PQ Crypto - 50 cracked up Qbits online within 1 year, NIST PQC Competition, etc

grarpamp grarpamp at gmail.com
Thu May 25 21:12:49 PDT 2017

IBM Fronts at least 17 Q-bits to the World's Private Buyers,
50 rough Q-Bits by Many Entities within 1 Year

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is now
accepting submissions for quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic
algorithms.  The deadline for submission is November 30, 2017.  Please
see the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization menu at left for the
complete submission requirements and evaluation criteria.
In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of research on
quantum computers – machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena
to solve mathematical problems that are difficult or intractable for
conventional computers. If large-scale quantum computers are ever
built, they will be able to break many of the public-key cryptosystems
currently in use. This would seriously compromise the confidentiality
and integrity of digital communications on the Internet and elsewhere.
The goal of post-quantum cryptography (also called quantum-resistant
cryptography) is to develop cryptographic systems that are secure
against both quantum and classical computers, and can interoperate
with existing communications protocols and networks.
The question of when a large-scale quantum computer will be built is a
complicated one. While in the past it was less clear that large
quantum computers are a physical possibility, many scientists now
believe it to be merely a significant engineering challenge. Some
engineers even predict that within the next twenty or so years
sufficiently large quantum computers will be built to break
essentially all public key schemes currently in use. Historically, it
has taken almost two decades to deploy our modern public key
cryptography infrastructure.  Therefore, regardless of whether we can
estimate the exact time of the arrival of the quantum computing era,
we must begin now to prepare our information security systems to be
able to resist quantum computing.

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/424
On Reliability, Reconciliation, and Error Correction in Ring-LWE Encryption
Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
Abstract: We describe a new reconciliation method for Ring-LWE that
has a significantly smaller failure rate than previous proposals while
reducing ciphertext size and the amount of randomness required. It is
based on a simple, deterministic variant of Peikert's reconciliation
that works with our new ``safe bits'' selection and constant-time
error correction techniques. The new method does not need randomized
smoothing to achieve non-biased secrets. When used with the very
efficient ``New Hope'' Ring-LWE parametrization we achieve a
decryption failure rate well below 2−128 (compared to 2−60 of the
original), making the scheme suitable for public key encryption in
addition to key exchange protocols; the reconciliation approach saves
about 40% in ciphertext size when compared to the common LP11 Ring-LWE
encryption scheme. We perform a combinatorial failure analysis using
full probability convolutions, leading to a precise understanding of
decryption failure conditions on bit level. Even with additional
implementation security and safety measures the new scheme is still
essentially as fast as the New Hope but has slightly shorter messages.
The new techniques have been instantiated and implemented as a Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and public key encryption scheme
designed to meet the requirements of NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography
effort at very high security level.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Ring-LWE,
Reconciliation, Post-Quantum Encryption, New Hope
Date: received 16 May 2017
Contact author: mjos at iki fi

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/351
Post-quantum RSA
Daniel J. Bernstein and Nadia Heninger and Paul Lou and Luke Valenta
Abstract: This paper proposes RSA parameters for which (1) key
generation, encryption, decryption, signing, and verification are
feasible on today's computers while (2) all known attacks are
infeasible, even assuming highly scalable quantum computers. As part
of the performance analysis, this paper introduces a new algorithm to
generate a batch of primes. As part of the attack analysis, this paper
introduces a new quantum factorization algorithm that is often much
faster than Shor's algorithm and much faster than pre-quantum
factorization algorithms. Initial pqRSA implementation results are
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / post-quantum
cryptography, RSA scalability, Shor's algorithm, ECM, Grover's
algorithm, Make RSA Great Again
Original Publication (in the same form): PQCrypto 2017
Date: received 19 Apr 2017
Contact author: authorcontact-pqrsa at box cr yp to

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