On Monday, October 21, 2019, 04:10:23 AM PDT, grarpamp
   <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:
   On 10/17/19, jim bell <[1]jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
   >>  Okay, I'm not advocating (or opposing) this concept.  It just
   seemed to me
   >> that since we are talking TOR-related features, we should pay
   attention to
   >> what TOR currently claims to provide.
   >> I think a few months ago, I mentioned the idea (which I assume
   somebody else
   >> thought of first, probably years ago) of splitting a file into two
   (or
   >> more?) pieces, stored in two (or more?) separate systems), which
   when XOR'd
   >> together, provide the (forbidden, banned, 'reallybad!!!'
   'highly-illegal')
   >> product file.  Neither file, alone, would be 'forbidden'.
   >> The purpose of this is not 'secrecy' of course, but merely
   deniability.
   >> Without the other file(s), the one file _I_ possess will be
   >> indistinguishable from a random number.  In fact, it could be a
   random
   >> number, which when XOR'd with a forbidden text, becomes what amounts
   to
   >> another random number, and somebody else's system will hold the
   other
   >> 'random number'  .  Think Vernam cipher, otherwise known as a
   "one-time
   >> pad".  [2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad
   >See the related...
   >[3]OFFSystem
   One application of using this XOR principle is to avoid the problem of
   a anonymization output node (TOR or otherwise) containing openly
   suspicious or incriminating information.  If all data through the
   network splits, before it exits, converted to two (or more???)
   seemingly-random data steams, outputted by two (or more???) distinct
   nodes, it can be recombined to regenerate the desired source data.
   An individual node's output is simply random data.
                     Jim Bell

References

   1. mailto:jdb10987@yahoo.com
   2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad
   3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OFFSystem