small rehash of part of modern cointelpro/disruption tactics from activism

[Karl]

Private Military Corporations (PMCs) are essentially mercenaries acting
largely outside of government regulation or democratic control. They are
hired by private corporations to assist in their interests and act as
for-hire businesses with few or no ethical considerations. Some examples of
these corporations are TigerSwan, Triple Canopy, and STRATFOR.

PMCs are often staffed with U.S. military veterans, and employ
counterinsurgency techniques and skills honed during the invasions of Iraq
and Afghanistan, or other military operations. And in many cases, these
PMCs collaborate with public law enforcement agencies to share information,
such that law enforcement is essentially acting as a private contractor
<https://dgrnewsservice.us13.list-manage.com/track/click?u=89a226816d8aa73fa13cf8c16&id=013bdc833f&e=cbeda825d2>
for a corporation.
Disruption Tactics Used by Corporate Goon Squads

PMCs can be expected to deploy four basic tactics.

   1. * Intelligence Gathering*

First, they will attempt to gather as much information on protesters as
possible. This begins with what is called OSINT — Open Source Intelligence.
This simply means combing through open records on the internet: Googling
names, scrolling through social media profiles and groups, and compiling
information that is publicly available for anyone who cares to look.

Other methods of information gathering are more active, and include
physical surveillance (such as flying a helicopter overhead, as occurred
today), signals intelligence (attempting to capture cell phone calls,
emails, texts, and website traffic using a device like a Stingray also
known as an IMSI catcher), and infiltration or human intelligence (HUMINT).
This last is perhaps the most important, the most dangerous, and the most
difficult to combat.

   1. * Disruption*

Second, they will attempt to disrupt the protest. This is often done by
using the classic tactics of COINTELPRO to plant rumors, false information,
and foment infighting to weaken opposition.

During the protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline, one TigerSwan
infiltrator
<https://dgrnewsservice.us13.list-manage.com/track/click?u=89a226816d8aa73fa13cf8c16&id=668ceec8b2&e=cbeda825d2>
working inside the protest camps wrote to his team that

“I need you guys to start looking at the activists in your area and see if
there are individuals who are vulnerable. They’re broke, always talking
about needing gas money or whatever. Maybe they’re disillusioned, depressed
a little. Life is fucking them over. We can buy them a bus ticket to any
camp they want if they’re willing to provide intel. We win no matter what.
If they agree to inform for pay, we get intel. If they tell our pitchman to
go f*** himself/herself, the activist will start wondering who did take the
money and it’ll cause conflict within the activist groups and it won’t cost
us anything.”

In 2013, there was a leak of documents from the private intelligence
company STRATFOR, which has worked for the American Petroleum Institute,
Dow Chemical, Northrup Grumman, Coca Cola, and so on. The leaked documents
revealed one part of STRATFOR’s strategy for fighting social movements. The
document proposes dividing activists into four groups, then exploiting
their differences to fracture movements.

“Radicals, idealists, realists and opportunists [are the four categories],”
the leaked documents state. “The Opportunists are in it for themselves and
can be pulled away for their own self-interest. The Realists can be
convinced that transformative change is not possible and we must settle for
what is possible.  Idealists can be convinced they have the facts wrong and
pulled to the Realist camp.  Radicals, who see the system as corrupt and
needing transformation, need to be isolated and discredited, using false
charges to assassinate their character is a common tactic.”

As I will discuss later on, solidarity and movement culture is the best way
to push back against these methods.

Other examples of infiltration and disruption have often focused on:

   - Increasing tensions around racist or sexist behavior
   - Targeting individuals with drug or alcohol addictions to become
   informants
   - Using sex appeal and relationship building to get information
   - Acting as an “agent provocateur” to encourage protesters to become
   violent, even to the point of supplying them with bombs, in order to secure
   arrests
   - Spreading rumors about inappropriate behavior to sew discord and
   mistrust


   1. * Intimidation*

The third tactic used by these companies is intimidation. They will use
fear and paranoia as a deliberate form of psychological warfare. This can
include anonymous threats, shows of force, visible surveillance, and so on.

   1. * Violence*

When other methods fail, PMCs and public law enforcement will ultimately
resort to direct violence, as we have seen with Standing Rock and many
other protest movements.

As I have written before, colonial states enforce their resource extraction
regimes with force, and we should disabuse ourselves of notions to the
contrary. Vigilante violence is also always a concern. When people seek to
defend land from destruction, men with guns are usually dispatched to
arrest them, remove them from the site, and lock them in cages.
How to Resist Against Surveillance and Repression

There are specific techniques we can deploy to protect ourselves, and by
extension, protect the land at Thacker Pass. These techniques are called
“security culture.”

Security culture is a set of practices and attitudes designed to increase
the safety of political communities. These guidelines are created based on
recent and historic state repression, and help to reduce paranoia and
increase effectiveness.

Security culture cannot keep us 100% safe, all the time. There is risk in
political action. But it helps us manage risks that do exist, and take
calculated risks when necessary to achieve our goals.

The first rule of security culture is this: be cautious, but do not live in
fear. We cannot let their intimidation be effective. Creating paranoia is a
key goal for PMCs and other repressive organizations. When they make us so
paranoid we no longer take action, reach out to potential allies, or plan
and carry out our campaigns, they win using only the techniques of
psychological warfare. When we are fighting to protect the land and water,
we are doing something righteous, and we should be proud and stand tall
while we do this work.

The second rule of security culture is that solidarity is how we overcome
paranoia, snitchjacketing, and rumor-spreading. We must act with principles
and in a deeply ethical and honorable way. Work to build alliances,
friendships, and trust—while maintaining good boundaries and holding people
accountable. This is the foundation of a good culture.

In regards to infiltration, security culture recommends the following:

   1. It’s not safe nor a good idea to generally speculate or accuse people
   of being infiltrators. This is a typical tactic that infiltrators use to
   shut movements down.
   2. Paranoia can cause destructive behavior.
   3. Making false/uncertain accusations is dangerous: this is called
   “bad-jacketing” or “snitch-jacketing.”
   4. Build relationships deliberately, and build trust slowly. Do not
   share sensitive information with people who don’t need to know it. There is
   a fine line between promoting a campaign and sharing information that could
   put someone at risk.
   5. Good security culture focuses on *identifying and stopping bad
   behavior.*
   6. Do not talk to police or law enforcement unless you are a designated
   liaison.

Secure communications are an important part of security culture.

Here are some basic recommendations to secure your communications.

   1. Email, phone calls, social media, and text messages are inherently
   insecure. Nothing sensitive should be discussed using these platforms.
   2. Preferably, use modern secure messaging apps such as Signal, Wire, or
   Session. These apps are free and easy to use.
   3. We recommend setting up and using a VPN for all your internet access
   needs at camp. ProtonVPN and Firefox VPN are two reputable providers. These
   tools are easy to use after a brief initial setup, and only cost a small
   amount. Invest in security.

We must also remember that secure communications aren’t a magic bullet. If
you’re communicating with someone who decides to share your private
message, it’s no longer private. Use common sense and consider trust when
using secure communications tools.

Security culture also warns us not talk about some sensitive issues,
including:

   - Your or someone else’s participation in illegal action.
   - Someone else’s advocacy for such actions.
   - Your or someone else’s plans for a future illegal action.
   - Don’t talk about illegal actions in terms of specific times, people,
   places, etc.

Note: Nonviolent civil disobedience is illegal, but can sometimes be
discussed openly. In general, the specifics of nonviolent civil
disobedience should be discussed only with people who will be involved in
the action or those doing support work for them. It’s still acceptable
(even encouraged) to speak out generally in support of monkeywrenching and
all forms of resistance as long as you don’t mention specific places,
people, times, etc.
 Conclusion

 Security is a very important topic, but is challenging. There are so many
potential threats, and we are not used to acting in a secure way. That’s
why we are working to create a “security culture”—so that our communities
of resistance are always considering security, assessing threats, studying
our opposition, and creating countermeasures to their methods.

Most importantly, do not let this scare you, and do not be overwhelmed.
Simply take one security measure at a time, begin to study it, and then
implement better protocols one by one. We use the term “security culture”
because security is a mindset that should be developed and shared.
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