By choosing a different physical transport means a different and, I
   maintain, better set of security tradeoffs become available. Unlike
   approaches which invariably depend on the Internet and heavily
   monitored commercial gateways, I propose using infrastructure-less or
   non-permissioned commercial, single-hop, relays. It's not the
   electromagnetic spectrum isn't also monitored but that the efficacy of
   that monitoring is, unlike the former environment, much more limited by
   physics, channel conditions, information theory and the proper
   application of tradecraft by possible targets.
   Both as a hobbyist and professional I've delved into the practicality
   of utilizing and building on commonly available, even consumer grade,
   Software Defined Signal Processing  (SDSP, the use of the term SDR is
   verboten in my world due to its inherent regulatory implications)
   hardware and open source software. My investigations (some openly
   shared at Cypherpunk-oriented tech conferences) have led me to believe
   that even a moderate uptake of these SDSP technologies would
   effectively neutralize most or all SIGINT against parties who aren't
   already the subject of individual targeting.Â
   These technologies aren't some magical new creation but rather the
   integration and adoption of ideas already well studied and reported in
   academia but whose implementations are often not openly available for
   tailoring and testing, mostly due to unfounded fears of regulatory
   actions.Â
   To be continued...