BriarProject Messaging 1.0 Released

Steve Kinney admin at
Thu May 10 20:33:39 PDT 2018

On 05/10/2018 09:23 PM, juan wrote:


>> From here to a better than 90% 'unmasking' rate per TOR connection is
>> left as an exercise.  Note that due to customized routers on the cloud
>> server, any message that touches the hydra will not be allowed to
>> leave it until outbound to its final destination:  The hydra's owner
>> determines whether or not packets in transit cross the open network or
>> just get passed around inside the cloud server.
>> This solution generalizes to /all/ distributed mix routing network
>> protocols, as far as I can tell.
> 	I think that 'high latency' networks and networks that use fill
> 	traffic are harder to attack. 
> 	But unsurprisingly, the tor scum isn't interested in that sort
> 	of thing. They want a 'low latency' network that allows retards
> 	to watch HD video on jewtube. And allows people in 'repressive
> 	regimes' to watch pentagon propaganda.

Back around 1999 or 2000 I documented what I believed to be an ongoing,
successful attack agaisnt the Mixmaster remailer network.

First, I attempted to geolocate all the 'reliable' routers then active.
I found a startling number of them in the State of Texas, suggesting one
sponsor for all - therefore, capable of following the "bouncing ball" of
high latency traffic in many chains.

I found others in IP ranges assigned to various countries, including
ones with "mutually hostile" political and economic relations.  So I
created chains that crossed mutually hostile borders and started sending
test messages.  I sent several batches over a period of about a week.
NONE ever came back to me, indicating high likelihood of deliberate
interruption of that traffic - the global adversary at work.

So there's nothing new about the "ha ha fuck you" nature of allegedly
anonymized comms on the networks.  The only real security afforded would
be in the "my adversary does not want to openly disclose this capability
if he can avoid it" category, which is thin cover indeed...

IMO physical opsec is the only guarantor of anonymity on the networks:
Hit and run comms with a scrambled MAC address via open routers, with
due attention to avoiding surveillance on the way in and out, seems to
be the only option where /real/ hazards from State sponsored terrorist
reprisals are on the table.


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