Overlay Network Designs and the Odds of Voids, Link Crypto [was: AP, latency]

juan juan.g71 at gmail.com
Wed Aug 8 12:41:14 PDT 2018


On Wed, 8 Aug 2018 00:38:04 -0400
grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:

> >> >     for other stuff...do you have to ask? What sort of system do you think should be used for coordinating 'criminal' activity, instead of streaming super full SHD video for retards?
> 
> >         And the answer is : some sort of 'high latency' mixing network. And interestingly enough such a network doesn't seem to exist, although it seems to me it would require less resources than something like tor. And nobody seems to be worried about having or not having that kind of  network, which strikes me as odd...
> 
> >         What I was trying to say is that, if the use case is 'criminal activity', then using a 'low latency' network like tor which provides centralized 'hidden' services is a not a good idea. It's more like a recipe for disaster.
> 
> https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/Tor%20Stinks.pdf


	Thanks for showing that snowden only leaked mostly useless 'information' or *outright propaganda* like your link above. 

	And thanks for showing that you remain a torbot grarpamp. And thanks for showing that you are an intelectual fraud. 

	Now, I'm sure I already mentioned this, but I will again : if you think that all the knowledge about tor that the NSA has is cointained in those 'slides' you are either a complete fucking retard - or a propaganda agent. In your case grarpamp it is clearly the second case. 


> 
> If the mix or other network design is doing it's job,
> programmed delay, being a part of observed latency,
> might not end up mattering much to security.

	wut

	if packets arrive at a relay at different times and then, after a delay, all leave the relay at the same time then there's no timing information to exploit.






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