Box for simple Tor node.

[Zenaan Harkness]

On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:59:00AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> On 10/13/19, jim bell <jdb10987 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> > arbitrarily-long hops (256 hops?  65,536 hops?
> > An even larger power-of-2 hops?)
> 
> Hops, alone, don't add much protection beyond
> a good routing of 3 to 9 or so. They're more for fucking
> with traditional jurisdictional log reconstruction trails,

That's a point.


> than dealing with GPA's, GT-1's and GAA'a including Sybil

  GPA - Global Passive Adversary
  GAA - Global Active Adversary
  GT-1 - ??


> that can just follow traffic patterns across the mesh bisecting
> in real time, or more generally... sort and match traffic patterns
> between all sets of two edge hosts.

"between two edge hosts (aka src and dst)" is the point why more than
say 3 to 9 hops adds little to nought - and if you're onion routing,
not only reducing bw by [header_size] per layer, but consuming
overall network bandwidth according to hop count (again, to little or
no advantage to privacy).


> If applied together with other tech, especially
> regarding nets where you want any kind of
> useable stream

> (even delivery of storage or msgs is in a way a stream),

indeed


> beyond those hops is going to get
> really unperformant, and less security return than thought.

No increase in security in relation to conceivable attacks.

Jurisdictional hops - e.g. through Russia if you're avoiding USGov
etc - sound conceptually useful.


> You can demo today by recompile Tor and Phantom and tweak I2P,
> to set arbitrary hop levels beyond single digits... are you more
> secure from G* as result... probably not.

Link(s) to Phantom please?