Loki-network LLARP I2Pd Torrent Cryptocurrency

furrier furrier at protonmail.ch
Mon Apr 1 12:21:28 PDT 2019


> Bad: I2P uses old cryptography, specially 2048 bit ElGamal using non standard primes. The use of ElGamal is so pervasive throughout the I2P protocol stack that it exists at every level of it. Removing it is a massive task that is taking a long
LONG time.

I am not a crypto expert but really how bad is ElGamal 2048bit that you cannot wait for it to change? It's still the default in gpg fwiw. What did you choose instead and what did Loki gain out of it in terms of performance?

> Ugly: I2P cannot currently mitigate most sybil attacks with their current network architecture. Recently I2P has added some blocklist solutions signed by release signers but this probably won't scale in the event of a "big" attack.

What about a mix of staking and DDoSing existing Service Nodes out of the network? At a large scale such an attack would be far more effective than trying to out-stake the network.

> In addition I2P isn't staffed for such attacks either.

Is Loki staffed for such attacks?

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Monday, April 1, 2019 2:53 PM, jeff <jeff at i2p.rocks> wrote:

> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:48:43PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
> > > ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
> > > On Sunday, March 31, 2019 7:14 PM, grarpamp grarpamp at gmail.com wrote:
> > >
> > > > https://loki.network/
> > > > https://github.com/majestrate/torrent.ano
> > > > http://anodex.oniichanylo2tsi4.onion/
> > > > https://i2pd.website/
> > > > https://github.com/loki-project/loki-network/blob/master/docs/high-level.txt
> > > > https://www.reddit.com/r/i2p/
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 06:42:54PM +0000, furrier wrote:
> >
> > > Monero fork with premine, governance tax, and 50% funds lockup for "market-based sybil resistance". Good luck, I'll pass.
> > > Also, it wasn't clear from a quick look, do they utilize I2P at the networking layer or did they roll out they own custom solution like Kovri?
> >
> > Loki network appears to be a ground up rewrite of I2P, with an eye to
> > the lower latency and clear-net accessibility of Tor, with newer
> > (presumably better) crypto than I2P.
> This is correct.
> > Appears to ignore the fundamental currently-missing feature in all
> > mix-/ anon-/ dark-/ onion-/ etc- nets in existence today - i.e. chaff
> > fill, which implies some sort of badwidth/ time reservation/ promise
> > between nodes, which is (re)negotiated from time to time between
> > nodes.
> > This chaff fill feature is the single currently-missing feature which
> > is required to begin to handle the problem of global (in a network
> > sense) passive adversaries, aka GPAs - i.e. the NSA, the CIA, the
> > FSB, etc, i.e. those well-funded entities paid for and run by
> > nation-state actors who generally oppress the fundamental rights of
> > the rest of us, such as the rights to live, trade, and move about
> > within our communities.
> I am personally convinced that a flat traffic shape will only dare
> attackers to cut links between parts of the network, effectively
> making an even larger traffic shape to corrilate with.
> I am not convinced low latency systems can be immune to traffic shape
> corrilation and hence that being said, I think state actors are out
> of scope of the current threat model of llarp.
> This may or may not change.

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