[ot][spam] Thank you for your post coderman

Karl gmkarl at gmail.com
Thu Jul 1 01:01:39 PDT 2021

I'm including the entire quote of my previous message below, because david
was replying to everything I said but only including the leftmost email,
didn't reply when I asked about it, and I don't know why that is.  More
text following at bottom.

On Thu, Jul 1, 2021, 3:30 AM Karl <gmkarl at gmail.com> wrote:

> oramfs looks pretty cool and is similar to things I'm working on.
> ---
> other yammer:
> Regarding filesystems, I'm struggling to find a way to preserve data
> across corrupt systems damaging it and harddrives that break frequently.
> This is very hard for me to solve.
> This list still makes no sense to me, no pgp keys, to me people say things
> that make little sense (spam filtering out of nowhere?).  We need to get
> onto better channels.  I wonder what people are using for discourse with
> more cryptographic integrity nowadays.
> I proposed to the lsl project (used for neuroscience research) that they
> encrypt and authenticate their biosignal streams.  I wasn't sure what
> system to suggest and suggested hypercore because it offers some small
> proof of creation after the fact  They were expecting TLS of course, which
> I worry around because it doesn't say anything about archival integrity
> after decryption.  Hypercore wasn't really a good suggestion because it is
> written in nodejs and lsl is in c++ :-/
> Seems go and rust are the future.  I looked up go.sum : dependencies,
> although retrieved from github over the network (scary way to make an
> ecosystem) are hashed via sha256 in a way that can be upgraded (reliable,
> trustworthy).  Inspiring.  There are multiple facilities in the go
> dependency system, for pulling from offline mirrors instead of github, but
> they aren't that easy to find.  Haven't checked if the commit id of
> dependencies is used in the hash, or the worktree checkout, or what.
> Haven't checked rust's cargo to see what their approach is.  When picking
> a language, I want to make sure there are ways to quickly check where data
> corruption arises.  I always use submodules and subtrees for my
> dependencies in older languages.
> It's cool that go's approach pressures people to mirror github to dev
> offline.  That could accomplish a lot in the world, although is likely a
> little limited to things written in go.

After writing the above I looked into rust a little.
Rust stores its cargo.io package index in a single git repository with
history.  Each package's source bundle is hashed with sha256, although it
does not look like the format provides for easily upgrading that algorithm.

It is very inspiring that the entire package index can be downloaded and
used offline to checksum one's dependencies, as a single repository with
history.  The format is described a little in
https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/registries.html .

Additionally, executable projects made with rust include sha256sums of
their dependencies in their Cargo.lock file, I believe with the intent of
providing for deterministic rebuild, unsure.  oramfs's dependency checksums
can be seen at
https://github.com/kudelskisecurity/oramfs/blob/main/Cargo.lock .

Library projects that don't build executables do not include the Cargo.lock
file, and hence are a little less trustworthy when shared.  The format of
the hash is the same as in the index and doesn't provide for smoothly
adopting a new digest algorithm like go does.

I'm curious if go has something like rust's single git package index
repository, cause that's pretty nice.  Of course git isn't to be trusted
for binary files until it adopts newhash, these are ascii hashes not binary
data, although technically that means scrubbing the repo to verify that
holds which nobody would remember to do.  Git will adopt newhash eventually.
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