bantering with punk was Re: What advantage does Signal protocol have over basic public key encryption?

Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 punks at tfwno.gf
Mon Jan 25 17:05:34 PST 2021


On Mon, 25 Jan 2021 19:02:02 -0500
Karl <gmkarl at gmail.com> wrote:

> >> > 	So, I think your understanding of so misleadingly called 'perfect
> >> > forward
> >> > secrecy' isn't right.
> >>
> >> I don't remember the protocol really well to hold up my end here,
> >
> > 	this isn't only about the signal protocol but about any protocol that
> > advertises 'perfect forward secrecy' and uses 'public key cryptography' of
> > the kind that's vulnerable to attacks using 'quantum computers'.
> 
> Do you mean that it is incredibly misleading to advertise
> cryptographic safety when there is obviously an increasing degree of
> unpublished research that counters it?
> 
> I'm not sure what you're saying here.  Wouldn't it be fine to just add
> a note that those are cryptographic terms, and do not technically
> guarantee perfect privacy in the face of time travel?

	DUDE! Two hours ago you stated 

	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
advancements decrypt all your messages" 

	FUTURE ADVANCEMENTS can decrypt all your signal messages as well. Fact.

	So what the hell are you saying about 'time travel' now? YOU first alluded to the fact that IN THE FUTURE p-gpg could be broken. I just added, broken JUST LIKE SIGNAL. And so you are FALSELY ADVERTISING signal. 
	
	Feel free to admit you were wrong about 'foward secrecy' - or keep up with the bullshit. 


> 
> >> and  i don't really trust that you're relating forthrightly to revisit it
> >> much.
> >
> > 	yeah well. I think I explained the basic problem twice. You don't need to
> > 'trust' me but do your own research.
> 
> Yeesh you removed the quote and stated you had explained it already.

	yes I explained it a few times now. 


> I don't remember what we were talking about, 

	so go read what you wrote 2 hours ago. You don't even need to do that. I quoted what you said above. And I'll quote you once more 

	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
advancements decrypt all your messages"
		


> >> does signal use diffie-helman key exchange?
> > 	
> > 	yes it does. You're the one pimping it, you shoud know.
> 
> Blargh, links help here. 

	nah. Read what I previously wrote or don't bother replying. 


> 
> https://weakdh.org/ is only about SSL and specifically chosen prime
> numbers.  

	It's about DH in various protocols not just in SSL. So you're wrong again. 


> These are implementation errors, not compromises of the
> protocol or the primtiive.

	that was an example of DH failing even without any 'future advancement'. And yes, it's an implementation error...of sorts. They used weak keys. The point that I was illustrating is how so called FORWARD SECRECY FAILS.

	If thanks to 'future advancements' keys are broken then there's no 'foward secrecy'. 


> 
> I vaguely recall there is something more serious regarding dh
> exchange, dunno.  What's relevant is that signal is far better than
> the plain text email we are communicating over right now.

	what's relevant is that you're falsely advertising signal. 

	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
advancements decrypt all your messages" - false. 


	Also, we're using plain text here because this is a public forum. 


> >> does it do it in a
> >> way that website describes as known to be vulnerable?
> >
> >
> > 	...see your first unfounded claim about 'perfect' secrecy. DH is
> > 'vulnerable' to 'advances in solving the discrete log problem' bla bla.
> 
> Not only that, once you research personal teleportation devices door
> locks become very vulnerable, too.


	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
advancements decrypt all your messages"

	wait, that's the argument you were using against pgp eh? In the future pgp will be broken because of 'teleportation devices'. 


> 
> >> > 	What I think is important to understand is that signal is a
> >> > centralized
> >> > service and the owners are not to be trusted, at all. Moxie morlonpoke
> >>
> >> That's the whole point of end-to-end encryption.
> >
> >
> > 	Not sure what you mean. So called end to end encryption only encrypts
> > messages. It doesn't magically solve 'traffic analysis' problems.
> 
> Neither does decentralisation.  I was responding to your mention of
> centralisation.

	
	at least decentralization doesn't allow the NSA to get all the data at once, directly from morlonpoke. 



> 
> It is weird that signal uses centralised servers.  


	I don't think 'weird' is the right word. 



> Maybe to reduce
> development load.  It's always sketchy the compromises made by
> communities struggling to effect change.  It's possible it's just
> communication issues.
> 
> The point is that we need an ANONYMOUS BLOCKCHAIN-BASED MESSENGER TO
> REPLACE SIGNAL in these times of disruption, and signal would pay
> anybody to contribute the backend in a way they accept ;P


	I don't see why we need a blockchain based messenger. A blockchain may solve part of the 'key distribution problem' but in turn key distribution is just one part of the whole communication problem. So a blockchain is not a silver bullet. 



> 
> >> > perfectly fits the profile of 'progressive' pentagon agent. So maybe
> >> > the
> >>
> >> The only people who believe these people are real agents, and not just
> >> people secretly drugged and abused by agents, are acting more as the
> >> agents than they are.
> >
> >
> > 	bullshit.
> 
> Yeah?  Which is more productive, arguing on a list where nobody
> replies to what you say or making software that increases privacy?


	a software endorsed by a CEO of the NSA like dorsey? A software directly marketed to people whom the state wants to survey closely? Anyway, use signal if you want, just don't make this sort of wrong and misleading claim

	"4. perfect forward secrecy.  addresses the issue with pgp where future
advancements decrypt all your messages"



> 
> >> > 'end to end encryption' works, but signal remains a US metadata spying
> >> > operation, 'endorsed' by the likes of the 'ceo' of twatter. Hard to get
> >> > a
> >> > bigger red flag than that by the way.
> >>
> >> Nah it's more like a bunch of people subjected to international spying
> >> operations figuring out the charades work that lets them escape a
> >> little bit.  Also, free technology for others!
> >
> > 	
> > 	more bullshit.
> 
> Yeesh!  Signal can poison our souls with technology, and dangerously
> reveal everything we do to the people who want to hurt us (BECAUSE IT
> RUNS ON A PHONE, NOT BECAUSE OF ITS PROTOCOL), without being some
> intentional attempt by cryptographers to harm the universe.
> 
> Before signal people were using NOTHING.  NO ENCRYPTION AT ALL.  


	That's ridiculous. The more you sound like a signal fanatic, the weaker your position becomes. 


> Some
> of them were using encryption where a corporation and government could
> freely decryption EVERYTHING, and was lying about it.  SOME of them.
> 
> Caps intended with love and care and embarrassment.  I don't deserve
> to write in caps.
> 
> >> >> When they say "metadata that the signal servers have
> >> >> access to" or "does not prevent a company from retaining information"
> >> >> they are talking about much smaller bits of data than people usually
> >> >> talk about.
> >> >
> >> > 	.....I think it's rather clear what 'metadata' we're talking about.
> >> > Signal
> >> > knows who talks to who and when.
> >>
> >> It doesn't sound like it's clear to you.  Metadata lives in bytes that
> >> travel over network protocols and are analysed by algorithms.
> 
> Anyway, yeah, PGP doesn't encrypt the message subjects and recipients.
> I don't recall the protocol well, but the way the ratchet protocol
> works there was a lot more possibility for encrypting per-message
> metadata.
> 
> >> Somebody has probably upgraded the concept now that deepfakes and such
> >> are normal.
> >>
> >
> > 	what are you talking about
> 
> Well, I don't know the cryptographic terms, but you're possibly
> talking about information that can be extracted from messaging by
> algorithms, like traffic analysis, as comparable to metadata, like the
> subject on an email or the location tagged on a jpeg photo.


	why don't you read what I wrote? I'm stating the obvious fact that in order to route messages the signal servers need to know who talks to who. Nothing to do with 'deep fakes' images, or fancy 'algorithms'. 



> 
> Nowadays machine learning is _way_ better at profiling stuff than just
> traffic analysis. 


	this isn't about so called 'machine learning'. 


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