Remailer Phases

[Joseph Ashwood]

----- Original Message -----
From: "Meyer Wolfsheim" <wolf at priori.net>
To: <cypherpunks at einstein.ssz.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2001 5:40 AM
Subject: Re: CDR: Re: re: Remailer Phases


> On Tue, 7 Aug 2001, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
>
> > > >   2. Operator probably trustworthy
> > >
> > > Impossible, and unnecessary. Don't assume any remops are trustworthy.
> >
> > Actually it is absolutely necessary. If all operators are willing to
> > collude, then your precious anonymity is completely lost. A simple
> > tracing methodology can establish this. The first remailer operator
> > tracks the
> > exact outgoing message to the next collusion, the second tracks to the
> > third, etc until the message escapes, then the colluding operators track
> > back through
> > the list of remailers, linking based on the intermediate value being
> > sent,
> > until it reaches operator 1 who knows the sending address. This assumes
> > a best case of the sender determining the path taken through encryption.
> > Worst case the first operator can reveal the information to everyone.
> >                         Joe
>
> Run your own remailer. Chain through it at some point. As long as you
> trust yourself, there is no threat.
>
> Who of the current remops do you trust? Why?

I don't trust any of them. I don't personally use remailers, I don't tend to
do things that are illegal, but if I did there are other methods that I'd
use.
                    Joe