git based dark web (Tor) "one way" blog/ document dump/ wordpress? - addendum: CIA technology notes

[coderman]

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Thursday, February 13, 2020 10:59 AM, John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote:
...
> https://documentcloud.org/documents/6775056-20200211.htm (pages 20-21)

https://www.documentcloud.org/notes/print?docs[]=6775056

 20200211
206 Pages - Contributed by Alexa O'Brien, Alexa O'Brien Investigations - Feb 12, 2020
4/20/2016 5:30 PM Lazy Snapshot Back Up (p. 3)

4/20/16 Revert to 4/16/16 5:35 pm (p. 3)

March 3, 2016 BU was last accessed April 20, 2016 05:43 PM (p. 4)

VMware-8.log created April 16, 2016 5:42 pm (p. 5)

Confluence log 4/20/16 They changed admin permissions, SSH keys; VMware-9.log and Vmware.log are 4/20/16 10:38 PM (p. 5)

Schulte (according to US crim theory deletes logs) (p. 5)

VMware-9 and VMware audit user activity on DevLAN 6:51 PM deleted (p. 6)

Schulte DevLAN logs 4/20/16 6:51 PM Revert to BU (p. 7)

4/20/16 6:55 pm Confirm delete (p. 9)

5/26/16 12:39 PM Schulte asking for admin priv within Stash for Brutal Kangaroo (p. 11)

Dave talked to Leonis immediately after then reviewed the audit log week or two after (p. 12)

Schulte was a problem on Brutal Kangaroo; Dave was told to remove all admins with access, make Leonis only one with access (p. 13)

3/7/17 DevLAN disabled to protect for FBI (p. 14)

Defense on what access means... (p. 17)

Per defense, Dave told FBI not to much logging turned on (p. 22)

'did not traverse the Internet' (p. 27)

'running thru CIA infrastructure and other private facilities' (p. 27)

didn't track netflow (p. 33)

May 2017 Dave interview FBI (p. 39)

Hard Drive that Dave had put stash on; he doesn't remember if he wiped; and he doesn't know where the HD is (p. 40)

Dave tells FBI three ways the data could have been downloaded. (p. 41)

Missing logs Jan. 14 to April 21 2016 (p. 55)

Logs only kept 30 days (p. 56)

deleted CIFS share March 2017 (month of leak) (p. 68)

Jira folder modified April 13, 2016 (p. 74)

Defense: anyone who had access to Jira could have copied any file from Altabackup (p. 75)

Redirect of dave denton (p. 78)

Not everyone who had access to Jira app had access to server (p. 78)

DevLAN account didn't give access to vSphere (p. 82)

Start of Patrick Leedom direct (p. 87)

works at MITRE (p. 88)

he is lead cybersecurity engineer for FBI at MITRE (p. 88)

technical analysis unit (p. 89)

cyber division of FBI (p. 89)

FBI cyber action team (CAT) (p. 89)

Harold Martin (p. 94)

US offers Leedom as expert in digital forensics and cop science; defense objects wants to VOIR DIRE (p. 99)

Leedom started March.early April 2017 (p. 104)

first part of forensic investigation was determining if there were nation-state hacking attempts; malware (p. 105)

US crim theory of theft (p. 106)

all confluence data disclosed by WikiLeaks March 7, 2017 (p. 107)

March 3 backup files disclosed on WikiLeaks (p. 107)

Confluence wiki (p. 115)

stash, bamboo, jira software development package (p. 115)

stash (p. 115)

bamboo, continuous integration platform (p. 115)

jira, issue tracker (p. 116)

crowd, atlassian to windows active directory (p. 116)

confluence & bamboo are virtual machines running on ESXi server (p. 116)

stash & crowd running on physical Stash server; jira running on physical Hickok server (p. 117)

netapp server (p. 118)

netapp server-- home directories; altabackup share store Atlassian services & BU; method for delivering completed tools (p. 119)

200 users as of April 2016 (p. 122)

Schulte did not have access to admin folders on netapp (p. 128)

schulte activity retrieved from unallocated spaces (p. 137)

unallocated space log (p. 139)

Oct. 27 2016 (Schulte last log on to DevLan) (p. 143)

Log file VWare April 12, 2016 (p. 144)

Log in thru v-Sphere on ESXi server April 15 2016 (p. 145)

April 4 2016 Brutal Kangaroo (p. 157)

Schulte DevLAN April 15, 2016 (p. 159)

Leedom testifies about US theory of theft forensic case... (p. 160)

ESXI Log file April 15 2016 3:36 pm Schule user account (p. 161)

Schulte attempting to create datastore April 15 3:47 PM (p. 164)

auth.log April 15 2016 Schulte IP on DevLAN 3:38 PM (p. 168)

fingerprint matches (p. 170)

no evidence of ESXi session closing until repurposed 4/25 (p. 172)

another session ESXi Weber 4/16 open to change root password and closed 4/18 (p. 172)

Schulte logged in as admin ESXi April 15 3:39, no evidence of close out (p. 173)

know he ran these commands after April 15 (p. 173)

root at OSB (p. 174)

April 16 password change on DevLAN on Atlassian products and ESXi server (p. 175)

Defendant account that created the key pair (p. 175)

That is the key used to log into April 15 (p. 176)

Rufus pub/private key in defendant's home directory (p. 178)

US theory Schulte deleted snapshot 3 of 4 (p. 179)

US theory Schulte used private key to log into Confluence using SSH (p. 182)

After April 16, 2016 (p. 183)

4/16 Schulte changed root account pw (p. 186)

Evidence of Schulte using admin access after 4/16 (p. 189)

Admin changed, but not SSH (p. 190)

Schulte activity on 4/18 (p. 192)

deefendant's virtual machine attempted to log to Confluence on April 18 11:08 am over SSH failed. public key no longer available (p. 198)

Another attempt at 11:13 am April 18 (p. 198)

those were regular log in attempts thru v-Sphere (p. 198)

host D file: log-in for user root from defendant's workstation IP into ESXi server thru sphere 4/18 11:12 am (p. 201)