Everyone here already knows this I'm sure, but it's still confusing the
   heck out of me.
   In the hive docs
   at [1]https://archive.org/stream/CIAVAULT7PDFFILES/UsersGuide_djvu.txt
   or at wikileaks or in the hiver source, files are paired with md5
   hashes.  These are also used elsewhere.  Release snapshots are also
   paired only with md5 hashes.
   Here's some text from [2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5#Security .
   My phone misbehaved very severely while pasting this text in, with
   multiple applications popping up unexpectedly and rapidly flashing over
   each other with sounds and UI elements ceasing to function.  I got the
   text in fully with only 1 reboot by finding alternative ways in the
   phone of working with it.
   Security
   The security of the MD5 hash function is severely compromised. A
   collision attack exists that can find collisions within seconds on a
   computer with a 2.6 GHz Pentium 4 processor (complexity of 224.1).[19]
   Further, there is also a chosen-prefix collision attack that can
   produce a collision for two inputs with specified prefixes within
   seconds, using off-the-shelf computing hardware (complexity 239).[20]
   The ability to find collisions has been greatly aided by the use of
   off-the-shelf GPUs. On an NVIDIA GeForce 8400GS graphics processor,
   16–18 million hashes per second can be computed. An NVIDIA GeForce 8800
   Ultra can calculate more than 200 million hashes per second.[21]
   These hash and collision attacks have been demonstrated in the public
   in various situations, including colliding document files[22][23] and
   digital certificates.[24] As of 2015, MD5 was demonstrated to be still
   quite widely used, most notably by security research and antivirus
   companies.[25]
   As of 2019, one quarter of widely used content management systems were
   reported to still use MD5 for password hashing.[6]
   Overview of security issues
   In 1996, a flaw was found in the design of MD5. While it was not deemed
   a fatal weakness at the time, cryptographers began recommending the use
   of other algorithms, such as SHA-1, which has since been found to be
   vulnerable as well.[26] In 2004 it was shown that MD5 is not
   collision-resistant.[27] As such, MD5 is not suitable for applications
   like SSL certificates or digital signatures that rely on this property
   for digital security. Also in 2004 researchers discovered more serious
   flaws in MD5, and described a feasible collision attack -- a method to
   create a pair of inputs for which MD5 produces identical
   checksums.[7][28] Further advances were made in breaking MD5 in 2005,
   2006, and 2007.[29] In December 2008, a group of researchers used this
   technique to fake SSL certificate validity.[24][30]
   As of 2010, the CMU Software Engineering Institute considers MD5
   "cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use",[31] and most
   U.S. government applications now require the SHA-2 family of hash
   functions.[32] In 2012, the Flame malware exploited the weaknesses in
   MD5 to fake a Microsoft digital signature.[33]
   Collision vulnerabilities
   Further information: Collision attack
   In 1996, collisions were found in the compression function of MD5, and
   Hans Dobbertin wrote in the RSA Laboratories technical newsletter, "The
   presented attack does not yet threaten practical applications of MD5,
   but it comes rather close ... in the future MD5 should no longer be
   implemented ... where a collision-resistant hash function is
   required."[34]
   In 2005, researchers were able to create pairs of PostScript
   documents[35] and X.509 certificates[36] with the same hash. Later that
   year, MD5's designer Ron Rivest wrote that "md5 and sha1 are both
   clearly broken (in terms of collision-resistance)".[37]
   On 30 December 2008, a group of researchers announced at the 25th Chaos
   Communication Congress how they had used MD5 collisions to create an
   intermediate certificate authority certificate that appeared to be
   legitimate when checked by its MD5 hash.[24] The researchers used a PS3
   cluster at the EPFL in Lausanne, Switzerland[38] to change a normal SSL
   certificate issued by RapidSSL into a working CA certificate for that
   issuer, which could then be used to create other certificates that
   would appear to be legitimate and issued by RapidSSL. VeriSign, the
   issuers of RapidSSL certificates, said they stopped issuing new
   certificates using MD5 as their checksum algorithm for RapidSSL once
   the vulnerability was announced.[39] Although Verisign declined to
   revoke existing certificates signed using MD5, their response was
   considered adequate by the authors of the exploit (Alexander Sotirov,
   Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne
   Osvik, and Benne de Weger).[24] Bruce Schneier wrote of the attack that
   "we already knew that MD5 is a broken hash function" and that "no one
   should be using MD5 anymore".[40] The SSL researchers wrote, "Our
   desired impact is that Certification Authorities will stop using MD5 in
   issuing new certificates. We also hope that use of MD5 in other
   applications will be reconsidered as well."[24]
   In 2012, according to Microsoft, the authors of the Flame malware used
   an MD5 collision to forge a Windows code-signing certificate.[33]
   MD5 uses the Merkle–Damgård construction, so if two prefixes with the
   same hash can be constructed, a common suffix can be added to both to
   make the collision more likely to be accepted as valid data by the
   application using it. Furthermore, current collision-finding techniques
   allow to specify an arbitrary prefix: an attacker can create two
   colliding files that both begin with the same content. All the attacker
   needs to generate two colliding files is a template file with a
   128-byte block of data, aligned on a 64-byte boundary, that can be
   changed freely by the collision-finding algorithm. An example MD5
   collision, with the two messages differing in 6 bits, is:
   d131dd02c5e6eec4 693d9a0698aff95c 2fcab58712467eab 4004583eb8fb7f89
   55ad340609f4b302 83e488832571415a 085125e8f7cdc99f d91dbdf280373c5b
   d8823e3156348f5b ae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e2b487da03fd 02396306d248cda0
   e99f33420f577ee8 ce54b67080a80d1e c69821bcb6a88393 96f9652b6ff72a70
   d131dd02c5e6eec4 693d9a0698aff95c 2fcab50712467eab 4004583eb8fb7f89
   55ad340609f4b302 83e4888325f1415a 085125e8f7cdc99f d91dbd7280373c5b
   d8823e3156348f5b ae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e23487da03fd 02396306d248cda0
   e99f33420f577ee8 ce54b67080280d1e c69821bcb6a88393 96f965ab6ff72a70
   Both produce the MD5 hash 79054025255fb1a26e4bc422aef54eb4.[41] The
   difference between the two samples is that the leading bit in each
   nibble has been flipped. For example, the 20th byte (offset 0x13) in
   the top sample, 0x87, is 10000111 in binary. The leading bit in the
   byte (also the leading bit in the first nibble) is flipped to make
   00000111, which is 0x07, as shown in the lower sample.
   Later it was also found to be possible to construct collisions between
   two files with separately chosen prefixes. This technique was used in
   the creation of the rogue CA certificate in 2008. A new variant of
   parallelized collision searching using MPI was proposed by Anton
   Kuznetsov in 2014, which allowed finding a collision in 11 hours on a
   computing cluster.[42]
   Preimage vulnerability
   In April 2009, an attack against MD5 was published that breaks MD5's
   preimage resistance. This attack is only theoretical, with a
   computational complexity of 2123.4 for full preimage.[43][44]

References

   1. https://archive.org/stream/CIAVAULT7PDFFILES/UsersGuide_djvu.txt
   2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5#Security