Tor Stinks re Traffic Analysis and Sybil (as do other networks)

[jim bell]

 I can think of what might be a disproof of this:   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem     

>> any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

>This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps
cannot actually be said without it.
A message (or a dummy) could be automatically sent to a large number ("N") recipients, who are instructed to return an answer (or a dummy) within a random or pseudorandom time less than a specific value.  This system would still be "low latency", although perhaps not particularly efficient.
Also, as for:
>Chaff might be really only "expensive" if
>1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan,
Some internet services (1 gbit/second Centurylink) are already unlimited-data, or at least the limit (1 terabyte/month?) is sufficiently high so that it is irrelevant.  The latter is about 386,000 bytes per second.  
             Jim Bell

    On Monday, November 25, 2019, 09:52:44 AM PST, Steven Schear <schear.steve at gmail.com> wrote:  
 
 I'm convinced there are too many security issues for high privacy communication over networks that eventually utilize or terminate on commercial facilities. Only specially designed, ptp, wireless comms using OTP or other trusted keying, combined with appropriate tradecraft are likely to be effective against nation state resources. Recall WW IIs wireless warriors. 
On Mon, Nov 25, 2019, 11:04 AM grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:

>       by 'low latency' they mean two things :
>
>       1) 'efficient' use of data transmission capacity, i.e. whether chaff is
> sent(expensive)  or not.

Chaff might be really only "expensive" if
1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan,

or refuses to buildout free p2p, guerilla, mesh networks.
2) Bandwidth, if chaff does not get out of the way upon
demand by wheat for carriage.
3) Footshoot, user attempted to feed a higher committed
rate to their CPU or internet than either can handle.

>       2) actual low latency. In order to prevent timing attacks, packets need to
> be reclocked, which means adding delay, which results in higher 'latency'.

While reclocking is likely necessary part of TA defence,
many CPUs and NICs can handle line rate processing,
and the committed rate to an overlay network can be
set below both the physical link speed, and the rate
bought from the ISP within which the overlay rides.
User or overlay can create its own processing headroom
by choosing a lesser rate.
Also, depending on nature of input, reclocking may not
necessarily imply additional average delay, as packets
and gaps between them might be simply normalized.
randomized and or distributed within the same overall sum.
Sure maybe due to variety of hardware making up an
actual overlay network and users paths in it, and other
processing demands, latency may be higher than
non chaff network, but maybe not by enough to actually
preclude use of low latency apps such as voice chat, IRC, etc.


> any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps
cannot actually be said without it.
  
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