I can think of what might be a disproof of this:
   [1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem
   >> any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man
   >This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps
   cannot actually be said without it.
   A message (or a dummy) could be automatically sent to a large number
   ("N") recipients, who are instructed to return an answer (or a dummy)
   within a random or pseudorandom time less than a specific value.  This
   system would still be "low latency", although perhaps not particularly
   efficient.
   Also, as for:
   >Chaff might be really only "expensive" if
   >1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan,
   Some internet services (1 gbit/second Centurylink) are already
   unlimited-data, or at least the limit (1 terabyte/month?) is
   sufficiently high so that it is irrelevant.  The latter is about
   386,000 bytes per second.
                Jim Bell

   On Monday, November 25, 2019, 09:52:44 AM PST, Steven Schear
   <schear.steve@gmail.com> wrote:
   I'm convinced there are too many security issues for high privacy
   communication over networks that eventually utilize or terminate on
   commercial facilities. Only specially designed, ptp, wireless comms
   using OTP or other trusted keying, combined with appropriate tradecraft
   are likely to be effective against nation state resources. Recall WW
   IIs wireless warriors.
   On Mon, Nov 25, 2019, 11:04 AM grarpamp <[2]grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:

     >       by 'low latency' they mean two things :
     >
     >       1) 'efficient' use of data transmission capacity, i.e.
     whether chaff is
     > sent(expensive)  or not.
     Chaff might be really only "expensive" if
     1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan,

     or refuses to buildout free p2p, guerilla, mesh networks.
     2) Bandwidth, if chaff does not get out of the way upon
     demand by wheat for carriage.
     3) Footshoot, user attempted to feed a higher committed
     rate to their CPU or internet than either can handle.
     >       2) actual low latency. In order to prevent timing attacks,
     packets need to
     > be reclocked, which means adding delay, which results in higher
     'latency'.
     While reclocking is likely necessary part of TA defence,
     many CPUs and NICs can handle line rate processing,
     and the committed rate to an overlay network can be
     set below both the physical link speed, and the rate
     bought from the ISP within which the overlay rides.
     User or overlay can create its own processing headroom
     by choosing a lesser rate.
     Also, depending on nature of input, reclocking may not
     necessarily imply additional average delay, as packets
     and gaps between them might be simply normalized.
     randomized and or distributed within the same overall sum.
     Sure maybe due to variety of hardware making up an
     actual overlay network and users paths in it, and other
     processing demands, latency may be higher than
     non chaff network, but maybe not by enough to actually
     preclude use of low latency apps such as voice chat, IRC, etc.
     > any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man
     This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps
     cannot actually be said without it.

References

   1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem
   2. mailto:grarpamp@gmail.com