Ah apologies, I thought you meant it only obfuscated "internal"
   metadata, ie headers.

   On 10 April 2015 21:43:51 GMT+01:00, Mike Ingle
   <mike@confidantmail.org> wrote:

My software goes through Tor hidden services (or exit node if necessary)
and sets up a TLS session inside that.
The From address of the mail only exists inside the encrypted envelope,
which only the recipient can open.
If someone had a global view of the Tor nodes, they might be able to
track a particular message via timing, but going through Tor prevents
mass surveillance by a passive observer.
Mike
On 4/10/2015 12:28 PM, Cathal (Phone) wrote:

     Metadata includes who speaks to who, which can only be hidden by
     obfuscation in a mixnet, public-message-boards that recipients pull
     randomly or fully from, or similar ways of removing means of
     connecting endpoints.
     On 10 April 2015 20:08:04 GMT+01:00, Mike Ingle
     <mike@confidantmail.org> wrote:
     How does one go about getting on this list? I think Confidant Mail
     qualifies. It uses GPG end to end, and encrypts the metadata in
     transit.
     On 4/10/2015 6:44 AM, hellekin wrote:
     On 04/10/2015 03:59 AM, Seth wrote:
     [1]https://github.com/sweis/crypto-might-not-suck/blob/master/README
     .md
     *** When EFF launched the Secure Messaging Scoreboard, lynX
     and I were a bit pissed that they even mentioned proprietary
     solutions, so we made an alternate list:
     [2]http://libreplanet.org/wiki/GNU/consensus/Secure_Messaging_Scoreb
     oard
     == hk
     --
     Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

   --
   Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

References

   1. https://github.com/sweis/crypto-might-not-suck/blob/master/README.md
   2. http://libreplanet.org/wiki/GNU/consensus/Secure_Messaging_Scoreboard