oramfs - ORAM filesystem written in Rust
coderman at protonmail.com
Sat Jul 3 16:07:28 PDT 2021
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Thursday, July 1st, 2021 at 5:01 PM, Peter Fairbrother peter at tsto.co.uk wrote:
> ... It seems simple to attack, 'oh look the
> file(system) has been changed, the user wrote or deleted a file'
> therefore he has accessed the filesystem.
i did not write this, but i did want to point out: even reads drive obfuscating writes to the underlying volume.
note that for SSDs in particular, this is a change in behavior: usually once error limit reached, and write leveling maxed out, you can still read what has been written.
in this case, only reading can still drive duty cycle to failure on SSD type storage.
i don't have a specific number on write overload for any activity (including reads) but this would be useful to know in advance...
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