Tor Stinks: Stealthy Traffic Analysis

[grarpamp]

https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/897-Tor-0day-Crashing-the-Tor-Network.html


> circuit padding
> client-edge padding capability already built

Neither may have much impact on a global TA adversary.
Draw it on paper and start thinking like a TA,
if not obvious, then drop in a cut.

As before on this list... a full time base layer
of fill among connected p2p nodes seems more
potential for impact against TA.

> someone said to tack up another N x parallel connections
> between the same two nodes when more bandwith desired

Such channel bonding, socket / cpu / management resources...
likely N x inefficient. Renegotiate the existing connection,
design it as a cell carrier from start, etc.

> Hey, has anyone else ever implemented this before, and maybe had a
> patch rejected?

Tor eschews entertaining such models and options
on their lists as Tor dislikes traffic and will not accept
such a patch that alters its marketed mode of operation.
Thus tor will remain 25+ year old TA vulnerable system,
leaving new projects to explore various approaches to TA
in a low latency net (and even make cost raising impact on Sybil).

Some coders who know Tor Project is a censor rejecting
topical posts and critiques, lies to its users, is infected with
virtue signalling SJW, etc... might not feel comfy working them
with patches either, as opposed to with a fork or some new.

Edge padding, and recent not-enough-against-anti-sybil, moved
forward, in some part because small number noisy people on
TA/Sybil, who were more banned than noise/ideas thanked.