Autonomous Next Generation Leaks

[Steve Kinney]

On 6/2/19 7:51 PM, grarpamp wrote:

[...]

> It’s been more than six years since Edward Snowden went public. After
> all the breathless headlines, Hollywood movies, book deals, Pulitzer
> prizes, and glossy primetime biopics. What, pray tell, has come of it?
> For the average American – bupkis. In fact, mass surveillance is
> actually growing by leaps and bounds. Such that those who wish to
> salvage the remnants of their individual privacy will be forced to
> make some tough choices in the years ahead.

Every public conflict and controversy set in motion by the Snowden
Affair arrived at the same conclusion:  A decisive win for the U.S.
intelligence community.  Examples:  Per precedents set, the NSA may now
'hack into' computers used by Congressional staff members at will, and
lie to Congress under oath, with no consequences other than getting
whatever results they want.

Our No Such Agency could not have gotten better results if they handed
Snowden exactly what they wanted published, and assured he gave
everything he had to agents under their own direct control.

Thanks to Global Research, I get to say I told you so, just days after
the Snowden Affair jumped into the headlines:

https://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-surround-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673


> The kernel of an approach can be found out in the field. Where poor
> security is fatal. Hunted by the world’s most formidable military, the
> head of ISIS is still alive thanks to solid operations security, also
> known as OPSEC. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is definitely a leader who
> appreciates OPSEC. According to the New York Times, “he eschews all
> electronic devices, which could identify his location, and probably
> communicates through a series of couriers.” The key to staying
> vertical, then, is the process surrounding the couriers. How they’re
> compartmented, screened, and arranged to create a resilient
> communication network. No doubt al-Baghdadi is aware that a flawed
> courier scheme was a significant factor in the downfall of Osama bin
> Laden.

Ah, good old fashioned ... should we call it "disinformation" or Big Lie
propaganda?  I guess that depends the context and audience.

ISIS, the mercenary army formerly known as Al Qaida, was founded by
Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter Administration as a deniable
channel to funnel arms and intelligence to anyone interested in kicking
Soviet ass in Afghanistan.  In an amazing series of coincidences, the
actions of Al Qaida by any name have always directly advanced the
agendas of U.S. Security State oligarchs and their radical fringe right
wing extremist DemoPublican political partners.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, if any such person exists, will continue to work
hand in glove with U.S. three letter agencies as long as he lives,
because reasons:  Whatever inducements prompted him to join up, and a
desire to stay alive.  As for our Mr. Bin Ladin, the fog of war makes it
difficult to say with certainty that he died of complications secondary
to kidney failure in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan during the
winter of 2001-2; if not, he most likely remains alive.  The guy Seal
Team Six murdered shortly before getting murdered themselves had "wrong
place, wrong time" problems.

> Edward Snowden likes to promote strong cryptography. Leaving people
> with the notion that staying under the radar is a matter of leveraging
> a technical quick fix. But recent history shows that trusting your
> life to an allegedly secure communication platform is an act of faith.
> And not an advisable one, especially when state sponsored operators
> enter the picture. Achieving higher levels of security requires a
> disciplined process which is anything but a quick fix and which often
> entails giving up technology. Even cartel bosses learn this lesson:
> security technology fails. Both my design and by accident. Spies win
> either way.

Quite so:  Cryptographic tools and manipulated network comms have
potential uses in the context of larger and much more time/energy
intensive operational security a.k.a. 'tradecraft' strategies.  But
never as a substitute for deception and misdirection, physical security
techniques, etc.

First time amateur 'operatives' may stand a chance of getting away with
leaking high value confidential documents and information - if nothing
connects them, more than hundreds of other people, with that
information; if they come up with clever strategies to disassociate
themselves from that information's escape into the wild (ideally, an
obvious target of opportunity the leak will get blamed on); drop
everything at one go with no advance warning to anyone living or dead;
then go on with their lives exactly as if they know nothing about what
happened.





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