Quality Time, Sweetheart: Some Principles on Dangerous Crypto

[Spirit of Nikopol]

On Sat, December 14, 2019 11:13 pm, Zenaan Harkness wrote:

[.....]

>> - Obscurity is a time buffer. Until the obscure is unobscured, time is
>> working effortlessly against the effort of attack. (!blasphemy!)
>
> Why is this logic "blesphemy"?

A visit to Stack Exchange, Quora, Yahoo Questions, etc. will reveal
countless parrots declaring 'security through obscurity' a verboten taboo.
But when you devise an obscure scheme using many ciphers, and don't
publish the scheme, it does in fact significantly increase security. But
you are not allowed to say that. If you throw in a couple of unpublished
ciphers to the mix, it is even better. But again, you are not allowed to
say that. Saying it is akin to, "He said Jehosephat!"

[.....]

>> - One-time pad injects a time bottleneck approaching functional
>> infinity.
>
> Sort of true.
>
>
> One-time pads are very simple (XOR), and since it's an XOR function,
> the one-time pad cyphertext can be "decrypted" into every possible plain
> text combination (for the given input size).
>
> Because of this, the above sentence can be clarified as
>
>
> - One-time pad injects a time bottleneck approaching functional
> infinity, where every possible output text is, at the limit, produced,
> rendering the brute force decryption functionally useless.
>
> I think it's for this reason that one time pads are described as "the
> only provably secure encryption algorithm".

True but I don't want to spell everything out. The reader must be led to
conclude some the implications.

[.....]


>> - The hassle of exchanging one-time pads is much less than the hassle
>> of digitally signing your own death warrant.
>
> Depending on your need of course. If you have some helicopter gunship
> expose, more than great crypto is advised, including top of the class
> op-sec.
>
>
>> - With random one-time pads you run zero risk of secretly borked crypto
>>  algorithms.
>
> Indeed.
>
>
> And suffer the time cost of pre exchange, as well as possible op-sec
> super fails such as discussing the key exchange protocol on a telephone.
> ("Oh no, the telephone's fine, I discuss all my drug
> dealer deals on the phone - the only reason the cops nabbed me was because,
> just as they said to me when they arrested me, a neighbour dobbed me in" -
> true story of ignorance par excellence.)
>
>
>> - If doubt is bad, use the one-time pad. Otherwise, bottleneck,
>> bottleneck, whiten, whiten, obscure, obscure.
>
> What a great way to distill important crypto rules of thumb!
>
>
> Thank you for sharing.

You're welcome. Your mind is clean, unlike the others. I find this host
body suitable for my thoughts.

>> - If it has not been 100% proven secure, why would you assume it is
>> secure?
>
> OTP, muffas!

You down with OTP?

> That said, Bernstein is a sufficiently stubborn, apparently diligent
> and socially acerbic nutter, that his black boxes have a shade of black
> which is quite new (I think they call it "new black") and somewhat
> appealing...

His spam and security protections are so stringent that not even his mum
can subscribe to his mailing list.

>> - The prophetess of Delphi is not your human shield.

[.....]

>> - Why would your adversary publish the fact that he has broken your
>> cryptography?
>>
>> - Rather it may mean your adversary is practicing security through
>> obscurity, which has won many battles. (!blasphemy!)
>
> Yes, fundamentally important blasphemy. For all who missed the memo.

[.....]

> Evidently we must distinguish types of communications, the lettuce
> and carrots from the rib eye and rump.
>
> OTP sharing implies meat space connections.
>
>
> Make your meat space real, embrace the rib eye.

I am stealing that (the rib eye is bossmonstrous). Can five eyes digest
the rib eyes?

[.....]

> The proud often parrot the "obvious", oblivious to official
> obfuscation. Your treatise is generous indeed...
>
>
>> - Basket encryption and stacking pancakes: If 16 superencryptions are
>> used with 16 different algorithms then the attacker must spend time to
>> correctly guess each algorithm in the correct order with the correct
>> keys or breaks. 16 pow 16 = 18446744073709551616 combinations, before
>> we've even addressed possible keys. If your basket of available
>> algorithms is larger than 16, this time injection can get unwieldy for
>> attackers, even if the attacker has a quantum 'flux capacitor.'
>
> Making meat space "OTP" or "super key" sharing, a much more
> profitable endeavour.
>
>
>> - When your life or liberty is at stake, to hell with efficiency.
>> Churn,
>> baby, churn!
>
> Meat space baby, meat space!

Insert Ted's steakhouse jingle. (!sorry!)

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