If this doesn't define what TOR really is, what does?

John Newman jnn at synfin.org
Tue Mar 7 15:27:50 PST 2017



> On Mar 7, 2017, at 5:55 PM, juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 7 Mar 2017 12:24:29 -0500
> Steve Kinney <admin at pilobilus.net> wrote:
> 
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> 
>> 
>> 1)  An as-yet undetected and unpatched vulnerability affecting Firefox
>> and/or the TOR router was used - and the defense team knows it.
> 
> 
>    That seems a plausible explanation to me. Web 'standards' and
>    web browsers are poorly designed pieces of bloatware and thus
>    full of holes.
> 
>    However, I think there's a more interesting issue at hand. 
> 
>    One would expect the creators of the tor cyberweapon to do some
>    sort of 'quality control' no? So if they were actually
>    interested in providing security for their users, it would be 
>    TRIVIAL for them to constantly monitor a site like the one that
>    was allegedly hacked, and so get a copy of whatever malware was
>    allegedly served. But it seems that they did not such thing.
> 
>    The tor project should be monitoring and protecting 'high
>    value' 'targets' like those that carry so called 'child
>    pornography' but of course they do no such thing. Because they
>    are on the pentagon's payroll.
> 
> 
>> 
>> 2)  The defendant may have traded some information or cooperation, or
>> may have an "insurance file" with enough evidence to convict someone
>> at FBI or DOJ of his same charges or worse.
>> 
>> 3)  The FBI decided to pick one suspect to kick loose with a bogus
>> story indicating an as-yet undetected and unpatched vulnerability, for
>> propaganda purposes.
> 
> 
>    Not sure about those two. Another explanation could be this : 
> 
>    there wasn't any malware served, and the users of the site were
>    identified using plain old traffic analysis. That's certainly
>    something that both the government AND the tor mafia would like
>    to sweep under the rug. 
> 
> 

I think that might be very likely. How many times has the tor project publicly acknowledged attacks involving ephemeral setup of large number of tor nodes for purpose of attack? 

Would NSA even need to own any nodes considering how many different places they have taps into the internet? I don't think so.



>> 
>> The fog of physical war is hard enough to see through, but with
>> network warfare that fog is hiding... more fog.
> 
>    Hehe, indeed.
> 
> 
>> 
>> :o/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
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