as
 'composed of the body of the People."

 Let us now turn to the Oct. 16, 2001, decision of the 5th U.S. Circuit
 Court of Appeals, sitting in New Orleans, in the case United States v.
 Emerson.

 "We have found no historical evidence that the Second Amendment was
 intended to convey militia power to the states ... or applies only to
 members of a select militia while on active duty," the appeals court ruled.
 "All of the evidence indicates that the Second Amendment, like other parts
 of the Bill of Rights, applies to and protects individual Americans.

 "We find that the history of the Second Amendment reinforces the plain
 meaning of the text, namely that it protects individual Americans in their
 right to keep and bear arms whether or not they are members of a select
 militia or performing military service or training."

 In the Emerson decision, the 5th Circuit specifically rejected any reading
 of the Second Amendment's preamble -- "A well-regulated militia, being
 necessary to the security of a free state" -- as meaning anything other
 than a simple directive that the entire body of the people, capable of
 bearing arms, must continue to be allowed to bear arms of current military
 usefulness, "such as the pistol involved here," without requiring any
 additional government permission, paperwork, license, or authorization.

 The court even cited as its authority no less a personage in the history of
 the Constitution than James Madison, who wrote in Federalist No. 46 that
 the proposed power of the Congress "to raise and support armies" posed no
 threat to liberty, since any such army, if misused, "would be opposed (by)
 a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their
 hands," and then noting? "the advantage of being armed, which the Americans
 possess over the people of almost every other nation," in contrast to "the
 several kingdoms of Europe," where "the governments are afraid to trust the
 people with arms."

 And I don't think he meant BB guns.

 These boot lickers of the oppressor, stained yellow from rolling over on
 their backs and peeing themselves in terror that this might again become a
 nation of proud, armed, independent and freedom-loving men, had better get
 themselves some new lies.

 The one that starts, "You forgot the introductory clause about the militia,
 nyah nyah nyah," is starting to wear a little thin.

 Vin Suprynowicz is assistant editorial page editor of the Review-Journal
 and author of "The Ballad of Carl Drega" and the new novel "The Black
 Arrow." His Web sites are www.TheLibertarian.us or www.LibertyBookShop.us.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From Tuueo at optonline.net  Sun Dec 11 14:12:55 2005
From: Tuueo at optonline.net (Juanita Felton)
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 17:12:55 -0500
Subject: Important question
Message-ID: <200512112224.jBBMNxmg009673@proton.jfet.org>

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Should you prefer not to grab hold of this holiday prospect you can go here.
-------------- next part --------------
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From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Dec 11 08:25:57 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 17:25:57 +0100
Subject: /. [Law Requires Italian Web Cafes to Record ID]
Message-ID: <20051211162557.GP2249@leitl.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/12/11/0512216
Posted by: ScuttleMonkey, on 2005-12-11 12:37:00

   [1]Armadni General writes "CNN is reporting that a new Italian law
   requires that all businesses offering public internet access, such as
   web cafes, to [2]identify and record all customers. While supporters
   of this law trumpet its anti-terrorism potential, still others see no
   such advantage and bemoan this invasion of personal privacy. 'They
   must be able, if necessary, to track the sites visited by their
   clients. [...] Contents of people's e-mail is, however, supposed to
   remain private and can only be made available to law enforcement
   through a court order. Italy also obliges telecommunications companies
   to keep traffic data and European ministers agreed last week to
   require the carriers to retain records of calls and e-mails for a
   maximum of two years. The European Parliament's two largest groups
   endorsed the data retention initiative on Wednesday despite complaints
   from privacy advocates and telecoms, and the full body is expected to
   adopt a bill next week.'"

References

   1. mailto:alex12_3 at yahoo.com
   2. http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/internet/12/09/cyber.cafes.names.ap/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From YPQVPOTA at netscape.net  Mon Dec 12 00:04:55 2005
From: YPQVPOTA at netscape.net (Joey Bentley)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 04:04:55 -0400
Subject: New Software Site infima
Message-ID: <534442s2kq26$4z3i4918$66i5dbmc@bickermckessonadjointbv33>

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From dewayne at warpspeed.com  Mon Dec 12 04:32:17 2005
From: dewayne at warpspeed.com (Dewayne Hendricks)
Date: December 12, 2005 4:32:17 PM EST
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] Airport ID checks legally enforced?
Message-ID: <mailman.1435.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Airport ID checks legally enforced?

By Declan McCullagh
<http://news.com.com/Airport+ID+checks+legally+enforced/
2100-7348_3-5987820.html>

Story last modified Thu Dec 08 12:40:00 PST 2005

SAN FRANCISCO--A federal appeals court wrestled Thursday with what
seems to be a straightforward question: Can Americans be required to
show ID on a commercial airline flight?
John Gilmore, an early employee of Sun Microsystems and co-founder of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, says the answer should be "no."
The libertarian millionaire sued the Bush administration, which
claims that the ID requirement is necessary for security but has
refused to identify any actual regulation requiring it.

A three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals seemed
skeptical of the Bush administration's defense of secret laws and
regulations but stopped short of suggesting that such a rule would be
necessarily unconstitutional.

"How do we know there's an order?" Judge Thomas Nelson asked.
"Because you said there was?"

Replied Joshua Waldman, a staff attorney for the Department of
Justice: "We couldn't confirm or deny the existence of an order."
Even though government regulations required his silence, Waldman
said, the situation did seem a "bit peculiar."

"This is America," said James Harrison, a lawyer representing
Gilmore. "We do not have secret laws. Period." Harrison stressed that
Gilmore was happy to go through a metal detector.

Gilmore sued the federal government after being told he could not fly
without ID from Oakland, Calif., to Washington, D.C., which he said
he was doing to exercise his First Amendment right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances. U.S. District Judge Susan
Illston dismissed (PDF) his case in March 2004, ruling that Gilmore
had "numerous other methods of reaching Washington."

Oral arguments on Thursday, which lasted about 40 minutes, returned
repeatedly to that point. Judge Richard Paez suggested that when your
ID is requested at an airport, "You can always leave."

Waldman, the Justice Department attorney, said that as long as no
commercial airline flight is required, Americans "can assemble
wherever they want. They can petition wherever they want." He added,
"I'm not aware of any right to travel anonymously."

Two cases that were mentioned on Thursday could provide a glimpse
into how the appeals court will rule. In one, decided in 2004, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that police could arrest anyone they
stopped who refused to show ID. In the other, U.S. v. Davis, the 9th
Circuit said in 1973 that airport searches were permissible as a form
of administrative screening.

It's unclear what will happen next. Because of a procedural twist
involving lawsuits against federal agencies, the district court
concluded that only an appeals court enjoys authority to resolve some
aspects of the dispute. But the 9th Circuit judges also could, if
they side with Gilmore, send the case back to the lower court for a
full trial.

On the courthouse steps after the arguments, Gilmore said he felt
confident about the case and welcomed a verbal concession from the
Justice Department. "I was glad the government admitted it was
'peculiar' and Orwellian to make secret laws," Gilmore said.

The Justice Department has said it could identify the secret law
under seal, which would be available to the 9th Circuit but not
necessarily Gilmore's lawyers. But any public description would not
be permitted, the department said.

Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>



-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From Serguei.Osokine at efi.com  Mon Dec 12 11:24:33 2005
From: Serguei.Osokine at efi.com (Serguei Osokine)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 11:24:33 -0800
Subject: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place or other
Message-ID: <mailman.1436.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

On Monday, December 12, 2005 Nazareno Andrade wrote:
> A nice paper which you may find useful in this thread:
>
> High Availability, Scalable Storage, Dynamic Peer Networks: Pick
> Two

	Yes, it is an interesting approach - thank you! However, I'm
not sure if their results directly apply to P2P nets. They are talking
about six nines and replication factor of 20 to 80. They would likely
commit suicide if they would try to actually use Gnutella for rare
content. Any improvement would be nice - and forget about six nines.

	Also, despite introducing an interesting approach, this article
results are very hard to verify and to reproduce, which is absolutely
necessary if one would want to repeat their calculations with some
different assumptions about the system requirements.

	For example, much of their conclusions are based on the Gnutella
trace from April of 2003. Back then Gnutella was more than an order of
magnitude smaller, and it would be interesting to repeat the
calculations for today's situation. But the properties of this trace
are not explicitly listed anywhere, being hidden in multiple charts
and obscure statements like "only 5,000 of the 33,000 Gnutella hosts
were usually available" (This, by the way, is a total mystery to me,
since in April of 2003 Slyck's stats archive lists Gnutella at about
90,000 simultaneous nodes, so I have no idea where these 5,000 or
33,000 came from and what their meaning might have been.)

	To put it shortly, they have an interesting methodology, but
I do not trust any one of their conclusions, as far as the caching
in P2P file-sharing network is concerned. All their reasonings
should be repeated for the reliable network statistical data, and
with the set of requirements that reflects the needs of P2P users,
not the need for a six nines-reliable data storage. I suspect that
then the conclusions might prove to be a bit different.

	Best wishes -
	S.Osokine.
	12 Dec 2005.


-----Original Message-----
From: p2p-hackers-bounces at zgp.org [mailto:p2p-hackers-bounces at zgp.org]On
Behalf Of Nazareno Andrade
Sent: Monday, December 12, 2005 10:22 AM
To: Peer-to-peer development.
Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place or other


Hi there.

A nice paper which you may find useful in this thread:

High Availability, Scalable Storage, Dynamic Peer Networks: Pick Two
(HotOS XI)

Peer-to-peer storage aims to build large-scale, reliable and available
storage from many small-scale unreliable, low-availability distributed
hosts. Data redundancy is the key to any data guarantees. However,
preserving redundancy in the face of highly dynamic membership is
costly. We use a simple resource usage model to measured behavior from
the Gnutella file-sharing network to argue that large-scale cooperative
storage is limited by likely dynamics and cross-system bandwidth - not
by local disk space. We examine some bandwidth optimization strategies
like delayed response to failures, admission control, and load-shifting
and find that they do not alter the basic problem. We conclude that when
redundancy, data scale, and dynamics are all high, the needed
cross-system bandwidth is unreasonable.

http://pmg.csail.mit.edu/~rodrigo/p2p-scl.pdf

regards,
Nazareno

Matthew Kaufman wrote:
> Alen Peacock:
>
>>  I'd add: what is the self-interested motivation for a node
>>to agree to cache the content in the first place?
>
>
> This could be some external motivation like "I want anonymously-posted
files
> about certain political views to be available for all to see" or "my
> corporate IT department says that we have to use this distributed
> collaboration tool"
>
>
>>If proactive caching were turned on by default in my p2p
>>filesharing client, don't I have a very real incentive to
>>turn this off in my own node to preserve bandwidth, disk
>>space, and perhaps limit any legal liability?
>
>
> In the general "filesharing" case? Absolutely. But that's not the only use
> for P2P technology or even P2P file transfer.
>
>
>>...which is similar to many of the arguments made against
>>pre-fetching in traditional caching literature: how do you
>>ensure that you prefetch the right content, especially when
>>the cost of prefetching the wrong content is very high?
>
>
> Actually, if you're replicating content to other nodes in order to ensure
> availability or create more downloadable nodes in order to speed future
> downloaders, it is more like the RAID arguments than the cache arguments.
>
> The real question is, IF you had a high-availability file sharing system,
> what files would you want to make available on it? (The answer is probably
> *not* the long tail of all files ever seen on generic file sharing
services)
>
> Matthew Kaufman
> matthew at matthew.at
> www.amicima.com
>
> _______________________________________________
> p2p-hackers mailing list
> p2p-hackers at zgp.org
> http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
> _______________________________________________
> Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
> http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences
>


--

Nazareno.

========================================
  Nazareno Andrade
  LSD - DSC/UFCG
  Campina Grande - Brazil
  http://lsd.dsc.ufcg.edu.br/~nazareno/

  OurGrid project
  http://www.ourgrid.org
========================================
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Dec 12 08:41:25 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 11:41:25 -0500
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <20051211085331.GD2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl>

Tor question. And remember, I'm not a datacom guy, so NK-me if I ask a 
stupid question.

I recently read that a simple LINUX OS has been written in java.

How hard would it be (and would it be meaningful) to write (or modify) a Tor 
client that could sit on top of a Java LINUX?

This could allow anyone at a public computer to open a Java-based Tor client 
(from a Tor website, of course), from pretty much anywhere (though I imagine 
Tor-on-Java would be resource hungry).

I imagine there are still security concerns, given that the Tor node is not 
actually "seeing" the machine directly.

Thoughts?

-TD


>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [arma at mit.edu: Tor 0.1.1.10-alpha is out]
>Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 09:53:31 +0100
>
>----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----
>
>From: Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu>
>Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2005 02:29:03 -0500
>To: or-talk at freehaven.net
>Subject: Tor 0.1.1.10-alpha is out
>User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
>Reply-To: or-talk at freehaven.net
>
>This is the tenth development snapshot for the 0.1.1.x series. We fix
>more crash bugs, fix some anonymity-related problems, and provide major
>performance speedups and use less memory than the previous alphas.
>
>http://tor.eff.org/download.html
>
>Changes in version 0.1.1.10-alpha - 2005-12-11
>   o Correctness bugfixes on 0.1.0.x:
>     - On Windows, build with a libevent patch from "I-M Weasel" to avoid
>       corrupting the heap, losing FDs, or crashing when we need to resize
>       the fd_sets. (This affects the Win32 binaries, not Tor's sources.)
>     - Stop doing the complex voodoo overkill checking for insecure
>       Diffie-Hellman keys. Just check if it's in [2,p-2] and be happy.
>     - When we were closing connections, there was a rare case that
>       stomped on memory, triggering seg faults and asserts.
>     - We were neglecting to unlink marked circuits from soon-to-close OR
>       connections, which caused some rare scribbling on freed memory.
>     - When we're deciding whether a stream has enough circuits around
>       that can handle it, count the freshly dirty ones and not the ones
>       that are so dirty they won't be able to handle it.
>     - Recover better from TCP connections to Tor servers that are
>       broken but don't tell you (it happens!); and rotate TLS
>       connections once a week.
>     - When we're expiring old circuits, we had a logic error that caused
>       us to close new rendezvous circuits rather than old ones.
>     - Fix a scary-looking but apparently harmless bug where circuits
>       would sometimes start out in state CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT at
>       servers, and never switch to state CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN.
>     - When building with -static or on Solaris, we sometimes needed to
>       build with -ldl.
>     - Give a useful message when people run Tor as the wrong user,
>       rather than telling them to start chowning random directories.
>     - We were failing to inform the controller about new .onion streams.
>
>   o Security bugfixes on 0.1.0.x:
>     - Refuse server descriptors if the fingerprint line doesn't match
>       the included identity key. Tor doesn't care, but other apps (and
>       humans) might actually be trusting the fingerprint line.
>     - We used to kill the circuit when we receive a relay command we
>       don't recognize. Now we just drop it.
>     - Start obeying our firewall options more rigorously:
>       . If we can't get to a dirserver directly, try going via Tor.
>       . Don't ever try to connect (as a client) to a place our
>         firewall options forbid.
>       . If we specify a proxy and also firewall options, obey the
>         firewall options even when we're using the proxy: some proxies
>         can only proxy to certain destinations.
>     - Fix a bug found by Lasse Overlier: when we were making internal
>       circuits (intended to be cannibalized later for rendezvous and
>       introduction circuits), we were picking them so that they had
>       useful exit nodes. There was no need for this, and it actually
>       aids some statistical attacks.
>     - Start treating internal circuits and exit circuits separately.
>       It's important to keep them separate because internal circuits
>       have their last hops picked like middle hops, rather than like
>       exit hops. So exiting on them will break the user's expectations.
>
>   o Bugfixes on 0.1.1.x:
>     - Take out the mis-feature where we tried to detect IP address
>       flapping for people with DynDNS, and chose not to upload a new
>       server descriptor sometimes.
>     - Try to be compatible with OpenSSL 0.9.6 again.
>     - Log fix: when the controller is logging about .onion addresses,
>       sometimes it didn't include the ".onion" part of the address.
>     - Don't try to modify options->DirServers internally -- if the
>       user didn't specify any, just add the default ones directly to
>       the trusted dirserver list. This fixes a bug where people running
>       controllers would use SETCONF on some totally unrelated config
>       option, and Tor would start yelling at them about changing their
>       DirServer lines.
>     - Let the controller's redirectstream command specify a port, in
>       case the controller wants to change that too.
>     - When we requested a pile of server descriptors, we sometimes
>       accidentally launched a duplicate request for the first one.
>     - Bugfix for trackhostexits: write down the fingerprint of the
>       chosen exit, not its nickname, because the chosen exit might not
>       be verified.
>     - When parsing foo.exit, if foo is unknown, and we are leaving
>       circuits unattached, set the chosen_exit field and leave the
>       address empty. This matters because controllers got confused
>       otherwise.
>     - Directory authorities no longer try to download server
>       descriptors that they know they will reject.
>
>   o Features and updates:
>     - Replace balanced trees with hash tables: this should make stuff
>       significantly faster.
>     - Resume using the AES counter-mode implementation that we ship,
>       rather than OpenSSL's. Ours is significantly faster.
>     - Many other CPU and memory improvements.
>     - Add a new config option FastFirstHopPK (on by default) so clients
>       do a trivial crypto handshake for their first hop, since TLS has
>       already taken care of confidentiality and authentication.
>     - Add a new config option TestSocks so people can see if their
>       applications are using socks4, socks4a, socks5-with-ip, or
>       socks5-with-hostname. This way they don't have to keep mucking
>       with tcpdump and wondering if something got cached somewhere.
>     - Warn when listening on a public address for socks. I suspect a
>       lot of people are setting themselves up as open socks proxies,
>       and they have no idea that jerks on the Internet are using them,
>       since they simply proxy the traffic into the Tor network.
>     - Add "private:*" as an alias in configuration for policies. Now
>       you can simplify your exit policy rather than needing to list
>       every single internal or nonroutable network space.
>     - Add a new controller event type that allows controllers to get
>       all server descriptors that were uploaded to a router in its role
>       as authoritative dirserver.
>     - Start shipping socks-extensions.txt, tor-doc-unix.html,
>       tor-doc-server.html, and stylesheet.css in the tarball.
>     - Stop shipping tor-doc.html in the tarball.
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which 
>had a name of signature.asc]




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From rsw at jfet.org  Mon Dec 12 09:12:23 2005
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 12:12:23 -0500
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl>
References: <20051211085331.GD2249@leitl.org>
  <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20051212171223.GA31477@proton.jfet.org>

Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> I recently read that a simple LINUX OS has been written in java.

Have a reference handy?  I'm just curious to see where they're going
with this.

I suppose all you'd really need is a linux kernel that'll run on the
JVM, which shouldn't be too hard to do.

> How hard would it be (and would it be meaningful) to write (or modify) a 
> Tor client that could sit on top of a Java LINUX?

I don't see the benefit of adding another layer on top of the JVM.  Tor
implemented in Java should be no more or less vulnerable to attacks from
the host machine than Tor talking with a Linux kernel running on the
JVM.  Moreover, you don't actually realize a benefit in portability by
adding the Linux-on-JVM abstraction to the soup.

Admittedly, you might save some development time by just running the
extant Tor client on a Linux virtual machine, but laziness isn't really
an excuse for doing something wrong, IMHO.

-- 
Riad S. Wahby
rsw at jfet.org




From gnu at toad.com  Mon Dec 12 14:36:48 2005
From: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 14:36:48 -0800
Subject: "Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights on Privacy"
Message-ID: <mailman.1437.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

[See the details at EFF:
  http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/USA_v_PenRegister/
 including the three court orders, and EFF's argument to the first court.

 The real story is that for years prosecutors have been asking
 magistrates to issue court orders to track cellphones in real time
 WITHOUT WARRANTS.  They're tracking people for whom they can't get
 warrants because they have no probable cause to believe there's any
 crime.  They're fishing.  The public never knew, because it all
 happens under seal.  One judge who had previously issued such orders
 got an attack of conscience, and surprisingly PUBLISHED a decision
 against such a secret DoJ request.  EFF noticed and offered legal
 analysis, and that judge and two others started publicly refusing
 such requests.  DoJ won't appeal, because without an appeals court
 precedent against them, they can keep secretly pulling the wool over
 the eyes of other magistrates, and keep tapping the locations of
 ordinary people in realtime without warrants.  --gnu]

No cookies or login required:
http://www.theledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051210/ZNYT01/512100416
/1001/BUSINESS

Published Saturday, December 10, 2005
Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights on Privacy

By MATT RICHTEL
New York Times

Most Americans carry cellphones, but many may not know that government
agencies can track their movements through the signals emanating from
the handset.

In recent years, law enforcement officials have turned to cellular
technology as a tool for easily and secretly monitoring the movements
of suspects as they occur. But this kind of surveillance - which
investigators have been able to conduct with easily obtained court
orders - has now come under tougher legal scrutiny.

In the last four months, three federal judges have denied prosecutors
the right to get cellphone tracking information from wireless
companies without first showing "probable cause" to believe that a
crime has been or is being committed. That is the same standard
applied to requests for search warrants.

The rulings, issued by magistrate judges in New York, Texas and
Maryland, underscore the growing debate over privacy rights and
government surveillance in the digital age.

With mobile phones becoming as prevalent as conventional phones (there
are 195 million cellular subscribers in this country), wireless
companies are starting to exploit the phones' tracking abilities. For
example, companies are marketing services that turn phones into even
more precise global positioning devices for driving or allowing
parents to track the whereabouts of their children through the
handsets.

Not surprisingly, law enforcement agencies want to exploit this
technology, too - which means more courts are bound to wrestle with
what legal standard applies when government agents ask to conduct such
surveillance.

Cellular operators like Verizon Wireless and Cingular Wireless know,
within about 300 yards, the location of their subscribers whenever a
phone is turned on. Even if the phone is not in use it is
communicating with cellphone tower sites, and the wireless provider
keeps track of the phone's position as it travels. The operators have
said that they turn over location information when presented with a
court order to do so.

The recent rulings by the magistrates, who are appointed by a majority
of the federal district judges in a given court, do not bind other
courts. But they could significantly curtail access to cell location
data if other jurisdictions adopt the same reasoning. (The
government's requests in the three cases, with their details, were
sealed because they involve investigations still under way.)

"It can have a major negative impact," said Clifford S. Fishman, a
former prosecutor in the Manhattan district attorney's office and a
professor at the Catholic University of America's law school in
Washington. "If I'm on an investigation and I need to know where
somebody is located who might be committing a crime, or, worse, might
have a hostage, real-time knowledge of where this person is could be a
matter of life or death."

Prosecutors argue that having such information is crucial to finding
suspects, corroborating their whereabouts with witness accounts, or
helping build a case for a wiretap on the phone - especially now that
technology gives criminals greater tools for evading law enforcement.

The government has routinely used records of cellphone calls and
caller locations to show where a suspect was at a particular time,
with access to those records obtainable under a lower legal
standard. (Wireless operators keep cellphone location records for
varying lengths of time, from several months to years.)

But it is unclear how often prosecutors have asked courts for the
right to obtain cell-tracking data as a suspect is moving. And the
government is not required to report publicly when it makes such
requests.

Legal experts say that such live tracking has tended to happen in
drug-trafficking cases. In a 2003 Ohio case, for example, federal drug
agents used cell tracking data to arrest and convict two men on drug
charges.

Mr. Fishman said he believed that the number of requests had become
more prevalent in the last two years - and the requests have often
been granted with a stroke of a magistrate's pen.

Prosecutors, while acknowledging that they have to get a court order
before obtaining real-time cell-site data, argue that the relevant
standard is found in a 1994 amendment to the 1986 Stored
Communications Act, a law that governs some aspects of cellphone
surveillance.

The standard calls for the government to show "specific and
articulable facts" that demonstrate that the records sought are
"relevant and material to an ongoing investigation" - a standard lower
than the probable-cause hurdle.

The magistrate judges, however, ruled that surveillance by cellphone -
because it acts like an electronic tracking device that can follow
people into homes and other personal spaces - must meet the same high
legal standard required to obtain a search warrant to enter private
places.

"Permitting surreptitious conversion of a cellphone into a tracking
device without probable cause raises serious Fourth Amendment
concerns, especially when the phone is monitored in the home or other
places where privacy is reasonably expected," wrote Stephen W. Smith,
a magistrate in Federal District Court in the Southern District of
Texas, in his ruling.

"The distinction between cell site data and information gathered by a
tracking device has practically vanished," wrote Judge Smith. He added
that when a phone is monitored, the process is usually "unknown to the
phone users, who may not even be on the phone."

Prosecutors in the recent cases also unsuccessfully argued that the
expanded police powers under the USA Patriot Act could be read as
allowing cellphone tracking under a standard lower than probable
cause.

As Judge Smith noted in his 31-page opinion, the debate goes beyond a
question of legal standard. In fact, the nature of digital
communications makes it difficult to distinguish between content that
is clearly private and information that is public. When information is
communicated on paper, for instance, it is relatively clear that
information written on an envelope deserves a different kind of
protection than the contents of the letter inside.

But in a digital era, the stream of data that carries a telephone
conversation or an e-mail message contains a great deal of information
- like when and where the communications originated.

In the digital era, what's on the envelope and what's inside of it,
"have absolutely blurred," said Marc Rotenberg, executive director of
the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a privacy advocacy group.

And that makes it harder for courts to determine whether a certain
digital surveillance method invokes Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches.

In the cellular-tracking cases, some legal experts say that the Store
Communications Act refers only to records of where a person has been,
i.e. historical location data, but does not address live tracking.

Kevin Bankston, a lawyer for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a
privacy advocacy group that has filed briefs in the case in the
Eastern District of New York, said the law did not speak to that
use. James Orenstein, the magistrate in the New York case, reached the
same conclusion, as did Judge Smith in Houston and James Bredar, a
magistrate judge in the Federal District Court in Maryland.

Orin S. Kerr, a professor at the George Washington School of Law and a
former trial attorney in the Justice Department specializing in
computer law, said the major problem for prosecutors was Congress did
not appear to have directly addressed the question of what standard
prosecutors must meet to obtain cell-site information as it occurs.

"There's no easy answer," Mr. Kerr said. "The law is pretty uncertain
here."

Absent a Congressional directive, he said, it is reasonable for
magistrates to require prosecutors to meet the probable-cause
standard.

Mr. Fishman of Catholic University said that such a requirement could
hamper law enforcement's ability to act quickly because of the
paperwork required to show probable cause. But Mr. Fishman said he
also believed that the current law was unclear on the issue.

Judge Smith "has written a very, very persuasive opinion," Mr. Fishman
said. "The government's argument has been based on some tenuous
premises." He added that he sympathized with prosecutors' fears.

"Something that they've been able to use quite successfully and
usefully is being taken away from them or made harder to get,"
Mr. Fishman said. "I'd be very, very frustrated."

---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 12 07:32:45 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 16:32:45 +0100
Subject: [solinym@gmail.com: Re: [Clips] Engineer Outwits Fingerprint
  Recognition Devices with Play-Doh]
Message-ID: <20051212153245.GZ2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from "Travis H." <solinym at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 12 09:26:33 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 18:26:33 +0100
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <20051212171223.GA31477@proton.jfet.org>
References: <20051211085331.GD2249@leitl.org> <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl> <20051212171223.GA31477@proton.jfet.org>
Message-ID: <20051212172633.GE2249@leitl.org>

On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 12:12:23PM -0500, Riad S. Wahby wrote:
> Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> > I recently read that a simple LINUX OS has been written in java.
> 
> Have a reference handy?  I'm just curious to see where they're going
> with this.

I presume everybody has seen http://www.masswerk.at/jsuix/ 
right?
 
> I suppose all you'd really need is a linux kernel that'll run on the
> JVM, which shouldn't be too hard to do.

-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 12 09:33:18 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 18:33:18 +0100
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl>
References: <20051211085331.GD2249@leitl.org>
  <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20051212173318.GG2249@leitl.org>

On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 11:41:25AM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:

> This could allow anyone at a public computer to open a Java-based Tor
> client (from a Tor website, of course), from pretty much anywhere (though I
> imagine Tor-on-Java would be resource hungry).

There's a Tor park Tor/Firefox appliance, which can be started off
local drive or an USB stick.

IIRC the author of Torpark might be developing a Tor Firefox plugin.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 12 11:25:34 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 20:25:34 +0100
Subject: [Serguei.Osokine@efi.com: RE: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place
  or other]
Message-ID: <20051212192534.GI2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Serguei Osokine <Serguei.Osokine at efi.com> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 12 18:29:59 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 21:29:59 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Hacker attacks in US linked to Chinese military: 
  researchers
Message-ID: <p062309e8bfc3e1151266@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 19:39:51 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Hacker attacks in US linked to Chinese military: researchers
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.breitbart.com/news/2005/12/12/051212224756.jwmkvntb.html>

 BREITBART.COM -

 Hacker attacks in US linked to Chinese military: researchers


 Dec 12 5:56 PM US/Eastern


 A systematic effort by hackers to penetrate US government and industry
 computer networks stems most likely from the Chinese military, the head of
 a leading security institute said. The attacks have been traced to the
 Chinese province of Guangdong, and the techniques used make it appear
 unlikely to come from any other source than the military, said Alan Paller,
 the director of the SANS Institute, an education and research organization
 focusing on cybersecurity.


  "These attacks come from someone with intense discipline. No other
 organization could do this if they were not a military organization,"
 Paller said in a conference call to announced a new cybersecurity education
 program.

  In the attacks, Paller said, the perpetrators "were in and out with no
 keystroke errors and left no fingerprints, and created a backdoor in less
 than 30 minutes. How can this be done by anyone other than a military
 organization?"

  Paller said that despite what appears to be a systematic effort to target
 government agencies and defense contractors, defenses have remained weak in
 many areas.

  "We know about major penetrations of defense contractors," he said.

  Security among private-sector Pentagon contractors may not be as robust,
 said Paller, because "they are less willing to make it hard for mobile
 people to get their work done."

  Paller said the US government strategy appears to be to downplay the
 attacks, which has not helped the situation.

  "We have a problem that our computer networks have been terribly and
 deeply penetrated throughout the United States ... and we've been keeping
 it secret," he said.

  "The people who benefit from keeping it secret are the attackers."

  Although Paller said the hackers probably have not obtained classified
 documents from the Pentagon, which uses a more secure network, it is
 possible they stole "extremely sensitive" information.

  He said it has been documented that US military flight planning software
 from its Redstone Arsenal was stolen.

  Pentagon officials confirmed earlier this year that US Defense Department
 websites are probed hundreds of times a day by hackers, but maintained that
 no classified site is known to have been penetrated by hackers.

  The US military has code-named the recent hacker effort "Titan Rain" and
 has made some strides in counter-hacking to identify the attackers, Paller
 said. This was first reported by Time magazine.

  Paller said a series of attacks on British computer networks reported
 earlier this year may have similar goals, but seems to use different
 techniques.

  In the United States, he said there are some areas of improvement such as
 the case of the Air Force, which has been insisting on better security from
 its IT vendors. But he argued that "the fundamental error is that America's
 security strategy relies on writing reports rather than hardening systems."


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 12 18:30:00 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 21:30:00 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Despite Govt. Funding,  Universities Failing to Produce
   National Security Experts
Message-ID: <p062309e7bfc3dde7536f@[68.167.57.91]>

Reminds me of a problem with West Point graduates before the Mexican War.
They made more money as engineers than they did in the Army, and Congress
was going the same kind of navel-gazing exercise about paying for people
who weren't going to do the jobs they were taught, at government expense,
to do.

More apropos of cryptography, (besides "financial cryptography is the only
cryptography that matters", I mean :-)), I'm reminded of something that
Whit Diffie was saying at Authors at MIT couple of years before 9/11 (Come to
think of it, the FBI's Kalstrom *was* there, for extra crunchy ironic
goodness). Diffie said something about how government can't actually
provide computer security, that businesses are going to have to defend
"themselves" from individual network-based attacks, and that was going to
have interesting consequences. I refer one to the previous post about how
Uncle Fed is pointing fingers at Chairman Mao about attacks on US
internetworking, for a possible bit of data in this regard...


So, yes, I think it's great fun that all these "policy" people, below, are
being retreaded into "strategy" (in the Sloan-School business-sense of
same) people, and that, guess what, they're going to not only going to be
used for their "policy" skills, whatever those are, but also, and more
valuably, to second-guess *governments* in their attempts to control
business.

Having some fun now? I thought so...



Cheers,
RAH

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 21:08:30 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Despite Govt. Funding,
  Universities Failing to Produce National Security Experts
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,177568,00.html>

 Fox News


 Despite Govt. Funding, Universities Failing to Produce National Security
 Experts

 Tuesday, December 06, 2005

 By Olivia Albrecht

 In 1957, the Soviet Union announced the launch of Sputnik 1, the world's
 first artificial satellite, bringing global attention to the emergence of
 sophisticated technologies and international security threats that came to
 characterize the Cold War period.

 One year after the proverbial launch of the Cold War-- recognizing the
 relative dearth of regional expertise-- the U.S. government, through Title
 VI of the National Defense Education Act, established foreign language and
 area studies programs at American universities such as Harvard, Columbia
 and Berkeley. The regional studies centers of NDEA aimed to guarantee
 experts of sufficient quality and quantity to meet U.S. national security
 needs.

 Today, at the height of the global war on terror, those same regional
 studies centers designed to develop the newest generation of international
 expertise to ensure our national security are failing to produce graduates
 willing to work for or within the government.

 Despite the $120 million of federal money annually allocated by Title VI of
 the Higher Education Act (the successor to the NDEA of 1958) to the
 regional studies centers, law enforcement agencies and intelligence
 communities are stuck outsourcing positions such as translators to foreign
 nationals of uncertain reliability. The worry of such a practice, of
 course, is that national security can easily be compromised-and indeed it
 has. Just this past October, for example, an Arabic translator for the Army
 was arrested for allegedly assisting Iraqi insurgents by stealing
 classified documents from the Army.

 Yet, even putting aside the question of whether an outsourced expert may
 experience a clash of loyalties at some point, there is still a void of
 Arabic translators: the New York Times last year reported that 120,000
 hours of pre-9/11 intelligence "chatter" remains untranslated from Arabic.

 Unfortunately, the situation with these federally funded regional studies
 centers is unlike the case of Princeton Unversity's Woodrow Wilson School,
 which is involved in a lawsuit with the private financial support of the
 program. The donors, the heirs to the Robertson family who founded the
 center, argue that Woody-Woo (as it is affectionately named) has not met
 its mission of preparing students for government service, as too few of its
 graduates take positions in government. In fact, they are producing more
 iBankers, consultants, journalists and future officials for governments
 other than that of the United States'.

 In the case of the federally funded regional studies centers, the
 government cannot just yank their funding, like the Robertson heirs
 threaten to do with their $558 million grant.

 With the consistent flow of federal money running into these regional
 studies centers, which were developed to produce international experts for
 the needs of our national security, how is it possible that we still
 experience a dearth of experts willing to support the war effort and help
 protect this nation? With 70 percent of Ph.Ds being earned at Middle
 Eastern studies centers, how can the United States government afford to do
 without this talent?

 Some critics have suggested that the liberal, anti-government lean of
 campus politics discourages students from entering government service.
 Regardless of why students are choosing not to put their expertise to work
 for the government, the fact remains that these centers are failing to
 produce the national security analysts they were built to cultivate.

 In this post-9/11 world, the U.S. cannot afford to have Title VI produce
 Ph.Ds merely for the academic job market. The U.S. has other needs for
 these intellectual, international experts.

 One solution includes legislation proposed by Rep. Patrick Tiberi, R-Ohio,
 and Rep. John Boehner, R-Ohio. Tiberi has proposed H.R. 509, which was
 recently added as an amendment to Boehner's H.R. 609. H.R. 609 broadly
 deals with the Higher Education Act of 1965, whereas H.R. 509 addresses
 only Title VI of the Higher Education Act of 1965 -- the regional studies
 centers.

 Addressing the distressing lack of national security personnel being
 graduated from these regional studies centers, the proposed amendment to
 Title VI of the Higher Education Act of 1965 recommends the establishment
 of an international higher education advisory board "to ensure that
 government-funded programs reflect diverse perspectives and the full range
 of views on world regions, foreign languages, and international affairs."

 The primary function of the advisory board is to recommend ways "to improve
 programs
to better reflect the national needs related to homeland security."

 However, it is critical to note that the bill clearly states that the board
 is not authorized to "mandate, direct, or control an institution of higher
 education's specific instructional content, curriculum, or program of
 instruction."

 It is merely authorized to study, appraise and evaluate a sample of program
 activities, including curriculum.

 Critics of such amendments fear that the true motivation for the
 government's involvement in the regional studies centers is not national
 security needs, but rather fear of intellectual criticism of their own
 foreign policy. They fear a "Big Brother" in the universities.

 However, this criticism is misguided. First, the legislation is very
 particular in establishing that the board cannot mandate curriculum. It
 prompts the analysis that, perhaps, it is the academians who are more
 concerned with criticism of their classroom policy than the government is
 concerned with criticism of its foreign policy.

 Secondly, because the regional studies centers are federally funded, such
 an advisory board is justified. It is permissible to establish
 accountability at the centers because they use taxpayer money.

 Fortunately, there are private donors, like the Robertson's children who
 support the Woodrow Wilson School, who are civic minded enough to demand
 that their money be spent for the original purpose of these institutions:
 to develop intellectuals to serve the nation. For the federally funded
 universities of the regional studies centers, we must rely on innovative
 legislation.

 Olivia Albrecht is the John Tower National Security Fellow with the Center
 for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. Ms. Albrecht researches
 international relations and national security issues, with a focus on the
 'Islamofascist' phenomenon. Albrecht previously worked for the Pentagon
 (Non-Proliferation Policy) and with the Heritage Foundation, and is a
 graduate of Princeton University with a degree in Philosophy.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From alenlpeacock at gmail.com  Tue Dec 13 07:41:56 2005
From: alenlpeacock at gmail.com (Alen Peacock)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 08:41:56 -0700
Subject: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place or other
Message-ID: <mailman.1438.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

On 12/13/05, Michael Rogers <m.rogers at cs.ucl.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> Then how about internal motivation: the faster you upload, the faster
> you can download, and the more files you share, the more likely you are
> to be able to upload. I've come up with a half-baked incentive mechanism
> for Gnutella based on these principles:
>
> http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/M.Rogers/gnutella-incentives.html
>
> No identity mechanism required I'm afraid ;-)

  Neat ideas.  Like you, I'm a big believer in incentive-based decisions.

  I just peaked at your "Cooperation in Decentralized Networks" paper,
and I notice that you do require exchange of public keys,
authentication with those keys, and some sort of history of
reciprocation, no?  This is what I'm talking about when I say
'identity' and 'trust'.  Each node has to be able to positively
certify the identities of other nodes, and what you seem to be
building is essentially a trust system built on top of those strong
identities.  Without the ability to certify node identities, you'd
have a system that was very susceptible to imposter nodes leeching
resources (in the form of reciprocation) that they hadn't earned,
right?

  Perhaps I confused the issue by using the word 'identity,' which in
some circles is used only to talk about the concept of linking a
virtual presence to a meatspace entity.  That isn't what I intended.
What I meant was exactly what you describe: use of assymetric keys to
establish and prove peer IDs, use of those IDs to learn something
about the behavior of other agents in the network, and use of that
knowledge to make appropriate incentive-based decisions.


> >   But, isn't it more interesting to think about building systems that
> > have some fairness guarantees than building ones that don't?
>
> Define fairness :-) I'm more interested in mutual benefit.

  Well, I don't know if my semantics are standard, but the concept of
'fairness' I was thinking of was one that was purposely broad -- an
umbrella under which 'mutual benefit' is certainly an essential piece.

  Alen
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From jamespwalker at gmail.com  Mon Dec 12 15:03:52 2005
From: jamespwalker at gmail.com (James Walker)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 10:03:52 +1100
Subject: [FoRK] Choking the Internet
Message-ID: <mailman.1439.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Choking the Internet: How much longer will your favorite sites be on line?
By Wayne Madsen

December 9, 2005 -- Internet censorship. It did not happen overnight but
slowly came to America's shores from testing grounds in China and the Middle
East.

Progressive and investigative journalist web site administrators are
beginning to talk to each other about it, e-mail users are beginning to
understand why their e-mail is being disrupted by it, major search engines
appear to be complying with it, and the low to equal signal-to-noise ratio
of legitimate e-mail and spam appears to be perpetuated by it.

In this case, "it," is what privacy and computer experts have long warned
about: massive censorship of the web on a nationwide and global scale. For
many years, the web has been heavily censored in countries around the world.
That censorship continues at this very moment. Now it is happening right
here in America. The agreement by the Congress to extend an enhanced Patriot
Act for another four years will permit the political enforcers of the Bush
administration, who use law enforcement as their proxies, to further clamp
censorship controls on the web.

Internet Censorship: The Warning Signs Were Not Hidden

The warning signs for the crackdown on the web have been with us for over a
decade. The Clipper chip controversy of the 90s, John Poindexter's Total
Information Awareness (TIA) system pushed in the aftermath of 9-11, backroom
deals between the Federal government and the Internet service industry, and
the Patriot Act have ushered in a new era of Internet censorship, something
just half a decade ago computer programmers averred was impossible given the
nature of the web. They were wrong, dead wrong.

Take for example of what recently occurred when two journalists were taking
on the phone about a story that appeared on Google News. The story was about
a Christian fundamentalist move in Congress to use U.S. military force in
Sudan to end genocide in Darfur. The story appeared on the English Google
News site in Qatar. But the very same Google News site when accessed
simultaneously in Washington, DC failed to show the article. This censorship
is accomplished by geolocation filtering: the restriction or modifying of
web content based on the geographical region of the user. In addition to
countries, such filtering can now be implemented for states, cities, and
even individual IP addresses.

With reports in the Swedish newspaper Svensa Dagbladet today that the United
States has transmitted a Homeland Security Department "no fly" list of
80,000 suspected terrorists to airport authorities around the world, it is
not unreasonable that a "no [or restricted] surfing/emailing" list has been
transmitted to Internet Service Providers around the world. The systematic
disruptions of web sites and email strongly suggests that such a list
exists.

News reports on CIA prisoner flights and secret prisons are disappearing
from Google and other search engines like Alltheweb as fast as they appear.
Here now, gone tomorrow is the name of the game.

Google is systematically failing to list and link to articles that contain
explosive information about the Bush administration, the war in Iraq, Al
Qaeda, and U.S. political scandals. But Google is not alone in working
closely to stifle Internet discourse. America On Line, Microsoft, Yahoo and
others are slowly turning the Internet into an information superhighway
dominated by barricades, toll booths, off-ramps that lead to dead ends,
choke points, and security checks.

America On Line is the most egregious is stifling Internet freedom. A former
AOL employee noted how AOL and other Internet Service Providers cooperate
with the Bush administration in censoring email. The Patriot Act gave
federal agencies the power to review information to the packet level and AOL
was directed by agencies like the FBI to do more than sniff the subject
line. The AOL term of service (TOS) has gradually been expanded to grant AOL
virtually universal power regarding information. Many AOL users are likely
unaware of the elastic clause, which says they will be bound by the current
TOS and any TOS revisions which AOL may elect at any time in the future.
Essentially, AOL users once agreed to allow the censorship and non-delivery
of their email.

Microsoft has similar requirements for Hotmail as do Yahoo and Google for
their respective e-mail services.

There are also many cases of Google's search engine failing to list and link
to certain information. According to a number of web site administrators who
carry anti-Bush political content, this situation has become more pronounced
in the last month. In addition, many web site administrators are reporting a
dramatic drop-off in hits to their sites, according to their web statistic
analyzers. Adding to their woes is the frequency at which spam viruses are
being spoofed as coming from their web site addresses.

Government disruption of the political side of the web can easily be hidden
amid hyped mainstream news media reports of the latest "boutique" viruses
and worms, reports that have more to do with the sales of anti-virus
software and services than actual long-term disruption of banks, utilities,
or airlines.

Internet Censorship in the US: No Longer a Prediction

Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Cisco Systems have honed their skills at
Internet censorship for years in places like China, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and other countries. They have
learned well. They will be the last to admit they have imported their
censorship skills into the United States at the behest of the Bush regime.
Last year, the Bush-Cheney campaign blocked international access to its web
site -- www.georgewbush.com -- for unspecified "security reasons."

Only those in the Federal bureaucracy and the companies involved are in a
position to know what deals have been made and how extensive Internet
censorship has become. They owe full disclosure to their customers and their
fellow citizens.
_______________________________________________
FoRK mailing list
http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Dec 13 08:16:04 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 11:16:04 -0500
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <20051212173318.GG2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F14B9BD9EEC3A16FD5FCF8D9B390@phx.gbl>

Well, I've been playing with one of those little Tor USB doohickeys.

But that's a very different thing from allowing anyone, anywhere to pull a 
Tor client down onto a java virtual machine.

Of course I'll grant that such a publically available Tor node offers a kind 
of anonymity that most Cypherpunks would pass on, but I still maintain that 
huge increases in quasi-anonymous traffic* is good for those of us who roll 
our own, more secure communications.

-TD

* By Quasi-anonymous I mean potentially breakable, but only through the 
exertion of significant TLA resources. In other words, too expensive to do 
fishing expeditions on big-mouths.


>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>, cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: Re: Tor client over Java LINUX
>Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 18:33:18 +0100
>
>On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 11:41:25AM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
> > This could allow anyone at a public computer to open a Java-based Tor
> > client (from a Tor website, of course), from pretty much anywhere 
>(though I
> > imagine Tor-on-Java would be resource hungry).
>
>There's a Tor park Tor/Firefox appliance, which can be started off
>local drive or an USB stick.
>
>IIRC the author of Torpark might be developing a Tor Firefox plugin.
>
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which 
>had a name of signature.asc]




From rabbi at abditum.com  Tue Dec 13 11:48:31 2005
From: rabbi at abditum.com (Len Sassaman)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 11:48:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [p2p-hackers] CodeCon submission deadline reminder
Message-ID: <mailman.1440.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Here's a reminder that the deadline for submissions to CodeCon 2006 is
this week. Feel free to forward this to project developers who might not
otherwise see it.

--Len.

--

CodeCon 2006
February 10-12, 2006
San Francisco CA, USA
www.codecon.org

Call For Papers

CodeCon is the premier showcase of cutting edge software development. It
is an excellent opportunity for programmers to demonstrate their work and
keep abreast of what's going on in their community.

All presentations must include working demonstrations, ideally
accompanied by source code. Presentations must be done by one of the
active developers of the code in question. We emphasize that
demonstrations be of *working* code.

We hereby solicit papers and demonstrations.

    * Papers and proposals due: December 15, 2005
    * Authors notified: January 1, 2006

Possible topics include, but are by no means restricted to:

    * community-based web sites - forums, weblogs, personals
    * development tools - languages, debuggers, version control
    * file sharing systems - swarming distribution, distributed search
    * security products - mail encryption, intrusion detection, firewalls

Presentations will be 45 minutes long, with 15 minutes allocated for
Q&A. Overruns will be truncated.

Submission details:

Submissions are being accepted immediately. Acceptance dates are
November 15, and December 15. After the first acceptance date,
submissions will be either accepted, rejected, or deferred to the
second acceptance date.

The conference language is English.

Ideally, demonstrations should be usable by attendees with 802.11b
connected devices either via a web interface, or locally on Windows,
UNIX-like, or MacOS platforms. Cross-platform applications are most
desirable.

Our venue will be 21+.

To submit, send mail to submissions-2006 at codecon.org including the
following information:

    * Project name
    * url of project home page
    * tagline - one sentence or less summing up what the project does
    * names of presenter(s) and urls of their home pages, if they have any
    * one-paragraph bios of presenters, optional, under 100 words each
    * project history, under 150 words
    * what will be done in the project demo, under 200 words
    * slides to be shown during the presentation, if applicable
    * future plans

General Chair: Jonathan Moore
Program Chair: Len Sassaman

Program Committee:

    * Bram Cohen, BitTorrent, USA
    * Jered Floyd, Permabit, USA
    * Ian Goldberg, Zero-Knowledge Systems, CA
    * Dan Kaminsky, Avaya, USA
    * Ben Laurie, The Bunker Secure Hosting, UK
    * Nick Mathewson, The Free Haven Project, USA
    * David Molnar, University of California, Berkeley, USA
    * Jonathan Moore, Mosuki, USA
    * Meredith L. Patterson, University of Iowa, USA
    * Len Sassaman, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE

Sponsorship:

If your organization is interested in sponsoring CodeCon, we would
love to hear from you. In particular, we are looking for sponsors for
social meals and parties on any of the three days of the conference,
as well as sponsors of the conference as a whole and donors of door
prizes. If you might be interested in sponsoring any of these aspects,
please contact the conference organizers at codecon-admin at codecon.org.

Press policy:

CodeCon provides a limited number of passes to qualifying press.
Complimentary press passes will be evaluated on request. Everyone is
welcome to pay the low registration fee to attend without an official
press credential.

Questions:

If you have questions about CodeCon, or would like to contact the
organizers, please mail codecon-admin at codecon.org. Please note this
address is only for questions and administrative requests, and not for
workshop presentation submissions.






_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From Serguei.Osokine at efi.com  Tue Dec 13 11:50:31 2005
From: Serguei.Osokine at efi.com (Serguei Osokine)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 11:50:31 -0800
Subject: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place or other
Message-ID: <mailman.1441.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

On Tuesday, December 13, 2005 Michael Rogers wrote:
> I believe eMule allows the uploader to assign different priorities
> to different files - I'd like to be able to do this in Gnutella, to
> make the rarer (or better) content on my node easier to find...

	Tha is more like "easier to download", but I see what you're
saying. Yes, at some point I used to place hight hopes on this method,
basically thinking that the transfer rates for the rare content can
be improved at the expense of the popular one. Popular content can be
found at lots of places anyway, so penalizing it should not hurt all
that much; for me the goal was to equalize the download rates for
all content regardless of its popularity. So if improving the rare
content download speed would make the widely distributed content
transfers a bit slower (because the systemwide cumulative uplink
bandwidth is a scarce resource, after all), so be it.

	Unfortunately the statistical research of the P2P systems
(the one that I've already quoted in this thread) shows that from
the uploader standpoint the prioritization of rare vs popular content
does not cover a very significant percentage of all upload situations.

	The typical upload scenario is not only "some popular, some
rare, so give the rare more bandwidth". Just as widespread is "many
rare uploads from one node", in which case changing their relative
priorities is pointless, and also "rare upload from a single node",
in which case no matter what this node does, the speed is going to
be substandard.

	And let me reemphasize this again - these scenarios seem to be
very common. Essentially the download speed for the rare content is
limited by the uplink rates of the nodes with rare content, even if
all the nodes are always on and spend just a small percantage of their
online time downloading. For popular content, you can have very fast
downloads in such a case; you can even saturate your downlink if you
wish. But for rare content, you're still stuck with whatever is the
uplink rate of a single node that has this file.

	As the nodes start spending more time on line, this disparity
becomes more and more pronounced no matter how you prioritize the
uploads. And seeing this causes the user frustration on a significant
percentage of all downloads (on everything that is in the long tail).

	Best wishes -
	S.Osokine.
	13 Dec 2005.


-----Original Message-----
From: p2p-hackers-bounces at zgp.org [mailto:p2p-hackers-bounces at zgp.org]On
Behalf Of Michael Rogers
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2005 3:25 AM
To: Peer-to-peer development.
Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place or other


Serguei Osokine wrote:
> 	And the reason for this is quite understandable - if most of
> the content exists in just one or two copies, what good are the swarm
> downloaders and other marvelous instruments of progress? This single
> copy that you need might be on a single host behind the modem in
> Albania, the host might go off-line at any moment, and to make it
> more fun, it might be trying to upload five other files (different
> files, mind you) to five other people at the same time.

I believe eMule allows the uploader to assign different priorities to
different files - I'd like to be able to do this in Gnutella, to make
the rarer (or better) content on my node easier to find, almost like a
recommendation system.

Cheers,
Michael
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 13 03:09:25 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 12:09:25 +0100
Subject: [jamespwalker@gmail.com: [FoRK] Choking the Internet]
Message-ID: <20051213110925.GL2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from James Walker <jamespwalker at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 13 07:21:42 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 16:21:42 +0100
Subject: [gnu@toad.com: "Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court
  Fights on Privacy"]
Message-ID: <20051213152142.GA2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 13 07:42:50 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 16:42:50 +0100
Subject: [alenlpeacock@gmail.com: Re: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place or
  other]
Message-ID: <20051213154250.GF2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Alen Peacock <alenlpeacock at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 13 08:20:54 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 17:20:54 +0100
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F14B9BD9EEC3A16FD5FCF8D9B390@phx.gbl>
References: <20051212173318.GG2249@leitl.org>
  <BAY103-F14B9BD9EEC3A16FD5FCF8D9B390@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20051213162054.GH2249@leitl.org>

On Tue, Dec 13, 2005 at 11:16:04AM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:

> Of course I'll grant that such a publically available Tor node offers a
> kind of anonymity that most Cypherpunks would pass on, but I still maintain
> that huge increases in quasi-anonymous traffic* is good for those of us who
> roll our own, more secure communications.

A really good multiplier would be to package Tor into a malware vector.

Dialup is worse than useless, but residential broadband means 100 MBit/s
(and sometimes more) in some places. 260 TByte/month is nothing to sneeze
at.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From Ogoda at optonline.com  Tue Dec 13 13:44:29 2005
From: Ogoda at optonline.com (Millie Mata)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 19:44:29 -0200
Subject: Fw: ...
Message-ID: <200512132153.jBDLri96001007@proton.jfet.org>

Sir/Madam,

Your present homeloan meets the criteria for you to receive sizable rebates.

Our service will connect you with the most capable broker, so that you will have more finances in your bank account at the end of each month.

Its really that simple..

Myriads of Americans are Re-Fi-Nancing their houses every day.

Now its your time.

This succinct 1 minute form will be your next rung on the ladder towards true percuniary security.

With kind regards,

Millie Mata




Should you choose not to collect this opportunity any further say no more.
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From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 13 11:49:38 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 20:49:38 +0100
Subject: [rabbi@abditum.com: [p2p-hackers] CodeCon submission deadline
  reminder]
Message-ID: <20051213194938.GQ2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Len Sassaman <rabbi at abditum.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 13 11:56:03 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 20:56:03 +0100
Subject: [Serguei.Osokine@efi.com: RE: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place
  or other]
Message-ID: <20051213195603.GR2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Serguei Osokine <Serguei.Osokine at efi.com> -----


From declan at well.com  Wed Dec 14 08:00:49 2005
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 08:00:49 -0800
Subject: [Politech] E.U. Parliament votes to force "data retention" on
 telecom, Net firms [priv]
Message-ID: <mailman.1442.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Previous Politech messages:
http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/05/european-data-retention/
http://www.politechbot.com/2005/09/23/european-commission-proposes/
http://www.politechbot.com/2005/06/16/feds-contemplate-forcing/

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: EU Parliament agrees to data retention
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 16:20:00 +0100
From: Ralf Bendrath <bendrath at zedat.fu-berlin.de>
Reply-To: bendrath at zedat.fu-berlin.de
To: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>

Declan, something for Politech? Very bad news from Europe.

The European Parliament this morning voted in favour of a backroom deal
that had been made between the two big parties in Brussels and the Council
of Ministers, currently chaired by the UK. The deal completely ignored the
amendmends proposed by the Parliament's Rapporteur and by the Justice and
Civil Liberties Committee that was (well - officialy) in charge of the
process. After a hot debate and a number of signs of cracks in the party
blocks, a majority of 378 parliamentarians voted in favour of mandatory
retention of telecommunications data, 197 against, 30 abstained.

This is in short what we will get now:

- retention of telephone and internet connection data (including email
addresses) and location data for mobile phone calls
- no harmonisation of the retention period (6 to 24 months but longer is
allowed: Poland wants 15 years)
- no harmonisation of cost reimbursement for the needed investments on the
providers' side
- no limitation to certain types of crimes for which access is allowed
- retention of unsuccessful call attempts
- no independent evaluation
- no extra privacy safeguards
- follow-up committee without representation from civil rights organisations

Civil liberties organizations, consumers organizations and all the telco
industry associations as well as journalists associations had been
fighting like hell against this major and unprecedented surveillance plan
until the last minute. We did not win (the outcome is in fact the worst
possible, exactly what the UK home affairs minister Clarke wanted), but we
at least raised a lot of awareness and disturbed the conservative and
social-democrat party lines. But the UK council presidency had pushed so
hard after the London bombings that this directive will enter the EU
history as the one which took the shortest time ever from the first
Commission draft to the final vote (less than three months - normally they
need years).

The next steps will be the adoption by the Council of Ministers (before
christmas) and then the implementation process into national laws. There
will be challenges to this plan before the constitutional courts. I am
pretty sure that the German constitutional court will not like it, as it
recently had ruled unconstitutional a major eavesdropping plan on phone
calls - and that one was only directed at suspicious persons, whereas the
EU directive applies to every single communication of all 450 Million
inhabitants of the EU.

More information, including recordings of the EP debate, is available at
<http://wiki.dataretentionisnosolution.com/>.

Ralf
(European Digital Rights, www.edri.org)

_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From roy at rant-central.com  Wed Dec 14 06:49:12 2005
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 09:49:12 -0500
Subject: EU gone fascist
In-Reply-To: <20051214120337.GQ2249@leitl.org>
References: <20051214120337.GQ2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <43A030E8.4060405@rant-central.com>

Eugen Leitl wrote:

>Now it's official
>
>	http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/67358 </kraut>
>
>Having a working Tor network is now more vital than ever.
>I've ordered a 10 MBit/s flat rate server, and will start working
>on a private high-performance Tor network around turn of the year.
>  
>
That page makes the fish crap.  How about an executive summary for the
kraut-impaired?

-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
CRM114->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From mnl at well.com  Wed Dec 14 10:35:27 2005
From: mnl at well.com (Mike Liebhold)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 10:35:27 -0800
Subject: [Geowanking] new Microsoft privacy policy?
Message-ID: <mailman.1443.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Jeremy Irish wrote:

>Many seem to faint in the site of Microsoft knowing your location -

Jeremy,

This is not about "fainting" , and the problem is -much- larger than
Microsoft.  Privacy concerns, have in part delayed the availibility of
location APIs from telcos and from others including Google, et. al.
Intel has been widely praised for breaking a conceptual logjam. When it
became clearer that Microsoft was actually going to productize the
technology,  a lot of us expected that they would embrace the same
philosophy in their implementation. Instead, the published a privacy
disclaimer that, instead of reinforcing privacy  -equivocated- on
privacy,  despite the misleading and insincere introduction " your
privacy is important"

The good news is that I got a note, this morning from Microsoft [thanks
Nat] agreeing essentially and promising to revisit the policy and to
draft a new privacy statement to reflect a genuine emphasis on privacy
in the "location finder" service ofering.

-Mike






_______________________________________________
Geowanking mailing list
Geowanking at lists.burri.to
http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking


----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 14 04:03:37 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 13:03:37 +0100
Subject: EU gone fascist
Message-ID: <20051214120337.GQ2249@leitl.org>

Now it's official

	http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/67358 </kraut>

Having a working Tor network is now more vital than ever.
I've ordered a 10 MBit/s flat rate server, and will start working
on a private high-performance Tor network around turn of the year.

If you wish to collaborate, and I don't have your address yet,
drop me a line.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From stefan.kelm at secorvo.de  Wed Dec 14 05:42:51 2005
From: stefan.kelm at secorvo.de (Stefan Kelm)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 14:42:51 +0100
Subject: Deal on EU data retention law
Message-ID: <mailman.1444.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

[http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/expert/infopress_page/019-3536-348-12-50-902
-20051206IPR03225-14-12-2005-2005--false/default_en.htm]

Deal on EU data retention law

The European Parliament adopted today by 378 votes in favour, 197
against and 30 abstentions a directive on data retention in first
reading. The final text negotiated beforehand with the Council aims to
facilitate judicial co-operation in criminal matters by approximating
Member States' legislation on the retention of data processed by
telecommunications companies.

The directive covers traffic and location data generated by telephony,
SMS and internet, but not the content of the information communicated.

The new EU law will help national authorities to track down possible
criminals and terrorists by granting them access to a list of all
telephone calls, SMS or Internet connections made by suspects during the
previous few months.  The amendments finally adopted were a compromise
between the PES and EPP groups with the Council and differed in some key
points to the draft directive adopted initially by the Civil Liberties
Committee.  The GUE, Greens and UEN groups and some members from the
ALDE group voted against the directive in the final vote.  Alexander
Nuno ALVARO (ALDE, DE) was unhappy with the result of the compromise
adopted and withdrew his name as rapporteur.

Limited access to data

In the final text adopted, Parliament is proposing a number of
amendments to the Commission text to restrict the use of retained data
and ensure that the future law fully respects the privacy of the
telephone and internet users.

On the aim of the directive, MEPs agree with the need to retain data for
the detection, investigation and prosecution of crime, but only for
?specified forms? of serious criminal offences (terrorism and organised
crime), and not for the mere ?prevention? of all kinds of crime.  MEPs
feel that the concept of prevention is too vague and could lead to abuse
of the system from national authorities.

The directive will provide for data to be retained by the
telecommunications companies for a minimum of six months and a maximum
of 24.  MEPs also added a provision for ?effective, proportionate and
dissuasive? penal sanctions for companies who fail to store the data or
misuse the retained information.

Only the competent authorities determined by Member States should have
access to the retained data from phone or internet providers.
Furthermore, each national government will designate an independent
authority responsible for monitoring the use of the data.

MEPs also establish that access to retained data should be limited to
specific purpose and on a case by case basis (push system): each time,
the authorities would need to request to the telecom company that the
data related to a concrete suspect, instead of having granted access to
the whole database.

As for the type of data to be retained, MEPs finally supported the
registration of location data on calls, SMS and internet use, including
unsuccessful calls.  This point was controversial due to the fact that
telecom companies do not currently register lost calls for billing
purposes and so to do this using new technologies would be expensive.
Spanish MEPs strongly supported the Council position to include the
retention of unsuccessful calls, since the terrorist attacks in Madrid
were prosecuted thanks to the investigation of specific lost calls from
mobile phones.

Who foots the bill?

Finally, MEPs decided to delete the paragraph in which it was mandatory
for Member States to reimburse telecom companies for all additional
costs of retention, storage and transmission of data.  In the draft
directive adopted by the Civil Liberties Committee, MEPs had initially
called for the full reimbursement of costs.


-------------------------------------------------------
Stefan Kelm
Security Consultant

Secorvo Security Consulting GmbH
Ettlinger Strasse 12-14, D-76137 Karlsruhe

Tel. +49 721 255171-304, Fax +49 721 255171-100
stefan.kelm at secorvo.de, http://www.secorvo.de/
-------------------------------------------------------
PGP Fingerprint 87AE E858 CCBC C3A2 E633 D139 B0D9 212B

---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 14 08:20:03 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 17:20:03 +0100
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] E.U. Parliament votes to force
  "data retention" on telecom, Net firms [priv]]
Message-ID: <20051214162003.GA2249@leitl.org>

Just as well, I can spare writing up a blurb.

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From Gwheoa at optonline.com  Wed Dec 14 09:17:46 2005
From: Gwheoa at optonline.com (Whitney Benson)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 18:17:46 +0100
Subject: That idea...
Message-ID: <200512141729.jBEHT2I9028784@proton.jfet.org>

Sir/Madam,

Your primary homeloan meets the requirements for you to get generous gains.

Our service will connect you with the most expert company, so that you will have more cash in your account at the end of each month.

Its really that simple..

Tons of Americans are Re-Fi-Nancing their residences every day.

Now its your turn.

This quick 1 minute form will be your next step towards categorical financial security.

Hoping on the best for you all.

Whitney Benson




Should you want not to get hold of this opening offer any further say no more.
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From dave at farber.net  Wed Dec 14 16:23:40 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 19:23:40 -0500
Subject: [IP] Airport ID checks legally enforced?
Message-ID: <mailman.1445.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 14 10:47:01 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 19:47:01 +0100
Subject: [mnl@well.com: [Geowanking] new Microsoft privacy policy?]
Message-ID: <20051214184701.GK2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Mike Liebhold <mnl at well.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 14 11:13:07 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 20:13:07 +0100
Subject: [stefan.kelm@secorvo.de: Deal on EU data retention law]
Message-ID: <20051214191306.GN2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Stefan Kelm <stefan.kelm at secorvo.de> -----


From arma at mit.edu  Wed Dec 14 23:35:06 2005
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 02:35:06 -0500
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] E.U. Parliament votes to force "data
Message-ID: <mailman.1446.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

retention" on telecom, Net firms [priv]]
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
Reply-To: or-talk at freehaven.net

On Thu, Dec 15, 2005 at 01:20:19AM -0500, Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote:
> On Wednesday 14 December 2005 08:00 pm, nile wrote:
> > Correct me if I'm mistaken, but I believe the laws do not require
> > holding onto the content of the call/data, just the routing information
> > or phone numbers. If so, it's interesting to note that that's exactly
> > what Tor is for - defeating _traffic_ analysis.
>
> It seems to me that traffic analysis is the one major thing Tor is
susceptible
> to. Being a real time, the Tor network can be compromised by someone who has
> the ability to colate ingress and egress traffic, and this legislation gives
> the "EU" the ability to sit back and examine an entire regional network at
> its leisure.
[snip]
> Prior to this "broad" loggin being in place it would have been necessary for
> Johnny Law to have some prior knowledge. They'd have to suspect Joe, and
then
> invest the time and resources in logging both Joe and the blog site. Now,
> they can simply sift through the already collected data looking for people
> who use Tor connections at the same time the blog is accessed.

Alas, I think Jeffrey has it right. Tor aims to provide protection in
a scenario where the adversary cannot observe the whole network (or
a substantial piece of it). The EU data retention directives directly
threaten the security that the current Tor design can provide.

There are some anonymity designs that aim to provide protection against
this strong level of adversary -- see e.g. http://mixminion.net/ --
but they carry unacceptably high latency for Tor-style connections.

As I understand it we're still a ways off from understanding exactly
what laws will be passed in each country, and only a while after that
will we start to understand what each law will mean. It may turn out
to be impractical (or illegal) to put out a blanket query to every ISP
in Europe saying "please tell me all users who connected to any of the
following 1000 IP addresses in this 10 second period".

But even so, once we have a sense of what sorts of attacks are likely,
we can also start looking at some specialized padding techniques for
Tor users to blend together better without paying too high a price in
overhead. The goal is not to beat arbitrary statistical attacks, but
to increase false positives (and maybe false negatives) with respect to
specific attacks.

We may also be able to take advantage of the fact that these adversaries
are only partial attackers: even in the best attacks they can only
observe perhaps half the network. We may be able to arrange things to
increase the doubt in their findings -- though as Jeffrey points out,
a patient attacker will use statistics to become increasingly convinced
that he has found his target.

It really is a shame that Europe has chosen to cripple the security of
its citizens and companies in this way. The bad people will continue to
break laws and not get caught by this (breaking into computers around the
world and using them as stepping stones, using open wireless networks,
using botnets, you name it), and honest people and organizations in Europe
will always be wondering who has broken into their ISP and grabbed their
traffic data -- for espionage, for advertising purposes, for stalking,
for who knows.

This is reminiscent of the U.S.'s earlier crypto export fiasco, when they
chose to undermine their position as the world leader in cryptography,
as well as ensure that the good guys were vulnerable while the bad guys
were safe. I wonder how this one will turn out.

--Roger

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From matej.kovacic at owca.info  Wed Dec 14 23:02:33 2005
From: matej.kovacic at owca.info (Matej Kovacic)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 08:02:33 +0100
Subject: Data retention in Europe
Message-ID: <mailman.1447.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi,

> or phone numbers. If so, it's interesting to note that that's exactly
> what Tor is for - defeating _traffic_ analysis.

Since I live in Europe, just a short explanation of this.

Yes, it is about traffic data and not content. So Tor is a good solution
to this.

But there are some other problems as well.

In US there was a case Smith v. Maryland (Smith v. Maryland, 242 U.S.
735 (1979).), which diferentiates between content of communication and
traffic data. However, there is State v. Hunt decision (State v. Hunt,
91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).), which says individual can expect
privacy in traffic data also.

But European Court of Human Rights in 1984 (interesting date :-D) in
their Malone v. Great Britain decision clearly stated that traffic data
are integral part of communication.

There are some legal opinions that data retention won't go through so
called triple principle test. This test requires that regulation must be
a) legal (prescribed by law, law must be accesible to the public) b)
necessary in democratic society for the pursuit of a legitimate aim and
c) proportionate to the aim pursued.

It is also important to know, that European Court of Human Rights
critisized so called blanket measures in other decisions as well. So -
if there is no suspicion, individual should not be put under
surveillance. But data retention is that - surveillance and secret
tracking without prior suspicion.


The other interesting thing is that this directive was prepared and
adopted in very short time. How that?
It is likely that some strong lobby was behind direkctive. However, this
idea of extended surveilalnce is not new and is NOT the consequence of
antiterrorism measures. There are some documents from 1993 which show
that extension of surveillance and harmonisation of this area is not new
in Europe (see Interception of communications, report to COREPER,
ENFOPOL 40, 10090/93, Confidential, Brussels, 16.11.93, published on
Statewatch website in 1997). Terrorism is not the reason for this.

BTW: one of the latest proposals (I thik this version was also adopted)
said retention of data applies to ISP's only. No cybercaffes and public
places included.
The question is what are you doing in cybercaffe and wha in your home.
In cybercaffe you are surfing, posting on forums and checking your mail.
But you are not using P2P applications. P2P applications you are using
at your home.

So which lobby is behind directive?
Actually, there is only one lobby strong enough. This is the lobby of
anti-piracy groups and industry.

It is important to know, that first directive proposals stated that
retention is necessariy for fight against terrorism. But then they
started to talk about "serious criminal offences". What are they?
They are offences, which fall under European arrest warant. The warrant
applies in the following cases: a) where a final sentence of
imprisonment or a detention order has been imposed for a period of at
least four months or b) for offences punishable by imprisonment or a
detention order for a maximum period of at least one year.

Piracy and filesharing fall under European arrest warrant in some
european legislations. OK, it is true, that European arrest warrant is
in "crisis" since German constitutional court rejected it, but note
this: "no limitation to certain types of crimes for which access is
allowed".

Slovenian Ministry of justice (I live in Slovenia) declared they support
data retention for all crimes which should be prosecuted officially.

So next step will be fighting this directive in constitutional courts
and finally on the ECHR.

Meantime we should propagate using Tor.


bye, Matej

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 14 23:48:37 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 08:48:37 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Airport ID checks legally enforced?]
Message-ID: <20051215074837.GZ2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 15 00:12:27 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 09:12:27 +0100
Subject: [matej.kovacic@owca.info: Data retention in Europe]
Message-ID: <20051215081227.GK2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Matej Kovacic <matej.kovacic at owca.info> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 15 00:13:10 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 09:13:10 +0100
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Re: [declan@well.com: [Politech] E.U. Parliament
  votes to force "data retention" on telecom, Net firms [priv]]]
Message-ID: <20051215081310.GL2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From jbloss at tampabay.rr.com  Thu Dec 15 10:00:16 2005
From: jbloss at tampabay.rr.com (Jeffrey F. Bloss)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 13:00:16 -0500
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] E.U. Parliament votes to force "data
Message-ID: <mailman.1448.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

retention" on telecom, Net firms [priv]]
User-Agent: KMail/1.7
Reply-To: or-talk at freehaven.net

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On Thursday 15 December 2005 02:49 am, David Benfell wrote:
> On Thu, 15 Dec 2005 01:20:19 -0500, Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote:
>
> > With this new logging in place XYZ might be able to force law enforcement
> > to perform a simple query of the data to discover exactly who is posting
> > the information. It's a simple (?) matter of searching for connection
> > times to the blog, and comparing them to times that "Joe" makes
> > connections to a Tor node. If Joe builds a new circuit at 2PM and the
> > blog is updated at 2:00:01 PM, and this relationship can be demonstrated
> > for some period of time, it's pretty clear that it won't take 6 months of
> > data to prove beyond any reasonable doubt Joe is the blog owner.
>
> Suppose the blog is hosted outside Europe, and the blog software
> introduces a random delay before actually posting Joe's entry?

Sure, anything that removes influence or power from an "attacker" is a
generally good thing, but...

Jurisdictional borders aren't the panacea they use to be, if they ever really
were. Treaties and agreements between nations can make collecting information
from foreign sources a matter of an attorney filing the proper form in
triplicate. In some number of places that depends completely on specific laws
governing each jurisdiction, this is even an advantage for some attackers
because getting around local laws and/or security is more difficult than
simply asking a foreign official to collect the information for you.

There's a depressingly increasing number of jurisdictions where some appointed
official can walk through the door and confiscate, log, back door, etc any
system on nothing more than a whim. It's theorized that this is why things
like ECHELON were deployed outside US borders... to circumvent requirements
like showing cause and obtaining warrants.

This isn't to say that there's no jurisdictions that might make you safer,
just that they're few, far between, and not near as safe as they once were.
In fact, I don't believe mandatory logging is anything new even within EU
Member Nations. I believe for some of them this is a step backwards if
they're somehow restricted to the 6/12 month and "connection only" logging
dictated by this new policy. The *real* threat is in the organization and
broad scope of the thing. It will effectively transform all of Europe and
then some, into one big surveillance tool. :(

Anyway, the latency thing probably wouldn't make much difference at all
either. It might fool a casual observer who is assessing the published
content, but with these sweeping logging requirements there's no need to wait
for the page to change when you hit the [refresh] button. ;-) The blog owner
logging in to make the changes is what's being automagically logged, or what
can be "force" logged from outside a jurisdiction. And half the puzzle is
already relatively trivial to solve due to the forced connection logging. You
have to assume that an attacker will absolutely know either the origin, or
the destination of every packet, and have the ability to do what they will
with that data.

It's also important to note that blogging was just an out-of-thin-air example,
and other types of communications can't be subject to any similar sort of
latency.

That's my semi-literate layperson's take on things. This EU logging policy is
a problem of great concern as I see it. In theory at least, it could make Tor
and any other similar distributed "anonymous" network completely and utterly
useless for serious users in that jurisdiction, and far less secure for
people who cross those jurisdictional lines in either direction.

- --
Hand crafted on December 15, 2005 at 12:09:56 -0500

Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend.
Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read.
                                  -Groucho Marx
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 15 05:07:26 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 14:07:26 +0100
Subject: fritz chip on the internets
Message-ID: <20051215130726.GT2249@leitl.org>

Let.s see some ID, please

The end of anonymity on the Internet?

By Michael Rogers

Special to MSNBC
Updated: 7:53 a.m. ET Dec. 13, 2005

As the joke goes, on the Internet nobody knows you.re a dog. But although
anonymity has been part of Internet culture since the first browser, it.s also
a major obstacle to making the Web a safe place to conduct business: Internet
fraud and identity theft cost consumers and merchants several billion dollars
last year. And many of the other more troubling aspects of the Internet, from
spam emails to sexual predators, also have their roots in the ease of masking
one.s identity in the online world.

Change, however, is on the way. Already over 20 million PCs worldwide are
equipped with a tiny security chip called the Trusted Platform Module,
although it is as yet rarely activated. But once merchants and other online
services begin to use it, the TPM will do something never before seen on the
Internet: provide virtually fool-proof verification that you are who you say
you are.

Some critics say that the chip will change the free-wheeling Web into a police
state, while others argue that it.s needed to create a safe public space.  But
the train has already left the station: by the end of this decade, a TPM will
almost certainly be part of your desktop, laptop and even cell phone.

The TPM chip was created by a coalition of over one hundred hardware and
software companies, led by AMD, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Microsoft and Sun. The
chip permanently assigns a unique and permanent identifier to every computer
before it leaves the factory and that identifier can.t subsequently be
changed. It also checks the software running on the computer to make sure it
hasn.t been altered to act malevolently when it connects to other machines:
that it can, in short, be trusted. For now, TPM-equipped computers are
primarily sold to big corporations for securing their networks, but starting
next year TPMs will be installed in many consumer models as well.

With a TPM onboard, each time your computer starts, you prove your identity to
the machine using something as simple as a PIN number or, preferably, a more
secure system such as a fingerprint reader. Then if your bank has TPM
software, when you log into their Web site, the bank.s site also .reads. the
TPM chip in your computer to determine that it.s really you. Thus, even if
someone steals your username and password, they won.t be able to get into your
account unless they also use your computer and log in with your fingerprint.
(In fact, with TPM, your bank wouldn.t even need to ask for your username and
password . it would know you simply by the identification on your machine.)

The same would go for online merchants . once you.d registered yourself and
your computer with an Amazon or an e-Bay, they.d simply look for the TPM on
your machine to confirm it.s you at the other end. (Of course you could always
.fool. the system by starting your computer with your unique PIN or
fingerprint and then letting another person use it, but that.s a choice
similar to giving someone else your credit card.)

Another plus for the TPM is that your computer will be able to make sure that
it.s really a legitimate e-commerce site you.re connected to, and not some
phishing-style fraud. There would still, of course, be ways that you could
access your bank or e-commerce accounts from other computers when you were
traveling, but the connection wouldn.t be as secure as using your own
computer. Plans are already underway to put TPMs into smartphones and other
portable devices as well.

The TPM will become even more important as we move toward Web-based
applications, where we may actually store our documents and files on remote
servers. The TPM could automatically encrypt any files as soon as they left
your computer, and only allow decryption privileges to your TPM and any others
you might specify. It could automatically encrypt email as well, so that only
specific recipients are able to read it. And it could more firmly identify
where email originates, taking a big step forward in controlling spam at the
source.

That is the potential good news. But some critics are worried that the TPM is
a step too far.  Their concern particularly revolves around using the TPM to
control .digital rights management. . that is, what you can and cannot do with
the music, movies and software you run on your computer.

A movie, for example, would be able to look at the TPM and know whether it was
legally licensed to run on that machine, whether it could be copied or sent to
others, or whether it was supposed to self-destruct after three viewings. If
you tried to do something with the movie that wasn.t allowed in the license,
your computer simply wouldn.t cooperate.

The same would go for software. Now that Apple is moving to Intel processors,
Mac fans are watching closely to see if the new machines will incorporate
TPMs. That may be the way that Apple makes sure that its Macintosh operating
system only runs on Apple computers . otherwise, hackers will probably be
quick to figure out ways to make the new Intel-based Macintosh software run on
HP or Dell machines as well. Similar concerns arise around how Microsoft might
make use of TPM to insure that its software is used only on machines with
paid-up licenses (as one joke has it: .TPM is Bill Gates. way of finally
getting the Chinese to pay for software..)

Ultimately the TPM itself isn.t inherently evil or good.  It will depend
entirely on how it.s used, and in that sphere, market and political forces
will be more important than technology.  Users will still control how much of
their identity they wish to reveal . in fact, for complex technical reasons,
the TPM will actually also make truly anonymous connections possible, if
that.s what both ends of the conversation agree on.  And should a media or
software company come up with overly Draconian restrictions on how its movies
or music or programs can be used, consumers will go elsewhere.  (Or worse:
Sony overstepped with the DRM on its music CDs recently and is now the target
of a dozen or so lawsuits, including ones filed by California and New York.)

To future historians, the anonymity we.ve experienced in the first decade of
the commercial Internet may in retrospect seem aberrant.  In the real world,
after all, we carry multiple forms of fixed identification, ranging from our
faces and fingerprints to drivers. licenses and social security numbers.  Some
of these are easier to counterfeit than others, but generally most of us are
more comfortable when we can prove who we are.  In some situations . driving
cars, boarding aircraft . we.re required to have identification.  Of course,
our real world policies on identification . what kind we must have, when we
need to display it . have evolved over centuries of social and political
thought and is still, post 9/11, a national hot-button.  With the arrival of
the Trusted Computing Module, the argument will now extend to cyberspace as
well.
) 2005 MSNBC Interactive

) 2005 MSNBC.com

URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ID/10441443/

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 15 10:08:58 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 19:08:58 +0100
Subject: [jbloss@tampabay.rr.com: Re: [declan@well.com: [Politech] E.U.
  Parliament votes to force "data retention" on telecom, Net firms
  [priv]]]
Message-ID: <20051215180858.GQ2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from "Jeffrey F. Bloss" <jbloss at tampabay.rr.com>
-----


From jay.listo at gmail.com  Thu Dec 15 07:48:14 2005
From: jay.listo at gmail.com (Jay Listo)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 22:48:14 +0700
Subject: EU gone fascist
In-Reply-To: <43A030E8.4060405@rant-central.com>
References: <20051214120337.GQ2249@leitl.org>
  <43A030E8.4060405@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <43A1903E.5010309@gmail.com>

For non-deutsch readers...

http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/14/business/data.php


Roy M. Silvernail wrote:

>Eugen Leitl wrote:
>
>  
>
>>Now it's official
>>
>>	http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/67358 </kraut>
>>
>>Having a working Tor network is now more vital than ever.
>>I've ordered a 10 MBit/s flat rate server, and will start working
>>on a private high-performance Tor network around turn of the year.
>> 
>>
>>    
>>
>That page makes the fish crap.  How about an executive summary for the
>kraut-impaired?




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 15 21:11:50 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2005 00:11:50 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on Spying in U.S.
  After   9/11, Officials Say
Message-ID: <p062309a0bfc7fce39bc9@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2005 00:10:31 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on Spying in U.S. After
  9/11, Officials Say
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/15/politics/15cnd-program.html?ei=5065&en=80681ada74c04ce9&ex=1135314000&partner=MYWAY&pagewanted=print>

 The New York Times


 December 15, 2005

 Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on Spying in U.S. After 9/11, Officials Say
 By JAMES RISEN
  and ERIC LICHTBLAU


  WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 - Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush
 secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans
 and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist
 activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for
 domestic spying, according to government officials.

  Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has
 monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail
 messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States
 without warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible
 "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda, the officials said. The agency, they
 said, still seeks warrants to monitor entirely domestic communications.

  The previously undisclosed decision to permit some eavesdropping inside
 the country without court approval represents a major shift in American
 intelligence-gathering practices, particularly for the National Security
 Agency, whose mission is to spy on communications abroad. As a result, some
 officials familiar with the continuing operation have questioned whether
 the surveillance has stretched, if not crossed, constitutional limits on
 legal searches.

  "This is really a sea change," said a former senior official who
 specializes in national security law. "It's almost a mainstay of this
 country that the N.S.A. only does foreign searches."

  Nearly a dozen current and former officials, who were granted anonymity
 because of the classified nature of the program, discussed it with
 reporters for The New York Times because of their concerns about the
 operation's legality and oversight.

  According to those officials and others, reservations about aspects of the
 program have also been expressed by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, the
 West Virginia Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence
 Committee, and a judge presiding over a secret court that oversees
 intelligence matters. Some of the questions about the agency's new powers
 led the administration to temporarily suspend the operation last year and
 impose more restrictions, the officials said.

  The Bush administration views the operation as necessary so that the
 agency can move quickly to monitor communications that may disclose threats
 to this country, the officials said. Defenders of the program say it has
 been a critical tool in helping disrupt terrorist plots and prevent attacks
 inside the United States.

  Administration officials are confident that existing safeguards are
 sufficient to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, the
 officials say. In some cases, they said, the Justice Department eventually
 seeks warrants if it wants to expand the eavesdropping to include
 communications confined within the United States. The officials said the
 administration had briefed Congressional leaders about the program and
 notified the judge in charge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
 Court, the secret Washington court that deals with national security issues.

  The White House asked The New York Times not to publish this article,
 arguing that it could jeopardize continuing investigations and alert
 would-be terrorists that they might be under scrutiny. After meeting with
 senior administration officials to hear their concerns, the newspaper
 delayed publication for a year to conduct additional reporting. Some
 information that administration officials argued could be useful to
 terrorists has been omitted.

  While many details about the program remain secret, officials familiar
 with it said the N.S.A. eavesdropped without warrants on up to 500 people
 in the United States at any given time. The list changes as some names are
 added and others dropped, so the number monitored in this country may have
 reached into the thousands over the past three years, several officials
 said. Overseas, about 5,000 to 7,000 people suspected of terrorist ties are
 monitored at one time, according to those officials.

  Several officials said the eavesdropping program had helped uncover a plot
 by Iyman Faris, an Ohio trucker and naturalized citizen who pleaded guilty
 in 2003 to supporting Al Qaeda by planning to bring down the Brooklyn
 Bridge with blowtorches. What appeared to be another Qaeda plot, involving
 fertilizer bomb attacks on British pubs and train stations, was exposed
 last year in part through the program, the officials said. But they said
 most people targeted for N.S.A. monitoring have never been charged with a
 crime, including an Iranian-American doctor in the South who came under
 suspicion because of what one official described as dubious ties to Osama
 bin Laden.

 Dealing With a New Threat

  The eavesdropping program grew out of concerns after the Sept. 11 attacks
 that the nation's intelligence agencies were not poised to deal effectively
 with the new threat of Al Qaeda and that they were handcuffed by legal and
 bureaucratic restrictions better suited to peacetime than war, according to
 officials. In response, President Bush significantly eased limits on
 American intelligence and law enforcement agencies and the military.

  But some of the administration's antiterrorism initiatives have provoked
 an outcry from members of Congress, watchdog groups, immigrants and others
 who argue that the measures erode protections for civil liberties and
 intrude on Americans' privacy. Opponents have challenged provisions of the
 USA Patriot Act, the focus of contentious debate on Capitol Hill this week,
 that expand domestic surveillance by giving the Federal Bureau of
 Investigation more power to collect information like library lending lists
 or Internet use. Military and F.B.I. officials have drawn criticism for
 monitoring what were largely peaceful antiwar protests. The Pentagon and
 the Department of Homeland Security were forced to retreat on plans to use
 public and private databases to hunt for possible terrorists. And last
 year, the Supreme Court rejected the administration's claim that those
 labeled "enemy combatants" were not entitled to judicial review of their
 open-ended detention.

  Mr. Bush's executive order allowing some warrantless eavesdropping on
 those inside the United States  including American citizens, permanent
 legal residents, tourists and other foreigners  is based on classified
 legal opinions that assert that the president has broad powers to order
 such searches, derived in part from the September 2001 Congressional
 resolution authorizing him to wage war on Al Qaeda and other terrorist
 groups, according to the officials familiar with the N.S.A. operation.

  The National Security Agency, which is based at Fort Meade, Md., is the
 nation's largest and most secretive intelligence agency, so intent on
 remaining out of public view that it has long been nicknamed "No Such
 Agency.'' It breaks codes and maintains listening posts around the world to
 eavesdrop on foreign governments, diplomats and trade negotiators as well
 as drug lords and terrorists. But the agency ordinarily operates under
 tight restrictions on any spying on Americans, even if they are overseas,
 or disseminating information about them.

  What the agency calls a "special collection program" began soon after the
 Sept. 11 attacks, as it looked for new tools to attack terrorism. The
 program accelerated in early 2002 after the Central Intelligence Agency
 started capturing top Qaeda operatives overseas, including Abu Zubaydah,
 who was arrested in Pakistan in March 2002. The C.I.A. seized the
 terrorists' computers, cellphones and personal phone directories, said the
 officials familiar with the program. The N.S.A. surveillance was intended
 to exploit those numbers and addresses as quickly as possible, the
 officials said.

  In addition to eavesdropping on those numbers and reading e-mail messages
 to and from the Qaeda figures, the N.S.A. began monitoring others linked to
 them, creating an expanding chain. While most of the numbers and addresses
 were overseas, hundreds were in the United States, the officials said.

  Under the agency's longstanding rules, the N.S.A. can target for
 interception phone calls or e-mail messages on foreign soil, even if the
 recipients of those communications are in the United States. Usually,
 though, the government can only target phones and e-mail messages in this
 country by first obtaining a court order from the Foreign Intelligence
 Surveillance Court, which holds its closed sessions at the Justice
 Department.

  Traditionally, the F.B.I., not the N.S.A., seeks such warrants and
 conducts most domestic eavesdropping. Until the new program began, the
 N.S.A. typically limited its domestic surveillance to foreign embassies and
 missions in Washington, New York and other cities, and obtained court
 orders to do so.

  Since 2002, the agency has been conducting some warrantless eavesdropping
 on people in the United States who are linked, even if indirectly, to
 suspected terrorists through the chain of phone numbers and e-mail
 addresses, according to several officials who know of the operation. Under
 the special program, the agency monitors their international
 communications, the officials said. The agency, for example, can target
 phone calls from someone in New York to someone in Afghanistan.

  Warrants are still required for eavesdropping on entirely
 domestic-to-domestic communications, those officials say, meaning that
 calls from that New Yorker to someone in California could not be monitored
 without first going to the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court.

 A White House Briefing

  After the special program started, Congressional leaders from both
 political parties were brought to Vice President Dick Cheney's office in
 the White House. The leaders, who included the chairmen and ranking members
 of the Senate and House intelligence committees, learned of the N.S.A.
 operation from Mr. Cheney, Gen. Michael V. Hayden of the Air Force, who was
 then the agency's director and is now the principal deputy director of
 national intelligence, and George J. Tenet, then the director of the
 C.I.A., officials said.

  It is not clear how much the members of Congress were told about the
 presidential order and the eavesdropping program. Some of them declined to
 comment about the matter, while others did not return phone calls.

  Later briefings were held for members of Congress as they assumed
 leadership roles on the intelligence committees, officials familiar with
 the program said. After a 2003 briefing, Senator Rockefeller, the West
 Virginia Democrat who became vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence
 Committee that year, wrote a letter to Mr. Cheney expressing concerns about
 the program, officials knowledgeable about the letter said. It could not be
 determined if he received a reply. Mr. Rockefeller declined to comment.
 Aside from the Congressional leaders, only a small group of people,
 including several cabinet members and officials at the N.S.A., the C.I.A.
 and the Justice Department, know of the program.

  Some officials familiar with it say they consider warrantless
 eavesdropping inside the United States to be unlawful and possibly
 unconstitutional, amounting to an improper search. One government official
 involved in the operation said he privately complained to a Congressional
 official about his doubts about the legality of the program. But nothing
 came of his inquiry. "People just looked the other way because they didn't
 want to know what was going on," he said.

  A senior government official recalled that he was taken aback when he
 first learned of the operation. "My first reaction was, 'We're doing what?'
 " he said. While he said he eventually felt that adequate safeguards were
 put in place, he added that questions about the program's legitimacy were
 understandable.

  Some of those who object to the operation argue that is unnecessary. By
 getting warrants through the foreign intelligence court, the N.S.A. and
 F.B.I. could eavesdrop on people inside the United States who might be tied
 to terrorist groups without skirting longstanding rules, they say.

  The standard of proof required to obtain a warrant from the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Court is generally considered lower than that
 required for a criminal warrant  intelligence officials only have to show
 probable cause that someone may be "an agent of a foreign power," which
 includes international terrorist groups  and the secret court has turned
 down only a small number of requests over the years. In 2004, according to
 the Justice Department, 1,754 warrants were approved. And the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Court can grant emergency approval for wiretaps
 within hours, officials say.

  Administration officials counter that they sometimes need to move more
 urgently, the officials said. Those involved in the program also said that
 the N.S.A.'s eavesdroppers might need to start monitoring large batches of
 numbers all at once, and that it would be impractical to seek permission
 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court first, according to the
 officials.

 Culture of Caution and Rules

  The N.S.A. domestic spying operation has stirred such controversy among
 some national security officials in part because of the agency's cautious
 culture and longstanding rules.

  Widespread abuses  including eavesdropping on Vietnam War protesters and
 civil rights activists  by American intelligence agencies became public in
 the 1970's and led to passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
 which imposed strict limits on intelligence gathering on American soil.
 Among other things, the law required search warrants, approved by the
 secret F.I.S.A. court, for wiretaps in national security cases. The agency,
 deeply scarred by the scandals, adopted additional rules that all but ended
 domestic spying on its part.

  After the Sept. 11 attacks, though, the United States intelligence
 community was criticized for being too risk-averse. The National Security
 Agency was even cited by the independent 9/11 Commission for adhering to
 self-imposed rules that were stricter than those set by federal law.

  Several senior government officials say that when the special operation
 first began, there were few controls on it and little formal oversight
 outside the N.S.A. The agency can choose its eavesdropping targets and does
 not have to seek approval from Justice Department or other Bush
 administration officials. Some agency officials wanted nothing to do with
 the program, apparently fearful of participating in an illegal operation, a
 former senior Bush administration official said. Before the 2004 election,
 the official said, some N.S.A. personnel worried that the program might
 come under scrutiny by Congressional or criminal investigators if Senator
 John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, was elected president.

  In mid-2004, concerns about the program expressed by national security
 officials, government lawyers and a judge prompted the Bush administration
 to suspend elements of the program and revamp it.

  For the first time, the Justice Department audited the N.S.A. program,
 several officials said. And to provide more guidance, the Justice
 Department and the agency expanded and refined a checklist to follow in
 deciding whether probable cause existed to start monitoring someone's
 communications, several officials said.

  A complaint from Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, the federal judge who
 oversees the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court, helped spur the
 suspension, officials said. The judge questioned whether information
 obtained under the N.S.A. program was being improperly used as the basis
 for F.I.S.A. wiretap warrant requests from the Justice Department,
 according to senior government officials. While not knowing all the details
 of the exchange, several government lawyers said there appeared to be
 concerns that the Justice Department, by trying to shield the existence of
 the N.S.A. program, was in danger of misleading the court about the origins
 of the information cited to justify the warrants.

  One official familiar with the episode said the judge insisted to Justice
 Department lawyers at one point that any material gathered under the
 special N.S.A. program not be used in seeking wiretap warrants from her
 court. Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not return calls for comment.

  A related issue arose in a case in which the F.B.I. was monitoring the
 communications of a terrorist suspect under a F.I.S.A.-approved warrant,
 even though the National Security Agency was already conducting warrantless
 eavesdropping. According to officials, F.B.I. surveillance of Mr. Faris,
 the Brooklyn Bridge plotter, was dropped for a short time because of
 technical problems. At the time, senior Justice Department officials
 worried what would happen if the N.S.A. picked up information that needed
 to be presented in court. The government would then either have to disclose
 the N.S.A. program or mislead a criminal court about how it had gotten the
 information.

 The Civil Liberties Question

  Several national security officials say the powers granted the N.S.A. by
 President Bush go far beyond the expanded counterterrorism powers granted
 by Congress under the USA Patriot Act, which is up for renewal. The House
 on Wednesday approved a plan to reauthorize crucial parts of the law. But
 final passage has been delayed under the threat of a Senate filibuster
 because of concerns from both parties over possible intrusions on
 Americans' civil liberties and privacy.

  Under the act, law enforcement and intelligence officials are still
 required to seek a F.I.S.A. warrant every time they want to eavesdrop
 within the United States. A recent agreement reached by Republican leaders
 and the Bush administration would modify the standard for F.B.I. wiretap
 warrants, requiring, for instance, a description of a specific target.
 Critics say the bar would remain too low to prevent abuses.

  Bush administration officials argue that the civil liberties concerns are
 unfounded, and they say pointedly that the Patriot Act has not freed the
 N.S.A. to target Americans. "Nothing could be further from the truth,"
 wrote John Yoo, a former official in the Justice Department's Office of
 Legal Counsel, and his co-author in a Wall Street Journal opinion article
 in December 2003. Mr. Yoo worked on a classified legal opinion on the
 N.S.A.'s domestic eavesdropping program.

  At an April hearing on the Patriot Act renewal, Senator Barbara A.
 Mikulski, Democrat of Maryland, asked Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
 and Robert S. Mueller III, the director of the F.B.I., "Can the National
 Security Agency, the great electronic snooper, spy on the American people?"

  "Generally," Mr. Mueller said, "I would say generally, they are not
 allowed to spy or to gather information on American citizens." President
 Bush did not ask Congress to include provisions for the N.S.A. domestic
 surveillance program as part of the Patriot Act and has not sought any
 other laws to authorize the operation. Bush administration lawyers argued
 that such new laws were unnecessary, because they believed that the
 Congressional resolution on the campaign against terrorism provided ample
 authorization, officials said.

  Seeking Congressional approval was also viewed as politically risky
 because the proposal would be certain to face intense opposition on civil
 liberties grounds. The administration also feared that by publicly
 disclosing the existence of the operation, its usefulness in tracking
 terrorists would end, officials said.

  The legal opinions that support the N.S.A. operation remain classified,
 but they appear to have followed private discussions among senior
 administration lawyers and other officials about the need to pursue
 aggressive strategies that once may have been seen as crossing a legal
 line, according to senior officials who participated in the discussions.

  For example, just days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York and
 the Pentagon, Mr. Yoo, the Justice Department lawyer, wrote an internal
 memorandum that argued that the government might use "electronic
 surveillance techniques and equipment that are more powerful and
 sophisticated than those available to law enforcement agencies in order to
 intercept telephonic communications and observe the movement of persons but
 without obtaining warrants for such uses."

  Mr. Yoo noted that while such actions could raise constitutional issues,
 in the face of devastating terrorist attacks "the government may be
 justified in taking measures which in less troubled conditions could be
 seen as infringements of individual liberties."

  The next year, Justice Department lawyers disclosed their thinking on the
 issue of warrantless wiretaps in national security cases in a
 little-noticed brief in an unrelated court case. In that 2002 brief, the
 government said that "the Constitution vests in the President inherent
 authority to conduct warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or
 otherwise) of foreign powers or their agents, and Congress cannot by
 statute extinguish that constitutional authority."

  Administration officials were also encouraged by a November 2002 appeals
 court decision in an unrelated matter. The decision by the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which sided with the
 administration in dismantling a bureaucratic "wall" limiting cooperation
 between prosecutors and intelligence officers, noted "the president's
 inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless foreign
 intelligence surveillance."

  But the same court suggested that national security interests should not
 be grounds "to jettison the Fourth Amendment requirements" protecting the
 rights of Americans against undue searches. The dividing line, the court
 acknowledged, "is a very difficult one to administer."

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




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From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Fri Dec 16 04:41:21 2005
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: December 16, 2005 4:41:21 PM EST
Subject: [IP] more on Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts
Message-ID: <mailman.1449.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Neil Munro missed the basic trick that the Bush Administration has
done here.

Because of extensive previous abuse, Congress banned the NSA and CIA
from
spying on Americans - they're limited to spying on foreigners,
while the FBI and other law enforcement agencies are the only ones
who can normally spy on Americans and are subject to Constitutional
requirements,
like getting warrants for specific searches.
The Patriot Act and CALEA let the FBI expand their powers significantly,
with tools such as roving wiretaps,
but there's still some semblance of court supervision.

To accommodate problems like foreign spies talking to Americans,
the FISA courts are a court system that operates in secrecy and
can issue warrants based on classified information,
which allow the intelligence agencies to do specific kinds of spying
and wiretapping within the US.  In theory, this provides some kind of
independent Constitutional adult supervision; in practice it's a
rubber stamp,
and the only case in which they're publicly known to have refused a
request
was in the Wen Ho Lee witchhunt after it had become political.

What the Bush Administration has changed is get its lawyers to say that
the post-9/11 resolutions let them avoid even this level of supervision,
letting the NSA wiretap inside the US without any warrants at all,
and as far as I can tell from the NYT article, without notifying the
FISA courts after they've started to keep records and possibly be
ordered
to turn the wiretap back off if the court disagreed with them.
If this were simply a matter of speed, because half a day's delay in
getting a warrant approved would interfere with their work,
they could do that much - this is a major change in character.
It's shameful that the New York Times sat on the story for a year -
and if this were a legitimate activity, the Bush Administration wouldn't
have pressured them into suppressing it that long.

In separate news, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10454316/ ,
NBC reports that the Defense Department is back to spying on Americans,
specifically anti-war groups and campaigns against military recruiting,
especially suspicious groups associating with Quakers.
They got busted for this back during the Vietnam war,
and were supposed to have stopped,
but they're doing it again in ways that appear to be
violating the rules for data collection that were imposed on them
and are clearly inappropriate in a free society.

And the EU just voted to impose extensive data collection and retention
requirements on ISPs and telcos, in ways that negate many previous
European data privacy laws, as yet another reminder that
when civil rights are protected by laws, that's only good until
the laws are changed or the government starts disobeying them.

It's time to get PGP working again  (originally written for
anti-nuclear groups who were being surveilled),
give some more money to the EFF, get back to Quaker Meeting,
and find ways to replace an Administration that thinks the
Constitution is "just a goddamned piece of paper."

		Bill Stewart.


------------
From: "Munro, Neil" <NMunro at nationaljournal.com>
Date: December 16, 2005 1:34:26 PM EST
To: dave at farber.net
Subject: RE: [IP] Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts >:o >:o


Do please read the 42nd paragraph of the NYT story;

".....law enforcement and intelligence officials are still required to
seek a F.I.S.A. warrant every time they want to eavesdrop within the
United States. A recent agreement reached by Republican leaders and the
Bush administration would modify the standard for F.B.I. wiretap
warrants, requiring, for instance, a description of a specific target.
Critics say the bar would remain too low to prevent abuses."

So, as far as I can see, what's being targeted are international calls
to or from known foreign terrorists (that are not yet covered by US
civil rights laws) that mention, begin or end at U.S. persons.

The CIA/FBI intelligence-take would drop if they had to get a judge's
approval every time an AL-Q guy called up a new number for a brief phone
call in the US. If this was the norm, then traditional eavesdropping on
Atta would have been very unlikely, as he would have been able to use
different street phones every time he called home. If voters want to
accept that trade-off, Congress will give it to them.
[....]



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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From peter at redesignresearch.com  Fri Dec 16 05:38:11 2005
From: peter at redesignresearch.com (Peter Jones)
Date: December 16, 2005 5:38:11 PM EST
Subject: Diebold easily hacked
Message-ID: <mailman.1450.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Dave - For IP, in case you had not seen this yet. The punchline:
Secretary
of State says the issue is between the election supervisor and Diebold.
Apparently, hackable voting machines are not sufficient cause for
concern to
Florida's sterling electoral system.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-12-15-opticalvoting_x.htm

County says electronic voting machines can be hacked

TALLAHASSEE, Fla. (AP) - Tests on an optical-scan voting system used
around
the country showed it is vulnerable to hacking that can change the
outcome
of races without leaving evidence of fraud, a county election supervisor
said.

The voting system maker, Diebold Inc., sent a letter in response that
questioned the test results and said the test was "a very foolish and
irresponsible act" that may violated licensing agreements.

Company spokesman David Bear did not return a phone call from The
Associated
Press seeking comment Thursday. Diebold's letter was written by its
senior
lawyer, Michael Lindroos, and sent to the state of Florida, Leon
County and
the county election supervisor, Ion Sancho.

Optical-scan machines use paper ballots where voters fill in bubbles
to mark
their candidates. The ballots are then fed into scanners that record the
selections.
In one of the tests conducted for Sancho and the non-profit
election-monitoring group BlackBoxVoting.org, the researchers were
able to
get into the system easily, make the loser the winner and leave
without a
trace, said Herbert Thompson, who conducted the test.

He also said the machine that tabulates the overall count asked for a
user
name and password, but didn't require it.

In the other test, the researcher who had hacked into the voting
machine's
memory card was able to hide votes, make losers out of winners and
leave no
trace of the changes, said BlackBox founder Bev Harris. The memory card
records the votes of one machine, then is taken to a central location
where
results are totaled.
Sancho criticized the Florida Secretary of State's Office, which
approves
the voting systems used in the state, for not catching the alleged
problems.


A spokeswoman for the secretary of state's office said any faults Sancho
found were between him and Diebold.

"If Ion Sancho has security concerns with his system, he needs to
discuss
them with Diebold," spokeswoman Jenny Nash said.

The Miami Herald reported Thursday that Sancho scraped Leon's Diebold
machines this week for a voting system from another manufacturer.
Many Florida counties switched to computer-based elections systems
after the
2000 presidential election, when the cardboard punchcard ballots then
in use
were plagued by incomplete and multiple punches.



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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




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From: Nrvutua at optonline.com (Diego Dawson)
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2005 14:51:23 +0600
Subject: What you said
Message-ID: <200512160903.jBG93Atw015882@proton.jfet.org>

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From dave at farber.net  Fri Dec 16 16:38:45 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2005 19:38:45 -0500
Subject: [IP] Diebold easily hacked
Message-ID: <mailman.1451.1575948448.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From skquinn at speakeasy.net  Fri Dec 16 20:14:09 2005
From: skquinn at speakeasy.net (Shawn K. Quinn)
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2005 22:14:09 -0600
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <1134792850.27623.13.camel@xevious.platypuslabs.org>

On Mon, 2005-12-12 at 11:41 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> I recently read that a simple LINUX OS has been written in java.

What exactly do you mean by a "simple LINUX OS"?

Do you mean a port of all or part of GNU to Java? Part of the Linux
kernel? Both?

The answers to the rest of the questions vary quite a bit depending on
what exactly you meant. This is part of the reason *why* referring to
both the kernel and OS as just "Linux" is bad.

-- 
Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn at speakeasy.net>




From AlanIveygibbous at freefromclutter.com  Fri Dec 16 20:08:20 2005
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Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 05:08:20 +0100
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From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec 17 08:28:16 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 11:28:16 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts
Message-ID: <mailman.1452.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From jya at cryptome.net  Sat Dec 17 12:15:38 2005
From: jya at cryptome.net (John Young)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 12:15:38 -0800
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on Bush Lets U.S. Spy on  
  Callers  Without Courts]
In-Reply-To: <20051217163153.GZ2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <E1Enfln-0007UI-00@pop03.mail.atl.earthlink.net>

The Times sitting on the NSA story for a year needs to be probed:
was it the Times or James Risen -- who has been overly close to
intel agencies for many years and a while back was supposedly 
reined in by the Times for his "going too far" intimacy with intel
sources, and producing reports as biased as those of Judith
Miller. 

The Times is now again in the position it got itself into by encouraging
Miller to sleep with the enemy as the WashPo did with Bob Woodward 
and Time and others who embed their WHores to get pillow talk, real or
imaginary. Then if caught apologize for the 10,000 year old practice,
asking for trust just like those it accuses of being distrustful.

Sy Hersh has criticized the Times for this duplicity, as did Raymond Bonner, 
and other ex-Timesers, manh of whom left the Times over being restricted 
in what they could report by what they termed as senior Times (like WashPo 
and Time) officials lusting for intimacy with powerful politicians -- or
fearful
of being excluded at the intimate dinners in DC and NYC and world capitals. 
Hoover at the FBI swapped dirt with the DC reporters, a 20,000-year-old
wedding of enforcers and informants.

While minor scandals are being reported for US and Iraqi journalists 
being paid to report favorably on the Administration, the big scandal is 
the non-cash rewards earned by world-class media for getting insider
exclusives to boost circulation, whether Brian Williams or Jim Lehrer, 
most recently handling Bush with delicacy, or what Sy Hersh says are 
the unending information bribes that come his way, especially from intel 
sources for their own interest but more often for the interests of their 
superiors all the way to the top who use the spooks to leak policy with 
an glaze of "anonymous" legitimization, albeit deniable, to those as easily
seduced with specialized information as members of Congress.

Will there ever be an investigation of the leak racket, the congressional
hearing dissimulation, so long as we succumb to its "secrets exposed" 
allure for what we are trained to think is believable about the press, the 
Congress, looking after the public interest in opposition to unchecked power?




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 17 12:29:44 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 15:29:44 -0500
Subject: [Clips] NYT 'Spying' Splash Tied To Book Release
Message-ID: <p062309adbfca254ecfb7@[68.167.57.91]>

At 12:15 PM -0800 12/17/05, John Young wrote:
>The Times sitting on the NSA story for a year needs to be probed

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 13:33:36 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] NYT 'Spying' Splash Tied To Book Release
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.drudgereport.com/flash9nyt.htm>

 The Drudge Report


  NYT 'SPYING' SPLASH TIED TO BOOK RELEASE
  Fri Dec 16 200 11:27:16 ET

  **Exclusive**

 Newspaper fails to inform readers "news break" is tied to book publication

  On the front page of today's NEW YORK TIMES, national security reporter
 James Risen claims that "months after the September 11 attacks, President
 Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on
 Americans and others inside the United States... without the court approved
 warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying, according to government
 officials."

  Risen claims the White House asked the paper not to publish the article,
 saying that it could jeopardize continuing investigations and alert
 would-be terrorists that they might be under scrutiny.

  Risen claims the TIMES delayed publication of the article for a year to
 conduct additional reporting.

  But now comes word James Risen's article is only one of many "explosive
 newsbreaking" stories that can be found -- in his upcoming book -- which he
 turned in 3 months ago!

  The paper failed to reveal the urgent story was tied to a book release and
 sale.

  "STATE OF WAR: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration"
 is to be published by FREE PRESS in the coming weeks, sources tell the
 DRUDGE REPORT.

  Carisa Hays, VP, Director of Publicity FREE PRESS, confirms the book is
 being published.

  The book editor of Bush critic Richard Clarke [AGAINST ALL ENEMIES] signed
 Risen to FREE PRESS.



 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"The stoical scheme of supplying our wants by lopping off our
desires is like cutting off our feet when we want shoes."
 -- Jonathan Swift




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sat Dec 17 12:30:08 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 15:30:08 -0500
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <1134792850.27623.13.camel@xevious.platypuslabs.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F3BD4778CEC5CBB3711A2A9B3D0@phx.gbl>

>From: "Shawn K. Quinn" <skquinn at speakeasy.net>
>To: Cypherpunks Mailing List <cypherpunks at jfet.org>
>Subject: Re: Tor client over Java LINUX
>Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2005 22:14:09 -0600
>
>On Mon, 2005-12-12 at 11:41 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> > I recently read that a simple LINUX OS has been written in java.
>
>What exactly do you mean by a "simple LINUX OS"?
>
>Do you mean a port of all or part of GNU to Java? Part of the Linux
>kernel? Both?

Uh...huh? Dunno. I think the Java Linux was able to run some software like 
spreadsheets and whatnot.

>The answers to the rest of the questions vary quite a bit depending on
>what exactly you meant. This is part of the reason *why* referring to
>both the kernel and OS as just "Linux" is bad.

Uh...OK. But you can you repeat the part about the things, or thing?

Sorry. Me no speaky linux. Me ex-telecom geek. Ask me about RZ-encoded 
solitonic transmission and maybe I'll sound smarter.

On the other hand, it occurs to me one does not necessarily need Linux on 
top of Java at all.

How secure would it be to have a Tor client run on top of Java directly?

This way, no matter what computer one were on, it should be fairly easily to 
pull down the "portable cone of silence" from a site somewhere and start 
doing your business.

-TD




From rsw at jfet.org  Sat Dec 17 12:55:02 2005
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 15:55:02 -0500
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F3BD4778CEC5CBB3711A2A9B3D0@phx.gbl>
References: <1134792850.27623.13.camel@xevious.platypuslabs.org> <BAY103-F3BD4778CEC5CBB3711A2A9B3D0@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20051217205502.GA22583@proton.jfet.org>

Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> On the other hand, it occurs to me one does not necessarily need Linux on 
> top of Java at all.

Yup.  No reason to increase the complexity any more than necessary to
get the job done---you're only adding holes to poke.

-- 
Riad S. Wahby
rsw at jfet.org




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 17 08:19:53 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 17:19:53 +0100
Subject: [ant1@rael.org: [rael-science] Bush Approved Eavesdropping,
  Official Says]
Message-ID: <20051217161953.GY2249@leitl.org>

Source: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051217/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush_nsa


Bush Approved Eavesdropping, Official Says



President Bush has personally authorized a
secretive eavesdropping program in the United
States more than three dozen times since October
2001, a senior intelligence official said Friday night.

The disclosure follows angry demands by lawmakers
earlier in the day for congressional inquiries
into whether the monitoring by the highly
secretive National Security Agency violated civil liberties.

"There is no doubt that this is inappropriate,"
declared Republican Sen. Arlen Specter (news,
bio, voting record) of Pennsylvania, chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. He promised hearings early next year.

Bush on Friday refused to discuss whether he had
authorized such domestic spying without obtaining
warrants from a court, saying that to comment
would tie his hands in fighting terrorists.

In a broad defense of the program put forward
hours later, however, a senior intelligence
official told The Associated Press that the
eavesdropping was narrowly designed to go after
possible terrorist threats in the United States.

The official said that, since October 2001, the
program has been renewed more than three dozen
times. Each time, the White House counsel and the
attorney general certified the lawfulness of the
program, the official said. Bush then signed the authorizations.

During the reviews, government officials have
also provided a fresh assessment of the terrorist
threat, showing that there is a catastrophic risk
to the country or government, the official said.

"Only if those conditions apply do we even begin
to think about this," he said. The official spoke
on condition of anonymity because of the
classified nature of the intelligence operation.

"The president has authorized NSA to fully use
its resources ? let me underscore this now ?
consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution to
defend the United States and its citizens," the
official said, adding that congressional leaders
have also been briefed more than a dozen times.

Senior administration officials asserted the
president would do everything in his power to
protect the American people while safeguarding civil liberties.

"I will make this point," Bush said in an
interview with "The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer."
"That whatever I do to protect the American
people ? and I have an obligation to do so ? that
we will uphold the law, and decisions made are
made understanding we have an obligation to
protect the civil liberties of the American people."

The surveillance, disclosed in Friday's New York
Times, is said to allow the agency to monitor
international calls and e-mail messages of people
inside the United States. But the paper said the
agency would still seek warrants to snoop on
purely domestic communications ? for example,
Americans' calls between New York and California.

"I want to know precisely what they did," Specter
said. "How NSA utilized their technical
equipment, whose conversations they overheard,
how many conversations they overheard, what they
did with the material, what purported justification there was."

Sen. Russ Feingold (news, bio, voting record),
D-Wis., a member of the Judiciary Committee,
said, "This shocking revelation ought to send a
chill down the spine of every American."

Vice President Dick Cheney and Bush chief of
staff Andrew Card went to the Capitol Friday to
meet with congressional leaders and the top
members of the intelligence committees, who are
often briefed on spy agencies' most classified
programs. Members and their aides would not
discuss the subject of the closed sessions.

The intelligence official would not provide
details on the operations or examples of success
stories. He said senior national security
officials are trying to fix problems raised by
the Sept. 11 commission, which found that two of
the suicide hijackers were communicating from San
Diego with al-Qaida operatives overseas.

"We didn't know who they were until it was too late," the official said.

Some intelligence experts who believe in broad
presidential power argued that Bush would have
the authority to order these searches without warrants under the
Constitution.

In a case unrelated to the NSA's domestic
eavesdropping, the administration has argued that
the president has vast authority to order
intelligence surveillance without warrants "of
foreign powers or their agents."

"Congress cannot by statute extinguish that
constitutional authority," the Justice Department
said in a 2002 legal filing with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.

Other intelligence veterans found difficulty with
the program in light of the 1978 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, passed after the
intelligence community came under fire for spying
on Americans. That law gives government ? with
approval from a secretive U.S. court ? the
authority to conduct covert wiretaps and
surveillance of suspected terrorists and spies.

In a written statement, NSA spokesman Don Weber
said the agency would not provide any information
on the reported surveillance program. "We do not
discuss actual or alleged operational issues," he said.

Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, former NSA general
counsel, said it was troubling that such a change
would have been made by executive order, even if
it turns out to be within the law.

Parker, who has no direct knowledge of the
program, said the effect could be corrosive.
"There are programs that do push the edge, and
would be appropriate, but will be thrown out," she said.

Prior to 9/11, the NSA typically limited its
domestic surveillance activities to foreign
embassies and missions ? and obtained court
orders for such investigations. Much of its work
was overseas, where thousands of people with
suspected terrorist ties or other valuable intelligence may be monitored.

The report surfaced as the administration and its
GOP allies on Capitol Hill were fighting to save
provisions of the expiring USA Patriot Act that
they believe are key tools in the fight against
terrorism. An attempt to rescue the approach
favored by the White House and Republicans failed on a procedural vote.

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 17 08:31:53 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 17:31:53 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
  Without Courts]
Message-ID: <20051217163153.GZ2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 17 08:33:33 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 17:33:33 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Diebold easily hacked]
Message-ID: <20051217163333.GA2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From tandm at xanadu.net  Sun Dec 18 11:49:40 2005
From: tandm at xanadu.net (Ted Nelson)
Date: December 18, 2005 11:49:40 PM EST
Subject: Military's news-planting service (New York Times)
Message-ID: <mailman.1453.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Military's Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive
By JEFF GERTH
The media center in Fayetteville, N.C., would be the envy of any global
communications company.

In state of the art studios, producers prepare the daily mix of music
and
news for the group's radio stations or spots for friendly television
outlets. Writers putting out newspapers and magazines in Baghdad and
Kabul
converse via teleconferences. Mobile trailers with high-tech gear are
parked outside, ready for the next crisis.

The center is not part of a news organization, but a military operation,
and those writers and producers are soldiers. The 1,200-strong
psychological operations unit based at Fort Bragg turns out what its
officers call "truthful messages" to support the United States
government's
objectives, though its commander acknowledges that those stories are
one-sided and their American sponsorship is hidden.

"We call our stuff information and the enemy's propaganda," said Col.
Jack
N. Summe, then the commander of the Fourth Psychological Operations
Group,
during a tour in June. Even in the Pentagon, "some public affairs
professionals see us unfavorably," and inaccurately, he said, as "lying,
dirty tricksters."

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/politics/11propaganda.html?ei=5090&en=3b298
30b7c656c93&ex=1291957200&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print

Cheers,T


________________________________________________
Theodor Holm Nelson, Fellow, Oxford Internet Institute
 University of Oxford, 1 St Giles, Oxford OX1 3JS, UK
V. Professor, U. Southampton; V. Fellow, Wadham College
Founder, Project Xanadu (the first hypertext project), 1960+
 ?  e-mail: tandm at xanadu.net  ?  http://ted.hyperland.com,
     ?  xanadu.com  ?  translit.org  ?  transcopyright.org
 ?  world-wide phone and fax  +1/908-847-0264
_________________________________________________



-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 18 13:22:44 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 16:22:44 -0500
Subject: [Clips] A small editorial about recent events.
Message-ID: <p06230943bfcb839cebaa@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 15:17:30 -0500
 To: "Philodox Clips List" <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] A small editorial about recent events.
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


 --- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
  To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
  Subject: A small editorial about recent events.
  From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry at piermont.com>
  Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 13:58:06 -0500
  Sender: owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com


  A small editorial from your moderator. I rarely use this list to
  express a strong political opinion -- you will forgive me in this
  instance.

  This mailing list is putatively about cryptography and cryptography
  politics, though we do tend to stray quite a bit into security issues
  of all sorts, and sometimes into the activities of the agency with the
  biggest crypto and sigint budget in the world, the NSA.

  As you may all be aware, the New York Times has reported, and the
  administration has admitted, that President of the United States
  apparently ordered the NSA to conduct surveillance operations against
  US citizens without prior permission of the secret court known as the
  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the "FISC"). This is in clear
  contravention of 50 USC 1801 - 50 USC 1811, a portion of the US code
  that provides for clear criminal penalties for violations. See:

  http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_36_20_I.html

  The President claims he has the prerogative to order such
  surveillance. The law unambiguously disagrees with him.

  There are minor exceptions in the law, but they clearly do not apply
  in this case. They cover only the 15 days after a declaration of war
  by congress, a period of 72 hours prior to seeking court authorization
  (which was never sought), and similar exceptions that clearly are not
  germane.

  There is no room for doubt or question about whether the President has
  the prerogative to order surveillance without asking the FISC -- even if
  the FISC is a toothless organization that never turns down requests,
  it is a federal crime, punishable by up to five years imprisonment, to
  conduct electronic surveillance against US citizens without court
  authorization.

  The FISC may be worthless at defending civil liberties, but in its
  arrogant disregard for even the fig leaf of the FISC, the
  administration has actually crossed the line into a crystal clear
  felony. The government could have legally conducted such wiretaps
  at any time, but the President chose not to do it legally.

  Ours is a government of laws, not of men. That means if the President
  disagrees with a law or feels that it is insufficient, he still must
  obey it. Ignoring the law is illegal, even for the President. The
  President may ask Congress to change the law, but meanwhile he must
  follow it.

  Our President has chosen to declare himself above the law, a dangerous
  precedent that could do great harm to our country.  However, without
  substantial effort on the part of you, and I mean you, every person
  reading this, nothing much is going to happen.  The rule of law will
  continue to decay in our country. Future Presidents will claim even
  greater extralegal authority, and our nation will fall into
  despotism. I mean that sincerely. For the sake of yourself, your
  children and your children's children, you cannot allow this to stand.

  Call your Senators and your Congressman.  Demand a full investigation,
  both by Congress and by a special prosecutor, of the actions of the
  Administration and the NSA. Say that the rule of law is all that
  stands between us and barbarism. Say that we live in a democracy, not
  a kingdom, and that our elected officials are not above the law. The
  President is not a King. Even the President cannot participate in a
  felony and get away with it. Demand that even the President must obey
  the law.

  Tell your friends to do the same. Tell them to tell their friends to
  do the same. Then, call back next week and the week after and the week
  after that until something happens. Mark it in your calendar so you
  don't forget about it. Politicians have short memories, and Congress
  is about to recess for Christmas, so you must not allow this to be
  forgotten. Keep at them until something happens.


  Perry

  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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  Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com

 --- end forwarded text


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From Skx at optonline.com  Sun Dec 18 06:26:29 2005
From: Skx at optonline.com (Valarie Albert)
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 18:26:29 +0400
Subject: Treat Yourself
Message-ID: <200512181444.jBIEio5G027936@proton.jfet.org>

This holiday season treat yourself to unadulterated luxury







Not today.
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From XFMVUMDNFZ at prodigy.net  Sun Dec 18 05:56:32 2005
From: XFMVUMDNFZ at prodigy.net (Lynette Cherry)
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 18:56:32 +0500
Subject: Software 3000 dodson 7
Message-ID: <436324n8na79$1x6q1592$04w8kplp@oocytelumpurslavishdt24>

Great xmas software supersale 

get it now over 3000 softwares 

http://www.theoemall.com

step

From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec 18 17:21:44 2005
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 19:21:44 -0600 (CST)
Subject: NSA Special Collection Program
In-Reply-To: <E1Eo9ZR-0006mB-00@pop03.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
References: <E1Eo9ZR-0006mB-00@pop03.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <20051218192036.W13015@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005, John Young wrote:

> And, there has been no mention in the news of the UK/USA arrangement
> for the UK to do what NSA once was forbidden to do inside the US. Perhaps
> there has been an expansion of that as well.

Interestingly, I came to the exact opposite thought: why would they do it
this way if the old deal was still in place?

This could get *very* interesting as it unfolds.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF


	Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about
	the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise?

	- Steve Thompson




From jya at cryptome.net  Sun Dec 18 20:04:51 2005
From: jya at cryptome.net (John Young)
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 20:04:51 -0800
Subject: NSA Special Collection Program
Message-ID: <E1Eo9ZR-0006mB-00@pop03.mail.atl.earthlink.net>

The NYT report on NSA surveillance described it as a "special collection
program." This is the also the name of the NSA-CIA program which performs
black bag jobs against targets which are tough to surveil with stand-off
means, including targets which use encryption. Codebooks are stolen,
copied and returned, bugs are planted, cavity resonating devices are rigged, 
cipher machines are lifted for tampering then replaced, and a host of
other means are used to overcome electronic and physical defenses.

One wonders what means NSA (and others) used to spy inside the US in 
addition to plain old electronic interception. The story so far is pretty 
simpleminded about NSA's capabilities. Could be the part of the story
the Times claims it is still withholding covers that.

And, there has been no mention in the news of the UK/USA arrangement 
for the UK to do what NSA once was forbidden to do inside the US. Perhaps
there has been an expansion of that as well.

Jason Vest and Wayne Madsen described the Special Collection Service
in 1999:


http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1999/02/vest_madsen.htm

[Excerpt]

    According to a former high-ranking intelligence official, SCS was
formed in the late 1970s after competition between the NSA's embassy-based
eavesdroppers and the CIA's globe-trotting bugging specialists from its
Division D had become counterproductive. While sources differ on how SCS
works some claim its agents never leave their secret embassy warrens where
they perform close-quarters electronic eavesdropping, while others say
agents operate embassy-based equipment in addition to performing riskier
"black-bag" jobs, or break-ins, for purposes of bugging "there's a lot of
pride taken in what SCS has accomplished," the former official says.

    Intriguingly, the only on-the-record account of the Special Collection
Service has been provided not by an American but by a Canadian. Mike Frost,
formerly of the Communications Security Establishment Canada's NSA
equivalent served as deputy director of CSE's SCS counterpart and was
trained by the SCS. In a 1994 memoir, Frost describes the complexities of
mounting "special collection" operations finding ways to transport
sophisticated eavesdropping equipment in diplomatic pouches without
arousing suspicion, surreptitiously assembling a device without arousing
suspicion in his embassy, technically troubleshooting under less than ideal
conditions and also devotes considerable space to describing visits to
SCS's old College Park headquarters.

    "It is not the usual sanitorium-clean atmosphere you would expect to
find in a top-secret installation," writes Frost. "Wires everywhere,
jerry-rigged gizmos everywhere, computers all over the place, some people
buzzing around in three-piece suits, and others in jeans and t-shirts. [It
was] the ultimate testing and engineering centre for any espionage
equipment." Perhaps one of its most extraordinary areas was its "live
room," a 30-foot-square area where NSA and CIA devices were put through dry
runs, and where engineers simulated the electronic environment of cities
where eavesdroppers are deployed. Several years ago, according to sources,
SCS relocated to a new, 300-acre, three-building complex disguised as a
corporate campus and shielded by a dense forest outside Beltsville,
Maryland. Curious visitors to the site will find themselves stopped at a
gate by a Department of Defense police officer who, if one lingers, will
threaten arrest. 

-----

Satellite photos of the Special Collection Service:


http://cryptome.org/scs-eyeball.htm




From charliek at exchange.microsoft.com  Sun Dec 18 21:52:31 2005
From: charliek at exchange.microsoft.com (Charlie Kaufman)
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 21:52:31 -0800
Subject: It's almost enough to make you feel sorry for Diebold
Message-ID: <mailman.1454.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Reportedly, some people demonstrated falsifying votes on Diebold voting
machines using only resources and techniques available to thousands of
election workers. It will be interesting to see the fallout. These weaknesses
have apparently long been "known", but denied by Diebold.

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/15595.html


---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 18 19:46:45 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 22:46:45 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Clinton NSA Eavesdropped on U.S. Calls
Message-ID: <p062309d5bfcbdd86feee@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 22:44:30 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Clinton NSA Eavesdropped on U.S. Calls
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.newsmax.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2005/12/18/221452.shtml>

 Reprinted from NewsMax.com
 Sunday, Dec. 18, 2005 10:10 p.m. EST

 Clinton NSA Eavesdropped on U.S. Calls

  During the 1990's under President Clinton, the National Security Agency
 monitored millions of private phone calls placed by U.S. citizens and
 citizens of other countries under a super secret program code-named Echelon.

  On Friday, the New York Times suggested that the Bush administration has
 instituted "a major shift in American intelligence-gathering practices"
 when it "secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on
 Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of
 terrorist activity without [obtaining] court-approved warrants."

  But in fact, the NSA had been monitoring private domestic telephone
 conversations on a much larger scale throughout the 1990s - all of it done
 without a court order, let alone a catalyst like the 9/11 attacks.

  In February 2000, for instance, CBS "60 Minutes" correspondent Steve Kroft
 introduced a report on the Clinton-era spy program by noting:

 "If you made a phone call today or sent an e-mail to a friend, there's a
 good chance what you said or wrote was captured and screened by the
 country's largest intelligence agency. The top-secret Global Surveillance
 Network is called Echelon, and it's run by the National Security Agency."

  NSA computers, said Kroft, "capture virtually every electronic
 conversation around the world."

  Echelon expert Mike Frost, who spent 20 years as a spy for the Canadian
 equivalent of the National Security Agency, told "60 Minutes" that the
 agency was monitoring "everything from data transfers to cell phones to
 portable phones to baby monitors to ATMs."

 Mr. Frost detailed activities at one unidentified NSA installation, telling
 "60 Minutes" that agency operators "can listen in to just about anything" -
 while Echelon computers screen phone calls for key words that might
 indicate a terrorist threat.

  The "60 Minutes" report also spotlighted Echelon critic, then-Rep. Bob
 Barr, who complained that the project as it was being implemented under
 Clinton "engages in the interception of literally millions of
 communications involving United States citizens."

 One Echelon operator working in Britain told "60 Minutes" that the NSA had
 even monitored and tape recorded the conversations of the late Sen. Strom
 Thurmond.

  Still, the Times repeatedly insisted on Friday that NSA surveillance under
 Bush had been unprecedented, at one point citing anonymously an alleged
 former national security official who claimed: "This is really a sea
 change. It's almost a mainstay of this country that the NSA only does
 foreign searches."

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 18 21:53:40 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 00:53:40 -0500
Subject: BOUNCE cryptography@metzdowd.com: Approval required:
Message-ID: <p06230900bfcbfb55fb92@[68.167.57.91]>

;-)

Cheers,
RAH

--- begin forwarded text


 To: rah at shipwright.com
 Subject: Re: BOUNCE cryptography at metzdowd.com: Approval required:
 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry at piermont.com>
 Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 22:57:19 -0500
 User-Agent: Gnus/5.1006 (Gnus v5.10.6) Emacs/21.4 (berkeley-unix)


 That article is bullshit, Rob. Yes, Clinton's NSA spied on US
 citizens, but they got FISA approval when they did it. I would agree
 that FISC would approve spying on a dead goat on the basis of a white
 house lawyer claiming the goat was a foreign agent, but that's beside
 the point -- to my knowledge, they obeyed the law, as odious as the
 law was. Therefore, I'm not forwarding.

 Perry

 owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com writes:
 >>From owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com  Sun Dec 18 22:46:59 2005
 > Return-Path: <owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com>
 > X-Original-To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
 > Delivered-To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
 > Received: from bullae.ibuc.com (sovereign.shipwright.com [68.167.57.91])
 > 	by blue.metzdowd.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C8171C2CD68
 > 	for <cryptography at metzdowd.com>; Sun, 18 Dec 2005 22:46:58 -0500 (EST)
 > Received: from [68.167.57.91] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 > 	by bullae.ibuc.com (Postfix) with ESMTP
 > 	id 1CC8814A2E82; Sun, 18 Dec 2005 22:46:51 -0500 (EST)
 > Mime-Version: 1.0
 > Message-Id: <p062309d5bfcbdd86feee@[68.167.57.91]>
 > Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 22:46:45 -0500
 > To: cryptography at metzdowd.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
 > From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 > Subject:  [Clips] Clinton NSA Eavesdropped on U.S. Calls
 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
 >
 >
 > --- begin forwarded text
 >
 >
 >  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 >  Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2005 22:44:30 -0500
 >  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 >  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 >  Subject: [Clips] Clinton NSA Eavesdropped on U.S. Calls
 >  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 >  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com
 >
 >
<http://www.newsmax.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2005/12/18/221452.shtml>
 >
 >  Reprinted from NewsMax.com
 >  Sunday, Dec. 18, 2005 10:10 p.m. EST
 >
 >  Clinton NSA Eavesdropped on U.S. Calls
 >
 >   During the 1990's under President Clinton, the National Security Agency
 >  monitored millions of private phone calls placed by U.S. citizens and
 >  citizens of other countries under a super secret program code-named
Echelon.
 >
 >   On Friday, the New York Times suggested that the Bush administration has
 >  instituted "a major shift in American intelligence-gathering practices"
 >  when it "secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on
 >  Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of
 >  terrorist activity without [obtaining] court-approved warrants."
 >
 >   But in fact, the NSA had been monitoring private domestic telephone
 >  conversations on a much larger scale throughout the 1990s - all of it done
 >  without a court order, let alone a catalyst like the 9/11 attacks.
 >
 >   In February 2000, for instance, CBS "60 Minutes" correspondent Steve Kroft
 >  introduced a report on the Clinton-era spy program by noting:
 >
 >  "If you made a phone call today or sent an e-mail to a friend, there's a
 >  good chance what you said or wrote was captured and screened by the
 >  country's largest intelligence agency. The top-secret Global Surveillance
 >  Network is called Echelon, and it's run by the National Security Agency."
 >
 >   NSA computers, said Kroft, "capture virtually every electronic
 >  conversation around the world."
 >
 >   Echelon expert Mike Frost, who spent 20 years as a spy for the Canadian
 >  equivalent of the National Security Agency, told "60 Minutes" that the
 >  agency was monitoring "everything from data transfers to cell phones to
 >  portable phones to baby monitors to ATMs."
 >
 >  Mr. Frost detailed activities at one unidentified NSA installation, telling
 >  "60 Minutes" that agency operators "can listen in to just about anything" -
 >  while Echelon computers screen phone calls for key words that might
 >  indicate a terrorist threat.
 >
 >   The "60 Minutes" report also spotlighted Echelon critic, then-Rep. Bob
 >  Barr, who complained that the project as it was being implemented under
 >  Clinton "engages in the interception of literally millions of
 >  communications involving United States citizens."
 >
 >  One Echelon operator working in Britain told "60 Minutes" that the NSA had
 >  even monitored and tape recorded the conversations of the late Sen. Strom
 >  Thurmond.
 >
 >   Still, the Times repeatedly insisted on Friday that NSA surveillance under
 >  Bush had been unprecedented, at one point citing anonymously an alleged
 >  former national security official who claimed: "This is really a sea
 >  change. It's almost a mainstay of this country that the NSA only does
 >  foreign searches."
 >
 >  --
 >  -----------------
 >  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 >  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 >  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 >  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 >  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 >  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 >  _______________________________________________
 >  Clips mailing list
 >  Clips at philodox.com
 >  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips
 >
 > --- end forwarded text
 >
 >
 > --
 > -----------------
 > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 >

 --
 Perry E. Metzger		perry at piermont.com

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 18 22:17:52 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 01:17:52 -0500
Subject: A small editorial about recent events.
Message-ID: <p06230903bfcc01035061@[68.167.57.91]>

At 1:58 PM -0500 12/18/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>Ours is a government of laws, not of men.

"When the hares made speeches in the assembly and demanded that all should
have equality, the lions replied, "Where are your claws and teeth?"  --
attributed to Antisthenes in Aristotle, 'Politics', 3.7.2


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Force shits on reason's back."
     -- Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanack




From Carmela.Emerson at bowling1.no  Mon Dec 19 00:07:47 2005
From: Carmela.Emerson at bowling1.no (Lane Atkinson)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 03:07:47 -0500
Subject: nice
References: <06790467433433590860716@conex.com.br>
Message-ID: <346352ambrosial7179119@expectant>

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From gnu at toad.com  Mon Dec 19 03:44:51 2005
From: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 03:44:51 -0800
Subject: NSA director on NSA domestic wiretaps (to Cong in Oct 2002)
Message-ID: <mailman.1455.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Paragraph 40, below, is about as bald a statement as an NSA director
could make, saying he needs help to decide what he should be allowed
to wiretap about US persons.  We, the privacy community, did not
respond.  We were a bit surprised, but that was about the extent of
the support we offered.

Of course, we were living in a time where being anti-paranoia or
anti-war or anti-president was considered treasonous by the president,
and by most of the people who elected him, and many who worked for
him.  And we were living in the lost time when we expected the
government to follow clearly written laws, until such time as they
were rewritten.  And nobody had ever gotten NSA to stop doing ANYTHING
corrupt, without either suing them, beating them in the legislature,
or shining some bright sunlight on one of their secrets -- in some
cases it took all three.  The door of the NSA Director's office has
never been open for privacy activists to come in and review their
secret programs for sanity and constitutionality, though it should be.

His challenge to the NSA work force -- "to keep America free by making
Americans feel safe again" -- is as bogus as TSA's "We're upholding
the right to travel by making travel feel safe, even while we keep
innocent YOU off the plane".  It begs the question -- who do we need
to feel safe FROM?  Governments are historically thousands of times as
likely to injure you than 'terrorists'.  Do you feel safe from Bush
and NSA and TSA today?  Are you really sure your government isn't
tapping and tracing you, building databases about who you call and who
you travel with, with or without a warrant from some rubber stamp
court?

Indeed, what good would it have done if the whole privacy and crypto
community had risen up to say, "You should follow the law!"?  Bush was
intent on breaking it in secret ANYWAY, and rather than exposing his
treason, NSA followed his orders.  Mr. Hayden did not pose the
question as, "We are now wiretapping the foreign communications of US
persons without warrants, in violation of the FISA; do you think this
is OK?", though he was doing so at the time he made this speech.  But
that's the question that he and his successor will have to face civil
and criminal charges over.

http://www.nsa.gov/releases/relea00072.html

"Statement for the record by Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, USAF,
Director, National Security Agency... 17 October 2002"

...
2.  We know our responsibilities for American freedom and security at
    NSA. Our workforce takes the events of September 11, 2001 very
    personally. By the very nature of their work, our people deeply
    internalize their mission. This is personal.

...

25. The final issue - what have we done in response - will allow me to
    give some specifics although I may be somewhat limited by the
    demands of classification. I will use some of the terms that
    Congress has used with us over the past year.

26. It was heartening, for example, to hear Congress echo the phrase
    of our SIGINT Director, Maureen Baginski, in the belief that we
    need to be "hunters rather than gatherers." She believed and
    implemented this strategy well before September 11th, and then she
    applied it with a vengeance to al-Qa'ida after the attacks.

...

36. There is a certain irony here. This is one of the few times in the
    history of my Agency that the Director has testified in open
    session about operational matters. The first was in the mid 1970s
    when one of my predecessors sat here nearly mute while being
    grilled by members of Congress for intruding upon the privacy
    rights of the American people. Largely as a result of those
    hearings, NSA is governed today by various executive orders and
    laws and these legal restrictions are drilled into NSA employees
    and enforced through oversight by all three branches of
    government.

37. The second open session was a little over two years ago and I was
    the Director at that time. During that session the House
    intelligence committee asked me a series of questions with a
    single unifying theme:

    How could I assure them that I was safeguarding the privacy rights
    of those protected by the U.S. constitution and U.S. law? During
    that session I even said - without exaggeration on my part or
    complaint on yours - that if Usama bin Laden crossed the bridge
    from Niagara Falls, Ontario to Niagara Falls, New York, U.S. law
    would give him certain protections that I would have to
    accommodate in the conduct of my mission. And now the third open
    session for the Director of NSA: I am here explaining what my
    Agency did or did not know with regard to 19 hijackers who were in
    this country legally.

38. When I spoke with our workforce shortly after the September 11th
    attacks, I told them that free people always had to decide where
    to draw the line between their liberty and their security, and I
    noted that the attacks would almost certainly push us as a nation
    more toward security. I then gave the NSA workforce a challenge:
    We were going to keep America free by making Americans feel safe
    again.

39. Let me close by telling you what I hope to get out of the national
    dialogue that these committees are fostering. I am not really
    helped by being reminded that I need more Arabic linguists or by
    someone second-guessing an obscure intercept sitting in our files
    that may make more sense today than it did two years ago. What I
    really need you to do is to talk to your constituents and find out
    where the American people want that line between security and
    liberty to be.

40. In the context of NSA's mission, where do we draw the line between
    the government's need for CT information about people in the
    United States and the privacy interests of people located in the
    United States?

    Practically speaking, this line-drawing affects the focus of NSA's
    activities (foreign versus domestic), the standard under which
    surveillances are conducted (probable cause versus reasonable
    suspicion, for example), the type of data NSA is permitted to
    collect and how, and the rules under which NSA retains and
    disseminates information about U.S. persons.

41. These are serious issues that the country addressed, and resolved
    to its satisfaction, once before in the mid-1970's. In light of
    the events of September 11th, it is appropriate that we, as a
    country, readdress them. We need to get it right. We have to find
    the right balance between protecting our security and protecting
    our liberty. If we fail in this effort by drawing the line in the
    wrong place, that is, overly favoring liberty or security, then
    the terrorists win and liberty loses in either case.

42. Thank you. I look forward to the committees' questions.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Mon Dec 19 02:43:22 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 05:43:22 -0500
Subject: [IP] Military's news-planting service (New York Times)
Message-ID: <mailman.1456.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


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Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 06:04:33 -0300
Subject: New Software Site obsess
Message-ID: <572485r2ft80$3x4l4339$20r6akhi@hathawayravinecompilationap16>

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Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 10:02:02 -0500
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Message-ID: <LAW07.OE649yfB4mvo928553d5@motmail.com>


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Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 10:30:30 -0100
Subject: do you remember that? oh
Message-ID: <20770402235750.A31250@xearthlink.net>

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From schneier at counterpane.com  Mon Dec 19 11:56:55 2005
From: schneier at counterpane.com (Bruce Schneier)
Date: December 19, 2005 11:56:55 PM EST
Subject: [EPIC_IDOF] I Have An Essay on Salon
Message-ID: <mailman.1457.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/12/20/surveillance/

Uncle Sam is listening

Bush may have bypassed federal wiretap law to deploy more high-tech
methods of surveillance.

By Bruce Schneier

Dec. 20, 2005 | When President Bush directed the National Security
Agency to secretly eavesdrop on American citizens, he transferred an
authority previously under the purview of the Justice Department to
the Defense Department and bypassed the very laws put in place to
protect Americans against widespread government eavesdropping. The
reason may have been to tap the NSA's capability for data-mining and
widespread surveillance.

Illegal wiretapping of Americans is nothing new. In the 1950s and
'60s, the NSA intercepted every single telegram coming in or going
out of the United States. It conducted eavesdropping without a
warrant on behalf of the CIA and other agencies. Much of this became
public during the 1975 Church Committee hearings and resulted in the
now famous Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.

The purpose of this law was to protect the American people by
regulating government eavesdropping. Like many laws limiting the
power of government, it relies on checks and balances: one branch of
the government watching the other. The law established a secret
court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and
empowered it to approve national-security-related eavesdropping
warrants. The Justice Department can request FISA warrants to monitor
foreign communications as well as communications by American
citizens, provided that they meet certain minimal criteria.

The FISC issued about 500 FISA warrants per year from 1979 through
1995, and has slowly increased subsequently -- 1,758 were issued in
2004. The process is designed for speed and even has provisions where
the Justice Department can wiretap first and ask for permission
later. In all that time, only four warrant requests were ever
rejected: all in 2003. (We don't know any details, of course, as the
court proceedings are secret.)

FISA warrants are carried out by the FBI, but in the days immediately
after the terrorist attacks, there was a widespread perception in
Washington that the FBI wasn't up to dealing with these new threats
-- they couldn't uncover plots in a timely manner. So instead the
Bush administration turned to the NSA. They had the tools, the
expertise, the experience, and so they were given the mission.

The NSA's ability to eavesdrop on communications is exemplified by a
technological capability called Echelon. Echelon is the world's
largest information vacuum cleaner, sucking up a staggering amount of
communications data -- satellite, microwave, fiber-optic, cellular,
and everything else -- from all over the world: an estimated 3
billion communications per day. These communications are then
processed through sophisticated data-mining technologies, looking for
simple phrases like "assassinate the president" as well as more
complicated communications patterns.

Supposedly Echelon only covers communications outside of the United
States. Although there is no evidence that the Bush administration
has employed Echelon to monitor communications to and from the U.S.,
this surveillance capability is probably exactly what the president
wanted and may explain why the administration sought to bypass the
FISA process of acquiring a warrant for searches.

Perhaps the NSA just didn't have any experience submitting FISA
warrants, so Bush unilaterally waived that requirement. And perhaps
Bush thought FISA was a hindrance -- in 2002 there was a widespread
but false believe that the FISC got in the way of the investigation
of Zacarias Moussaoui (the presumed "20th hijacker") -- and bypassed
the court for that reason.

Most likely, Bush wanted a whole new surveillance paradigm. You can
think of the FBI's capabilities as "retail surveillance": it
eavesdrops on a particular person or phone. The NSA, on the other
hand, conducts "wholesale surveillance." It, or more exactly its
computers, listen to everything. An example might be to feed the
computer a transcript of every conversation that mentions "Ayman al-
Zawahiri" and monitor everybody who uttered the name, as well as
everybody contacted. This type of surveillance was not anticipated in
FISA and raises all sorts of legal issues. As Sen. Rockefeller wrote
in a secret memo after being briefed on the program, it raises
"profound oversight issues," and it is unclear whether FISA would
have approved this activity.

It is also unclear whether Echelon-style eavesdropping would prevent
terrorist attacks. In the months before 9/11, Echelon noticed
considerable "chatter": bits of conversation suggesting some sort of
imminent attack. But because much of the planning for 9/11 occurred
face-to-face, analysts were unable to learn details.

The fundamental issue here is security, but it's not the security
most people think of. James Madison famously said: "If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary." Terrorism is a serious risk to our nation, but an even
greater threat is the centralization of American political power in
the hands of any single branch of the government.

Over 200 years ago, the framers of the U.S. Constitution established
an ingenious security device against tyrannical government: they
divided government power among three different bodies. A carefully
thought out system of checks and balances in the executive branch,
the legislative branch, and the judicial branch, ensured that no
single branch became too powerful.

After watching tyrannies rise and fall throughout Europe, this seemed
like a prudent way to form a government. Courts monitor the actions
of police. Congress passes laws that even the president must follow.
Since 9/11, the United States has seen an enormous power grab by the
executive branch. It's time we brought back the security system
that's protected us from government for over 200 years.
_______________________________________________
EPIC_IDOF mailing list
EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof


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--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 19 03:07:46 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 12:07:46 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Military's news-planting service (New
  York Times)]
Message-ID: <20051219110746.GB2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 19 04:51:55 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 13:51:55 +0100
Subject: Agents' visit chills UMass Dartmouth senior 
Message-ID: <20051219125155.GF2249@leitl.org>

"My instinct is that there is a lot more monitoring than we think,"

http://www.southcoasttoday.com/daily/12-05/12-17-05/a09lo650.htm

Agents' visit chills UMass Dartmouth senior
By AARON NICODEMUS, Standard-Times staff writer

NEW BEDFORD -- A senior at UMass Dartmouth was visited by federal agents two
months ago, after he requested a copy of Mao Tse-Tung's tome on Communism
called "The Little Red Book."
Two history professors at UMass Dartmouth, Brian Glyn Williams and Robert
Pontbriand, said the student told them he requested the book through the UMass
Dartmouth library's interlibrary loan program.
The student, who was completing a research paper on Communism for Professor
Pontbriand's class on fascism and totalitarianism, filled out a form for the
request, leaving his name, address, phone number and Social Security number.
He was later visited at his parents' home in New Bedford by two agents of the
Department of Homeland Security, the professors said.
The professors said the student was told by the agents that the book is on a
"watch list," and that his background, which included significant time abroad,
triggered them to investigate the student further.
"I tell my students to go to the direct source, and so he asked for the
official Peking version of the book," Professor Pontbriand said. "Apparently,
the Department of Homeland Security is monitoring inter-library loans, because
that's what triggered the visit, as I understand it."
Although The Standard-Times knows the name of the student, he is not coming
forward because he fears repercussions should his name become public. He has
not spoken to The Standard-Times.
The professors had been asked to comment on a report that President Bush had
authorized the National Security Agency to spy on as many as 500 people at any
given time since 2002 in this country.
The eavesdropping was apparently done without warrants.
The Little Red Book, is a collection of quotations and speech excerpts from
Chinese leader Mao Tse-Tung.
In the 1950s and '60s, during the Cultural Revolution in China, it was
required reading. Although there are abridged versions available, the student
asked for a version translated directly from the original book.
The student told Professor Pontbriand and Dr. Williams that the Homeland
Security agents told him the book was on a "watch list." They brought the book
with them, but did not leave it with the student, the professors said.
Dr. Williams said in his research, he regularly contacts people in
Afghanistan, Chechnya and other Muslim hot spots, and suspects that some of
his calls are monitored.
"My instinct is that there is a lot more monitoring than we think," he said.
Dr. Williams said he had been planning to offer a course on terrorism next
semester, but is reconsidering, because it might put his students at risk.
"I shudder to think of all the students I've had monitoring al-Qaeda Web
sites, what the government must think of that," he said. "Mao Tse-Tung is
completely harmless."

Contact Aaron Nicodemus at anicodemus at s-t.com

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 19 07:37:34 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 16:37:34 +0100
Subject: [gnu@toad.com: NSA director on NSA domestic wiretaps (to Cong
  in Oct 2002)]
Message-ID: <20051219153734.GM2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 19 07:39:23 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 16:39:23 +0100
Subject: [charliek@exchange.microsoft.com: It's almost enough to make
  you feel sorry for Diebold]
Message-ID: <20051219153923.GN2249@leitl.org>

Diebold has emerged from similiar unscathed. Somebody must
be covering them. Why should this time be different?

----- Forwarded message from Charlie Kaufman <charliek at exchange.microsoft.com>
-----


From ralf at fimaluka.org  Mon Dec 19 07:56:08 2005
From: ralf at fimaluka.org (Ralf-Philipp Weinmann)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 16:56:08 +0100
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <20051212172633.GE2249@leitl.org>
References: <20051211085331.GD2249@leitl.org>
  <BAY103-F10DDA64F03690E676C7E269B460@phx.gbl>
  <20051212171223.GA31477@proton.jfet.org>
  <20051212172633.GE2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <1FD1EB91-2998-458E-B853-CD16F18123ED@fimaluka.org>

On Dec 12, 2005, at 6:26 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 12:12:23PM -0500, Riad S. Wahby wrote:
>> Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
>>> I recently read that a simple LINUX OS has been written in java.
>>
>> Have a reference handy?  I'm just curious to see where they're going
>> with this.
>
> I presume everybody has seen http://www.masswerk.at/jsuix/

Uhm. That's not really an entire operating system. Moreover it's  
implemented in Javascript, not in Java. Anyone got a reference for  
the Unix-like OS implementation atop of a JVM? I haven't heard of  
anyone trying to do a OS-on-top-of-a-JVM implementation since the  
failure of Sun's JavaOS [1].

Anyway. As far as I know, the JAP source code [1] contains some  
usable Java tor client implementation if you throw out all the GUI  
crap. Writing a TOR server implementation in Java shouldn't be so  
hard either.

Cheers,
Ralf

[1] P.W. Madany, S. Keohan, D. Kramer, T. Saulpaugh:
     JavaOS: A Standalone Java Environment
     White Paper, Sun Microsystems, Mountain View, CA, May, 1996

[2] JAP source code
     http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/develop/sources_en.html




From ralf at fimaluka.org  Mon Dec 19 07:57:15 2005
From: ralf at fimaluka.org (Ralf-Philipp Weinmann)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 16:57:15 +0100
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <20051213162054.GH2249@leitl.org>
References: <20051212173318.GG2249@leitl.org>
  <BAY103-F14B9BD9EEC3A16FD5FCF8D9B390@phx.gbl>
  <20051213162054.GH2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <A9F3FE3F-3414-45B7-8B72-3F5579B875E0@fimaluka.org>

On Dec 13, 2005, at 5:20 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 13, 2005 at 11:16:04AM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
>> Of course I'll grant that such a publically available Tor node  
>> offers a
>> kind of anonymity that most Cypherpunks would pass on, but I still  
>> maintain
>> that huge increases in quasi-anonymous traffic* is good for those  
>> of us who
>> roll our own, more secure communications.
>
> A really good multiplier would be to package Tor into a malware  
> vector.

Yeah. That would really work. We should pitch that idea to some  
spammers :) Enough cover traffic in *THAT* mix-network as well...

Cheers,
Ralf




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 19 08:14:47 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 17:14:47 +0100
Subject: Tor client over Java LINUX
In-Reply-To: <A9F3FE3F-3414-45B7-8B72-3F5579B875E0@fimaluka.org>
References: <20051212173318.GG2249@leitl.org>
  <BAY103-F14B9BD9EEC3A16FD5FCF8D9B390@phx.gbl>
  <20051213162054.GH2249@leitl.org>
  <A9F3FE3F-3414-45B7-8B72-3F5579B875E0@fimaluka.org>
Message-ID: <20051219161447.GW2249@leitl.org>

On Mon, Dec 19, 2005 at 04:57:15PM +0100, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann wrote:

> >A really good multiplier would be to package Tor into a malware
> >vector.
>
> Yeah. That would really work. We should pitch that idea to some
> spammers :) Enough cover traffic in *THAT* mix-network as well...

Port 25 is blocked in default exit policy. Script kiddies are already using
the Tor network, whether you like it, or not. Spammers who already command
vast armies of zombies would laugh at your Tor network. Trafic remixing
buys nothing for them, but a means to conceal control traffic (which they
don't seem to bother with, bouncing traffic of 0wn3d machines seems to
be enough). All they want is to pump out as much traffic as possible,
any overhead just slows them down.

Of course packaging Tor in a malware vector would result in bad press.
However, as things currently go, offering anonymity already firmly puts you
into drug-trafficking pedophile terrorist mobsters corner.

So, have you stopped beating your wife yet?

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 19 14:57:40 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 17:57:40 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Bush Announces Do-Not-Wiretap List
Message-ID: <p06230925bfcceb503b7d@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 17:56:16 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Bush Announces Do-Not-Wiretap List
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.scrappleface.com/?p=2106>
 ScrappleFace ;

 December 19, 2005

 Bush Announces Do-Not-Wiretap List
 by Scott Ott

 (2005-12-19) - Just days after the New York Times released classified
 information about eavesdropping by the NSA on Americans linked to
 international terrorists, President George Bush at a news conference today
 announced creation of a new website which allows people to voluntarily
 exclude their phone numbers and email addresses from NSA wiretap lists.

 The new National Do Not Wiretap Registry (DoNotWiretap.gov) follows the
 successful DoNotCall.gov model of allowing citizens to opt-out of
 harassment by electronic means.

 "If you're concerned that your civil rights might be violated simply
 because some al Qaeda member has your information in his cellphone or
 computer," the president said, "then go to DoNotWiretap.gov, enter your
 contact phone number, email address, and names of terrorists who might have
 you on speed dial and we'll let the National Security Administration know
 that you don't want them eavesdropping on you."

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From Earline.Pollock at aventura.uk.com  Mon Dec 19 20:44:39 2005
From: Earline.Pollock at aventura.uk.com (Freddie Childers)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 23:44:39 -0500
Subject: Techencomia Customer Support
References: <33922259503961845412309@bobreidell.com>
Message-ID: <954006swear9331683@hanley>

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From arma at mit.edu  Mon Dec 19 23:13:09 2005
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 02:13:09 -0500
Subject: We have a new Windows Tor installer
Message-ID: <mailman.1458.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi folks,

Matt Edman has created a "package bundle" that includes Tor, TorCP,
and Privoxy. We've rewritten the Tor win32 instructions to tell people
to use that rather than doing all the steps manually:

http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/tor-doc-win32.html

If you're a Windows user, please take a look and let us know if there
are any installation problems, and if there are any documentation things
we should fix.

Thanks!
--Roger

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Tue Dec 20 06:51:37 2005
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: December 20, 2005 6:51:37 PM EST
Subject: LA Times on NYT spying story
Message-ID: <mailman.1459.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi, Brock, Dave - the URL lost a hyphen when it got folded;
the two halves are:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/
la-na-media20dec20,1,3657594.story?coll=la-headlines-nation

Meanwhile, not only is this yet another reminder of the
fallacy of the right-wing rants about liberal press bias,
but President Bush has been asserting that he's told
Congress a dozen times that he's doing this,
and none of the Congresscritters who were informed
have seen fit to tell the public either,
so the President and NYTimes have a lot of
unindicted co-conspirators.

Another LA Times story
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/
la-na-spy20dec20,1,4766037.story?coll=la-headlines-nation
reports that the main difference between Bush's authorization
and the powers already granted under the 1978 FISA laws
is that FISA has the Constitutional requirement for
a court to find "probable cause" for issuing warrants,
while Bush's order allows an NSA shift supervisor
to decide there's "a reasonable basis" for wiretapping,
even if there's not enough evidence for a FISC rubber stamp.

		Bill Stewart




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To manage your subscription, go to
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dewayne at warpspeed.com  Tue Dec 20 08:25:41 2005
From: dewayne at warpspeed.com (Dewayne Hendricks)
Date: December 20, 2005 8:25:41 AM EST
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] San Francisco leaders voice concerns about Wi-
Message-ID: <mailman.1460.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Fi project
Reply-To: dewayne at warpspeed.com

San Francisco leaders voice concerns about Wi-Fi project
Agency members want to avoid a restrictive franchise deal
News Story by Stephen Lawson
<http://www.computerworld.com/mobiletopics/mobile/technology/story/
0,10801,107216,00.html?source=x596>

DECEMBER 19, 2005 (IDG NEWS SERVICE) - San Francisco's plan for
citywide Wi-Fi ran into some friction Friday from a local regulatory
agency.

The government of the City and County of San Francisco is readying a
request for proposal (RFP) for the wireless network, which is
intended to provide free or affordable Internet access throughout
most of the city. Several possible partners, including Google Inc.,
EarthLink Inc., Motorola Inc. and a local nonprofit project called
SFLan, have already expressed interest in the project through an
earlier request for information. The San Francisco plan would become
one of the largest rollouts yet of government-initiated broadband, a
concept that has generated heated political discussion in the past
several months.

At a hearing Friday, some members of San Francisco's Local Agency
Formation Commission (LAFCO) grilled Chris Vein, director of the
city's Department of Technology and Information Services (DTIS),
about the process of deciding how to build and operate the network.

LAFCO, made up of San Francisco county supervisors and members of the
public, has a broad oversight role, including approval of district
boundaries and annexation of land as well as contract approvals. The
agency's aim in the hearing was to stimulate discussion, supervisor
and LAFCO member Jake McGoldrick said in an interview after the meeting.

County Supervisor Ross Mirkarimi and other LAFCO members said they
fear a deal like San Francisco's current franchise agreement with
cable operator Comcast Corp., in which the board of supervisors has
been presented with already negotiated franchise deals that it must
approve or vote down. DTIS handles cable franchise administration and
other communications and IT responsibilities for the city as well as
spearheading the Wi-Fi project.

[snip]

Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>



-------------------------------------
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 19 23:55:58 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 08:55:58 +0100
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: We have a new Windows Tor installer]
Message-ID: <20051220075558.GS2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From lauren at vortex.com  Tue Dec 20 10:01:41 2005
From: lauren at vortex.com (Lauren Weinstein)
Date: December 20, 2005 10:01:41 PM EST
Subject: "Double Secret" Wiretaps vs. the President's 2004 Statement
Message-ID: <mailman.1461.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>


Dave,

In April 2004, President Bush made a seemingly direct and
unequivocal statement regarding U.S. wiretapping policies in the
fight against terrorism.  We now know that he spoke these words after
authorizing the NSA warrantless wiretapping program.

You can hear his comments for yourself in this very short video:

http://www.vortex.com/bv/wiretaps.wmv (Windows Media)

The White House explanation for this seemingly gaping discrepancy is
that the President was supposedly (we're now told) only talking about
"ordinary" secret wiretaps under the PATRIOT Act, not about what
we might call "Double Secret" NSA wiretaps (legal or not).

Newspeak is alive and well.  Dean Wormer of "Animal House" fame
would be proud.

--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein
lauren at pfir.org or lauren at vortex.com or lauren at eepi.org
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
http://www.pfir.org/lauren
Co-Founder, PFIR
  - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org
Co-Founder, EEPI
  - Electronic Entertainment Policy Initiative - http://www.eepi.org
Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com
DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com



-------------------------------------
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To manage your subscription, go to
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 08:36:29 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 11:36:29 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Thank You for Wiretapping
Message-ID: <p062309debfcde381684d@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 11:16:31 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Thank You for Wiretapping
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB113503784784326861.html>

 The Wall Street Journal

  December 20, 2005
  REVIEW & OUTLOOK

 Thank You for Wiretapping
 December 20, 2005; Page A14

 Wisconsin Democrat Russ Feingold wants to be President, and that's fair
 enough. By all means go for it in 2008. The same applies to Lindsey Graham,
 the South Carolina Republican who's always on the Sunday shows fretting
 about the latest criticism of the Bush Administration's prosecution of the
 war on terror. But until you run nationwide and win, Senators, please stop
 stripping the Presidency of its Constitutional authority to defend America.

 That is the real issue raised by the Beltway furor over last week's leak of
 National Security Agency wiretaps on international phone calls involving al
 Qaeda suspects. The usual assortment of Senators and media potentates is
 howling that the wiretaps are "illegal," done "in total secret," and
 threaten to bring us a long, dark night of fascism. "I believe it does
 violate the law," averred Mr. Feingold on CNN Sunday.

 The truth is closer to the opposite. What we really have here is a perfect
 illustration of why America's Founders gave the executive branch the
 largest measure of Constitutional authority on national security. They
 recognized that a committee of 535 talking heads couldn't be trusted with
 such grave responsibility. There is no evidence that these wiretaps violate
 the law. But there is lots of evidence that the Senators are "illegally"
 usurping Presidential power -- and endangering the country in the process.

 * * *

 The allegation of Presidential law-breaking rests solely on the fact that
 Mr. Bush authorized wiretaps without first getting the approval of the
 court established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
 But no Administration then or since has ever conceded that that Act trumped
 a President's power to make exceptions to FISA if national security
 required it. FISA established a process by which certain wiretaps in the
 context of the Cold War could be approved, not a limit on what wiretaps
 could ever be allowed.

 The courts have been explicit on this point, most recently in In Re: Sealed
 Case, the 2002 opinion by the special panel of appellate judges established
 to hear FISA appeals. In its per curiam opinion, the court noted that in a
 previous FISA case (U.S. v. Truong), a federal "court, as did all the other
 courts to have decided the issue [our emphasis], held that the President
 did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain
 foreign intelligence information." And further that, "We take for granted
 that the President does have that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA
 could not encroach on the President's constitutional power."

 On Sunday Mr. Graham opined that "I don't know of any legal basis to go
 around" FISA -- which suggests that next time he should do his homework
 before he implies on national TV that a President is acting like a
 dictator. (Mr. Graham made his admission of ignorance on CBS's "Face the
 Nation," where he was representing the Republican point of view. Democrat
 Joe Biden was certain that laws had been broken, while the two journalists
 asking questions clearly had no idea what they were talking about. So much
 for enlightening television.)

 The mere Constitution aside, the evidence is also abundant that the
 Administration was scrupulous in limiting the FISA exceptions. They applied
 only to calls involving al Qaeda suspects or those with terrorist ties. Far
 from being "secret," key Members of Congress were informed about them at
 least 12 times, President Bush said yesterday. The two district court
 judges who have presided over the FISA court since 9/11 also knew about
 them.

 Inside the executive branch, the process allowing the wiretaps was
 routinely reviewed by Justice Department lawyers, by the Attorney General
 personally, and with the President himself reauthorizing the process every
 45 days. In short, the implication that this is some LBJ-J. Edgar Hoover
 operation designed to skirt the law to spy on domestic political enemies is
 nothing less than a political smear.

 All the more so because there are sound and essential security reasons for
 allowing such wiretaps. The FISA process was designed for wiretaps on
 suspected foreign agents operating in this country during the Cold War. In
 that context, we had the luxury of time to go to the FISA court for a
 warrant to spy on, say, the economic counselor at the Soviet embassy.

 In the war on terror, the communications between terrorists in Frankfurt
 and agents in Florida are harder to track, and when we gather a lead the
 response often has to be immediate. As we learned on 9/11, acting with
 dispatch can be a matter of life and death. The information gathered in
 these wiretaps is not for criminal prosecution but solely to detect and
 deter future attacks. This is precisely the kind of contingency for which
 Presidential power and responsibility is designed.

 What the critics in Congress seem to be proposing -- to the extent they've
 even thought much about it -- is the establishment of a new intelligence
 "wall" that would allow the NSA only to tap phones overseas while the FBI
 would tap them here. Terrorists aren't about to honor such a distinction.
 As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Sunday on NBC's "Meet the
 Press," before 9/11 "Our intelligence agencies looked out; our law
 enforcement agencies looked in. And people could -- terrorists could --
 exploit the seam between them." The wiretaps are designed to close the seam.

 * * *

 As for power without responsibility, nobody beats Congress. Mr. Bush has
 publicly acknowledged and defended his decisions. But the Members of
 Congress who were informed about this all along are now either silent or
 claim they didn't get the full story. This is why these columns have long
 opposed requiring the disclosure of classified operations to the
 Congressional Intelligence Committees. Congress wants to be aware of
 everything the executive branch does, but without being accountable for
 anything at all. If Democrats want to continue this game of intelligence
 and wiretap "gotcha," the White House should release the names of every
 Congressman who received such a briefing.

 Which brings us to this national security leak, which Mr. Bush yesterday
 called "a shameful act." We won't second guess the New York Times decision
 to publish. But everyone should note the irony that both the Times and
 Washington Post claimed to be outraged by, and demanded a special counsel
 to investigate, the leak of Valerie Plame's identity, which did zero
 national security damage.

 By contrast, the Times's NSA leak last week, and an earlier leak in the
 Washington Post on "secret" prisons for al Qaeda detainees in Europe, are
 likely to do genuine harm by alerting terrorists to our defenses. If more
 reporters from these newspapers now face the choice of revealing their
 sources or ending up in jail, those two papers will share the Plame blame.

 The NSA wiretap uproar is one of those episodes, alas far too common, that
 makes us wonder if Washington is still a serious place. Too many in the
 media and on Capitol Hill have forgotten that terrorism in the age of WMD
 poses an existential threat to our free society. We're glad Mr. Bush and
 his team are forcefully defending their entirely legal and necessary
 authority to wiretap enemies seeking to kill innocent Americans.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From EEkid at aol.com  Tue Dec 20 11:41:30 2005
From: EEkid at aol.com (EEkid at aol.com)
Date: December 20, 2005 11:41:30 PM EST
Subject: State refuses to approve Diebold voting machines
Message-ID: <mailman.1462.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

State refuses to approve Diebold voting machines

By Edwin Garcia
Mercury News Sacramento Bureau

SACRAMENTO - Suggesting the ``security and integrity'' of electronic
voting could be at risk, Secretary of State Bruce McPherson on
Tuesday refused to approve the use of thousands of electronic voting
machines pending a federal evaluation.

The touch-screen and optical-scan machines, made by Diebold Election
Systems and used in 17 counties, including Alameda, were found to
have ``unresolved significant security concerns'' with a memory card
that stores votes in each machine, McPherson's elections chief, Caren
Daniels-Meade, said in a letter to the company's vice president,
David Byrd.

At issue is whether the removable cards, which are used to program
and configure the machines, will keep data secure.

The Secretary of State's office is asking Diebold to submit the
machine's source code for review by the federal Independent Testing
Authorities before resubmitting the company's application for
certification in California.

Byrd, Diebold's vice president of business operations, is eager to
comply.

``Diebold Election Systems is always willing to participate in
responsible testing to show that our voting systems are up to the
task of giving more Californians an accessible and reliable way to
vote,'' Byrd said. ``This has always been our goal: to provide a more
accurate, secure and accessible voting process for all Californians.''

http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/13452214.htm



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______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 08:59:12 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 11:59:12 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps
Message-ID: <p062309e0bfcde8b8a11b@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 11:57:58 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.p?ref=/york/york200512191334.asp>

 The National Review
 Byron York

 December 19, 2005, 1:34 p.m.
 Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps
 Not long ago, both parties agreed the FISA court was a problem.


 In the days since the revelation that President Bush authorized the
 National Security Agency to bypass, in certain cases of suspected al Qaeda
 activity, the special court set up to provide warrants for
 national-security wiretaps, the question has come up repeatedly: Why did he
 do it?

 At his news conference this morning, the president explained that he
 believed the U.S. government had to "be able to act fast" to intercept the
 "international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda." "Al
 Qaeda was not a conventional enemy," Bush said. "This new threat required
 us to think and act differently."

 But there's more to the story than that. In 2002, when the president made
 his decision, there was widespread, bipartisan frustration with the
 slowness and inefficiency of the bureaucracy involved in seeking warrants
 from the special intelligence court, known as the FISA court. Even later,
 after the provisions of the Patriot Act had had time to take effect, there
 were still problems with the FISA court - problems examined by members of
 the September 11 Commission - and questions about whether the court can
 deal effectively with the fastest-changing cases in the war on terror.

 People familiar with the process say the problem is not so much with the
 court itself as with the process required to bring a case before the court.
 "It takes days, sometimes weeks, to get the application for FISA together,"
 says one source. "It's not so much that the court doesn't grant them
 quickly, it's that it takes a long time to get to the court. Even after the
 Patriot Act, it's still a very cumbersome process. It is not built for
 speed, it is not built to be efficient. It is built with an eye to keeping
 [investigators] in check." And even though the attorney general has the
 authority in some cases to undertake surveillance immediately, and then
 seek an emergency warrant, that process is just as cumbersome as the normal
 way of doing things.

 Lawmakers of both parties recognized the problem in the months after the
 September 11 terrorist attacks. They pointed to the case of Coleen Rowley,
 the FBI agent who ran up against a number roadblocks in her effort to
 secure a FISA warrant in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the al Qaeda
 operative who had taken flight training in preparation for the hijackings.
 Investigators wanted to study the contents of Moussaoui's laptop computer,
 but the FBI bureaucracy involved in applying for a FISA warrant was
 stifling, and there were real questions about whether investigators could
 meet the FISA court's probable-cause standard for granting a warrant. FBI
 agents became so frustrated that they considered flying Moussaoui to
 France, where his computer could be examined. But then the attacks came,
 and it was too late.

 Rowley wrote up her concerns in a famous 13-page memo to FBI Director
 Robert Mueller, and then elaborated on them in testimony to Congress.
 "Rowley depicted the legal mechanism for security warrants under the
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, as burdensome and
 restrictive, a virtual roadblock to effective law enforcement," Legal Times
 reported in September 2002.

 The Patriot Act included some provisions, supported by lawmakers of both
 parties, to make securing such warrants easier. But it did not fix the
 problem. In April 2004, when members of the September 11 Commission briefed
 the press on some of their preliminary findings, they reported that
 significant problems remained.

 "Many agents in the field told us that although there is now less hesitancy
 in seeking approval for electronic surveillance under the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, the application process nonetheless
 continues to be long and slow," the commission said. "Requests for such
 approvals are overwhelming the ability of the system to process them and to
 conduct the surveillance. The Department of Justice and FBI are attempting
 to address bottlenecks in the process."

 It was in the context of such bureaucratic bottlenecks that the president
 first authorized, and then renewed, the program to bypass the FISA court in
 cases of international communications of people with known al Qaeda links.

 There were other reasons for the president to act, as well. In short, it
 appears that he was trying to shake the bureaucracy into action. The
 September 11 Commission report pointed to a deeply entrenched
 it's-not-my-job mentality within the National Security Agency that led the
 organization to shy away from aggressive antiterrorism surveillance. "The
 law requires the NSA to not deliberately collect data on U.S. citizens or
 on persons in the United States without a warrant based on foreign
 intelligence requirements," the 9/11 commission report wrote,
 While the NSA had the technical capability to report on communications with
 suspected terrorist facilities in the Middle East, the NSA did not seek
 FISA Court warrants to collect communications between individuals in the
 United States and foreign countries, because it believed that this was an
 FBI role. It also did not want to be viewed as targeting persons in the
 United States and possibly violating laws that governed NSA's collection of
 foreign intelligence. An almost obsessive protection of sources and methods
 by the NSA, and its focus on foreign intelligence, and its avoidance of
 anything domestic would...be important elements in the story of 9/11.

 Bush's order, it appears, was an attempt to change that situation.
 Especially before, and even after, passage of the Patriot Act, the FISA
 bureaucracy and the agencies that dealt with it were too unwieldy to handle
 some fast-moving intelligence cases. And now, a group of 43 Democrats and
 four Republicans is trying to undo even those improvements brought by the
 Patriot Act; after the effort to renew the law was filibustered last week,
 Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid exulted, "We killed the Patriot Act." Put
 all those factors together, and they explain the president's impassioned
 argument that he has to act to keep the pressure on al Qaeda - especially
 at a time when others, for whatever reasons, are trying to stop him.

  - Byron York, NR's White House correspondent, is the author of The Vast
 Left Wing Conspiracy: The Untold Story of How Democratic Operatives,
 Eccentric Billionaires, Liberal Activists, and Assorted Celebrities Tried
 to Bring Down a President - and Why They'll Try Even Harder Next Time.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From perry at piermont.com  Tue Dec 20 09:14:30 2005
From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 12:14:30 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Thank You for Wiretapping
In-Reply-To: <p062309debfcde381684d@[68.167.57.91]> (R. A. Hettinga's 
  message of "Tue, 20 Dec 2005 11:36:29 -0500")
References: <p062309debfcde381684d@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <87r787n11l.fsf@snark.piermont.com>

>  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
[...]
>  The Wall Street Journal
>
>   December 20, 2005
>   REVIEW & OUTLOOK
>
>  Thank You for Wiretapping
>  December 20, 2005; Page A14
[...]
>  There is no evidence that these wiretaps violate the law.[...]

Well, no evidence if you can't read. If you can read, I suggest
looking here:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_36_20_I.html

That is the text of the law. It was passed in 1978 after the congress
got upset about the NSA spying without court orders, so the intent is
unmistakable. The law says "you can listen in on US citizens all you
like, but you have to request permission of a special court, the
FISC. You can start listening in on their communications up to 72
hours before asking the FISC so you can't make a claim that there was
no time to ask, but you must ultimately ask the FISC. If you do not
ask the FISC, what you do is a felony punishable by five years in
prison and a $10,000 fine, and the people you listened in on get to
sue you for civil damages, too."

You can read the law yourself. Yo do not need to believe me on it.  I
suggest strongly that people take the five minutes needed to read this
section of the law in its entirety. It is short and simple. There is
no complicated legal language in it. It is also utterly impossible to
misinterpret. Once you have read it for yourself, no spin doctor like
Bob or the Wall Street Journal can tell you what to think. No one can
pretend to you that the truth is not the truth. You will know for
yourself, without the need for the media to interpret things for
you. So, I suggest you arm yourself against people who choose to tell
you things that aren't true by reading for yourself. Again, it will
take you less than five minutes.

There are also lots of people out there who will claim to you that the
President can ignore the law. That's not true -- we have multiple
Supreme Court precedents that say otherwise. Still others will tell
you that the President's military authority lets him ignore the law in
certain ways, and again, we have Supreme Court precedents that cover
that.

So, why are some people pretending that black is white and white is
black? Because for once, George W. Bush has actually slipped up and
committed a federal crime. That means that everyone involved is
dancing as hard as they can, trying to kick up enough dust that people
forget about lines in the law like:

   An offense described in this section is punishable by a fine of not
   more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or
   both.

They're gambling that you won't read the law for yourself, that you
won't know what it says, that you'll believe them when they say that
the truth is not the truth. They're betting on the ignorance and
foolishness of the US public, on the laziness of the public. Do not
let them win. Read the law for yourself. See for yourself that the
President of the United States willfully committed a felony and
encouraged others to do so, not to protect anyone, because the law
already allowed legal surveillance, even in emergencies, but because
the administration arrogantly decided that it was above the law.

Read for yourself. Then, call your congressman and your senators and
tell them to read for themselves. Do not let this die. Do not let it
be forgotten.

Perry




From jya at cryptome.net  Tue Dec 20 12:19:50 2005
From: jya at cryptome.net (John Young)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 12:19:50 -0800
Subject: [Clips] Thank You for Wiretapping
In-Reply-To: <p062309debfcde381684d@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <E1EolGW-0000iN-00@pop06.mail.atl.earthlink.net>

The proponents of NSA snooping are getting their drawers twisted,
some calling Echelon Clinton's baby, with Drudge and Limbaugh and
other wing-nuts linking to a CBS 60 Minutes cursory report, and 
others of the war lovers disavowing it, while the WSJ cheers for 
what it does do not understand, ignorantly accusing others of 
misunderstanding.

Duncan Campbell wrote a long report on Echelon for EPIC in
June 2000 which the "privacy" org refused to publish, claiming
NSA does not spy on Americans. We asked EPIC in January 
2005 for permission to publish the report but never got an answer.
Here it is, entitled "Signals Intelligence and Human Rights -
the ECHELON report:"


http://cryptome.org/sigint-hr-dc.htm

Campbell carefully reviews all technical, political and legal
aspects of Echelon and NSA's global interception programs,
and there is meat there for all sides of the current superficial
spitting contest -- WSJ and the NYT and WashPo could learn
from Campbell. He cites 70s eavesdropping reports from all 
of them which seem to have been ignored in the shallow
recent accounts.

Campbell's principal conclusion is that NSA and its backers 
have lied consistently about what it is doing, from the Church
Committee hearings in the 70s on through 2000, and likely
have lied since then as a matter of policy, lied to Congress, 
lied to the public, and perhaps lied to its backers so polished
and encrusted is its concealment.

Porter Goss, along with Bob Barr, both CIA dudes, tried to
pry open NSA's box in the late 90s and had no luck due to
the blind faith that NSA could do no wrong, or at least could
do no wrong in the eyes of overseers.

To be sure, what NSA siphons about US corporate, governmental
and political corruption could silence the most frightened of
WSJ-adoring malfeasors, a trick learned from Hoover. Don't

spy in the US, too much villany in the homeland of winner take
all markets.

What NSA has on the Times, WashPo and WSJ top dogs would
be wondrous to read.




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 09:54:35 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 12:54:35 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Clinton Claimed Authority to Order No-Warrant Searches
Message-ID: <p062309eabfcdf5c4aff6@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 12:52:41 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Clinton Claimed Authority to Order No-Warrant Searches
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.p?ref=/york/york200512200946.asp>

 The National Review
 Byron York

 December 20, 2005, 9:46 a.m.
 Clinton Claimed Authority to Order No-Warrant Searches
 Does anyone remember that?


 In a little-remembered debate from 1994, the Clinton administration argued
 that the president has "inherent authority" to order physical searches -
 including break-ins at the homes of U.S. citizens - for foreign
 intelligence purposes without any warrant or permission from any outside
 body. Even after the administration ultimately agreed with Congress's
 decision to place the authority to pre-approve such searches in the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, President Clinton still
 maintained that he had sufficient authority to order such searches on his
 own.

 "The Department of Justice believes, and the case law supports, that the
 president has inherent authority to conduct warrantless physical searches
 for foreign intelligence purposes," Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick
 testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on July 14, 1994, "and
 that the President may, as has been done, delegate this authority to the
 Attorney General."

 "It is important to understand," Gorelick continued, "that the rules and
 methodology for criminal searches are inconsistent with the collection of
 foreign intelligence and would unduly frustrate the president in carrying
 out his foreign intelligence responsibilities."

 Executive Order 12333, signed by Ronald Reagan in 1981, provides for such
 warrantless searches directed against "a foreign power or an agent of a
 foreign power."

 Reporting the day after Gorelick's testimony, the Washington Post's
 headline - on page A-19 - read, "Administration Backing No-Warrant Spy
 Searches." The story began, "The Clinton administration, in a
 little-noticed facet of the debate on intelligence reforms, is seeking
 congressional authorization for U.S. spies to continue conducting
 clandestine searches at foreign embassies in Washington and other cities
 without a federal court order. The administration's quiet lobbying effort
 is aimed at modifying draft legislation that would require U.S.
 counterintelligence officials to get a court order before secretly snooping
 inside the homes or workplaces of suspected foreign agents or foreign
 powers."

 In her testimony, Gorelick made clear that the president believed he had
 the power to order warrantless searches for the purpose of gathering
 intelligence, even if there was no reason to believe that the search might
 uncover evidence of a crime. "Intelligence is often long range, its exact
 targets are more difficult to identify, and its focus is less precise,"
 Gorelick said. "Information gathering for policy making and prevention,
 rather than prosecution, are its primary focus."

 The debate over warrantless searches came up after the case of CIA spy
 Aldrich Ames. Authorities had searched Ames's house without a warrant, and
 the Justice Department feared that Ames's lawyers would challenge the
 search in court. Meanwhile, Congress began discussing a measure under which
 the authorization for break-ins would be handled like the authorization for
 wiretaps, that is, by the FISA court. In her testimony, Gorelick signaled
 that the administration would go along a congressional decision to place
 such searches under the court - if, as she testified, it "does not restrict
 the president's ability to collect foreign intelligence necessary for the
 national security." In the end, Congress placed the searches under the FISA
 court, but the Clinton administration did not back down from its contention
 that the president had the authority to act when necessary.

  - Byron York, NR's White House correspondent, is the author of The Vast
 Left Wing Conspiracy: The Untold Story of How Democratic Operatives,
 Eccentric Billionaires, Liberal Activists, and Assorted Celebrities Tried
 to Bring Down a President - and Why They'll Try Even Harder Next Time.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From perry at piermont.com  Tue Dec 20 10:04:00 2005
From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 13:04:00 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <p062309e0bfcde8b8a11b@[68.167.57.91]> (R. A. Hettinga's 
  message of "Tue, 20 Dec 2005 11:59:12 -0500")
References: <p062309e0bfcde8b8a11b@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <87k6dzmyr3.fsf@snark.piermont.com>

"R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> writes:
[...]>
>  The National Review
>  Byron York
[...]
>  At his news conference this morning, the president explained that he
>  believed the U.S. government had to "be able to act fast" to intercept the
>  "international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda." "Al
>  Qaeda was not a conventional enemy," Bush said. "This new threat required
>  us to think and act differently."

The FISA law already allows taps to go on for 72 hours before a court
is informed. That's three days. In three days people can't fill in a
form and deliver it to the FISA court? The FISC has approved 15,000
wiretaps and rejected less than ten in its history.

>  But there's more to the story than that. In 2002, when the president made
>  his decision, there was widespread, bipartisan frustration with the
>  slowness and inefficiency of the bureaucracy involved in seeking warrants
>  from the special intelligence court, known as the FISA court.

It is so inefficient that you don't even have to ask for THREE
DAYS. Three days isn't enough time?

More to the point, even if the President thinks something is
"inefficient", the law is the law. If it says "those who do not seek a
FISC warrant go to jail for five years", the President has to obey.

>  People familiar with the process say the problem is not so much with the
>  court itself as with the process required to bring a case before the court.
>  "It takes days, sometimes weeks, to get the application for FISA together,"
>  says one source. "It's not so much that the court doesn't grant them
>  quickly, it's that it takes a long time to get to the court.

Of course, this is in fact untrue. FISA requests are as fast as the
Department of Justice and NSA wish them to be.

Of course, even if it were true, the law is clear, and the President
is not the legislature. The administration had years and years in
which to ask Congress to alter the law. It did not do so. It chose to
simply solicit the commission of felonies.

All these comments about "slowness" and "cumbersomeness" etc. are
attempts by the magician to keep your eye away from what he does not
want you to see. Do not be distracted. A felony was solicited by the
President and committed by employees of the NSA. Do not let them
distract you. Keep your eye on the target.

>  And even though the attorney general has the
>  authority in some cases to undertake surveillance immediately, and then
>  seek an emergency warrant, that process is just as cumbersome as the normal
>  way of doing things.

Actually, the law doesn't say "in some cases".

  Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the
  Attorney General reasonably determines that
  (1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of
      electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information
      before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due
      diligence be obtained; and
  (2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this subchapter
      to approve such surveillance exists;
  he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance
  if a judge having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is
  informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such
  authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency
  electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this
  subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more
  than 72 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance.

So it isn't "in some cases" -- it is basically any time the Attorney
General decides to rubber stamp it.

Again, don't be fooled by the smokescreen. Read the law yourself. See
for yourself that the President has disobeyed a criminal statute.

>  Lawmakers of both parties recognized the problem in the months after the
>  September 11 terrorist attacks. They pointed to the case of Coleen Rowley,
>  the FBI agent who ran up against a number roadblocks in her effort to
>  secure a FISA warrant in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the al Qaeda
>  operative who had taken flight training in preparation for the hijackings.
>  Investigators wanted to study the contents of Moussaoui's laptop computer,
>  but the FBI bureaucracy involved in applying for a FISA warrant was
>  stifling, and there were real questions about whether investigators could
>  meet the FISA court's probable-cause standard for granting a
>  warrant.

A fascinating story, except it is on its face false. FISA warrants are
for intercepting communications, not for examining laptops:

   Electronic surveillance means
   (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
       surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
       communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular,
       known United States person who is in the United States, if the
       contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United
       States person, under circumstances in which a person has a
       reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
       for law enforcement purposes;
   (2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
       surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to
       or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any
       party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States,
       but does not include the acquisition of those communications of
       computer trespassers that would be permissible under section 2511
       (2)(i) of title 18;
   (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
       surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication,
       under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation
       of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
       purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are
       located within the United States; or
   (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
       surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire
       information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under
       circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
       privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.

Also, Mr. Moussaoui was not a US person, and the Attorney General can
authorized anything he likes without a court order if:

   [...]there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire
   the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a
   party[...]

As I said, the story in question is completely false on its face. The
people who wrote it are counting on you not reading the law, not
informing yourself, not knowing what is true and what is not. Do not
be fooled. Read the law for yourself.

In any case, cumbersome and unpleasant or not, the law is still in
force, and the law says that the President of the United States
committed a felony and solicited the commission of felonies.

>  Bush's order, it appears, was an attempt to change that situation.
>  Especially before, and even after, passage of the Patriot Act, the FISA
>  bureaucracy and the agencies that dealt with it were too unwieldy to handle
>  some fast-moving intelligence cases.

There is no "FISA bureaucracy". What is there? There is a court with
eleven judges. That's it:

  The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 11
  district court judges from seven of the United States judicial
  circuits of whom no fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the
  District of Columbia who shall constitute a court which shall have
  jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving
  electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States under the
  procedures set forth in this chapter[...]

That is the "FISA bureaucracy" they speak of.

Again, do not be fooled. Do not allow the spin masters to convince you
that black is white and white is black. Read the law for yourself,
understand for yourself what has happened.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_36_20_I.html

Perry




From perry at piermont.com  Tue Dec 20 10:27:08 2005
From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 13:27:08 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Clinton Claimed Authority to Order No-Warrant
  Searches
In-Reply-To: <p062309eabfcdf5c4aff6@[68.167.57.91]> (R. A. Hettinga's 
  message of "Tue, 20 Dec 2005 12:54:35 -0500")
References: <p062309eabfcdf5c4aff6@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <873bknmxoj.fsf@snark.piermont.com>

"R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> writes:
>  The National Review
>  Byron York
>
>  December 20, 2005, 9:46 a.m.
>  Clinton Claimed Authority to Order No-Warrant Searches
>  Does anyone remember that?
>
>
>  In a little-remembered debate from 1994, the Clinton administration argued
>  that the president has "inherent authority" to order physical searches -
>  including break-ins at the homes of U.S. citizens - for foreign
>  intelligence purposes without any warrant or permission from any outside
>  body. Even after the administration ultimately agreed with Congress's
>  decision to place the authority to pre-approve such searches in the Foreign
>  Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, President Clinton still
>  maintained that he had sufficient authority to order such searches on his
>  own.

Nice misdirection, but:

>  Executive Order 12333, signed by Ronald Reagan in 1981, provides for such
>  warrantless searches directed against "a foreign power or an agent of a
>  foreign power."

Those are both terms of art in 50 USC. They're not "US Persons".

>  Reporting the day after Gorelick's testimony, the Washington Post's
>  headline - on page A-19 - read, "Administration Backing No-Warrant Spy
>  Searches." The story began, "The Clinton administration, in a
>  little-noticed facet of the debate on intelligence reforms, is seeking
>  congressional authorization for U.S. spies to continue conducting
>  clandestine searches at foreign embassies in Washington and other cities
>  without a federal court order.

Note the phrase "Congressional Authorization".

And, even if Clinton suggested the law could be broken or broke it,
that does not mean that Bush has not broken the law.

Again and again, Bob seems to be forwarding us chaff -- the smoke
thrown up by the President's spin doctors who do not want you paying
attention to the fact that the President broke a criminal law. Do not
be deceived. Do not be misdirected. Keep your eye on what matters, and
not on what the magicians want you to watch.

Most importantly, call your senators and congressional representative
NOW.

Perry




From coderman at gmail.com  Tue Dec 20 13:38:54 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 13:38:54 -0800
Subject: Exactly what part...
In-Reply-To: <p06230939bfce1e59331d@68.167.57.91>
References: <p06230939bfce1e59331d@68.167.57.91>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512201338w3f51c77en36fb329efdd4919e@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/20/05, R. A. Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:
> ...of "cypherpunks write code" doesn't anyone around here understand?

Glenn Henry at VIA gets my respect for putting crypto on the core of
commodity processors*.  Does hardware count? :)

* http://www.via.com.tw/en/initiatives/padlock/hardware.jsp




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 10:40:39 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 13:40:39 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Democrats Say They Didn't Back Wiretapping
Message-ID: <p06230901bfce009c3ac4@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 13:37:05 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Democrats Say They Didn't Back Wiretapping
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.breitbart.com/news/2005/12/20/D8EK2VEO7.html>


 BREITBART.COM -

 Democrats Say They Didn't Back Wiretapping


 By KATHERINE SHRADER
 Associated Press Writer
 Dec 20 11:22 AM US/Eastern


 WASHINGTON -  Some Democrats say they never approved a domestic wiretapping
 program, undermining suggestions by President Bush and his senior advisers
 that the plan was fully vetted in a series of congressional briefings. "I
 feel unable to fully evaluate, much less endorse, these activities," West
 Virginia Sen. Jay Rockefeller, the Senate Intelligence Committee's top
 Democrat, said in a handwritten letter to Vice President Dick Cheney in
 July 2003. "As you know, I am neither a technician nor an attorney."


  Rockefeller is among a small group of congressional leaders who have
 received briefings on the administration's four-year-old program to
 eavesdrop _ without warrants _ on international calls and e-mails of
 Americans and others inside the United States with suspected ties to
 al-Qaida.

  The government still would seek court approval to snoop on purely domestic
 communications, such as calls between New York and Los Angeles.

  The White House brushed aside Democrats' contention that they weren't
 provided enough information on the program. "They were briefed and
 informed," White House press secretary Scott McClellan said, repeatedly
 refusing to address Democrats' specific complaints. "Congress has an
 important oversight role."

  Some legal experts described the program as groundbreaking. And until the
 highly cl conference that he was assuming unlimited powers.

  "To say 'unchecked power' basically is ascribing some kind of dictatorial
 position to the president, which I strongly reject," he said angrily. "I am
 doing what you expect me to do, and at the same time, safeguarding the
 civil liberties of the country."

  Despite the defense, there was a growing storm of criticism in Congress
 and calls for investigations, from Democrats and Republicans alike. Until
 the past several days, the White House had only informed Congress' top
 political and intelligence committee leadership about the program that Bush
 has reauthorized more than three dozen times.

  Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said he and other top aides were now
 educating the American people and Congress. "The president has not
 authorized ... blanket surveillance of communications here in the United
 States," he said.

  The spying uproar was the latest controversy about Bush's handling of the
 war on terror. It follows allegations of secret prisons in Eastern Europe
 and of torture and other mistreatment of detainees, and an American death
 toll in Iraq that has exceeded 2,150.

  The eavesdropping program was operated out of the NSA, the nation's
 largest and perhaps most secretive spy operation. Employees there
 appreciate their nicknames: No Such Agency or Never Say Anything.

  Decisions on what conversations to monitor are made at the Fort Meade,
 Md., headquarters, approved by an NSA shift supervisor and carefully
 recorded, said Gen. Michael Hayden, the principal deputy director of
 intelligence.

  "The reason I emphasize that this is done at the operational level is to
 remove any question in your mind that this is in any way politically
 influenced," said Hayden, who was NSA director when the program began.

  Since the program was disclosed last week by The New York Times, current
 and former Congress members have been liberated to weigh in.

  Former Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., who was part of the Intelligence
 Committee's leadership after the 9/11 attacks, recalled a briefing about
 changes in international electronic surveillance, but does not remember
 being told of a program snooping on individuals in the United States.

  House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., received several briefings
 and raised concerns, including in a classified letter, her spokeswoman
 Jennifer Crider said.

  Former Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle said he, too, was briefed by
 the White House between 2002 and 2004 but was not told key details about
 the scope of the program.

  Daschle's successor, Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., said he received a single
 briefing earlier this year and that important details were withheld. "We
 need to investigate this program and the president's legal authority to
 carry it out," Reid said.

  Republicans, too, were skeptical.

  Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has
 promised hearings next year and said he would ask Bush's Supreme Court
 nominee, Samuel Alito, his views of the president's authority for spying
 without a warrant.

  ___

  On the Net:

  Rockefeller's handwritten note:
 http://wid.ap.org/documents/051219rockefeller.pdf


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 12:19:33 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 15:19:33 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Bush gets key backing on spy policy
Message-ID: <p06230932bfce173e88d3@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 15:15:08 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Bush gets key backing on spy policy
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/front/13445932.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp>

 Posted on Tue, Dec. 20, 2005?
 Intelligence chairman Roberts of Kansas says program 'consistent with U.S.
law'
 Bush gets key backing on spy policy

 By MATT STEARNS
 The Star's Washington Correspondent

 WASHINGTON - The Bush administration found a key ally on Capitol Hill
 Monday as it broadened its aggressive defense of a recently revealed
 domestic spying program that used warrantless surveillance.

 Sen. Pat Roberts of Kansas, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence
 Committee, "believes the program is consistent with U.S. law and the
 Constitution," Sarah Little, Roberts' spokeswoman, said in an e-mailed
 statement.

 Roberts, in his first public remarks on the electronic surveillance
 program, indicated he has known about the program since he took over the
 committee in 2003. He said he believes the administration has taken proper
 safeguards to preserve Americans' civil liberties and is in talks with
 Senate leaders on what additional oversight steps Congress should take,
 Little said.

 "Senator Roberts believes that in a time of war, the president should have
 every lawful authority to protect the American people," Little said.

 The Kansas Republican's defense of the administration came just hours after
 President Bush lambasted critics of his domestic anti-terror policies at a
 White House news conference.

 Facing harsh bipartisan criticism in Congress over the surveillance
 program, and with renewal of his signature anti-terrorism law, the Patriot
 Act, stalled in the Senate, Bush said both are key tools in the war on
 terror.

 "We're doing the right thing," Bush asserted.

 Sen. Russ Feingold, a Wisconsin Democrat, countered by calling the
 surveillance program "an outrageous power grab
against the laws of the
 United States of America."

 Bush called public disclosure of the National Security Agency program
 "shameful 
 the fact that we're discussing this program is helping the
 enemy."

 The program bypasses a secret court system that requires warrants for
 eavesdropping.

 "I just want to assure the American people that, one, I've got the
 authority to do this; two, it is a necessary part of my job to protect you;
 and, three, we're guarding your civil liberties," Bush said.

 The program began after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Bush said
 Congress had been briefed "more than a dozen times on this program."

 Such briefings are classified, which means that even if a member of
 Congress disagrees with a policy, they can't disclose it. The briefings
 were limited to top congressional leadership and the chairmen and ranking
 members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees.

 Sen. Kit Bond, a Missouri Republican who has been on the Senate
 Intelligence Committee since 2003, said he was not aware of the program.
 Sen. Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat on the committee, said he did not know
 about it, either.

 On Capitol Hill, Bush's defense did little to quell criticism, amid
 bipartisan calls for hearings to investigate the program. Democrats said
 they would not seek to halt the program until they gathered more
 information about it. Sen. Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican who is
 chairman of the Judiciary Committee, has criticized the program and vowed
 to hold hearings on it.

 Bush said public hearings would help terrorists by revealing U.S. strategy
 and tactics. Senate GOP leaders appear to agree with Bush; Majority Leader
 Bill Frist is said to prefer that any hearings be held by Roberts and the
 Intelligence Committee, and be closed.

 "Because of the nature of this subject, it needs to be kept close-held,"
 Bond said in explaining why Roberts' committee would be a better venue than
 Specter's.

 Meanwhile, top administration officials sharpened their aggressive defense
 of the program.

 Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, the deputy national intelligence director and
 former NSA chief, credited the program with "detecting and preventing
 attacks inside the United States."

 "I can say, unequivocally 
 that we have got information through this
 program that would not otherwise have been available," Hayden said at a
 White House briefing.

 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sought to dampen congressional concerns
 that the program may be illegal.

 He said the program could only be used if one party on the call or e-mail
 was outside the United States, and if authorities had "a reasonable basis
 to conclude" that one of the parties was in some way affiliated with
 al-Qaida.

 In a 1972 case involving domestic security surveillance, the Supreme Court
 found such spying, without a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment.

 Congress in 1978 established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance court,
 known as FISA, a secret court through which covert spying warrants must be
 obtained.

 Gonzales conceded that the law requires warrants for the type of
 surveillance being done by the NSA. But he claimed Congress trumped that
 requirement by authorizing the use of force in the war on terror after the
 Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

 Although nowhere in that authorization is domestic surveillance
 contemplated, Gonzales said the administration interpreted it to include
 communication interception.

 "We believe signals intelligence is 
 a fundamental incident of war, and we
 believe has been authorized by the Congress," Gonzales said. "And even
 though signals intelligence is not mentioned in the authorization to use
 force, we believe that the court would 
 recognize the authorization by
 Congress to engage in this kind of electronic surveillance."

 Feingold, appearing on NBC's "Today Show," disputed that assertion.

 "Nobody, nobody, thought, when we passed the resolution to invade
 Afghanistan and to fight the war on terror, including myself, who voted for
 it, thought that this was an authorization to allow a wiretapping against
 the law of the United States," Feingold said.

 Gonzales also said the surveillance court would not work well in combating
 terrorism.

 "(FISA) doesn't provide the speed and the agility that we need in all
 circumstances to deal with this new kind of threat," Gonzales said.

 But Sen. Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat, pointed out that FISA
 procedures seem designed to assist quick action by authorities.

 "These procedures are secret and they're retroactive," Reed said.

 Some pointed to last week's disclosure of the surveillance program as the
 reason opponents of the Patriot Act were able to block its renewal in the
 Senate. A group of senators has bottled up the bill because of civil
 liberties concerns. Aspects of the bill will expire in 12 days unless
 Congress acts.

 At his Monday news conference, Bush took aim at those opponents, implying
 they were jeopardizing the security of American citizens.

 "It is inexcusable for the United States Senate to let this Patriot Act
 expire
 I want senators from New York or Los Angeles or Las Vegas to go
 home and explain why these cities are safer," without the Patriot Act, Bush
 said.

 "In the war on terror, we cannot afford to be without this law for a single
 moment," Bush said.

 But opponents indicated no willingness to cave either on Patriot Act
 renewal or on demands to investigate the surveillance program, as they
 pushed back against the broad executive powers claimed by the
 administration.

 "He is the president, not a king," Feingold said. "If the president is
 asserting a doctrine that he can do anything to protect the American people
 without the basis of law, we need to know what those things are, and we
 need to talk about it."

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 12:19:55 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 15:19:55 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time of
  war
Message-ID: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 14:19:04 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time of war
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00001811----000-.html>


 U.S. Code collection

 TITLE 50 > CHAPTER 36 > SUBCHAPTER I > ' 1811
 Prev | Next

 ' 1811. Authorization during time of war

 Release date: 2005-03-17

 Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General,
 may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this
 subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to
 exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress.


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 12:46:50 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 15:46:50 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of  war
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F392BB8F16A206D985665F4E63E0@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY103-F392BB8F16A206D985665F4E63E0@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <p06230937bfce1df91ca7@[68.167.57.91]>

At 8:43 PM +0000 12/20/05, Gil Hamilton wrote:
>Was there some part of the phrase you quoted: "for a period not to  exceed
>fifteen
>calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress" that you
>were unable to understand?

I'm just wondering exactly what part of their collective asses they're
going to pull a justification out of, is all.

Thank you for playing, and for your keen grasp of the obvious.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 13:16:58 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 16:16:58 -0500
Subject: Exactly what part...
Message-ID: <p06230939bfce1e59331d@[68.167.57.91]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

...of "cypherpunks write code" doesn't anyone around here understand?


Somewhere, as Aristotle might say, Antisthenes is laughing.

The political mental masturbations of leftist cryptographic
crypto-academicians don't actually amount to much, frankly.

Of course, if you want to change the physics of eavesdropping (end-to-end
encrypted VOIP is probably a good place to start, if not the best
solution), then you have my complete attention.

Bleating about laws, whether we have "a nation of laws" or not, doesn't
work too much when there's an egregious surplus of same.  Under those
circumstances, no matter who's in charge, the law fucks you in the ass.
Everything is illegal, and thus nothing is.

As far as voting goes, no matter who you vote for, the government gets
elected, as the old libertarian saw goes.

Even if, as Twain wisecracked, history does rhyme instead of repeat, don't
look for the Ballad of Tricky Dick Nixon -- or Slick Willie Clittin' -- to
be recited in iambic pentameter from a Republican legislature anytime soon,
and, since the Democrats don't actually have any *prescriptive* behavior
available during a putative state of war -- or during a massive global
increase in freedom and prosperity, for that matter -- that doesn't make
the electorate laugh out loud, expect them to continue implode like
crypto-marxist "social democrats" everywhere else in the world. (Okay.
There's North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela. And Bolivia. Knock yourselves
out.)

Lex vincula justitiae, as Mr. Pullo might say...


Cheers,
RAH

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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From perry at piermont.com  Tue Dec 20 13:38:58 2005
From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 16:38:58 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of  war
In-Reply-To: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]> (R. A. Hettinga's 
  message of "Tue, 20 Dec 2005 15:19:55 -0500")
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>

"R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> writes:
>  U.S. Code collection
>
>  TITLE 50 > CHAPTER 36 > SUBCHAPTER I > ' 1811
>  Prev | Next
>
>  ' 1811. Authorization during time of war
>
>  Release date: 2005-03-17
>
>  Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General,
>  may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this
>  subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to
>  exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress.

Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following
a declaration of war. By the congress.

Perry




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 13:57:14 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 16:57:14 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of   war
In-Reply-To: <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <p0623094abfce2e82fce4@[68.167.57.91]>

At 4:38 PM -0500 12/20/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following
>a declaration of war. By the congress.

Again, Perry, expect nothing to come of any of this.

Except bleating.

Lots of bleating.

Write code, dude. Quit bleating.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 15:06:59 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 18:06:59 -0500
Subject: [Clips] eCash: New Zealander challenges Amazon one-click patent
Message-ID: <p0623097dbfce3effda2b@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 18:05:51 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] New Zealander challenges Amazon one-click patent
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2005/12/new-zealander-challenges-amazon-one.html>

  Unenumerated

 A variety of topics, especially law and history.
 Tuesday, December 20, 2005

  New Zealander challenges Amazon one-click patent
 Caveat: As is with every post on this blog, this post is not legal advice.
 If you want to make, use, sell, offer to sell, challenge, or otherwise
 legally entangle yourself with Amazon's patent, consult a good patent
 laywer (I'm not even one of those quite yet either).

 Peter Calveley from New Zealand has asked the United States Patent &
 Trademark Office to re-examine the validity of Amazon's infamous
 "one-click" patent. One of the claims he is going after is Claim 11 which
 reads as follows:

 11. A method for ordering an item using a client system, the method
comprising:

 displaying information identifying the item and displaying an indication of
 a single action that is to be performed to order the identified item; and

 in response to only the indicated single action being performed, sending to
 a server system a request to order the identified item

 whereby the item is ordered independently of a shopping cart model and the
 order is fulfilled to complete a purchase of the item.

 Calveley has made great use of the Wayback Machine  to dig up old
 documents. Of particular interest is some of the old ecash(tm)
 documentation from DigiCash. It's of particular interest to me because way
 back when I worked for six months for DigiCash as a contractor.

 Ecash was the first digital cash payment system to be deployed on the web.
 Ecash deployed cutting-edge cryptography, in particular the blind signature
 which was one of the earliest patents for what was basically a pure
 algorithm. I describe blind signatures here.

 However, it's not the cryptography that's important here, but how ecash
 interacted with the web to order a product. The normal cycle of using ecash
 was as follows:

 (1) Click on a link or button on a web page to place an order with a merchant;

 (2) In response to this click the web server would (using a CGI script)
 start up the "shop" ecash software;

 (3) That software would contact the ecash client to request a payment;

 (4) The ecash client would pop up a screen to confirm a payment, and finally;

 (5) The user would click a button on the pop-up to confirm the order, and
 the order would be executed (the file delivered, the wager made, or
 whatever).

 This is a "two-click" process. However, ecash had another feature, which I
 personally only dimly remember, and never associated with the notorious
 one-click patent until now. But Calveley did make the link and has
 recovered the documentation for this feature. With this feature the user
 could alter step 4 to automate the payment. If a user trusted a merchant,
 he could configure the policy so that step 4 would not launch a pop-up, but
 would just go ahead and make the requested payment. The result was a
 one-click ordering process.

 The combination of ecash automated payment policy with web ordering, which
 is at least strongly implied by the documentation Claveley has enearthed
 and almost surely was actually deployed and used in a one-click manner,
 reads on Amazon's claim 11 and some associated claims.

 Calveley is the first to point out, as far as I know, that the automated
 payment policy setting of ecash, combined with a single click to order an
 item (e.g. to download a file or to make a wager), is a very good prior art
 reference which anticipates the Amazon one-click patent (or at least makes
 it even more blindingly obvious than we software engineers already thought
 it was).

 If you have personal information or know of further documentation about
 this feature, or any other product or design prior to 1997 that used
 one-click ordering, both myself and Peter Claveley are greatly interested
 in collecting this information.

 Also, Claveley's going forward with the re-examination is contingent upon
 him collecting enough donations to recoup the $2,500 USPTO fee for a patent
 re-examination. You can donate here.
 posted by Nick Szabo at 7:26 AM

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From perry at piermont.com  Tue Dec 20 15:55:20 2005
From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 18:55:20 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of   war
In-Reply-To: <p0623094abfce2e82fce4@[68.167.57.91]> (R. A. Hettinga's 
  message of "Tue, 20 Dec 2005 16:57:14 -0500")
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com> 
  <p0623094abfce2e82fce4@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <87fyonl3x3.fsf@snark.piermont.com>

"R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> writes:
> At 4:38 PM -0500 12/20/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>>Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following
>>a declaration of war. By the congress.
>
> Again, Perry, expect nothing to come of any of this.
>
> Except bleating.
>
> Lots of bleating.
>
> Write code, dude. Quit bleating.

The "bleating" has already had a serious effect. More "bleating" may
yet end the current administration's ambitious for the expansion of
their powers.

.pm




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 15:59:37 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 18:59:37 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of    war
In-Reply-To: <87fyonl3x3.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com> 
  <p0623094abfce2e82fce4@[68.167.57.91]>
  <87fyonl3x3.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <p0623098dbfce4acf9f04@[68.167.57.91]>

At 6:55 PM -0500 12/20/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>The "bleating" has already had a serious effect.

Please.

The dogs bark, but the caravan moves on.

Now, if wiretapping were as obsolete as cracking wax seals and envelopes,
*that* would be something.

Cheers,
RAH


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Camels, fleas, and princes exist everywhere."  -- Persian proverb




From dave at farber.net  Tue Dec 20 16:48:27 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 19:48:27 -0500
Subject: [IP] San Francisco leaders voice concerns about Wi-Fi project
Message-ID: <mailman.1463.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 17:31:39 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 20:31:39 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Clinton Administration Secret Search On Americans -- 
  Without  Court Order
Message-ID: <p0623099fbfce60f5d024@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 20:30:53 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Clinton Administration Secret Search On Americans -- Without
  Court Order
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.drudgereport.com/flash8.htm>

 The Drudge Report


 Support The DrudgeReport; Visit Our Advertisers





  CLINTON ADMINISTRATION SECRET SEARCH ON AMERICANS -- WITHOUT COURT ORDER

 Bill Clinton Signed Executive Order that allowed Attorney General to do
 searches without court approval

  Secret searches of Aldrich Ames's office and home in June and October
 1993, both without a federal warrant.

  Clinton, February 9, 1995: "The Attorney General is authorized to approve
 physical searches, without a court order"

  WASH POST, July 15, 1994: Extend not only to searches of the homes of U.S.
 citizens but also -- in the delicate words of a Justice Department official
 -- to "places where you wouldn't find or would be unlikely to find
 information involving a U.S. citizen... would allow the government to use
 classified electronic surveillance techniques, such as infrared sensors to
 observe people inside their homes, without a court order."

  Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick, the Clinton administration
 believes the president "has inherent authority to conduct warrantless
 searches for foreign intelligence purposes."

  1982: COURT SAYS U.S. SPY AGENCY CAN TAP OVERSEAS MESSAGES

  By DAVID BURNHAM, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES (NYT) 1051 words
 Published: November 7, 1982

  A Federal appeals court has ruled that the National Security Agency may
 lawfully intercept messages between United States citizens and people
 overseas, even if there is no cause to believe the Americans are foreign
 agents.

  END


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 20 17:31:55 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 20:31:55 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Executive Order 12949
Message-ID: <p0623099ebfce60f5d012@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 20:31:06 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Executive Order 12949
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12949.htm>
  [Executive Orders]
 [Federal Register page and date: 60 FR 8169; February 13, 1995]



                             THE WHITE HOUSE

                      Office of the Press Secretary

 ________________________________________________________________________
 For Immediate Release                                   February 9, 1995


                         EXECUTIVE ORDER 12949

                             - - - - - - -
                FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PHYSICAL SEARCHES


        By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution
 and the laws of the United States, including sections 302 and 303 of the
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("Act") (50 U.S.C.  1801,
 et seq.), as amended by Public Law 103- 359, and in order to provide for
 the authorization of physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes
 as set forth in the Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:

        Section 1.  Pursuant to section 302(a)(1) of the Act, the
 Attorney General is authorized to approve physical searches, without a
 court order, to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of
 up to one year, if the Attorney General makes the certifications
 required by that section.

        Sec. 2.  Pursuant to section 302(b) of the Act, the Attorney
 General is authorized to approve applications to the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Court under section 303 of the Act to obtain
 orders for physical searches for the purpose of collecting foreign
 intelligence information.

        Sec. 3.  Pursuant to section 303(a)(7) of the Act, the following
 officials, each of whom is employed in the area of national security or
 defense, is designated to make the certifications required by section
 303(a)(7) of the Act in support of applications to conduct physical
 searches:

        (a) Secretary of State;

        (b) Secretary of Defense;

        (c) Director of Central Intelligence;

        (d) Director of the Federal Bureau of
   Investigation;

        (e) Deputy Secretary of State;

        (f) Deputy Secretary of Defense; and

        (g) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

        None of the above officials, nor anyone officially acting in that
 capacity, may exercise the authority to make the above certifications,
 unless that official has been appointed by the President, by and with
 the advice and consent of the Senate.


                          WILLIAM J. CLINTON


   THE WHITE HOUSE,
       February 9, 1995.






 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From gil_hamilton at hotmail.com  Tue Dec 20 12:43:04 2005
From: gil_hamilton at hotmail.com (Gil Hamilton)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 20:43:04 +0000
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of war
In-Reply-To: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F392BB8F16A206D985665F4E63E0@phx.gbl>

Bob Hettinga wrote:
>  TITLE 50 > CHAPTER 36 > SUBCHAPTER I > ' 1811

>  ' 1811. Authorization during time of war

>  Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney
>  General,  may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order
>  under this  subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information
>  for a period not to  exceed fifteen calendar days following a
>  declaration of war by the Congress.

Bob,

That's a pretty short and uncomplicated paragraph even in view of your
well-known attention-deficit issues.

Was there some part of the phrase you quoted: "for a period not to  exceed 
fifteen
calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress" that you
were unable to understand?

GH

_________________________________________________________________
Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! 
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/




From measl at mfn.org  Tue Dec 20 19:04:30 2005
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 21:04:30 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time 
  of   war
In-Reply-To: <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]>
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <20051220210349.U37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Tue, 20 Dec 2005, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

> Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following
> a declaration of war. By the congress.

Which declaration we are missing.

There is no formal state of war here.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF


	Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about
	the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise?

	- Steve Thompson




From declan at well.com  Tue Dec 20 20:15:46 2005
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 23:15:46 -0500
Subject: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA surveillance by Alberto
 Gonzales and Michael Hayden [priv]
Message-ID: <mailman.1464.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>




THE WHITE HOUSE



Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release                     December 19, 2005





PRESS BRIEFING

BY

ATTORNEY GENERAL ALBERTO GONZALES

AND

GENERAL MICHAEL HAYDEN,

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE



James S. Brady Briefing Room





8:30 A.M. EST





MR. McCLELLAN:  Good morning, everybody.  I've got with me the Attorney
General and General Hayden here this morning to brief you on the legal
issues surrounding the NSA authorization and take whatever questions you
have for them on that.  The Attorney General will open with some
comments and then they'll be glad to take your questions.



And with that, I'll turn it over to General Gonzales.



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Thanks, Scott.



The President confirmed the existence of a highly classified program on
Saturday.  The program remains highly classified; there are many
operational aspects of the program that have still not been disclosed
and we want to protect that because those aspects of the program are
very, very important to protect the national security of this country.
So I'm only going to be talking about the legal underpinnings for what
has been disclosed by the President.



The President has authorized a program to engage in electronic
surveillance of a particular kind, and this would be the intercepts of
contents of communications where one of the -- one party to the
communication is outside the United States.  And this is a very
important point -- people are running around saying that the United
States is somehow spying on American citizens calling their neighbors.
Very, very important to understand that one party to the communication
has to be outside the United States.



Another very important point to remember is that we have to have a
reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a
member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an
organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al
Qaeda.  We view these authorities as authorities to confront the enemy
in which the United States is at war with -- and that is al Qaeda and
those who are supporting or affiliated with al Qaeda.



What we're trying to do is learn of communications, back and forth, from
within the United States to overseas with members of al Qaeda.  And
that's what this program is about.



Now, in terms of legal authorities, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act provides -- requires a court order before engaging in
this kind of surveillance that I've just discussed and the President
announced on Saturday, unless there is somehow -- there is -- unless
otherwise authorized by statute or by Congress.  That's what the law
requires.  Our position is, is that the authorization to use force,
which was passed by the Congress in the days following September 11th,
constitutes that other authorization, that other statute by Congress, to
engage in this kind of signals intelligence.



Now, that -- one might argue, now, wait a minute, there's nothing in the
authorization to use force that specifically mentions electronic
surveillance.  Let me take you back to a case that the Supreme Court
reviewed this past -- in 2004, the Hamdi decision.  As you remember, in
that case, Mr. Hamdi was a U.S. citizen who was contesting his detention
by the United States government.  What he said was that there is a
statute, he said, that specifically prohibits the detention of American
citizens without permission, an act by Congress -- and he's right, 18
USC 4001a requires that the United States government cannot detain an
American citizen except by an act of Congress.



We took the position -- the United States government took the position
that Congress had authorized that detention in the authorization to use
force, even though the authorization to use force never mentions the
word "detention."  And the Supreme Court, a plurality written by Justice
O'Connor agreed.  She said, it was clear and unmistakable that the
Congress had authorized the detention of an American citizen captured on
the battlefield as an enemy combatant for the remainder -- the duration
of the hostilities.  So even though the authorization to use force did
not mention the word, "detention," she felt that detention of enemy
soldiers captured on the battlefield was a fundamental incident of
waging war, and therefore, had been authorized by Congress when they
used the words, "authorize the President to use all necessary and
appropriate force."

For the same reason, we believe signals intelligence is even more a
fundamental incident of war, and we believe has been authorized by the
Congress.  And even though signals intelligence is not mentioned in the
authorization to use force, we believe that the Court would apply the
same reasoning to recognize the authorization by Congress to engage in
this kind of electronic surveillance.



I might also add that we also believe the President has the inherent
authority under the Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief, to engage in
this kind of activity.  Signals intelligence has been a fundamental
aspect of waging war since the Civil War, where we intercepted
telegraphs, obviously, during the world wars, as we intercepted
telegrams in and out of the United States.  Signals intelligence is very
important for the United States government to know what the enemy is
doing, to know what the enemy is about to do.  It is a fundamental
incident of war, as Justice O'Connor talked about in the Hamdi decision.
We believe that -- and those two authorities exist to allow, permit the
United States government to engage in this kind of surveillance.



The President, of course, is very concerned about the protection of
civil liberties, and that's why we've got strict parameters, strict
guidelines in place out at NSA to ensure that the program is operating
in a way that is consistent with the President's directives.  And,
again, the authorization by the President is only to engage in
surveillance of communications where one party is outside the United
States, and where we have a reasonable basis to conclude that one of the
parties of the communication is either a member of al Qaeda or
affiliated with al Qaeda.



Mike, do you want to -- have anything to add?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  I'd just add, in terms of what we do globally with
regard to signals intelligence, which is a critical part of defending
the nation, there are probably no communications more important to what
it is we're trying to do to defend the nation; no communication is more
important for that purpose than those communications that involve al
Qaeda, and one end of which is inside the homeland, one end of which is
inside the United States.  Our purpose here is to detect and prevent
attacks.  And the program in this regard has been successful.



Q    General, are you able to say how many Americans were caught in this
surveillance?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm not -- I can't get into the specific
numbers because that information remains classified.  Again, this is not
a situation where -- of domestic spying.  To the extent that there is a
moderate and heavy communication involving an American citizen, it would
be a communication where the other end of the call is outside the United
States and where we believe that either the American citizen or the
person outside the United States is somehow affiliated with al Qaeda.



Q    General, can you tell us why you don't choose to go to the FISA
court?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, we continue to go to the FISA court
and obtain orders.  It is a very important tool that we continue to
utilize.  Our position is that we are not legally required to do, in
this particular case, because the law requires that we -- FISA requires
that we get a court order, unless authorized by a statute, and we
believe that authorization has occurred.



The operators out at NSA tell me that we don't have the speed and the
agility that we need, in all circumstances, to deal with this new kind
of enemy.  You have to remember that FISA was passed by the Congress in
1978.  There have been tremendous advances in technology --



Q    But it's been kind of retroactively, hasn't it?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  -- since then.  Pardon me?



Q    It's been done retroactively before, hasn't it?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  What do you mean, "retroactively"?



Q    You just go ahead and then you apply for the FISA clearance,
because it's damn near automatic.



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  If we -- but there are standards that have
to be met, obviously, and you're right, there is a procedure where we --
an emergency procedure that allows us to make a decision to authorize --
to utilize FISA, and then we go to the court and get confirmation of
that authority.



But, again, FISA is very important in the war on terror, but it doesn't
provide the speed and the agility that we need in all circumstances to
deal with this new kind of threat.



Q    But what -- go ahead.



GENERAL HAYDEN:  Let me just add to the response to the last question.
As the Attorney General says, FISA is very important, we make full use
of FISA.  But if you picture what FISA was designed to do, FISA is
designed to handle the needs in the nation in two broad categories:
there's a law enforcement aspect of it; and the other aspect is the
continued collection of foreign intelligence.  I don't think anyone
could claim that FISA was envisaged as a tool to cover armed enemy
combatants in preparation for attacks inside the United States.  And
that's what this authorization under the President is designed to help
us do.



Q    Have you identified armed enemy combatants, through this program,
in the United States?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  This program has been successful in detecting and
preventing attacks inside the United States.



Q    General Hayden, I know you're not going to talk about specifics
about that, and you say it's been successful.  But would it have been as
successful -- can you unequivocally say that something has been stopped
or there was an imminent attack or you got information through this that
you could not have gotten through going to the court?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  I can say unequivocally, all right, that we have got
information through this program that would not otherwise have been
available.



Q    Through the court?  Because of the speed that you got it?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  Yes, because of the speed, because of the procedures,
because of the processes and requirements set up in the FISA process, I
can say unequivocally that we have used this program in lieu of that and
this program has been successful.



Q    But one of the things that concerns people is the slippery slope.
If you said you absolutely need this program, you have to do it quickly
-- then if you have someone you suspect being a member of al Qaeda, and
they're in the United States, and there is a phone call between two
people in the United States, why not use that, then, if it's so
important?  Why not go that route?  Why not go further?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  Across the board, there is a judgment that we all have
to make -- and I made this speech a day or two after 9/11 to the NSA
workforce -- I said, free peoples always have to judge where they want
to be on that spectrum between security and liberty; that there will be
great pressures on us after those attacks to move our national banner
down in the direction of security.  What I said to the NSA workforce is,
our job is to keep Americans free by making Americans feel safe again.
That's been the mission of the National Security Agency since the day
after the attack, is when I talked -- two days after the attack is when
I said that to the workforce.



There's always a balancing between security and liberty.  We understand
that this is a more -- I'll use the word "aggressive" program than would
be traditionally available under FISA.  It is also less intrusive.  It
deals only with international calls.  It is generally for far shorter
periods of time.  And it is not designed to collect reams of
intelligence, but to detect and warn and prevent about attacks.  And,
therefore, that's where we've decided to draw that balance between
security and liberty.



Q    Gentlemen, can you say when Congress was first briefed, who was
included in that, and will there be a leaks investigation?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well of course, we're not going to -- we
don't talk about -- we try not to talk about investigations.  As to
whether or not there will be a leak investigation, as the President
indicated, this is really hurting national security, this has really
hurt our country, and we are concerned that a very valuable tool has
been compromised.  As to whether or not there will be a leak
investigation, we'll just have to wait and see.



And your first question was?



Q    When was Congress first briefed --



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm not going to -- I'm not going to talk
about -- I'll let others talk about when Congress was first briefed.
What I can say is, as the President indicated on Saturday, there have
been numerous briefings with certain key members of Congress.
Obviously, some members have come out since the revelations on Saturday,
saying that they hadn't been briefed.  This is a very classified
program.  It is probably the most classified program that exists in the
United States government, because the tools are so valuable, and
therefore, decisions were made to brief only key members of Congress.
We have begun the process now of reaching out to other members of
Congress.  I met last night, for example, with Chairman Specter and
other members of Congress to talk about the legal aspects of this
program.



And so we are engaged in a dialogue now to talk with Congress, but also
-- but we're still mindful of the fact that still -- this is still a
very highly classified program, and there are still limits about what we
can say today, even to certain members of Congress.



Q    General, what's really compromised by the public knowledge of this
program?  Don't you assume that the other side thinks we're listening to
them?  I mean, come on.



GENERAL HAYDEN:  The fact that this program has been successful is proof
to me that what you claim to be an assumption is certainly not
universal.  The more we discuss it, the more we put it in the face of
those who would do us harm, the more they will respond to this and
protect their communications and make it more difficult for us to defend
the nation.



Q    Mr. Attorney General --



Q    -- became public, have you seen any evidence in a change in the
tactics or --



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  We're not going to comment on that kind of
operational aspect.



Q    You say this has really hurt the American people.  Is that based
only on your feeling about it, or is there some empirical evidence to
back that up, even if you can't --



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I think the existence of this program, the
confirmation of the -- I mean, the fact that this program exists, in my
judgment, has compromised national security, as the President indicated
on Saturday.



Q    I'd like to ask you, what are the constitutional limits on this
power that you see laid out in the statute and in your inherent
constitutional war power?  And what's to prevent you from just listening
to everyone's conversation and trying to find the word "bomb," or
something like that?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, that's a good question.  This was a
question that was raised in some of my discussions last night with
members of Congress.  The President has not authorized -- has not
authorized blanket surveillance of communications here in the United
States.  He's been very clear about the kind of surveillance that we're
going to engage in.  And that surveillance is tied with our conflict
with al Qaeda.



You know, we feel comfortable that this surveillance is consistent with
requirements of the 4th Amendment.  The touchstone of the 4th Amendment
is reasonableness, and the Supreme Court has long held that there are
exceptions to the warrant requirement in -- when special needs outside
the law enforcement arena.  And we think that that standard has been met
here.  When you're talking about communications involving al Qaeda, when
you -- obviously there are significant privacy interests implicated
here, but we think that those privacy interests have been addressed;
when you think about the fact that this is an authorization that's
ongoing, it's not a permanent authorization, it has to be reevaluated
from time to time.  There are additional safeguards that have been in
place -- that have been imposed out at NSA, and we believe that it is a
reasonable application of these authorities.



Q    Mr. Attorney General, haven't you stretched --



Q    -- adequate because of technological advances?  Wouldn't you do the
country a better service to address that issue and fix it, instead of
doing a backdoor approach --



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  This is not a backdoor approach. We believe
Congress has authorized this kind of surveillance.  We have had
discussions with Congress in the past -- certain members of Congress --
as to whether or not FISA could be amended to allow us to adequately
deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that that would be
difficult, if not impossible.



Q    If this is not backdoor, is this at least a judgment call?  Can you
see why other people would look at it and say, well, no, we don't see it
that way?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I think some of the concern is because
people had not been briefed; they don't understand the specifics of the
program, they don't understand the strict safeguards within the program.
And I haven't had a discussion -- an opportunity to have a discussion
with them about our legal analysis.  So, obviously, we're in that
process now.  Part of the reason for this press brief today is to have
you help us educate the American people and the American Congress about
what we're doing and the legal basis for what we're doing.



Q    Al, you talk about the successes and the critical intercepts of the
program.  Have there also been cases in which after listening in or
intercepting, you realize you had the wrong guy and you listened to what
you shouldn't have?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  That's why I mentioned earlier that the program is less
intrusive.  It deals only with international calls.  The time period in
which we would conduct our work is much shorter, in general, overall,
than it would be under FISA.  And one of the true purposes of this is to
be very agile, as you described.



If this particular line of logic, this reasoning that took us to this
place proves to be inaccurate, we move off of it right away.



Q    Are there cases in which --



GENERAL HAYDEN:  Yes, of course.



Q    Can you give us some idea of percentage, or how often you get it
right and how often you get it wrong?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  No, it would be very -- no, I cannot, without getting
into the operational details.  I'm sorry.



Q    But there are cases where you wind up listening in where you
realize you shouldn't have?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  There are cases like we do with regard to the global
SIGIN system -- you have reasons to go after particular activities,
particular communications.  There's a logic; there is a standard as to
why you would go after that, not just in a legal sense, which is very
powerful, but in a practical sense.  We can't waste resources on targets
that simply don't provide valuable information.  And when we decide that
is the case -- and in this program, the standards, in terms of
re-evaluating whether or not this coverage is worthwhile at all, are
measured in days and weeks.



Q    Would someone in a case in which you got it wrong have a cause of
action against the government?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  That is something I'm not going to answer,
Ken.



Q    I wanted to ask you a question.  Do you think the government has
the right to break the law?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Absolutely not.  I don't believe anyone is
above the law.



Q    You have stretched this resolution for war into giving you carte
blanche to do anything you want to do.



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, one might make that same argument in
connection with detention of American citizens, which is far more
intrusive than listening into a conversation.  There may be some members
of Congress who might say, we never --



Q    That's your interpretation.  That isn't Congress' interpretation.



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, I'm just giving you the analysis --



Q    You're never supposed to spy on Americans.



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm just giving the analysis used by Justice
O'Connor -- and she said clearly and unmistakenly the Congress
authorized the President of the United States to detain an American
citizen, even though the authorization to use force never mentions the
word "detention" --



Q    -- into wiretapping everybody and listening in on --



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  This is not about wiretapping everyone.
This is a very concentrated, very limited program focused at gaining
information about our enemy.



Q    Now that the cat is out of the bag, so to speak, do you expect your
legal analysis to be tested in the courts?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm not going to, you know, try to guess as
to what's going to happen about that.  We're going to continue to try to
educate the American people and the American Congress about what we're
doing and the basis -- why we believe that the President has the
authority to engage in this kind of conduct.



Q    Because there are some very smart legal minds who clearly think a
law has been broken here.



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, I think that they may be making or
offering up those opinions or assumptions based on very limited
information.  They don't have all the information about the program.  I
think they probably don't have the information about our legal analysis.



Q    Judge Gonzales, will you release then, for the reasons you're
saying now, the declassified versions of the legal rationale for this
from OLC?  And if not, why not?  To assure the American public that this
was done with the legal authority that you state.



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  We're engaged now in a process of educating
the American people, again, and educating the Congress.  We'll make the
appropriate evaluation at the appropriate time as to whether or not
additional information needs to be provided to the Congress or the
American people.



Q    You declassified OLC opinions before, after the torture -- why not
do that here to show, yes, we went through a process?




ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm not confirming the existence of opinions
or the non-existence of opinions.  I've offered up today our legal
analysis of the authorities of this President.



Q    Sir, can you explain, please, the specific inadequacies in FISA
that have prevented you from sort of going through the normal channels?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  One, the whole key here is agility.  And let me
re-trace some grounds I tried to suggest earlier.  FISA was built for
persistence.  FISA was built for long-term coverage against known agents
of an enemy power.  And the purpose involved in each of those -- in
those cases was either for a long-term law enforcement purpose or a
long-term intelligence purpose.



This program isn't for that.  This is to detect and prevent.  And here
the key is not so much persistence as it is agility.  It's a quicker
trigger.  It's a subtly softer trigger.  And the intrusion into privacy
-- the intrusion into privacy is significantly less.  It's only
international calls.  The period of time in which we do this is, in most
cases, far less than that which would be gained by getting a court
order.  And our purpose here, our sole purpose is to detect and prevent.



Again, I make the point, what we are talking about here are
communications we have every reason to believe are al Qaeda
communications, one end of which is in the United States.  And I don't
think any of us would want any inefficiencies in our coverage of those
kinds of communications, above all.  And that's what this program allows
us to do -- it allows us to be as agile as operationally required to
cover these targets.



Q    But how does FISA --



GENERAL HAYDEN:  FISA involves the process -- FISA involves marshaling
arguments; FISA involves looping paperwork around, even in the case of
emergency authorizations from the Attorney General.  And beyond that,
it's a little -- it's difficult for me to get into further discussions
as to why this is more optimized under this process without, frankly,
revealing too much about what it is we do and why and how we do it.



Q    If FISA didn't work, why didn't you seek a new statute that allowed
something like this legally?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  That question was asked earlier. We've had
discussions with members of Congress, certain members of Congress, about
whether or not we could get an amendment to FISA, and we were advised
that that was not likely to be -- that was not something we could likely
get, certainly not without jeopardizing the existence of the program,
and therefore, killing the program.  And that -- and so a decision was
made that because we felt that the authorities were there, that we
should continue moving forward with this program.



Q    And who determined that these targets were al Qaeda?  Did you
wiretap them?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  The judgment is made by the operational work force at
the National Security Agency using the information available to them at
the time, and the standard that they apply -- and it's a two-person
standard that must be signed off by a shift supervisor, and carefully
recorded as to what created the operational imperative to cover any
target, but particularly with regard to those inside the United States.



Q    So a shift supervisor is now making decisions that a FISA judge
would normally make?  I just want to make sure I understand.  Is that
what you're saying?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  What we're trying to do is to use the approach we have
used globally against al Qaeda, the operational necessity to cover
targets.  And the reason I emphasize that this is done at the
operational level is to remove any question in your mind that this is in
any way politically influenced.  This is done to chase those who would
do harm to the United States.



Q    Building on that, during --



Q    Thank you, General.  Roughly when did those conversations occur
with members of Congress?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  I'm not going to get into the specifics of
when those conversations occurred, but they have occurred.



Q    May I just ask you if they were recently or if they were when you
began making these exceptions?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  They weren't recently.



MR. McCLELLAN:  The President indicated that those -- the weeks after
September 11th.



Q    What was the date, though, of the first executive order?  Can you
give us that?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  If I could just, before you ask that question, just add
-- these actions that I described taking place at the operational level
-- and I believe that a very important point to be made -- have intense
oversight by the NSA Inspector General, by the NSA General Counsel, and
by officials of the Justice Department who routinely look into this
process and verify that the standards set out by the President are being
followed.



Q    Can you absolutely assure us that all of the communications
intercepted --



Q    Have you said that you -- (inaudible) -- anything about this
program with your international partners -- with the partners probably
in the territories of which you intercept those communications?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  I'm not aware of discussions with other
countries, but that doesn't mean that they haven't occurred.  I simply
have no personal knowledge of that.



Q    Also, is it only al Qaeda, or maybe some other terrorist groups?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  Again, with respect to what the President
discussed on Saturday, this program -- it is tied to communications
where we believe one of the parties is affiliated with al Qaeda or part
of an organization or group that is supportive of al Qaeda.



Q    Sir, during his confirmation hearings, it came out that
now-Ambassador Bolton had sought and obtained NSA intercepts of
conversations between American citizens and others.  Who gets the
information from this program; how do you guarantee that it doesn't get
too widely spread inside the government, and used for other purposes?



Q    And is it destroyed afterwards?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  We report this information the way we report any other
information collected by the National Security Agency.  And the phrase
you're talking about is called minimization of U.S. identities.  The
same minimalizationist standards apply across the board, including for
this program.  To make this very clear -- U.S. identities are minimized
in all of NSA's activities, unless, of course, the U.S. identity is
essential to understand the inherent intelligence value of the
intelligence report.  And that's the standard that's used.



Q    General, when you discussed the emergency powers, you said, agility
is critical here.  And in the case of the emergency powers, as I
understand it, you can go in, do whatever you need to do, and within 72
hours just report it after the fact.  And as you say, these may not even
last very long at all.  What would be the difficulty in setting up a
paperwork system in which the logs that you say you have the shift
supervisors record are simply sent to a judge after the fact?  If the
judge says that this is not legitimate, by that time probably your
intercept is over, wouldn't that be correct?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  What you're talking about now are efficiencies.  What
you're asking me is, can we do this program as efficiently using the one
avenue provided to us by the FISA Act, as opposed to the avenue provided
to us by subsequent legislation and the President's authorization.



Our operational judgment, given the threat to the nation that the
difference in the operational efficiencies between those two sets of
authorities are such that we can provide greater protection for the
nation operating under this authorization.



Q    But while you're getting an additional efficiency, you're also
operating outside of an existing law.  If the law would allow you to
stay within the law and be slightly less efficient, would that be --



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  I guess I disagree with that
characterization.  I think that this electronic surveillance is within
the law, has been authorized.  I mean, that is our position.  We're only
required to achieve a court order through FISA if we don't have
authorization otherwise by the Congress, and we think that that has
occurred in this particular case.



Q    Can you just give us one assurance before you go, General?



ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  It depends on what it is.  (Laughter.)



Q    Can you assure us that all of these intercepts had an international
component and that at no time were any of the intercepts purely
domestic?



GENERAL HAYDEN:  The authorization given to NSA by the President
requires that one end of these communications has to be outside the
United States.  I can assure you, by the physics of the intercept, by
how we actually conduct our activities, that one end of these
communications are always outside the United States of America.



                                  END                        9:02 A.M.
EST

 ---
_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




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Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 05:43:52 -0400
Subject: do you remember that? alligator
Message-ID: <4.9.99.2081924.0083fc70@ies.edu>

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From dave at farber.net  Wed Dec 21 05:20:06 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 08:20:06 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on  LA Times on NYT spying story
Message-ID: <mailman.1465.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Wed Dec 21 05:21:56 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 08:21:56 -0500
Subject: [IP] "Double Secret" Wiretaps vs. the President's 2004 Statement
Message-ID: <mailman.1466.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Wed Dec 21 05:28:34 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 08:28:34 -0500
Subject: [IP] State refuses to approve Diebold voting machines
Message-ID: <mailman.1467.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Wed Dec 21 05:37:05 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 08:37:05 -0500
Subject: [IP] Bruce Schneier --  An Essay on Salon
Message-ID: <mailman.1468.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 20 23:53:33 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 08:53:33 +0100
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA
  surveillance by Alberto Gonzales and Michael Hayden [priv]]
Message-ID: <20051221075333.GG2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 00:00:03 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 09:00:03 +0100
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of   war
In-Reply-To: <20051220210349.U37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]>
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
  <20051220210349.U37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <20051221080003.GH2249@leitl.org>

On Tue, Dec 20, 2005 at 09:04:30PM -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> On Tue, 20 Dec 2005, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
> > Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following
> > a declaration of war. By the congress.
>
> Which declaration we are missing.
>
> There is no formal state of war here.

"We always have been at war with Oceania bin Laden".

It is remarkable that in the U.S. lying about the location of
the presidential dick is almost enough for impeachment, whereas
starting wars and trampling all over the Constitution doesn't
even raise eyebrows.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 00:10:09 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 09:10:09 +0100
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of   war
In-Reply-To: <87fyonl3x3.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]>
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
  <p0623094abfce2e82fce4@[68.167.57.91]>
  <87fyonl3x3.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <20051221081008.GP2249@leitl.org>

On Tue, Dec 20, 2005 at 06:55:20PM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

> > Write code, dude. Quit bleating.
>
> The "bleating" has already had a serious effect. More "bleating" may
> yet end the current administration's ambitious for the expansion of
> their powers.

You don't have to write code if the bleating succeeds first.
And if the bleating doesn't, no amount of code will save our ass.

"Mandatory authentication to be online" and "run an anonymizer,
get fined $$$/go to jail" is all it takes.

So bleat early, bleat often.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From YEMNOBQEDEHVY at prodigy.net  Tue Dec 20 21:41:27 2005
From: YEMNOBQEDEHVY at prodigy.net (Elmo Albert)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 09:41:27 +0400
Subject: New Software Site bull
Message-ID: <979430f9ok15$7n7y7132$42p8mndg@intonetemperategraftar28>

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guardia

From rms at computerbytesman.com  Wed Dec 21 10:00:32 2005
From: rms at computerbytesman.com (Richard M. Smith)
Date: December 21, 2005 10:00:32 PM EST
Subject: [EPIC_IDOF] Surveillance UK: why this revolution is only the
Message-ID: <mailman.1469.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

start

http://news.independent.co.uk/world/science_technology/article334684.ece

Surveillance UK: why this revolution is only the start
By Steve Connor, Science Editor
Published: 22 December 2005

The new national surveillance network for tracking car journeys,
which has
taken more than 25 years to develop, is only the beginning of plans to
monitor the movements of all British citizens. The Home Office
Scientific
Development Branch in Hertfordshire is already working on ways of
automatically recognising human faces by computer, which many people
would
see as truly introducing the prospect of Orwellian street surveillance,
where our every move is recorded and stored by machines.

Although the problems of facial recognition by computer are far more
formidable than for car number plates, experts believe it is only a
matter
of time before machines can reliably pull a face out of a crowd of
moving
people.

If the police and security services can show that a national
surveillance
operation based on recording car movements can protect the public
against
criminals and terrorists, there will be a strong political will to do
the
same with street cameras designed to monitor the flow of human traffic.

A major feature of the national surveillance centre for car numbers
is the
ability to trawl through records of previous sightings to build up an
intelligence picture of a vehicle's precise whereabouts on the road
network.


However, the Home Office and police believe that the Big Brother
nature of
the operation can be justified on the basis of the technology's proven
ability to catch criminals. "In simple terms criminals use vehicles.
If you
want to commit a crime, you're going to use a vehicle," said Frank
Whiteley,
the Chief Constable of Hertfordshire, who leads the project. " There is
nothing secretive about it and we don't want it to be secret, because we
want people to feel safer, to see that they are protected."

A 13-month pilot scheme between 2003 and 2004 found the performance
of the
police improved dramatically when they had access automatic number plate
recognition (ANPR) cameras. Project Laser 2 involved 23 police forces
using
specially fitted vans with ANPR cameras linked to a police database.
It led
to a fivefold increase in the arrest rate for frontline officers.

But these mobile units will constitute only a tiny proportion of the
many
thousands of ANPR cameras that by next year will be feeding more than 35
million number plate "reads" every day into the new national data
centre at
Hendon, north London, the same site as the Police National Computer.

Mr Whiteley, chairman of the ANPR steering committee, said the intention
eventually was to move from the "low thousands" of cameras to the " high
thousands".

...
_______________________________________________
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EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof


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______________________________________________________________
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From jasonc at science.org  Wed Dec 21 02:12:18 2005
From: jasonc at science.org (Jason Coombs)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 10:12:18 +0000 GMT
Subject: [Antisocial] Re: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps
  (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <20051220234918.O37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <20051220234918.O37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <15321512.1135160256591.JavaMail.teamon@bda055-cell00.bisx.prod.on.blackberry>

Perry E. Metzger <perry at piermont.com> wrote:
>   Electronic surveillance means
>   (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
>       surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
>       communication sent by or intended to be received by
...

Dear Perry, et al:

I think you're missing the key clue as to what was actually done, and thus why it was done in the manner chosen, and why it is now being defended by the Bush Administration as being legal.

All of the statutes quoted, and every other one of which I am aware, prohibit the INTERCEPTION of the CONTENT of communications.

Nothing presently prohibits the automated processing of the content via software when the content is not captured/intercepted, nor excerpted/preserved for law enforcement's review. A computer system, designed to circumvent the intent but comply with the letter of present law, can legally do what a person cannot.

Furthermore, courts in jurisdictions in which I have worked are presently ruling that with respect to electronic equivalents of conventional PSTN pen register intercepts, all information considered to be 'routing' information rather than CONTENT of electronic communications is fair game, and may not even require a warrant, anywhere, with respect to anyone.

At the very least, there is serious gray area in the lack of clear definition of the electronic communication equivalent to the conventional PSTN pen register.

I suspect that what is actually being intercepted is not content, but rather is data that the administration considers to be network routing information -- e-mail and IP addresses, basically. Maybe domain names of Web sites being visited.

Read more about Carnivore's known capabilities from several years ago with respect to its pen register mode of operation:

http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore

Then consider the consequences of the absence of explicit mention of 'electronic communications equivalent of a pen register' or the words 'or network routing information' in any of the statutes you mentioned.

I wouldn't be surprised at all if the administration ultimately argues that the data they intercepted without a warrant, to the extent that ANY data was 'intercepted', was not 'content' that the sender/recipient intended to communicate to/from the other party. Furthermore they could take the position that there is no need for a warrant for 'electronic communication pen registers' as the pen register statutes are cleverly ambiguous and (probably intentionally) antiquated...

Regards,

Jason Coombs
jasonc at science.org

-----Original Message-----
From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 23:49:30 
To:antisocial at mfn.org
Subject: [Antisocial] Re: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps (fwd)


Good back and forth.
-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF


	Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about
	the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise?

	- Steve Thompson



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 13:04:00 -0500
From: Perry E. Metzger <perry at piermont.com>
To: R. A. Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com>
Cc: cypherpunks at jfet.org
Subject: Re: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps

"R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> writes:
[...]>
>  The National Review
>  Byron York
[...]
>  At his news conference this morning, the president explained that he
>  believed the U.S. government had to "be able to act fast" to intercept the
>  "international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda." "Al
>  Qaeda was not a conventional enemy," Bush said. "This new threat required
>  us to think and act differently."

The FISA law already allows taps to go on for 72 hours before a court
is informed. That's three days. In three days people can't fill in a
form and deliver it to the FISA court? The FISC has approved 15,000
wiretaps and rejected less than ten in its history.

>  But there's more to the story than that. In 2002, when the president made
>  his decision, there was widespread, bipartisan frustration with the
>  slowness and inefficiency of the bureaucracy involved in seeking warrants
>  from the special intelligence court, known as the FISA court.

It is so inefficient that you don't even have to ask for THREE
DAYS. Three days isn't enough time?

More to the point, even if the President thinks something is
"inefficient", the law is the law. If it says "those who do not seek a
FISC warrant go to jail for five years", the President has to obey.

>  People familiar with the process say the problem is not so much with the
>  court itself as with the process required to bring a case before the court.
>  "It takes days, sometimes weeks, to get the application for FISA together,"
>  says one source. "It's not so much that the court doesn't grant them
>  quickly, it's that it takes a long time to get to the court.

Of course, this is in fact untrue. FISA requests are as fast as the
Department of Justice and NSA wish them to be.

Of course, even if it were true, the law is clear, and the President
is not the legislature. The administration had years and years in
which to ask Congress to alter the law. It did not do so. It chose to
simply solicit the commission of felonies.

All these comments about "slowness" and "cumbersomeness" etc. are
attempts by the magician to keep your eye away from what he does not
want you to see. Do not be distracted. A felony was solicited by the
President and committed by employees of the NSA. Do not let them
distract you. Keep your eye on the target.

>  And even though the attorney general has the
>  authority in some cases to undertake surveillance immediately, and then
>  seek an emergency warrant, that process is just as cumbersome as the normal
>  way of doing things.

Actually, the law doesn't say "in some cases".

  Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the
  Attorney General reasonably determines that
  (1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of
      electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information
      before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due
      diligence be obtained; and
  (2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this subchapter
      to approve such surveillance exists;
  he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance
  if a judge having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is
  informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such
  authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency
  electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this
  subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more
  than 72 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance.

So it isn't "in some cases" -- it is basically any time the Attorney
General decides to rubber stamp it.

Again, don't be fooled by the smokescreen. Read the law yourself. See
for yourself that the President has disobeyed a criminal statute.

>  Lawmakers of both parties recognized the problem in the months after the
>  September 11 terrorist attacks. They pointed to the case of Coleen Rowley,
>  the FBI agent who ran up against a number roadblocks in her effort to
>  secure a FISA warrant in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the al Qaeda
>  operative who had taken flight training in preparation for the hijackings.
>  Investigators wanted to study the contents of Moussaoui's laptop computer,
>  but the FBI bureaucracy involved in applying for a FISA warrant was
>  stifling, and there were real questions about whether investigators could
>  meet the FISA court's probable-cause standard for granting a
>  warrant.

A fascinating story, except it is on its face false. FISA warrants are
for intercepting communications, not for examining laptops:

   Electronic surveillance means
   (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
       surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
       communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular,
       known United States person who is in the United States, if the
       contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United
       States person, under circumstances in which a person has a
       reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
       for law enforcement purposes;
   (2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
       surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to
       or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any
       party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States,
       but does not include the acquisition of those communications of
       computer trespassers that would be permissible under section 2511
       (2)(i) of title 18;
   (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
       surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication,
       under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation
       of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
       purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are
       located within the United States; or
   (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
       surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire
       information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under
       circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
       privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.

Also, Mr. Moussaoui was not a US person, and the Attorney General can
authorized anything he likes without a court order if:

   [...]there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire
   the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a
   party[...]

As I said, the story in question is completely false on its face. The
people who wrote it are counting on you not reading the law, not
informing yourself, not knowing what is true and what is not. Do not
be fooled. Read the law for yourself.

In any case, cumbersome and unpleasant or not, the law is still in
force, and the law says that the President of the United States
committed a felony and solicited the commission of felonies.

>  Bush's order, it appears, was an attempt to change that situation.
>  Especially before, and even after, passage of the Patriot Act, the FISA
>  bureaucracy and the agencies that dealt with it were too unwieldy to handle
>  some fast-moving intelligence cases.

There is no "FISA bureaucracy". What is there? There is a court with
eleven judges. That's it:

  The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 11
  district court judges from seven of the United States judicial
  circuits of whom no fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the
  District of Columbia who shall constitute a court which shall have
  jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving
  electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States under the
  procedures set forth in this chapter[...]

That is the "FISA bureaucracy" they speak of.

Again, do not be fooled. Do not allow the spin masters to convince you
that black is white and white is black. Read the law for yourself,
understand for yourself what has happened.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_36_20_I.html

Perry
_______________________________________________
Antisocial mailing list
Antisocial at mfn.org
http://lists.mfn.org/mailman/listinfo/antisocial

.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec 21 07:19:09 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 10:19:09 -0500
Subject: Exactly what part...
In-Reply-To: <p06230939bfce1e59331d@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F305A87B5A4DE92BC4986CD9B310@phx.gbl>

Holy Shit! Did you forward this Hettinga? It actually makes sense and is 
relevant!

The fact that Bush's wiretapping might be technically "illegal" is of only 
marginal interest.

Remember that some of our bandits have probably been getting this level of 
info through Echelon: Remember, it's not illegal for the Brits to spy on US 
citizens. Receiving such info from our Limey bandits pals is probably only 
marginally illegal at best.

The only thing "new" here is that there are new subgroups of bandits with 
the info now obtained through conventional channels, probably more local, 
and who aren't too afraid to reveal that they have it. Thus look for arrests 
of various troublemakers and big-mouths whereas NSA probably woud have been 
mum unless absolutely necessary, and even though only through a careful 
process that didn't indicate how they got the info (thus precluding general 
bigmouth roundups).

Of course, this does have some practical implications. Time to update the 
hardware...

-TD

>Bleating about laws, whether we have "a nation of laws" or not, doesn't
>work too much when there's an egregious surplus of same.  Under those
>circumstances, no matter who's in charge, the law fucks you in the ass.
>Everything is illegal, and thus nothing is.
>
>As far as voting goes, no matter who you vote for, the government gets
>elected, as the old libertarian saw goes.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec 21 07:22:52 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 10:22:52 -0500
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA
  surveillance by A
In-Reply-To: <20051221075333.GG2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F19B79EDDE186F909C969CB9B310@phx.gbl>

>Another very important point to remember is that we have to have a
>reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a
>member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an
>organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al
>Qaeda.

Whew. That's a relief. All those anti-war commies had it coming. And those 
damned cryptography nuts. Oh, pro-labor too.

As long as I shuttle back and forth between my home and the mall and don't 
turn on my computer I should be fine.

-TD


>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: transhumantech at yahoogroups.com, cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [declan at well.com: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA  
>surveillance by Alberto Gonzales and Michael Hayden [priv]]
>Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 08:53:33 +0100
>
>----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----
>
>From: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
>Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 23:15:46 -0500
>To: politech at politechbot.com
>Subject: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA surveillance by Alberto
>  Gonzales and Michael Hayden [priv]
>User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.6 (Macintosh/20050716)
>
>
>
>
>THE WHITE HOUSE
>
>
>
>Office of the Press Secretary
>
>For Immediate Release                     December 19, 2005
>
>
>
>
>
>PRESS BRIEFING
>
>BY
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL ALBERTO GONZALES
>
>AND
>
>GENERAL MICHAEL HAYDEN,
>
>PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
>
>
>
>James S. Brady Briefing Room
>
>
>
>
>
>8:30 A.M. EST
>
>
>
>
>
>MR. McCLELLAN:  Good morning, everybody.  I've got with me the Attorney
>General and General Hayden here this morning to brief you on the legal
>issues surrounding the NSA authorization and take whatever questions you
>have for them on that.  The Attorney General will open with some
>comments and then they'll be glad to take your questions.
>
>
>
>And with that, I'll turn it over to General Gonzales.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Thanks, Scott.
>
>
>
>The President confirmed the existence of a highly classified program on
>Saturday.  The program remains highly classified; there are many
>operational aspects of the program that have still not been disclosed
>and we want to protect that because those aspects of the program are
>very, very important to protect the national security of this country.
>So I'm only going to be talking about the legal underpinnings for what
>has been disclosed by the President.
>
>
>
>The President has authorized a program to engage in electronic
>surveillance of a particular kind, and this would be the intercepts of
>contents of communications where one of the -- one party to the
>communication is outside the United States.  And this is a very
>important point -- people are running around saying that the United
>States is somehow spying on American citizens calling their neighbors.
>Very, very important to understand that one party to the communication
>has to be outside the United States.
>
>
>
>Another very important point to remember is that we have to have a
>reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a
>member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an
>organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al
>Qaeda.  We view these authorities as authorities to confront the enemy
>in which the United States is at war with -- and that is al Qaeda and
>those who are supporting or affiliated with al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>What we're trying to do is learn of communications, back and forth, from
>within the United States to overseas with members of al Qaeda.  And
>that's what this program is about.
>
>
>
>Now, in terms of legal authorities, the Foreign Intelligence
>Surveillance Act provides -- requires a court order before engaging in
>this kind of surveillance that I've just discussed and the President
>announced on Saturday, unless there is somehow -- there is -- unless
>otherwise authorized by statute or by Congress.  That's what the law
>requires.  Our position is, is that the authorization to use force,
>which was passed by the Congress in the days following September 11th,
>constitutes that other authorization, that other statute by Congress, to
>engage in this kind of signals intelligence.
>
>
>
>Now, that -- one might argue, now, wait a minute, there's nothing in the
>authorization to use force that specifically mentions electronic
>surveillance.  Let me take you back to a case that the Supreme Court
>reviewed this past -- in 2004, the Hamdi decision.  As you remember, in
>that case, Mr. Hamdi was a U.S. citizen who was contesting his detention
>by the United States government.  What he said was that there is a
>statute, he said, that specifically prohibits the detention of American
>citizens without permission, an act by Congress -- and he's right, 18
>USC 4001a requires that the United States government cannot detain an
>American citizen except by an act of Congress.
>
>
>
>We took the position -- the United States government took the position
>that Congress had authorized that detention in the authorization to use
>force, even though the authorization to use force never mentions the
>word "detention."  And the Supreme Court, a plurality written by Justice
>O'Connor agreed.  She said, it was clear and unmistakable that the
>Congress had authorized the detention of an American citizen captured on
>the battlefield as an enemy combatant for the remainder -- the duration
>of the hostilities.  So even though the authorization to use force did
>not mention the word, "detention," she felt that detention of enemy
>soldiers captured on the battlefield was a fundamental incident of
>waging war, and therefore, had been authorized by Congress when they
>used the words, "authorize the President to use all necessary and
>appropriate force."
>
>For the same reason, we believe signals intelligence is even more a
>fundamental incident of war, and we believe has been authorized by the
>Congress.  And even though signals intelligence is not mentioned in the
>authorization to use force, we believe that the Court would apply the
>same reasoning to recognize the authorization by Congress to engage in
>this kind of electronic surveillance.
>
>
>
>I might also add that we also believe the President has the inherent
>authority under the Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief, to engage in
>this kind of activity.  Signals intelligence has been a fundamental
>aspect of waging war since the Civil War, where we intercepted
>telegraphs, obviously, during the world wars, as we intercepted
>telegrams in and out of the United States.  Signals intelligence is very
>important for the United States government to know what the enemy is
>doing, to know what the enemy is about to do.  It is a fundamental
>incident of war, as Justice O'Connor talked about in the Hamdi decision.
>We believe that -- and those two authorities exist to allow, permit the
>United States government to engage in this kind of surveillance.
>
>
>
>The President, of course, is very concerned about the protection of
>civil liberties, and that's why we've got strict parameters, strict
>guidelines in place out at NSA to ensure that the program is operating
>in a way that is consistent with the President's directives.  And,
>again, the authorization by the President is only to engage in
>surveillance of communications where one party is outside the United
>States, and where we have a reasonable basis to conclude that one of the
>parties of the communication is either a member of al Qaeda or
>affiliated with al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>Mike, do you want to -- have anything to add?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  I'd just add, in terms of what we do globally with
>regard to signals intelligence, which is a critical part of defending
>the nation, there are probably no communications more important to what
>it is we're trying to do to defend the nation; no communication is more
>important for that purpose than those communications that involve al
>Qaeda, and one end of which is inside the homeland, one end of which is
>inside the United States.  Our purpose here is to detect and prevent
>attacks.  And the program in this regard has been successful.
>
>
>
>Q    General, are you able to say how many Americans were caught in this
>surveillance?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm not -- I can't get into the specific
>numbers because that information remains classified.  Again, this is not
>a situation where -- of domestic spying.  To the extent that there is a
>moderate and heavy communication involving an American citizen, it would
>be a communication where the other end of the call is outside the United
>States and where we believe that either the American citizen or the
>person outside the United States is somehow affiliated with al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>Q    General, can you tell us why you don't choose to go to the FISA
>court?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, we continue to go to the FISA court
>and obtain orders.  It is a very important tool that we continue to
>utilize.  Our position is that we are not legally required to do, in
>this particular case, because the law requires that we -- FISA requires
>that we get a court order, unless authorized by a statute, and we
>believe that authorization has occurred.
>
>
>
>The operators out at NSA tell me that we don't have the speed and the
>agility that we need, in all circumstances, to deal with this new kind
>of enemy.  You have to remember that FISA was passed by the Congress in
>1978.  There have been tremendous advances in technology --
>
>
>
>Q    But it's been kind of retroactively, hasn't it?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  -- since then.  Pardon me?
>
>
>
>Q    It's been done retroactively before, hasn't it?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  What do you mean, "retroactively"?
>
>
>
>Q    You just go ahead and then you apply for the FISA clearance,
>because it's damn near automatic.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  If we -- but there are standards that have
>to be met, obviously, and you're right, there is a procedure where we --
>an emergency procedure that allows us to make a decision to authorize --
>to utilize FISA, and then we go to the court and get confirmation of
>that authority.
>
>
>
>But, again, FISA is very important in the war on terror, but it doesn't
>provide the speed and the agility that we need in all circumstances to
>deal with this new kind of threat.
>
>
>
>Q    But what -- go ahead.
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  Let me just add to the response to the last question.
>As the Attorney General says, FISA is very important, we make full use
>of FISA.  But if you picture what FISA was designed to do, FISA is
>designed to handle the needs in the nation in two broad categories:
>there's a law enforcement aspect of it; and the other aspect is the
>continued collection of foreign intelligence.  I don't think anyone
>could claim that FISA was envisaged as a tool to cover armed enemy
>combatants in preparation for attacks inside the United States.  And
>that's what this authorization under the President is designed to help
>us do.
>
>
>
>Q    Have you identified armed enemy combatants, through this program,
>in the United States?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  This program has been successful in detecting and
>preventing attacks inside the United States.
>
>
>
>Q    General Hayden, I know you're not going to talk about specifics
>about that, and you say it's been successful.  But would it have been as
>successful -- can you unequivocally say that something has been stopped
>or there was an imminent attack or you got information through this that
>you could not have gotten through going to the court?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  I can say unequivocally, all right, that we have got
>information through this program that would not otherwise have been
>available.
>
>
>
>Q    Through the court?  Because of the speed that you got it?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  Yes, because of the speed, because of the procedures,
>because of the processes and requirements set up in the FISA process, I
>can say unequivocally that we have used this program in lieu of that and
>this program has been successful.
>
>
>
>Q    But one of the things that concerns people is the slippery slope.
>If you said you absolutely need this program, you have to do it quickly
>-- then if you have someone you suspect being a member of al Qaeda, and
>they're in the United States, and there is a phone call between two
>people in the United States, why not use that, then, if it's so
>important?  Why not go that route?  Why not go further?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  Across the board, there is a judgment that we all have
>to make -- and I made this speech a day or two after 9/11 to the NSA
>workforce -- I said, free peoples always have to judge where they want
>to be on that spectrum between security and liberty; that there will be
>great pressures on us after those attacks to move our national banner
>down in the direction of security.  What I said to the NSA workforce is,
>our job is to keep Americans free by making Americans feel safe again.
>That's been the mission of the National Security Agency since the day
>after the attack, is when I talked -- two days after the attack is when
>I said that to the workforce.
>
>
>
>There's always a balancing between security and liberty.  We understand
>that this is a more -- I'll use the word "aggressive" program than would
>be traditionally available under FISA.  It is also less intrusive.  It
>deals only with international calls.  It is generally for far shorter
>periods of time.  And it is not designed to collect reams of
>intelligence, but to detect and warn and prevent about attacks.  And,
>therefore, that's where we've decided to draw that balance between
>security and liberty.
>
>
>
>Q    Gentlemen, can you say when Congress was first briefed, who was
>included in that, and will there be a leaks investigation?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well of course, we're not going to -- we
>don't talk about -- we try not to talk about investigations.  As to
>whether or not there will be a leak investigation, as the President
>indicated, this is really hurting national security, this has really
>hurt our country, and we are concerned that a very valuable tool has
>been compromised.  As to whether or not there will be a leak
>investigation, we'll just have to wait and see.
>
>
>
>And your first question was?
>
>
>
>Q    When was Congress first briefed --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm not going to -- I'm not going to talk
>about -- I'll let others talk about when Congress was first briefed.
>What I can say is, as the President indicated on Saturday, there have
>been numerous briefings with certain key members of Congress.
>Obviously, some members have come out since the revelations on Saturday,
>saying that they hadn't been briefed.  This is a very classified
>program.  It is probably the most classified program that exists in the
>United States government, because the tools are so valuable, and
>therefore, decisions were made to brief only key members of Congress.
>We have begun the process now of reaching out to other members of
>Congress.  I met last night, for example, with Chairman Specter and
>other members of Congress to talk about the legal aspects of this
>program.
>
>
>
>And so we are engaged in a dialogue now to talk with Congress, but also
>-- but we're still mindful of the fact that still -- this is still a
>very highly classified program, and there are still limits about what we
>can say today, even to certain members of Congress.
>
>
>
>Q    General, what's really compromised by the public knowledge of this
>program?  Don't you assume that the other side thinks we're listening to
>them?  I mean, come on.
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  The fact that this program has been successful is proof
>to me that what you claim to be an assumption is certainly not
>universal.  The more we discuss it, the more we put it in the face of
>those who would do us harm, the more they will respond to this and
>protect their communications and make it more difficult for us to defend
>the nation.
>
>
>
>Q    Mr. Attorney General --
>
>
>
>Q    -- became public, have you seen any evidence in a change in the
>tactics or --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  We're not going to comment on that kind of
>operational aspect.
>
>
>
>Q    You say this has really hurt the American people.  Is that based
>only on your feeling about it, or is there some empirical evidence to
>back that up, even if you can't --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I think the existence of this program, the
>confirmation of the -- I mean, the fact that this program exists, in my
>judgment, has compromised national security, as the President indicated
>on Saturday.
>
>
>
>Q    I'd like to ask you, what are the constitutional limits on this
>power that you see laid out in the statute and in your inherent
>constitutional war power?  And what's to prevent you from just listening
>to everyone's conversation and trying to find the word "bomb," or
>something like that?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, that's a good question.  This was a
>question that was raised in some of my discussions last night with
>members of Congress.  The President has not authorized -- has not
>authorized blanket surveillance of communications here in the United
>States.  He's been very clear about the kind of surveillance that we're
>going to engage in.  And that surveillance is tied with our conflict
>with al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>You know, we feel comfortable that this surveillance is consistent with
>requirements of the 4th Amendment.  The touchstone of the 4th Amendment
>is reasonableness, and the Supreme Court has long held that there are
>exceptions to the warrant requirement in -- when special needs outside
>the law enforcement arena.  And we think that that standard has been met
>here.  When you're talking about communications involving al Qaeda, when
>you -- obviously there are significant privacy interests implicated
>here, but we think that those privacy interests have been addressed;
>when you think about the fact that this is an authorization that's
>ongoing, it's not a permanent authorization, it has to be reevaluated
>from time to time.  There are additional safeguards that have been in
>place -- that have been imposed out at NSA, and we believe that it is a
>reasonable application of these authorities.
>
>
>
>Q    Mr. Attorney General, haven't you stretched --
>
>
>
>Q    -- adequate because of technological advances?  Wouldn't you do the
>country a better service to address that issue and fix it, instead of
>doing a backdoor approach --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  This is not a backdoor approach. We believe
>Congress has authorized this kind of surveillance.  We have had
>discussions with Congress in the past -- certain members of Congress --
>as to whether or not FISA could be amended to allow us to adequately
>deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that that would be
>difficult, if not impossible.
>
>
>
>Q    If this is not backdoor, is this at least a judgment call?  Can you
>see why other people would look at it and say, well, no, we don't see it
>that way?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I think some of the concern is because
>people had not been briefed; they don't understand the specifics of the
>program, they don't understand the strict safeguards within the program.
>And I haven't had a discussion -- an opportunity to have a discussion
>with them about our legal analysis.  So, obviously, we're in that
>process now.  Part of the reason for this press brief today is to have
>you help us educate the American people and the American Congress about
>what we're doing and the legal basis for what we're doing.
>
>
>
>Q    Al, you talk about the successes and the critical intercepts of the
>program.  Have there also been cases in which after listening in or
>intercepting, you realize you had the wrong guy and you listened to what
>you shouldn't have?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  That's why I mentioned earlier that the program is less
>intrusive.  It deals only with international calls.  The time period in
>which we would conduct our work is much shorter, in general, overall,
>than it would be under FISA.  And one of the true purposes of this is to
>be very agile, as you described.
>
>
>
>If this particular line of logic, this reasoning that took us to this
>place proves to be inaccurate, we move off of it right away.
>
>
>
>Q    Are there cases in which --
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  Yes, of course.
>
>
>
>Q    Can you give us some idea of percentage, or how often you get it
>right and how often you get it wrong?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  No, it would be very -- no, I cannot, without getting
>into the operational details.  I'm sorry.
>
>
>
>Q    But there are cases where you wind up listening in where you
>realize you shouldn't have?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  There are cases like we do with regard to the global
>SIGIN system -- you have reasons to go after particular activities,
>particular communications.  There's a logic; there is a standard as to
>why you would go after that, not just in a legal sense, which is very
>powerful, but in a practical sense.  We can't waste resources on targets
>that simply don't provide valuable information.  And when we decide that
>is the case -- and in this program, the standards, in terms of
>re-evaluating whether or not this coverage is worthwhile at all, are
>measured in days and weeks.
>
>
>
>Q    Would someone in a case in which you got it wrong have a cause of
>action against the government?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  That is something I'm not going to answer,
>Ken.
>
>
>
>Q    I wanted to ask you a question.  Do you think the government has
>the right to break the law?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Absolutely not.  I don't believe anyone is
>above the law.
>
>
>
>Q    You have stretched this resolution for war into giving you carte
>blanche to do anything you want to do.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, one might make that same argument in
>connection with detention of American citizens, which is far more
>intrusive than listening into a conversation.  There may be some members
>of Congress who might say, we never --
>
>
>
>Q    That's your interpretation.  That isn't Congress' interpretation.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, I'm just giving you the analysis --
>
>
>
>Q    You're never supposed to spy on Americans.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm just giving the analysis used by Justice
>O'Connor -- and she said clearly and unmistakenly the Congress
>authorized the President of the United States to detain an American
>citizen, even though the authorization to use force never mentions the
>word "detention" --
>
>
>
>Q    -- into wiretapping everybody and listening in on --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  This is not about wiretapping everyone.
>This is a very concentrated, very limited program focused at gaining
>information about our enemy.
>
>
>
>Q    Now that the cat is out of the bag, so to speak, do you expect your
>legal analysis to be tested in the courts?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm not going to, you know, try to guess as
>to what's going to happen about that.  We're going to continue to try to
>educate the American people and the American Congress about what we're
>doing and the basis -- why we believe that the President has the
>authority to engage in this kind of conduct.
>
>
>
>Q    Because there are some very smart legal minds who clearly think a
>law has been broken here.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  Well, I think that they may be making or
>offering up those opinions or assumptions based on very limited
>information.  They don't have all the information about the program.  I
>think they probably don't have the information about our legal analysis.
>
>
>
>Q    Judge Gonzales, will you release then, for the reasons you're
>saying now, the declassified versions of the legal rationale for this
>from OLC?  And if not, why not?  To assure the American public that this
>was done with the legal authority that you state.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  We're engaged now in a process of educating
>the American people, again, and educating the Congress.  We'll make the
>appropriate evaluation at the appropriate time as to whether or not
>additional information needs to be provided to the Congress or the
>American people.
>
>
>
>Q    You declassified OLC opinions before, after the torture -- why not
>do that here to show, yes, we went through a process?
>
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  I'm not confirming the existence of opinions
>or the non-existence of opinions.  I've offered up today our legal
>analysis of the authorities of this President.
>
>
>
>Q    Sir, can you explain, please, the specific inadequacies in FISA
>that have prevented you from sort of going through the normal channels?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  One, the whole key here is agility.  And let me
>re-trace some grounds I tried to suggest earlier.  FISA was built for
>persistence.  FISA was built for long-term coverage against known agents
>of an enemy power.  And the purpose involved in each of those -- in
>those cases was either for a long-term law enforcement purpose or a
>long-term intelligence purpose.
>
>
>
>This program isn't for that.  This is to detect and prevent.  And here
>the key is not so much persistence as it is agility.  It's a quicker
>trigger.  It's a subtly softer trigger.  And the intrusion into privacy
>-- the intrusion into privacy is significantly less.  It's only
>international calls.  The period of time in which we do this is, in most
>cases, far less than that which would be gained by getting a court
>order.  And our purpose here, our sole purpose is to detect and prevent.
>
>
>
>Again, I make the point, what we are talking about here are
>communications we have every reason to believe are al Qaeda
>communications, one end of which is in the United States.  And I don't
>think any of us would want any inefficiencies in our coverage of those
>kinds of communications, above all.  And that's what this program allows
>us to do -- it allows us to be as agile as operationally required to
>cover these targets.
>
>
>
>Q    But how does FISA --
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  FISA involves the process -- FISA involves marshaling
>arguments; FISA involves looping paperwork around, even in the case of
>emergency authorizations from the Attorney General.  And beyond that,
>it's a little -- it's difficult for me to get into further discussions
>as to why this is more optimized under this process without, frankly,
>revealing too much about what it is we do and why and how we do it.
>
>
>
>Q    If FISA didn't work, why didn't you seek a new statute that allowed
>something like this legally?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES:  That question was asked earlier. We've had
>discussions with members of Congress, certain members of Congress, about
>whether or not we could get an amendment to FISA, and we were advised
>that that was not likely to be -- that was not something we could likely
>get, certainly not without jeopardizing the existence of the program,
>and therefore, killing the program.  And that -- and so a decision was
>made that because we felt that the authorities were there, that we
>should continue moving forward with this program.
>
>
>
>Q    And who determined that these targets were al Qaeda?  Did you
>wiretap them?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  The judgment is made by the operational work force at
>the National Security Agency using the information available to them at
>the time, and the standard that they apply -- and it's a two-person
>standard that must be signed off by a shift supervisor, and carefully
>recorded as to what created the operational imperative to cover any
>target, but particularly with regard to those inside the United States.
>
>
>
>Q    So a shift supervisor is now making decisions that a FISA judge
>would normally make?  I just want to make sure I understand.  Is that
>what you're saying?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  What we're trying to do is to use the approach we have
>used globally against al Qaeda, the operational necessity to cover
>targets.  And the reason I emphasize that this is done at the
>operational level is to remove any question in your mind that this is in
>any way politically influenced.  This is done to chase those who would
>do harm to the United States.
>
>
>
>Q    Building on that, during --
>
>
>
>Q    Thank you, General.  Roughly when did those conversations occur
>with members of Congress?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  I'm not going to get into the specifics of
>when those conversations occurred, but they have occurred.
>
>
>
>Q    May I just ask you if they were recently or if they were when you
>began making these exceptions?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  They weren't recently.
>
>
>
>MR. McCLELLAN:  The President indicated that those -- the weeks after
>September 11th.
>
>
>
>Q    What was the date, though, of the first executive order?  Can you
>give us that?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  If I could just, before you ask that question, just add
>-- these actions that I described taking place at the operational level
>-- and I believe that a very important point to be made -- have intense
>oversight by the NSA Inspector General, by the NSA General Counsel, and
>by officials of the Justice Department who routinely look into this
>process and verify that the standards set out by the President are being
>followed.
>
>
>
>Q    Can you absolutely assure us that all of the communications
>intercepted --
>
>
>
>Q    Have you said that you -- (inaudible) -- anything about this
>program with your international partners -- with the partners probably
>in the territories of which you intercept those communications?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  I'm not aware of discussions with other
>countries, but that doesn't mean that they haven't occurred.  I simply
>have no personal knowledge of that.
>
>
>
>Q    Also, is it only al Qaeda, or maybe some other terrorist groups?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  Again, with respect to what the President
>discussed on Saturday, this program -- it is tied to communications
>where we believe one of the parties is affiliated with al Qaeda or part
>of an organization or group that is supportive of al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>Q    Sir, during his confirmation hearings, it came out that
>now-Ambassador Bolton had sought and obtained NSA intercepts of
>conversations between American citizens and others.  Who gets the
>information from this program; how do you guarantee that it doesn't get
>too widely spread inside the government, and used for other purposes?
>
>
>
>Q    And is it destroyed afterwards?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  We report this information the way we report any other
>information collected by the National Security Agency.  And the phrase
>you're talking about is called minimization of U.S. identities.  The
>same minimalizationist standards apply across the board, including for
>this program.  To make this very clear -- U.S. identities are minimized
>in all of NSA's activities, unless, of course, the U.S. identity is
>essential to understand the inherent intelligence value of the
>intelligence report.  And that's the standard that's used.
>
>
>
>Q    General, when you discussed the emergency powers, you said, agility
>is critical here.  And in the case of the emergency powers, as I
>understand it, you can go in, do whatever you need to do, and within 72
>hours just report it after the fact.  And as you say, these may not even
>last very long at all.  What would be the difficulty in setting up a
>paperwork system in which the logs that you say you have the shift
>supervisors record are simply sent to a judge after the fact?  If the
>judge says that this is not legitimate, by that time probably your
>intercept is over, wouldn't that be correct?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  What you're talking about now are efficiencies.  What
>you're asking me is, can we do this program as efficiently using the one
>avenue provided to us by the FISA Act, as opposed to the avenue provided
>to us by subsequent legislation and the President's authorization.
>
>
>
>Our operational judgment, given the threat to the nation that the
>difference in the operational efficiencies between those two sets of
>authorities are such that we can provide greater protection for the
>nation operating under this authorization.
>
>
>
>Q    But while you're getting an additional efficiency, you're also
>operating outside of an existing law.  If the law would allow you to
>stay within the law and be slightly less efficient, would that be --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  I guess I disagree with that
>characterization.  I think that this electronic surveillance is within
>the law, has been authorized.  I mean, that is our position.  We're only
>required to achieve a court order through FISA if we don't have
>authorization otherwise by the Congress, and we think that that has
>occurred in this particular case.
>
>
>
>Q    Can you just give us one assurance before you go, General?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ:  It depends on what it is.  (Laughter.)
>
>
>
>Q    Can you assure us that all of these intercepts had an international
>component and that at no time were any of the intercepts purely
>domestic?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN:  The authorization given to NSA by the President
>requires that one end of these communications has to be outside the
>United States.  I can assure you, by the physics of the intercept, by
>how we actually conduct our activities, that one end of these
>communications are always outside the United States of America.
>
>
>
>                                   END                        9:02 A.M.
>EST
>
>  ---
>_______________________________________________
>Politech mailing list
>Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
>Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which 
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From perry at piermont.com  Wed Dec 21 07:45:01 2005
From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 10:45:01 -0500
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Re: [Antisocial] Re: [Clips] Why Bush Approved
	the Wiretaps (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <15321512.1135160256591.JavaMail.teamon@bda055-cell00.bisx.prod.on.blackberry>
	(Jason Coombs's message of "Wed, 21 Dec 2005 10:12:18 +0000 GMT")
References: <20051220234918.O37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>
	<15321512.1135160256591.JavaMail.teamon@bda055-cell00.bisx.prod.on.blackberry>
Message-ID: <871x06h2te.fsf@snark.piermont.com>


"Jason Coombs" <jasonc at science.org> writes:
> Perry E. Metzger <perry at piermont.com> wrote:
>>   Electronic surveillance means
>>   (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
>>       surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
>>       communication sent by or intended to be received by
> ...
>
> Dear Perry, et al:
>
> I think you're missing the key clue as to what was actually done,
> and thus why it was done in the manner chosen, and why it is now
> being defended by the Bush Administration as being legal.
>
> All of the statutes quoted, and every other one of which I am aware,
> prohibit the INTERCEPTION of the CONTENT of communications.
>
> Nothing presently prohibits the automated processing of the content
> via software when the content is not captured/intercepted, nor
> excerpted/preserved for law enforcement's review. A computer system,
> designed to circumvent the intent but comply with the letter of
> present law, can legally do what a person cannot.

I'm afraid your interpretation is not consistent with the law. The law
defines electronic surveillance in a specific way, to whit:

    (f) Electronic surveillance means
    (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
        surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
        communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular,
        known United States person who is in the United States, if the
        contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United
        States person, under circumstances in which a person has a
        reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
        for law enforcement purposes;
    (2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
        surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to
        or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any
        party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States,
        but does not include the acquisition of those communications of
        computer trespassers that would be permissible under section 2511
        (2)(i) of title 18;
    (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
        surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication,
        under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation
        of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
        purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are
        located within the United States; or
    (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
        surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire
        information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under
        circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
        privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.

As I read that, I see no requirement that a human being be involved.
If an electronic, mechanical or other surveillance device *acquires*
the content, even if no human then looks at it, you've conducted
"electronic surveillance". I'm well aware that in places like New York
State there is a distinction between "Pen Register" and "Wiretapping"
activities, but there is no such distinction in the FISA.

I suggest that, in coming up with creative interpretations of the
situation, you read the law first to see if your interpretation is
consistent with the law.

Perry
_______________________________________________
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From rvh40 at insightbb.com  Wed Dec 21 10:59:45 2005
From: rvh40 at insightbb.com (Randall)
Date: December 21, 2005 10:59:45 PM EST
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <mailman.1470.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

<dewayne at warpspeed.com>, cyberia <CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM>
Subject: Download Piaf, Go To Jail

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,69905,00.html?tw=wn_story_top5
Internet downloaders could face jail sentences and software makers
may be required to add anti-copying technology to products
distributed in France under draft legislation that's expected to go
to a vote this week.

The so-called emergency legislation would require software makers to
include digital-rights management, or DRM, software in their
products, according to a draft (.pdf) of the proposed legislation
seen by Wired News.

...French legislators are also calling for three-year jail sentences
and fines of 300,000 euros for illegally copying music, video or any
other copyright-protected files.

...But forcing all software makers to conform to special DRM rules
for France alone is likely unworkable, said Urs Gasser, professor of
law at the University of St.

...The lower house of France's national assembly is scheduled to vote
as early as Thursday on the legislation, which has been proposed as a
way to bring France into compliance with a pending European
Commission copyright directive.

...The language of the proposal reflects lobbying pressure from
French media giant Vivendi Universal and other recording industry
interests, said Loic Dachary, founder of the eucd.info watch group
and treasurer of The Free Software Foundation in France.

"Vivendi Universal, the Business Software Alliance and the Soci?t?
des Auteurs et des Compositeurs de Musique actually drafted these
texts that the legislators are using," Dachary said.

The industry considers the imposition of strong, proactive measures
on software makers necessary to thwart pirates, especially in Europe
where more than one in three copies of software in use is unlicensed,
said Ga?lle Prigent-Protasov, a vice president of software maker
Aladdin.

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From measl at mfn.org  Wed Dec 21 09:51:35 2005
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 11:51:35 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [Clips] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
In-Reply-To: <p062309f9bfcf4334d7bb@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <p062309f9bfcf4334d7bb@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <20051221115034.R37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Wed, 21 Dec 2005, R. A. Hettinga wrote:

" The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act makes it difficult to conduct
 surveillance of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents unless they
 are suspected of being involved in terrorist or other hostile activities.
 That is too restrictive. Innocent people, such as unwitting neighbors of
 terrorists, may, without knowing it, have valuable counterterrorist
 information. Collecting such information is of a piece with data-mining
 projects such as Able Danger."

This says it all - they want the authority to look at "innocent people"
without restriction.  Forget it.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF


	Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about
	the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise?

	- Steve Thompson




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 02:51:36 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 11:51:36 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] San Francisco leaders voice concerns
  about Wi-Fi project]
Message-ID: <20051221105136.GX2249@leitl.org>

Let's see how much locality tracking the free network will
have, and whether they will block anonymizing services.

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From measl at mfn.org  Wed Dec 21 09:54:05 2005
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 11:54:05 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [EMED-L] Patriot Act and HIPPA (fwd)
Message-ID: <20051221115344.H37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>

Take note people!

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF


	Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about
	the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise?

	- Steve Thompson



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 12:10:59 -0500
From: Jeanne Lenzer <jeanne.lenzer at GMAIL.COM>
Reply-To: EMED-L -- a list for emergency medicine practitioners.
    <EMED-L at ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU>
To: EMED-L at ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU
Subject: [EMED-L] Patriot Act and HIPPA

Could anyone on this listserve who has seen anything like what follows
below, please contact me off-list immediately jeanne.lenzer at earthlink.net
(for background or for attribution - your choice).

Thanks, Jeanne



A patient was handed a medical information rights and disclosure booklet
she got from her doctor. It lists the folks that they might
release medical information to for various reasons (health department,
lawyers and courts because of subpoena, law enforcement officials, coroners,
medical examiners, funeral directors, etc.).
Below them, there is this graph:

Protective Services for the President, National Security and Intelligence
Activities:
We may disclose medical information about you to authorized federal
officials so they may without limitation (i) provide protection to the
President, other authorized persons or foreign heads of state or conduct
special investigations, or (ii) conduct lawful intelligence,
counter-intelligence, or other national security activities authorized by
law.





__________



Jeanne Lenzer

Freelance journalist

11 Len Court

Kingston, NY  12401

USA

jeanne.lenzer at earthlink.net

845.943.6202 office

203.300.7136 cell



To unsubscribe, send the command  "SIGNOFF EMED-L" to LISTSERV at ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 21 09:36:58 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 12:36:58 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
Message-ID: <p062309f9bfcf4334d7bb@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 12:31:45 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053_pf.html>

 The Washington Post

 Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis

 By Richard A. Posner
 Wednesday, December 21, 2005; A31

 We've learned that the Defense Department is deeply involved in domestic
 intelligence (intelligence concerning threats to national security that
 unfold on U.S. soil). The department's National Security Agency has been
 conducting, outside the framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
 Act, electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens within the United States.
 Other Pentagon agencies, notably the one known as Counterintelligence Field
 Activity (CIFA), have, as described in Walter Pincus's recent articles in
 The Post, been conducting domestic intelligence on a large scale. Although
 the CIFA's formal mission is to prevent attacks on military installations
 in the United States, the scale of its activities suggests a broader
 concern with domestic security. Other Pentagon agencies have gotten into
 the domestic intelligence act, such as the Information Dominance Center,
 which developed the Able Danger data-mining program.

 These programs are criticized as grave threats to civil liberties. They are
 not. Their significance is in flagging the existence of gaps in our
 defenses against terrorism. The Defense Department is rushing to fill those
 gaps, though there may be better ways.

 The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of
 personal data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and
 processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their
 volume, the data are first sifted by computers, which search for names,
 addresses, phone numbers, etc., that may have intelligence value. This
 initial sifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient
 being), keeps most private data from being read by any intelligence officer.

 The data that make the cut are those that contain clues to possible threats
 to national security. The only valid ground for forbidding human inspection
 of such data is fear that they might be used to blackmail or otherwise
 intimidate the administration's political enemies. That danger is more
 remote than at any previous period of U.S. history. Because of increased
 political partisanship, advances in communications technology and more
 numerous and competitive media, American government has become a sieve. No
 secrets concerning matters that would interest the public can be kept for
 long. And the public would be far more interested to learn that public
 officials were using private information about American citizens for base
 political ends than to learn that we have been rough with terrorist
 suspects -- a matter that was quickly exposed despite efforts at
 concealment.

 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act makes it difficult to conduct
 surveillance of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents unless they
 are suspected of being involved in terrorist or other hostile activities.
 That is too restrictive. Innocent people, such as unwitting neighbors of
 terrorists, may, without knowing it, have valuable counterterrorist
 information. Collecting such information is of a piece with data-mining
 projects such as Able Danger.

 The goal of national security intelligence is to prevent a terrorist
 attack, not just punish the attacker after it occurs, and the information
 that enables the detection of an impending attack may be scattered around
 the world in tiny bits. A much wider, finer-meshed net must be cast than
 when investigating a specific crime. Many of the relevant bits may be in
 the e-mails, phone conversations or banking records of U.S. citizens, some
 innocent, some not so innocent. The government is entitled to those data,
 but just for the limited purpose of protecting national security.

 The Pentagon's rush to fill gaps in domestic intelligence reflects the
 disarray in this vital yet neglected area of national security. The
 principal domestic intelligence agency is the FBI, but it is primarily a
 criminal investigation agency that has been struggling, so far with limited
 success, to transform itself. It is having trouble keeping its eye on the
 ball; an FBI official is quoted as having told the Senate that
 environmental and animal rights militants pose the biggest terrorist
 threats in the United States. If only that were so.

 Most other nations, such as Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Israel,
 many with longer histories of fighting terrorism than the United States,
 have a domestic intelligence agency that is separate from its national
 police force, its counterpart to the FBI. We do not. We also have no
 official with sole and comprehensive responsibility for domestic
 intelligence. It is no surprise that gaps in domestic intelligence are
 being filled by ad hoc initiatives.

 We must do better. The terrorist menace, far from receding, grows every
 day. This is not only because al Qaeda likes to space its attacks, often by
 many years, but also because weapons of mass destruction are becoming ever
 more accessible to terrorist groups and individuals.

 The writer is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit and
 a senior lecturer in law at the University of Chicago.
 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 21 09:41:33 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 12:41:33 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time  
   of   war
In-Reply-To: <20051221081008.GP2249@leitl.org>
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]>  
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>  
  <p0623094abfce2e82fce4@[68.167.57.91]>  
  <87fyonl3x3.fsf@snark.piermont.com> <20051221081008.GP2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <p062309fcbfcf442e1260@[68.167.57.91]>

At 9:10 AM +0100 12/21/05, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>You don't have to write code if the bleating succeeds first.
>And if the bleating doesn't, no amount of code will save our ass.

So...what? Don't write code?

Didn't you ever learn any logic?

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 05:38:44 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 14:38:44 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on  LA Times on NYT spying story]
Message-ID: <20051221133844.GH2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 05:39:21 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 14:39:21 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] "Double Secret" Wiretaps vs. the
  President's 2004 Statement]
Message-ID: <20051221133921.GI2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 05:40:37 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 14:40:37 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Bruce Schneier --  An Essay on Salon]
Message-ID: <20051221134037.GJ2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 05:42:08 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 14:42:08 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] State refuses to approve Diebold voting
  machines]
Message-ID: <20051221134208.GL2249@leitl.org>

Will wonders never cease.

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 10:06:23 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 19:06:23 +0100
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of   war
In-Reply-To: <p062309fcbfcf442e1260@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]>
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
  <p0623094abfce2e82fce4@[68.167.57.91]>
  <87fyonl3x3.fsf@snark.piermont.com> <20051221081008.GP2249@leitl.org>
  <p062309fcbfcf442e1260@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <20051221180623.GZ2249@leitl.org>

On Wed, Dec 21, 2005 at 12:41:33PM -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> At 9:10 AM +0100 12/21/05, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> >You don't have to write code if the bleating succeeds first.
> >And if the bleating doesn't, no amount of code will save our ass.
>
> So...what? Don't write code?

Write code. Participate in the political process.
Both are not mutually exclusive.

> Didn't you ever learn any logic?

You need to work more on your reading comprehension.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 21 10:22:40 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 19:22:40 +0100
Subject: [post2wm@freenet.de: [rael-science] Pentagon spying on anti-war
  groups - Report]
Message-ID: <20051221182240.GB2249@leitl.org>

Source: Al  Jazeera
http://aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?service_
ID=10263

Pentagon spying on anti-war groups - Report

12/17/2005

A Pentagon document shows that the U.S. army is monitoring and collecting
information on anti-war activists across the United States, NBC reported.

The network obtained a classified Pentagon document which lists four dozen
anti-war meetings or demonstrations that took place in the U.S. over a
10-month period.

The document also included anti-nuclear protests staged in Nebraska on the
50th anniversary of the U.S. nuclear bombing of Nagasaki.

The Pentagon describes all of these events as threats, says William Arkin,
the former Army intelligence officer, who obtained the secret documents.

According to NBC, the document says that the U.S. military is even
monitoring Internet traffic. The network quoted one Pentagon briefing
document, stamped "secret", as saying: "We have noted increased
communication and encouragement between protest groups using the Internet."

Correspondents say the revelation shows how Washington stepped up
intelligence collection since the September 11, 2001 attacks.

American citizens have been wary of any monitoring of anti-war groups since
the Vietnam war when the Pentagon spied on anti-war and civil rights
organizations. In the 1970s, the Congress recommended tough restrictions on
military spying inside the United States.

Following the NBC report, the Pentagon said it ordered a review of the
military intelligence program, indicating, but not admitting, that some of
the gathered information had been handled improperly.

A Pentagon spokesman said that "the Department of Defense uses
counterintelligence and law enforcement information properly collected by
law enforcement agencies.

"The use of this information is subject to strict limitations, particularly
the information must be related to missions relating to protection of DoD
installations, interests and personnel," he said, according to Reuters.

The Pentagon has already acknowledged the existence of a
counterintelligence program known as the "Threat and Local Observation
Notice" (TALON) reporting system, which the military says is aimed at
gathering "non-validated threat information and security anomalies
indicative of possible terrorist pre-attack activity."

     * "Psychological war"

USAToday reported that the Pentagon has a $400 million psychological
warfare campaign that includes plans to plant pro-American stories in
global media outlets.

One of the army officials involved in the program was quoted as saying that
the operation is aimed at altering foreign audiences' perceptions to back
American policies.

The program, run by psychological warfare experts at the U.S. Special
Operations Command, would operate throughout the world, the report said.

According to Reuters, one of the three firms handling the campaign include
the Lincoln Group, a company under investigation by the Pentagon for paying
Iraqi newspapers to run pro-American stories.

Pentagon officials involved in the program say that they don't plan to
secretly plant false stories in foreign media outlets. But Mike Furlong,
deputy director of the Joint Psychological Operations Support Element, told
USAToday that the army would not always reveal its role in distributing
pro-American messages.

"While the product may not carry the label, 'Made in the USA,' we will
respond truthfully if asked" by reporters, he said.

USAToday said Furlong refused to give examples of specific products, which
he said would include articles, advertisements and public service
announcements.

Copyright 2005 Al Jazeera Publishing Limited


----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Wed Dec 21 19:20:34 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 22:20:34 -0500
Subject: [IP] Surveillance UK: why this revolution is only the start
Message-ID: <mailman.1471.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From checker at panix.com  Wed Dec 21 19:26:58 2005
From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker)
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 22:26:58 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [>Htech] Independent: Britain will be first country to monitor every
Message-ID: <mailman.1472.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

car
 journey
Reply-To: transhumantech at yahoogroups.com

Britain will be first country to monitor every car journey
http://news.independent.co.uk/www.independent.co.uk/template/ver/wireFrame/

By Steve Connor, Science Editor

Published: 22 December 2005

    Britain is to become the first country in the world where the movements of
all
    vehicles on the roads are recorded. A new national surveillance system
will hold
    the records for at least two years.

    Using a network of cameras that can automatically read every passing
number
    plate, the plan is to build a huge database of vehicle movements so that
the
    police and security services can analyse any journey a driver has made
over
    several years.

    The network will incorporate thousands of existing CCTV cameras which are
being
    converted to read number plates automatically night and day to provide
24/7
    coverage of all motorways and main roads, as well as towns, cities, ports
and
    petrol-station forecourts.

    By next March a central database installed alongside the Police National
Computer
    in Hendon, north London, will store the details of 35 million
number-plate
    "reads" per day. These will include time, date and precise location, with
camera
    sites monitored by global positioning satellites.

    Already there are plans to extend the database by increasing the storage
period
    to five years and by linking thousands of additional cameras so that
details of
    up to 100 million number plates can be fed each day into the central
databank.

    Senior police officers have described the surveillance network as possibly
the
    biggest advance in the technology of crime detection and prevention since
the
    introduction of DNA fingerprinting.

    But others concerned about civil liberties will be worried that the
movements of
    millions of law-abiding people will soon be routinely recorded and kept on
a
    central computer database for years.

    The new national data centre of vehicle movements will form the basis of
a
    sophisticated surveillance tool that lies at the heart of an operation
designed
    to drive criminals off the road.

    In the process, the data centre will provide unrivalled opportunities to
gather
    intelligence data on the movements and associations of organised gangs
and
    terrorist suspects whenever they use cars, vans or motorcycles.

    The scheme is being orchestrated by the Association of Chief Police
Officers
    (Acpo) and has the full backing of ministers who have sanctioned the
spending of
    ?24m this year on equipment.

    More than 50 local authorities have signed agreements to allow the police
to
    convert thousands of existing traffic cameras so they can read number
plates
    automatically. The data will then be transmitted to Hendon via a secure
police
    communications network.

    Chief constables are also on the verge of brokering agreements with the
Highways
    Agency, supermarkets and petrol station owners to incorporate their own
CCTV
    cameras into the network. In addition to cross-checking each number plate
against
    stolen and suspect vehicles held on the Police National Computer, the
national
    data centre will also check whether each vehicle is lawfully licensed,
insured
    and has a valid MoT test certificate.

    "Every time you make a car journey already, you'll be on CCTV somewhere.
The
    difference is that, in future, the car's index plates will be read as
well," said
    Frank Whiteley, Chief Constable of Hertfordshire and chairman of the Acpo
    steering committee on automatic number plate recognition (ANPR).

    "What the data centre should be able to tell you is where a vehicle was in
the
    past and where it is now, whether it was or wasn't at a particular
location, and
    the routes taken to and from those crime scenes. Particularly important
are
    associated vehicles," Mr Whiteley said.

    The term "associated vehicles" means analysing convoys of cars, vans or
trucks to
    see who is driving alongside a vehicle that is already known to be of
interest to
    the police. Criminals, for instance, will drive somewhere in a lawful
vehicle,
    steal a car and then drive back in convoy to commit further crimes "You're
not
    necessarily interested in the stolen vehicle. You're interested in what's
moving
    with the stolen vehicle," Mr Whiteley explained.

    According to a strategy document drawn up by Acpo, the national data
centre in
    Hendon will be at the heart of a surveillance operation that should deny
    criminals the use of the roads.

    "The intention is to create a comprehensive ANPR camera and reader
infrastructure
    across the country to stop displacement of crime from area to area and to
allow a
    comprehensive picture of vehicle movements to be captured," the Acpo
strategy
    says.

    "This development forms the basis of a 24/7 vehicle movement database that
will
    revolutionise arrest, intelligence and crime investigation opportunities
on a
    national basis," it says.

    Mr Whiteley said MI5 will also use the database. "Clearly there are values
for
    this in counter-terrorism," he said.

    "The security services will use it for purposes that I frankly don't have
access
    to. It's part of public protection. If the security services did not have
access
    to this, we'd be negligent."

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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rms at computerbytesman.com  Thu Dec 22 02:22:49 2005
From: rms at computerbytesman.com (Richard M. Smith)
Date: December 22, 2005 2:22:49 PM EST
Subject: [EPIC_IDOF] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
Message-ID: <mailman.1473.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR20051220010
53.html

Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
By Richard A. Posner
Wednesday, December 21, 2005; Page A31

We've learned that the Defense Department is deeply involved in domestic
intelligence (intelligence concerning threats to national security that
unfold on U.S. soil). The department's National Security Agency has been
conducting, outside the framework of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance
Act, electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens within the United States.
Other Pentagon agencies, notably the one known as Counterintelligence
Field
Activity (CIFA), have, as described in Walter Pincus's recent
articles in
The Post, been conducting domestic intelligence on a large scale.
Although
the CIFA's formal mission is to prevent attacks on military
installations in
the United States, the scale of its activities suggests a broader
concern
with domestic security. Other Pentagon agencies have gotten into the
domestic intelligence act, such as the Information Dominance Center,
which
developed the Able Danger data-mining program.

These programs are criticized as grave threats to civil liberties.
They are
not. Their significance is in flagging the existence of gaps in our
defenses
against terrorism. The Defense Department is rushing to fill those gaps,
though there may be better ways.

The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of
personal
data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and processing of
data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their volume, the
data are
first sifted by computers, which search for names, addresses, phone
numbers,
etc., that may have intelligence value. This initial sifting, far from
invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most
private
data from being read by any intelligence officer.

The data that make the cut are those that contain clues to possible
threats
to national security. The only valid ground for forbidding human
inspection
of such data is fear that they might be used to blackmail or otherwise
intimidate the administration's political enemies. That danger is more
remote than at any previous period of U.S. history. Because of increased
political partisanship, advances in communications technology and more
numerous and competitive media, American government has become a
sieve. No
secrets concerning matters that would interest the public can be kept
for
long. And the public would be far more interested to learn that public
officials were using private information about American citizens for
base
political ends than to learn that we have been rough with terrorist
suspects
-- a matter that was quickly exposed despite efforts at concealment.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act makes it difficult to conduct
surveillance of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents unless
they are
suspected of being involved in terrorist or other hostile activities.
That
is too restrictive. Innocent people, such as unwitting neighbors of
terrorists, may, without knowing it, have valuable counterterrorist
information. Collecting such information is of a piece with data-mining
projects such as Able Danger.

...
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______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
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From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 22 02:05:07 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 05:05:07 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of    war
In-Reply-To: <20051221180623.GZ2249@leitl.org>
References: <p06230933bfce17e2af46@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <87lkyfla8d.fsf@snark.piermont.com> 
  <p0623094abfce2e82fce4@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <87fyonl3x3.fsf@snark.piermont.com> <20051221081008.GP2249@leitl.org> 
  <p062309fcbfcf442e1260@[68.167.57.91]>
  <20051221180623.GZ2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <p0623098dbfd02a91aec9@[68.167.57.91]>

At 7:06 PM +0100 12/21/05, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>Write code. Participate in the political process.
>Both are not mutually exclusive.

One is useful. The other is, at best, masturbatory.

Physics causes politics, not vice-versa.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From gnu at toad.com  Thu Dec 22 05:11:35 2005
From: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
Date: December 22, 2005 5:11:35 AM EST
Subject: [E-PRV] "Steven M. Bellovin": loophole in FISA?
Message-ID: <mailman.1474.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

>Hi John--As I think I've already mentioned, Steven is probably
>right--indiscriminate extraterritorial wiretapping that is not
>targeted
>at particular people likely isn't prohibited by FISA.  However, this
>loophole is more relevant to ECHELON and global eavesdropping
>generally, not the current wiretap controversy, as the
>currently-controversial wiretaps definitely targeted specific people
>within the US and almost certainly occurred within US borders.

Please read the Ars Technica post that Steve cited.  It really isn't
clear that the currently-controversial wiretaps "definitely targeted
specific people".  And it's also pretty clear that it almost certainly
DIDN'T occur within US borders; see Hayden's press conference,
transcripted in full by Declan:

  http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/20/transcript-of-briefing/

The clues are piling up that vacuum-cleaner style dragnets are what's
at issue:

  http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20051220-5808.html

The new text below from today's Post leads me in the same direction.
They make a big distinction between "detecting" and "monitoring",
where "monitoring" is what requires warrants, while "detecting"
doesn't.  (It depends on what the meaning of "is" is.)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/21/
AR2005122102326.html

>Still, Bush and his advisers have said they need to operate outside
>the FISA system in order to move quickly against suspected
>terrorists. In explaining the program, Bush has made the distinction
>between detecting threats and plots and monitoring likely, known
>targets, as FISA would allow.
>
>Bush administration officials believe it is not possible, in a
>large-scale eavesdropping effort, to provide the kind of evidence the
>court requires to approve a warrant. Sources knowledgeable about the
>program said there is no way to secure a FISA warrant when the goal is
>to listen in on a vast array of communications in the hopes of finding
>something that sounds suspicious. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
>said the White House had tried but failed to find a way.
>
>One government official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said
>the administration complained bitterly that the FISA process demanded
>too much: to name a target and give a reason to spy on it.
>
>"For FISA, they had to put down a written justification for the
>wiretap," said the official. "They couldn't dream one up."
>
>The NSA program, and the technology on which it is based, makes it
>impossible to meet that criterion because the program is designed to
>intercept selected conversations in real time from among an enormous
>number relayed at any moment through satellites.
>
>"There is a difference between detecting, so we can prevent, and
>monitoring. And it's important to note the distinction between the
>two," Bush said Monday.

It appears that perhaps they've pointed the NSA vacuum cleaner
straight into all US-based international telecommunications.  [By the
way, satellites are only a tiny part of it; the vast majority of
conversations go via fiber, and NSA can tap them.  It's not clear why
the Post said "satellites" here.]

Perhaps NSA is just sampling every communication to determine what
language it's in, and feeding all the Arabic to further analysis.  The
theory would be that if they didn't feed your call to further
analysis, then it was only "detected", not "monitored".  We've seen
inklings of this before, in the context of wiretapping IP traffic.
They claim that having a computer look at every bit and byte is
OK without a warrant as long as it sorts out the "signalling info"
like URLs and email addresses, which are buried deep in the user's
packets right next to all the un-wiretappable stuff.  It's total
hokum, unsupported by law, but it's their theory.

Hmm, here's my conclusion.  Perhaps they're doing a pen-register/
trap-and-trace on every call that leaves or enters the US.  They're
building up the database containing the huge network of who-calls-who,
over the long term.  (This would also sweep up any touch-tones during
a call, including PIN codes, passwords, dial-back systems, etc).  And
then when they capture a bad guy who was using phone number X, they
look it up and know every number who called phone number X, or
received a call from it.  And then they do directed wiretaps against
those numbers (with or without the FISA court).  No wonder a judge in
the know would resign to call attention to this!

Is this a murky area of international wiretap law?  It's clear NSA
can't broadly wiretap the CONTENTS of communications of US citizens,
without a warrant.  Can it broadly wiretap the SIGNALLING of US
citizens, and store it forever for easy lookup, without a warrant?
>From within the government we see everywhere their assumption that
they have carte blanche over signalling info, without warrants.

And this is just the sort of Total Information Awareness-like
operation that would get a reaction like this from Congress:

  http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/
2005_12/007812.php

  Gonzales: "We've had discussions with members of Congress, certain
  members of Congress, about whether or not we could get an amendment
  to FISA, and we were advised that that was not likely to be --
  that was not something we could likely get, certainly not without
  jeopardizing the existence of the program, and therefore, killing
  the program."

Merely raising the possibility publicly would get it killed.

I can see why the FISA court would get upset about such a thing too.
It's just like the infamous illegal LAPD "handoff" in which illegal
wiretaps were used to get evidence that was used in the declarations
to get legal wiretap warrants.

Here's something said in the press conf today by ex-NSA dir Hayden:

  We understand that this is a more -- I'll use the word "aggressive"
  program than would be traditionally available under FISA.  It is
  also less intrusive.  It deals only with international calls.  It is
  generally for far shorter periods of time.  And it is not designed
  to collect reams of intelligence, but to detect and warn and prevent
  about attacks.  And, therefore, that's where we've decided to draw
  that balance between security and liberty.

Remember, you read it here first.

	John






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______________________________________________________________
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From dpreed at reed.com  Thu Dec 22 05:47:25 2005
From: dpreed at reed.com (David P. Reed)
Date: December 22, 2005 5:47:25 PM EST
Subject: [IP] worth reading -- loophole in FISA?
Message-ID: <mailman.1475.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Well, Dave, here's a couple of relevant personal thoughts regarding
vacuum-cleaner-like data gathering...

1) there's a saying I heard recently that the NSA's approach to
intelligence is like trying to find a needle in the haystack by
sending tractors in the field to gather more hay.  Based on my
understanding of the reliability of inference-making I suspect the
problem is that and worse.   So these so-called vacuum-cleaner
technologies probably won't improve the ability to predict terrorism
that much, but the elimination of checks and balances will almost
certainly result in lots of "false positives" that can be used as
presumptive reasons to harass both US citizens and foreigners for
"inferences" that are little more than wild-ass intuitions about what
kind of activity might be correlated with bad actors.   Of course
there are lots of technology companies who sell stuff to the
intelligence community who are full of hyperbolic claims about the
wonders of mass data collection and analysis, but if they were so
good, why don't they predict the stock market instead and make money
the old fashioned way?   Predicting the stock market is a trivial
problem compared to predicting and preventing terrorism, but in the
market there is actually a measure of success, whereas the measure of
success in the beltway intelligence technology business is getting
another, bigger contract.  (that's what comes from outsourcing to a
military-industrial complex that is so big it can buy members of
Congress, lock stock and barrel, as we saw with Duke Cunningham).

2) what the NSA does outside the US may be legal under US law, but by
no means is it either legal or a source of pride when viewed in other
countries or in international law.

The grand glorious endeavor of spying is fundamentally anti-social
and anti-humanity.   Apparently, part of the standard CIA induction
briefing is being reminded that humint is just another word for
fraud, deception, burglary, and other things that we do not tolerate
in civilized societies.   If agents carrying out such acts are
discovered in our country they can be executed, and by symmetry most
countries can and will execute our spies if caught.   (this may be
cruel and unusual, because theft of information inside a country is
usually punished by more lenient methods).

Sigint (though the hands *seem* cleaner) is legally and morally just
wire fraud and peeping-tomism etc. by another name, and again, agents
who listen in on radio or wire conversations in other countries are
violating their laws, just as agents doing that in the US would be
guilty of espionage and subject to execution or harsh penalties.   So
by any "golden rule" standard of justice we should be careful.

One can argue that, just as war is sometimes thought to be necessary
to deal with threats to the citizens of our nation, intelligence
gathering, however illegal, might also be sometimes necessary.   But
it's not a "good" at any level, and hardly something we should be
proud of.

However, the thrill of hanging out with the codebreakers shouldn't be
used to glamorize what is, at its core, just a government-sanctioned
form of antisocial behavior.  It's practitioners cannot be trusted to
decide what is appropriate, because they are by definition able to
carry out acts that are antisocial and illegal.






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[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dpreed at reed.com  Thu Dec 22 05:47:25 2005
From: dpreed at reed.com (David P. Reed)
Date: December 22, 2005 5:47:25 PM EST
Subject: [IP] worth reading -- loophole in FISA?
Message-ID: <mailman.1476.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Well, Dave, here's a couple of relevant personal thoughts regarding
vacuum-cleaner-like data gathering...

1) there's a saying I heard recently that the NSA's approach to
intelligence is like trying to find a needle in the haystack by
sending tractors in the field to gather more hay.  Based on my
understanding of the reliability of inference-making I suspect the
problem is that and worse.   So these so-called vacuum-cleaner
technologies probably won't improve the ability to predict terrorism
that much, but the elimination of checks and balances will almost
certainly result in lots of "false positives" that can be used as
presumptive reasons to harass both US citizens and foreigners for
"inferences" that are little more than wild-ass intuitions about what
kind of activity might be correlated with bad actors.   Of course
there are lots of technology companies who sell stuff to the
intelligence community who are full of hyperbolic claims about the
wonders of mass data collection and analysis, but if they were so
good, why don't they predict the stock market instead and make money
the old fashioned way?   Predicting the stock market is a trivial
problem compared to predicting and preventing terrorism, but in the
market there is actually a measure of success, whereas the measure of
success in the beltway intelligence technology business is getting
another, bigger contract.  (that's what comes from outsourcing to a
military-industrial complex that is so big it can buy members of
Congress, lock stock and barrel, as we saw with Duke Cunningham).

2) what the NSA does outside the US may be legal under US law, but by
no means is it either legal or a source of pride when viewed in other
countries or in international law.

The grand glorious endeavor of spying is fundamentally anti-social
and anti-humanity.   Apparently, part of the standard CIA induction
briefing is being reminded that humint is just another word for
fraud, deception, burglary, and other things that we do not tolerate
in civilized societies.   If agents carrying out such acts are
discovered in our country they can be executed, and by symmetry most
countries can and will execute our spies if caught.   (this may be
cruel and unusual, because theft of information inside a country is
usually punished by more lenient methods).

Sigint (though the hands *seem* cleaner) is legally and morally just
wire fraud and peeping-tomism etc. by another name, and again, agents
who listen in on radio or wire conversations in other countries are
violating their laws, just as agents doing that in the US would be
guilty of espionage and subject to execution or harsh penalties.   So
by any "golden rule" standard of justice we should be careful.

One can argue that, just as war is sometimes thought to be necessary
to deal with threats to the citizens of our nation, intelligence
gathering, however illegal, might also be sometimes necessary.   But
it's not a "good" at any level, and hardly something we should be
proud of.

However, the thrill of hanging out with the codebreakers shouldn't be
used to glamorize what is, at its core, just a government-sanctioned
form of antisocial behavior.  It's practitioners cannot be trusted to
decide what is appropriate, because they are by definition able to
carry out acts that are antisocial and illegal.



-------------------------------------
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To manage your subscription, go to
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 22 05:34:24 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 08:34:24 -0500
Subject: [IP] Summarized --  Download Piaf, Go To Jail
Message-ID: <mailman.1477.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 22 00:06:50 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 09:06:50 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Surveillance UK: why this revolution is
  only the start]
Message-ID: <20051222080650.GW2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec 22 06:19:46 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 09:19:46 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of war
In-Reply-To: <p0623098dbfd02a91aec9@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F49EFDF061244230810CCB9B300@phx.gbl>

RAHweh wrote...

>One is useful. The other is, at best, masturbatory.

Now always. If a political discussion can uncover likely threat models, then 
there's some distinct usefulness.

Also, the politics of dis-intelligence is also useful. Those worries about 
super-quantum-TEMPEST is a good example: "Oh don't you bother with your cute 
lil' crypto systems, because we can just watch you  at your keyboard 
anyway..."

So if there's some way to modify "write code" to include "code-impacting 
political discussion", then I agree, but I also agree it still gets rather 
masturbatory.

But then again, it's not like any male has ever wanted to masturbate 
before...


-TD




From ip20398470293845 at aquick.org  Thu Dec 22 09:55:30 2005
From: ip20398470293845 at aquick.org (Adam Fields)
Date: December 22, 2005 9:55:30 AM EST
Subject: [IP] more on Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts
Message-ID: <mailman.1478.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

On Sat, Dec 17, 2005 at 07:37:37PM -0500, David Farber wrote:
>Begin forwarded message:
>
>From: Chris Beck <cbeck at pacanukeha.net>
[...]
>I don't read papers in their printed form, but my experience with
>blogs and other new media news sources is that they cover what is
>apparently happening very well, but hidden stuff still seems to be
>revealed mostly by professional journalists who have the time and
>budget to travel, meet sources, &c.  Notice that even in the one
>year gap in which the Times knew about this, it didn't explode on
>anyone's website.
>
>Who new - the papers still serve a purpose :)

It's not so much that the papers serve a purpose as it is that they
hire (and support with the resources of their organization)
journalists. Largely, bloggers are not investigative
journalists. Bloggers have a very good distribution network, and are
excellent at getting out stories where the focus is either something
public or something where a blogger has some sort of inside access
stemming from their own personal situation. But bloggers don't often
have large organizations behind them to defend their sources, which
I'd expect would be a concern when you're blowing the whistle on a
large secret government operation.

This difference is key - it takes money and free time to do the
footwork required to follow a story, verify it, research it, and
defend it if need be, and most bloggers aren't professional bloggers,
let alone professional journalists. It's a very small number of
bloggers who have the resources, training, inclination, or
connections/reputation to develop breaking news stories.

In this discourse, we should definitely be drawing a distinction
between news distribution and news origination. It's entirely possible
that this will change in the next few years, but still - the stories
have to come from somewhere.

--
				- Adam

** Expert Technical Project and Business Management
**** System Performance Analysis and Architecture
****** [ http://www.everylastounce.com ]

[ http://www.aquick.org/blog ] ............ Blog
[ http://www.adamfields.com/resume.html ].. Experience
[ http://www.flickr.com/photos/fields ] ... Photos
[ http://www.aquicki.com/wiki ].............Wiki
[ http://del.icio.us/fields ] ............. Links





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______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 22 07:05:56 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 10:05:56 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts
Message-ID: <mailman.1479.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 22 07:19:48 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 10:19:48 -0500
Subject: [IP] worth reading --  loophole in FISA?
Message-ID: <mailman.1480.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From jya at cryptome.net  Thu Dec 22 10:33:45 2005
From: jya at cryptome.net (John Young)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 10:33:45 -0800
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time  
   of war
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F49EFDF061244230810CCB9B300@phx.gbl>
References: <p0623098dbfd02a91aec9@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <E1EpSYx-0005jK-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>

And it is still not impossible, not even improbable, that public use of
crypto was, is, not a disinfo op to red flag communications that need 
to be intercepted.

Not a hell of a lot has been written lately, if at all, how public crypto came
into wide use, the battle to free it from regulation, the rise of belief that
some types were mathematically impregnable.

There was discussion a few years back here about the disappearance
of some able contributors, and wishes they do well in their new, more
comfortable habitats. Whether any are aiding and abetting the latest 
SHAMROCK redux or the SHAMROCK that never died might be
clued by the coincidence of the discovery of PK just at the time Church
Committee hearings were being held to ostensibly defang NSA.

Cypherpunks' role in this dissemination of crypto takeover of the
workld is a good place to start that story. No, not the ones written in 
the early days to prime public interest, cloaked in libertarian camouflage 
of hollywoodish antiauthoritarianism. What could be informative are the 
stories about where the crypto-wizards are now employed. Steven Levy
might do an update, or a host of others who got a boost parlaying
the adventures of the crypto-rebels -- which hooked me via
Levy's NY Times mag piece in 1994.

How public key crypto, for example, got a toehold on climbing out
of GCHQ's and NSA's clampdown. Serendipitous research, says
the legend, perhaps aided with hints from the bowels of NSA, or
perhaps from elsewhere not yet revealed.

It wouldn't be the first time a long-running deception has been used
to encourage trust in reputedly impregnable systems.

Is NSA regularly cracking all encryption or not, whether or with a
foolproof algorithmic tool (again and again discounted by the best
and brightest of the cryptographers) is that what the Times
will not write about. Or via exploitation of faulty implementation.

There are regular calls to trust no infosec system that is not continually
monitored by experts. A lesson taught by the government pros as well.
Who watches who in this backscratch is not well covered, at least
outside classified gatherings -- not that crypto contractors are now
regular participants in these, having embraced NDAs as a way
of survival, and golden opportunity. 9/11 has lifted many small boats
in commerce and education and NGOs.

How many crypto-rebels been brought in from the cold to demonstrate
implementation vulnerabilities absolutely controlled by NDAs. That, too,
would not be the first time. Screaming rebels oft reap the benefits of
calling attention to themselves. Those that somehow never go to
jail and accuse those who do of being bumbling idiots.

There was also discussion years back about who were the most
likely coverts on cpunks. The rubric was that it didn't matter, even
narcs were welcome for mathematics would defeat their bosses.
Impregnable mathematics gradually withered as a protective
rationale with the rise of the threat of faulty implementaion, 
black bag jobs, keystroke loggers, insider betrayal, and the gamut
of traditional security failures, the very same ones used to build
and maintain the most gigantic expensive national defense system
ever, with plenty of contracts to recruit whoever disagreed, well,
disagreed enough to get a special invitation or a hint about how
to build a superduper security method.

Security pros claim you can't be too paranoid, that 100% security is
impossible, that, to be sure, is likely to boost demand for their protection 
racket. Religious faiths have become wealthy preaching that, some
even killing infidels to protect market share.




From coderman at gmail.com  Thu Dec 22 10:47:07 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 10:47:07 -0800
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of war
In-Reply-To: <E1EpSYx-0005jK-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
References: <p0623098dbfd02a91aec9@68.167.57.91> 	
  <BAY103-F49EFDF061244230810CCB9B300@phx.gbl> 	
  <E1EpSYx-0005jK-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512221047n4574faf7u38f0278799b073a3@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/22/05, John Young <jya at cryptome.net> wrote:
> ...
> Is NSA regularly cracking all encryption or not, whether or with a
> foolproof algorithmic tool (again and again discounted by the best
> and brightest of the cryptographers) is that what the Times
> will not write about. Or via exploitation of faulty implementation.

faulty implementations meaning side channels leaking key material.  i
know that Glenn at Centaur/VIA is concerned about perceived pressures
to keep crypto out of processor cores.   consider this rumor but i'd
love to see someone follow up on this story.

with cache/memory timing, differential power analysis, even acoustic
side channels weakening software cipher implementations (and hardware
to a lesser degree) i can't help but wonder why Intel and AMD have not
deployed entropy, digests, block ciphers and Montgomery multipliers in
their cores - it takes very little die space and provides a huge
return.  makes my inner paranoid twitch...

</VIA whoring>

with that said, i think it's clear that a properly designed crypto
system could be considered secure.  the government still uses AES256
for their top secret datum, and the NSA license of ECC could be
interpreted as a vote of confidence in that PK system.  (or is this
just another ruse? :)


> There are regular calls to trust no infosec system that is not continually
> monitored by experts. A lesson taught by the government pros as well.
> ...
> Impregnable mathematics gradually withered as a protective
> rationale with the rise of the threat of faulty implementaion,
> black bag jobs, keystroke loggers, insider betrayal, and the gamut
> of traditional security failures...

with ciphers and protocols maturing is the next frontier for
cypherpunks decentralized reputation and trust metrics applied to
process, persons, and systems?

the world around these theoretically secure ciphers is full of holes
as you describe.




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 22 08:43:56 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 11:43:56 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time  
      of war
In-Reply-To: <E1EpSYx-0005jK-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
References: <p0623098dbfd02a91aec9@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <E1EpSYx-0005jK-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <p062309e6bfd0871c5f86@[68.167.57.91]>

At 10:33 AM -0800 12/22/05, John Young wrote:
>And it is still not impossible, not even improbable, that public use of
>crypto was, is, not a disinfo op to red flag communications that need
>to be intercepted.

"You just keep on thinkin' Butch. That's what you're good at." -- Harry
"Sundance Kid" Longbaugh

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From coderman at gmail.com  Thu Dec 22 12:33:36 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 12:33:36 -0800
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of war
In-Reply-To: <E1EpWJE-000300-00@pop03.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
References: <p0623098dbfd02a91aec9@68.167.57.91> 	
  <BAY103-F49EFDF061244230810CCB9B300@phx.gbl> 	
  <E1EpSYx-0005jK-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net> 	
  <E1EpWJE-000300-00@pop03.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512221233iab5003bg8ad9949943c695ee@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/22/05, John Young <jya at cryptome.net> wrote:
> ...
> The open competition for AES had a taint of that, and maybe
> a couple of hundred cryptographers knew WTF was going on
> and half of those were blinded by vanity and ignorance of
> "independence." The NDAs of participants sucked of "trust us."

this question has bothered me: why choose a cipher whose
implementation in most circumstances is subject to side channels when
there are others resistant to such attacks?

are side channels in flawed implementations the new backdoor of choice
(since insufficient key space and overt flaws are now unavailable)?


> Nearly all infosec standards for military use recommend and/or
> require the use of tokens or other mechanical gadgets to backup
> passwords and biometrics which are known to be vulnerable to
> human weaknesses for sex, drugs, boss hatred and venality.

i don't see how hardware tokens / crypto ignition keys prevent human
abuses.  passwords and passphrases are useless (unless coupled with
tokens and used only for liveness detection) and vascular biometrics
are excellent for "who you are" type authentication coupled with
physical key "what you have" based auth.

this doesn't preclude the use of a single cipher though; key
management has always been the bane of strong crypto.


> We finally shelled out a few bucks to buy the PGP version which
> provides a token as a backup for passphrases. Haven't used it
> yet but the regular alarms about crackability of passphrases
> suggests there should be more than your too smart by half,
> too lazy by whole, brain for protection.

indeed; passwords/passphrases as sole authenticators should die. they
should always be coupled with physical tokens IMHO...




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 22 04:54:16 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 13:54:16 +0100
Subject: [checker@panix.com: [>Htech] Independent: Britain will be first
  country to monitor every car journey]
Message-ID: <20051222125416.GK2249@leitl.org>

Germany will trail U.K. only by a few years, at best. The infrastructure
is already all there.

----- Forwarded message from Premise Checker <checker at panix.com> -----


From jya at cryptome.net  Thu Dec 22 14:33:46 2005
From: jya at cryptome.net (John Young)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 14:33:46 -0800
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time  
   of war
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60512221047n4574faf7u38f0278799b073a3@mail.gmail.co
   m>
References: <E1EpSYx-0005jK-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net> 
  <p0623098dbfd02a91aec9@68.167.57.91> 
  <BAY103-F49EFDF061244230810CCB9B300@phx.gbl> 
  <E1EpSYx-0005jK-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <E1EpWJE-000300-00@pop03.mail.atl.earthlink.net>

NSA may claim to use AES256 for classified material but we
don't really know if that is true for all material or only for selected
parts not needing the best protection the agency has. 

NSA has never been a proponent, at least not a practictioner, of 
open testing of crypto to assure security. They read those results, 
file them away and keep quiet about secret inventions.

No intel agency has ever disclosed its best stuff, and that is
true of most commercially valuable inventions. What you can
get is a retail version and a lot of hokum about how good
it is and how bad is that of the competition. You don't what's
true until a rogue employee breaks away to set a new shop
or to get a new paymaster to spread FUD.

Reverse engineering is a double-edged sword when you
don't know if the purloined product you're investigating was
deliberately lofted your way for "independent product
testing" in order to assay your own capabilities and stupidities.

The open competition for AES had a taint of that, and maybe
a couple of hundred cryptographers knew WTF was going on
and half of those were blinded by vanity and ignorance of 
"independence." The NDAs of participants sucked of "trust us."

But no official crypto system has ever been free of the odor of 
suspicion so common are cracks and betrayals as David Kahn
amply describes. Multiple layers of protection are presumably
used along with obscurity about what they are. Relying on a
single crypto system for protection is surely insufficient -- but
it does nicely ID itself for scrutiny. End to end is singularly
noticeable. 

Indeed, it should be assumed that any openly discussed infosec 
system is subject to attacks not made public, particular those
which are successful, which no doubt is why NSA does not openly 
discuss its prowess beyond a few public utterances that are hardly 
revealing even to infosec connoisseurs. Like the vapidities General 
Hayden is oozing these days to dull the perceptions of journalists and
snoozers on the Hill.

To be sure it is likely Hayden knows not much more than he is briefed 
to know by the crypto and cracking wizards who have always danced 
circles around DIRNSAs bemedaled up the kazoo to flummox 
the fleecers.

Bobby Ray Inman may have got a little inside the dark box, but none of 
the others knew any more than they were allowed to know, and much
less after the Church hearings.

Anybody heard a peep about the current NSA dustup from cpunk's old 
crypto control nemesis, ex-NSA Counsel Stewart Baker? His predecessor
was quoted but not him, and once he couldn't get enough face time.



Nearly all infosec standards for military use recommend and/or
require the use of tokens or other mechanical gadgets to backup
passwords and biometrics which are known to be vulnerable to
human weaknesses for sex, drugs, boss hatred and venality.

We finally shelled out a few bucks to buy the PGP version which
provides a token as a backup for passphrases. Haven't used it
yet but the regular alarms about crackability of passphrases
suggests there should be more than your too smart by half,
too lazy by whole, brain for protection. Settle down, Hettinga,
this is only directed at you, you running dog commie bastard.




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 22 05:57:18 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 14:57:18 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Summarized --  Download Piaf, Go To
  Jail]
Message-ID: <20051222135718.GN2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 22 07:11:53 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 16:11:53 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
  Without Courts]
Message-ID: <20051222151152.GU2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 22 13:16:34 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 16:16:34 -0500
Subject: [IP] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
Message-ID: <mailman.1481.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 22 07:47:05 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 16:47:05 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] worth reading --  loophole in FISA?]
Message-ID: <20051222154705.GW2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 22 15:40:00 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 18:40:00 -0500
Subject: [IP] worth reading -- loophole in FISA?
Message-ID: <mailman.1482.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 22 13:19:01 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 22:19:01 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis]
Message-ID: <20051222211901.GS2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


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From arma at mit.edu  Fri Dec 23 02:22:46 2005
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2005 05:22:46 -0500
Subject: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN: for-profit Tor
Message-ID: <mailman.1483.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

operators)
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
Reply-To: or-talk at freehaven.net

On Fri, Nov 25, 2005 at 08:35:41PM -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> We don't need complex theories to explain it. They simply ran out of
> money. They had to let go some of their actual employees too. This time
> of year is never good for non-profits.

I've put up a donations page for Tor here:

http://tor.eff.org/donate.html.en

Nick and I are continuing to work on Tor in our spare time, but as you
can see, the user base is growing faster than our development can keep
up. Please help us to put our attention back on Tor development rather
than getting day jobs.

Thanks,
--Roger

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




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From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 22 23:51:20 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2005 08:51:20 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] worth reading -- loophole in FISA?]
Message-ID: <20051223075120.GW2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 23 08:09:49 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2005 11:09:49 -0500
Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time
  of war
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60512221047n4574faf7u38f0278799b073a3@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F20446BB1DAAF445B1CFD2E9B330@phx.gbl>

Coderman wrote...

>with that said, i think it's clear that a properly designed crypto
>system could be considered secure.  the government still uses AES256
>for their top secret datum, and the NSA license of ECC could be
>interpreted as a vote of confidence in that PK system.  (or is this
>just another ruse? :)

Well, I'd consider it secure in the following sense: NSA can probably break 
it via manipulating some microscopic vulnerability, but it will take time 
and money. For all but Al Qaeda, that's going to be good enough: NSA won't 
reveal what it's got to even local law enforcement, unless it's really 
really necessary (ie, they'll lose lots of funding or bigshot jobs). This 
means that, unless I've got a special delivery for the beltway area, local 
thugs won't come pounding at my door. (And if I did have such a special 
delivery, I won't be using any technological channels at all.)

-TD




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 23 02:41:23 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2005 11:41:23 +0100
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Re: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN:
  for-profit Tor operators)]
Message-ID: <20051223104123.GM2249@leitl.org>

Folks, some donations are in order.

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From arma at mit.edu  Fri Dec 23 15:39:05 2005
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2005 18:39:05 -0500
Subject: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN: for-profit Tor
Message-ID: <mailman.1484.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

operators)
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
Reply-To: or-talk at freehaven.net

On Fri, Dec 23, 2005 at 03:04:42PM -0600, clifnor at warpmail.net wrote:
> I wish to donate but have had problems with PayPal in the past. Is there
> another option--e.g. an address where I can send a check or money order?

Good idea. I've added a few more paragraphs to
http://tor.eff.org/donate.html.en
with details on this, plus other options.

Let me know if I've left out anything else that's important. :)

Thanks!
--Roger

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 23 17:09:35 2005
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2005 19:09:35 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Re: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN:
    for-profit Tor operators)]
In-Reply-To: <20051223104123.GM2249@leitl.org>
References: <20051223104123.GM2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20051223190853.V37487@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Fri, 23 Dec 2005, Eugen Leitl wrote:

> Folks, some donations are in order.

Agreed.  Does anyone have any idea how much their annual subsidy level
was?

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF


	Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about
	the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise?

	- Steve Thompson




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From dave at farber.net  Fri Dec 23 19:58:50 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2005 22:58:50 -0500
Subject: [IP] Summarized --  Warrantless NSA program involved massive data
Message-ID: <mailman.1485.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

collection (NYT)
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
Reply-To: dave at farber.net


http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 - The National Security Agency has traced and
analyzed large volumes of telephone and Internet communications
flowing into and out of the United States as part of the
eavesdropping program that President Bush approved after the Sept.
11, 2001, attacks to hunt for evidence of terrorist activity,
according to current and former government officials.

The volume of information harvested from telecommunication data and
voice networks, without court-approved warrants, is much larger than
the White House has acknowledged, the officials said.

...One issue of concern to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, which has reviewed some separate warrant applications growing
out of the N.S.A.'s surveillance program, is whether the court has
legal authority over calls outside the United States that happen to
pass through American-based telephonic "switches," according to
officials familiar with the matter.

...Since the disclosure last week of the N.S.A.'s domestic
surveillance program, President Bush and his senior aides have
stressed that his executive order allowing eavesdropping without
warrants was limited to the monitoring of international phone and e-
mail communications involving people with known links to Al Qaeda.

...The use of similar data-mining operations by the Bush
administration in other contexts has raised strong objections, most
notably in connection with the Total Information Awareness system,
developed by the Pentagon for tracking terror suspects, and the
Department of Homeland Security's Capps program for screening airline
passengers.

...But the Bush administration regards the N.S.A.'s ability to trace
and analyze large volumes of data as critical to its expanded mission
to detect terrorist plots before they can be carried out, officials
familiar with the program say.

...A former technology manager at a major telecommunications company
said that since the Sept. 11 attacks, the leading companies in the
industry have been storing information on calling patterns and giving
it to the federal government to aid in tracking possible terrorists.

"All that data is mined with the cooperation of the government and
shared with them, and since 9/11, there's been much more active
involvement in that area," said the former manager, a
telecommunications expert who did not want his name or that of his
former company used because of concern about revealing trade secrets.

...The switches are some of the main arteries for moving voice and
some Internet traffic into and out of the United States, and, with
the globalization of the telecommunications industry in recent years,
many international-to-international calls are also routed through
such American switches.

...Now that foreign calls were being routed through switches on
American soil, some judges and law enforcement officials regarded
eavesdropping on those calls as a possible violation of those decades-
old restrictions, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, which requires court-approved warrants for domestic surveillance.

...But the N.S.A.'s backdoor access to major telecommunications
switches on American soil with the cooperation of major corporations
represents a significant expansion of the agency's operational
capability, according to current and former government officials.




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--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 23 16:13:12 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 01:13:12 +0100
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Re: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN:
  for-profit Tor operators)]
Message-ID: <20051224001312.GG2249@leitl.org>

Update on donation options for Tor.

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 24 06:04:44 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 09:04:44 -0500
Subject: [Clips]  Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report - 
  New York Times
Message-ID: <p0623096abfd305ebf754@[68.167.57.91]>

Here's the un-summarized version...

Cheers,
RAH

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 09:04:01 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips]
  Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report - New York Times
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html?th=&emc=th&pagewanted=print>

 The New York Times



 December 24, 2005

 Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report

 By ERIC LICHTBLAU and JAMES RISEN

 WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 - The National Security Agency has traced and analyzed
 large volumes of telephone and Internet communications flowing into and out
 of the United States as part of the eavesdropping program that President
 Bush approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to hunt for evidence of
 terrorist activity, according to current and former government officials.

 The volume of information harvested from telecommunication data and voice
 networks, without court-approved warrants, is much larger than the White
 House has acknowledged, the officials said. It was collected by tapping
 directly into some of the American telecommunication system's main
 arteries, they said.

 As part of the program approved by President Bush for domestic surveillance
 without warrants, the N.S.A. has gained the cooperation of American
 telecommunications companies to obtain backdoor access to streams of
 domestic and international communications, the officials said.

 The government's collection and analysis of phone and Internet traffic have
 raised questions among some law enforcement and judicial officials familiar
 with the program. One issue of concern to the Foreign Intelligence
 Surveillance Court, which has reviewed some separate warrant applications
 growing out of the N.S.A.'s surveillance program, is whether the court has
 legal authority over calls outside the United States that happen to pass
 through American-based telephonic "switches," according to officials
 familiar with the matter.

 "There was a lot of discussion about the switches" in conversations with
 the court, a Justice Department official said, referring to the gateways
 through which much of the communications traffic flows. "You're talking
 about access to such a vast amount of communications, and the question was,
 How do you minimize something that's on a switch that's carrying such large
 volumes of traffic? The court was very, very concerned about that."

 Since the disclosure last week of the N.S.A.'s domestic surveillance
 program, President Bush and his senior aides have stressed that his
 executive order allowing eavesdropping without warrants was limited to the
 monitoring of international phone and e-mail communications involving
 people with known links to Al Qaeda.

 What has not been publicly acknowledged is that N.S.A. technicians, besides
 actually eavesdropping on specific conversations, have combed through large
 volumes of phone and Internet traffic in search of patterns that might
 point to terrorism suspects. Some officials describe the program as a large
 data-mining operation.

 The current and former government officials who discussed the program were
 granted anonymity because it remains classified.

 Bush administration officials declined to comment on Friday on the
 technical aspects of the operation and the N.S.A.'s use of broad searches
 to look for clues on terrorists. Because the program is highly classified,
 many details of how the N.S.A. is conducting it remain unknown, and members
 of Congress who have pressed for a full Congressional inquiry say they are
 eager to learn more about the program's operational details, as well as its
 legality.

 Officials in the government and the telecommunications industry who have
 knowledge of parts of the program say the N.S.A. has sought to analyze
 communications patterns to glean clues from details like who is calling
 whom, how long a phone call lasts and what time of day it is made, and the
 origins and destinations of phone calls and e-mail messages. Calls to and
 from Afghanistan, for instance, are known to have been of particular
 interest to the N.S.A. since the Sept. 11 attacks, the officials said.

 This so-called "pattern analysis" on calls within the United States would,
 in many circumstances, require a court warrant if the government wanted to
 trace who calls whom.

 The use of similar data-mining operations by the Bush administration in
 other contexts has raised strong objections, most notably in connection
 with the Total Information Awareness system, developed by the Pentagon for
 tracking terror suspects, and the Department of Homeland Security's Capps
 program for screening airline passengers. Both programs were ultimately
 scrapped after public outcries over possible threats to privacy and civil
 liberties.

 But the Bush administration regards the N.S.A.'s ability to trace and
 analyze large volumes of data as critical to its expanded mission to detect
 terrorist plots before they can be carried out, officials familiar with the
 program say. Administration officials maintain that the system set up by
 Congress in 1978 under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act does not
 give them the speed and flexibility to respond fully to terrorist threats
 at home.

 A former technology manager at a major telecommunications company said that
 since the Sept. 11 attacks, the leading companies in the industry have been
 storing information on calling patterns and giving it to the federal
 government to aid in tracking possible terrorists.

 "All that data is mined with the cooperation of the government and shared
 with them, and since 9/11, there's been much more active involvement in
 that area," said the former manager, a telecommunications expert who did
 not want his name or that of his former company used because of concern
 about revealing trade secrets.

 Such information often proves just as valuable to the government as
 eavesdropping on the calls themselves, the former manager said.

 "If they get content, that's useful to them too, but the real plum is going
 to be the transaction data and the traffic analysis," he said. "Massive
 amounts of traffic analysis information - who is calling whom, who is in
 Osama Bin Laden's circle of family and friends - is used to identify lines
 of communication that are then given closer scrutiny."

 Several officials said that after President Bush's order authorizing the
 N.S.A. program, senior government officials arranged with officials of some
 of the nation's largest telecommunications companies to gain access to
 switches that act as gateways at the borders between the United States'
 communications networks and international networks. The identities of the
 corporations involved could not be determined.

 The switches are some of the main arteries for moving voice and some
 Internet traffic into and out of the United States, and, with the
 globalization of the telecommunications industry in recent years, many
 international-to-international calls are also routed through such American
 switches.

 One outside expert on communications privacy who previously worked at the
 N.S.A. said that to exploit its technological capabilities, the American
 government had in the last few years been quietly encouraging the
 telecommunications industry to increase the amount of international traffic
 that is routed through American-based switches.

 The growth of that transit traffic had become a major issue for the
 intelligence community, officials say, because it had not been fully
 addressed by 1970's-era laws and regulations governing the N.S.A. Now that
 foreign calls were being routed through switches on American soil, some
 judges and law enforcement officials regarded eavesdropping on those calls
 as a possible violation of those decades-old restrictions, including the
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which requires court-approved
 warrants for domestic surveillance.

 Historically, the American intelligence community has had close
 relationships with many communications and computer firms and related
 technical industries. But the N.S.A.'s backdoor access to major
 telecommunications switches on American soil with the cooperation of major
 corporations represents a significant expansion of the agency's operational
 capability, according to current and former government officials.

 Phil Karn, a computer engineer and technology expert at a major West Coast
 telecommunications company, said access to such switches would be
 significant. "If the government is gaining access to the switches like
 this, what you're really talking about is the capability of an enormous
 vacuum operation to sweep up data," he said.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sat Dec 24 06:54:54 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 09:54:54 -0500
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Re: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN:
  for-profit Tor o
In-Reply-To: <20051224001312.GG2249@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F35BACAD3E4664606422A849B320@phx.gbl>

Just out of curiosity, any nice-n-easy Tor-style anonymous donation methods?
-TD


>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [arma at mit.edu: Re: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN:  
>for-profit Tor operators)]
>Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 01:13:12 +0100
>
>Update on donation options for Tor.
>
>----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----
>
>From: Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu>
>Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2005 18:39:05 -0500
>To: or-talk at freehaven.net
>Subject: Re: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN: for-profit Tor
>operators)
>User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
>Reply-To: or-talk at freehaven.net
>
>On Fri, Dec 23, 2005 at 03:04:42PM -0600, clifnor at warpmail.net wrote:
> > I wish to donate but have had problems with PayPal in the past. Is there
> > another option--e.g. an address where I can send a check or money order?
>
>Good idea. I've added a few more paragraphs to
>http://tor.eff.org/donate.html.en
>with details on this, plus other options.
>
>Let me know if I've left out anything else that's important. :)
>
>Thanks!
>--Roger
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which 
>had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 24 01:32:05 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 10:32:05 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Summarized --  Warrantless NSA program
  involved massive data collection (NYT)]
Message-ID: <20051224093205.GR2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From revers at evers.org  Sat Dec 24 12:25:40 2005
From: revers at evers.org (Ridgely Evers)
Date: December 24, 2005 12:25:40 PM EST
Subject: worth reading -- loophole in FISA?
Message-ID: <mailman.1486.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Dave,

David Reed is right on the money in terms of the false positive issue.

Actually, the "more hay" methodology has been shown to be ineffective in
other, related fields, and even worse has been shown to be an
effective tool
for _evading_ detection.

Simply put, it is relatively easy for an attacker to determine the
kinds of
things that trigger alerts, and to flood the detection system with those
types of events.  Intrustion detection systems on networks are
classic cases
in point: they are so overwhelmeed by false positives that in very short
order the people monitoring the systems stop paying attention.  A
"boy who
cried wolf" problem, exacerbated by the fact that the marginal cost of
creating a false positive is many orders of magnitude less than the
cost of
responsing to one.

Ultimately, the IDS systems end up being used either (a) to show
uninformed
management that "we're doing something", and/or (b) as part of the
forensic
process _after_ a breach has occurred to try to see if the attacker
left any
useful footprints (hint: the answer is "no").

There's a trend to watch for, as well.  The follow-on technology to IDS,
optimistically referred to as Intrusion Prevention Systems, has been
touted
as a tool to actually stop attacks in progress.  Essentially, it's a
combination of detection capability coupled with 'drop the connection'
capability.  It came into existence because security people thought
it would
be cool, and because customers were complaining about the overload on
human
resources that the IDS technologies imposed.  The theory was that
technology
could operate with sufficient speed to prevent bad things from
happening.

The real world response (as noted in a recent Network World review of
IPS)
has been that the systems are getting deployed, but without the 'P'
feature
enabled.  It seems that users are not willing to take the risk of
shutting
off a good connection (the 99.9999% case) in order to prevent an
attack (the
0.0001% case).

But I expect that the next layer of proposals out of the NSA data mining
mess will be to create and deploy some magic system that can operate
at the
speed of the technology being monitored.

<Insert massive (unsuccessful) budget here.>

"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." - Ben Franklin, ~1784

--Ridge

-----Original Message-----
From: David Farber [mailto:dave at farber.net]
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 3:40 PM
To: Ip Ip
Subject: worth reading -- loophole in FISA?



Begin forwarded message:


From declan at well.com  Sat Dec 24 10:23:14 2005
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 13:23:14 -0500
Subject: [Politech] More revelations about Bush and NSA domestic
 surveillance: a roundup [priv]
Message-ID: <mailman.1487.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Tangentially-related article about judge approving cell phone monitoring
without requiring prosecutors to show evidence of probable cause:
http://news.com.com/Police+blotter+Judge+lets+Feds+track+cell+phones/2100-102
8_3-6006453.html

How extensive is NSA's spy program:
http://news.com.com/Just+how+extensive+is+NSAs+spy+program/2100-1028_3-600632
6.html

An earlier roundup of blog posts:
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/12/nsa_surveillanc.html

Articles asking whether President Bush commited an impeachable offense:
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/viewstory.asp?Page=%5CPolitics%5Carchive%5C200512
%5CPOL20051220a.html
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/12/24/MNGBOGD4FF1.DTL
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,179323,00.html

Previous Politech message:
http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/20/transcript-of-briefing/
http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/20/two-submissions-on/
http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/21/democrats-scramble-to/

-Declan

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: HAVE YOU SEEN THIS? NY Times on NSA data mining
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 00:27:35 -0800
From: Philip Merrill <veyr at earthlink.net>
To: Fred von Lohmann EFF <fred at eff.org>, Cory Doctorow <cory at eff.org>,
      Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>

Fred, Cory, Declan,

http://nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html

Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report
By ERIC LICHTBLAU and JAMES RISEN
Published: December 24, 2005

...

A former technology manager at a major telecommunications company said
that since the Sept. 11 attacks, the leading companies in the industry
have been storing information on calling patterns and giving it to the
federal government to aid in tracking possible terrorists.

"All that data is mined with the cooperation of the government and
shared with them, and since 9/11, there's been much more active
involvement in that area," said the former manager, a telecommunications
expert who did not want his name or that of his former company used
because of concern about revealing trade secrets.

Such information often proves just as valuable to the government as
eavesdropping on the calls themselves, the former manager said.

"If they get content, that's useful to them too, but the real plum is
going to be the transaction data and the traffic analysis," he said.
"Massive amounts of traffic analysis information - who is calling whom,
who is in Osama Bin Laden's circle of family and friends - is used to
identify lines of communication that are then given closer scrutiny."

...

Phil Karn, a computer engineer and technology expert at a major West
Coast telecommunications company, said access to such switches would be
significant. "If the government is gaining access to the switches like
this, what you're really talking about is the capability of an enormous
vacuum operation to sweep up data," he said.

[BY THE WAY guys, here is an e-mail I just sent about this: "This is
truly interesting and not surprising from a technical point of view. As
someone who looks at how ISPs are treated, it explains things I already
knew. In terms of any positive potential for the future, it just shows
what a different world we are now living in that this is even possible.
My MUSIC bias is to try to figure out how musicians can get paid based
on today's technology. Puts the attached-below news article in a
different light."]




-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Reliability of information from telephone wiretaps
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 10:09:48 -0800
From: Alan Barclay <barclay at rtda.com>
Organization: Runtime Design Automation
To: declan at well.com
CC: bankston at eff.org

Hello Declan:-

I came across a very interesting paper on wiretap evasion by
Matt Blaze (UPenn) at the following URL.
  http://www.doxpara.com/?q=node&from=0

I particularly think that the legal implications on the
reliability of information obtained by phone wiretaps may
be far-reaching, and of interest to Politech readers.

Especially given the current administration's demonstrated
record of vindictiveness, I agree with Dan's conjecture
about Matt's cojones.


News article (incorrectly attributed to NY Times in above):
  http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/30/business/taps.php

Summary of paper:
  http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretapping/

Full paper
  http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretap.pdf

Best wishes for the holiday season and for the New Year.
Thanks again for running Politech.

Regards,
  Alan Barclay


--
--Alan Barclay--  barclay at rtda.com   (408) 492-0942 direct
  www.rtda.com   (408) 492-0940 main




-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [Politech] Democrats scramble to say they didn't tacitly
approve Bush's NSA surveillance [priv]
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 12:21:27 -0800
From: Benjamin SMITH <b3smith at mac.com>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
References: <43A99CEB.4010509 at well.com>


     Uh, Declan, the handful of Congresspeople who were even able to
see the Administration's plans with the NSA were barred from discussing
it even with their staffs, and others (like Senator Graham of FL) said
that the briefings were much less informative than what was revealed in
Friday's article in the NYT.  Cherry-picked information, limited
access... wait a minute, that sounds familiar...  -b3n



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [Politech] Democrats scramble to say they didn't tacitly
approve Bush's NSA surveillance [priv]
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 14:33:06 -0500
From: Eric Gasior <eric at tastysnackcracker.com>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
References: <43A99CEB.4010509 at well.com>

Declan,
In fairness it should be pointed out that the briefings were classified
therefore the ability of Rockefeller and Pelosi to inform others was
limited.

>From Sen. Rockefeller's statement on 12/19:
"The limited members who were told of the program were prohibited by
the Administration from sharing any information about it with our
colleagues, including other members of the Intelligence Committees."
http://rockefeller.senate.gov/news/2005/pr121905a.html

Eric Gasior

"First of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have
to fear is fear itself - nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror
which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance."

 -- Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1933




-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [Politech] One more submission on Bush authorizing secret
surveillance
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 16:02:18 EST
From: MarkKernes at aol.com
To: declan at well.com

http://www.avn.com/index.php?Primary_Navigation=Articles&Action=View_Article&
Content_ID=251800

News Analysis:
Why You Should Be Worried About Bush's Illegal Wiretaps
By Mark Kernes
12-19-2005

WASHINGTON, D.C. ? In his annual end-of-the-year speech delivered on
Saturday, President Bush admitted to having committed at least 30
federal crimes by
having issued an executive order authorizing the National Security
Agency to
intercept the international communications of people, including U.S.
citizens
(known in the law as "United States persons"), with known links to Al
Qaeda and
related terrorist organizations, and renewing that order, according to one
report, more than 36 times. Each renewal could be considered by a court to
constitute a separate crime.

[snip]

Mark Kernes, AVN

"Those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to have them
repeated for them." ? Me





-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [Politech] Two submissions on Bush authorizing secret
surveillance by National Security Agency [priv]
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 23:38:20 -0500 (EST)
From: Dean Anderson <dean at av8.com>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
CC: politech at politechbot.com

FYI, its my read of the news on this issue the Whitehouse is claiming
that the
authorization to 'use any and all means appropriate to fight terrorism'
supercedes the FISA and all other laws governing wiretapping, and indeed, I
think they interpret it to be authorization to supercede all other laws
governing anything else as well.  This interpretation, if actually the
position
of the Whitehouse, is far more disturbing than tapping Americans
talking/emailing foriegners internationally.

In the case of tapping international calls and emails, there is
ambiguity as to
whether FISA applies anyway. In 1978, tapping was done on wires. It had
to be
done on the caller or the called. That is, in the US or outside the US.

Suppose we tapped Osama's phone, physically in Afghanistan, and an American
contact was made, FISA wouldn't apply. However, if we tapped the
American (or
more likely, a foriegner) physically in the US, hopping a contact would
be made,
FISA would apply.  But modern surveillance is done differently because
telecom
is also different, now.

In the case of modern international call, the tapping is probably done from
space, using a satellite, or an undersea cable. And modern tapping can
essentially scan all calls/emails for keywords. FISA covers surveillance
done in
the US. If the surveillance is done outside the US then FISA doesn't
apply.
Arguably, these interceptions might occur outside the US. But---I don't
think
this argument has been raised in this case. Rather, the Whitehouse seems
to be
claiming that it has congressional authorization for carte blanch
superceding
all prior laws incluing FISA.

		--Dean
_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec 24 12:12:48 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 15:12:48 -0500
Subject: [IP] worth reading -- loophole in FISA?
Message-ID: <mailman.1488.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 24 14:18:04 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 23:18:04 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] worth reading -- loophole in FISA?]
Message-ID: <20051224221804.GM2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 24 14:18:26 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 23:18:26 +0100
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] More revelations about Bush and
  NSA domestic surveillance: a roundup [priv]]
Message-ID: <20051224221826.GN2249@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 25 14:56:38 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2005 17:56:38 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Vin Suprynowicz: 'The Unlimited Power Of The Sword'
Message-ID: <p06230900bfd4d3f844a2@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2005 15:37:28 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Vin Suprynowicz: 'The Unlimited Power Of The Sword'
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2005/Dec-25-Sun-2005/opinion/4819453.html>

 Dec. 25, 2005

 Las Vegas Review-Journal

 VIN SUPRYNOWICZ: 'The unlimited power of the sword'

 A couple of loyal readers asked me, in response to my recent evisceration
 of the discredited "militia clause" argument, "But Vin, do you think the
 Founders would have written the Second Amendment that way if they'd known
 we'd have Uzis"?

 Leaving aside the fact that it takes extraordinary dedication and
 commitment (and loot) for a "civilian" of average means to legally acquire
 a fully automatic Israeli machine pistol in America today, the answer is,
 "Yes."

 The Founders had every opportunity to add "except for bombs, mortars,
 artillery and other devices that can kill more than one person at a time"
 -- all of which were well-known by 1787. They did not. Quite to the
 contrary, Tench Coxe, noted federalist and friend of James Madison, wrote
 in defense of the proposed Constitution, in the Pennsylvania Gazette of
 Feb. 20, 1788: "Their swords, and every other terrible instrument of the
 soldier, are the birth right of an American. ... The unlimited power of the
 sword is not in the hands of either the federal or the state governments,
 but, where I trust in God it will ever remain, in the hands of the people."

 Note "unlimited." Note "every terrible instrument."

 Under the form of government that we're told Americans still enjoy, the
 government can exercise only those powers that are delegated to it by the
 people. You cannot delegate a right or power that you do not already
 possess. Therefore, if members of the U.S. Army have legitimate authority
 to "keep and bear" Uzis and nuclear weapons, they can only have gotten that
 right from the individual Americans who delegated it to them.

 It doesn't matter whether you "think this is a good idea." If you want to
 contend we now have a form of government in which our rulers start with all
 rights and powers, and allow to the peasantry only those lesser included
 liberties as they see fit, say so out loud now, please. And tell me when
 the original Constitution was voided, and by what legal process.

 Nor do we usually or necessarily abdicate a right when we delegate it: We
 delegate to police the duty to chase down fleeing felons, but each citizen
 retains the right to go ahead and do this himself if circumstances dictate.

 Similarly, the Second and 14th amendments guarantee that we have not given
 up our private, individual right to keep and bear howitzers and really big
 machine guns just because we have also delegated this right to the Army.

 Of particular interest is the fact that several of my questioners work in
 the newspaper business. How would they respond, I wonder, to the
 proposition that the First Amendment protects only the freedom to use
 old-fashioned hand presses -- that the Founders can't possibly have meant
 to authorize unrestricted use of today's far more dangerous, high-speed
 electrical presses, with their ability to spread lies and seditious,
 anti-government propaganda hundreds of times faster than Ben Franklin or
 James Madison could ever have imagined?

 *Speaking of my (necessarily brief) summary of the inquiries that have
 gutted the tired old "militia clause" arguments, noted Alabama
 constitutional attorney Larry Becraft writes in:

 "Vin, You did not mention: www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.htm."

 Frankly, I'm cautious about using Department of Justice filings, because
 they're inherently political and could easily shift under some future
 Hillaryesque administration. Nonetheless, Larry does offer up an official
 DOJ memorandum of opinion, dated Aug. 24, 2004, which finds:

 "The Second Amendment secures a right of individuals generally, not a right
 of States or a right restricted to persons serving in militias. ... As
 developed in the analysis below, we conclude that the Second Amendment
 secures a personal right of individuals, not a collective right that may
 only be invoked by a State or a quasi-collective right restricted to those
 persons who serve in organized militia units.

 "The Amendment's prefatory clause, considered under proper rules of
 interpretation, could not negate the individual right recognized in the
 clear language of the operative clause. In any event, the prefatory clause
 -- particularly its reference to the 'Militia,' which was understood at the
 Founding to encompass all able-bodied male citizens, who were required to
 be enrolled for service -- is fully consistent with an individual-right
 reading of the operative language."

 *And speaking of lies and the credibility of the press, what about those
 Associated Press and CNN stories that kept echoing (often without
 attribution) the Democratic/organized labor talking point that the GOP
 Senate wanted to "slash $39 billion" (or whatever today's number is) from
 federal social programs?

 Would that it were so. One more time, guys: If the Republicans seek to
 "grow" a federal program at only 5 percent next year, instead of 5.5
 percent, that's not even a "cut," let alone a "slash." If you were hoping
 for a dollar-an-hour raise, and your boss only gave you a 90-cent-an-hour
 raise, and you went home and told your spouse, "My paycheck got cut," you
 would be ... what?

 Lying.

 Vin Suprynowicz is assistant editorial page editor of the Review-Journal
 and author of "Send in the Waco Killers" and the new novel "The Black
 Arrow." His Web sites are www.TheLibertarian.us or www.LibertyBookShop.us.


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From dscqabpzts at yahoo.com  Sun Dec 25 14:02:51 2005
From: dscqabpzts at yahoo.com (Trey Saenz)
Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2005 19:02:51 -0300
Subject: Best Replika Watches R9p
Message-ID: <CFE8.9A5.3054298B8C@mopalinux.com>


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From coderman at gmail.com  Sun Dec 25 21:12:58 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2005 21:12:58 -0800
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Re: EFF no longer funding Tor (was Re: ATTN:
  for-profit Tor o
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F35BACAD3E4664606422A849B320@phx.gbl>
References: <20051224001312.GG2249@leitl.org> 	
  <BAY103-F35BACAD3E4664606422A849B320@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512252112h7633537fp8b88e611cee1a36f@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/24/05, Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> Just out of curiosity, any nice-n-easy Tor-style anonymous donation methods?

here is my preference:
- locate a store that provides pre paid mastercard/visa/amex , often
as gift cards or for internet payments.
- have someone buy one for you, buy one yourself incognito, or locate
a kiosk that dispenses and charges them like an ATM in reverse
(coinstar used to do this, though sadly that program was shut down)
- register the card via an anonymous hotspot / through tor? *grin* /
untraceable line (most of the cards work like debit/credit when
swiped, but if you want to use it for online / catalogue purchases or
put more than $500 on them you need to register via phone or website)
- create a pseudonymous identity and remember it, as you will need the
name and address later.
- send donation via the afore mentioned hotspot / untraceable line and enjoy!

P.S.  the lifecycle of these pre-paid card systems has been an
interest of mine since the late 90's.  it's weird how many of them
sprout up, last a year or two, and then disappear just as quickly as
they came.  surely there is a story behind this somewhere.  fraud? 
lack of interest?  the man keeping us down? :P~

P.P.S. using a hotspot anonymously can be a little tricky.  i'll let
you ponder this for a while...

P.P.P.S.  these work well for paying for VoIP service too, which gives
you a hard(er) to trace line, when used in conjunction with
$random_hotspots for situations where a phone is required.  remember
that the transaction for the VoIP gear should be anonymous as well
since the devices are identified by MAC ID.

ok, not simple, but seems to work well enough if you are cautious.  if
you are really paranoid you can layer these services until an adequate
depth of deception is in place.




From dewayne at warpspeed.com  Mon Dec 26 02:25:43 2005
From: dewayne at warpspeed.com (Dewayne Hendricks)
Date: December 26, 2005 2:25:43 PM EST
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] Boundless' CEO to speak at NYC Wireless: Using
Message-ID: <mailman.1489.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

City-Scale WiFi to Fight Crime
Reply-To: dewayne at warpspeed.com

[Note:  For readers in the NYC area.  DLH]

>From: Steve Morton <smorton at BoundlessS.com>
>Date: December 26, 2005 11:11:26 AM PST
>To: info at dandin.com
>Subject: [please forward to Dewayne Hendricks] Boundless' CEO to
>speak at NYC Wireless: Using City-Scale WiFi to Fight Crime
>
>Dewayne,
>
><http://www.nycwireless.net/tiki-view_articles.php>
>
>NYCwireless December Meeting Announcement
>All are invited - please re-post everywhere !
>
>Wednesday, December 28th, 2005 at 7:15pm
>
>Bway.net
>568 Broadway at Prince St, NE corner
>Suite 404
>New York, NY 10012
>
>Agenda:
>
>1. Steve Morton / Boundless Security Systems: Can City-Scale WiFi
>Reduce Crime ?
>
>        What are the obstacles and opportunities for city-scale
>wireless video surveillance, especially in crime-plagued
>neighborhoods ?
>
>        A fascinating discussion about BoundlessS.com's new WiFi
>video surveillance system that greatly enhances image clarity,
>network capacity and mobility. This could be a tremendously
>effective tool for law enforcement that could help reduce crime.
>How can privacy concerns be balanced ? Steve will also cover system
>design, and possible deployment schemes ? followed by an extended
>Q&A session.
>
>2. Year-end roundup and NYCwireless-2006 resolutions
>
>3. Workshop breakout sessions: small group discussions from novice
>to advanced questions
>
>Happy Holidays,
>
>
>Steven G. Morton, CEO, CTO

Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>



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______________________________________________________________
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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From brett at lariat.net  Mon Dec 26 03:38:01 2005
From: brett at lariat.net (Brett Glass)
Date: December 26, 2005 3:38:01 PM EST
Subject: For IP: Fear destroys what Bin Laden could not
Message-ID: <mailman.1490.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Fear destroys what Bin Laden could not

By Rober Steinback

Fear destroys what bin Laden could not
ROBERT STEINBACK
rsteinback at MiamiHerald.com

One wonders if Osama bin Laden didn't win after all. He ruined the
America that existed on 9/11. But he had help.

If, back in 2001, anyone had told me that four years after bin
Laden's attack our president would admit that he broke U.S. law
against domestic spying and ignored the Constitution -- and then
expect the American people to congratulate him for it -- I would have
presumed the girders of our very Republic had crumbled.

Had anyone said our president would invade a country and kill 30,000
of its people claiming a threat that never, in fact, existed, then
admit he would have invaded even if he had known there was no threat
-- and expect America to be pleased by this -- I would have thought
our nation's sensibilities and honor had been eviscerated.

If I had been informed that our nation's leaders would embrace
torture as a legitimate tool of warfare, hold prisoners for years
without charges and operate secret prisons overseas -- and call such
procedures necessary for the nation's security -- I would have
laughed at the folly of protecting human rights by destroying them.

If someone had predicted the president's staff would out a CIA agent
as revenge against a critic, defy a law against domestic propaganda
by bankrolling supposedly independent journalists and commentators,
and ridicule a 37-year Marie Corps veteran for questioning U.S.
military policy -- and that the populace would be more interested in
whether Angelina is about to make Brad a daddy -- I would have called
the prediction an absurd fantasy.

That's no America I know, I would have argued. We're too strong, and
we've been through too much, to be led down such a twisted path.

What is there to say now?

All of these things have happened. And yet a large portion of this
country appears more concerned that saying ''Happy Holidays'' could
be a disguised attack on Christianity.

More at  http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/columnists/13487511.htm


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From EEkid at aol.com  Mon Dec 26 11:58:05 2005
From: EEkid at aol.com (EEkid at aol.com)
Date: December 26, 2005 11:58:05 AM EST
Subject: Victims of the darkness: Government surveillance and
Message-ID: <mailman.1491.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

intimidation

I'm not sure which is more interesting, the story or the source.

Jerry

************************************************************************
******

Victims of the darkness: Government surveillance and intimidation
12/26/2005 13:42

The Bush Administration has consistently harassed citizens who
exercise their First Amendment freedoms and voice concerns about
government policies

"As nightfall does not come at once, neither does oppression. In both
instances there is a twilight where everything remains seemingly
unchanged, and it is in such a twilight that we must be aware of the
change in the air, however slight, lest we become unwitting victims
of the darkness." Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas

Not since the notorious McCarthy era of the 1950s, when American
freedoms faced extinction, has there been such an attack against the
Bill of Rights. The recent media focus on President Bush's
authorizing the National Security Agency to spy on ordinary Americans
has brought this issue to the forefront. On secret orders from
President Bush, the NSA has been monitoring the international phone
calls and emails of Americans without warrants.

Moreover, the Bush Administration has consistently harassed citizens
who exercise their First Amendment freedoms and voice concerns about
government policies. The main weapon used in this war is
intimidation, specifically through governmental surveillance and
government agents.

Indeed, the American government has a near paranoia about dissenting
citizens. "The Administration and campaign of George W. Bush," writes
former Congressman Bob Barr (R-Ga.), "is squelching any possible hint
of disagreement or protest at every political rally or gathering."
For example, in March of this year, three citizens were removed from
President Bush's town hall meeting in Aurora, Colo., because the car
they arrived in featured the bumper sticker, "No More Blood for Oil."

This past summer, FBI agents went to Windsor, Conn., with a document
marked for delivery by hand. On Matianuk Avenue, across from the
tennis courts, two special agents found their man. They gave George
Christian the letter, which warned him to tell no one - ever - what
it said. The letter, which was on FBI stationery, directed Christian
to surrender "all subscriber information, billing information and
access logs of any person" who used a specific computer at a library
branch some distance away.

Christian, who manages digital records for three dozen Connecticut
libraries, said in an affidavit that he configures his system for
privacy. But the vendors of the software Christian operates said
their databases can reveal the websites that visitors browse, the e-
mail accounts they open and the books they borrow. Christian refused
to hand over the records, and his employer, Library Connection, Inc.,
filed suit for the right to protest the FBI demand in public.

This case affords a rare glimpse of an exponentially growing practice
of domestic surveillance under some of the heinous provisions of the
USA Patriot Act. National security letters, such as the one issued to
George Christian, were created in the 1970s for espionage and
terrorism investigations.

They were originally intended as narrow exceptions in consumer
privacy law, enabling the FBI to review in secret the customer
records of suspected foreign agents. However, the Patriot Act and
Bush Administration guidelines for its use have transformed those
letters by permitting clandestine scrutiny of U. S. residents and
visitors who are not alleged to be terrorists or spies.

"The FBI now issues more than 30,000 national security letters a
year," writes Barton Gellman in The Washington Post, "a hundredfold
increase over historic norms. The letters - one of which can be used
to sweep up the records of many people - are extending the bureau's
reach as never before into the telephone calls, correspondence and
financial lives of ordinary Americans." Indeed, according to a
previously classified document released recently, the FBI has
conducted clandestine surveillance on some U. S. residents for as
long as 18 months at a time without proper paperwork or oversight.

Thus, the government does not limit its attacks to actual terrorists.
Ordinary American citizens are the focus as well. Take the case of
Selena Jarvis, a social studies teacher at Currituck County High
School in North Carolina. She assigned her senior civics and
economics class to use photographs to illustrate their freedoms as
found in the Bill of Rights. One student photographed a picture of
George W. Bush next to his own hand in a thumbs-down position as a
way to express his freedom to dissent.

However, while developing the student's photographs, a Wal-Mart photo
department employee, in obvious need of some education on the Bill of
Rights, called the police. They then contacted the Secret Service.
But rather than dismissing the case, the Secret Service decided to
investigate the matter. The agents interrogated the student and
questioned Jarvis. While questioning Jarvis, an agent asked her if
she thought the photo was suspicious. Dumbfounded, Jarvis responded,
"No, it was a Bill of Rights project!" Jarvis was startled at the
claim that the student was a terrorist and called the whole thing
"ridiculous."

Why would the Secret Service, which is not run by incompetent
individuals, take the time to investigate a high school student and
his class project? It is safe to assume that the Secret Service knew
the student was not a terrorist and wanted to make an example of him
for others who might be bold enough to use their right to dissent.
After the ordeal, Selena Jarvis commented, "I blame Wal-Mart more
than anybody. I was really disgusted with them. But everyone was
using poor judgment, from Wal-Mart up to the Secret Service."

Unfortunately, this is not the only "ridiculous" case of individuals
tattling on their neighbors. For example, Barry Reingold was
questioned by the FBI after he criticized the war in Afghanistan in
the locker room of his local health club. In another case, Derek
Kjar's neighbors reported his bumper sticker of George Bush wearing a
crown with the heading "King George - off with his head." As a
result, Kjar was interrogated by the Secret Service. In both
instances, close contacts of the two men reported them to the
authorities.

And as if things weren't bad enough, the military is now spying on
us. A secret database obtained by NBC News recently reveals that the
Department of Defense and the Pentagon have also increased
intelligence collection on American citizens inside the country. This
includes monitoring peaceful anti-war groups and protests and
involves video taping, monitoring the Internet and collecting the
name of anyone critical of the government.

There is even a toll-free number for anyone interested to report on
fellow Americans to the military. And the spying even includes
religious groups such as those attending the Quaker Meeting House in
Lake Worth, Florida. "On a domestic level, this is unprecedented,"
says NBC News analyst William Arkin. "I think it is the beginning of
enormous problems and enormous mischief for the military."

Since 9/11, it has been consistently drummed into our heads by the
government, with all its alerts and multi-colored alarms, that
terrorists are everywhere and even your next door neighbor could be
one. As a result, the government's promotion of fear and paranoia has
moved us closer to an Orwellian state where citizens inform on one
another. The result is that the citizens often do the job of the
police and no longer use good judgment before reporting their
neighbors. In the process, such informing citizens are doing away
with their own freedoms.

These tactics are not new to the world. The Nazi and Soviet secret
police of former regimes were infamous for such tactics. The police
controlled the people through fear, and the subsequent result was a
totalitarian state. They turned their respective population into a
society of informers.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning author and
former Soviet dissident, once spoke of how fear destroys the will of
the people. He noted how the Russian people would kneel inside the
doors of their apartments, pressing their ears to listen when the KGB
came at midnight to arrest a neighbor who had spoken out against the
government. Solzhenitsyn said that if all the people would have come
out and driven off the secret police, sheer public opinion would have
demoralized the effort to subdue a free people. But fear and paranoia
kept the people at bay.

We should not be afraid of government agents, whether employed by the
FBI, the military or local authorities. Their salaries are paid
through our tax dollars. Supposedly, they are our servants. Truly
free societies do not function that way. Our fear of government
servants is a clear indication of ominous things to come. If citizens
are too frightened to use their freedoms, then those freedoms will
become extinct. And the darkness will be complete.

http://english.pravda.ru/mailbox/22/101/399/16678_surveillance.html


-------------------------------------
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----- End forwarded message -----
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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Mon Dec 26 10:19:05 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 13:19:05 -0500
Subject: [IP] Victims of the darkness: Government surveillance and
Message-ID: <mailman.1492.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

intimidation
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
Reply-To: dave at farber.net



Begin forwarded message:


From sxtjdb at msn.com  Mon Dec 26 09:57:50 2005
From: sxtjdb at msn.com (Mayra Leary)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 14:57:50 -0300
Subject: All Mens Need This fp2
Message-ID: <68MK87FE.0O24.sxtjdb@msn.com>



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From dave at farber.net  Mon Dec 26 12:34:15 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 15:34:15 -0500
Subject: [IP] Boundless' CEO to speak at NYC Wireless: Using City-Scale WiFi
Message-ID: <mailman.1493.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

to Fight Crime
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
Reply-To: dave at farber.net



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Mon Dec 26 12:44:21 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 15:44:21 -0500
Subject: [IP] Fear destroys what Bin Laden could not
Message-ID: <mailman.1494.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From dethezier at hotmail.com  Mon Dec 26 07:59:40 2005
From: dethezier at hotmail.com (Justice De Thezier)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 15:59:40 -0000
Subject: [technoliberation] Does Technoliberation  have $24.95 to spend?
Message-ID: <mailman.1495.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

>From http://alternet.org/story/29899/ :

The Best $24.95 MoveOn Ever Spent

By Micah L. Sifry, Personal Democracy Forum.
Posted December 24, 2005.

MoveOn's popular Flickr photo-sharing account shows how political
causes can engage people who are already socializing online.

If you're a typical fan of Flickr, the community photo-sharing site
that was recently bought by Yahoo, then you are undoubtedly already
familiar with Flickr's tagging system, which allows anyone who
uploads a photo to the site to add his or her own topical notations
to each photo. One of the site's best features is its main tags
page, where not only can you see some of the hottest tags in the
last few days (snowday and lennon being two example), but you can
also browse the site's most popular tags, which are arranged in
a "tag cloud" that shows each word (beach, birthday, cameraphone,
japan, me, vacation) and indicates its relative popularity by the
word's type size. Click on any tag and you're taken to a stream of
recent public photos with that tag.

But if by some chance you stumble onto one Flickr member's home
page, you'll discover a very odd-seeming list of tags in its cloud,
led by antiroverally, approved, candlelight, cindysheehan,
faceamerica, great, memberadded, mothers, photopetition, and vigil.

Welcome to the public Flickr account of MoveOn.org. With little
notice, the giant liberal advocacy group has dipped its toes into
the social networking slipstream, and so far it's quite enthralled
with the experiment.

Says MoveOn CTO Patrick Michael Kane, of the firm We Also Walk
Dogs, "Flickr has got to be the best $24.95 we've ever spent. We've
been able to review, organize and make available over 11,000 photos
to MoveOn (and Flickr!) members." In November alone, he says, the
group uploaded over a gigabyte of photos, and it has been able to
make photos from campaigns available in real time.

As far as I know, this is the first major use of Flickr by a
political campaign. Individuals have attempted to make use of the
site's free service and simple tagging feature to express a
collective point; for example the writer Rob Walker has spawned a
haunting series of photos that are all tagged Mlkblvd to bring
together photos of the many streets and boulevards across America
that have been named for Martin Luther King Jr., quietly
illustrating how far the country has to go before King's vision of
equality is realized. People have also spontaneously tagged their
photos of political events, there are plenty of provocative photos
that people have tagged "politics," and Flickr does support the
formation of groups around pictorial themes. But so far these
efforts are very scattered.

Sharing the work

MoveOn came to Flickr in large degree because its own internal
system for receiving members' photos of events, reviewing them and
posting them wasn't very functional. MoveOn has long used photos to
show its members that they are part of something much larger; after
the group helped spawn thousands of grass-roots candlelight vigils
across America just before the invasion of Iraq, its staff put
together an amazing page of photos showing how the events went
worldwide. But managing the flood of photos that come in around each
MoveOn event, Kane says, was complicated.

"Finding the best photos was difficult and the sheer number of
photos meant that we often had to take photos offline to save disk
space," he explains. "The system was also very campaign-oriented --
it provided ways to get at photos in the context of a certain
campaign, but not a great way to look at all the photos that MoveOn
members had taken over time."

Meanwhile, Kane says, he had been using Flickr to manage his
personal photos and loved it. "So in March and April of this year,
we started talking to the guys over at Flickr about the idea of
building a distributed photo approval and storage application around
their API." An API -- application program interface -- is a bit of
software that enables different programs to talk to each other. "The
goal," he says, "was to allow users to upload and view photos from
any MoveOn event, while making sure that inappropriate pictures got
filtered out."

The system they built has two main parts: an email based photo
uploader and a distributed photo approval application. It works like
this, according to Kane:


We setup an email account for a campaign. Campaigners can associate
any number of tags with that email account. Folks email photos in as
attachments. A script looks at each email, finds the ones that have
photos and uploads them to Flickr. On the MoveOn side, we keep some
metadata about the photo: when it was uploaded, whether the person
who sent them in was a MoveOn user or not etc.


At this point, the photos are all private -- the public can't view
them. So, MoveOn volunteers use the "photo booth" application to
review uploaded photos. Each photo gets at least two votes. If it's
approved, the photo is marked public and becomes part of the Flickr
photostream. Volunteers can also flag photos as "great", so we can
quickly cherry pick great photos to highlight to MoveOn members.

By all indications, the system is working well. Since so many people
are already familiar with emailing photos to friends or family,
MoveOn's email-based uploading process is a snap. And the photo
approval process has turned into a great way to involve MoveOn
volunteers. Kane reports that when the group was testing the review
application, it asked volunteers to review 7,000 photos from
previous events. "The folks that responded to the ask went through
all 7,000 photos in less than 50 minutes and were disappointed when
we ran out of pics for them to look at. Great stuff!"

Power to the edges?

Apart from being able to save server space and involve volunteers,
MoveOn's engagement with Flickr has had some unexpected benefits
that come precisely from using a platform that is designed to push
power to the users. Kane recalls, "One of our campaigners wanted a
slideshow of photos from a recent action and was able to put it
together himself, just by selecting the tags he was interested in
and using the Flickr slideshow app." He adds, "It's also made
finding pictures for the MoveOn homepage and other materials a snap -
- MoveOn staff can easily browse photos by campaign or time period."

And so can you. Kane says there have been more than a quarter
million viewings of MoveOn's photos on Flickr, and that's without
the group ever directly informing its members of the resource.
MoveOn is also discovering lots of new contacts among Flickr users
who have stumbled across its photos.

Though MoveOn is making only limited use of the Flickr toolset on
its own homepage, where members are pointed to a simple slideshow,
in the future Kane expects "to point folks towards the 'most viewed'
or 'most interesting' lists for a given campaign, just like we point
people to the photos that our volunteer reviewers have flagged
as 'great' now." He's also thinking of adding geographic information
to their photo-set, since they already know which event every photo
has come from, and combining that with the Google Maps API to create
instant national, state and local maps.

Where all this may lead is unclear. MoveOn members could start to
use the group's Flickr pages to engage in some lateral communication
with each other, for example, since Flickr encourages people to
leave comments on photos and also enables group forums. But it's not
likely that will happen without some instigation from the group's
leadership.

The larger lesson for other organizations is this: As social
networking sites like Flickr, del.icio.us (also just bought by
Yahoo!), and MySpace attract millions of users, it may make sense to
go where the people already are and start playing with the same
tools, not only because those tools may offer all kinds of benefits
to the organization, but also to see what unexpected benefits may
engage people. What MoveOn is doing with Flickr is just a beginning.





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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 26 10:30:51 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 19:30:51 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Victims of the darkness: Government
  surveillance and intimidation]
Message-ID: <20051226183051.GE2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 26 12:36:49 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 21:36:49 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Boundless' CEO to speak at NYC Wireless:
  Using City-Scale WiFi to Fight Crime]
Message-ID: <20051226203649.GG2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 26 12:46:49 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 21:46:49 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Fear destroys what Bin Laden could not]
Message-ID: <20051226204649.GH2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 26 13:54:48 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 22:54:48 +0100
Subject: [dethezier@hotmail.com: [technoliberation] Does
  Technoliberation  have $24.95 to spend?]
Message-ID: <20051226215448.GJ2235@leitl.org>

Of marginal interest. It's a slow holiday, though.

----- Forwarded message from Justice De Thezier <dethezier at hotmail.com> -----


From magnoliagamero at lennonfan.com  Mon Dec 26 12:42:44 2005
From: magnoliagamero at lennonfan.com (Arlene)
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 23:42:44 +0300
Subject: FW: Get the esteem with our designerproducts.
Message-ID: <EB7EAB7B.AC1941D@lennonfan.com>

Ciao amore,

Leaving the house to purchase your necessities is so last month- come
e-browsing with me tonight!

Always and truly yours,

Arlene

 -------Original Message-------
 
From: Eike [mailto:cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net] 
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 1:42 AM
To: Arlene
Subject: 

Ciao!  Arlene

Holy smokes, it looks like I may have come across the most fitting gift for
my son! It's this great e store that has luxury look timekeepers and since
you're my pal, I wanted to tell you first.  You're charitable to all other
people, but not ever to yourself and I surmise this should change.
http://jd.q02g.ouryieldingtime.com/x0/

It's time you get what is owed to you, a rugged luxurious wrist accessory.
Their post is a snap, so there's no waiting and they also provide online
tracking!

If you see a  navitimer you want to give as a surprise, they have the most
adorable gift boxes!

Because I love you,

Eike


sadness to my glance greet unexpected advent.  shuttle gentle slope "The 
hers goal all conception." 





From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 26 21:44:57 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2005 00:44:57 -0500
Subject: [Clips] interesting new feature on osx..!
Message-ID: <p0623091dbfd68542d438@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2005 00:44:13 -0500
 To: "Philodox Clips List" <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] interesting new feature on osx..!
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 This comes from the smartfriends list, apparently...

 Cheers,
 RAH

 --- begin forwarded text


 Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 16:38:59 -0800
 To: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 From: Vinnie Moscaritolo <vinnie at vmeng.com>
 Subject: interesting new feature on osx..!




 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"


 I just got a new PB 17 and noticed to my absolute terror that it
 seems to be performing some kind of new hibernation feature that
 writes out the contents of main memory to disk when going to sleep
 (the lack of which feature has long been a point of pride for Mac
 users in my eyes as it has always been the largest Windows security
 flaw known to man). It is doing this automatically without even
 asking me if I would like to sacrifice every semblance of security,
 and I have not found an option to turn it off. The implications of
 this are astronomical, and I need to get this feature completely
 removed so that there is no possibility it would ever occur. I would
 even switch laptops if this can't be disabled. Does anyone know yet
 how one might go about getting rid of this?

 Thanks.
 - Will


 _______________________________________________

 Will Price, wrote:
 >I just got a new PB 17 and noticed to my absolute terror that it
 >seems to be performing some kind of new hibernation feature that
 >writes out the contents of main memory to disk when going to sleep
 >(the lack of which feature has long been a point of pride for Mac
 >users in my eyes as it has always been the largest Windows security
 >flaw known to man).

 I thought that feature would only kick in when the machine is already
 asleep and in danger of losing its memory. Too bad.

 >Does anyone know yet
 >how one might go about getting rid of this?

 Probably the opposite of this:

 <http://www.macosxhints.com/article.php?story=20051114072358161>

 | Jonathan 'Wolf' Rentzsch   http://rentzsch.com
 | Red Shed Software           http://redshed.net
 |     "better" necessarily means "different"

 _______________________________________________

 On Dec 22, 2005, at 6:19 PM, Will Price wrote:
 >  The implications of
 >  this are astronomical, and I need to get this feature completely
 >  removed so that there is no possibility it would ever occur. I would
 >  even switch laptops if this can't be disabled. Does anyone know yet
 >  how one might go about getting rid of this?

 My first try would be to remove the has-safe-sleep property in Open
 Firmware.  Instructions on hacking it on are here:

 	http://www.andrewescobar.com/archive/2005/11/11/how-to-safe-sleep-
 your-mac/

 Presumably, a variation on this technique can force the property off
 on the latest PowerBooks.

 Barring that, Ebay your machine and get a reconditioned previous model.


 Amanda Walker

 _______________________________________________

 On Dec 22, 2005, at 15:19 PM, Will Price wrote:

 >  I just got a new PB 17 and noticed to my absolute terror that it
 >  seems to be performing some kind of new hibernation feature that
 >  writes out the contents of main memory to disk when going to sleep

 Excellent! All computers should do that, including desktops. I was
 beginning to worry that Mac OS X didn't have this basic and important
 feature, as does Windows.

 >  (the lack of which feature has long been a point of pride for Mac
 >  users in my eyes as it has always been the largest Windows security
 >  flaw known to man).

 It's called "virtual memory". RAM is constantly being written to
 disk. Am I missing something?

 Programs that wish to keep parts of RAM off of disk can request it--
 and should--but that is orthogonal to the rather simple idea of
 flushing pending writes to the backing store in case of power failure.

 Are you talking about something else?

 >  It is doing this automatically without even asking me if I would
 >  like to sacrifice every semblance of security, and I have not found
 >  an option to turn it off.

 You won't be able to turn of virtual memory. I assume that if you
 turn on encrypted VM backing store, that'll ease your mind:

 	System Preferences : Security : Use secure virtual memory

 If you aren't using that already, what happens at sleep is the least
 of your worries. Oh, and turn on FileVault to encrypt your files on
 disk, otherwise all your really important data will be trivially
 accessible through a FireWire cable and target disk mode -- what's in
 RAM is not usually the biggest security risk.

 _______________________________________________

 Amanda Walker suggested:
 >  On Dec 22, 2005, at 6:19 PM, Will Price wrote:
 >>  The implications of
 >>  this are astronomical, and I need to get this feature completely
 >>  removed so that there is no possibility it would ever occur. I would
 >>  even switch laptops if this can't be disabled. Does anyone know yet
 >>  how one might go about getting rid of this?
 >
 >  My first try would be to remove the has-safe-sleep property in Open
 >  Firmware.  Instructions on hacking it on are here:
 >
 > 	http://www.andrewescobar.com/archive/2005/11/11/how-to-safe-sleep-
 >  your-mac/
 >
 >  Presumably, a variation on this technique can force the property
 >  off on the latest PowerBooks.

 This worked:

 sudo pmset -a hibernatemode 0

 I suspect this will be a very popular command until a patch is issued
 which I certainly hope comes soon given the scale of this problem.

 Chris Page opined:
 >>  I just got a new PB 17 and noticed to my absolute terror that it
 >>  seems to be performing some kind of new hibernation feature that
 >>  writes out the contents of main memory to disk when going to sleep
 >
 >  Excellent! All computers should do that, including desktops. I was
 >  beginning to worry that Mac OS X didn't have this basic and important
 >  feature, as does Windows.

 Errr. Ya. Right. Sadly, I'm sure some marketing checkbox is
 responsible for this debacle.

 >>  (the lack of which feature has long been a point of pride for Mac
 >>  users in my eyes as it has always been the largest Windows security
 >>  flaw known to man).
 >
 >  It's called "virtual memory". RAM is constantly being written to
 >  disk. Am I missing something?
 >
 >  Programs that wish to keep parts of RAM off of disk can request it--
 >  and should--but that is orthogonal to the rather simple idea of
 >  flushing pending writes to the backing store in case of power failure.
 >
 >  Are you talking about something else?

 I wish it were like virtual memory, that has an encryption option at
 least. Unfortunately, it is a massive security flaw that completely
 bypasses virtual memory encryption even if it is on. At this point I
 almost regret bringing it up as further research has now revealed it
 really is a security flaw and I should probably be reporting this
 directly to Apple as a courtesy. However, I had not done that
 research when I asked my question.

 >>  It is doing this automatically without even asking me if I would
 >>  like to sacrifice every semblance of security, and I have not found
 >>  an option to turn it off.
 >
 >  You won't be able to turn of virtual memory. I assume that if you
 >  turn on encrypted VM backing store, that'll ease your mind:
 >
 > 	System Preferences : Security : Use secure virtual memory
 >
 >  If you aren't using that already, what happens at sleep is the least
 >  of your worries. Oh, and turn on FileVault to encrypt your files on
 >  disk, otherwise all your really important data will be trivially
 >  accessible through a FireWire cable and target disk mode -- what's in
 >  RAM is not usually the biggest security risk.

 No, it did not ease my mind because these features are totally
 unrelated.

 Run the strings command on /var/vm/sleepimage. That would be the 2GB
 file which appears to contain the contents of my entire main memory
 (wasting 2GB of space on the drive). That file is chock full of
 strings in English. It is not encrypted at all. It is not stored
 inside FileVault. It is just sitting there WIDE OPEN! I found
 passwords, emails, and all kinds of other stuff in this wonderful
 file, and I'm using not only everything you just mentioned but much
 more security software on this machine.

 This was an Apple oversight, pure and simple. This virtually secret
 feature, turned on by default without any notification on new
 machines, with no option to turn it off, that completely eliminates
 the usefulness of FileVault, encrypted VM, and any other security you
 might think you have, writing every bit of your main memory to
 unencrypted disk space, is.... I just don't have words for it. I'm
 extremely frustrated right now that I fell for this even for a week
 before catching telltale signs of this in my syslog.

 >  Does this feature write the data separately from the VM backing
 >  store? Does it circumvent VM backing store encryption?

 Sure does. Totally eliminating any benefit you may have thought you
 had from those features.

 >>>  It is doing this automatically without even asking me if I would
 >>>  like to sacrifice every semblance of security, and I have not found
 >>>  an option to turn it off.
 >>
 >>  You won't be able to turn of virtual memory. I assume that if you
 >>  turn on encrypted VM backing store, that'll ease your mind:
 >>
 >> 	System Preferences : Security : Use secure virtual memory
 >
 >  It has been explained to me that Will has mad security skilz, so I'm
 >  assuming the problem is that this isn't merely flushing to the VM
 >  backing store, but writing RAM to a different location sans
 >  encryption, is that it?
 >
 >  Still, I am firmly in favor of the basic idea of saving machine state
 >  in non-volatile storage -- securely, of course.

 I am glad you are in favor of it. Perhaps if it could be implemented
 in such a way that every semblance of security in the rest of the
 operating system was not thrown out the window at the same time, I
 might reconsider whether it was a good idea. For now, if I were at
 Apple, I would be setting off the red alert and finding who is
 responsible for this so that it can be fixed.

 Thanks.
 - Will


 _______________________________________________

 On Dec 23, 2005, at 4:32 AM, Will Price wrote:
 >  Run the strings command on /var/vm/sleepimage. That would be the 2GB
 >  file which appears to contain the contents of my entire main memory
 >  (wasting 2GB of space on the drive). That file is chock full of
 >  strings in English. It is not encrypted at all.

 I know the file contains many strings. Some of these strings are from
 my machine, and are non-generic. However, I'm not entirely sure it is
 all of main memory unencrypted. I don't know how the feature works
 entirely -- it probably uses some kind of caching to write only parts
 of memory to disk based on usage, but of course whatever is in use is
 what you would want encrypted. I do know it has many unencrypted
 strings. I used the laptop in Firewire target mode to make sure I
 could still read the contents of /var/vm/sleepimage. The file is also
 successfully unused once disabling the feature.



 _______________________________________________

 On Dec 23, 2005, at 3:17 AM, Chris Page wrote
 >  On Dec 23, 2005, at 00:07 AM, Chris Page wrote:
 >
 >>  It's called "virtual memory". RAM is constantly being written to
 >>  disk. Am I missing something?
 >
 >  Does this feature write the data separately from the VM backing
 >  store? Does it circumvent VM backing store encryption?

 Yes and yes.


 Amanda Walker

 _______________________________________________

 On Dec 23, 2005, at 3:29 AM, Chris Page wrote:
 >  It has been explained to me that Will has mad security skilz, so I'm
 >  assuming the problem is that this isn't merely flushing to the VM
 >  backing store, but writing RAM to a different location sans
 >  encryption, is that it?

 Correct.  And since the Mac doesn't currently support encrypting an
 entire partition, that different location is unencrypted, bypassing
 (as Will noted) FileVault, PGPDisk, encrypted VM, or whatever else
 you use.

 It also means that you can clone a machine's running state from a
 "cold disk" (or possibly just from Firewire disk mode, without even
 having to open the machine).  This is a definite security risk.

 And yes, most modern PCs have this problem as well, but making Macs
 vulnerability-compatible with PCs isn't necessarily a good thing :-).

 >  Still, I am firmly in favor of the basic idea of saving machine state
 >  in non-volatile storage -- securely, of course.

 Indeed.  I've been pestering Vinnie about PGP Whole Disk Encryption
 for Macs for a while now :-).  MacOS X could really use something
 like that or FreeBSD's GBDE.


 Amanda Walker

 _______________________________________________

 --

 Vinnie Moscaritolo                                          ITCB-IMSH
 PGP: 3F903472C3AF622D5D918D9BD8B100090B3EF042
 -------------------------------------------------------

 --- end forwarded text


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Dec 27 07:46:06 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2005 10:46:06 -0500
Subject: Bamford: The Agency That Could Be Big Brother
In-Reply-To: <20051226212751.Q70131@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F35F21AC0D70182B46629719B370@phx.gbl>

OK...does anyone know why the NSA has such a facility out there? Not a lot 
of the most useful information these days is natively not of fiber plant.

I know that the area is famous for maintaining radio silence for large 
swathes of spectrum (I remember a radio astronomer from the area telling a 
story of how a large blast of radio noise was messing with one of his 
measurements. He drove something like 20 miles to a farm and found that a 
toaster or something was on the fritz.)

What I'm wondering then is whether large quantities of telephone calls are 
actually transmitted via satellite rather than through fiber. This would 
have a number of advantages over the use of standard fiber-optic 
transmission. It might also explain a few things too.

The first thing it could explain is why they need such a facility. Of 
course, such a facility might mere be an artifact from the old 
Soviet/Satellite days. But if they had moved over to very fiber-intensive 
methods, that would not be an ideal place to perform such activities.

But it seems to me that radio silence might be useful if they are receiving 
huge amounts of signal via  satellite. In order to support the badwidth, 
they'd need to use as much available spectrum as they can (probably even 
spread-spectrum techniques in already-occupied bands). They'd also be 
pushing things to the absolute maximum bitrate-wise, meaning they need as 
much sensitivity and highest possible SNRs as they can get.

What this also means, however, is that there must be a network of uplink 
stations around. Local telecom traffic is probably backhauled to such 
stations for literal upload to satellite (ie, rather than NSA building out 
it's own conspicuous fiber network).

Such stations must be easily observable, so they are disguised as something 
else. Actually, Cable TV uses a distribution network that might serve quite 
well in reverse, with the proper modifications.

-TD




>From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org>
>To: undisclosed-recipients: ;
>Subject: Bamford: The Agency That Could Be Big Brother
>Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 21:28:59 -0600 (CST)
>
>http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/25/weekinreview/25bamford.html?ei=5070&en=0267ffdbbdeb2c92&ex=1135746000&pagewanted=print
>
>December 25, 2005
>Private Lives
>The Agency That Could Be Big Brother
>By JAMES BAMFORD
>
>Washington
>
>DEEP in a remote, fog-layered hollow near Sugar Grove, W.Va., hidden by
>fortress-like mountains, sits the country's largest eavesdropping bug.
>Located in a "radio quiet" zone, the station's large parabolic dishes
>secretly and silently sweep in millions of private telephone calls and
>e-mail messages an hour.
>
>Run by the ultrasecret National Security Agency, the listening post
>intercepts all international communications entering the eastern United
>States. Another N.S.A. listening post, in Yakima,Wash., eavesdrops on the
>western half of the country.
>
>A hundred miles or so north of Sugar Grove, in Washington, the N.S.A. has
>suddenly taken center stage in a political firestorm. The controversy over
>whether the president broke the law when he secretly ordered the N.S.A. to
>bypass a special court and conduct warrantless eavesdropping on American
>citizens has even provoked some Democrats to call for his impeachment.
>
>According to John E. McLaughlin, who as the deputy director of the Central
>Intelligence Agency in the fall of 2001 was among the first briefed on the
>program, this eavesdropping was the most secret operation in the entire
>intelligence network, complete with its own code word - which itself is
>secret.
>
>Jokingly referred to as "No Such Agency," the N.S.A. was created in
>absolute secrecy in 1952 by President Harry S. Truman. Today, it is the
>largest intelligence agency. It is also the most important, providing far
>more insight on foreign countries than the C.I.A. and other spy
>organizations.
>
>But the agency is still struggling to adjust to the war on terror, in
>which its job is not to monitor states, but individuals or small cells
>hidden all over the world. To accomplish this, the N.S.A. has developed
>ever more sophisticated technology that mines vast amounts of data. But
>this technology may be of limited use abroad. And at home, it increases
>pressure on the agency to bypass civil liberties and skirt formal legal
>channels of criminal investigation. Originally created to spy on foreign
>adversaries, the N.S.A. was never supposed to be turned inward. Thirty
>years ago, Senator Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat who was then chairman
>of the select committee on intelligence, investigated the agency and came
>away stunned.
>
>"That capability at any time could be turned around on the American
>people," he said in 1975, "and no American would have any privacy left,
>such is the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations,
>telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no place to hide."
>
>He added that if a dictator ever took over, the N.S.A. "could enable it to
>impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back."
>
>At the time, the agency had the ability to listen to only what people said
>over the telephone or wrote in an occasional telegram; they had no access
>to private letters. But today, with people expressing their innermost
>thoughts in e-mail messages, exposing their medical and financial records
>to the Internet, and chatting constantly on cellphones, the agency
>virtually has the ability to get inside a person's mind.
>
>The N.S.A.'s original target had been the Communist bloc. The agency
>wrapped the Soviet Union and its satellite nations in an electronic
>cocoon. Anytime an aircraft, ship or military unit moved, the N.S.A. would
>know. And from 22,300 miles in orbit, satellites with super-thin,
>football-field-sized antennas eavesdropped on Soviet communications and
>weapons signals.
>
>Today, instead of eavesdropping on an enormous country that was always
>chattering and never moved, the N.S.A. is trying to find small numbers of
>individuals who operate in closed cells, seldom communicate electronically
>(and when they do, use untraceable calling cards or disposable cellphones)
>and are constantly traveling from country to country.
>
>During the cold war, the agency could depend on a constant flow of
>American-born Russian linguists from the many universities around the
>country with Soviet studies programs. Now the government is forced to
>search ethnic communities to find people who can speak Dari, Urdu or
>Lingala - and also pass a security clearance that frowns on people with
>relatives in their, or their parents', former countries.
>
>According to an interview last year with Gen. Michael V. Hayden, then the
>N.S.A.'s director, intercepting calls during the war on terrorism has
>become a much more complex endeavor. On Sept. 10, 2001, for example, the
>N.S.A. intercepted two messages. The first warned, "The match begins
>tomorrow," and the second said, "Tomorrow is zero hour." But even though
>they came from suspected Al Qaeda locations in Afghanistan, the messages
>were never translated until after the attack on Sept. 11, and not
>distributed until Sept. 12.
>
>What made the intercepts particularly difficult, General Hayden said, was
>that they were not "targeted" but intercepted randomly from Afghan pay
>phones.
>
>This makes identification of the caller extremely difficult and slow.
>"Know how many international calls are made out of Afghanistan on a given
>day? Thousands," General Hayden said.
>
>Still, the N.S.A. doesn't have to go to the courts to use its electronic
>monitoring to snare Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan. For the agency to
>snoop domestically on American citizens suspected of having terrorist
>ties, it first must to go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
>or FISA, make a showing of probable cause that the target is linked to a
>terrorist group, and obtain a warrant.
>
>The court rarely turns the government down. Since it was established in
>1978, the court has granted about 19,000 warrants; it has only rejected
>five. And even in those cases the government has the right to appeal to
>the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which in 27 years
>has only heard one case. And should the appeals court also reject the
>warrant request, the government could then appeal immediately to a closed
>session of the Supreme Court.
>
>Before the Sept. 11 attacks, the N.S.A. normally eavesdropped on a small
>number of American citizens or resident aliens, often a dozen or less,
>while the F.B.I., whose low-tech wiretapping was far less intrusive,
>requested most of the warrants from FISA.
>
>Despite the low odds of having a request turned down, President Bush
>established a secret program in which the N.S.A. would bypass the FISA
>court and begin eavesdropping without warrant on Americans. This decision
>seems to have been based on a new concept of monitoring by the agency, a
>way, according to the administration, to effectively handle all the data
>and new information.
>
>At the time, the buzzword in national security circles was data mining:
>digging deep into piles of information to come up with some pattern or
>clue to what might happen next. Rather than monitoring a dozen or so
>people for months at a time, as had been the practice, the decision was
>made to begin secretly eavesdropping on hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
>people for just a few days or a week at a time in order to determine who
>posed potential threats.
>
>Those deemed innocent would quickly be eliminated from the watch list,
>while those thought suspicious would be submitted to the FISA court for a
>warrant.
>
>In essence, N.S.A. seemed to be on a classic fishing expedition, precisely
>the type of abuse the FISA court was put in place to stop.At a news
>conference, President Bush himself seemed to acknowledge this new tactic.
>"FISA is for long-term monitoring," he said. "There's a difference between
>detecting so we can prevent, and monitoring."
>
>This eavesdropping is not the Bush administration's only attempt to expand
>the boundaries of what is legally permissible.
>
>In 2002, it was revealed that the Pentagon had launched Total Information
>Awareness, a data mining program led by John Poindexter, a retired rear
>admiral who had served as national security adviser under Ronald Reagan
>and helped devise the plan to sell arms to Iran and illegally divert the
>proceeds to rebels in Nicaragua.
>
>Total Information Awareness, known as T.I.A., was intended to search
>through vast data bases, promising to "increase the information coverage
>by an order-of-magnitude." According to a 2002 article in The New York
>Times, the program "would permit intelligence analysts and law enforcement
>officials to mount a vast dragnet through electronic transaction data
>ranging from credit card information to veterinary records, in the United
>States and internationally, to hunt for terrorists." After press reports,
>the Pentagon shut it down, and Mr. Poindexter eventually left the
>government.
>
>But according to a 2004 General Accounting Office report, the Bush
>administration and the Pentagon continued to rely heavily on data-mining
>techniques. "Our survey of 128 federal departments and agencies on their
>use of data mining," the report said, "shows that 52 agencies are using or
>are planning to use data mining. These departments and agencies reported
>199 data-mining efforts, of which 68 are planned and 131 are operational."
>Of these uses, the report continued, "the Department of Defense reported
>the largest number of efforts."
>
>The administration says it needs this technology to effectively combat
>terrorism. But the effect on privacy has worried a number of politicians.
>
>After he was briefed on President Bush's secret operation in 2003, Senator
>Jay Rockefeller, the Democratic vice chairman of the Senate Select
>Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to Vice President Dick Cheney.
>
>"As I reflected on the meeting today and the future we face," he wrote,
>"John Poindexter's T.I.A. project sprung to mind, exacerbating my concern
>regarding the direction the administration is moving with regard to
>security, technology, and surveillance."
>
>Senator Rockefeller sounds a lot like Senator Frank Church.
>
>"I don't want to see this country ever go across the bridge," Senator
>Church said. "I know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in
>America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that
>possess this technology operate within the law and under proper
>supervision, so that we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss
>from which there is no return."
>
>James Bamford is the author of "Puzzle Palace" and"Body of Secrets:
>Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency."




From bree at aley.com  Tue Dec 27 10:52:44 2005
From: bree at aley.com (Kessem)
Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2005 17:52:44 -0100
Subject: Superior feature navitimer. Gathering all top style buyers.
Message-ID: <75034992.0442CC0@aley.com>

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 -------Original Message-------
 
From: Jones [mailto:cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net] 
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2005 1:52 PM
To: Kessem
Subject: 

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From dichotomoussynoptic at dpr.go.id.jfet.org  Tue Dec 27 21:27:07 2005
From: dichotomoussynoptic at dpr.go.id.jfet.org (Joe)
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 00:27:07 -0500
Subject: cohort is rupture but petroglyph
Message-ID: <533400.7864935068248.539390500102.HSOG.0385@piece>

be candidate on bastion on nosebag on abolition try stephanotis 
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From arrickionx at hornfans.com  Wed Dec 28 07:46:01 2005
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Message-ID: <6d2101c60b82$bf85aa60$e1d60ddc@arrickionx>

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 -------Original Message-------
 
From: Ellis [mailto:cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net] 
Sent: Saturday, December 24, 2005 3:46 PM
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From ekr at rtfm.com  Wed Dec 28 09:38:07 2005
From: ekr at rtfm.com (Eric Rescorla)
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 09:38:07 -0800
Subject: Hey kids, come join the NSA!
Message-ID: <mailman.1496.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Hey boys and girls! Want to help your country defeat that mean old
Osama? Then check out the National Security Agency's CryptoKids web site
(http://www.nsa.gov/kids/):

    On this site, you can learn all about codes and ciphers, play lots
    of games and activities, and get to know each of us - Crypto Cat,
    Decipher Dog, Rosetta Stone, Slate, Joules, T.Top, and, of course,
    our leader CSS Sam.

    You can also learn about the National Security Agency/Central
    Security Service - they're Americas real codemakers and
    codebreakers. Our Nation's leaders and warfighters count on the
    technology and information they get from NSA/CSS to get their jobs
    done. Without NSA/CSS, they wouldnt be able to talk to one another
    without the bad guys listening and they wouldnt be able to figure
    out what the bad guys were planning.

    We hope you have lots of fun learning about cryptology and
    NSA/CSS. You might be part of the next generation of Americas
    codemakers and codebreakers.

The site comes complete with a bunch of material on making and breaking
simple codes (cool), resources to teach kids about crypto (also cool),
and detailed biographies of the CryptoKids characters (kind of
creepy). Here's some of what CryptoCat does for fun:

    I'm usually hanging out with my friends at the mall or catching the
    latest movie. I love helping people so I find different ways to help
    out around the community. Right now, I volunteer as a swim coach for
    children with special needs. Its a lot of fun AND I get to spend
    extra time with my sister who has Downs Syndrome.

The NSA Gifted and Talented program looks pretty cool, though.

-Ekr


---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




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From roy at rant-central.com  Wed Dec 28 10:17:09 2005
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 13:17:09 -0500
Subject: Looking for some VPN guidance
Message-ID: <43B2D6A5.5080506@rant-central.com>

An associate asked me an interesting question.  He has a colo box and
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-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
CRM114->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 28 07:22:41 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 16:22:41 +0100
Subject: FBI/Energy Department sniff private invididuals for hot
  isotopes
Message-ID: <20051228152241.GG2235@leitl.org>

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/national/24radioactive.html?oref=login

Widespread Radioactivity Monitoring Is Confirmed

By MATTHEW L. WALD
Published: December 24, 2005

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 - The F.B.I. and the Energy Department have conducted
thousands of searches for radioactive materials at private sites around the
country in the last three years, government officials confirmed on Friday.

The existence of the search program was disclosed on Thursday by U.S. News &
World Report, on its Web site. Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, government
agencies have disclosed that they have installed radiation-detection equipment
at ports, subway stations and other public locations, but extensive
surreptitious monitoring of private property has not been publicly known.

The federal government has given thousands of radiation alarms, worn like
cellphones on the belt, to police and fire departments in major cities.

A spokesman for the Justice Department, Brian Roehrkasse, confirmed that law
enforcement personnel were conducting "passive operations in publicly
accessible areas to detect the presence of radiological materials, in a manner
that protects U.S. constitutional rights."

U.S. News, citing people it did not name, said many of the sites that federal
agents had monitored were mosques or the homes or businesses of Muslims, and
the report set off a dispute between a Muslim group here and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.

The group, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, said in a statement:
"This disturbing revelation, coupled with recent reports of domestic
surveillance without warrant, could lead to the perception that we are no
longer a nation ruled by law, but instead one in which fear trumps
constitutional rights. All Americans should be concerned about the apparent
trend toward a two-tiered system of justice, with full rights for most
citizens, and another diminished set of rights for Muslims."

But John Miller, an assistant director of the F.B.I., said in a statement that
his agency "does not target any group based on ethnicity, political or
religious belief."

"When intelligence information suggests a threat to public safety,
particularly involving weapons of mass destruction," the statement said,
"investigators will go where the intelligence information takes them."

Mr. Miller said the bureau was "disappointed at the conclusions" reached by
the Muslim group. He added that F.B.I. agents would work through the holiday
weekend to catch whoever set off a bomb on Tuesday that damaged the door of a
mosque near Cincinnati.

According to a federal official who would not allow his name to be used, the
investigators have visited hundreds of sites in Washington, New York, Chicago,
Detroit, Las Vegas and Seattle on multiple occasions, as well other locations
for high-profile events like the Super Bowl. The surveillance was conducted
outdoors, and no warrants were needed or sought, the official said, speaking
on anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss classified programs.

"If you can go drive a car into the parking lot near the shopping mall, we can
go there," he said. "It's nothing intrusive. We're not searching into a
particular building, just sniffing the air in the area."

Federal officials have expressed anxiety about two radiological threats. One
is a "dirty bomb," a conventional explosive that would spread a radioactive
material. Such an attack would be unlikely to kill anyone with radiation, but
it could contaminate streets, buildings or other public places. The materials
that would be used are highly radioactive and might be detected from some
distance, experts say.

The other threat is that someone would try to detonate a nuclear bomb. Bomb
fuel, either enriched uranium or plutonium, is much harder to detect, because
its radiation signature is weak, physicists say. But it is also much harder to
obtain.

At least some of the surveillance was by the Nuclear Emergency Support Team,
part of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration,
which leads the American effort to secure nuclear materials around the world.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 28 10:06:18 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 19:06:18 +0100
Subject: [ekr@rtfm.com: Hey kids, come join the NSA!]
Message-ID: <20051228180618.GI2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Eric Rescorla <ekr at rtfm.com> -----


From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Wed Dec 28 21:04:25 2005
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 21:04:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ekr@rtfm.com: Hey kids, come join the NSA!]
In-Reply-To: <20051228180618.GI2235@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20051229050425.99076.qmail@web33315.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

What really is the advantage of this programme?


--- Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:

> ----- Forwarded message from Eric Rescorla
> <ekr at rtfm.com> -----
> 
> From: Eric Rescorla <ekr at rtfm.com>
> Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 09:38:07 -0800
> To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
> Subject: Hey kids, come join the NSA!
> X-Mailer: MH-E 7.4.3; nmh 1.0.4; XEmacs 21.4 (patch
> 15)
> 
> Hey boys and girls! Want to help your country defeat
> that mean old
> Osama? Then check out the National Security Agency's
> CryptoKids web site
> (http://www.nsa.gov/kids/):
> 
>     On this site, you can learn all about codes and
> ciphers, play lots
>     of games and activities, and get to know each of
> us - Crypto Cat,
>     Decipher Dog, Rosetta Stone, Slate, Joules,
> T.Top, and, of course,
>     our leader CSS Sam.
> 
>     You can also learn about the National Security
> Agency/Central
>     Security Service - they're Americas real
> codemakers and
>     codebreakers. Our Nation's leaders and
> warfighters count on the
>     technology and information they get from NSA/CSS
> to get their jobs
>     done. Without NSA/CSS, they wouldnt be able to
> talk to one another
>     without the bad guys listening and they wouldnt
> be able to figure
>     out what the bad guys were planning.
> 
>     We hope you have lots of fun learning about
> cryptology and
>     NSA/CSS. You might be part of the next
> generation of Americas
>     codemakers and codebreakers.
> 
> The site comes complete with a bunch of material on
> making and breaking
> simple codes (cool), resources to teach kids about
> crypto (also cool),
> and detailed biographies of the CryptoKids
> characters (kind of
> creepy). Here's some of what CryptoCat does for fun:
> 
>     I'm usually hanging out with my friends at the
> mall or catching the
>     latest movie. I love helping people so I find
> different ways to help
>     out around the community. Right now, I volunteer
> as a swim coach for
>     children with special needs. Its a lot of fun
> AND I get to spend
>     extra time with my sister who has Downs
> Syndrome.
> 
> The NSA Gifted and Talented program looks pretty
> cool, though.
> 
> -Ekr
> 
> 
>
---------------------------------------------------------------------
> The Cryptography Mailing List
> Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to
> majordomo at metzdowd.com
> 
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> --
> Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
> http://leitl.org
>
______________________________________________________________
> ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820           
> http://www.ativel.com
> 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443
> 8B29 F6BE
> 
> [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type
> application/pgp-signature which had a name of
> signature.asc]
> 



	
		
__________________________________ 
Yahoo! for Good - Make a difference this year. 
http://brand.yahoo.com/cybergivingweek2005/




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 28 19:29:06 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 22:29:06 -0500
Subject: [Clips] NSA Web Site Puts 'Cookies' on Computers
Message-ID: <p06230904bfd9080da1b7@[68.167.57.91]>

Shock. Horror. The NSA leaves cookies.

Exactly what part of "spook" do people not understand at this stage?

Cheers,
RAH
-------
--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 22:25:34 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] NSA Web Site Puts 'Cookies' on Computers
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://www.breitbart.com/news/2005/12/28/D8EPGENO2.html>


 BREITBART.COM


 NSA Web Site Puts 'Cookies' on Computers

 By ANICK JESDANUN

 AP Internet Writer

 Dec 28 4:44 PM US/Eastern

 NEW YORK - The National Security Agency's Internet site has been placing
 files on visitors' computers that can track their Web surfing activity
 despite strict federal rules banning most of them. These files, known as
 "cookies," disappeared after a privacy activist complained and The
 Associated Press made inquiries this week, and agency officials
 acknowledged Wednesday they had made a mistake. Nonetheless, the issue
 raises questions about privacy at a spy agency already on the defensive
 amid reports of a secretive eavesdropping program in the United States.

 "Considering the surveillance power the NSA has, cookies are not exactly a
 major concern," said Ari Schwartz, associate director at the Center for
 Democracy and Technology, a privacy advocacy group in Washington, D.C. "But
 it does show a general lack of understanding about privacy rules when they
 are not even following the government's very basic rules for Web privacy."


 Until Tuesday, the NSA site created two cookie files that do not expire
 until 2035 _ likely beyond the life of any computer in use today.

 Don Weber, an NSA spokesman, said in a statement Wednesday that the cookie
 use resulted from a recent software upgrade. Normally, the site uses
 temporary, permissible cookies that are automatically deleted when users
 close their Web browsers, he said, but the software in use shipped with
 persistent cookies already on.

 "After being tipped to the issue, we immediately disabled the cookies," he
 said.

 Cookies are widely used at commercial Web sites and can make Internet
 browsing more convenient by letting sites remember user preferences. For
 instance, visitors would not have to repeatedly enter passwords at sites
 that require them.

 But privacy advocates complain that cookies can also track Web surfing,
 even if no personal information is actually collected.

 In a 2003 memo, the White House's Office of Management and Budget prohibits
 federal agencies from using persistent cookies _ those that aren't
 automatically deleted right away _ unless there is a "compelling need."

 A senior official must sign off on any such use, and an agency that uses
 them must disclose and detail their use in its privacy policy.

 Peter Swire, a Clinton administration official who had drafted an earlier
 version of the cookie guidelines, said clear notice is a must, and `vague
 assertions of national security, such as exist in the NSA policy, are not
 sufficient."

 Daniel Brandt, a privacy activist who discovered the NSA cookies, said
 mistakes happen, "but in any case, it's illegal. The (guideline) doesn't
 say anything about doing it accidentally."

 The Bush administration has come under fire recently over reports it
 authorized NSA to secretly spy on e-mail and phone calls without court
 orders.

 Since The New York Times disclosed the domestic spying program earlier this
 month, President Bush has stressed that his executive order allowing the
 eavesdropping was limited to people with known links to al-Qaida.

 But on its Web site Friday, the Times reported that the NSA, with help from
 American telecommunications companies, obtained broader access to streams
 of domestic and international communications.

 The NSA's cookie use is unrelated, and Weber said it was strictly to
 improve the surfing experience "and not to collect personal user data."

 Richard M. Smith, a security consultant in Cambridge, Mass., questions
 whether persistent cookies would even be of much use to the NSA. They are
 great for news and other sites with repeat visitors, he said, but the NSA's
 site does not appear to have enough fresh content to warrant more than
 occasional visits.

 The government first issued strict rules on cookies in 2000 after
 disclosures that the White House drug policy office had used the technology
 to track computer users viewing its online anti-drug advertising. Even a
 year later, a congressional study found 300 cookies still on the Web sites
 of 23 agencies.

 In 2002, the CIA removed cookies it had inadvertently placed at one of its
 sites after Brandt called it to the agency's attention.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From zanderzon at bluehyppo.com  Wed Dec 28 20:25:10 2005
From: zanderzon at bluehyppo.com (Blanca)
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 07:25:10 +0300
Subject: FW: In favor of a cheaper meds store?
Message-ID: <EFF66CA8.F50AB8A@bluehyppo.com>

What's new,

I knew you would enjoy this as much as I do- assure me you'll take a peek
at this!

Sincerely,

Blanca

 -------Original Message-------
 
From: Govindan [mailto:cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net] 
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2005 1:25 PM
To: Blanca
Subject: 
What's shakin', Blanca,


After some hard searching, I saw a web page that's definitely gonna help
you.

My pal told me about a site that provides medications for less and I just
had to tell you about it.
http://jhg.gh.placeofbestbuys.com


creed adult other for factory 'Lucy.'" to common historic place; though
CNTA just now, twist as I am not disposed to paint his portrait in detail, 
oil there, and appendix von Schoenvorts arrive is making preparations

Cheers

Govindan




From bsteinhardt at aclu.org  Thu Dec 29 08:15:03 2005
From: bsteinhardt at aclu.org (Barry Steinhardt)
Date: December 29, 2005 8:15:03 PM EST
Subject: NSA Spying on Americans
Message-ID: <mailman.1497.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Dave,

As has been made plain by the many submissions to IP, the
significance of
the Bush/NSA spying scandal continues to grow each day.

The ACLU has just posted a number of materials on our web site
aclu.org and
the new nsawatch.org that we hope will add to the debate.

Those items include:

1. A new ACLU ad calling for a special counsel to investigate the
President's illegal surveillance of U.S. Citizens.The add appeared in
today's NY Times, as well as the web site along with related
materials at
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/.

The text of the ad compares the words of President Nixon and
President Bush,
both of whom denied allegations of illegal spying. Next to the image of
Nixon, the advertisement says: "He lied to the American people and
broke the
law." Below that is an image of President Bush, with the words, "So
did he.

2. The Updated NSA Watch site (formerly known as Echelon watch):
http://www.nsawatch.org/ which contains a wide variety of materials and
links documenting the NSA's extraordinary communication interception
capabilities ("sigint"), which are part of an international arrangement
sometimes referred to as "Echelon".

3 A new piece explaining how the "NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal" at
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/23279res20051229.html

Since the Administration has sought to cast its unprecedented and
lawless
spying on American's as "legal", I have included the text of our piece
below. You are, of course, free to use as much or little of it and
the rest
of this message as you would like.

Have a good New Year,

Barry Steinhardt

ACLU Technology and Liberty Project



NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/23279res20051229.html


What if it emerged that the President of the United States was
flagrantly
violating the Constitution and a law passed by the Congress to protect
Americans against abuses by a super-secret spy agency?  What if,
instead of
apologizing, he said, in essence, ?I have the power to do that,
because I
say I can.?  That frightening scenario is exactly what we are now
witnessing
in the case of the warrantless NSA spying ordered by President Bush
that was
reported December 16, 2005 by the New York Times.

According to the Times, Bush signed a presidential order in 2002
allowing
the National Security Agency to monitor without a warrant the
international
(and sometimes domestic) telephone calls and e-mail messages of
hundreds or
thousands of citizens and legal residents inside the United States. The
program eventually came to include some purely internal controls ?
but no
requirement that warrants be obtained from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court as the 4th Amendment to the Constitution and the
foreign
intelligence surveillance laws require.

In other words, no independent review or judicial oversight.

That kind of surveillance is illegal.  Period.

The day after this shocking abuse of power became public, President Bush
admitted that he had authorized it, but argued that he had the
authority to
do so.  But the law governing government eavesdropping on American
citizens
is well-established and crystal clear.  President Bush?s claim that
he is
not bound by that law is simply astounding.  It is a Presidential
power grab
that poses a challenge in the deepest sense to the integrity of the
American
system of government ? the separation of powers between the
legislative and
executive branches, the concept of checks and balances on executive
power,
the notion that the president is subject to the law like everyone
else, and
the general respect for the ?rule of law? on which our democratic system
depends.

Flouting a long history
The tensions between the need for intelligence agencies to protect the
nation and the danger that they would become a domestic spy agency
have been
explicitly and repeatedly fought out in American history.  The National
Security Act of 1947 contained a specific ban on intelligence operatives
from operating domestically.  In the 1970s, America learned about the
extensive domestic political spying carried out by the FBI, the
military,
the CIA, and the NSA, and Congress passed new laws to prevent a
repeat of
those abuses. Surveillance laws were debated and modified under
presidents
Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush Sr. and Clinton.

But, President Bush would sweep aside this entire body of democratically
debated and painstakingly crafted restrictions on domestic
surveillance by
the executive branch with his extraordinary assertion that he can simply
ignore this law because he is the Commander-in-Chief.  In a December 17
radio address, for example, Bush asserted that the spying was ?fully
consistent with my constitutional responsibilities and authorities.?
But
his constitutional duty is to ?take care that the laws be faithfully
executed? (Article II, Section 3); the law here clearly establishes
well-defined procedures for eavesdropping on U.S. persons, and the
fact is,
Bush ordered that those procedures not be followed.

Government eavesdropping on Americans is an extremely serious matter;
the
ability to intrude on the private realm is a tremendous power that
can be
used to monitor, embarrass, control, disgrace, or ruin an individual.
Because it is so invasive, the technology of wiretapping has been
subject to
carefully crafted statutory controls almost since it was invented.
Ignoring
those controls and wiretapping without a court order is a crime that
carries
a significant prison sentence (in fact, criminal violations of the
wiretap
statute were among the articles of impeachment that were drafted against
President Nixon shortly before his resignation).

Clearly Illegal
Unfortunately, although the law in this matter is crystal clear, many
Americans, faced with President Bush?s bold assertions of ?inherent?
authority for these actions, will not know what to believe.  There
are only
5 points they need to understand:

Point #1: Electronic surveillance by the Government is strictly
limited by
the Constitution and Federal Law

The law on surveillance begins with the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, which states clearly that Americans? privacy may not be
invaded without a warrant based on probable cause.



United States Constitution
 Fourth Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (emphasis added)


The US Supreme Court (US v. Katz 389 US 347) has made it clear that this
core privacy protection does cover government eavesdropping.  As a
result,
all electronic surveillance by the government in the United States is
illegal, unless it falls under one of a small number of precise
exceptions
specifically carved out in the law.



  United States Code Title 50, Chapter 36, Subchapter 1
Section 1809. Criminal sanctions
 (a) Prohibited activities  A person is guilty of an offense if he
intentionally?  (1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of
law
except as authorized by statute

In other words, the NSA can only spy where it is explicitly granted
permission to do so by statute.  Citizens concerned about
surveillance do
not have to answer the question, ?what law restricts the NSA?s spying??
Rather, the government is required to supply an answer to the
question ?what
law permits the NSA to spy??

Point #2: There are only three laws that permit the government to spy
There are only three laws that authorize any exceptions to the ban on
electronic eavesdropping by the government.  Congress has explicitly
stated
that these three laws are the exclusive means by which domestic
electronic
surveillance can be carried out (18 USC, Section 2511(2)(f)).  They are:
?     Title III and ECPA.  Title III and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act make up the statutes that govern criminal wiretaps in the
United
States.
?     FISA.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is the law that
governs eavesdropping on agents of ?foreign powers? within the United
States, including suspected foreign terrorists.

Point #3: The Bush-NSA spying was not authorized by any of these laws
Title III and ECPA govern domestic criminal wiretaps and are not
relevant to
the NSA?s spying. FISA is the law under which the NSA should have
operated.
It authorizes the government to conduct surveillance in certain
situations
without meeting all of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment that
apply
under criminal law, but requires that an independent Foreign
Intelligence
Surveillance Court oversee that surveillance to make sure that
Americans who
have no ties to foreign terrorist organizations or other ?foreign
powers?
are not spied upon.



FISA was significantly loosened by the Patriot Act (which, for example,
allowed it to be used for some criminal investigations), and parts of
it now
stand in clear violation of the Constitution?s Fourth Amendment in
the view
of the ACLU and many others.  However, even the post-Patriot Act
version of
FISA does not authorize the president to conduct warrantless
eavesdropping
on U.S. citizens or permanent legal residents in the U.S. without an
order
from the FISA Court.  Yet it is that very court order requirement ?
imposed
to protect innocent Americans ? that the President has ignored.


In fact, one member of the FISA Court, Judge James Roberston, has
apparently
resigned from the court in protest of President Bush's secret
authorization
of this program.  And the New York Times reported that the court?s chief
judge complained about the program when she was (belatedly) notified
of it,
and refused to allow information gathered under the program to be
used as
the basis for FISA wiretap orders.

Point #4: Congress?s post-9/11 use-of-force resolution does not
legitimize
the Bush-NSA spying

Congress after 9/11 approved an Authorization to Use Military Force
against
those responsible for the attacks in order to authorize the president to
conduct foreign military operations such as the invasion of Afghanistan.

But that resolution contains no language changing, overriding or
repealing
any laws passed by Congress.  Congress does not repeal legislation
through
hints and innuendos, and the Authorization to Use Military Force does
not
authorize the president to violate the law against surveillance
without a
warrant any more than it authorizes him to carry out an armed robbery or
seize control of Citibank in order to pay for operations against
terrorists.
In fact, when President Truman tried to seize control of steel mills
that
were gripped by strikes in 1952, the Supreme Court decisively
rejected his
authority to make such a seizure, even in the face of arguments that the
strike would interfere with the supply of weapons and ammunition to
American
troops then under fire on the battlefields of the Korean War.  The
Supreme
Court also rejected similar assertions of inherent executive power by
Richard Nixon.



U.S. Supreme Court

YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)


 ?The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the
President?s
military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. . . .
?Nor can
the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional
provisions that grant executive power to the President. . . . The
Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks
bad.
And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall
make
laws which the President is to execute. . . .   ?The Founders of this
Nation
entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad
times.?




In fact, FISA contains explicit language describing the president?s
powers
?during time of war? and provides that ?the President, through the
Attorney
General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order
under
this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period
not to
exceed fifteen days following a declaration of war by the Congress." 50
U.S.C. ? 1811 (emphasis added). So even if we accept the argument
that the
use-of-force resolution places us on a war footing, warrantless
surveillance
would have been legal for only 15 days after the resolution was
passed on
September 18, 2001.


Point #5: The need for quick action does not justify an end-run
around the
courts

The FISA law takes account of the need for emergency surveillance,
and the
need for quick action cannot be used as a rationale for going outside
the
law. FISA allows wiretapping without a court order in an emergency; the
court must simply be notified within 72 hours. The government is
aware of
this emergency power and has used it repeatedly.  In addition, the
Foreign
Intelligence court is physically located in the Justice Department
building,
and the FISA law requires that at least two of the FISA judges reside
in the
Washington, DC area, for precisely the reason that rapid action is
sometimes
needed.

If President Bush still for some reason finds these provisions to be
inadequate, he must take his case to Congress and ask for the law to be
changed, not simply ignore it.

The president is bound by the rule of law
President Bush?s claim that he has ?inherent authority? as
Commander-in-Chief to use our spy agencies to eavesdrop on Americans is
astonishing, and such spying is clearly illegal.  It must be halted
immediately, and its origins must be thoroughly investigated by
Congress and
by a special counsel.  (See letter from the ACLU to Attorney General
Gonzales calling for a special counsel
<http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/23184leg20051221.html> ).

Given the extensive (indeed, excessive) surveillance powers that the
government already possesses, the Administration?s blatantly illegal
use of
warrantless surveillance raises an important question: why?  One
possibility, raised by the New York Times in a Dec. 24, 2005 story (?Spy
Agency Minded Vast Data Trove, Officials Report
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html> ?), is that
the NSA
is relying on assistance from several unnamed telecommunications
companies
to ?trace and analyze large volumes of communications? and is ?much
larger
than the White House has acknowledged.?

This, as security expert Bruce Schneier has noted, suggests the Bush
Administration has developed a ?a whole new surveillance paradigm? ?
exploiting the NSA?s well known capabilities to spy on individuals
not one
at a time, as FISA permits, but to run communications en masse through
computers in the search for suspicious individuals or patterns.  This
?new
paradigm? may well be connected to the NSA  program sometimes known as
?Echelon,? which carries out just that kind of mass collection of
communications (see www.nsawatch.org <http://www.nsawatch.org/> ).  This
?wholesale? surveillance, as Schneier calls it, would constitute an
illegal
invasion of Americans? privacy on a scale that has never before been
seen.
(See Schneier, ?NSA and Bush?s Illegal Eavesdropping
<http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/12/20/surveillance/> ,?
Salon.com)

According to the Times, several telecommunications companies provided
the
NSA with direct access to streams of communications over their
networks.  In
other words, the NSA appears to have direct access to a large volume of
Americans? communications ? with not simply the assent, but the
cooperation
of the companies handling those communications.

We do not know from the report which companies are involved or
precisely how
or what  the  NSA can access. But this revelation raises questions about
both the legal authority of the NSA to request and receive this data,
and
whether these companies may have violated either the Federal laws
protecting
these communications or their own stated privacy polices (which may, for
example, provide that they will only turn over their customers? data
with
their consent or in response to a proper order).

Regardless of the scale of this spying, we are facing a historic
moment: the
President of the United states has claimed a sweeping wartime power
to brush
aside the clear limits on his power set by our Constitution and laws ? a
chilling assertion of presidential power that has not been seen since
Richard Nixon.








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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 29 07:27:30 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 10:27:30 -0500
Subject: [ekr@rtfm.com: Hey kids, come join the NSA!]
In-Reply-To: <20051229050425.99076.qmail@web33315.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <20051229050425.99076.qmail@web33315.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <p0623092abfd9b0aa2739@[68.167.57.91]>

At 9:04 PM -0800 12/28/05, Sarad AV wrote:
>What really is the advantage of this programme?

It was part of AlGore's "The internet is hip and *all* government agencies
*must* participate" scheme.

It's been there for most of a decade, and I bet it hasn't changed much.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 29 08:19:47 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 11:19:47 -0500
Subject: [ekr@rtfm.com: Hey kids, come join the NSA!]
In-Reply-To: <p0623092abfd9b0aa2739@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <20051229050425.99076.qmail@web33315.mail.mud.yahoo.com> 
  <p0623092abfd9b0aa2739@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <p06230940bfd9bc83ee26@[68.167.57.91]>

At 10:27 AM -0500 12/29/05, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>I bet it hasn't changed much.

Including the cookies.

Caveat Clicktor.

Whaddya think, ya go to the NSA site and they *don't* look up your kimono
as far as they can see?

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec 29 09:01:17 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 12:01:17 -0500
Subject: Bamford: The Agency That Could Be Big Brother
In-Reply-To: <20051229023735.GA649@pig.my.domain>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F250A0EEC38B5914FCB11309B290@phx.gbl>

Now that's starting to make some sense.

Unless, of course, NSA doesn't want us realizing how easy it would be to jam 
major portions of their operation!!!

-TD


>From: "(Mr) Lyn R Kennedy" <lrkn at earthlink.net>
>To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>Subject: Re: Bamford: The Agency That Could Be Big Brother
>Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 20:37:35 -0600
>
>On Tue, Dec 27, 2005 at 10:46:06AM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> >
> > OK...does anyone know why the NSA has such a facility out there? Not a 
>lot
> > of the most useful information these days is natively not of fiber 
>plant.
>
>They don't. Sugar Grove was a Navy Security Group station until it was
>recently shuffled-renamed along with some other similar functions.
>
>It was first selected for Navy satellite communications and then re-worked
>as a listening post. There are lots of interesting stories surrounding SG
>but major telephone interception was not one of them.
>
>When NSA did do satellite telephone intereception in the U.S., it was from
>Rosman, NC, a site since donated to radio astronomy. Look up Pisgah
>Astronomical Research Institute. The big dish antennas are still there.
>
>
>Bamford also says Washington DC is "north of" Sugar grove. Such basic
>errors probably mean he has never "been to the mountain" and looked at
>SG. The mountain is named Reddish Knob if you are ever in the area. It
>was the site of the AT&T relay station before the fiber cables.
>
>The BS surrounding NSA capability is getting pretty deep.
>
>
>--
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>| 73,            E-mail       | lrkn at earthlink.net                      |
>| Lyn Kennedy    webpage      | http://home.earthlink.net/~lrkn         |
>| K5QWB          ICBM         | 32.5 North 96.9 West                    |
>---Livin' on an information dirt road a few miles off the superhighway---




From TannerShawdiscrete at jefferyassociates.com  Thu Dec 29 04:51:21 2005
From: TannerShawdiscrete at jefferyassociates.com (Elvira Sherwood)
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 15:51:21 +0300
Subject: ultram apprehension
Message-ID: <0106711081800.01145@jfuertes.maz.es>

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From AlfredManleynewt at loan-gamer.co.uk  Thu Dec 29 14:52:30 2005
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Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 18:52:30 -0400
Subject: Jack rabbit vibrator. sumner
Message-ID: <20110406465750.A31810@xearthlink.net>

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From udhay at pobox.com  Thu Dec 29 21:34:56 2005
From: udhay at pobox.com (Udhay Shankar N)
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 21:34:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [silk] Delocalizer
Message-ID: <mailman.1498.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,69942-0.html

Hackers Rebel Against Spy Cams

By Ann Harrison

BERLIN -- When the Austrian government passed a law this year allowing
police to install closed-circuit surveillance cameras in public spaces
without a court order, the Austrian civil liberties group Quintessenz
vowed to watch the watchers.

Members of the organization worked out a way to intercept the camera
images with an inexpensive, 1-GHz satellite receiver. The signal could
then be descrambled using hardware designed to enhance copy-protected
video as it's transferred from DVD to VHS tape.

The Quintessenz activists then began figuring out how to blind the
cameras with balloons, lasers and infrared devices.

And, just for fun, the group created an anonymous surveillance system
that uses face-recognition software to place a black stripe over the
eyes of people whose images are recorded.

Quintessenz members Adrian Dabrowski and Martin Slunksy presented their
video-surveillance research at the 22nd annual Chaos Communication
Congress here this week. Five hundred hackers jammed into a meeting
room for a presentation that fit nicely into CCC's 2005 theme of
"private investigations."

Slunksy pointed out that searching for special strings in Google, such
as axis-cgi/, will return links that access internet-connected cameras
around the world. Quintessenz developers entered these Google results
into a database, analyzed the IP addresses and set up a website that
gives users the ability to search by country or topic -- and then rate
the cameras.

"You can use this to see if you are being watched in your daily life,"
said Dabrowski.

The conference, hosted by Germany's Chaos Computer Club, featured many
discussions on data interception and pushing back the unprecedented
onslaught of surveillance technologies.

Even the Dutch, once known as hacker-friendly, politically progressive
Europeans, are now fearful and demanding more cameras on their streets,
said Rop Gonggrijp, founder of Dutch ISP Xs4All.

Gonggrijp says the Dutch chief of police has announced the intention to
store large amounts of surveillance data and mine it to determine who
to pressure and question. "People are screaming for more control," said
Gonggrijp.

Dutch journalist Brenno de Winter warned that the European Parliament's
support for data retention doesn't ensure security, and makes citizens
vulnerable to automated traffic analysis of who communicates with whom
through phone calls and internet connections. "What we have seen is a
system that fails because we miss out on too much information, and even
if we have all that information, it doesn't give us the right
information and it is easy to circumvent," said de Winter.

CCC member and security researcher Frank Rieger said hackers should
provide secure communications for political and social movements and
encourage the widespread use of anonymity technologies. He said people
on the other side of the camera need to be laughed at and shamed.

"It must not be cool anymore to have access to this data," said Rieger,
who argued that Western societies are becoming democratically
legitimized police states ruled by an unaccountable elite. "We have
enough technical knowledge to turn this around; let's expose them in
public, publish everything we know about them and let them know how it
feels to be under surveillance."

The four-day Chaos Computer Congress is meeting near Alexanderplatz in
the former East Berlin, where more than a half-million people rallied
for political reform five days before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In his keynote address, Joichi Ito, general manager of international
operations for Technorati, warned that the internet could itself become
a walled-in network controlled by the International Telecommunication
Union, Microsoft and telecommunications companies.

Ito said these restrictions would stifle free speech and the ability to
question authority without retribution. "An open network is more
important for democracy than the right to bear arms and the right to
vote," said Ito. "Voice is more important than votes."



----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 29 20:25:25 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 23:25:25 -0500
Subject: [IP] ACLU ON NSA Spying on Americans
Message-ID: <mailman.1499.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


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From bill at scannell.org  Fri Dec 30 02:46:41 2005
From: bill at scannell.org (Bill Scannell)
Date: December 30, 2005 2:46:41 PM EST
Subject: [IP] more on AP Story Justice Dept. Probing Domestic
Message-ID: <mailman.1500.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Spying Leak

Dave,

Lest we forget what this is about: George W. Bush illegally ordered
NSA to
spy on US citizens.  This is a felony, for which I (and many other
former
and current NSA employees) hope to see him impeached and jailed.

As as former SIGINT analyst, I -and anyone else ever associated with
NSA-
know that USSID 18 prohibits the spying on United States Persons.
This is
NSA's Prime Directive, Ten Commandments, and Bill of Rights, all
rolled into
one.  It is an unlawful order to direct NSA to eavesdrop on US
citizens. It
is impossible for me to stress strongly enough that from day one, every
human associated with NSA has USSID 18 drilled into him.

With USSID 18, NSA is able to protect and defend our country.
Without USSID
18, NSA can be used to oppress the American populace. It comes as no
surprise to me that, in the face of an unlawful order, someone went
to the
papers with the story.

The exception to the rule of course, is the FISA courts.  President Bush
declined to use these courts despite the ability to get a FISA
warrant three
days after the fact.

It is a shame that with such a massive crime freely admitted by
President
Bush, a smart guy like Hiawatha continues to carry water for this
Administration.

-Bill

PS:  A public version of USSID 18 can be read at:
http://cryptome.org/nsa-ussid18.htm


Also sprach David Farber aka dave at farber.net on 30.12.05 13:50 :

>
>
>Begin forwarded message:
>
>From: h_bray at globe.com
>Date: December 30, 2005 12:55:23 PM EST
>To: dave at farber.net
>Subject: Re: [IP] AP Story Justice Dept. Probing Domestic Spying Leak
>
>Because (a) the DOJ approved of the spying and (b) the leakers
>violated
>federal law by revealing an ongoing intelligence operation in
>wartime.  If
>the Valerie Plame leak was a crime, this leak is doubly so.
>
>
>
>Hiawatha Bray
>
>
>
>
>              David Farber
>              <dave at farber.net>
>
>  To
>              12/30/2005 12:32          ip at v2.listbox.com
>
>PM                                                         cc
>
>
>Subject
>              Please respond to         [IP] AP Story Justice Dept.
>Probing
>               dave at farber.net          Domestic Spying Leak
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Begin forwarded message:
>
>From: Mary Shaw <mary.shaw at cs.cmu.edu>
>Date: December 30, 2005 12:26:18 PM EST
>To: Dave Farber <dave at farber.net>
>Subject: AP Story Justice Dept. Probing Domestic Spying Leak
>
>Dave,
>
>Why is the Justice Dept probing the leak rather than the domestic
>spying program itself?  Or did I miss the announcement of the latter?
>
>Excerpted from  http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=514&u=/ap/
>20051230/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/domestic_spying_probe_6
>
>Mary
>
>============================
>
>Justice Dept. Probing Domestic Spying Leak
>
>By TONI LOCY, Associated Press Writer
>
>The Justice Department has opened an investigation into the leak of
>classified information about President Bush's secret domestic spying
>program, Justice officials said Friday.
>
>The officials, who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of
>the probe, said the inquiry will focus on disclosures to The New York
>Times about warrantless surveillance conducted by the National
>Security Agency since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
>
>[[[snip]]]
>
>Revelation of the secret spying program unleashed a firestorm of
>criticism of the administration. Some critics accused the president
>of breaking the law by authorizing intercepts of conversations ?
>without prior court approval or oversight ? of people inside the
>United States and abroad who had suspected ties to al-Qaida or its
>affiliates.
>
>[[[snip]]]
>
>
>
>
>-------------------------------------
>You are subscribed as bray at globe.com
>To manage your subscription, go to
>   http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
>
>Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-
>people/
>
>-------------------------------------
>You are subscribed as bill at scannell.org
>To manage your subscription, go to
>  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
>
>Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-
>people/
>

??? --- ???  ??? --- ???
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety
deserve neither liberty nor safety."
- Benjamin Franklin





-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




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From dave at farber.net  Fri Dec 30 04:24:48 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 07:24:48 -0500
Subject: [IP] Summarized -- WashPost: Bush's Massive and Secret CIA "GST"
Message-ID: <mailman.1501.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Program
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
Reply-To: dave at farber.net


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/29/AR20051229015
85.html

The effort President Bush authorized shortly after Sept. 11, 2001, to
fight al Qaeda has grown into the largest CIA covert action program
since the height of the Cold War, expanding in size and ambition
despite a growing outcry at home and abroad over its clandestine
tactics, according to former and current intelligence officials and
congressional and administration sources.

...GST includes programs allowing the CIA to capture al Qaeda
suspects with help from foreign intelligence services, to maintain
secret prisons abroad, to use interrogation techniques that some
lawyers say violate international treaties, and to maintain a fleet
of aircraft to move detainees around the globe.

...Over the past two years, as aspects of this umbrella effort have
burst into public view, the revelations have prompted protests and
official investigations in countries that work with the United
States, as well as condemnation by international human rights
activists and criticism by members of Congress.

...The administration's decisions to rely on a small circle of
lawyers for legal interpretations that justify the CIA's covert
programs and not to consult widely with Congress on them have also
helped insulate the efforts from the growing furor, said several
sources who have been involved.

...That program is separate from the GST program, but three lawyers
involved said the legal rationale for the NSA program is essentially
the same one used to support GST, which is an abbreviation of a
classified code name for the umbrella covert action program.

The administration contends it is still acting in self-defense after
the Sept. 11 attacks, that the battlefield is worldwide, and that
everything it has approved is consistent with the demands made by
Congress on Sept. 14, 2001, when it passed a resolution authorizing
"all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons [the president] determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks."

...After a CIA inspector general's report in the spring of 2004
stated that some authorized interrogation techniques violated
international law, Goss asked two national security experts to study
the program's effectiveness.

...But two intelligence experts said the CIA will be required to draw
up clear guidelines and to get all special interrogation techniques
approved by a wider range of government lawyers who hold a more
conventional interpretation of international treaty obligations.

...The top-secret presidential finding Bush signed six days after the
Sept. 11 attacks empowered the intelligence agencies in a way not
seen since World War II, and it ordered them to create what would
become the GST program.

...With billions of dollars appropriated each year by Congress, the
CIA has established joint counterterrorism intelligence centers in
more than two dozen countries, and it has enlisted at least eight
countries, including several in Eastern Europe, to allow secret
prisons on their soil.

Working behind the scenes, the CIA has gained approval from foreign
governments to whisk terrorism suspects off the streets or out of
police custody into a clandestine prison system that includes the
CIA's black sites and facilities run by intelligence agencies in
other countries.

...In four years, the GST has become larger than the CIA's covert
action programs in Afghanistan and Central America in the 1980s,
according to current and former intelligence officials.

...When the CIA wanted new rules for interrogating important
terrorism suspects the White House gave the task to a small group of
lawyers within the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel who
believed in an aggressive interpretation of presidential power.

..."The Bush administration did not seek a broad debate on whether
commander-in-chief powers can trump international conventions and
domestic statutes in our struggle against terrorism," said Radsan,
the former CIA lawyer, who is a professor at William Mitchell College
of Law in St.


-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 30 08:18:16 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:18:16 -0500
Subject: [Clips] WhiteHouse.gov Uses Cookies, Bugs
Message-ID: <p062309babfdb0e441910@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:17:06 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] WhiteHouse.gov Uses Cookies, Bugs
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 Gee. Another government website that tries to look up your skirt.

 Imagine that.

 These people in the AP really *are* virgins, aren't they?

 Cheers,
 RAH
 -------

 <http://www.wired.com/news/wireservice/1,69945-0.html>

 Wired News


   WhiteHouse.gov Uses Cookies, Bugs


 Associated Press

 NEW YORK -- Unbeknown to the Bush administration, an outside contractor has
 been using internet tracking technologies that may be prohibited to analyze
 usage and traffic patterns at the White House's website, an official said
 Thursday.

 David Almacy, the White House's internet director, promised an
 investigation into whether the practice is consistent with a 2003 policy
 from the White House's Office of Management and Budget banning the use of
 most such technologies at government sites.

 "No one even knew it was happening," Almacy said. "We're going to work with
 the contractor to ensure that it's consistent with the OMB policy."

 The acknowledgment came a day after the National Security Agency admitted
 it had erred in using banned "cookies" at its website. Both acknowledgments
 followed inquiries by The Associated Press.

 The White House's website uses what's known as a web bug to anonymously
 keep track of who's visiting and when. A web bug is essentially a tiny
 graphic image -- a dot, really -- that's virtually invisible. In this case,
 the bug is pulled from a server maintained by the contractor, WebTrends,
 and lets the traffic analytic company know that another person has visited
 a specific page on the site.

 Web bugs themselves are not prohibited.

 But when these bugs are linked to a data file known as a "cookie" so that a
 site can tell if the same person has visited again, a federal agency using
 them must demonstrate a "compelling need," get a senior official's signoff
 and disclose such usage, said Peter Swire, a Clinton administration
 official who helped draft the original rules.

 The White House's privacy policy does not specially mention cookies or web
 bugs, and Almacy said the signoff was never sought because one was not
 thought to be required. He said his team was first informed of the cookie
 use by the AP.

 In any case, Almacy said, no personal information was collected, and the
 cookie was used only to determine whether a visitor was a new or returning
 user.

 It's not entirely clear how the cookies are created.

 Cookies from the White House site do not appear to be generated simply by
 visiting it, according to analyses by the AP and by Richard M. Smith, a
 security consultant in Cambridge, Massachusetts, who first noticed the web
 bug this week.

 Rather, WebTrends cookies are sometimes created when visiting other
 WebTrends clients. Smith said his analysis of network traffic shows such
 pre-existing cookies have then been used to recognize visitors to the White
 House site.

 But WebTrends officials say they do not aggregate information about
 visitors across multiple sites, and when presented with Smith's data,
 referred inquiries to the White House. Almacy said it's possible the cookie
 resulted from the White House visit, adding he was awaiting further details
 from WebTrends.

 In a statement, the company added that the analysis performed at the White
 House site is typical among organizations for improving user experience.

 But Swire said a similar use of cookies had prompted the federal guidelines.

 The Clinton administration first issued the strict rules on cookies in 2000
 after its Office of National Drug Control Policy, through a contractor, had
 used the technology to track computer users viewing its online anti-drug
 advertising. The rules were updated in 2003 by the Bush administration.

 Although no personal information was collected at the time, Swire said,
 concerns were raised that one site's data could be linked later with those
 from the contractor's other clients.

 "It all could be linked up after the fact, and that was enough to lead to
 the federal policy," Swire said.

 Nonetheless, agencies occasionally violate the rules inadvertently. The CIA
 did in 2002, and the NSA more recently. The NSA disabled the cookies this
 week and blamed a recent upgrade to software that shipped with cookie
 settings already on.

 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From coderman at gmail.com  Fri Dec 30 12:38:49 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 12:38:49 -0800
Subject: Detect Spying on YOU
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F1761730CEF1E8015FECA3A9B280@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY103-F1761730CEF1E8015FECA3A9B280@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512301238t5c60dcc8tc32108c4422026c5@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/30/05, Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> Set up an overseas Email account.
>
> Send yourself Emails from hotmail/gmail, etc...
>
> In the email place, first of all, plenty of key words such as "Jihad", Bomb,
> meeting, Al Qaeda, etc...
>
> In the email have a link to a website you set up with a counter and that you
> have told no one about (I'll add that you should have a nice big GOATSE
> picture in there).
>
> Send yourself emails periodically and keep track of your counter. Any
> incremements not caused by you were caused by someone else.

cmon, who seriously thinks they can honey token the NSA/$TLA?

i bet they are laughing themselves silly over such amusing suggestions...




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 30 10:32:59 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 13:32:59 -0500
Subject: Detect Spying on YOU
Message-ID: <BAY103-F1761730CEF1E8015FECA3A9B280@phx.gbl>

I read somewhere recently a nice little way to determine if someone is 
observing you. Haven't seen this mentioned here, but I might have missed it.

Set up an overseas Email account.

Send yourself Emails from hotmail/gmail, etc...

In the email place, first of all, plenty of key words such as "Jihad", Bomb, 
meeting, Al Qaeda, etc...

In the email have a link to a website you set up with a counter and that you 
have told no one about (I'll add that you should have a nice big GOATSE 
picture in there).

Send yourself emails periodically and keep track of your counter. Any 
incremements not caused by you were caused by someone else.

-TD




From dave at farber.net  Fri Dec 30 12:52:57 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 15:52:57 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on AP Story Justice Dept. Probing Domestic Spying Leak
Message-ID: <mailman.1502.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


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Subject: Arranging your supplements at home- what a splendid idea.
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From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 30 09:04:09 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 18:04:09 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Summarized -- WashPost: Bush's Massive
  and Secret CIA "GST" Program]
Message-ID: <20051230170409.GF2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 30 09:16:28 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 18:16:28 +0100
Subject: [udhay@pobox.com: [silk] Delocalizer]
Message-ID: <20051230171628.GH2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Udhay Shankar N <udhay at pobox.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 30 09:18:50 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 18:18:50 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] ACLU ON NSA Spying on Americans]
Message-ID: <20051230171849.GJ2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From Nostra2004 at Safe-mail.net  Fri Dec 30 15:32:40 2005
From: Nostra2004 at Safe-mail.net (Nostra2004 at Safe-mail.net)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 18:32:40 -0500
Subject: Detect Spying on YOU
Message-ID: <N1-dHmbBXIEKS@Safe-mail.net>

For the NSA to find out about the contents of an URL they dont click the links, they start drawing a profile. Then they monitor the participants connections. They might fingerprint the webserver, even hack it, but most times they will sit on a router and wait for that data being called by someone else. If it isnt, then its of no means for them anyway.

N.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 30 16:23:58 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 19:23:58 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Why Airport Screeners Sometimes Don't Spot Guns,
  Knives,  	Scissors
Message-ID: <p06230940bfdb8013c628@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 19:22:19 -0500
 To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] Why Airport Screeners Sometimes Don't Spot Guns, Knives,
 	Scissors
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

 <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/science_journal.html?mod=djemtct>

 The Wall Street Journal

 December 30, 2005


 SCIENCE JOURNAL

 By SHARON BEGLEY


 Why Airport Screeners Sometimes
 Don't Spot Guns, Knives, Scissors
 December 30, 2005

 It seemed like good news on the antiterrorism front. Using a system called
 Threat Image Projection, British authorities digitally inserted one of 250
 images of guns or other banned objects into X-ray images of bags passing
 through screening at a U.K. airport.

 At first the screeners' performance was mediocre (authorities will not
 release results, citing security concerns), but over several months it
 improved markedly. Then the testers changed their image library. Although
 the new images belonged to the same categories of forbidden items, the
 screeners' performance dropped off a cliff, to no better than it was when
 the TIP program began.

 The screeners had become eagle-eyed at recognizing the 250 images that kept
 popping up, but were apparently unable to generalize to images of a gun
 with a different grip or a knife in a different orientation.

 As experts in "visual search" study explanations for the screeners'
 blindness, they are discovering that there are more ways to miss targets
 than they ever imagined ... or feared.

 Scientists have long known that the ability to pick out a target in a
 complex scene suffers when there are loads of things you're not looking
 for. That may be why screeners at Newark Liberty airport missed a butcher
 knife in a cluttered handbag this year. In all the visual chaos and
 "distractors," they missed the knife.

 Another well-known security blind spot is trying to identify an item
 surrounded by distractors that are similar to it, as when trying to find a
 particular pair of pumps in a stuffed shoe closet. This "target-distractor
 similarity" will be exacerbated, experts say, by the Transportation
 Security Administration's decision to allow small scissors, knives and
 other tools in carry-ons, as of last week.

 But it is the problem highlighted by the U.K. test, of being unable to
 recognize variations on dangerous themes, that has security experts most
 worried. Called "target-target dissimilarity," it's familiar to anyone who
 has looked for a beer in the refrigerator. The suds may be front and
 center, but if the bottle looks different from the one in your mind's eye,
 it may as well be invisible.

 In studies funded in part by the TSA, cognitive scientist J. David Smith of
 the State University of New York, Buffalo, and colleagues trained scores of
 volunteers to learn a number of origami-like targets, the original shape as
 well as rotated or slightly distorted versions. The volunteers saw one
 shape at a time, on a computer screen, and determined whether it belonged
 to a target category. They made the right call as much as 76% of the time.
 Since the bird-like shapes were arguably more complex than, say, a knife,
 that wasn't bad.

 The scientists then embedded target shapes in cluttered scenes, where items
 overlapped, touched and took different orientations. The volunteers got
 better and better at finding the targets, as real screeners do. But as soon
 as they had to spot a target that was slightly different from the one they
 had learned, performance plummeted. The volunteers spotted only targets
 they had seen repeatedly, not variations of them. It was as if someone
 learned what dogs are by studying dachshunds and poodles, and then didn't
 recognize a spaniel as a dog.

 "Screeners have trouble applying their knowledge of what some guns and
 knives look like to identify other members of that category," says Prof.
 Smith. "They instead rely on what we call a specific-token strategy,
 remembering Bowie knives and Beretta guns and other images they've been
 trained on, but not in a way that lets them generalize to guns and knives
 they've never seen."

 Terrorists obviously aren't limited to weapons that screeners are trained
 and tested on. As Prof. Smith and his colleagues write in the current issue
 of the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition,
 "It is a serious matter."

 Just to be sure there wasn't something especially difficult about the
 origami-like shapes, the scientists had 88 participants try to spot actual
 knives, scissors and guns in X-ray images of cluttered suitcases. Again,
 there was a steep learning curve as specific targets repeated, with people
 eventually spotting 90% of the contraband. But as soon as slightly
 different guns, knives and scissors were digitally inserted into the image,
 scores fell. Unable to see family resemblances, people missed three times
 as many novel items as familiar ones.

 Oddly, people did hardly better when they had to find one target category
 rather than three. That suggests that reducing the number of forbidden
 carry-ons won't make screeners catch more of them. "I was surprised that
 performance wasn't better with fewer targets," Prof. Smith says. "There's
 little reason to think that decreasing the number of items screeners have
 to spot will improve the quality of the search."

 The TSA has reportedly upped the number of images in its training library
 to more than 1,000. That may help, but what's really needed is a way to
 train the brain to broaden its search criteria so that it can spot any
 knife or gun after being trained on hundreds of specific knives or guns.

 So far, no one knows how to do that.


 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
 _______________________________________________
 Clips mailing list
 Clips at philodox.com
 http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From jya at cryptome.net  Fri Dec 30 19:55:59 2005
From: jya at cryptome.net (John Young)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 19:55:59 -0800
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on AP Story Justice Dept.  
  Probing  Domestic Spying Leak]
In-Reply-To: <20051230223205.GT2235@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <E1EsV9V-00068N-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>

Keep in mind that NSA has always gathered data on US citizens in the
course of performing foreign intelligence but was heretofore supposed 
to filter rather than use it. What is different in the present case is that a 
decision was made to use the data, both newly gathered and likely that
which was stored unfilered for future mining.

What could come out of a DoJ probe is exactly who implemented that
decision and whether they were given exculpation, and if so, how was
that done and by whom. Did senior NSA officials get exculpation and
if so what precisely was it and did it differ from what those lower down
were given.

Further, members of the military performing NSA duites are given 
different exculpation than the civilians due to differing employment
and service regulations. A large percentage of interception operatives
are civilians, some former service members but far from all.

US civilian intelligence members -- State, FBI, DEA, and several 
other departments with intelligence duties -- are also involved in 
processing intercepted data and preparing it for distribution to 
NSA customers.

And there are foreign military members working at NSA as well as 
civilians -- and those are not only from UK, CA, AU and NZ but from
NATO and other treaty country participants. 

These foreign operatives are given instructions both by their own 
superiors and also by those from the US on how to handle intercepts 
of citizens from the countries who provide NSA operatives as well
as data gathered on US citizens.

There have been incidents reported of these foreign operatives
performing or processing intercepts forbidden to the US while sitting 

adjacent to the US operatives, with consequent disclosure. This
goes beyond the well-known US-UK backscratching.

Beyond orders to gather information on US citizens there is the
question of what was done to mine long-stored raw data which
has presumably been filtered. Recall NSA policy to never discard
any encrypted material gathered, none, forever. It is likely there
is voluminous material on US citizens stored and ready for
reassessment as needs be.

There have been numerous revelations of other countries storing
such data for decades, an example are the decades-long Stasi files 
obtained by the CIA from East Germany which the agency will still not
release. All countries with intelligence capabilities have such files.
And few are required to release them, such as the UK and US sometimes
do for a small number.

The US is surely not alone in amassing huge new files as a result of
the terrorism intiative, for every time there is a war there is a surge
in spying across the board, at home and overseas. 

9/11 was a godsend to the spying industry which was slowly withering 
with the winddown of the artificially-prolonged Cold War. To be sure
it has been immensely beneficial to the media industry, and a slew
of other boats lifted by the desire for more information, the dirtier
the better.

Nice to see ACLU put its Echelon Watch files back up. A while back 
we went looking for Echelon Watch files at ACLU and found a bunch 
of them through Google still on the ACLU website, but nary a link on 
the main pages.

Perhaps EPIC and others will also have a change of mind about 
Echelon after withdrawing material post-9/11.

The there's Bamford's admission that after being invited to NSA for
royal treatment and a classified briefing, he found the agency not
so monstrous. What he was briefed on cannot be revealed, apparently,
only that the place is honorably operated.

When David Kahn was doing research at NSA, he claims he refused 
to be suckered and tainted by being given access to classified material.

Big deceptions are often hidden by small ones delivered as exposes,
and those given access to secrets are customarily obliged to tell
only a sanitized version glossed with trust me the ex-trustworthy
investigator.




From aasyceajxc at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 30 15:30:46 2005
From: aasyceajxc at hotmail.com (Perry Downing)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 22:30:46 -0100
Subject: Doctors Use This Too fN
Message-ID: <68XK87FE.0W24.aasyceajxc@hotmail.com>



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ST6n0




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 30 14:18:02 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 23:18:02 +0100
Subject: Detect Spying on YOU
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F1761730CEF1E8015FECA3A9B280@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY103-F1761730CEF1E8015FECA3A9B280@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20051230221802.GM2235@leitl.org>

On Fri, Dec 30, 2005 at 01:32:59PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:

> In the email have a link to a website you set up with a counter and that
> you have told no one about (I'll add that you should have a nice big GOATSE

Let me get you straight, you're proposing a modus operandi by which
suspect rich content gets rendered outside of a sandbox by TLAs.
Oooh, boy.

To begin with, filters aggregate content without executing it.
If it goes over threshold to require investigator eyeball time
or gets pulled up retroactively each link will be individually
scrutinized. Investigators will have SOPs to follow, and one
of whose will be the equivalent "don't access hypertext links
in suspect material until you've verified they're safe".
In most cases, there's no way to tell the links are safe a priori,
so they will never be accessed. Violations will be persecuted
by beheading.

I realize that Dave Farber's IP list and boingboing will regurgitate
drivel mindlessly, but I do expect participants on this list to do
a bit better.

Please do not taunt the happy-fun ball.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 30 14:32:08 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 23:32:08 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on AP Story Justice Dept. Probing
  Domestic Spying Leak]
Message-ID: <20051230223205.GT2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From sethf at sethf.com  Sat Dec 31 02:41:57 2005
From: sethf at sethf.com (Seth Finkelstein)
Date: December 31, 2005 2:41:57 PM EST
Subject: "Cool Tools for Tyrants"
Message-ID: <mailman.1503.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

http://legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/
feature_bambauer_janfeb06.msp

Cool Tools for Tyrants

The latest American technology helps the Chinese government and other
repressive regimes clamp down.

By Derek Bambauer

"... Curbing market freedom to protect human rights inevitably limits
profits, an unappealing prospect in the best of circumstances. With
this no doubt in mind, companies argue that merely doing business with
repressive nations helps open the nations to democracy, free trade,
and human rights. Cisco CEO John Chambers said recently, "Anytime
you've got a good exchange of information, citizens benefit as a
whole." And Microsoft has argued that a censored Internet is better
than no Internet: Although the company's Chinese MSN Spaces web-log
software prevents users from writing words like "democracy" and "human
rights" in the titles to their postings, it encourages a central value
of democracy by promoting self-expression.

But there is little evidence to support these views. Despite China's
five million bloggers, the Communist Party remains firmly in control
of the nation and, for the most part, the Internet within its
borders. Iran's blogging community is perhaps the country's liveliest
political arena, yet the authoritarian Iranian government is stronger
than ever, especially after a resounding victory in February 2004
elections. Contrary to the utopian view that the Internet evades local
control, governments are proving adept at controlling the information
that their citizens receive and share. Market freedom does not
necessarily lead to personal freedom. We must at times limit the first
to safeguard the second; the right to sell must sometimes yield to
protect the right to speak."

--
Seth Finkelstein  Consulting Programmer  http://sethf.com
Infothought blog - http://sethf.com/infothought/blog/
Interview: http://sethf.com/essays/major/greplaw-interview.php


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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From EEkid at aol.com  Sat Dec 31 02:57:02 2005
From: EEkid at aol.com (EEkid at aol.com)
Date: December 31, 2005 2:57:02 PM EST
Subject: Pupils Being Given 'Patriotism' Tests in Washington State
Message-ID: <mailman.1504.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Schools



Click the link at the bottom of the page to see a copy of the
questionnaire.



Pupils Being Given 'Patriotism' Tests in Washington State Schools

Children in Washington State are being given 'Patriotism tests' which
are completely unrelated to their studies. The paper gauges whether
or not the student shows fealty to the power of the state and whether
the student believes in the right to overthrow a corrupt government.

A reader from Washington State writes us to highlight a questionnaire
paper handed out to her daughter and the rest of her 10th grade class.

The reader comments,

"We live in Washington state. My daughter is in 10th grade and found
this to be interesting. She has a GPA of 3.75 and uses her brain.
This was given in her English class, and has nothing to do with the
materials they were studying. We thought you might be able to use
this. They are grooming our kids. Keep up the great work. Christine."

The paper is shown below. Click for an enlargement.

Considering the fact that this paper is a complete one off in that it
is not part of any standard curriculum, we must question the
motivations behind it.

Is the paper a means of gauging the level of obedience to the state
amongst American teenagers?

We have covered several examples before where the government
identifies a target group in society and canvasses their views on the
nature of power and when that power goes too far. For example, in the
90's, American marines and national guard were occasionally asked if
they would be willing to fire on American citizens in a time of crisis.

We are by no means against patriotism when it means love of country.
Unfortunately however, the new brand of so-called patriotism
translates as worship of government, and that definition is something
that the founding fathers never intended.

This may be an isolated case but if we receive anything similar then
watch this space for any updates.

http://prisonplanet.com/articles/december2005/301205patriotismtests.htm

-------------------------------------
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--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From sheldonf2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Dec 31 03:43:30 2005
From: sheldonf2000 at yahoo.com (sheldonf2000 at yahoo.com)
Date: December 31, 2005 3:43:30 PM EST
Subject: Nuclear Terrorism
Message-ID: <mailman.1505.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Terrorism Book and Al-Qaeda: Nuclear Terrorism Plot in
'King of Bombs' Suggests Next 9/11 Will Kill Millions



(PRWEB) -- The author of "King of Bombs," a novel
about a future Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on the United
States involving nuclear weapons, believes a future
9/11 may claim millions of American lives. Sheldon
Filger, a former New Yorker who witnessed the Al-Qaeda
attacks of September 11, 2001, wrote "King of Bombs"
as a warning of what he is convinced is the imminent
threat of nuclear terrorism (www.kingofbombs.com).

"King of Bombs" has been praised by reviewers on
Amazon.com for its realistic and terrifying portrayal
of the danger of nuclear terrorism posed by radical
Islamist terrorist organizations linked to Al-Qaeda.
The plot in "King of Bombs" centers on a conspiracy to
inflict a devastating terrorist strike on major
American cities involving Al-Qaeda, with covert
assistance from Iran and North Korea. As Mr. Filger
points out, Iran's possible role in future nuclear
terrorism cannot be dismissed as merely a novelist's
speculation. "Iran has been involved in a covert
nuclear program for the past 20 years, arousing great
suspicion from the international community and the
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency-the nuclear
watchdog organization of the United Nations which
received the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize)," Filger said. He
added that since publication of "King of Bombs," the
new Iranian President has called for the destruction
of the United States of America and Israel, and has
publically expressed his hatred for Western
civilization (www.kingofbombs.com).

In August 2005, the number two man in the Al-Qaeda
organization, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released a statement,
warning the American people that, " What you saw in
New York and Washington [on September 11th, 2001] and
what you are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq, all these
are nothing compared to what you will see next." The
author of "King of Bombs" suggests that Osama bin
Laden's deputy may be referring to a future terrorist
attack on the United States involving weapons of mass
destruction, most likely nuclear weapons.
"Unfortunately, since 9/11, the Bush administration
has done little to reduce the danger of nuclear
terrorism, " Sheldon Filger said. He made reference to
a recent "report card" issued by the 9/11 Commission,
an independent body that investigated failures by the
government, intelligence and law enforcement
communities to prevent the Al-Qaeda attacks on 9/11.

According to the report issued by the 9/11 Commission,
in many key areas the government received a failing
grade, including those related to the threat of
nuclear terrorism. The Commission pointed out that
critical programs designed to reduce the chance that
Al-Qaeda could obtain stolen plutonium or highly
enriched uranium (the essential ingredients for
building a nuclear weapon)are woefully underfunded,
and low on the priority list of the Bush
administration and Congress. The author of "King of
Bombs" stated that, "The 9/11 Commission warned in its
original report that Al-Qaeda was doing everything in
its power to obtain nuclear weapons, and that the
danger of nuclear terrorism is the number one national
security threat to the United States. Their recent
report card sadly demonstrates that Washington remains
oblivious to the criticality of the threat."

A major theme in "King of Bombs" is how failure by
government leadership to understand the severity of
the threat of nuclear terrorism can have consequences
beyond the worst nightmares of most Americans. "I hope
that 'King of Bombs' remains fiction," Filger
said,"however, the passivity of political leadership
on the threat of nuclear terrorism does not create
grounds for optimism," he warned. According to Mr.
Filger, a single crude nuclear device, which experts
conclude Al-Qaeda has the capability to fabricate if
it obtains fissile materials (highly enriched uranium
or plutonium), if detonated in mid-town Manhattan,
would probably kill one million New Yorkers.

In "King of Bombs," Sheldon Filger presents a
worst-case scenario for nuclear terrorism, involving
thermonuclear weapons, which are far more destructive
than crude atomic bombs of the type that destroyed
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In his novel, potentially tens
of millions of lives are in jeapardy if the terrorists
are successful.
(www.kingofbombs.com)





__________________________________________
Yahoo! DSL - Something to write home about.
Just $16.99/mo. or less.
dsl.yahoo.com




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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rca53 at columbia.edu  Sat Dec 31 05:06:33 2005
From: rca53 at columbia.edu (Atkinson, Robert)
Date: December 31, 2005 5:06:33 PM EST
Subject: [IP] Nuclear Terrorism
Message-ID: <mailman.1506.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Dave:

Happy New Year???? I was hoping to have a pleasant time in Manhattan
this New Year's eve trying not to remember that I live in a bulls-eye.
Oh well.

I do hope that you (and all the Interesting People) have a healthy,
happy and relaxing New Year.

Bob

-----Original Message-----
From: David Farber [mailto:dave at farber.net]
Sent: Saturday, December 31, 2005 4:23 PM
To: ip at v2.listbox.com
Subject: [IP] Nuclear Terrorism



Begin forwarded message:


From zjnzbtbxtnokf at msn.com  Sat Dec 31 08:28:16 2005
From: zjnzbtbxtnokf at msn.com (Robin Underwood)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 12:28:16 -0400
Subject: The Best Super Vaigra qly
Message-ID: <68SX87FE.0O24.zjnzbtbxtnokf@msn.com>



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From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sat Dec 31 10:43:19 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 13:43:19 -0500
Subject: Detect Spying on YOU
In-Reply-To: <20051230221802.GM2235@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F311D194AD8CCB3BEFCF74E9B2B0@phx.gbl>

OK OK I acknowledge this was cheesy. Thought it was worth a mention, if for 
no other reason then to kick the crap out of it.

BUT, true to my "Local Authorities" rant these days, it MIGHT snag a local 
MwG in your area, if not NSA. (My assumption continues to be that NSA and 
that echelon of extra spooky spooks doesnt share info with local 
authorities.) And frankly, unless youre actually WOMD-type dangerous, the 
state police or whatever are going to be what you have to worry about, if 
you are the identifiable Cordian type.

-TD




>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: Re: Detect Spying on YOU
>Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 23:18:02 +0100
>
>On Fri, Dec 30, 2005 at 01:32:59PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
> > In the email have a link to a website you set up with a counter and that
> > you have told no one about (I'll add that you should have a nice big 
>GOATSE
>
>Let me get you straight, you're proposing a modus operandi by which
>suspect rich content gets rendered outside of a sandbox by TLAs.
>Oooh, boy.
>
>To begin with, filters aggregate content without executing it.
>If it goes over threshold to require investigator eyeball time
>or gets pulled up retroactively each link will be individually
>scrutinized. Investigators will have SOPs to follow, and one
>of whose will be the equivalent "don't access hypertext links
>in suspect material until you've verified they're safe".
>In most cases, there's no way to tell the links are safe a priori,
>so they will never be accessed. Violations will be persecuted
>by beheading.
>
>I realize that Dave Farber's IP list and boingboing will regurgitate
>drivel mindlessly, but I do expect participants on this list to do
>a bit better.
>
>Please do not taunt the happy-fun ball.
>
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which 
>had a name of signature.asc]




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sat Dec 31 11:00:21 2005
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 14:00:21 -0500
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on AP Story Justice Dept.
  Probing Domestic Spyin
In-Reply-To: <E1EsV9V-00068N-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F426E39267B11EF9300EE89B2B0@phx.gbl>

John Young wrote...

>Beyond orders to gather information on US citizens there is the
>question of what was done to mine long-stored raw data which
>has presumably been filtered. Recall NSA policy to never discard
>any encrypted material gathered, none, forever. It is likely there
>is voluminous material on US citizens stored and ready for
>reassessment as needs be.
>
>There have been numerous revelations of other countries storing
>such data for decades,

Seems to me there should be a nice workaround for this, crypto-wise. Again, 
sorry if this is well-known. No time to keep up these days.

BUT, encrypted messages should have something like an expiring one-off time 
stamp. It could work like this:

Message is encrypted and broken into 2 or more pieces. Neither piece is 
sufficient to reconstruct the message. Piece one is sent as the "message" 
(or maybe the message is merely a pointer to the various encrypted pieces). 
Message 2 is stored somewhere in a Tor-based repository (ie, the actual 
address is unknown). The key includes encrypted instructions on where to 
obtain the other half as well as deencrypting the message.

If the message is not de-encrypted with X days, the stored piece(s) is\are 
destroyed.

Of course, NSA will likely grab&store the hidden piece as well, but I submit 
one might be able to make this a fairly intractable problem, particularly if 
information about -where- the appropriate piece is stored is itself 
destroyed. (ie, they may have the piece, but they dont know which message it 
belongs).

-TD




From contrary at fastmail.fm  Sat Dec 31 12:26:06 2005
From: contrary at fastmail.fm (contrary)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 15:26:06 -0500
Subject: Subscribe
Message-ID: <1136060766.14223.250843515@webmail.messagingengine.com>

subscribe
-- 
  contrary
  contrary at fastmail.fm




From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec 31 13:05:43 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 16:05:43 -0500
Subject: [IP] "Cool Tools for Tyrants"
Message-ID: <mailman.1507.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec 31 14:39:24 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 17:39:24 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on   Nuclear Terrorism
Message-ID: <mailman.1508.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From coderman at gmail.com  Sat Dec 31 17:44:32 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 17:44:32 -0800
Subject: Detect Spying on YOU
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F311D194AD8CCB3BEFCF74E9B2B0@phx.gbl>
References: <20051230221802.GM2235@leitl.org> 	
  <BAY103-F311D194AD8CCB3BEFCF74E9B2B0@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512311744r7fed5ab8qc70d364b560e98d6@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/31/05, Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> BUT, true to my "Local Authorities" rant these days, it MIGHT snag a local
> MwG in your area, if not NSA. (My assumption continues to be that NSA and
> that echelon of extra spooky spooks doesnt share info with local
> authorities.)

i could see some county sheriff's office doing something stupid like
that with seized evidence perhaps. ("ooh! here's a bookmark labeled
'sekrit stuff', let's check it out!")

but the NSA and any other intelligence agency worth half a shit is
going to have clue.


> And frankly, unless youre actually WOMD-type dangerous, the
> state police or whatever are going to be what you have to worry about, if
> you are the identifiable Cordian type.

early this year i was collecting information on telecommunications and
electrical power distribution infrastructure to see how detailed a map
publicly available sources could provide to such facilities and the
trends/assessments possible when combining data sets for pattern
analysis.

i had a number of custom search tools, bots, and databases built up
internally that pulled large amounts of GIS data, LERG, industry
investments/research, maps, press releases, product catalogues, web
searches, cached documents, etc. (court documents pertaining to
telecom and power industries are full of informative details,
especially when the redaction performed in PDF for confidentiality is
only visibly obscuring text [white on white] while keeping content in
place :)

after about 6 weeks and many 100*GBytes of traffic i noticed a
peculiar echo on my line begin abruptly one day.  i'm off an old
analog switch ESS style in rural oregon and this echo/line noise was
associated with my number only (not others off same CO).

i suspected this was a one way conference / tap, which is completely
undetectable for digital systems but alters the line characteristics
of an analog switched circuit.

this was the only hint ever given that i might be under scrutiny. 
given the nature of my internet usage and the *.gov sites used (among
others) it would have been clear to anyone watching what i was up to. 
the data mining programs 'rumored' to be in use by the various
government agencies would be able to detect this type of activity
easily, so i suspect this was visible to somebody.

even still, the only clue, if it is one, was the analog conference on
my line, and this was noticeable only because i'm still hanging off
antiquated analog equipment that is rarely in use today.

while i think honey tokens are an interesting approach to independent
evaluation of intelligence / surveillance process and capability, it
would be incredibly difficult to get any information out of such a
project.  NSA and others are very skilled at the one way function of
information: a lot goes in, very very little ever comes back out, and
even then it is tightly constrained.  (i would guess no other agency
the world over has "least privilege" mastered so thoroughly)

an interesting subject for discussion perhaps, but not really useful
in the real world (tm)...




From dave at farber.net  Sat Dec 31 14:59:18 2005
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 17:59:18 -0500
Subject: [IP] Pupils Being Given 'Patriotism' Tests in Washington State
Message-ID: <mailman.1509.1575948449.62801.testlist@lists.cpunks.org>

Schools
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
Reply-To: dave at farber.net



Begin forwarded message:


From coderman at gmail.com  Sat Dec 31 18:32:33 2005
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 18:32:33 -0800
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on AP Story Justice Dept.
  Probing Domestic Spyin
In-Reply-To: <BAY103-F426E39267B11EF9300EE89B2B0@phx.gbl>
References: <E1EsV9V-00068N-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net> 	
  <BAY103-F426E39267B11EF9300EE89B2B0@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60512311832r245dc2f7y2cd5261b73363dcf@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/31/05, Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> Of course, NSA will likely grab&store the hidden piece as well

i would count on it, as it's a good bet the answer is yes rather than no.


> but I submit
> one might be able to make this a fairly intractable problem, particularly if
> information about -where- the appropriate piece is stored is itself
> destroyed. (ie, they may have the piece, but they dont know which message it
> belongs).

i'm working on a one time pad based IPsec key daemon with a similar
purpose to what you describe.  i'll be posting here for feedback when
it's ready but the basic premise is that it provides strong ephemeral
IPsec keying using one time pads previously exchanged between peers. 
as long as the pads are generated and secured properly[1] you don't
need to care if $TLA has kept your IPsec traffic archives in their
acres of computing machinery.

likewise, if large qubit quantum computers suddenly become feasible or
multi ring GCF gets really fast, you don't need to worry about past
key exchanges (also archived) being compromised, as with pub key based
ISAKMP implementations.

last, such a mode needs no open ports[2], so the attack surface for
remote exploitation is limited to the IP level - only authenticated
traffic is passed up the stack, everything else is dropped.

as long as your OTP's are truly random and never compromised, the key
exchange will be secure and the only way to attack your traffic
remotely will be brute force of AES256.

[1]. securing pads is really the crux of the issue here.  i'm using
modified linux distributions for key generation (a host with no
networking capability - kernel omits all network functionality) and
IPsec termination (boot from CD/DVD, require USB fob / hardware token
+ passphrase for auth to access pads stored in encrypted volume).

[2]. this is true with an explanation: for the initial session ICMP
payloads are sent in the clear (not IPsec) to perform the encrypted
key exchange using OTP's.  once IPsec is initialized, ICMP is also
directed through IPsec via the SPD and future rekeying uses OTP's on
top of the existing IPsec SA.  i'll have more details later but in
short all traffic is authenticated or dropped, most of it
authenticated via IPsec, and the only exception being key exchange via
ICMP which is authenticated via OTP only until the first SA is
established.

the advantage of using OTP's in addition to security is simplicity:
all buffers are fixed size, key material is small (per instance) and
the operations fast (no montgomery multiplication on very large
numbers).  even at a 1Hz rekey interval you could fit a years worth of
key exchange OTP in 100MBytes of storage.

the disadvantage is you probably need hardware entropy generation to
produce the pads in a reasonable time.  i'm using the VIA C5XL and C5P
processors for testing / runtime and these can produce more than
enough entropy for large pads without sucking /dev/random dry.

last but not least, the implicit out of band pad exchange with trusted
peers is reasonable for private group networking and other smaller
networks but would be very difficult to scale to a large organization.
 this is a feature in my eyes, as private group networks are what this
is intended for and meatspace pad exchange a desired requirement to
ensure trust is properly placed.




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 31 19:28:45 2005
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2005 22:28:45 -0500
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on AP Story Justice Dept.   
  Probing Domestic Spyin
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60512311832r245dc2f7y2cd5261b73363dcf@mail.gmail.com>
References: <E1EsV9V-00068N-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net> 	  
  <BAY103-F426E39267B11EF9300EE89B2B0@phx.gbl> 
  <4ef5fec60512311832r245dc2f7y2cd5261b73363dcf@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <p0623098bbfdcfcda06cb@[68.167.57.91]>

At 6:32 PM -0800 12/31/05, coderman wrote:
> a one time pad based IPsec key daemon

There ya go.

Time for some *real* cryptography, dammit!

;-)

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 31 15:19:49 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2006 00:19:49 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Pupils Being Given 'Patriotism' Tests in
  Washington State Schools]
Message-ID: <20051231231949.GT2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 31 15:21:35 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2006 00:21:35 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on   Nuclear Terrorism]
Message-ID: <20051231232135.GV2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 31 15:28:42 2005
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2006 00:28:42 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] "Cool Tools for Tyrants"]
Message-ID: <20051231232842.GW2235@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From qwmvvex at prodigy.net  Sat Dec 31 22:57:09 2005
From: qwmvvex at prodigy.net (Milo Cross)
Date: Sun, 01 Jan 2006 04:57:09 -0200
Subject: OEMSOFT your Language institution
Message-ID: <085471h0oz30$5t6r4051$29x6dcsw@penissexyconfederacyjp02>

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