Overlay Network Designs and the Odds of Voids, Link Crypto [was: AP, latency]

[juan]

On Wed, 8 Aug 2018 16:31:33 -0400
grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:

> >> https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/Tor%20Stinks.pdf
> 
> > all the knowledge about tor that the NSA has is cointained in those 'slides'
> 
> Only the stupid would suggest that, stop being stupid.

	fucking idiot - you know pretty well what you are doing when you link that sort of snowden propaganda. So don't play the fucking the idiot grarpamp - your torbot game got pretty old, a long time ago. 

	tor indeed stikns, from the point of view of USERS, not attackers.

	
> 
> >         if packets arrive at a relay at different times and then, after a delay, all leave the relay at the same time then there's no timing information to exploit.
> 
> Yes there is, the packets you sent were observed arriving, 

	but the next hop gets(and forwards) all packets at the same time. So even if you can time packets when they enter the network you are missing the outgoing timing information needed to correlate them. So  what the hell are you talking about, apart from your usual torbot propaganda. 

	bottom line : it is possible to  make timing analysis harder but  the piece of shit software you promote (a US military network) in your role as US govt agent doesn't do that.