dude - I'm not sure what you said but your a brain bro - way outta my
   league didn't understand a thing you said
   . On that note I'm retiring from this list bye!
   -------- Original Message --------
   On Aug 2, 2018, 8:16 PM, Zenaan Harkness < zen@freedbms.net> wrote:

     God, the chaff fill concept is so dang simple - every time period T,
     send as many packets to PO(outgoing_bandwidth) to link endoint, if
     insufficient packets to send, send pseudo random chaff fill packets
     to get up to PO.
     That's the outgoing side.
     The incoming side is of course similar: over T, shape down to PI,
     dropping packets beyond that limit (+/- S 'slack' packets I guess).
     SIE (incoming packet shortage event): If PI is deficient, lower
     incoming rate PI (and notify endpoint of course).
     Rate reliability of endpoints based on SIE counts per time period
     RT (reliability analysis time period) - which might also be
     multi-layered (term?) i.e. do SIE analysis over multiple relevant
     time periods, e.g. 1s, 10s, 1m, 10m, 1hr.
     Simple (i.e. asynchronous) event/message protocol to request
     bandwidth, offer bandwidth in response to request, and offer
     bandwidth pre-emptively, including time parameters of duration
     (offer
     to guarantee rate PI/PO for T, or "best effort").
     Best effort might be suitable for some requestors, insufficient for
     others - make the requests you require, offer what you can, meet
     your
     contracts when made, rate those endpoints who fail in their
     contracts, possibly also include "allegations" (i.e. ratings as made
     by peers about other peers they've had experience - obviously
     allegations would carry less weight than personal/own-node
     experiences, yet, as in the torrent world, may well be useful to
     improve overall network characteristics.
     The more fundamental issue with Tor is its currently TCP only
     design.
     I2P is therefore probably a better starting point for chaff fill -
     everything else can be layered on top of ethernet, IP and/ or UDP.
     Good luck,
     On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 04:43:20PM -0700, Steven Schear wrote:
     > I've been waiting for Loopix, or a similar, anonymity overlay to
     go into
     > widespread testing but it's seems to be stillborn.
     >
     > On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 4:38 PM Zenaan Harkness <zen@freedbms.net>
     wrote:
     >
     > > On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 04:27:53PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
     > > > On 08/02/2018 04:14 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
     > > > > "Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what
     its users
     > > choose
     > > > > to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This
     creates a
     > > > > problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says
     Wright, who
     > > > > recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have
     a very
     > > > > concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people
     that are
     > > running
     > > > > the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that
     activity from
     > > > > occurring?”
     > > > >
     > > > > This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a
     feature.
     > > >
     > > > Yep. I mean, that's the fucking point!
     > > >
     > > > But I gotta say, they need to work on the anonymity aspect.
     The argument
     > > > that participation anonymity doesn't matter, as long as
     adversaries
     > > > can't attribute stuff, is weak. Look at Freenet, for example.
     > >
     > > Free speech (free from censorship and arbitrary punishment
     against
     > > 'speech the state does not like') depends on anonymity, which
     depends
     > > on the transport - e.g. localised face to face conversation on
     the
     > > beach (and no sand bugs in your ears), or some form of mesh
     > > networking.
     > >
     > > At the very least, for digital anonymity, trusted entry nodes to
     a
     > > network, some number (math math) of trusted peer nodes (if all
     your
     > > entry node's peers are untrusted and say kill your link
     > > simultaneously, or in symmetric semi-rapid succession, they will
     > > likely be able to correlate your communication) and chaff fill
     links.
     > >
     > > 'Till then... pigs ain't flyin'.
     > >
     > >
     > > > > On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com>
     wrote:
     > > > >
     > > > >>
     > > > >>
     > >
     [1]https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based
     -assassination-market-platform-could-cause-napster-size-legal/
     > > >
     > > > <SNIP>
     > > >
     > >

References

   1. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassination-market-platform-could-cause-napster-size-legal/