tor stinks, take #376029
Zenaan Harkness
zen at freedbms.net
Sun Dec 1 21:35:57 PST 2019
On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 12:06:19PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 07:06:26PM -0300, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:
> > https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/active-pet2010.pdf
> >
> > "Suppose the adversary runs just two routers. If we take into
> > account the way Tor chooses circuits, the size of the network ],
> > and the number of users observed on Tor in one day , we expect the
> > adversary to compromise 15 users at least once in that day. If the
> > adversary provides the top two routers by bandwidth, the expected
> > number of compromised users increases to 9464.1 Thus, the system
> > provides poor anonymity against a wide variety of realistic
> > opponents, such as governments, ISPs,"
>
>
> Thanks heaps for the tl;dr paragraph. Very succinct.
>
> Important/ foundation question for any alternative to Tor:
>
> What alternative network topologies are actually able to protect
> (to any relevant degree) against traffic analysis by governments
> and ISPs?
>
> Here are some possible network topologies/ connection models, which
> may (or may not) provide any such improvement:
>
>
> - split connections / connection bonding / massive micro routes etc
>
> - enter the network, and access network and data/cache resources,
> through some number of simultaneous routes, rather than only
> one
>
>
> - peer with one or more meat space "friend" nodes
>
> - quid pro quo in concept
>
> - access of resources may or may not hop initially through your
> friend, but when your outgoing resources access speed is capped
> to your chaff filled F2F link max throughput, then adversarial
> node may not know whether it is you, or your friend through
> you, accessing the network resource
>
> - if adversary is also able to actively monitor all your
> friend's node's links, then identifying who is requesting and
> or sending what, becomes trivial
To clarify this one, I mean by passive and active:
- Passive monitoring is what every ISP can do - monitor the amount
of data, packet meta data etc, but not the content of encrypted
packets.
- Active monitoring means somehow cracking, or getting access to,
the actual content of encrypted packets (as well as all the
passive data).
I.e., an actively monitored node is a compromised node.
Compromise of a node may happen in software, and/or in hardware.
> - access through dark links (private back haul, Eth Over The Fence,
> Neighbour 2 Neighbour "street" wireless, guerilla HAM mesh,
> opportunistic mobile phone wireless mesh, etc)
>
> - each node in such a guerilla mesh may also have normie net
> (regular Internet/ ISP/ govnet) access
>
> - the local dark link backhaul may provide some relevant "mix"ing
> against active adversaries
>
>
>
> moar ??
>
>
>
> > that comes directly from supreme scum-master syverson himself. What's really astounding is that at the same time syverson and the rest of tor shitbags advertise tor as a means for people to "protect themselves against traffic analysis".
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