[spam][wrong] Traffic Exhaustion Attack to Enumerate Tor Circuits as a 3rd Party

Undiscussed Horrific Abuse, One Victim of Many gmkarl at gmail.com
Mon May 16 14:25:04 PDT 2022

One factor this working depends on would be whether or not tor has put
efforts in place to mitigate it.

Assumption: you have a statistical model for behavior via a circuit,
possibly crafted after the attack.

1. Completely exhaust bandwidth via as many tor nodes as possible, ideally
by crafting single-hop circuits. Using this approach, find a way to measure
gaps in available bandwidth: times others are using the bandwidth.

2. Compare measurements between nodes so as to identify circuit connections.

How then to anonymize one's behavior?

A user can do various things to exhaust bandwidth themselves using cover
traffic, but it seems quite hard to fully prevent some shape from sticking

[composition halted here via unexpected cognitive change]
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