Is a BTC - BCC flippening in the offing?

Steven Schear schear.steve at gmail.com
Tue Nov 14 11:38:27 PST 2017


The Flippening, BTC to BCH The Last Mile
Upgraded #BCH <https://mobile.twitter.com/hashtag/BCH?src=hashtag_click>
#EDA <https://mobile.twitter.com/hashtag/EDA?src=hashtag_click>. This time,
once the BTC chain come into the orbit, of the death grip, of the Chain
Death Spiral, they will not be "rescued" by a BCH difficulty
adjustment. http://bitcoinandtheblockchain.blogspot.ch/2017/11/the-flippening-btc-to-bch-last-mile.html)
bitcoinandtheblockchain.blogspot.ch/2017/11/the-f
<https://t.co/h0ke3Z8BXK?amp=1>

On Nov 13, 2017 9:51 AM, "Lee Clagett" <forum at leeclagett.com> wrote:

> Sorry for reviving this old thread. Just noticed I replied directly to
> Steven instead of the list, there might be something in here people
> find interesting ... replies inline.
>
> On Wed, 23 Aug 2017 12:26:43 -0700
> Steven Schear <schear.steve at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 8:34 PM, Lee Clagett <forum at leeclagett.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, 18 Aug 2017 14:18:40 -0500
> > > Steven Schear <schear.steve at gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > And now some politics...
> > > >
> > > > *Here is why Bitcoin Cash (BCH) Is The Real Bitcoin*
> > > >
> > > > *It is the original bitcoin*
> > > > It was hijacked from Gavin Andresen very surreptitiously by Adam
> > > > Back (back in the day, Adam and I worked on hashcash and digital
> > > > cash-related projects) with his Sidechain
> > > > <http://www.satoshisdeposition.com/podcast/BTCK-169-2015-09-11.mp3>
> > > > proposal. It was a "Trojan Horse" and together with the help of
> > > > Blockstream, Theymos and the Core developers the process was
> > > > completed. We, the original community, have finally regained
> > > > control of the Bitcoin project, except that we have lost control
> > > > of the name. This position is about to be redressed.
> > > >
> > > > *It does not have Segwit.*
> > > > If you look at a Bitcoin file as AD. A being the address and D
> > > > being the data, Segwit removes the address portion A, It is
> > > > reduced to a hash and the original signature is discarded after
> > > > it is verified. So if your "fingerprint" is the hash of all your
> > > > signatures, the signatures are discarded after being checked, and
> > > > only the "fingerprint" is kept. This is in effect what Segwit
> > > > does.
> > > >
> > > > The signatures are stored on another chain, but not the main
> > > > chain. Some nodes will keep signatures, some only keep partial
> > > > records, some will discard them entirely. If you ever need to
> > > > refer back to the transaction to check on the signatures all you
> > > > have is the hash. "The fingerprint". Satoshi's original design of
> > > > bitcoin being an unbroken record of signatures is violated.
> > >
> > > It has been possible to "prune" old transactions from a local copy
> > > of the blockchain with Bitcoin Core for some time before Segwit was
> > > ever merged. You cannot realistically force someone to store the
> > > entire blockchain for you. The ability to prune old signatures
> > > while keeping the core transaction is actually a benefit - every
> > > transaction is necessary to verify that no double-spending has
> > > occurred or that miners did not create more coins than allowed. So
> > > even if the entire network dumped all segwit information, some
> > > critical checks of the system can be done by newcomers (but only if
> > > at least one person stores the entirety of the transaction
> > > information).
> >
> > Accessing information from another's blockchain db is a privacy issue.
> > That's why running your own full, private, node is such a good idea.
> > Its not practical to do so in your mobile so an appliance is good
> > solution.
> >
> > A few years back some cypherpunks write a paper with controversial
> > suggestions on improving the Bitcoin blockchain. I think its still
> > worth a read. Here's the coverage article. There's a link inside to
> > the paper on scribd.:
> >
> > https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-activists-suggest-
> hard-fork-to-bitcoin-to-keep-it-anonymous-and-regulation-free/
>
> What did this have to do with my post? You seem to be addressing a
> tangential part - yes pruning transaction information in your local
> blockchain may cause information leakage - but my focus was refuting
> the argument against separating the signatures from the transactions.
> Bitcoin is not a cryptonote like design where the signatures are
> intricately linked to double spending and the inflation schedule. So
> the impact/negatives are in more of a "gray" area.
>
> > Key suggestions:
> >
> > 1. Use forced mixing (like ZeroCoin/ZCash) to improve transaction
> > privacy 2. Enforce a limited, regular-sized, block chain
> > 3. Ability to choose miners of payments
> >
> > Steve
>
> 1. Privacy transactions are optional in ZCash, which reduces its
> cloaking set. I am not sure about the Zcoin variant, but privacy
> transactions are also unlikely to be mandatory due to the costs of
> computing such transactions. And most likely Bitcoin would switch to
> something closer to Dash than the ZeroCoin protocol (not that its
> necessarily a better privacy option, just that its a smaller less risky
> transition).
>
> 3. I do not see how this is desirable based on the information provided
> in that Bitcoin 2.0 paper. The "winner" of the next block is still based
> on hashing power and therefore this does not appear to be a solution
> that prevents mining centralization. No reasonable person would select
> a miner with low probability of mining the next block. I suppose if
> magically nearly everyone agreed to ban one miner it could work, but
> only until the miner generated another alias.
>
> > >
> > >
> > > > [...]
> > > >
> > > > Steve
> > > >
> > >
> > > Lee
> > >
> >
> >
> >
>
> Lee
>
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