tor stinks, take #376029

[Zenaan Harkness]

On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 07:06:26PM -0300, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:
> https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/active-pet2010.pdf
> 
> "Suppose the adversary runs just two routers. If we take into
> account the way Tor chooses circuits, the size of the network ],
> and the number of users observed on Tor in one day , we expect the
> adversary to compromise 15 users at least once in that day. If the
> adversary provides the top two routers by bandwidth, the expected
> number of compromised users increases to 9464.1 Thus, the system
> provides poor anonymity against a wide variety of realistic
> opponents, such as governments, ISPs,"


Thanks heaps for the tl;dr paragraph.  Very succinct.

Important/ foundation question for any alternative to Tor:

What alternative network topologies are actually able to protect
(to any relevant degree) against traffic analysis by governments
and ISPs?

Here are some possible network topologies/ connection models, which
may (or may not) provide any such improvement:


  - split connections / connection bonding / massive micro routes etc

    - enter the network, and access network and data/cache resources,
      through some number of simultaneous routes, rather than only
      one


  - peer with one or more meat space "friend" nodes

    - quid pro quo in concept

    - access of resources may or may not hop initially through your
      friend, but when your outgoing resources access speed is capped
      to your chaff filled F2F link max throughput, then adversarial
      node may not know whether it is you, or your friend through
      you, accessing the network resource

      - if adversary is also able to actively monitor all your
        friend's node's links, then identifying who is requesting and
        or sending what, becomes trivial


  - access through dark links (private back haul, Eth Over The Fence,
    Neighbour 2 Neighbour "street" wireless, guerilla HAM mesh,
    opportunistic mobile phone wireless mesh, etc)

    - each node in such a guerilla mesh may also have normie net
      (regular Internet/ ISP/ govnet) access

    - the local dark link backhaul may provide some relevant "mix"ing
      against active adversaries



moar ??



> that comes directly from supreme scum-master syverson himself. What's really astounding is that at the same time syverson and the rest of tor shitbags advertise tor as a means for people to "protect themselves against traffic analysis".