EFail - OpenPGP S/MIME Vulnerability

[Marina Brown]

On 05/15/2018 02:14 AM, Mirimir wrote:
> On 05/14/2018 06:05 PM, Marina Brown wrote:
>> On 05/14/2018 07:49 PM, Mirimir wrote:
>>> On 05/14/2018 06:48 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>>>> https://efail.de/
>>>> https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/060315.html
>>>> https://efail.de/efail-attack-paper.pdf
>>>> https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/995989254143606789
>>>> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17064129
>>>> https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/attention-pgp-users-new-vulnerabilities-require-you-take-action-now
>>>>
>>>> https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/05/critical-pgp-and-smime-bugs-can-reveal-encrypted-e-mails-uninstall-now/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The EFAIL attacks break PGP and S/MIME email encryption by coercing
>>>> clients into sending the full plaintext of the emails to the attacker.
>>>> In a nutshell, EFAIL abuses active content of HTML emails, for example
>>>> externally loaded images or styles, to exfiltrate plaintext through
>>>> requested URLs. To create these exfiltration channels, the attacker
>>>> first needs access to the encrypted emails, for example, by
>>>> eavesdropping on network traffic, compromising email accounts, email
>>>> servers, backup systems or client computers. The emails could even
>>>> have been collected years ago.
>>>
>>> Thanks. That's the clearest explanation I've seen.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Remember the campaign against HTML email ? I do.
>> We were right.
>>
>> --- Marina
> 
> Right, and its evil child, remote content.
> 
> I always disable HTML. And fetching of remote content.
> 
> And I have since the 90s. I got that from this list :)
> 
> It's funny that these exploits depend on both. And that some on HN put
> it all on pgp/gpg, arguing that one can't expect users to know this
> stuff. By default, Thunderbird does render HTML. But at least it doesn't
> fetch remote content. So Thunderbird+Enigmail users should be safe.
> 

Honestly i'm missing PINE and ELM right about now.

--- Marina