This is probably only *theoretically* possible with quantum
     computation, but it's *practically* possible with tamperproof
     hardware: TCMs used for good instead of evil, maybe?

   What I'm planning doesn't have much in the way of uniqueness of
   hardware. The only unique thing is.. wait.. shouldn't I patent this
   first?
   The whole hardware device will be as trusted as any TPM would be. And
   probably be more trustworthy than any TPM that exists now. 't Is a
   tricky thing. The programs run in a vacuum, even they can't know where
   they run. That changes the purpose of a "TPM" significantly.
   2014-07-28 19:53 GMT+02:00 Troy Benjegerdes <[1]hozer@hozed.org>:

   On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 06:05:47PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte
   wrote:
   > <3
   >

   > If you're a secure kernel developer, Onion routing expert, fantastic
   C
   > coder or technology investor, and this triggered your interests,
   please
   > contact me!

     I would be very interested in contract work for running Linux on L4
     microkernels.

   There will be need for running software on the secure platform, but I
   suspect resources will be so pricy that Linux will be too fat. I'm not
   really sure about that left or right, so don't pin me down on it. In
   tone with microkernels it would be nice to make wrappers for portions
   of Linux APIs, also to ease porting.

     You can see my experience here [2]https://lkml.org/lkml/1999/3/7/59
     But if you give me the code, and I can emulate the hardware with
     qemu,
     I can extract keys/code/whatever from anything running inside the
     'secure'
     microkernel.

   I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this. At least in my design
   there is absolutely no unique (platform) information available, that
   includes platform/application keys. If you need them you'll have to
   make them in your own userspace.

     If you want the 'tamper evident' hardware it must be open-source
     hardware
     and you will need on the order of at least a million USD to
     fabricate the
     silicon,

   From what I heard from those that make mining hardware about half a
   million is enough. But I'm afraid trustable silicon is only part of the
   problem. The trustable silicon will already require some sort of
   minimalism to allow for validation, but it gets worse. To prevent data
   observation the rest of the casing will have to be able to
   self-destruct (think harddrives coated in thermite), and therefore
   self-observe in known an unknown ways. It also musn't radiate patterns,
   which will be exceedingly hard to prove. It will involve Faraday's
   cages and the like. Such hardware design is has been attempted before,
   but is probably still less effort than the software.

     and then another million to offer cash prizes at DEFCON for anyone
     that can hack the silicon & microkernel.

   I was thinking of a few millions thrown at companies banks could trust,
   to validate proofs, check circuits, observe fabrication, etc. and
   eventually undersign responsibility for the validity of the end result.

     So if you can secure 2 to 10 million, let's get it done.

   I don't think that'd be enough. It requires a small horde of experts
   and a significant support infrastructure. On top of that the idea is
   exceedingly hard to convey. The idea that the cloud can be more secure
   then an in-house dedicated server is very foreign. It was to me, when I
   thought it up.
   The upside is that the income model is very simple. Just charge for
   resources on the computing grids.

     Otherwise talking about the theory of a formal-methods 'microkernel'
     running
     on today's buggy broken pre-trojaned hardware is unethical and
     dangerous.

   It's not that unethical and dangerous, it just wouldn't work! How can
   you claim to stay afloat when you're underwater? The hardware that
   makes op the grid will probably be a collection of simplistic
   components bought in VHDL-form. These simple, trusted, components will
   likely be in a shroud of not-vital components that do some practical
   stuff, like connecting to the Internet. Fresh ground to find those
   stupid patents, too.

     Do you know what your network card firmware is doing? Neither do I,
     but I bet
     the NSA and Chinese intelligence will have updates for you when the
     'secure'
     kernel comes out.

   Are you really prepared to see how [3]deep the rabbit hole goes?

References

   1. mailto:hozer@hozed.org
   2. https://lkml.org/lkml/1999/3/7/59
   3. http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/intelligent-systems/intel-technology/intel-amt-design-remote-management-even-when-systems-powered-off.html