oramfs - ORAM filesystem written in Rust

Travis Biehn tbiehn at gmail.com
Sat Jul 3 16:32:28 PDT 2021

On Sat, Jul 3, 2021 at 5:08 PM coderman <coderman at protonmail.com> wrote:

> ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
> On Thursday, July 1st, 2021 at 5:01 PM, Peter Fairbrother peter at tsto.co.uk
> wrote:
> ... It seems simple to attack, 'oh look the
> file(system) has been changed, the user wrote or deleted a file'
> therefore he has accessed the filesystem.
> i did not write this, but i did want to point out: even reads drive
> obfuscating writes to the underlying volume.
> note that for SSDs in particular, this is a change in behavior: usually
> once error limit reached, and write leveling maxed out, you can still read
> what has been written.
> in this case, only reading can still drive duty cycle to failure on SSD
> type storage.
> i don't have a specific number on write overload for any activity
> (including reads) but this would be useful to know in advance...
> best regards,

Here's the scheme they mention as an option, it has what you're looking


Seems like something a service provider uses, might result in thier hosting
provider doing slightly more ssd swaps.

What are some motivations for a general oram fs?

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