1984: Thread

[grarpamp]

USA and World rapidly adopting China's Total Control Model
Fight Back !


China: The World's First Technate – Part 2

by Iain Davis

https://iaindavis.com/china-technocracy-part-1/
https://off-guardian.org/2022/12/14/china-the-worlds-first-technate-part-2/
https://iaindavis.substack.com/p/understanding-technocracy

https://iaindavis.com/pseudopandemic/
https://iaindavis.com/propaganda-fry-part-3/
https://iaindavis.com/ukc/Datong.pdf
https://www.technocracyinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Study-Course.pdf
https://iaindavis.com/what-is-the-global-public-private-partnership/
https://iaindavis.com/who-are-the-new-world-order-a-brief-history/
https://iaindavis.com/long-live-democracy/
https://iaindavis.com/multipolar-world-order-part-4/
https://steemit.com/china/@corbettreport/china-s-american-arsenal
https://logicmag.io/china/the-messy-truth-about-social-credit/
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/the-redlists-are-coming-the-blacklists-are-coming/
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2016/12/17/chinas-digital-dictatorship
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/socialcreditsystem/
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/who-did-china-ban-from-flying/
https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/02/china-brings-in-mandatory-facial-recognition-for-mobile-phone-users
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gSU_Xes3GQ
https://amp.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/03/china-positive-energy-emotion-surveillance-recognition-tech
https://daxueconsulting.com/internet-censorship-in-china/
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2110400/chinas-twitter-weibo-orders-users-register-their-real
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-cybersecurity-law-peoples-republic-china/
https://jamestown.org/program/beijing-harnesses-big-data-ai-to-perfect-the-police-state/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/10/chinese-publisher-who-spoke-up-for-dissident-academic-is-jailed-for-three-years
https://sociable.co/government-and-policy/individual-carbon-footprint-tracker-alibaba-wef-2022/
https://www.world-today-news.com/the-brain-of-china-which-sees-everything-in-shanghai/
https://unlimitedhangout.com/2021/12/investigative-reports/the-new-normal-the-civil-society-deception/
https://www.corbettreport.com/nwnw503/
https://www.ukcolumn.org/blogs/the-uks-new-bill-of-no-rights


In Part 1, we discussed the historical background of Technocracy Inc.
that briefly found popularity in the US in the 1930s during the
turmoil of the Great Depression.

Technocracy was rooted in socioeconomic theories that focused upon the
efficient management of society by experts (technocrats). This idea
briefly held the public’s attention during a period of sustained
recession, mass unemployment and growing poverty.

The technological capabilities required for the energy surveillance
grid, essential for the operation of a Technate (a technocratic
society), were far beyond the practical reach of 1930s America.
Consequently, for that and other reasons, public interest in the
seemingly preposterous idea of technocracy soon subsided.

However, in recent decades, many influential policy strategists—most
notably Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger—and private
philanthropic foundations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation,
recognised that advances in digital technology would eventually make a
Technate feasible. As founding and leading members of the Trilateral
Commission, a policy “think tank,” they saw China as a potential test
bed for technocracy.

We will now consider their efforts to create the world’s first
Technate in China.

These articles build upon the research found in my 2021 publication
Pseudopandemic, which is freely available to my blog subscribers.

WHY CHINA?

In the West we often have difficulty understanding or even
conceptualising Chinese mores. We tend to see the world in our own
terms and are able to describe it only in reference to the principles
and philosophical concepts that we are familiar with. Perhaps we
forget that the Western perspective is not the only one in the world.

For example, as pointed out by students of the Chinese political
philosophy of tianxia, there is no ontological tradition in China. In
the Chinese philosophical mind, the question is not “What is this
thing” but “What path does this thing suggest?”

Datong lies at the heart of “the Great Way,” first described in the
Liyun chapter of the “Book of Rites” (the Liji), written more than
2,000 years ago. Recounting the teachings of Confucius, the chapter
depicted a utopian society of the ancient past this way:

    When the Great Way was practised, the world was shared by all
alike. The worthy and the able were promoted to office and men
practised good faith and lived in affection. Therefore they did not
regard as parents only their own parents, or as sons only their own
sons.

The “Rites” (or “li”) are the formal etiquette and behavioural conduct
that underpin Chinese social order. Li also compasses the ceremony and
rituals that reinforce normative standards.

Datong, which can be translated as “the Great Unity,” represents the
central political and moral philosophy of the ideal Chinese society.
In datong, everyone respects “the li” and is imbued with the Confucian
virtue of “ren.” This love and benevolence (ren) is founded in human
empathy. It first manifests within the family but extends to the whole
of society.

Datong implies a society where the most able and virtuous lead, with
ren foremost in their hearts and minds. All resources are shared
equitably for the common good. In the Liyun chapter, the expression
“the world is shared by all alike” is written as “tianxia weigong.”
This can be translated as “all under Heaven is held in common” or “all
under Heaven is publicly held.”

There is no place for private property in datong, because communities
meet the needs of all. There is no conflict of interest. The Great Way
is one of “Universal Harmony.”

The opening passage of the Liyun chapter also described xiaokang, the
“lesser prosperity,” in which society still maintained li and ren but
differed from datong in an important regard:

    The world is the possession of private families. Each regards as
parents only his own parents, as sons only his own sons; goods and
labour are employed for selfish ends.

While datong describes a world where resources are “shared by all
alike,” in xiaokang resources are in “the possession of private
families.” Xiaokang was not seen as opposed to datong but rather on
the path toward it, for li and ren were still observed. But there is a
warning in the Liyun chapter that private property and the control of
resources by private interests present a risk:

    Therefore intrigue and plotting come about and men take up arms.

Kang Youwei’s book “Datong shu” (The Great Commonwealth) was published
posthumously in 1935. Kang wrote it as a series of lecture notes, the
earliest dating to 1884. Rather than view datong only as a lost
utopia, Kang proposed datong as a future society that could be
constructed. He viewed ren as the path toward establishing the common
good for all, attainable by eliminating suffering and creating
happiness.

Kang noted that ren was applicable not only to humanity but to the
universe and all within it, and he called this “jen.” Jen gave rise,
he said, to creation and to the establishment of universal order.
Therefore, order should be based upon the same principle of the
“compassionate mind.”

He drew upon the work of the Confucian scholar He Xiu, whose Gongyang
theory of history described sociopolitical development as a path
consisting of incremental, progressive stages. Kang built upon
Gongyang’s work to plot a course toward the Great Unity.

In essence, Kang suggested that society could be reverse-engineered to
achieve datong in the future. He identified “nine boundaries” of human
suffering that needed to be deconstructed in order to reach datong. He
said that datong could be attained once nation-states, social class,
racism, sexism, families, private property, injustice, environmental
destruction, and poverty (the result of social inequality and
oppression) were abolished.

“Sages” or “persons of jen” would be needed to lead, Kang maintained.
He acknowledged that the sages had to operate in the social, economic
and political circumstances of their day and that the resultant laws
and institutions might be oppressive and cause suffering. Therefore,
the objective of the “person of jen” (sage) should be to reform the
laws and organisations of the state with a view to eradicating the
nine boundaries of suffering.

With the abolition of the nation state, Kang’s proposed path toward
the Great Way extended far beyond China. He favoured a global society
where a world government would rule over a planet that was divided
into regional districts.

In this global society, there would be no class or private property,
and all would strive to deliver the common good and benefit everyone.
Specifically, all resources would be deployed for the benefit and
happiness of all. Public institutions, not families, would raise
children. And the children would be trained to become citizens who
would provide free services, such as health care and education, for
all.

The only distinction between people would be the badges of honour worn
by those deemed to have great ren, or knowledge—that is, the sages.
Ultimately, once datong exists, there would be complete harmony with
nature, which in turn would mean that all human beings are vegetarians
and that euthanasia would be practised with ren, for the common good.

The ideology of datong, as Kang expounded it, and the hope of
following the Great Way have strongly influenced Chinese political
philosophy throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Xi Jinping has been
heard on numerous occasions to repeat the phrase, “When the Great Way
prevails, the world is for everyone.”

Seen from the Chinese philosophical perspective, the best anyone can
hope for today is xiaokang. Thus, xiaokang sages must be free to
reform the institutions of the state on the path toward removing the
nine boundaries, achieving datong and leading the Great Way.

There are many parallels between this path and the socioeconomic
theory underpinning technocracy. For those who wished to establish a
global technate, China was a natural choice for their pilot project.

UNDERSTANDING TECHNOCRACY

While there is a lot of debate about the extent of “legitimate”
technocratic governance in the West’s supposedly liberal
representative democracies, governance is just one aspect of
technocracy. In other words, technocratic governance alone is not
technocracy.

As discussed previously, a technocracy is a “governance of function.”
The overarching goal is to run the whole of society as efficiently as
possible.

The Technocracy Inc. Study Course states:

    The basic unit of this organization is the Functional Sequence. A
Functional Sequence is one of the larger industrial or social units,
the various parts of which are related one to the other in a direct
functional sequence. Thus among the major Industrial Sequences we have
transportation (railroads, waterways, airways, highways and pipe
lines); communication (mail, telephone, telegraph, radio and
television); agriculture (farming, ranching, dairying, etc.); and the
major industrial units such as textiles, iron and steel, etc. Among
the Service Sequences are education (this would embrace the complete
training of the younger generation), and public health (medicine,
dentistry, public hygiene, and all hospitals and pharmaceutical plants
as well as institutions for defectives)

Each “Functional Sequence” is overseen by a directorate. For example,
the Distribution Sequence collects all the data gathered from the
“Energy Certificates,” which are allocated to the citizens to be
exchanged for goods and services. The “Price System” is abolished.
There is no private property. The entire Technate is controlled by one
body: Continental Control.

Like Kang’s “sages,” and in a fashion similar to guidance of the
population toward the Great Way, a technocracy creates a rigid
hierarchical structure to ensure that all are working for the common
good. In the language of technocracy, the citizen contributes toward
the appropriate service function.

Effectively, this creates a pyramid-like sociopolitical structure:

    The personnel of all Functional Sequences will pyramid on the
basis of ability to the head of each department within the Sequence,
and the resultant general staff of each Sequence will be a part of the
Continental Control. A government of function! The Continental
Director, as the name implies, is the chief executive of the entire
social mechanism. On his immediate staff are the Directors of the
Armed Forces, the Foreign Relations, the Continental Research, and the
Social Relations and Area Control. [. . .] The Continental Director is
chosen from among the members of the Continental Control by the
Continental Control. Due to the fact that this Control is composed of
only some 100 or so members, all of whom know each other well, there
is no one better fitted to make this choice than they.

Class is abolished in technocracy. Child care is provided by the
Technate. Rather than having “great ren,” the general staff of the
Technate are said to possess “peck-rights.” That is, they are the most
suited to be at the top of the pyramid because a “governance of
function” works most efficiently when “the right man is in the right
place” to serve the common good.

Like the ideas presented in “Datong shu,” the intention of technocracy
is essentially altruistic. The small cluster of engineers, economists,
sociologists and other academics brought together by the Rockefellers
and Howard Scott wanted to construct a society that would deliver
“lives of abundance” to all.

It must be admitted that the Technocracy Inc. Study Course made some
valid criticisms of a number of social problems. Unfortunately, the
offered solution of a Technate is both arrogant and naïve.

It assumes, much as does the notion of a Great Way, that authority can
be exercised by some human beings over other human beings for the
common good. Further, it imagines that there is some social or
political mechanism that can produce leaders who are omniscient and
capable of defining what that “common good” is.

Both datong and technocracy would require human nature to undergo a
fundamental transformation. Avarice, malevolence, narcissism,
psychopathy and every other deleterious failing would need to be
expunged from humanity. Until they are, power will continue to be
sought by those who want to control others.

The most ruthless among us will ultimately succeed—often not because
they are the most suited but because they are prepared to do what
others won’t in order to gain the power they crave. This situation
will persist for as long as we believe that someone or some
organisation needs to have absolute authority over our lives in order
for us to be able to cooperate effectively.

To imagine that concentrating all power in the hands of a tiny, select
band of experts or sages will solve the problems caused by the
unscrupulous and frequently violent and immoral use of authority is
ridiculous. You can’t fix a kakistocracy by investing more power in
the “kakistocrats.”

For the global public-private partnership (G3P), which operates a
compartmentalised, hierarchical, pyramid-like power structure, the
most enticing aspect of technocracy is the extreme centralisation of
power and authority over vast swaths of the humanity. That is why, as
soon as technological development permitted and the opportunity arose,
the G3P set about assisting the development of a Technate in China.

INFILTRATING CHINA

The formal story of Henry Kissinger’s “secret” 1971 discussions with
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai—officially acknowledged in 2001—is that US
President Richard Nixon sent Kissinger to normalise relationships with
the Chinese government as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. What
is mentioned less frequently, though, is Kissinger’s relationship with
the Rockefellers.

In 1956, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund commissioned Kissinger to
convene its Special Studies Panels. The panels investigated emerging
global challenges and trends and suggested how US foreign policy might
adapt to meet them.

In the 1961 publication of the six panel reports, Prospect for America
(subtitled “The problems and opportunities confronting American
democracy—in foreign policy, in military preparedness, in education,
in social and economic affairs”), the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
outlined how public-private partnership would be key to this projected
future:

    Corporations, whose operations extend through many nations[,] [. .
.] through which a considerable and essential part of the world’s
economic activities is carried on, must be able to compose
diversities, adjust conflicts of interest, and adapt their operations
to the needs of the country in which they operate. In doing so they
represent a further example of multinational solutions to common
problems.

The authors of these reports regarded private finance as essential not
only for developing international markets but also for guiding the
social and political development of the target nation:

    Rapid economic growth can be achieved only if local savings and
public foreign investment are supplemented by an increasing inflow of
private foreign investment. Such investment performs two key
functions: it adds to the capital resources of the host nation and it
is the chief mechanism through which the managerial and technical
skills and the creative and catalytic quality can contribute to
economic development in less developed areas. [. . .] Private
philanthropic capital can also play an important role in economic
development.

The panels that provided the analysis for Prospect for America were
convened in the aftermath of McCarthyism. They needed to appeal to a
US polity still obsessed with the perceived threat of international
communism. Thus, the reports eulogise so-called democracy throughout.

However, there are numerous indications that the Rockefeller foreign
policy strategists were willing to diplomatically suggest
alternatives:

    The American pattern of private enterprise and voluntary
association is not the only mold for a free society.

It is clear that these strategists sought to both exploit the
differences between nation-states for their development potential and
amplify the importance of global issues as a means of uniting nations,
regardless of their model of government, under a system of global
governance. They considered scientific and technological development
one way to do just that:

    In the field of science, international cooperation on a world
scale is most readily achievable. [. . .] [T]he United States should,
therefore, seek to develop a series of agreements, looking toward the
stimulation of scientific interchange and the fostering of scientific
progress on a world scale. [. . .] The Communist nations should be
invited to participate.

The panels, which effectively formed a temporary Rockefeller-funded
think tank, were not opposed to colonialism on moral grounds but they
highlighted its tactical flaws. Inherent in their critique of
colonialism was an acknowledgement that alleged democratic values have
nothing to do with hard-nosed geopolitics or with expansive foreign
policy ambitions:

    While colonialism exacted a human and political toll, it also
represented one of the greatest conversions in history. As the ideals
of the British, French and American revolutions became diffused,
partly through the very spread of colonialism, the seeds were sown for
the destruction of colonialism itself. The more successful the
teachings of the colonial powers, the more untenable grew their
position. Almost without exception, the leaders of independence
movements fought their rulers in terms of the rulers’ own beliefs.
They asked them to live up to their own principles.

The Rockefellers, being one of the leading families at the head of the
G3P’s compartmentalised hierarchy, had worked with the Chinese
authorities for generations. John D. Rockefeller Sr. was trading
kerosene in China in 1863.

The family’s philanthropic foundation had long fostered strong ties
with the Chinese government. For example, it helped advance the use of
Western allopathic medicine in China by establishing the Peking Union
Medical College (PUMC) and by making other philanthropic investments.

It’s safe to say that the Rockefellers were knowledgeable and
enthusiastic supporters of the Chinese government. Not surprisingly,
they were also knowledgeable and enthusiastic supporters of the
technocracy movement in the US, maintaining their keen interest in it
despite its lack of public support. They understood the potential of
social engineering to create a governance of function (a Technate):

    Changes in technology have always been a major cause of change in
government, economic relations and social institutions. But
technological innovation is no longer the work of isolated, ingenious
inventors; it is the product of organised scientific enterprise and is
constant, insistent and accelerating. One of its notable effects is
upon the tempo of social change itself, which is enormously quicker
than it has been, and which subjects every inhabitant of a
technological society to its pressures. Technological innovation thus
poses a series of issues with which our society will have to deal. [.
. .] The growth of technological society has changed the traditional
society in which men have enjoyed freedom. Large and complex
organisations have become the order of the day. [. . .] Programs for
the preservation and strengthening of individual freedom must assume
the existence and the inevitability of such organisations.

The Rockefellers had a nuanced appreciation of the potential for
technological development to act as the catalyst for change. Despite
the report’s primary focus on the US relationship with the Soviet
Union, the Rockefellers obviously recognised the ripe opportunities in
China:

    It [China] has a rapidly growing population, a shortage of
resources, and a fanatical ideology. Around a large part of its
perimeter exists “soft” situations, making infiltration, subversion,
and outright conquest seem easy or inviting prospects. The present
relations between Soviet Russia and Red China [. . .] may not always
be drawn together by common interests. [. . .] We must avoid, wherever
possible, courses that seem to drive China closer to the Soviets.

As founders of the Trilateral Commission, the Rockefellers’ and their
fellow Trilateralists’ goal was to infiltrate China by extending the
hand of cooperative friendship through public-private investment in
technological and thus financial and economic development.

The Sino-Soviet split was seemingly the window of opportunity they
wished to lever open.

China’s society, its political history and government structure was
already amenable to the introduction of technocracy, as it was to
communism. The Trilateralists were apparently eager to avoid the
mistakes of Western colonialists, who extolled the democratic ideals
and associated legal concepts which had come back to bite them. These
ideals were, in any event, antithetical to the Trilateralists’
project.

ASSISTING CHINA

Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping rose to power, becoming
the Paramount Leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1978.
Just two weeks after assuming power, on January 1, 1979, he became the
first communist Chinese leader to conduct a formal state visit to the
US.

He was received with full state honours by the administration of Jimmy
Carter, whose National Security advisor was Trilateralist Zbigniew
Brzezinski—and who was himself a Trilateralist.

Deng Xiaoping immediately set about instigating a series of social and
economic reforms, which were called “reform and opening up” in China
and “the opening up of China” in the West.

Deng was one of a group of eight high-ranking Chinese officials who
had survived the brutal repressions of cultural revolution. The
reverently named “Eight Immortals” were credited with turning the
Chinese economy from an unstable mess, riven with extreme poverty,
into the thriving economic engine it is today.

Despite the hopes of datong, and far from being the sages that Kang
Youwei dreamed of, the sons and daughters of the Eight Immortals, who
are collectively known as the Princelings, hoovered up China’s state
assets to effectively create a new dynasty, just as corrupt as its
predecessors. Such is the nature of kakistocracy.

The scale and pace of the economic transformation in such a vast
country would have been impossible without the considerable inward
investment and the transfer of technology which China received from
the G3P. This G3P investment was the initial source of China’s
economic growth miracle. In late 2019, The World Economic Forum (WEF)
reported:

    High levels of government spending and foreign investment have
enabled China to roughly double the size of its economy every eight
years since the introduction of economic reforms in 1979.

CITIC (China International Trust & Investment Corp, renamed CITIC
Group) was effectively China’s state–run investment arm. Kissinger’s
visit to China had opened up investment banking opportunities for
Rockefeller’s Chase Group (Chase Manhattan Bank at the time.)

In June 1980, CITIC Chairman Rong Yiren attended a meeting with David
Rockefeller and the representatives of 300 Fortune 500 companies in
the Chase Manhattan offices in New York.

The purpose of the meeting between CITIC and the G3P representatives was:

    [To] identify and define those areas of the Chinese economy most
susceptible to American technology and capital infusion.

Kissinger and Rong reportedly established an investment company, with
Trilateralist Kissinger appointed as a special advisor to CITIC. The
initial phase of China’s economic transformation consisted of banking
reforms that allowed much greater Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in
China.

FDIs aren’t just capital investments. They typically come with a
transfer or sharing of expertise, technology and even workforce.
Common types of FDIs are mergers, acquisitions, management services
and logistical and manufacturing agreements.

>From the mid 1980s onwards the G3P began to pour into Beijing’s
Central Business District (CBD).

By 2009 there were 114 Western companies with a substantial presence
and established investments in Beijing and beyond. By 2020 there were
238 Fortune 500 companies in Beijing. Today, Beijing CBD (called the
Functional Area) now houses the regional headquarters of 105
multinational corporations and more than 4,000 foreign-invested
enterprises. The CBD is one of six “high-end industrial functional
areas in Beijing.”

According to Chinese state media, between 1983 and 1991 FDI in China
went from a value of $920 million to $4.37 billion. By 2019 total FDI
had risen to more than $2.1 trillion. At the same time, the transition
economy of China, just like many other economies, rapidly expanded its
money supply.

All of this monopoly money, a mixture of FDI and domestic (digital)
currency printing, fuelled the economic and technological development
of China. In exchange for access to its market, the Chinese government
required that investors sign so-called Forced Technology Transfer
(FTT) agreements.

Simultaneously, the Western mainstream media (MSM) began constantly
pushing the notion of the “rising threat” of China and frequently
accused China of alleged industrial espionage and “technology theft.“

Like so much propaganda aimed at Western populations by their MSM,
these charges were just a fabrication. In truth, no one was forcing
anyone to transfer technology to China. In fact, Trilateralists like
President Bill Clinton went to considerable lengths to make sure China
could get hold of the technology, including military technology, it
needed.

In 1994 the Clinton administration scrapped Cold War export controls,
thereby enabling more sensitive technology to be transferred to China.
Claiming that they would not allow defence technology, such as
supercomputer or potential uranium enrichment technology, to go to
China (or Russia), they soon lifted this restriction via a work-around
that shifed oversight from the departments of State and Defense to the
Department of Commerce.

One only has to look at the near identical design of US and Chinese
defence systems and weaponry to see that a massive amount of
“sensitive” technology is common to both countries.

The asinine explanation we are given is that this is all the result of
Chinese espionage, even though the US government has amended
legislation to make such transfers possible.

The Israeli government and Israeli defence contractors have
consistently acted as facilitators for the transfer of the most
sensitive Western defence and surveillance technology to China. As
soon as “reform and opening up” began in 1979, Israeli
multibillionaire—then a humble billionaire—Saul Eisenberg flew a
delegation of defence contractors to arrange military supply contracts
with the Chinese government.

While the West’s MSM parrots the intelligence agencies’ overwhelmingly
baseless claims that China represents an “immense threat,” the US
government and others have maintained deep defence ties with the
Israeli government for generations.

In the full and certain knowledge that Israel is passing defence
technology to China, the US and other NATO allies continue to provide
Israel with the latest defence technology.

Occasionally a story surfaces claiming that Washingtion is “angered”
by this habitual practice. If we look beyond the propaganda, the
fables simply reaffirm that which is blatantly obvious.

The Israeli government, its defence contractor and tech corporation
partners, have consistently acted as a conduit for the transfer of
“sensitive” defence, fintech, surveillance and communication
technology from the West to China. Between 1992 and 2017 the volume of
overall trade between Israel and China multiplied 200 times over.

Another Western propagandist myth is that China has “stolen” jobs from
Western economies. While it is true that manufacturers took advantage
of cheaper labour costs in China, leading to job losses in the West,
the practice of offshoring jobs had been ongoing for decades.

Companies are in the business of maximising profits for shareholders
and staying competitive. No one was forcing Western corporations to
offshore. It was simply an economic expediency, largely the
consequence of G3P efforts to modernise China’s economy.

Often the focus of G3P investment in China has been Research and
Development (R&D). In 1994 China ranked 30th in terms of US overseas
R&D investment; by 2000 it was 11th.

Between 1994 to 2001 multinational corporation (MNC) investment in
China quadrupled. As a ratio of overseas R&D investment, the G3P were
providing thrice the amount of “technology infusion” into China
compared to anywhere else.

While the pseudopandemic sharpened the decline in total global FDI,
that figure continued to rise in China.

The 4% increase of FDI in China in 2020 saw it temporarily surpass the
US as the world’s leading recipient of direct investment. In 2020,
while FDI in other advanced economies collapsed, China benefited from
FDI valued at $163 billion.

In addition to the huge growth stimulus pumped into the Chinese
economy over the last four decades, a significant number of
foreign/Chinese industrial R&D alliances were established. These were
separate business organizations that targeted specific research or
technological development projects. They were formed through
collaboration between academic and scientific research establishments,
NGOs, government institutions and private enterprise.

Between 1990 and 2001 the US government established 105 such
alliances. In the same time period, Japan had the second largest
number of R&D partnership alliances (26), followed by Germany (15),
the UK (14), Singapore (12), and Canada (11). The overwhelming
majority of these R&D collaborations operated in China.

>From 2001, to the financial crash in 2008, both FDI in R&D and China’s
own R&D investment really took off. While the explosive pace of FDI
growth slowed from 2010 onward, by 2016 China’s own outward foreign
investment had surpassed the FDI it received. That was an astounding
economic turnaround in less than 40 years.

A 2019 report by the World Bank stated:

    China’s spending on research and development (R&D) rose to 2.18
percent of GDP in 2018, up from 1.4 percent in 2007[.] [. . .] Its
spending on R&D accounts for around 20 percent of the world total,
second only to the United States. Its number of patents granted
annually for inventions increased from 68,000 in 2007 to 420,000 in
2017, the highest in the world. [. . .] China is also a hotbed for
venture capital in search of the next technology. [. . .] China has
evolved from being a net importer of FDI to a net exporter. [. . .]
China remains an attractive destination for foreign investments due to
its large domestic market. Foreign enterprises such as BASF, BMW,
Siemens, and Tesla have recently announced new or expanded investments
in China.

A focus of apparent Western concern has been China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI).

This enormous infrastructure project, known in China as One Belt, One
Road, or OBOR, is establishing a network of modern trade routes across
Eurasia, linking Asia, Africa, Europe, South East Asia and
Australasia, easing both international trade and, in particular,
Chinese exports.

Beyond China’s borders there are 140 countries involved in the BRI to
one degree or another.

In its 2018 research paper looking at FDI in a BRI-related project,
the World Bank referred to those countries directly involved in its
construction as BRI nations. China’s own investment in BRI nations has
grown, but the majority of its FDI goes to non-BRI nations. These,
according to the World Bank, are nations that are not inviolved in the
BRI.

China is the leading single nation investor in BRI nations but it does
not account for the bulk of total investment. China took the lead
after the 2008 financial crisis saw non-BRI nations (such as the US
and the UK) pull back on their FDI deals in BRI nations. The
investment from the non-BRI nations picked up again as quantitative
easing (money printing) monetary policies in Western countries took
effect post-2010.

The World Bank reported:

    The majority of BRI countries’ [those who are part of the One
Belt, One Road project] FDI inflow comes from non-BRI countries.

That is to say, BRI nations—Italy, Saudi Arabia, Austria, New Zealand,
South Korea and Singapore, etc.—are net recipients of FDI from non-BRI
nations, such as the US, UK, France and Germany.

The majority of the investment, expertise and technology that is
building the BRI infrastructure comes from the non-BRI G3P partners.
The notion that Western politicians, corporations and financial
institutions are worried about the Belt and Road Initiative is just an
MSM story. In reality, they are working hard to construct it in
partnership with China.
CHINA: THE WORLD’S FIRST TECHNATE

China has developed an overt system dedicated to the social
engineering of society.

As noted in Part 1, the definition of technocracy is:

    The science of social engineering, the scientific operation of the
entire social mechanism to produce and distribute goods and services
to the entire population.

The focus of technocracy is to direct the population to maximise the
efficiency of all “functions” of society, primarily through control of
the allocation of resources.

Published in 2014, the State Council Notice for planning a Social
Credit System (SCS) outlined the Chinese government’s rationale for
its social credit system:

    The social credit system is an important component of the
Socialist market economy system and the social governance system; [. .
.] its foundation is a complete network covering the credit records of
all members of society and the credit infrastructure; [. . .] its
reward and punishment mechanisms are incentivizing trustworthiness and
restricting untrustworthiness. [. . .] The establishment of a social
credit system is an important foundation for comprehensively
implementing the scientific viewpoint of development. [. . .]
Accelerating and advancing the establishment of the social credit
system is an important precondition for promoting the optimized
allocation of resources.

This is a description of pure technocracy.

Western commentators often focus upon the technological aspects of
China’s social credit system. China certainly operates a dystopian
surveillance society, but this complements the social credit system
which, as the name suggests, is an overarching system for
“implementing the scientific viewpoint of development.”

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) reported that the
supposedly “terrifying system doesn’t exist” in China:

    [T]he system that the central government has been slowly working
on is a mix of attempts to regulate the financial credit industry,
enable government agencies to share data with each other, and promote
state-sanctioned moral values.

MIT and its funding partners, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, have
consistently highlighted the potential merits of the social credit
system (SCS).

When reading that material, we must separate the rhetoric of the
engineers of the social credit system from its practical application.

Like the Great Way or technocracy or communism, the political
philosophy underpinning the social credit system is presented by its
advocates as progressive, humanitarian and benign. Naturally, the
people who impose this system would also need to be progressive,
humanitarian and benign, right?

Yet, while the social credit system is effectively a massive
bureaucracy, combining the digital sharing of information with
legislation and various paper-shuffling exercises, there are many
aspects of it that are extremely concerning.

For one thing, it creates a public-private partnership that, by
rewarding good behaviour, fosters public faith in the mechanisms of
the state. For another, it punishes those who aren’t duly faithful.

The SCS removes access to “privileges” from people who have broken the
law and even from those who haven’t. The concept of Joint Disciplinary
Action in the SCS introduces the idea that, if found “untrustworthy,”
a citizen or organisation so labelled will face broader social
consequences, from having their right to fly removed to restricting
their ability to book “high-class” tickets on trains to impeding their
employment or business opportunities.

The SCS sets up a blacklist for those deemed to have committed
“misdeeds.” Thus far it has predominantly punished those who have
failed to pay court fines or those considered bad debtors.

Chinese state media have praised the courts’ partnership with tech
giants like Sesame Credit—the credit-scoring system of the Alibaba
Group subsidiary Ant Financial.

Chinese government data, gathered from the courts and elsewhere, has
been combined with private data, gathered from social media, for the
purpose of lowering the financial credit score of millions of people
who have been “blacklisted.”

Public humiliation and shaming are commonly used to change the
blacklisted’s behaviour. The Supreme Court maintains a database of
“discredited individuals” (laolai). Tech companies like TikTok, owned
by Chinese company ByteDance Ltd., publish laolai lists from the
publicly available data to inform its users which companies and
individuals have been “discredited.”

Technology enhances the social credit system.

To register a SIM cards and new SMART phones, Chinese users must by
law use face scan technology. This biometric data then informs China’s
already extensive and rapidly expanding national network of facial
recognition cameras.

The surveillance grid, allowing entry to everything from bus depots to
safari parks, is integrating with alleged emotion-recognition
technology to assess an individual’s mood and “predict” their
behaviour.

China’s internet is highly regulated via the “Measures on the
Administration of Internet Information Services.” The government
prohibits news bloggers from commenting on any policies or political
developments without a license from the Cyberspace Adminstration of
China (CAC).

Again, this system operates as a public-private partnership. There are
eight licensed Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in China registered
with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), but
censorship largely occurs through the state’s partnership with fintech
companies and social media platforms. The censorship is overseen by
the Internet Information Office.

The Chinese have to register their personal details to use the popular
social media platforms. The independent sale of SIM cards and network
adapters is prohibited; the cards and adapters require similar
registration upon purchase and prior to use.

The Chinese authorities can block foreign websites, restricting
citizens access to information from outside China, and it is a crime
for anyone to facilitate the illegal flow of prohibited information
into China. The Chinese authorities have effectively created the crime
of information-smuggling.

Beyond inciting crimes or advocating violence or terrorism, Article 12
of China’s Cybersecurity Law outlines the other types of information
that Chinese people are not permitted to share:

    [Users] must not use the Internet to engage in activities
endangering national security, national honour, and national
interests; they must not incite subversion of national sovereignty,
overturn the socialist system, incite separatism, break national
unity, [. . .] create or disseminate false information to disrupt the
economic or social order, or information that infringes on the
reputation, privacy, intellectual property or other lawful rights and
interests of others, and other such acts.

In other words, no one is permitted to question the state in China.
This doesn’t stop the people from doing so, but the associated risks
are high. Political dissidents can certainly expect to be censored by
the social media platforms, and prison sentences are a distinct
possibility for those who speak out too vociferously.

Among the major geopolitical powers, China is leading in the
development of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). CBDC is
“programmable money” and the issuer can insert “smart contracts” to
control what can be bought, where it can be used and who can use it.

Bo Li, the former Deputy Governor of the Bank of China and the current
Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
speaking at the Central Bank Digital Currencies for Financial
Inclusion: Risks and Rewards symposium, clarified smart contracts
further:

    CBDC can allow government agencies and private sector players to
program [CBDC] to create smart-contracts, to allow targetted policy
functions. For example[,] welfare payments [. . .], consumptions
coupons, [. . .] food stamps. By programming, CBDC money can be
precisely targeted [to] what kind of [things] people can own, and what
kind of use [for which] this money can be utilised. For example, [. .
.] for food.

At the 2022 World Economic Forum’s Davos gathering, the president of
the Chinese Alibaba Group, J. Michael Evans, announced that the global
tech corporation would soon roll out its personal “carbon footprint
tracker.”

He said:

    We’re developing, through technology, an ability for consumers to
measure their own carbon footprint [. . .] That’s where they’re
travelling, how they are travelling, what are they eating, what are
they consuming on the platform. [. . .] So, individual carbon
footprint tracker, stay tuned! We don’t have it operational yet, but
this is something we’re working on.

During the initial COVID-19 lockdowns, China’s government required all
businesses and public services to install Covid status app scanners,
connected to the internet.

In order to access shops, restaurants, libraries, hospitals, etc., and
to move between the newly created urban “zones,” the Chinese have to
use their Covid app. In conjunction with the SIM and SMART phone
registration requirements, combined with the biometric facial
recognition technology, the public movements of the urban Chinese can
be tracked 24/7 in real time by China’s public-private partnership.

The foundations for “the scientific operation of the entire social
mechanism” have already been built in China. One of the major cities
conducting some of its business in CBDC is Shanghai. In Shanghai’s
Pudong “smart city” district, an AI integrated monitoring system is
able to access the feeds from 290,000 surveillance cameras.

The deputy director of the smart city, Sheng Denden, explained the
systems value to the Chinese government:

    For the government, this is a tool for more efficient
administration in the city.

China is not communist. It is a technocracy. It is the world’s first Technate.

THE CHINA BLAME GAME

As we have already discussed, the idea that Western governments are
“opposed” to China’s government is frankly ridiculous. This is not to
suggest that there aren’t tensions, but these spring from competition
not trenchant animosity. China’s government, and its tech giant
partners, are as much a part of G3P as any other nation. The
propaganda, from both the West and the Communist Party of China,
serves as a surface narrative designed to divide and rule the global
population, and to exert control over the respective domestic
populations.

The Trilateralists who worked tirelessly to ensure that China was able
to construct a Technate are seemingly proud of their claimed
achievements. In 2001, Hedley Donovan, one of the founding members of
the Trilateral Commission alongside Brzezinski and the Rockefellers,
wrote:

    It’s no exaggeration to describe the current regime as a
technocracy. [. . .] You might say that technocratic politics is a
natural fit with the Chinese political culture. [. . .] During the
1980s, technocracy as a concept was much talked about, especially in
the context of so-called ‘Neo-Authoritarianism.’ [. . .] The basic
beliefs and assumptions of the technocrats were laid out quite
plainly: Social and economic problems were akin to engineering
problems and could be understood, addressed, and eventually solved as
such. [. . .] Scientism underlies the post-Mao technocracy, and it is
the orthodoxy against which heresies are measured.

The self-congratulation was largely misplaced. That China’s government
developed a Technate owes more to that nation’s circumstances and
political and social history and belief systems than it does to the
ambitions of the Trilateralists.

Technocracy is intended to be a sociopolitical system where individual
rights are sacrificed to communitarianism. This is contrary to the
Western liberal tradition. Technocracy represented less of a culture
shock to the Chinese people. Certainly this fact was another impetus
for the Trilateralists to pilot technocracy in China.

Just as we in the West generally believe in individual liberty and
freedom from the state, so the Chinese people largely hold that the
state should strive to rule with ren along the path to the Great Way
and equality for all. In both cases, the people continue to be
deceived and disappointed by the “kakistocrats,” who clearly have no
intention of living up to any of those principles or expectations.

The mass and widespread Chinese demonstrations against the human cost
of the government’s harsh Covid lockdown measures shows that the
people are not willing to simply allow the state to do whatever it
likes.

While isolated protests in China are not unusual, the scale and
coordination of these protests are testament to the Chinese people’s
determination to resist oppression.

The Western investment in Chinese technocracy was made with a view to
developing a global system, not one restricted to China. From the
surveillance network and social credit to censorship and social
control using CBDC, having seen what can be achieved in China, Western
governments are busy trying to impose exactly the same model of
technocracy upon their own people.

The Western political class cannot help but openly admire China’s
technocracy. The only difference is that China’s system is publicly
discussed—although rarely acknowledged as “technocracy” by name—while
the rapidly emerging technocracy in the West is denied and concealed.

The G3P is ostensibly colonising Western populations yet remains eager
to avoid the errors of 19th century colonialists. The Rockefellers’
research in the late 1950s highlighted the need to first justify the
necessary destruction of democratic values—something all Western
governments are working hard to do.

For its part, the Chinese government has had its own reasons for
allowing technocracy to flourish. Technocracy fits well with China’s
domestic policy ambitions. That said, there is no reason to think that
the Chinese government ever intended to “export” technocracy to other
nations.

Technocracy is being installed globally. This suits China’s oligarchy,
accustomed as it is to operating a Technate. The Chinese government
has no reason to stand in the way of the global adoption of
technocracy. It is merely aligned with the global transformation, not
leading it.

China’s government is not forcing other nations to adopt technocracy.
Rather, all governments are collaborating to that end.

The Chinese people are not our enemy, and China is not a foe to be
fought. We, the people of the Earth, are all under attack by our own
G3P governments.