Vault1317 protocol: a modern approach for metadata protection with deniablity

[Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0]

On Sat, 05 Jun 2021 05:29:22 +0000
"ROOT at HardenedVault" <root at hardenedvault.net> wrote:

> Hi,
> 

>  If anyone can forge a message pretending to be yours, when a judge holds a message and claims it is yours, you can deny it by claiming that it is forged by him.

	If you tell that to the judge, I'd expect the judge to ask you to prove your claim...which can't be done. But ok I understand that the claim is : anybody could forge messages. But, again, the fact that messages can be forged doesn't mean they actually have been forged. So as a defense it seems kind of ambiguous to me. 

	The big problem here is that the protocol doesn't hide the fact that messages are being exchanged in the first place...

	Seems to me that if on the other hand we were using a system that includes cover traffic then 'message deniability' would simply not be needed. 



> S0rry, it's our company website. Try to use tor-browser if you don't want to mess with js shit

	I simply block JS and your site still works fine, like it should. I partly mentioned it because the irony involved =P


> for stats purpose. You can download the paper (IACR version) and whitepaper( URL) w/o using browser at all.
> 
> 
> regards
> R at HardenedVault