New York Times Confidential Documents Leak

[Zenaan Harkness]

On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 02:10:48PM -0700, Se7en wrote:
> Due to a major oversight, the New York Time's digital collection of
> private, privleged, and confidential documentation is avalible for
> download.
> 
> Archive it fast.
> 
> <https://kiwifarms.net/threads/nyt-secure-server-leak.74777/>
> 
> Via clearnet HTTP, and via FTP. 


Definitely needs many eyes.

One way to browse is click on Google's "images" link.  Much more fasterer browsing through documents.

I don't know how revelatory such things might prompt humans to actually live a human right - we can only hope...


   https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/578-beatles-uk-court-judgment/3fb570ca7b71959d4635/optimized/full.pdf
   Neutral Citation Number: [2019] EWHC 60 (Admin)
   Case No: CO/3449/2018
   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
   QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
   DIVISIONAL COURT
   Royal Courts of Justice
   Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
   Date: 18/01/2019

      The mischief this provision is aimed at is the disclosure (“revealing”) of information
      which, by its nature, is very personal. Indeed, much of it is of a nature that many people
      would keep tightly held and discuss with few, if any. Recital 37 to the LED indicates
      that that such processing merits “specific protection as the context of [the] processing
      could create significant risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms” of the data
      subject. Sir James submits, correctly in our view, that the term “religious or
      philosophical beliefs” could not include extreme religious violence. We would add that
      a mindset which impels a person to commit criminal acts of violence could not be seen
      as a “political belief” for these purposes. A paedophile who has an unshakeable belief
      that sex with children is in their interests, or any other criminal with a profound belief
      that his criminality is not wrong, could not rely on their motivation as a political or
      philosophical belief and thus engage these provisions. No more can a person alleged
      to use terrorist violence for what he considers to be justifiable political or religious ends,
      were that motivation referred to in the evidence collected as part of a criminal
      investigation.
      In our judgment, the Home Secretary is right to submit that these
      provisions should not be interpreted to give a heightened degree of protection in respect
      of terrorist offences which advance “a political, religious, racial or ideological cause”
      compared with non-ideologically driven crimes.




   https://int.nyt.com/data/int-shared/nytdocs/docs/224/224.pdf
   United States Court of Appeals
   For the Seventh Circuit
   No. 06-3376
   LYNNE BLOCH , HELEN BLOCH , and NATHAN BLOCH ,
   Plaintiffs-Appellants,
   v.
   EDWARD FRISCHHOLZ and  HORELINE TOWERS
   CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION ,
   Defendants-Appellees.
   ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2008—DECIDED JULY 10, 2008

      Although we can accept in the abstract Mr. Doe’s argu-
      ment that a government may not punish pure thought, we
      cannot accept his further submission that, in subjecting him
      to this ban, the City “punished” him for “pure thought.”8

      8 It is important to note that the City, in banning Mr. Doe from
      the parks, was not “punishing” him at all. Rather, the ban was a
      civil (i.e., nonpunitive) measure designed for the protection of the
      public. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (finding the
      Alaska sex offender registration statute nonpunitive); see also
      Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997) (explaining regarding
      Hendricks, the challenger of the civil commitment statute at
      issue: “This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a
      prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes
      Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
      properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings”).
      It is unquestionable that a governmental entity has broader
      powers to operate both substantively and procedurally in the
      civil, as opposed to criminal (i.e., punitive), context. See generally
      Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To
      Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending
      the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J. 1325, 1343-44
      (1991)...

      The City has not banned him from having sexual fantasies
      about children. It did not ban him from the public parks
      because he admitted to having sexual fantasies about child-
      ren in his home or even in a coffee shop. The inescapable
      reality is that Mr. Doe did not simply entertain thoughts; he
      brought himself to the brink of committing child molesta-
      tion. He had sexual urges directed toward children, and he
      took dangerous steps toward gratifying his urges by going
      to a place where he was likely to find children in a vulnera-
      ble situation.

      To characterize the ban as directed at “pure thought”
      would require us to close our eyes to Mr. Doe’s actions. It
      also would require that we give short shrift to Mr. Doe’s
      condition as an admitted pedophile who continues to have
      difficulty controlling his urges. The law has long recognized
      that not every individual is equally capable of controlling
      his desires and preventing them from becoming actions
      which injure others. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003)
      (explaining, in upholding Alaska’s sex offender registration
      statute, that “an imposition of restrictive measures on sex
      offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a legitimate nonpu-
      nitive governmental objective and has been historically so
      regarded” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
      As Justice Holmes wrote, “the character of every act de-
      pends upon the circumstances in which it is done.” Schenck
      v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Mr. Doe is an admitted
      sexual addict with a proclivity toward children; as such, he
      belongs to a group of persons who are more susceptible to
      having sexual desires with respect to children and to acting
      on those urges. We cannot ignore, nor can we say the law
      somehow commands the City to ignore, Mr. Doe’s pedo-
      philia and the history of his battle with that affliction.
      Facing this reality certainly does not license society, acting
      through government, to exile, harass or marginalize Mr.
      Doe, but it permits government to fulfill its responsibility to
      protect vulnerable children in dangerous situations.

      In short, we must recognize the actual situation confront-
      ing the City as well as the parents and children who look to
      that City for protection. The children and their parents are
      not concerned about Mr. Doe’s thoughts. They are con-
      cerned about his coming to the park to achieve sexual grati-
      fication. They do not need to wait until a child is molested
      to take steps to protect their children. The First Amendment
      does not prohibit the City from taking the action it did to
      protect its children. It does not require the City to act in an
      ostrichlike fashion and expose the children of the City to the
      risk that, on a future date, a child will wander further from
      the group, present a better opportunity and experience the
      tragic consequences.

      ... Further, in Free Speech Coalition, the government proposed
      a similar theory in defense of the ban of virtual child
      pornography. 535 U.S. at 253. Attempting to prevent the
      potential indirect harm to children posed by pedophiles,
      Congress reasoned that the virtual pictures may serve to
      “whet” the appetites of pedophiles and may be used to
      convince a reluctant child to participate in sexual acts. Id. at
      241. In line with its previous stance in Stanley, the Court
      squarely rejected this theory: “The government ‘cannot con-
      stitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of control-
      ling a person’s private thoughts.’ First Amendment freedoms
      are most in danger when the government seeks to control
      thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end.” Id.
      (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566). Citing criminal statutes 18
      U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2251, which prohibit sexual abuse, the
      Court reasoned that “Congress may pass valid laws to
      protect children from abuse,” however, “[t]he prospect of
      crime . . . by itself does not justify laws suppressing pro-
      tected speech.” Id. at 245 (emphasis added).

      ...