[ogsa-wg] [ogsa-authn-bof] Authentication in OGSA
Blair Dillaway
blaird at microsoft.com
Mon Jan 22 11:46:52 CST 2007
Hi All,
In helping to draft the HPC Basic Profile security specification under
consideration, I did review the latest drafts of the OGSA-BSP-Secure
Channel specification. The HPC security proposal is compatible with the
recommendations in that document as cited in the text, though it allows
for some additional functionality. This was deemed necessary, after
discussion with the HPC Profile WG chairpersons, to adequately support
interoperability between existing products.
Specific differences include:
- Mutual authN based on X.509 certificates is not required, as a
client username/password option is provided
- TLS 1.0 is not mandatory when establishing an HTTP-based
connection. SSL3.0 and TLS 1.1 are also allowed
The mandatory and optional TLS/SSL cipher suites and guidance in
OGS-BSP-SC are adopted.
I hope that background helps facilitate discussion of the proposal. It
is certainly worth discussing whether we can bring these two documents
into even tighter alignment while still fully meeting the needs each was
intended to address.
Regards,
Blair Dillaway
-----Original Message-----
From: ogsa-authn-bof-bounces at ogf.org
[mailto:ogsa-authn-bof-bounces at ogf.org] On Behalf Of Hiro Kishimoto
Sent: Monday, January 22, 2007 1:33 AM
To: Alan Sill; Andrew Grimshaw; Marty Humphrey
Cc: OGSA Authentication WG BoF; security-area at ogf.org;
ogsa-wg at gridforum.org
Subject: Re: [ogsa-authn-bof] [ogsa-wg] Authentication in OGSA
Hi Alan, Andrew, and Marty,
OGSA Security Profile - secure channel is certificate base and I think
HPCP WG can utilize (and maybe extents) it for your interoperability
purpose.
If you can make this Thursday call, we will allocate some time for
this discussion. If Thursday does not for you, please come to OGSA
security session (Mon 29 Jan, 2pm) at OGF19 for farther discussion.
Thanks,
----
Hiro Kishimoto
Alan Sill wrote:
> Hi Andrew and the OGSA-WG,
>
> I apologize for missing the meeting last Thursday on this topic. We
> have a machine full of new cluster and grid equipment, and I have been
> fully occupied commissioning and configuring it.
>
> I am afraid that I differ rather strongly with the direction being
taken
> with regard to the HPC profile at this stage. My view is strongly
that
> simple username/password login, even SSL secured, is quite
demonstrably
> insufficiently secure to deploy as a model for authentication and
access
> to high performance computing. I disagree fairly strongly that any
sort
> of stop-gap of this nature should be written into the HPC profile,
> distributed or promoted at this time.
>
> I have an excuse for having taken so long to reply on this topic. It
> was necessary for me to investigate as thoroughly as possible the
> current state of deployment of GSI-secured alternatives to
> username/password login and to do so in a way that would allow me to
> give a credible response to all of you regarding the state of the art
on
> this topic.
>
> At this point I am assured and feel sufficiently confident to proceed,
> either at OGF-19 or before, with Andrew, Marty, and whoever else would
> like to participate on a revision of the HPC profile that would cover
> more secure basic access to high performance cluster and storage
systems
> based on GSIOpenSSH and similar software that uses either GT4 or an
> equivalent callout. We are writing standards, not implementations,
but
> I wished to be sure that the state of the art on existing
> implementations would be consistent with making this recommendation.
>
> It is essential from my point of view to promote secure access to HPC
> resources. As the bulk of the compromise attacks that have been
> successful over the past 2 to 3 years on HPC resources has been
through
> discovery and reuse of username/password combinations from ordinary
> users (at least as I read the recent record), I think that now is not
> the right time to propose backing off from the use of strong
> cryptographic methods to use HPC resources in grid settings. The use
of
> strong cryptography does not have to be limited to X.509 "pure
classic"
> PKI, and I look forward to an active discussion on federated identity
> and related topics to be held at the OGF meeting next week. It is
clear
> to me that recent improvements to the availability and technology for
> authentication, authorization and attribute transmission will make
many
> modes of access to grid resources possible with appropriate security
> that up to now have been either impossible or confined to limited
> implementation.
>
> For the moment, I would like to suggest that a revision of the HPC
> profile propose that "only GSI or equivalently secure architectures be
> used for direct access to HPC resources" and that the document be
> revised specifically to discourage the direct access by users to
highly
> capable computational and to secure storage resources by
> username/password mechanisms. In my own project, we use GSI-OpenSSH
via
> grid-mapfiles. I have been able to confirm that current
implementations
> of GSI-OpenSSH are capable of interoperating with more general
> callout-based systems, including attribute-based AuthZ systems,
without
> modification. Therefore it is not necessary for users to have
> username/password access if direct login is needed on an HPC system.
>
> As a further enhancement to the document and to the profile, I feel it
> would be useful to describe architectures for pure-computational
(i.e.,
> batch-only access), for pure-login (i.e., front-end and submission
> access), pure-storage (i.e., stage-in/stage-out and related data
> handling) and for the interesting use case of "managed fork" (i.e.,
> interactive but sand-boxed grid access) systems. I believe these
> changes would result in an improved HPC profile that would be of
better
> total usability within the HPC community. This document is NOT
> attached, instead your original one is for discussion, but I believe
can
> be worked out in the context of discussions to be held at OGF-19 next
week.
>
> Sorry for being (apparently but not really) strident, but I believe
the
> above reflects current best practices better than recommending
> username/password support for direct login to HPC systems. I would
not
> personally be able to support the current draft as written.
>
> Thanks and best wishes,
> Alan
>
> On Jan 18, 2007, at 2:16 PM, Andrew Grimshaw wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> On this mornings call I volunteered to see what was up with the HPC
>> profile working group with respect to authentication. Recall that we
>> need some sort of authentication story in the short run or we cannot
>> put together any form or realistic, cross-organizational, compute
>> grids with BES, or for that matter data grids using RNS/ByteIO.
>>
>>
>>
>> Attached is a short white paper from the HPC Profile WG (or maybe
just
>> the three authors). It is BES-specific, but I think the ideas may be
>> generalized to a broader set of OGSA services. I think we should
>> consider it, or something like it.
>>
>>
>>
>> Note that it does NOT deal with the ultimate authentication and
>> delegation problem that we will face. Rather, I personally (speaking
>> only for myself, and not even the people in my research group) think
>> that this sort of solution is a stop gap that we can use for awhile,
>> and that we will ultimately deprecate in favor of whatever comes out
>> of the OGSA-Authentication WG.
>>
>>
>>
>> So, for your reading pleasure - and with my thanks to Marty for
giving
>> me a copy.
>>
>>
>>
>> A
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Andrew Grimshaw
>>
>> Professor of Computer Science
>>
>> University of Virginia
>>
>> 434-982-2204
>>
>> grimshaw at cs.virginia.edu
>>
>> --
>>
>> ogsa-wg mailing list
>> ogsa-wg at ogf.org
>> http://www.ogf.org/mailman/listinfo/ogsa-wg
>
>
>
>
> Alan Sill, Ph.D
> TIGRE Senior Scientist, High Performance Computing Center
> Adjunct Professor of Physics
> TTU
>
> ====================================================================
> : Alan Sill, Texas Tech University Office: Admin 233, MS 4-1167 :
> : e-mail: Alan.Sill at ttu.edu ph. 806-742-4350 fax 806-742-4358 :
> ====================================================================
>
>
>
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> --
> ogsa-wg mailing list
> ogsa-wg at ogf.org
> http://www.ogf.org/mailman/listinfo/ogsa-wg
_______________________________________________
ogsa-authn-bof mailing list
ogsa-authn-bof at ogf.org
http://www.ogf.org/mailman/listinfo/ogsa-authn-bof
More information about the ogsa-wg
mailing list