Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy

[grarpamp]

> Tor uses some kind of limited padding,

Tor Project Inc added netflow padding after someone
started posting on netflow, general TA, and Sybil problems.
Then TPI censored, banned, and booted them out after
they kept publicly posting about TA and other insidious and
inconvenient problems such as Sybil. Now with Sybil, like before
with padding, they never credit mention the poster's work, and try
to phrase claim that TPI was the natural origin self impetus source
to do the pad and Sybil just at those moments in time, when
they had decades to do that since they knew the weaknesses
since decades... No, they were just getting exposed is why... lol.

Just like their netflow padding doesn't do much,
neither does their current Sybil proposal.
Some interest in real security surely exists,
but it definitely gets distracted by $ponsors
who pay for other things, all to half of said money
for decades has been from Government, which many
define as a problematic source of conflictive influencing.

> Afaik all backbone routers can be configured for packet or per-flow

At high line rates it takes serious HW to do full spyveillance
capture or flows, sampled and aggregated flows are common
for ISP service when those aren't needed.

> can get packet logs whenever they want them.

They can "get" them, but there's no need to go external
for that when they can just troll the output of their own
private TOP-SECRET FVEY taps that feed into their
global internet buffers at Bluffdale and elsewhere.
Same for what they get from their Corp-is-aware
feeds obtained under different "authorities".

> Against the elephant? Tor's padding is totally useless.

Not only the elephants anymore.
Netflow traditionally a quaint thing used by ISP's and LEA's
to match up endpoints, subpoenas, abuse, bots, traffic
stats, etc... it can work to some percent to follow some
tor traffic cases, but it isn't a generalized form of TA.

Today really anyone with a brain and some code
can begin to general TA characterize streams of bytes
counting and timing over various size windows, and
hunt for that pattern where it also appeared on their
other boxes.

Good luck trying to make a factor of defense improvement
against general TA without trying a fulltime enforced
and reclocked base layer of dynamic chaff.
Submit papers for acceptance into tor alternatives :)


"Tor Stinks -- NSA"