[Nsi-wg] Network names and authentication scaling
Jerry Sobieski
jerry at nordu.net
Wed Apr 13 21:53:06 CDT 2011
Hi all-
An issue occurs to me:
First...
Given that each Network has exactly one NSA, then the implication is
that no two different NSAs can claim to represent/be the same network.
Since our discussion today decided that the Network Name (used in
tuples) and the NSA_ID (used in messages) were identical, it follows
then that every NSA RA requesting a connection must be identified by an
NSA_ID that being a Network name also must be globally unique. Even
simple user codes just requesting an adhoc connection become RAs by
definition...and therefore are required to get a globally unique NSAID.
For simple user requests, this seems onerous...is this really
necessary?
The Network names definitely need to be globally unique as they are part
of a global topology model. And by implication the NSAs representing
those networks should be uniquely addressible (though I contend they
need/ought not be defined as the same thing). The the CS protocol,
however, only talks between PA and RA. There is no inherent global
scope in this relationship, and as we concluded in Hong Kong, this
relationship only needs to be locally unique.
I believe it would significantly simplify user codes if user RAs could
dispense with constructing a verifyably global unique NSA_IDs, and
simply ask the PA to respond with a locally unique NSAID that will work
for the life of this connection conversation.
Second, what if an "NSA" deliberately hijacks an established Network
name [NSA-ID]? How do we insure this does not occur? How do we
authenticate an NSA as being the proper agent to represents a specific
[real] network domain?
Thoughts? (I know we have authenticated sessions between trusted NSAs,
but that doesn't in itself associate a network with an NSA...or more
accurately, it doesn't preclude that agent from acting as another
Network.) I think we need some specific language on this...
Regards
Jerry
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