bantering with punk was Re: What advantage does Signal protocol have over basic public key encryption?

[Karl]

>> Do you mean that it is incredibly misleading to advertise
>> cryptographic safety when there is obviously an increasing degree of
>> unpublished research that counters it?
>>
>> I'm not sure what you're saying here.  Wouldn't it be fine to just add
>> a note that those are cryptographic terms, and do not technically
>> guarantee perfect privacy in the face of time travel?
>
> 	DUDE! Two hours ago you stated

Caps help reduce my caps!  (Woah.  Two hours.)

> 	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
> advancements decrypt all your messages"
>
> 	FUTURE ADVANCEMENTS can decrypt all your signal messages as well. Fact.

Man, here you quoted some slight hand-waving with focused argument ;P
I'm not up on the detailed meaning of perfect forward secrecy, but it
sure looks like a _lot_ more advancement is needed to decrypt it from
network data, because there is no single private key associated with
every message to simply recover from the flash media of a discarded
device.

I want my messages preserved, so I don't worry about forward secrecy =S

> 	So what the hell are you saying about 'time travel' now? YOU first alluded
> to the fact that IN THE FUTURE p-gpg could be broken. I just added, broken
> JUST LIKE SIGNAL. And so you are FALSELY ADVERTISING signal.

Second half of above paragraph.

I'll try to read your caps: you're saying that signal is similar to
pgp, and dangerous, and we need to cut the bullshit and get to stuff
that's real, being honest about the problems of all the solutions we
have?

> 	Feel free to admit you were wrong about 'foward secrecy' - or keep up with
> the bullshit.

I think you're drawing more similarities than the meanings of the
words warrant, something I do a ton myself.

>> > 	yeah well. I think I explained the basic problem twice. You don't need
>> > to
>> > 'trust' me but do your own research.
>>
>> Yeesh you removed the quote and stated you had explained it already.
>
> 	yes I explained it a few times now.
>
>
>> I don't remember what we were talking about,
>
> 	so go read what you wrote 2 hours ago. You don't even need to do that. I
> quoted what you said above. And I'll quote you once more
>
> 	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
> advancements decrypt all your messages"

So what are you saying the "basic problem" is, now.

>> >> does signal use diffie-helman key exchange?
>> > 	
>> > 	yes it does. You're the one pimping it, you shoud know.
>>
>> Blargh, links help here.
>
> 	nah. Read what I previously wrote or don't bother replying.

ummmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

you often send insulting things, I'll treat the reply as my form of
sending insulting things.

[personal experience description inhibited.  meanwhile, maybe you've
been mind controlled to argue on this list.]

>> https://weakdh.org/ is only about SSL and specifically chosen prime
>> numbers.
>
> 	It's about DH in various protocols not just in SSL. So you're wrong again.

my words after the comma include those other protocols.

i said ssl not tls, i don't know the difference at this time.

>> These are implementation errors, not compromises of the
>> protocol or the primtiive.
>
> 	that was an example of DH failing even without any 'future advancement'.
> And yes, it's an implementation error...of sorts. They used weak keys. The
> point that I was illustrating is how so called FORWARD SECRECY FAILS.

everything "fails" eventually.

> 	If thanks to 'future advancements' keys are broken then there's no 'foward
> secrecy'.

well, maybe i'll go look up forward secrecy so as to try to be more
rational here, but i'm also remembering you asked me not to reply
unless i was able to give you the respect of reviewing message content
you snipped away, to reply.

>> I vaguely recall there is something more serious regarding dh
>> exchange, dunno.  What's relevant is that signal is far better than
>> the plain text email we are communicating over right now.
>
> 	what's relevant is that you're falsely advertising signal.
>
> 	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
> advancements decrypt all your messages" - false.

you quoted this a lot of times.

I know I'm wrong there about something.  Do you know what it is,
specifically and clearly in language somebody experienced on this list
would agree to?  What does forward secrecy address, if not this?

> 	Also, we're using plain text here because this is a public forum.

that's not how I feel, the comparison seems like gossiping instead of
sending a letter to a mailing list.  in signal, messages are signed by
the sender and misbehavior of the isp and server are defended against
a little more.

it's notable that speaking in a forum transparent to those who dislike
the topic gets you hurt.  anarchists everywhere learn to organise in
small private groups.

>> >> does it do it in a
>> >> way that website describes as known to be vulnerable?
>> >
>> > 	...see your first unfounded claim about 'perfect' secrecy. DH is
>> > 'vulnerable' to 'advances in solving the discrete log problem' bla bla.
>>
>> Not only that, once you research personal teleportation devices door
>> locks become very vulnerable, too.
>
> 	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
> advancements decrypt all your messages"
>
> 	wait, that's the argument you were using against pgp eh? In the future pgp
> will be broken because of 'teleportation devices'.

pgp is broken by factorization.  teleportation would not be an
efficient way to research this.

not sure if https://primecoin.io/ is that relevant but we can make an
economy focused around compromising any cryptographic primitive, now.

>> >> > 	What I think is important to understand is that signal is a
>> >> > centralized
>> >> > service and the owners are not to be trusted, at all. Moxie
>> >> > morlonpoke
>> >>
>> >> That's the whole point of end-to-end encryption.
>> >
>> >
>> > 	Not sure what you mean. So called end to end encryption only encrypts
>> > messages. It doesn't magically solve 'traffic analysis' problems.
>>
>> Neither does decentralisation.  I was responding to your mention of
>> centralisation.
>
> 	
> 	at least decentralization doesn't allow the NSA to get all the data at
> once, directly from morlonpoke.

where are you from?  it's so funny to see the 'z'.  it's the united
states spelling.

i guess we'd better find this mr morlonpoke and defend them =/  dunno
how to do that.  we can call it freeing them from the shackles of
technology and forcing them to work on what actually makes sense to
work on.

the nsa already has agreements with isps, whereas a
morlonpoke-agreement would be a new negotiation.  you have a point
here but i don't think it's as big an issue as you seem to be saying
it is.  maybe cause i'm from the states so i already have their isps.

we could invest time and energy in making a contribution to signal to
make it decentralised.  this is phyiscally possible.

>> It is weird that signal uses centralised servers.   [if you could quote this line it would help me remember this topic.  i can forget things when what i see, changes.]
>
> 	I don't think 'weird' is the right word.

how about "painful as if you were getting beaten up by a fake holding
a surveillance camera so many times that you can't feel anymore"

what word would you use?

note to self: if punk removed the line where i said 'weird', it is
your responsibility to go and look.

>> Maybe to reduce
>> development load.  It's always sketchy the compromises made by
>> communities struggling to effect change.  It's possible it's just
>> communication issues.
>>
>> The point is that we need an ANONYMOUS BLOCKCHAIN-BASED MESSENGER TO
>> REPLACE SIGNAL in these times of disruption, and signal would pay
>> anybody to contribute the backend in a way they accept ;P
>
>
> 	I don't see why we need a blockchain based messenger. A blockchain may
> solve part of the 'key distribution problem' but in turn key distribution is
> just one part of the whole communication problem. So a blockchain is not a
> silver bullet.

blockchains break filters and firewalls like a tsunami, if they are
cryptographically sound and functioning.  if there is some protocol
quirk that makes for a censorship worry, that code can be designed to
not have that quirk.

it's getting late for making a blockchain messenger as people slowly
start noticing that money is just a fake thing to move them around,
but that hasn't actually happened yet.  the strength of a
cryptocurrency blockchain comes from the belief in money (because it
gives it to people as its steps of functioning).

>> >> > perfectly fits the profile of 'progressive' pentagon agent. So maybe
>> >> > the
>> >>
>> >> The only people who believe these people are real agents, and not just
>> >> people secretly drugged and abused by agents, are acting more as the
>> >> agents than they are.
>> >
>> >
>> > 	bullshit.
>>
>> Yeah?  Which is more productive, arguing on a list where nobody
>> replies to what you say or making software that increases privacy?
>
>
> 	a software endorsed by a CEO of the NSA like dorsey? A software directly
> marketed to people whom the state wants to survey closely? Anyway, use
> signal if you want, just don't make this sort of wrong and misleading claim
>
> 	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
> advancements decrypt all your messages"

I'm noticing you posted this _again_.  At this point my laptop ran out
of battery.  The place I'm staying, the fuse is broken so there's no
electricity in the room I use the laptop in.  I'm recharging it now in
the morning off a lead-acid battery I use.

I've been spending a lot of time messaging online in ways I'm not sure
of.  I'm going to turn off my internet for a bit.

But yeah.  Signal gave me great relief with its open,
shielded-room-supporting, protocol.

I didn't like how the people running it engaged in a chest-beating
competition with another cryptographic organisation, but they were
probably doing the best they could, just like you are.  I also don't
like that they have a centralised server, require a phone number to
register, and mostly support web-enabled technologies run by
corporations that have huge opportunity to put backdoors in.  But it's
pretty clear they gave a _lot_ of avenues for people to help address
those situations.

>
>
>
>>
>> >> > 'end to end encryption' works, but signal remains a US metadata
>> >> > spying
>> >> > operation, 'endorsed' by the likes of the 'ceo' of twatter. Hard to
>> >> > get
>> >> > a
>> >> > bigger red flag than that by the way.
>> >>
>> >> Nah it's more like a bunch of people subjected to international spying
>> >> operations figuring out the charades work that lets them escape a
>> >> little bit.  Also, free technology for others!
>> >
>> > 	
>> > 	more bullshit.
>>
>> Yeesh!  Signal can poison our souls with technology, and dangerously
>> reveal everything we do to the people who want to hurt us (BECAUSE IT
>> RUNS ON A PHONE, NOT BECAUSE OF ITS PROTOCOL), without being some
>> intentional attempt by cryptographers to harm the universe.
>>
>> Before signal people were using NOTHING.  NO ENCRYPTION AT ALL.
>
>
> 	That's ridiculous. The more you sound like a signal fanatic, the weaker
> your position becomes.
>
>
>> Some
>> of them were using encryption where a corporation and government could
>> freely decryption EVERYTHING, and was lying about it.  SOME of them.
>>
>> Caps intended with love and care and embarrassment.  I don't deserve
>> to write in caps.
>>
>> >> >> When they say "metadata that the signal servers have
>> >> >> access to" or "does not prevent a company from retaining
>> >> >> information"
>> >> >> they are talking about much smaller bits of data than people
>> >> >> usually
>> >> >> talk about.
>> >> >
>> >> > 	.....I think it's rather clear what 'metadata' we're talking about.
>> >> > Signal
>> >> > knows who talks to who and when.
>> >>
>> >> It doesn't sound like it's clear to you.  Metadata lives in bytes that
>> >> travel over network protocols and are analysed by algorithms.
>>
>> Anyway, yeah, PGP doesn't encrypt the message subjects and recipients.
>> I don't recall the protocol well, but the way the ratchet protocol
>> works there was a lot more possibility for encrypting per-message
>> metadata.
>>
>> >> Somebody has probably upgraded the concept now that deepfakes and such
>> >> are normal.
>> >>
>> >
>> > 	what are you talking about
>>
>> Well, I don't know the cryptographic terms, but you're possibly
>> talking about information that can be extracted from messaging by
>> algorithms, like traffic analysis, as comparable to metadata, like the
>> subject on an email or the location tagged on a jpeg photo.
>
>
> 	why don't you read what I wrote? I'm stating the obvious fact that in order
> to route messages the signal servers need to know who talks to who. Nothing
> to do with 'deep fakes' images, or fancy 'algorithms'.
>
>
>
>>
>> Nowadays machine learning is _way_ better at profiling stuff than just
>> traffic analysis.
>
>
> 	this isn't about so called 'machine learning'.
>