Nextgen G* Traffic Analysis Resistant Overlay Networks (re Tor stinks)

grarpamp grarpamp at gmail.com
Sun Oct 27 03:22:53 PDT 2019


> Let's say we buffer 500ms since that forces attackers to suspend
> links for over 500ms to identify target nodes, and making their
> network node bisections more noticeable to end users: 3.5s

> And 500ms may not be enough! Perhaps we should buffer up for a second
> or more?

10 milliseconds, 10 seconds, 10 minutes, 10 hours or 10 days...
speculating on which any adversary will use... removes
use cases for the network as a result.

Set speculations to 0 ms, and just depeer from node when
it appears to no be upholding traffic parameters it
said it would be sending you. If you agree to x,
possibly supported by iperf test between you, and your
peer start sending you a chopped up sine wave outside
allowable deviation, they or their path to you are obviously
fucked, just drop them. If it's allowable then buffer and reclock
it when sending it back out your NIC so that whatever
natural identifiable remains is not replicated beyond you.


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